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MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR FROM HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT AREA

PART 2
MAY 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Foreign Relations

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CONTENTS

Testimony of— Page

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accompanied by Lt. Col. Chester V. Clifton, assistant to General Bradley 729, 810, 878, 919, 997, 1092

Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army, accompanied by Maj. Gen. Miles Reber, Chief of Legislative Liaison, and Lt. Col. Malcolm F. Gilchrist, Jr., staff officer, General Staff 1184, 1285

Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; accompanied by Lt. Col. Immanuel J. Klette, United States Air Force 1375, 1408

Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, accompanied by Capt. Ira H. Nunn, United States Navy 1508, 1568, 1611

Adrian S. Fisher, legal adviser, Department of State 1552

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

TUESDAY, MAY 15, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. Gentleman, the first matter that we have before us is in the motion of Senator Morse that each member of the committee be limited to 30 minutes in his questions as we go about the table under the order that we have followed up until now. Those of you who favor that motion will say "aye."

(Chorus of "ayes.")

Chairman Russell. Those opposed will say "No."

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. The Chair hears no "noes" so the "ayes" have it. The motion is unanimously agreed to.

Senator Flanders requested a few minutes to make a statement this morning before we welcome General Bradley officially.

Senator Flanders. Mr. Chairman, when you were making your observations yesterday morning with regard to being sure that no secrets leaked out, I sat here in smug self-righteousness and listened to you. I do not know that any secrets leaked out through my agency, but as a matter of fact I did apparently say things that I did not intend.

I am not a radio fan: I do not listen to the radio unless there is some particular reason, so I was not aware until later that the radio broadcasts yesterday morning were indicating that I thought the war was going to end or something of that. I did not hear them, so I do not know.

I was, however, surprised when I got hold of the first edition of yesterday's Evening Star, against which I was headlined and Senator

Kefauver was modestly put down two lines below the top as indicating that there was big news going to break.

Now as nearly as I can remember—this all seemed incidental to me at the time. As near as I can remember the original story came about something like this: Being asked over the telephone by a reporter, I think for a broadcast, as to what I thought was the interesting thing in Saturday's hearing, and I thought that General Marshall's optimism was the most interesting thing in that hearing. And "What was it all about?" And I said, "He seemed to think that we might have some very favorable developments before long."

And "What were they?"

I said, "I can't tell; read the record."

And two or three other reporters called up, and I said, "Read the record." And when I came to look at the record of Saturday, the words in which that was expressed had been deleted, and anyone who read the record could not find them.

I assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I fervently hope that this will not ruin our political and military program in Korea, and wish further to assure you that it has been an experience from which I have learned a little something, probably not enough, but I still have learned a little something from it, and will not make exactly the same mistake again. I may make some other kind, but not this kind.

Chairman RUSSELL. I may assure you, Senator Flanders, that my remarks of yesterday were not directed to any predictions. Any Senator is free to make any prediction he might desire to make, having due regard, of course, to the fears they might boomerang on him. I did not have predictions in mind. I think any Senator can make any predictions he wishes. I was talking about quoting what transpired within these walls relating to this testimony. Any prediction any Senator wishes to make would not, of course, come within the scope of my admonition.

Senator FLANDERS. I do suggest, if it is agreeable to you, Mr. Chairman, that this part of the proceedings be considered as highly restricted and be not spread upon the public record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Under the procedure that we have adopted, Senators Flanders, I am afraid that will have to address itself to the discretion of Admiral Davis.

Senator FLANDERS. All right. I just thought that if left as I worded it, it would strengthen the impression that there was something definite and important—it would strengthen that impression.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure that Admiral Davis will take due note of your suggestion, but I doubt very much whether it will be compelling with him as to whether or not it should be deleted.

Senator FLANDERS. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, we are glad to welcome here today General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, who is the third of America's great military leaders to appear before this committee.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

To my mind, General Bradley holds a unique position in the history of our country. He is not only one of the ablest of our fighting generals, a man who has earned promotions by his actions on the field of battle, but he is one of the most efficient administrators, as was demonstrated by his efficiency in running one of the largest and most complex businesses in this country, our Veterans' Administration.

But even more important than that, he has earned the respect and affection of the American people as a man with a rare combination of qualities of great humanity and great humility.

Throughout the world's history popular and successful generals have earned their descriptive titles, and have been known by those titles.

A few of those that come to mind are "The Swamp Fox," "The Iron Duke," "Unconditional Surrender," "Stonewall," "Old Rough and Ready." There have been any number of adjectives used to describe those who have obtained success in war.

But it is particularly fitting that General Bradley emerged from World War II with but one characterization, and that was "The GI's general."

These titles given to them are usually used to measure people's feeling toward their leaders. In this case, I believe the term was a fitting recognition of the fact that here was a man who, despite his high rank and commanding position, still walked in sufficient humbleness to look at the world through the standpoint of the common soldier, the man who carries a rifle.

It is seldom that a nation, however great, is blessed with such leaders. I feel it is one of the finest tributes that could be paid to our democracy to say that we can produce men of that character and type.

I know, of course, that it would be impossible here to go into great length into General Bradley's great accomplishments and his contributions to the Nation; and it is unnecessary to do so because they are as well known to all of the members of the committee, and indeed to all the American people, as they are to me.

We do know that he was a fighting general in the days when the fighting was hot and under great handicaps in Africa and in Sicily. There he demonstrated the qualities to which I have referred.

Had he chosen to retire after the German surrender, his place in history would have been secure; but he did not make that decision. Instead he went on to some of the toughest jobs his country had to offer—that at the Veterans' Administration, to which I referred; the Army Chief of Staff; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He appears before this committee today to give us the benefit of his experience and counsel with us in the crucial plans that we face.

PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS OF WITNESS

Now, General, before you begin your testimony, I would like to know what your commitments are for the rest of the week. I heard you, I believe, when we were talking to Senator Knowland and the photographers were taking our pictures, you mentioned some addresses you had had scheduled for some time to deliver at Los Angeles or some other place in California.

I would like to find out if these commitments have been outstanding for some time, in order that the committee know that you should be entitled to fill them. So, will you please tell us first what those commitments are.

General Bradley. Mr. Chairman, as you undoubtedly all know, for the last couple of years instead of having separate service days we have had an Armed Service Day, in which all the services get together.

That comes on the third Saturday of the week ending with the third Saturday in May. I believe you will find that all the Chiefs of Staff have made commitments that they have had for some time. I know this commitment that I made here in Los Angeles was made a month or two ago in connection with Armed Services Day.

Out there they are having their principal get together on Friday noon. Then a further display on Saturday. So long as I was going to be out there, I agreed to appear off the record with the press club Thursday night, similar to the Washington Press Club, that we all have to go to once in a while.

Then Friday noon at this principal celebration and then Saturday evening I agreed to go to the display where there will be several thousand people in a ball park, a display of equipment, and so forth.

So actually my first one is Thursday night. If I have to cancel it, I will get in a little trouble, but I am just hoping I could leave here sometime Wednesday night, so as to get out there for that 6 o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday, if possible.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, am I correct in assuming that you can be with us today and tomorrow, all day, without interfering with your commitments?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, due to the unusual nature of these hearings, the committee has voted that I, as chairman, should administer the oath to all witnesses appearing. You will therefore stand and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the evidence which you are about to give to this committee, upon the matter under inquiry, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General BRADLEY. So help me God.

[Procedural matter deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(Discussion off the record.)

AFTERNOON SESSIONS OF COMMITTEE AND LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Senator BREWSTER. The majority leader said to me yesterday that he proposed to object to afternoon sessions. When he was in here he thought we had to give them up, and I do not know whether he discussed that with you or not.

Chairman RUSSELL. It had not been discussed with me and I had told all of the members of the committee who had asked me anything about afternoon sessions that I hoped that we could have them on those afternoons when it was apparent that no votes would be had in the Senate.

Of course, I realize where matters of importance are being voted upon, it is very difficult to have an effective meeting of the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. If the schedule could be worked out so that we would know if we were to have afternoon sessions, why one could plan a little. Could we discuss that with the majority leader and see whether he could work out a week's schedule or so?

Chairman RUSSELL. I endeavored to do that on Monday but at that time it was thought that the reciprocal-trade bill would be under consideration. Now it develops, I believe, that that is to be taken up Thursday, isn't it, Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. Not before Thursday. It may go over for a week.

Chairman RUSSELL. So that will cause considerable confusion. That bill was really set ahead of the grain-to-India bill. If the committee wishes to take any action on it, my only purpose is to try to expedite these hearings as rapidly as we can consistent with a thorough, full investigation of the matters under inquiry.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Gillette and I—I do not want to speak for him—hope we can get the grain-to-India bill disposed of today. We started debate last night and I feel myself committed to go back to the floor when we open up today to participate in that debate.

Chairman CONNALLY. There is no assurance that there will be a roll-call vote.

Senator SMITH. There is no assurance of anything.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, suppose we proceed here this morning and determine that before we recess at the noon hour.

General Bradley, do you have any statement you desire to make?

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to read a short statement and then, of course, try to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON, ASSISTANT TO GENERAL BRADLEY

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committees, at the very outset, I want to make it clear that I would not say anything to discredit the long and illustrious career of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. We may have different views on certain aspects of our Governments' military policy, but that is not unusual.

Certainly there have been no personal considerations in our differences of opinion. In matters of such great scope and of such importance many people have different ideas and might consequently recommend different courses of action.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am one of the military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. I pass on to them the collective advice and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff express their opinion on a subject, it is from the military point of view, and is given with a full realization that considerations other than military may be overriding in making the final decision. The relative importance of the military aspect varies. In some cases it is greatly overshadowed by other considerations. In other cases, the military aspects may be the decisive ones.

When all of these aspects are considered the Government's policy is determined. As military men we then abide by the decision.

Before your interrogation on the details of our Government's policies in Korea and the Far East, I would like to ask myself this question: What is the great issue at stake in this hearing?

Principally I would say that you are trying to determine the course we should follow as the best road to peace. There are military factors which must be evaluated before a sound decision can be made. At present the issue is obscured in the public mind by many details which do not relate to the task of keeping the peace and making America secure.

RISK OF GLOBAL WAR

The fundamental military issue that has arisen is whether to increase the risk of a global war by taking additional measures that are open to the United States and its allies. We now have a localized conflict in Korea. Some of the military measures under discussion might well place the United States in the position of responsibility for broadening the war and at the same time losing most if not all of our allies.

General MacArthur has stated that there are certain additional measures which can and should be taken, and that by so doing no unacceptable increased risk of global war will result.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these same measures do increase the risk of global war and that such a risk should not be taken unnecessarily. At the same time we recognize the military advantages that might accrue to the United Nations' position in Korea and to the United States position in the Far East by these measures. While a field commander very properly estimates his needs from the viewpoint of operations in his own theater or sphere of action, those responsible for higher direction must necessarily base their actions on broader aspects, and on the needs, actual or prospective, of several theaters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in view of their global responsibilities and their perspective with respect to the world-wide strategic situation, are in a better position than is any single theater commander to assess the risk of general war. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are best able to judge our own military resources with which to meet that risk.

GLOBAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED

In order that all may understand the strategy which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the United States must pursue, I would like to discuss in broad terms this perspective in which we view our security problems.

As a background to our consideration of global strategy, we must realize that human beings have invented a great variety of techniques designed to influence other nations. Right now, nations are being subjected to persuasion by propaganda and coercion by force of arms. It is my conviction that broad and comprehensive knowledge of the strength, aims, and the policies of nations is basic to understanding the problem of security in a world of tension.

We must understand—as we conduct our foreign affairs and our military affairs—that while power and nationalism prevail, it is up to us to gain strength through cooperative efforts with other nations which have common ideals and objectives with our own. At the same time, we must create and maintain the power essential to persuasion, and to our own security in such a world. We must understand the role and nature, including the limitations, of this power if we are to exercise it wisely.

One of the great power potentials of this world is the United States of America and her allies. The other great power in this world is Soviet Russia and her satellites. As much as we desire peace, we must realize that we have two centers of power supporting opposing ideologies.

From a global viewpoint—and with the security of our Nation of prime importance—our military mission is to support a policy of preventing communism from gaining the manpower, the resources, the raw materials, and the industrial capacity essential to world domination. If Soviet Russia ever controls the entire Eurasian land mass, then the Soviet-satellite imperialism may have the broad base upon which to build the military power to rule the world.

PLAN OF KOREA, BERLIN, AND GREECE, AND TURKEY IN GLOBAL CONCEPT

Three times in the past 5 years the Kremlin-inspired imperialism has been thwarted by direct action.

In Berlin, Greece, and Korea, the free nations have opposed Communist aggression with a different type of action. But each time the power of the United States has been called upon and we have become involved. Each incident has cost us money, resources, and some lives.

But in each instance we have prevented the domination of one more area, and the absorption of another source of manpower, raw materials, and resources.

Korea, in spite of the importance of the engagement, must be looked upon with proper perspective. It is just one engagement, just one phase of this battle that we are having with the other power center in the world which opposes us and all we stand for. For 5 years this "guerrilla diplomacy" has been going on. In each of the actions in which we have participated to oppose this gangster conduct, we have risked world war III. But each time we have used methods short of total war. As costly as Berlin and Greece and Korea may be, they are less expensive than the vast destruction which would be inflicted upon all sides if a total war were to be precipitated.

CONCEPT OF LIMITED WAR IN KOREA

I am under no illusion that our present strategy of using means short of total war to achieve our ends and oppose communism is a guarantee that a world war will not be thrust upon us. But a policy of patience and determination without provoking a world war, while we improve our military power, is one which we believe we must continue to follow.

As long as we keep the conflict within its present scope, we are holding to a minimum the forces we must commit and tie down.

The strategic alternative, enlargement of the war in Korea to include Red China, would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything else we could do. It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially our sea power and our air power, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged to put a single man into the conflict.

Under present circumstances, we have recommended against enlarging the war. The course of action often described as a "limited war" with Red China would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize.

Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.

ROLE OF JCS IN PLANNING POLICY

There are some other considerations which have tended to obscure this main issue. Some critics have not hesitated to state that the policy our Government is following, and its included strategy, is not that which has been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Statements have been made that the President, as Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, have a policy all their own, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been overridden.

This is just not so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have continually given their considered opinion—always from a military viewpoint—concerning our global capabilities and responsibilities and have recommended our present strategy in and for Korea. This has been the course of action which the Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief have adopted as far as practicable.

I pointed out earlier that many times the international policy considerations, including the views of our allies, are also considered and in some instances modify the course of action.

In other instances, even after the international considerations and the views of our allies have been considered, the proposed military strategy has not been altered.

Our over-all policy has been one of steadfast patience and determination in opposing Communist aggression without provoking unnecessarily a total war.

ADVISABILITY OF A "SHOWDOWN" NOW

There are many critics who have become impatient with this strategy and who would like to call for a show-down. From a purely military viewpoint, this is not desirable. We are not in the best military position to seek a show-down, even if it were the Nation's desire to forfeit the chances for peace by precipitating a total war.

Undoubtedly, this statement will be misconstrued by some critics who will say, "Why are the Joint Chiefs of Staff advertising the fact that we are not militarily in a position to have a show-down?"

I can assure those critics that with the methods we must pursue in a democracy in order to support a military establishment—including this present investigation of our strategy in the Far East—our capabilities are not unknown to the Communists.

They are apt students of military power, and fully realize that although we are not prepared to deliver any ultimatum, we could hurt them badly if they attacked us or our friends.

They also know that with out potential, and the strength of our allies, in the long run they could not win a war with a United States that is alert, and continuously prepared.

I would not be a proponent of any policy which would ignore the military facts and rush us headlong into a show-down before we are ready. It is true that this policy of armed resistance to aggression, which we pursue while we are getting stronger, often risks a world war. But so far we have taken these risks without disastrous results.

I think our global strategy is paying off and I see no reason to let impatience alter it in the Far East. Certainly the course of action we are pursuing has avoided a total war which could only bring death and destruction to millions of Americans, both in the United States and on the battlefield. Our present course of action has at the same time won us respect and admiration everywhere in the world, both inside and outside the iron curtain.

POSSIBLE RESULTS FROM ENLARGING WAR TO CHINA

There are also those who deplore the present military situation in Korea and urge us to engage Red China in a larger war to solve this problem. Taking on Red China is not a decisive move, does not guarantee the end of the war in Korea, and may not bring China to her knees. We have only to look back to the five long years when the Japanese, one of the greatest military powers of that time, moved into China and had almost full control of a large part of China, and yet were never able to conclude that war successfully. I would say that from past history one would only jump from a smaller conflict to a larger deadlock at greater expense. My own feeling is to avoid such an engagement if possible because victory in Korea would not be assured and victory over Red China would be many years away. We believe that every effort should be made to settle the present conflict without extending it outside Korea. If this proves to be impossible, then other measures may have to be taken.

In my consideration of this viewpoint, I am going back to the basic objective of the American people—as much peace as we can gain without appeasement.

NATURE OF APPEASEMENT FROM MILITARY VIEWPOINT

Some critics of our strategy say if we do not immediately bomb troop concentration points and airfields in Manchuria, it is "appeasement." If we do not immediately set up a blockade of Chinese ports—which to be successful would have to include British and Russian ports in Asia—it is "appeasement." These same critics would say that if we do not provide the logistical support and air and naval assistance to launch Chinese Nationalist troops into China it is "appeasement."

These critics ignore the vital questions:

Will these actions, if taken, actually assure victory in Korea?

Do these actions mean prolongation of the war by bringing Russia into the fight?

Will these actions strip us of our allies in Korea and in other parts of the world?

From a military viewpoint, appeasement occurs when you give up something, which is rightfully free, to an aggressor without putting up a struggle, or making him pay a price. Forsaking Korea—withdrawing from the fight unless we are forced out—would be an appeasement to aggression. Refusing to enlarge the quarrel to the point where our global capabilities are diminished, is certainly not appeasement but is a militarily sound course of action under the present circumstances.

It is my sincere hope that these hearings will encourage us as a Nation to follow a steadfast and determined course of action in this world, which would deny any free nation to Soviet imperialism, and at the same time preserve the peace for which so many men died in World War I, World War II, and in Greece, Indochina, Malaya, and Korea.

BRADLEY'S MILITARY CAREER

Chairman RUSSELL. General Bradley, just by way of background would you make a brief statement for the record of your long and distinguished military career?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I entered West Point from Missouri in August, August 1, 1911, graduated 1915, commissioned second lieutenant of Infantry and joined the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment. I served with that regiment for about 4 years at various stations in the West and Southwest and left the regiment in 1919 to serve as professor of military science and tactics at South Dakota State College for 1 year, at which time I was ordered to West Point in 1920, where I served as instructor in mathematics until 1924.

I went to the advanced course in the Infantry School in 1924 and 1925, at which time I was ordered on foreign service in Hawaii.

I served with the Twenty-seventh Regiment of Infantry, then known as Wolfhounds, and still called Wolfhounds in Korea, commanded by Colonel Michaelis recently.

Then I served with the National Guard and Reserve in downtown Honolulu in 1927 and 1928.

I then went to the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, where I stayed for a while, and then went from there to the Infantry School, 1929 to 1933.

I came to Washington to attend the Army War College in 1933 and 1934, after which I again went to West Point as an instructor in military science and tactics from 1934 to 1938.

I then served on the General Staff here in Washington from the 1st of June 1938 until the end of February 1941, at which time I was sent to Fort Benning, Ga., as commandant of the Infantry School.

After being there about a year, I was given command of the Eighty-second Division, which was being reactivated at Camp Claiborne, La.

After being with it 3 or 4 months, I was transferred to the Twenty-eighth Division, also at Alexandria, Camp Livingston. I took it to amphibious training in Florida during the winter, and in February 1943 I received orders to go overseas to join General Eisenhower.

I served as his personal representative and as deputy corps commander of General Patton's Second Corps until about April 15, in other words, about a month and a half, at which time I took command of the Second Corps in north Africa; and after the northern Tunisian campaign was finished on about May 12, 1943, I went back and planned for the Sicilian invasion, headed the Second Corps into Sicily, and was there until September 8, 1943, when I left Sicily to go to Englind to form a staff of the First United States Army and the First United States Army Group, and plan the invasion of France.

I commanded the First Army then, on invasion, and was with it until the 1st of August, in other words, about 2 months after D-day, at which time we broke up the divisions then in France into two American armies, and I then became the Army group commander, Army group headquarters becoming operative, and commanded the Army group which had been changed to Twelfth Army Group in designation, until the end of the war.

I then came home, and as the chairman said, I was in the Veterans' Administration from August 1 until November—August 1, 1945, until November 30, 1947, a little over 2 years.

I then returned to the Department of the Army and became Chief of Staff of the Army on February 8, 1948, which position I held until I was made Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15, 1949, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. The statement has been made here that you commanded the largest body of American troops that had ever been in action against any enemies.

Do you care to comment on that?

General BRADLEY. Of course, they referred to combat troops.

I think at one time there were 45 divisions in my Army group, and the total of the men assigned to the Army was about 1,200,000.

DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY 12, STUDY OF JANUARY 12, AND PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JANUARY 13, 1951

Chairman RUSSELL. The memorandum of January 12 has played quite a large part in these hearings, General Bradley.

I wish you would outline for the committee your understanding of the four items in the January 12 memorandum to which General MacArthur referred, with special reference to whether that was a directive or whether there were any contingencies involved in the four items to which he referred.

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would like to go back a little on that, because I think there has been some confusion on this memorandum, because there are really three things that took place about that time.

There was a directive, dated January 12. There was a study which you speak of, dated January 12, and there was a letter from the President to General MacArthur, dated January 13. In other words, there are three things in this period. I will confine my remarks now to the study which you speak about.

Chairman RUSSELL. No; I want you to clear up the confusion. You have named those three documents. I want you to start with January 11.

General BRADLEY. Well, I will have to go back a little further than that on the study, sir. I just want to bring out to start with that there are three things involved and I think there has been some confusion here because there was a directive dated the 12th which I don't think has been discussed much here, there was a study dated the 12th which has been discussed a great deal, and then there was the President's letter to General MacArthur on policy dated the 13th.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I have had some of the confusion and that is the reason I have asked you to clarify them.

General BRADLEY. May I take them up one at a time, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

DEVELOPMENT OF JCS JANUARY 12 STUDY

General **Bradley**. In late November, in fact November 28, when things were looking pretty bad in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed one of their Joint Staff committees to make a study of possible lines of action which might be taken if the war in Korea developed into an all-out war against China, either declared or undeclared.

Now that was a directive which finally ended up with the January 12 study. They came up first with a study which was not agreed upon. There were split views in it between the services.

Then they reworked that paper and came up with another one, another version of it, dated January 3, which was also not acceptable, and that one was reworked and we finally got down to a paper on which the Chiefs agreed, dated January 12.

Now, when we consider one of these studies which are primarily for our own use, we consider a whole series, so to us we were thinking of this in terms of the conditions under which we started the study.

However, as we went forward in writing these different studies, the preamble or the reason for the study dropped out of it, so when we got up to the January 12 study, taken by itself it does not have the conditions under which we started the study, and at that time it was boiled down to merely the statement that it is tentatively agreed, was the term used, on the following objectives and possible lines of action.

I want to emphasize again that it was not a directive. It was a study, and I would like to explain right there that when we send a directive to the Commander in Chief, Far East, we draw up a draft of the study, a draft of the directive, take it to the Secretary of Defense, who approves it or disapproves it, and if he approves it, if it has political implications we then discuss it with the Secretary of State or Department of State and then it is taken to the President who O.K.'s it or passes judgment on it.

It is then sent out as a directive. This particular study never went through that routine. In other words, it was never intended as a prospective directive to be handled in that way. It was a study for consideration along with other things that were going on at that time in trying to determine the policy, future policy toward Korea, and it was used for that purpose.

Chairman **Russell**. Well, what was the directive now as contrasted with this study or memorandum?

GENESIS OF JANUARY 12 DIRECTIVE

General **Bradley**. On January the 10th General MacArthur came in with a message pointing out that under the present conditions he thought we were going to have diffculty in staying in Korea. He pointed out that the morale of the troops was not too good after a long fight and some of the remarks that had been made about them at various places in the world, and it was rather a gloomy message.

The Chiefs proposed an answer to that, and it was discussed with the Department of State and they wanted to put certain political reasons also in this directive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to that. It ended up in a discussion at the White House with the President, and the decision was made that the military part of this discussion would be pulled out and sent as a directive to General MacArthur, and then the State Department would prepare with the President a letter on political policy which he would send separately. So, the military part of that was pulled out and sent in the directive of January the 12th.

The political part of it was pulled out and fixed up with the President, and he sent it under his signature on the 13th.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now the January 12th directive was then in response to this communication from General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. It was in response to his communication 2 days before; yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you give us the broad outlines of that directive?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. It directed him to defend in successive positions if necessary, and always with the understanding that the security of his troops was paramount.

That is in brief form what it was. It told him, as I say, to defend in successive positions; in other words, to stay in Korea. In addition to that, we were so concerned with the situation as painted in General MacArthur's wire of January 10 that two of the Chiefs, General Collins and General Vandenberg, left on the evening of the 12th right after we had cleared the directive and went to Japan and on into Korea to see for themselves just what the situation was. Fortunately, about that time the situation began to improve, and from then on the position was stabilized and we even started to come back.

Chairman RUSSELL. The January 12th directive then was to the effect that he should stay in Korea if that could be done without endangering the security of his forces?

General BRADLEY. I can give you a paraphrase of that message if you desire, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, that will be all right, give a paraphrase. I have been somewhat uncertain as to the sequence, the reason for these three papers since these hearings opened, and I want them clarified.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I would like to emphasize again that the one that was started back in November ended up as a study. This one was a directive which took—the formulation of it took—place over 2 days, and the political one really over 3 days.

Senator MORSE. Do you have the page from which the general is reading, Mr. Chairman?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I have a paraphrase of a message I will give you, sir, if I may.

Senator MORSE. I thought you were reading from an exhibit.

PARAPHRASE OF JANUARY 12 DIRECTIVE

General BRADLEY. I am reading from a note I have in my book, sir.

> We are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the factors known to us, including particularly those presented in your recent message, that it is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold the position in Korea for a protracted period.
>
> It would be to our national interests, however, and also to the interests of the UN, before you issue firm instructions for initiation of evacuation of troops from

Korea to gain some further time for essential military and diplomatic consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort.

It is important also to the future of UN and NATO organizations, to the United States prestige world-wide, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia, that maximum practical punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations. In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces.

[Deleted.]

In your messages of 30 December 1950 and 4 January 1951, you had indicated it would not be necessary to make an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had arrived at the old Pusan beachhead.

Including consideration of the factors outlined above, your estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea.

Directive contained in paragraph (c) of our message of 9 January meanwhile remains in effect.

That was, as I said, to fight in successive positions.

NATURE OF JANUARY 12, 1951, STUDY BY JCS

Chairman Russell. Now, did you construe the four paragraphs which were outlined by General MacArthur in his address, I believe, the bombing of the bases, or air reconnaissance, and the use of Chinese troops, blockade of the coast of China—I believe that is the gist of it—did you construe that as having been contained in any order that was issued to General MacArthur or any instructions of approval of any policy he had promulgated, or was it perfectly clear that that was a matter that was still under study, in your opinion?

General Bradley. Well, Mr. Chairman, to us it was clear that it was a study. Maybe it wasn't, and apparently it was not, to General MacArthur; but to us it was perfectly apparent that it was a study and was never handled as a proposed directive. It was a study which we used in the National Security Council in considering future actions if this thing developed into war against China.

Chairman Russell. How was that forwarded to General MacArthur?

General Bradley. It was forwarded in two ways. General Collins carried it to him, and discussed it with him when he arrived there on January 14. It was also sent to him later by the Army for information several days later; in fact, in a rather short form by message, by radio. So, it was actually sent to him in two ways, sir.

Chairman Russell. Of course, General Collins would be the proper person to inquire of as to the nature of the conversations he had with General MacArthur?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. I do not know the nature, the full nature, of those discussions.

REASONS FOR JANUARY 13 LETTER FROM PRESIDENT

Chairman Russell. Did I understand you to say now that the Joint Chiefs objected at a conference that was held at the White House to include the political considerations in the directive of January 12?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. We thought that the military part and the political part should be sent separately.

Chairman RUSSELL. And that accounts for the fact that the President's letter, I believe you said, followed this directive, and these instructions, this study?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; and the one that was sent on the 12th was a military directive. The one that was sent on the 13th, outlining certain political reasons, specifically said: "This is not a directive."

BRADLEY'S FIRST AWARENESS OF MOVE TO RELIEVE MAC ARTHUR

Chairman RUSSELL. When did you first learn or when were you first consulted with respect to the advisability of relieving General MacArthur of his several commands? When did you first learn that that was under discussion? When was your opinion first asked?

General BRADLEY. If you don't mind, I will refer to notes, because when you start referring to back dates, unless you refer to notes, you are apt to get confused.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

General BRADLEY. My first information that there was some concern being shown by the President over this was late the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th of April. When I received the information—I don't remember where from, but I think I received it from a telephone from someone—I called the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for about 30 minutes, from 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon, and told them that the President was concerned about some statements that had been made by General MacArthur, and that they should begin studying the military aspects of it. There was nothing more than that said about it.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you next approached with respect to this?

General BRADLEY. On Friday, the 6th of April, there was a meeting in the President's office, right after a Cabinet meeting, at which they asked me to join certain others, including Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman; and we were with the President, I would say, from around 11:30 to 12:30, and that is the first time I had heard first-hand the concern of the President in the matter.

DISCUSSIONS OF JCS ON MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you subsequently call another conference of the Joint Chiefs?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. There were subsequent meetings with the same four people—I believe General Marshall has explained that to you—and then on Saturday we were told that the President would like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. What day of the month would that be?

General BRADLEY. That was Saturday, April 7. We were told they would like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we should give them to General Marshall at 4 o'clock Sunday afternoon. That would have been Sunday, the 8th of April.

So, I called the Chiefs together at 2 p. m. Sunday, the 8th of April, in my office, at which time I presented to them the concern of the President and what he had in mind, and two or three other subjects were discussed between the time we met at 2 o'clock and 4 o'clock, when we went up to join General Marshall, and at 4 o'clock we went up to join him in a further conference, which lasted for about an hour, I guess.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were all of the Joint Chiefs present?

General BRADLEY. All the Chiefs were present.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were their opinions asked individually as to the wisdom of the course that was under consideration?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. After we discussed it and went up to General Marshall's office, he asked each of the three Chiefs their individual views, and there was some discussion in which they were all in agreement on the reasons that they advanced why they thought, from a military point of view, alone, he should be relieved.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were the Joint Chiefs unanimous in their opinion that, from the military standpoint, General MacArthur should be relieved?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you present when the final decision was taken to relieve General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes. The final decision was made on Monday, the 9th of April, at the White House; and I was present when that decision was made.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs—did they approve of the immediate relief of General MacArthur? Was there any discussion as to delay in time, or did any of them express any objection to the immediate relief of General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember that the exact time of the relief was discussed. Maybe some of the Chiefs will remember. I didn't include it in my notes I made immediately afterward, as to the timing of it.

The question of whether or not he could be left in part of his position and relieved of the command in Korea was discussed and from a military point of view, the Chiefs thought that was not feasible.

Chairman RUSSELL. They were unanimous in that opinion?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

STATE DEPARTMENT INFLUENCE ON DIRECTIVES TO MAC ARTHUR

Chairman RUSSELL. You made some reference there in the opening part of your statement—I can't quote it verbatim—as to the part that political considerations play in military policy.

Have the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs as to our military policy in Korea been influenced by political decisions that have been made in the Department of State?

General BRADLEY. We have not had any proposed directive disapproved because of State action, as far as Korea is concerned. I think it is known that the military did recommend different action with reference to Formosa about a year and a half ago, which was not taken because of certain political considerations, but I don't know of anything in Korea where a proposed military directive has been disapproved because of State Department objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were there any disagreements or misunderstandings between the Joints Chiefs or the Defense Establishment with

General MacArthur prior to the outbreak in Korea that you have any knowledge of?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; I don't recall any.

DANGER OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IF WAR EXTENDED

Chairman **Russell**. Now, in your opening statement, General, you referred to the fact that the Chiefs were in agreement as to the danger of Russian intervention if the war in Asia were extended as recommended by General MacArthur.

Was that finding as to the danger of Russian intervention a unanimous decision on the part of the Joint Chiefs?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir; they all feel that way.

Senator **Saltonstall**. Will you repeat that question, please, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. I asked him if the decision of the Joint Chiefs as to the danger of Russian intervention in the event of the adoption of the MacArthur program was unanimous.

Is that danger regarded as being remote or very real by the Joint Chiefs?

General **Bradley**. Well, we think there is a real danger. Now the degree of that is anybody's opinion, Mr. Chairman. In our case we believe it is a risk which we should not take at this time.

Chairman **Russell**. What do you base your opinion on?

General **Bradley**. Well, the strength that they have in the Far East—I mean that the Russians have in the Far East; the fact that they have been supporting China in its operation; they were supporting North Korea previously; the question of whether or not they can afford to lose in Korea; and the fact that they have an arrangement with China whereby if China is attacked under certain conditions Russia will come to her assistance.

DATES MAC ARTHUR FIRST RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL ACTION

Chairman **Russell**. When did General MacArthur first recommend to the Joint Chiefs approval of his policies for extending the war into Manchuria by air bombardment and by a blockade of the China coast?

General **Bradley**. Well, about as soon as the Chinese began coming in. His first message on the subject was about November 6, in which he wanted to attack the bridges across the Yalu, and this was the first intimation that we had that they were coming across in great force. And we held him up on that bombing until we could check on it, and then gave him permission to go ahead and bomb the Korean end of the bridges. And then from then on there were intimations that he would like to go right on into Manchuria and bomb the bases across the Yalu, beginning, oh, around November 6 or 8, from then on.

Chairman **Russell**. Did he bring in his views on the desirability of employing the Chinese Nationalist troops at the same time, or was that a later recommendation?

General **Bradley**. Well, he had discussed it before that. In other words, back in August the question had first come up. At that time he did not recommend the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. Then when the attack came on in such strength and around the end of November, then he made a recommendation that the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa be used in Korea.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REACTION TO MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you state briefly the reasons why the Joint Chiefs did not approve of that recommendation?

General BRADLEY. In our opinion the Nationalist troops on Formosa had very limited capabilities, particularly for offensive action. As General MacArthur himself had pointed out, they would have to have almost complete logistical support from ourselves, transportation furnished. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their leadership, equipment, and training were all of such a state that they would be of limited use in offensive operations.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you favor the imposition of an economic blockade on China?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. Economic sanctions is what I think you mean.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, economic blockade; that means sanctions.

Do you favor a naval blockade against China under the existing circumstances?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I believe that was one of the points that General MacArthur made—that he favored a blockade. It must be realized that a naval blockade is actually and can be taken certainly as an act of war; and in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, the naval blockade would not be effective unless it was a United Nations blockade and not just a United States blockade.

EFFECT ON ALLIES OF EXTENSION OF WAR

Chairman RUSSELL. You stated something in your opening statement about the loss of our allies in Europe. What effect do you think it would have on our allies if the war were extended in Manchuria or into China?

General BRADLEY. Well, if it were extended by United States action alone, I think we might stand the chance of losing some of our allies, because they are under the gun more or less in Europe and they are very reluctant to see anything done which might bring on a world war III at this time, so consequently it is our opinion that they would be very reluctant to join in extension of the war beyond Korea, and therefore that is why I say that we stand the chance, if we take that action ourselves, of having them drop out on us and discontinue their support.

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE TO UNITED STATES

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you wish to elaborate on your statement as to the importance you attach to maintaining a free Western Europe? I believe you mentioned it in your statement. How is it important militarily to the United States?

General BRADLEY. Well, that is where we have a lot of our trade. Furthermore, getting back specifically to my statement, Western Europe contains the manpower, the resources, the know-how, and industrial capacity which if added to what Russia already has would make her a very formidable opponent.

Right now we have a great advantage on Russia in production of steel and other industrial products. If she should overrun Europe and take on the additional manpower and industrial capacity there and add it to her own, it would be about equal to our own, I would guess.

RUSSIAN CAPACITY FOR WAR IN FAR EAST

Chairman Russell. What is your professional military opinion as to the potential for waging war of the Russian forces that are now stationed in Asia?

General Bradley. Well, in my opinion they have the capability of causing us a great deal of difficulty to say the least.

[Deleted.]

Chairman Russell. How about the difficulty in supplying those forces, would they be effective in any military action extended over any period of time?

General Bradley. That has always been one of Russia's weaknesses in the Far East, the fact that she has only one railroad line. It is true, it has been double-tracked, so that they have increased its capacity. However, for the last several years, they have attempted to increase the war production in the Far East so as to make it less dependent upon the industries of Urals, and of western Russia.

Undoubtedly she has enough supplies there, already in her supply dumps, to supply for a considerable length of time, the divisions she has in that area.

Chairman Russell. General, one thing hasn't been brought into this discussion.

PREWAR RUSSO-JAPANESE ENGAGEMENTS IN MANCHURIA

I recall that before World War II there were constant reports of large engagements between Russian and Japanese troops along the Manchurian border, or somewhere in that area.

It was referred to as an undeclared war in some newspaper articles I saw.

Do you know anything about those?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. That went on for several years, and the engagements involved units up to the size of a corps, on each side.

Chairman Russell. An army corps?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. Do you know whether or not Russia experienced any difficulties in supplying those troops during those engagements?

General Bradley. I know nothing about the supply problem at that time, sir.

Chairman Russell. I believe my time is about out, but I have one more question I want to ask you, General.

BEST POLICY IN KOREA

Is it your professional military opinion, concurred in by all of the Joint Chiefs, that the present policy in Korea is the best policy for this country to pursue?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. We think that we should try this policy, and hope that we can get decisive results without extending the war outside of Korea.

Chairman Russell. Well, do you think that the adoption of the MacArthur policies would hasten an end to the struggle in Korea?

General Bradley. There is no assurance that it would.

In other words, we do not believe the extension of it by extension of bombing would get decisive results. We have about 200 miles of enemy supply lines to work on now, and you would only extend that length back into Manchuria, and we do not think that it would be decisive.

Chairman Russell. Well, my time has expired.

Senator Connally?

Chairman Connally. Suppose we don't use all of our half-hour?

Chairman Russell. Then, you have another round of questions later on.

Chairman Connally. General Bradley, I want to say that I have a very high regard for your military abilities, your general abilities, and am very glad to have you here as a witness today.

I don't want to be repetitious, but it is somewhat difficult to avoid it.

As I understand it, you have testified that all of he Chiefs of Staff agreed to the action taken with reference to the MacArthur matter?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

IMPORTANCE OF AIR AND NAVAL POWER IN KOREA

Chairman Connally. I want to ask you if you believe, or are of the opinion that air and sea, alone, without ground troops, could stop the Chinese hordes from coming over on us in Korea?

General Bradley. No, sir; I do not.

Normally, you think of strategic bombing as going after the sources of production. The sources of production in this case are very largely out of reach of any strategic bombing because they are not even in China.

We think that such action could not be decisive, by itself.

That has been proven many times, that air, by itself, is not decisive; and General Vandenberg will tell you that in just as positive terms as I am telling you, sir.

Chairman Connally. Well, as a matter of fact, in Korea, when these different waves of the enemy have poured in, the air power has not been sufficient to stop them, has it?

General Bradley. No, sir; because they move at night, they move across country, and while the Air Force has kept a lot of the bridges knocked out, both railroad and road bridges, it has been unable to stop the advance of the Chinese, both as to manpower and supplies.

It certainly has hampered, and without this air power, we would have been in a very bad way many times, but even though it has had tremendous effect on it, it cannot, in itself, stop it.

Chairman Connally. And of course the sea power can't do anything in Korea?

General Bradley. The naval blockade of Korea, we think, has rather effectively stopped the import of supplies by water, so that it has been effective to that extent, causing the supplies to have to come by railroad and road.

Chairman Connally. Well, they would have to come in over the north part of Korea, from Manchuria, or from Red Russia?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

IMPORTANCE OF OUR ALLIES

Chairman CONNALLY. A good deal has been said about our allies. How important are our allies, looking at the global picture—how important are our allies to our own operations?

General BRADLEY. Well, I believe most everyone considers them very important. I think that was verified by the Congress when they approved the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to which we belong, along with 11 other nations.

Chairman CONNALLY. The reason I asked you that is, How could we "go it alone," on two fronts, one in Asia and one in Europe?

General BRADLEY. Well, it would be pretty tough, sir; because the more assistance you have, both militarily and industrially, the better off you are in combating communism, or in fighting a war.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, isn't it also of an advantage, a great advantage, psychologically, to have these allies, and have the world know that they are our allies?

General BRADLEY. Very much so, and if we should ever lose them completely, and be confined to the Western Hemisphere, we would have an entirely different situation and different standards of living than we have at the present time.

ACTION AGAINST CHINA MAINLAND WITHOUT USING GROUND TROOPS

Chairman CONNALLY. Now, it has been suggested here that no American ground soldiers should set foot on Chinese territory, with which I agree. I don't want to see any American troops go into China. But if we have an all-out war, and the war should expand to include China, would it not almost inevitably follow that at some time in the future development of that, we would have to put ground troops on Chinese soil?

General BRADLEY. To get decisive results, in my opinion you would.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I am asking about.

General BRADLEY. In other words, if you go to an all-out war with China, I think you would have to do something like the Japanese did. Go in and try to get a decision. I do not believe you could get any decision by naval and air action alone.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, naval and air action as against China without ground troops would mean just sort of a holding proposition, would it not?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think it would be a rather long-drawn-out affair in which you would try to knock out their centers of communication and knock out as much of their industry as possible, possibly try to limit them on supplies and food without taking any positive action inside China itself.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, I just do not want to have an American Army bogging down in China. Ground troops in China I feel would bog down in that tremendous area under all the difficulties which are presented to us.

I think, Mr. Chairman, I will reserve the balance of my time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

BRADLEY'S FIRST INDICATION OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator BRIDGES. General, you were developing the sequence of the recall of General MacArthur. You said the first you knew about it was on April 5 when you got a telephone call. Who made the telephone call to you?

General BRADLEY. I don't recall, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. Did it come from the White House or the Secretary of State?

General BRADLEY. I don't know, sir, where it came from. It may have been from the White House, it may have been from the Secretary of Defense's office. I don't know, sir.

I just got a warning that this thing was coming up because the President was concerned about it, and I frankly do not remember where it came from, and I am not too sure it came by telephone. My memory is that I got a call from someone.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, that is important to know who originated the idea. It was not you that originated the idea of firing MacArthur then?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. It was not the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. But you did get it you think by telephone. It might have come from the White House or it might have come from the Secretary of State or from the Secretary of Defense?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I don't remember where it came from. I just got word that the President was concerned about it and I warned the Chiefs that they had better start thinking about it because they might be asked their opinions.

Senator BRIDGES. But you will admit that is a pretty important point which you can't remember, General?

General BRADLEY. Well, it might be important only to prove that the Chiefs didn't start it, but other than that I don't know where it came from or just what bearing it has.

WHEN FINAL DECISION WAS MADE

Senator BRIDGES. Well, now at the April 9 conference at the White House when the final decision was made, who was there?

General BRADLEY. At the time the decision was made?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes; April 9.

General BRADLEY. Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman, and myself met with the President.

Senator BRIDGES. There the final decision was made. And was it at that time the decision which General Marshall testified to to have Secretary Pace notify General MacArthur was made?

General BRADLEY. I can't remember whether it came up at that time or whether it came up the next day when we presented to the President certain ideas and drafts of messages for his consideration which would carry into execution his decision made the day before. I don't remember whether we had any of those discussions on the 9th or whether or not they were all on the 10th.

POSSIBLE LEAK ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator BRIDGES. And General Marshall testified that the reason the Pace notification method was not carried out was a leak. Do you know where the leak came from?

General **Bradley**. I am not too sure it was a leak. Of course General Marshall is entitled to his own opinion. I am not too sure there was a leak on the matter.

Senator **Bridges**. Do you mean then it was deliberately given out?

General **Bradley**. No, sir. I am not sure that General MacArthur knew that this was coming. There had been so much in the papers a few days while this discussion was going on, you can't hide the fact that certain people go to the White House, there had been so much in the papers about the discussion and speculation as to whether or not the President was going to relieve him, that I think everyone was jumping at conclusions, and I in my own mind have not said that there was a leak. It just may have been that people were jumping to conclusions as to what might happen.

Senator **Bridges**. Well, then you disagree with Secretary Marshall on that?

General **Bradley**. I don't disagree. I don't admit to myself that there was such a thing as a leak. I am not sure there was.

Senator **Bridges**. How did certain foreign countries get the information in advance about MacArthur's recall?

General **Bradley**. I don't know; I didn't know they did.

Senator **Bridges**. Well, for instance, certainly Madam Pandit, the Ambassadress from India, announced in the papers that she knew it between 11:30 and 12, and that was sometime in advance of when the formal announcement was made publicly, in which you courteously attempted to reach members of this committee and tell them.

Now it is quite important here whether there was a leak, whether it was deliberately given out, and who informed foreign countries, which I think is a very bad thing, before officials of the United States Government know.

General **Bradley**. I wouldn't know because I didn't even know until this time that they had known in advance.

Senator **Bridges**. Well, that appeared in the papers.

Now did the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever take a formal vote to recall MacArthur?

ACTION OF JCS ON REQUEST FOR MILITARY OPINION

General **Bradley**. They unanimously agreed, that from a purely military point of view they thought he should be relieved, and they gave those reasons to General Marshall, and I repeated them to the President.

Senator **Bridges**. But they did not take a formal vote?

General **Bradley**. We never take a formal vote of holding up hands or anything like that. We have a discussion, and if there is any disagreement it comes out. In this case all three of them stated their reasons why they thought from a purely military point of view he should be relieved.

Senator **Bridges**. Well, did the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if they did not take a vote, did they request the ouster of General MacArthur?

General **Bradley**. No, sir. They were asked for their opinion, and they expressed it; and it was asked from a military point of view, and they expressed it from a military point of view.

Senator **Bridges**. In other words, the origin of the firing of MacArthur occurred first on a political level. You do not know where—

at the White House, Secretary of State, or just where it came from. And the only action the Joint Chiefs of Staff took was in response to that, where they agreed to the recall?

General BRADLEY. I think it is not quite a question of agreed. They were asked their opinion from a military point of view, whether or not he should be relieved, and they said "Yes".

Senator BRIDGES. In other words, they did not initiate the request?

General BRADLEY. They did not.

Senator BRIDGES. They made no request?

General BRADLEY. They did not.

Senator BRIDGES. They took no formal vote?

General BRADLEY. Well, they never take a formal vote that you are talking about. We get around a table and express our opinions, and if they all give reasons why they think this thing ought to be done, that is a vote in itself. There is no such thing as a secret ballot or holding up of hands.

Senator BRIDGES. But they did finally concur.

FIRST LOYALTY TO COUNTRY

Now, General Bradley, what do you consider your first loyalty?

General BRADLEY. To my country.

Senator BRIDGES. To your country. When you took your oath of office, you took it to uphold the Constitution of the United States?

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator BRIDGES. And you believe that General MacArthur took his oath to uphold the Constitution, do you not?

General BRADLEY. I am sure he did; yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. And his first loyalty is to his country?

General BRADLEY. Right.

ADVISIBILITY OF SPEAKING OUT IN BEST INTERESTS OF COUNTRY

Senator BRIDGES. Therefore, you consider your first loyalty to your country, and you concede that General MacArthur probably considered his first loyalty to his country; and then if he felt very deeply or if you felt very deeply something was against the best interests of your country, don't you think you have a right to speak out or General MacArthur had a right to speak out?

General BRADLEY. Yes, but I think I would say it to those in authority instead of carrying it to the public.

Senator BRIDGES. Well now, for instance, I have here an advance copy of your book, which I have enjoyed reading, and it is very interesting. I quote from page 543:

> With Ninth Army on the Elbe, the First on the Mulde, and the Ruhr shrinking under the pressure of three corps, I was anxious to push southeast, rout the enemy out of Bavaria, and clear the United States zone of occupation to the Austrian frontier. From there we would push on down the Danube to head east toward Vienna and cut off the enemy force from withdrawal into the redoubt. By now I was especially anxious to occupy all of the United States zone of occupation, for though we would be forced by agreement to quit the Russian zone, we had no such assurance that the Red army would get out as willingly if they occupied ours. Rather than make a test of Russian compliance with the zonal ageement, we would sweep up our own United States sector without help from the Red army.

Now, that is a very positive statement of your views at that time.

In the light of what has happened since, and in the light of your strong feelings at that time, with your first loyalty to your country, don't you think that you should have spoken out at that time rather than see what has later developed here, which has been tragic?

General BRADLEY. You must remember that I was removed by several echelons from the top of government at that time. This was a fait accompli; it had been decided long before as to what the various occupation zones would be. That was decided by the three governments, and then later France, and, as I say, I was much removed from the top of government at that time.

I was a field commander, and I do not believe it was up to me to try and put a letter back through channels protesting to the President of the United States the decisions which had already been made by a Big Three Conference.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, with your first loyalty to your country, and you, in your heart, apparently, from your book, knowing that was wrong, don't you feel that you had an obligation to speak out?

General BRADLEY. Well, I did discuss this with General Eisenhower, my immediate superior. What action he took I don't know.

LOSS OF ALLIES AS RESULT OF ADOPTING MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator BRIDGES. Were you ever told by the Secretary of State or the State Department that some of our allies would run out on us in case we followed the MacArthur recommendations, in spite of their solemn agreement with us through the Atlantic Pact?

General BRADLEY. Please read that question back.

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

General BRADLEY. No; I don't think we were ever told in any positive terms such as that. We have discussions with State Department representatives usually every week. That is, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff meet with some of the Assistant Secretaries, no papers, we just sit down and discuss these things, and maybe at times during those discussions, we discussed the possibility of these people dropping out.

I wouldn't be surprised. There was never any formal statement made to us by the State Department that this would happen that I know of.

Senator BRIDGES. What is the basis of your belief then, which you have expressed here, that we would lose our allies or we might lose our allies if we followed the MacArthur recommendations?

General BRADLEY. I believe it is well known that the British have a different policy toward China and Formosa than our Government has, and they are the principal contributors to the forces in Korea other than ourselves and South Korea.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NATIONALISTS AND OTHERS

Senator BRIDGES. General, you have referred to the fact that one of the reasons why the Nationalist troops were not used is the fact that they were not properly equipped at that time, so they could be of use.

Isn't it a fact that we are now and have been since that time helping supply some of our allies that are furnishing troops in Korea?

General **Bradley**. Yes; and we have since that time started furnishing military assistance to the Nationalists on Formosa.

Senator **Bridges**. So it would not be out of line with the policy of our country if we had started to furnish supplies and equipment to the Chinese Nationalists just as we did to our other allies, would it?

General **Bradley**. It so happened that up until last summer it was not the policy of our Government to help the Nationalists on Formosa at that time.

PRECEDENTS FOR LIMITATIONS ON MAC ARTHUR

Senator **Bridges**. General, will you give me any illustration that you know—and I know you are a great student of military history—where a commander has been ordered into combat and told to advance and yet told that he couldn't destroy the supply bases and the supply lines of his enemy?

Generat **Bradley**. No; I don't think I can recall any. As a matter of fact, such would not be applicable many years back because it only applies where you have air power, and we haven't had air power for many years; so you couldn't look very far back into history to look for one.

Senator **Bridges**. Even back in our Civil War days wasn't one of the primary targets in those days the supply line of the opposing army?

General **Bradley**. Yes; it was confined, of course, to ground action against them and naval action, of course—blockade.

BACKGROUND OF DIRECTIVES ON RACIN

Senator **Bridges**. Can you name another case in history where military directives have been given not to attack military bases, not to bomb military bases, even within the area of conflict?

General **Bradley**. I don't recall any. I assume you are referring in this case to the bombing of Racin?

Senator **Bridges**. Yes.

General **Bradley**. No; I don't recall any, and I don't recall any case where you would have a similar situation facing you. As far as bombing of Racin is concerned, I would like to correct one thing.

Statements have been used here before this committee several times that it is 35 miles from the Russian border. It is not 35 miles. It is around 17 or 18 miles—I have a map here with me if anybody wants to look at it.

Now, permission to bomb Racin was given twice. One of the bombings was carried out and the other one had to be diverted because of weather to its secondary target; and after that we did not give further permission to bomb it, because, as I say, it is 17 miles from the border, the railroad from Racin down the coast is not completed, and it is not as good a supply point for the North Koreans as Chongjin, which is farther down the coast and has rail connections with Russia and on down into Korea through Hungnam.

Racin, or Najin—it has two names—does not have rail communications completed on south of it.

SANCTUARIES

Senator **Bridges**. Do you think it is fair to ask American troops to go into battle when the enemy has a complete sanctuary across the river and the only sanctuary the American troops would have would be in the ocean, the other way?

General **Bradley**. Well, I don't admit that they don't have any other sanctuary actually. Right now we are bombing their troop concentrations over about a 200-mile line of communications, we are bombing their troops, we are bombing any airfields that occur in North Korea.

They are not bombing our ports and supply installations, and they are not bombing our troops.

So that, in a way, we have a sanctuary, too, under the conditions under which we are fighting.

GREATER DANGERS NOW THAN IN JUNE 1950

Senator **Bridges**. General, is there any greater danger now involved or any greater hazards involved now that we didn't know about in doing this, than when we went into Korea?

General **Bradley**. Well, to the extent that Russia has shown that she is willing to risk war more than she had ever shown before the Korean incident, I think to that extent there is a greater danger.

Senator **Bridges**. How has she shown she would be willing to risk war?

General **Bradley**. By backing the North Koreans with supplies and technical assistance, by getting China to come into the war and supplying her with war materials, including ammunition, trucks, planes, and so forth.

And she must know that all of that increases the risk of world war.

MANNER OF REMOVAL

Senator **Bridges**. Assuming that all you say, for the moment, about General MacArthur's position is a fact, do you believe the method used in removing him was correct? I mean his summary removal.

General **Bradley**. I think, frankly, it would have been better had it been handled in a little different way, and it was intended to be handled a different way, and then the decision was made to handle it differently.

EFFECT OF REMOVAL ON MORALE HERE AND ABROAD

Senator **Bridges**. Do you think it was good for the morale of our troops to do it this way?

General **Bradley**. I don't think it had any particular effect on the morale of our troops.

Senator **Bridges**. Would you be surprised that a great many people have written certain Senators—they have certainly written me—saying that it has had a real effect on the troops?

General **Bradley**. No; we get a lot of letters on many subjects, and I know a lot of people think it should have been done differently and some people may think that it has had an adverse effect on the morale of our troops.

I personally doubt if it had very much, because the outstanding leadership of General Ridgway has raised the morale of the troops in Korea to such an extent that they were a very different army from what they had been a couple of months before when they were retreating.

Senator BRIDGES. What effect do you think it had on unity in this country, which is necessary for the successful prosecution of a war?

General BRADLEY. Judging from what has gone on since this thing happened, I would say for the time being certainly it has caused some disunity.

Senator BRIDGES. What was its effect upon Japan?

General BRADLEY. I understand that they were deeply concerned at the time because General MacArthur had been pushing their case, and knew their problems, and that was the reason Mr. Dulles went over to try to put over to them that this Government's policy had not changed even though General MacArthur had been taken away.

Senator BRIDGES. What was its effect upon Europe?

General BRADLEY. I don't know of any particular effect on Europe.

Senator BRIDGES. What was the effect upon certain Communist publications like the Daily Worker in this country?

General BRADLEY. I never read it, sir; I don't know.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MILITARY TO THE COUNTRY AND THE CONSTITUTION

Senator BRIDGES. That is something, General. Suppose there is a basic conflict between the military authorities and the political authorities in this country on a military subject. Which, in your judgment, should prevail?

General BRADLEY. It depends on the subject, sir. In some cases I believe the military aspects should be guiding; in others, I admit that the political and the diplomatic considerations may be overriding the military aspects.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, now, in the case where the military should prevail, if the military is overriden, don't you think the American public are entitled to the best military judgment of our military leaders?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. We are supposed to be your military advisers, and we give you our honest opinion. Now if somebody overrules that we cannot help it.

Senator BRIDGES. But supposing General MacArthur—is not that the point at issue here? Was not his best military opinion the other way, and his head suffered at the block as the result?

General BRADLEY. Yes; but he had a responsibility for a theater only.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, I mean you put yourself in a different position from General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I have greater responsibilities and wider responsibilities, global. I must know more about the global situation than I think General MacArthur was required to know, and, furthermore, he did not have the responsibility.

Senator BRIDGES. If it reaches the time in this country where you think the political decision is affecting what you believe to be basically right militarily, what would you do?

General **Bradley**. Well, if after several instances in which the best military advice we could give was turned down for other reasons, I would decide that my advice was no longer of any help, why, I would quit. I feel that is the way you would have to do. Let them get some other military adviser whose advice apparently would be better or at least more acceptable.

Senator **Bridges**. Would you speak out, tell the American public?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Bridges**. Don't you think that is your duty, your loyalty to your country, to do that?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; I don't think so. I have been brought up a little differently.

Senator **Bridges**. Where does the loyalty to your country come in?

General **Bradley**. I am loyal to my country, but I am also loyal to the Constitution, and you have certain elected officials under the Constitution, and I wouldn't profess that my judgment was better than the President of the United States or the administration.

Senator **Bridges**. Would it not be on a military subject?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Bridges**. Should not you speak out?

General **Bradley**. I would; yes, to the constituted authorities; yes.

Senator **Bridges**. But you would stop there?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

AVOIDING A LAND WAR IN ASIA

Senator **Bridges**. What about Korea—when we entered the Korea conflict a day or two after June 25, 1950, did the Joint Chiefs of Staff take into consideration all of the potential risks at that time militarily?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir. We had always hoped we would not have to fight in Korea, and that's why we were in favor of getting out of Korea as far as our occupation was concerned. Because strategically it is a poor place to fight. And we did consider those things at the time the question of interceding in Korea was taken.

Senator **Bridges**. Now you are of the theory that has been expressed here that we should not get involved in a land war on the mainland of Asia?

General **Bradley**. Yes. I do not believe we should get involved in a land war in Asia if we can possibly avoid it.

Senator **Bridges**. Then you do not agree with a certain United States Senator who said the other day that in case Communist China or Russia attacked India we would be in war in an hour, or something like that?

General **Bradley**. I did not hear the statement. I still repeat that I would hate very much to see us involved in a land war in Asia.

Senator **Bridges**. Then what I am getting at, you are consistent whether it is China, Indochina, India, or Siam or what not, you have a basic thought for considering all factors that we should not be involved with our own troops on the mainland of Asia.

General **Bradley**. It of course depends on the circumstances at the time, but right now I feel as I said in my statement here, I think we would be fighting a wrong war at the wrong place and against a wrong enemy.

PRECEDENTS FOR SUMMARY REMOVAL

Senator BRIDGES. Now do you know of another case, any other case in military history where a commander commanding an area like General MacArthur has been removed summarily?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think there have been instances. I haven't looked them up lately, but as I remember it General McClellan was pretty much removed summarily. I don't know the circumstances, haven't gone to look it up, but he was removed by President Lincoln. There have been commanders removed at various times during wars, but I don't know the detailed circumstances under which they were removed.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you know of a case where a civil administrator like the governor of Japan, as MacArthur was, was removed summarily?

General BRADLEY. I don't recall any.

MAC ARTHUR'S KNOWLEDGE OF FAR EAST

Senator BRIDGES. Do you consider, as General Marshall has testified, that General MacArthur knows more from a military viewpoint about the Far East than any other American?

General BRADLEY. He probably does. He has been over there for a long time.

Senator BRIDGES. And do you agree with General MacArthur that as far as he knew, that he agreed he knew more about the Far East than any person on our side in the free world?

General BRADLEY. Well, that is a rather big statement, Senator. I am only speaking from the people I know. There may be some people I don't know that know just as much about it as General MacArthur.

Senator BRIDGES. But as far as you know at the moment, that would be true?

General BRADLEY. I am talking about the military people of my acquaintance, which I think was your question to me and to General Marshall.

Senator KNOWLAND. Will the Senator just yield for a correction? I think he said "as General MacArthur had stated." He meant General Marshall on the second question.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes; I did, General Marshall.

PROGRAM FOR ENDING WAR

Now if on one hand we have to decide a program here, you have to decide a program for the termination of this war, do you have any program other than that recommended by Secretary Marshall that we continue the fight in Korea as it is within the confines of Korea?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. The Joint Chiefs feel that we should try to obtain a decision in Korea, and avoid spreading it outside of Korea, is possible.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am notified by Dr. Wilcox that the Senator's time has expired.

Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. General, is there any real program in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff to end the war?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir. We think that if we can punish the Chinese severely enough in Korea [deleted] then we will be in a position, and they will be in an attitude where some kind of an arrangement may be reached, and a settlement made.

Senator **Wiley**. Well, General Marshall laid great stress on the destruction we were wreaking on the Chinese forces in Korea. Of course, China has many times more men to spend than we have.

I just want to get your judgment whether it is possible that we may be hurting ourselves under this program more than we are hurting the enemy in Korea.

General **Bradley**. In my opinion, we are not.

Senator **Wiley**. That is your judgment?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AND ALLIES' ATTITUDE ON KOREA

Senator **Wiley**. Do you believe that our allies would risk losing our great economic and military aid by refusal to accept, if we insisted, our policy to bomb the bases north of the Yalu?

General **Bradley**. They would certainly have a decision to make; and weighing the two, what decision they would arrive at, I don't profess to know.

RUSSIAN THREATS TO DATE

Senator **Wiley**. Can you name a single instance of Russian action at any time, at any place, against anyone, including Tito, that remotely indicates that she would risk war and our atomic bombs, regardless of any action we take to quickly end the Korean war?

General **Bradley**. I think that she will try to cause as much disturbance in the world as possible, and as many wars as she can without using her own troops. I think——

Senator **Wiley**. Well, maybe that answers the question, but I am asking for any instance that would indicate that she herself would accept this as a challenge. Have you any special inside information, you or the State Department, that would indicate that, if we bomb the nests north of the Yalu from which these folks come that are killing our sons, this would be considered by Russia a chance to get into the war?

General **Bradley**. It is very difficult to try to fathom the intentions of the Soviet Government. They make their decisions in a very small group, either 1 man or at the most 14, and there is no way of our knowing their intentions.

We do know their capabilities, and they have capabilities of taking certain action; and I know of no incident like you speak of, because if I did that would probably be world war III.

FACTOR OF PETROLEUM

Senator **Wiley**. Now, how much of the oil of this world do the Allies, the United States, Britain, and others, control?

General **Bradley**. A very large percentage of it. I do not have the exact figures; I can look it up if you would like to have it. There is no question but what we control much more than Russia does.

Senator **Wiley**. Do you think the Russian rulers would dare risk a greatly prolonged highly mechanized war when the United States and Britain control over 80 percent of the world's oil supply, and Russia only 20 percent, and we could quickly destroy the Near East oil fields to keep her from using them?

General BRADLEY. I don't think that would necessarily be a determining factor.

While we control, according to your figures, 80 percent now, we might not control that much after a few months of war.

Furthermore, you must remember that Russia does not have the consumption problem we have. They have very little civilian consumption, so they can devote all of their oil resources to war purposes; whereas we have a great deal of civilian consumption and have become dependent upon civilian consumption of oil to a much greater degree.

Senator WILEY. Well, of course, you realize that even her supply in the Baku oil region would be put out of business probably within 24 hours after the war. Her supply would be virtually terminated. The only other supply would be what she has in reserves; is that not true?

General BRADLEY. Certainly it would be a target for consideration for attack.

Senator WILEY. Well, again, let us get your judgment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield for a question on procedure, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WILEY. Without losing any of my time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have a matter on which I would like to be over on the floor at 12 o'clock, and I would not like to lose my place in asking my questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will have to submit that to the committee. We have a request from Senator Saltonstall that he not lose his place in the questioning. Is there any objection to the Senator from Massachusetts not losing his place? The Chair hears none.

All right, Senator.

POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING DECISIVE ACTION IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. Don't you think, General, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented General MacArthur with almost an impossible task in the Korean War by imposing the inhibitions upon him?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I think the troops over there have been doing pretty well, sir.

Senator WILEY. I think you probably answered it, but it is not clear in my mind: How would you visualize decisive results will be achieved under the present program in Korea?

General BRADLEY. Well, to get decisive results raises many questions. I am not too sure we will get them under our present methods; I am not too sure we would get them by expanding the war into Manchuria and China.

Circumstances, as they develop, will determine whether or not we have to take further steps, and just what steps; but I don't believe anyone is going to promise you or the country that we are going to get decisive results under what we are doing.

All I can say is that the Joint Chiefs do not feel that you would come much nearer in getting those decisive results by extending the war into China, and in taking additional risks.

BOMBING NEAR YALU RIVER

Senator **Wiley**. General MacArthur testified that he was not permitted to use his air power within 5 miles of the Yalu. You have testified on November 6 General MacArthur wanted permission to bomb the Yalu bridges and that subsequently you gave that permission. Just when was that permission granted?

General **Bradley**. The nonuse of air power within 5 miles of the border was something that was in effect prior to that time.

Then, when General MacArthur gave us the picture of what was taking place from Hamhung to Sinuiju, across the river, we then extended that permission and gave him permission to bomb the Korean ends of the bridges.

Senator **Wiley**. What is the date?

General **Bradley**. About November 6 or 7, sir. I can look it up and be specific; but the telegram in which he requested it was on the 6th, and I think we gave him the answer either that day or the next.

LIMITATIONS ON MAC ARTHUR

Senator **Wiley**. Can you very briefly give us the limitations or inhibitions which were imposed on General MacArthur on the use of his ground troops, on the use of the Navy, and on the use of his Air Force?

General **Bradley**. Well, to take the Air Force first, as I say up until about November 6 or 7, we had directed he not use it within 5 miles of the border, the Manchurian border, and had also restricted him later on at one time, in the bombing of Najin; so that for a while there were restrictions in the vicinity of the border.

Later on those were removed and now he does not have them, and he does fly up to the Manchurian border.

So far as the Navy is concerned, we have carried on a blockade at all times for that part of Korea for which we make it effective. It extends from about Chongjin on the east coast to the south, and extends just south of the mouth of the Yalu River on the west coast, south.

On the ground forces, at one time we stated that we would hope that he would use only North Korean troops in approaching the border. That was before the Chinese entered the war.

Oops

Chairman **Russell**. You mean South Korean troops.

General **Bradley**. South Korean troops. Only South Korean troops would go up to the border of Manchuria. Those instructions were given with the hope that we would decrease the likelihood of China's coming into the war.

After China came into the war, of course, none of those restrictions held.

At one time we suggested that as a further means of trying to keep China from trying to come into the war, that maybe when he moved up into the vicinity of the Manchurian border that he would consider holding the high ground overlooking the river instead of going right up to the river, where they would be subject to being seen from across the river and act as a greater incentive for the Chinese to come in. Again, of course, those restrictions were removed by the actual entry of China into the war; but there were several steps taken in there for a while, with the hope that we would not have China come into the war.

INTELLIGENCE ON CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator WILEY. Is it not true that the Government had intelligence that Chinese Red troops stationed opposite Formosa were moving north some time before they entered the war; and that you had that intelligence, did you not?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did you inform MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I am told that all of that information was sent to General MacArthur. However, the agent who does that is General Collins, in the Army, who acts as executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He has prepared a very thorough analysis of what information was furnished to General MacArthur, and General MacArthur's headquarters, and he will be prepared to give you that when he comes before your committee. He can give it to you in a lot more detail than I can.

Senator WILEY. Will he also be able to give us the general, over-all picture as to the information that was sent to MacArthur, from world sources, as to the subject—whether Red China would intervene in this battle, or not?

General BRADLEY. I think he can tell you any information that we had at that time, on the subject, and just what was passed on to General MacArthur.

Senator WILEY. Well, but you, as Chief of Staff, must have been formulating your plans, and must have had some information on that subject, so I am going to ask you the question: What information did you have, and when did you get it, if you did get it, that was communicated to you people, as to the possibility of the Red Chinese intervening in this conflict?

General BRADLEY. Well, for a considerable time prior to their actual contact with our troops in Korea, we had information that they were concentrating additional troops in Manchuria, some of them moved up from the south, of course, we had that information for some time.

DIRECTIVES ON ACTION IN CASE OF CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator WILEY. And did you plan the strategy of what would happen and communicate that to MacArthur if the Reds entered?

General BRADLEY. Yes; we gave him certain directives, what action he would take in case the Chinese came into the war.

Senator WILEY. Are those directives contained in this exhibit that you have furnished?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember whether they are covered in here or not. I have read this through two or three times, but I have also read all the messages so I don't remember clearly what is in one and what is in the other.

INTELLIGENCE ABOUT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

Senator WILEY. Really the question that I would like to get the information on is what intelligence did you have indicating that they were going to enter this war?

General Bradley. We had no intelligence that they were going to enter the war. We had the intelligence that they were concentrating in Manchuria. You can only then consider their capabilities. They had the capability of intervening in the war.

Senator Wiley. If the Intelligence Department of this Government had that information, you would have had it right off the bat, wouldn't you?

General Bradley. Yes.

Senator Wiley. So we have got that straightened around. There was no intelligence given to you people by any one of the intelligence forces in this Government that the Red Chinese were going to enter this war.

General Bradley. No, sir. We had the information that they had that capability and we always had the thought that they might enter it, but we did not have any intelligence to the positive effect that they were going to intervene.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AGAINST SUCH INTERVENTION

Senator Wiley. Now you know they were stationed up there. What additional precautions did you take or furnish MacArthur, with what additional air force or groups to meet that challenge, knowing that they were north of the Yalu? Anything at all?

General Bradley. Yes. We sent over some additional strategic bombers and we also sent over some jet-fighter groups to meet this threat if it came. In fact, a group of F–86's were sent over by the Air Force and some jet Navy planes were sent over without any request from General MacArthur. They were sent over because we saw this threat developing and we thought we should have them over there in case they were needed.

Senator Wiley. But when you did that you did not take off the inhibitions or limitations, did you?

General Bradley. We took them off up to the Yalu. We did not take them off across the Yalu, and we haven't yet.

MEMORANDUM ON EVENTS PRECEDING MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator Wiley. Now, let us go back to this meeting. If you will refer to your memoranda, when did you write up this memoranda that you claim describes your meeting on April 5 with the President?

General Bradley. I think it was the Monday morning as I remember it after the meeting with General Marshall on Sunday, I took the diary which is kept in my office as to where I am at various times so as to make sure of the times, and then sat down and dictated this memorandum for record.

Senator Wiley. But April 5 was Thursday, and it was not until the succeeding Monday that you attempted to recall the incidents of those dates—5, 6, 7, and 8; is that correct?

General Bradley. I think it was Monday that I dictated all of them.

MESSAGE ALETRING BRADLEY TO MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator Wiley. You already stated in reply to Senator Bridges that you do not recall who it was that called you. But you did say that there was a telephone call that came through late in the afternoon to the effect that the President was concerned about something. Now, what do your records show that he was concerned about?

General BRADLEY. As I remember it, he was concerned about some of the public statements made by General MacArthur.

Senator WILEY. Well, I ask you specifically, Was it in relation to the letter that was written to Congressman Martin?

General BRADLEY. It probably was. It came out about that time, if I remember correctly.

Senator WILEY. Well, now, this was an unusual occurrence in your life, was it not, General—that you should find out that a fellow general was about to have something happen to him? Now, what was this message that came? Just what did it say?

General BRADLEY. I told you that I did not remember where I first got this information. To the best of my memory it came by phone from someone, that the President was concerned about the statements of General MacArthur; and I warned the Chiefs that they had better be thinking about the matter because they might be called upon for a discussion of it. It is not unusual; if I know of something coming up, I warn the Chiefs that it is coming.

Senator WILEY. Then as a result you had your first meeting with the President. Was that on the 5th also?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; that was on the 6th.

Senator WILEY. All right. Now the point I am getting at is that this message resulted in your warning the Chiefs. Now that is a significant statement—warning the Chiefs that they had to get about and study. Was it then that you directed them to go back and find all the messages that MacArthur had before given to the public?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I didn't give them any directions except to suggest that they had better be studying the matter and thinking it over.

Senator WILEY. Studying the matter. What matter?

General BRADLEY. The question of the President's concern about the possible relief of General MacArthur.

Senator WILEY. Oh, then the message was definite that came over that the President was thinking about how to handle the relief of MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; not the how.

Senator WILEY. What?

General BRADLEY. Not the "how," but the question of whether—in other words, he had it under consideration, and somebody passed that on to me.

Senator WILEY. Well, was there anybody close enough to the President to have this information, or did it come right from the White House?

General BRADLEY. I frankly do not remember, Senator. I get calls from various people during the day, and I do not remember where this one came from.

JCS MEETING OF APRIL 5, 1951

Senator WILEY. Well, again, can you give us the content of the message that resulted in your telling the Chiefs of Staff they had better get busy, or telling the group, rather—whom did you call?

General BRADLEY. I called the three Chiefs and asked them if they could come by my office at 5 o'clock.

Senator **Wiley**. Name them, please.

General **Bradley**. General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman.

Senator **Wiley**. Told them to come by your office at 5 o'clock?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. Have you got any other information in your memoranda there as to what you said to them?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. Is that all you said to them?

General **Bradley**. Until they got there; yes.

Senator **Wiley**. What?

General **Bradley**. Until they got there; yes.

Senator **Wiley**. All right. Now, when they got there what did you tell them?

General **Bradley**. I made no record of that. As I have expressed here several times, I told them that I understood the President was worried about something General MacArthur said and we might be called upon to express an opinion on it. I had not been told at that time that we would; I merely passed that on to them because that is my job—to pass on to them things which may come up for consideration.

Senator **Wiley**. They came back to you on the 5th at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. How long were they in consultation with you that time?

General **Bradley**. Well, according to my diary they were in there about 30 minutes. I don't know whether we were talking about anything else at that time or not.

Senator **Wiley**. And can you recall what you said?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. Did you make any memoranda of what you said?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. Did you make any memoranda of what they said?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. Was this young man sitting next to you in the presence of these four?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; just us four.

Senator **Wiley**. What?

General **Bradley**. No; just us four.

Senator **Wiley**. I see him nodding his head, that is all, and wanted to know why he is so wise on the subject.

General **Bradley**. Beg your pardon?

Senator **Wiley**. Just the four of you?

General **Bradley**. That is right.

Senator **Wiley**. Now in half an hour you can say a lot, General.

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir; and I say I don't know what all we talked about. I just do know that I told them about this one. The same way Sunday afternoon we spent 2 hours before we went up to General Marshall, but we were not talking the whole 2 hours about this. Whenever we get together we talk about various things. I do happen to remember we were talking at that time about NATO command in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

Senator **Wiley**. In that half hour?

General **Bradley**. No; in this 2-hour conference.

COMPILATION AND JCS DIRECTIVE OF DECEMBER 6, 1951

Senator WILEY. Let's take the half-hour conference, get back to that, because we've got several other meetings we've got to talk about. At that time had they gathered the information that now appears in the communiqués in committee print, Compilation of Certain Published Information, starting in December 6, 1950, from there on? Did they gather that for your information?

General BRADLEY. Not at that time; no, sir.

Senator WILEY. Not at that time. If you have that book there, General, I would like to have you refer to it. Have you got it?

General BRADLEY. This one, sir [indicating]?

Senator WILEY. Yes. Now please refer to page 178, because if you go down to paragraph 6, you will find that there the Chiefs of Staff prepared a memorandum where they say, and I quote:

> The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government.

Do you see that paragraph?

General BRADLEY. I see it, but I don't know what the implication of it is offhand. It is apparently from the New York Herald Tribune of April 12, 1951.

Senator WILEY. This is a quotation, General, from the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur under December 6, 1950. We will let the language speak for itself. You and I both understand English, so we will go right back now.

JCS DISCUSSION OF APRIL 5, 1951

We will go back now to page 186 and ask you whether or not in this meeting where you four got together there was any discussion about the Martin letter.

General BRADLEY. I do not remember.

Senator WILEY. Haven't you anything there at all in your notes?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. What did you discuss?

General BRADLEY. I told you that I warned them that this question might come up soon, and that the President was disturbed about some statement General MacArthur had made.

Senator WILEY. Yes; but I am talking about the afternoon meeting, when they came over to see——

General BRADLEY. That is what I am talking about, too.

Senator WILEY. Meanwhile, had you gotten any more telephone calls from anybody? You can't recall?

General BRADLEY. No.

Senator WILEY. Or any communications from anybody?

General BRADLEY. No; not that I remember of.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, APRIL 6, 1951

The first time I really came into this, and found out what it was all about, was on Friday morning, April 6, when I met with the President, and the others in his office, at which time he explained what his concern was.

Senator Wiley. All right, now; we are coming to April 6, the one you just mentioned, Friday morning.

You said that at that time there was the President; there was the Joint Chiefs of Staff——

General Bradley. No, sir; I did not say the Joint Chiefs.

Senator Wiley. I beg your pardon.

You said there was Marshall, Acheson—and who else?

General Bradley. Harriman and myself.

RELATIONSHIP OF ADVISERS TO THE PRESIDENT

Senator Wiley. All right.

Now, tell us what was said then.

General Bradley. Senator, at that time I was in a position of a confidential adviser to the President. I do not feel at liberty to publicize what any of us said at that time.

Senator Wiley. Well, that raises a question, I suppose, that the Chair will have to rule on.

I didnt' raise it with Marshall, because I was in a hurry; but when you come before a committee, sir, to give information as to a very important matter that the public is entitled to know about, unless it goes to the question of endangering the public welfare, it seems to me that you waive the right you claim now, as to the President——

General Bradley. Senator, it seems to me that in my position as an adviser, one of the military advisers to the President, and to anybody else in a position of responsibility who wants it, that if I have to publicize my recommendations and my discussions, that my value as an adviser is ruined.

I may be wrong in this. I will abide by whatever the committee says, but it seems to me that when any of us have to tell everything that we say in our position as an adviser, that we might just as well quit.

Senator Wiley. I am not going to ask you to do that.

There is one issue before the bar of public opinion, and only one in this matter, as I see it, others disagree with me, and that is—whether or not this action, taken in the manner it was taken, can be justified by the facts, before the bar of public opinion.

Now, the President exercised the authority that he had, constitutionally, but he, sir, agreed to present you before this committee. He had a right to say "No," to it, you need not come. It seems to me that he has opened up the whole case, and that evidence ought to be given to the people, as to just how it happened that this very unusual and cruel action was taken by the associates of General MacArthur, and by the President of the United States.

I might say that there was a lot of testimony and evidence to the effect that some of you defended MacArthur. If you did, I would like to know it.

It would seem to me it would add something into this picture of strength and worthwhileness, but I am asking for the chairman to rule that my question is pertinent and relevant and should be answered.

General Bradley. May I correct my statement a little bit? I am not too sure that I would have the right to say that I would be guided by this committee.

Maybe I should take this to the President and get his permission to do it because I was acting as his adviser at the time, and I am not sure but what I should get his permission to tell you rather than to take it on myself to say I would do it under any other circumstances.

I would like to point out in my opinion there are two things before this committe instead of one. One is whether or not we are following the right policy in the Far East, and the other one is whether or not General MacArthur should have been relieved, so in my opinion there are two instead of one issue.

Senator WILEY. I might say on that, General——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am advised by Dr. Wilcox that your time has expired, Senator.

Senator WILEY. I don't think it has.

PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. According to my own time, Senator Bridges completed at 11:47. We allowed you 1 minute for an interruption by Senator Saltonstall that I do not think took over 30 seconds. We allowed you 1 minute for that and therefore your time has expired. I am so advised by Dr. Wilcox.

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed with a question that I have, and a question by Senator Wiley is subject to——

Chairman RUSSELL. You will have to get unanimous consent of the committee and take it out of your time, Senator McMahon.

Senator McMAHON. That is quite all right with me. I would like to get that stated because I think it is an important point that we are going to have to decide.

Senator MORSE. May I raise a procedural question. First, am I correct in my assumption that when a procedural matter arises during the examination of a witness by any Senator, the time taken up for a discussion of procedural matter is charged against the committee as a whole and not against the questioner?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I should think that is true, but as to whether or not a procedural question involves the reading back of the question is another matter.

Senator MORSE. That is the second point I was going to raise, whether or not the question put by the Senator from Connecticut is put for the purpose of finding out what the procedural problem before the committee is.

We have to know the question before we know whether or not there is a procedural question before the committee, and I think that when a procedural matter is raised, even though the time of the Senator may have lapsed in the midst of raising the procedural question, we ought to determine the procedural point before we go on with the next question.

Senator WILEY. That ought to give me about 3 minutes more then.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the procedural question had been raised during the time that you were examining, it would have.

Senator MORSE. I understood the Senator from Wisconsin asked the Chair to rule.

RULING OF THE CHAIR ON CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Chairman RUSSELL. He did. The Chair was sitting here greatly disturbed as to about how he should rule. It is an entirely new matter. I do not know that it has ever been raised before, before any committee.

Of course in this country there are certain well-established and clearly defined confidential relations that are respected by all of the courts of this land, of which I have any knowledge. Among them are the relations of doctor-patient. That is completely protected. All conversations and conferences that occur between a doctor and a patient are protected by law in most of the jurisdictions of which I have any knowledge.

Another is that of a lawyer and client. It is very well established that the conversations, communications that transpire between a lawyer and his client are held inviolate and sacred by the rulings of almost any court of which I have any knowledge.

Another one which is somewhat common is the source of information of newspaper correspondents, whether or not the information that they receive, the source of their information ought to be protected.

I am not thorough familiar with all of the decisions on that but as I recall back in my college days—I never had a case involving that subject—why, in most jurisdictions they are protected on that.

I do not know whether the Chair should even undertake to rule on this subject. Any ruling that I make, of course, is subject to an appeal by this committee, by any member of this committee. Since Senator Wiley has raised this issue, I have been running it over in my mind.

I know that in my opinion any conversation with respect to any of my actions that I might have, any conference I might have with my administrative assistant in my office I think should be protected, and it is my own view, and I so rule, that any matter that transpired in the private conversation between the President and the Chief of Staff as to detail can be protected by the witness if he so desires, and if General Bradley relies upon that relationship, so far as the Chair is concerned, though I regret very much that the issue was raised and I am compelled to pass on it, I would rule that he be protected.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHAIR'S RULING

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, before the chairman rules, the general has indicated that he thinks there might be a preferable procedure for him to talk with the President of the United States.

I think it is true that there are certain relationships which exist between a doctor and patient and a lawyer and client as the able chairman has mentioned. I also, however, call your attention to the fact that this deals with the public business of the Government of the United States. It deals with the question whereby, for instance, this country was put into a war which has resulted in 65,000 casualties without a declaration by the Congress.

If the chairman's ruling applies to this particular meeting dealing with specific far-eastern matter, then the same ruling would apply to the Blair House conferences of June 24, 25, and 26, which led this country into a war, but without a declaration of the Congress of the United States, and foreclose, perhaps for all time, the legislative branch in executive session from receiving information which they feel might be pertinent.

I am not now appealing from the ruling of the Chair because I have not made any final conclusion, but I would suggest that in view of the very grave consequences that might result, would it not be possible for General Bradley to consult with the President of the United States, lay the matter before him?

What we are seeking here is to arrive if possible at an agreement so that we may understand the various facets of a very important question to the American people, and I am fearful if at this time an iron curtain is lowered in this case, that it may be lowered on other matters and we may find our committee really stymied in the work which I think we have undertaken to do.

Chairman RUSSELL. As I have stated, I did not expect this issue to be raised and I was not prepared to pass on it except to give a curbstone opinion, which I have done conscientiously and to the very best of my ability.

I do not, however, see any parallel between the illustration that the Senator from California gives and the question at issue here. It does not go as to the decision, if I understand the question. It is what was said by certain individuals at a meeting in the White House.

I am just as anxious as any member of this committee to get every fact that is involved in this matter before the country, and I would that the question had not come up and that General Bradley had felt that he could state even down to the last word what was said by any individual there as to the best of his recollection what transpired at that meeting, but as I understood him, he did rely upon it and chose to claim the privileged relationship as an intimate adviser to the President as his reason for not giving the details of the conversation and how the order was finally arrived at.

TAKING MATTER UP WITH THE PRESIDENT

I am perfectly willing for the committee to take it up. I would like for General Bradley to talk to the President about it, and I would not have, if I had my choice, had to pass upon it, would not have made any statement whatever, if Senator Wiley had not insisted that I in effect give my views.

General BRADLEY. May I say something, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman CONNALLY. Just a minute, General, I want you to get what I am saying.

I do not think it would be appropriate for the general to speak to the President and then come back and tell us what the President decided about a purely procedural matter before this committee.

It is not the business of the President, and I don't think that we ought to establish any such doctrine for similar cases, that we run over and talk to the White House and get the President's opinion.

The rules about these matters are well known, and we have just as much capability for passing on the propriety of them as anybody else, and it is our duty and not the President's duty. I don't think General Bradley is required or that it would be really appropriate for him now to go to the President and ask whether or not he should be released from his obligation not to reveal what was said.

As the chairman well pointed out, it wasn't on the question of the final decision, but it was on the conversation, private conversation between General Bradley, as a military adviser, and the President of the United States, a confidential relationship.

Chairman RUSSELL. I merely wish to observe that I have been perfectly frank and fair, and as far as I am concerned, I have no objection to General Bradley consulting with the President about this matter.

IMPORTANCE OF WHITE HOUSE CONVERSATIONS TO MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. Now, that I have raised the point, I ought to have an opportunity to say something on the subject.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is recognized.

Senator WILEY. The President need not have permitted General Bradley to come down here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't agree with that.

Senator WILEY. I do. The thing that we are talking about here is a very simple matter, whether or not the facts and the circumstances before the bar of public opinion—and we are not to decide that—justify the dismissal of General MacArthur.

Now, how was it brought about? Why was it brought about? When was it brought about?

The answer to those questions is going to be determined by the conversations that took place between those who advised the President and what the President said in return.

General Bradley is a confidential adviser. I wouldn't want him to say one thing that in the slightest degree affected the general welfare in the sense that it endangered the lives of any person or endangered the safety of this country, but when it comes before us, who have taken jurisdiction to try out the issues, apparently, to see whether there is any justifiable ground for what took place, then we go to the only source where those facts are discoverable, and that source is the prosecutor and the defenders and the jury that decided that they would kick him out.

That was made up of three or four others. Personally, I believe that the analogy that you use is not applicable because, in the first place, it is the common law and then enacted into the statutes of the States, including that of the priests at the confessional, but no other place, if they are just talking, or if a lawyer and a client don't talk with relation to his business, it is not exempt, or a doctor, it is not exempt, they are still responsible; but here is a case where the Executive used the power—that is not an issue, he had it—but he wanted the advice of the State Department and the Chiefs of Staff. To do what? Well, I think it must be apparent. To build up the case, because of the Martin letter.

Until the Martin letter the evidence shows that nothing was said or done that was critical of MacArthur. That is Marshall's statement in substance as I developed it.

But when that came out, these folks were called into consultation. For what purpose? The President didn't have to give any excuse, but he did give an excuse in his dismissal.

We want to know whether the facts bear that out, and it seems to me the rule that when a witness comes on the stand and exposes his hand in relation to part of the testimony, that all the testimony is subject to be examined into relating to the case, that that rule of evidence applies.

That is the position I take. If the Chair has ruled, I shall appeal from the Chair, and at an appropriate time we can thresh this matter out.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think now is about as good a time as any.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. The appeal has been taken. Am I privileged now to speak?

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator please speak louder?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, the appeal has been taken from the ruling of the Chair, and am I now privileged to comment on the ruling and the appeal?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I want to go to the cases before I reach a final conclusion. If we come to a vote at the present time, I shall vote to support the decision of the Chair, for these reasons:

In the first place, I think the committee should look to its power of enforcement. If it wishes to use whatever powers of compulsion it might have to elicit from the general the testimony which he declines to give as to what took place at the White House at the conversation he had on April 6, that the only power of enforcement this committee would have would be its power through contempt proceedings, which would get you into a legal courtroom situation eventually for enforcement.

POSSIBLE OPINION OF A COURT ON CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP

It is my curbstone opinion, Mr. Chairman, that a court would necessarily rule that the military adviser to the President of the United States, having a personal conference with the President of the United States on a supposedly confidential basis—and if they say it was a confidential basis, I don't think the court would be able to deny that it was a confidential conference—such a court under such circumstances would have to necessarily rule that the exeutive powers of the President of the United States protect him from legislative interference. At least such would be true to the extent that he can have a confidenial conference with his chief military adviser without a Senate committee being authorized to take note of who goes in and out of the White House and then have those people subpenaed before the committee and asked questions as to the conversation that took place between those people and the President of the United States.

I think a court would necessarily have to find that if any committee of the Congress sought to exercise that jurisdiction over the conferences of the Executive with his officials called into the White House, that it would be impossible for the Executive to function on any confidential basis without interference by a congressional committee.

In the second place, I point out, Mr. Chairman, that if this conference with the President had been in the form of a memorandum sent by General Bradley to the President of the United States, I think you would there find that at least opinions of the Attorney General of the United States, and I am not so sure but what litigated cases, would hold that you couldn't subpena that memorandum out of the files of the President of the United States. This would be true because of its confidential nature, and because it was connected with the carrying out of the executive functions of the President of the United States.

I think if that is true of a memorandum, Mr. Chairman, the courts would have to find it also true of a confidential conversation.

Senator Lodge. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator Morse. Not at this point.

SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

I think we are confronted here again with the separation of powers doctrine, looked at from a little different and somewhat novel angle, I am perfectly willing to admit. But I think that under the separation of powers doctrine the President of the United States would be protected in the courts from having to disclose a confidential conference he has with the chief military adviser of the Executive at this time.

The third and last point I want to make, Mr. Chairman, is that I think that it is one thing for the committee to ask General Bradley for conclusions that were reached at the conference as to the public policy questions involved in relation to MacArthur and quite another thing to insist that General Bradley give us in detail the arguments pro and con, if there were any pro and con, a verbatim quotation of statements made by the President and by the other members of the conference to the President at that time.

Even as to the conclusions I would reserve judgment. But I want to say I think it would be regrettable if the men at that conference did not give us the conclusions of the conference, as did General Marshall, I have not understood that General Bradley is not willing to tell us what the conclusions were, and to what exent the conclusions represented a consensus of opinion. But as far as our having the power to demand from the White House confidential information, I seriously question that any court in carrying out a contempt proceeding would sustain our position.

PRESENCE OF QUORUM

Chairman Russell. I want the record to show, and I want the reporter to put down, the names of the members of the committee who are present to show that there is a quorum here, because if this develops into a contempt proceeding, I understand that is one of the things necessary to be shown.

(The following committee members were present as of this time: Chairman Russell, Chairman Connally, Senators Johnson of Texas, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Morse, Knowland, Cain, George, Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Lodge, and Brewster.)

Chairman Russell. I want to also say that I had undertaken to differentiate between the conclusions and the mere course of a conversation in a meeting of that kind. I have tried to not deal with personalities in this thing.

ANALOGY TO CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF COMMITTEE MEETINGS

I was taught from my youth on that there were three coordinate and equally powerful branches of the Government of the United States. I know that if I were in a senatorial committee where the hearings were in executive session, and we were discussing, with the cloak of executive session around that committee, what transpired in marking up a bill that was to go to the floor, and a detailed statement was made by this Senator or that Senator, and that matter was challenged, as it might be before a court or elsewhere, that I would stand in favor of protecting the right of Senators to discuss a matter of that kind in an executive session of a committee without a Senator being compelled to relate what another Senator had stated in that executive session of that committee.

It is an unfortunate situation that has arisen, but it is one that has been presented, and Senator Wiley is wholly within his rights in presenting here, and one that since it has arisen, that we should carry to a conclusion, and the committee can pass upon the ruling of the Chair.

I do not know whether the Chair was right in making the ruling, but I would not have ruled, had not Senator Wiley insisted that I rule upon it; but while it was distasteful it probably was within my duties, and I try never to shirk any proper duty that is imposed on me, so I think that we vote upon the appeal, and then if the actual consequence of it is sustained, and a motion is made to cite the general, we can have this matter thrashed out in a manner under our system of government.

APPEAL TO WITHDRAW REQUEST AND RULING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I earnestly hope that the Senator from Wisconsin will not press his request for a ruling, and that the Chair will withdraw his ruling and leave the matter in abeyance for these reasons: I personally can understand General Bradley's reluctance about relating details of a personal conversation with the President of what the President said.

I can also understand Senator Wiley's own justification for wanting as much information as he can get. But I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that before these hearings are over, there may be a number of questions which will arise of this nature.

I think it would be a mistake for us to precipitously rule on these things in every instant just as they come up.

Chairman RUSSELL. What did you expect me to do when Senator Wiley demanded a ruling from the Chair?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said a moment ago I hope that Senator Wiley might not press for a ruling, and that the Chair might see fit to withdraw his ruling, and leave the matter in abeyance at this moment, because I think it is very possible that as these hearings come on there may be other instances, and we could take a little more calm and detailed look at these questions, and then decide whether in the instances which caused trouble, answers are desirable to those questions, and whether we should press for them.

Now, I realize that Senator Wiley asked his question with a definite purpose in mind, and that he would like to have an answer, but I am merely suggesting that we may, by deciding these things individually, just decide ourselves clear out of court in some field that we may later want to pursue, and have to back up on.

I earnestly hope that the matter can be left in abeyance at this moment without a final decision either way.

Senator Long. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the position taken by Senator Hickenlooper.

Chairman Russell. Just a moment, Senator. Senator McMahon was trying to get recognition when I recognized Senator Hickenlooper, and I therefore, recognize him.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, I think this is one of these basic things we should settle right now.

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS PROTECTED

Under the common law, when the common law developed and these privileges were gradually written into the common law, which the chairman has mentioned, such as the privilege that exists between lawyer and client, and doctor and his patient, and priest and confessor, and in some jurisdictions between the newspaperman and the source of his information, the basic philosophy and philosophic reason that underlies those privileges, as I see it, is this: Those relationships cannot have any vitality and function if the two parties to the relationship are not assured that what they say in the course of the carrying on of that relationship will not be used in the future and publicly used against them.

Now, if we are going to have an successfully functioning Government, it is of the utmost importance, as I see it, that the President of the United States have top advisers who are going to give him, when the proper moment comes up when he is called upon to advise him, his best judgment, without regard to how this will look in public 6 months from now, or a year later.

To do otherwise, in the words of one of our commentators who discussed this problem the other day, would bring about a situation similar, in a lighter vein, to what would exist if a fellow writes his girl, and he thinks it is going to be opened; or a man writes his wife and thinks it is going to be opened for public inspection, he is going to write it a little different than he would have written it, if it was just a communication between him and his wife, or a man and his fiiancée

Now, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that is basic, that you cannot carry one th United States Government successfully if the top advisers to the President haven't got a right to speak to him in entire confidence and tell him what is in their mind at the time, without regard to the fact that it might become public property 6 months later.

You destroy the relationship, and you do just exactly what the courts have refused to do—they have refused to open up that relationship of these classifications, because they know that to do it is to destroy the vitality of the relationship.

(Several Senators spoke simultaneously.)

Chairman Russell. I recognize Senator Knowland.

IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION REQUESTED FROM BRADLEY

Senator Knowland. I merely want to say that I hope the suggestion of Senator Hickenlooper will be carried out, because this is a very grave decision. It might even be questionable as to the desirability o fcontinuing with the hearings if this committee is to be foreclosed from information which may be vital to us.

It seems to me that we should try and approach this situation on a rule of reason.

The President of the United States, himself, might decide that in view of the questions that have been raised, in view of the fact that this committee has been furnished with certain confidential and top secret information—that in order to get both a proper understanding, on the part of the committee, and ultimately the American people, that this information should be made available.

If this ruling stands, and others take the same position, it seems to me that we will be foreclosed from information which will be essential, if we are to do the job that I though we had undertaken to do.

Now I submit that we are dealing with the public's business. This is a business of the people of the United States and the Government of the United States. The administration is different from the Government. The Government consists of the executive and legislative and judicial branches. We have a constitutional obligation, we have a constitutional power to make war. We are in a war and the Congress has not exercised its constitutional rights and obligations in that regard.

That is a pertinent subject of this inquiry among other things.

The Joint Chiefs are the creatures of the Congress of the United States, they do have certain constitutional obligations to the President, certainly obligations to the President; but they also have legal obligations to the Congress of the United States. It seems to me that this is such a far-reaching quesion, and one that will establish a precedent which might, as I say, raise a question as to whether it is feasible for the hearings to continue, I hope that the Senator from Wisconsin would withdraw his appeal, and if the chairman would temporarily hold in abeyance his ruling, let General Bradley consult with the President; let Senator Morse and others who are legal experts, look into the law to see, maybe we will all change our minds on the situation. But to go to a vote now I think would be an unfortunate circumstance.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman?

Senator Lodge. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Just a brief statement now. I want to make one. I did not precipitate this matter. I did not intend to. When he asked the question, when he asked what the President had said in these conferences, I did not precipitate any question about it. General Bradley said he did not think he ought to quote the President, what he said when he was seeking his advice. Senator Wiley stated he thought he should state it, and he pressed it to where he insisted I make a ruling. That I have done.

NATURE OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND ADVISERS

I want to say to the Senator from California, I can see a great deal of difference between a conclusion that was reached and a private conversation that antedated reaching that conclusion. The American people, of course, are entitled to know every conclusion that has been reached; they are entitled to get every piece of evidence out of here that is material or pertinent; but there are still relations that have been protected since the beginning of time, and in my opinion our system of government, based on the three branches, coordinate and equal, was designed as a measure to protect each of them. It is the Chief Executive today whose statement in private conversation with his most intimate advisers is under question; it might well be a Member of the Senate tomorrow, or some justice of some court of what he said to his assistant when he was preparing an opinion and discussing the record in a case.

It is not with any view of protecting any individual that I made that ruling. I made it in all honesty, as I see it, to preserve the prerogatives of each branch of this Government.

Now the committee has a very quick way of deciding—not a quick way but a very effective and thorough way. They can overrule the Chair and decide General Bradley in contempt and let the courts pass on and decide the issue once and for all.

Senator GEORGE. May I have the question read?

Chairman RUSSELL. I expect that particular part of the record has gone downstairs. General Mudge, will you see that as soon as that part of the record is printed we get it?

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman?

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think I should recognize Senator Lodge. I have recognized you twice, Senator Wiley. I recognize Senator Lodge.

POSSIBLE INJURY TO DEVELOPMENT OF HEARINGS

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I do not quite agree this is on a par with the relationship between lawyer and client and doctor and patient because it does involve very large measures of public policy. But I do think we might as well face the fact that what we confront is the question of citation of contempt, and from the experience which we had in the Tydings committee where we engaged in a good many citations of contempt, I was led to the conclusion that they never result in obtaining that information.

Now, if we go ahead with this procedure today, we will change the atmosphere and we will change the whole normal development of information that has taken place up to now, and it will tend to result in the occurrence of similar situations, and we will get a great deal less information than we would get if we don't do this.

I would like to see the suggestion of the Senator from Iowa and the Senator from California carried out, that the Senator from Wisconsin does not press the question at this time. Maybe when we get through the hearings, if there have been a number of cases that we consider in our mature judgment to warrant it, then we can take up this procedure then. But I certainly think it would defeat the very purpose we have in mind for such an action to be taken at this moment.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. Now my questions were two or three: First, what did he say to the President? And what did the President say to him? And so forth.

I wanted to develop the facts as they came out there.

Now, in view of the suggestions that have been made, before I ask to be permitted to withdraw the appeal, I want to say definitely that the rule in law is clear. If you want to take the analogy of lawyer and client or doctor and patient, you get into court and you expose part of the picture; that opens up the whole picture.

Now I am sure that I would not for one moment have the record think that I want to interfere with the President's prerogatives. It has been my 12 years of experience here that I have tried to restrain the President from interfering with the legislative prerogative.

IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AT PERSONAL FEELINGS IN DISMISSAL

I want to keep this Government in four separate compartments—legislative, executive, and judicial, and residuum back in the States. But I say to you—when the President permits his greatest adviser to come to us in relation to an incident that does not involve, as I see it, injuring the public safety, when it is a question of discharging a man as commander and a governor of 80,000,000 people, then we are entitled to know the personal equations. That only comes about in the conversations that took place in these three or four meetings when all at once the letter to Martin precipitated this wave. That is what we want to know, to find out, and that is what the people want to find out.

I have no personal feelings in the matter. As far as I am personally concerned, I am not competent to judge who is right—MacArthur or the Chiefs of Staff—on the military policy. But I am called upon to judge what the personal animosities are, what the personal feelings, what it was that all at once created this charged atmosphere that resulted in what I think, a lot of people think, at least, is an unfair act, and probably a very injurious act to the future safety of this country. The only way you can develop that is when the President submits his adviser before us and gives us his story and tells us, "Now this is the conclusion." We want to know whether those conclusions are based on the facts. And before any court that testimony would not stand. You could not take any doctor into court and permit him to say, "This is the conclusion" in a relationship of this kind, but what the court would open up the whole case.

You know that. Now that analogy does not apply.

Now the question of Executive power. The Executive has his power definite and certain. I would be the first one to impinge upon it. But when the Executive submits his case to the people before a committee of this kind he has got to lay all the cards down and not just a few of them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will the gentleman yield?

Chairman RUSSELL. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Iowa?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I only wanted to point out that the Senator manifestly made a mistake in his statement when he would be the first to impinge upon the Executive power.

Senator WILEY. The first one not to impinge upon the executive power.

WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAL

Now I ask, Mr. Chairman, that I may be able to recall my appeal and this matter can be briefed and the legal basis of it can be thoroughly analyzed. So I withdraw my appeal.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, just a moment. The Chair feels like he has some responsibility here. I did not originate this matter. If you intend to leave it here with you withdrawing your appeal and with the Chair's ruling on the record without the committee having taken any action on it, I do not think that the Chair should be placed in that position.

I disliked very much to make the ruling. I had not anticipated any such question would arise here, and I regret therefore that I had not investigated or looked into it a little further. It is wholly proper that the committee should pass on the Chair's ruling.

Now I do not like to be left here with this record going out to the world that I have taken this position and the committee has been denied an opportunity to pass on it. The question has arisen and it has been pressed very vigorously; the Chair has made his ruling, and I think I have a right to have this committee pass on this question. I can assure you that I am not urging any member of this committee to vote in any way. I want you to vote just exactly like you see it on the question that has been raised here. It is a matter of sustaining the Chair, and I think I am entitled to make that statement.

CHARACTER OF WITNESSES BEFORE COMMITTEE

General Bradley has been referred to here as the President's witness. General Bradley did not volunteer this testimony. In the discharge of my duties as chairman of this committee I requested General Bradley's appearance here, and I did not assume that he was altogether the President's witness.

I think that inference is somewhat unfair to the witness, but that is a matter of opinion, that he would only seek to sustain the President without giving this committee any facts.

I assume that the War Department, the Department of Defense is an agency of the Government. True it is in the executive branch but certainly it has a very direct relation to the legislative branch of the Government and if we are going to assume that everyone who comes here from the Defense Establishment is merely, as you say, a Presidential witness, well, of course these hearings will never terminate and we would have to, if that asumption is valid, discount anything that we heard from those witnesses.

Now the fair and simple way that the Senator from Wisconsin has waived aside all legal objections saying there is no question on earth what the courts will do, there is a very simple way to find out what the courts will do in a matter of this kind and that is just to pursue it to its logical conclusion.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Maine.

Senator Smith. I would like to be recognized.

Chairman Russell. I will be glad to recognize you next, Senator Smith. I cannot recognize but one at a time.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I can sympathize deeply with the feeling of the chairman as I, as well as several other members of the committee have been chief executives of State and appreciate the problem as pointed out by the Senator from Connecticut.

I also sympathize deeply with what the Senator from Texas said, that we should not be in a position of submitting our procedures to any outside authority.

NOT A NEW PROBLEM

I am equally emphatic on that as he is, so I would not welcome the suggestion to wait and consult the President. I do want to call the attention of this committee to the fact that this is not a new problem. It has occurred many times before and it will occur again not only in this committee's proceedings but in the future relations of Congress.

This came up, I had experience with it when Mr. Truman was chairman of the Truman committee and we called for documents from the Chief Executive, particularly, conspicuously the Stettinius report which Mr. Truman as President later submitted to the committee when I was chairman and he gave it and it was a very valuable document which would have had a very great significance. There was a conspicuous instance when this question was raised.

I was greatly troubled in the Pearl Harbor Committee when the protection of the Executive was extended to a very broad field over all documents and all individuals, and I very much regretted that they sought to extend it to such an extent. I understand this has been under discussion with the committees in the Dawson case very recently. It is a very profound question, and I certainly as one do not believe that this committee which is very much in the public eye now and this issue which is presented here should be concluded in any such fashion as shooting from the hip here.

I do not think there would be any warrant for trying it. I can understand how the chairman acted when the Senator from Wisconsin pressed his question, but it might relieve the situation if the Senator from Wisconsin not only withdrew his appeal but also withdrew his insisting on the chairman ruling.

SUPPORT FOR WITHDRAWING APPEAL

I think the only question where I would raise any doubt about the chairman is if he paused a little while as the Presiding Officer of the Senate customarily does to perhaps hear some opinions on a matter of this kind, it might have saved any embarrassment because there was very strong feeling, but having got to this point, I believe very profoundly that we should demonstrate the capacity to accomplish a modus vivendi at least within the committee and I hope with the President.

MOTION TO RECESS

I have sufficient confidence in his trying to rationalize this thing that we could work out some arrangement where the limits would be placed both as to documents and conversations and so on without any derogation of our authority or responsibility and at the same time without embarrassment to the President, so that the hour of 1 o'clock having arrived, I should like, unless there is serious objection, to make a motion that we recess.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope the Senator will not do that until Senator Smith is heard.

Senator BREWSTER. I will withhold that temporarily.

Chairman RUSSELL. I would like to say that I have not consulted with the President with respect to any phase of this hearing. I think I am about as jealous of the prerogatives of the legislative branch of the Government, as most Senators are, but I also do not propose to invade the rights of the other coordinate branches of the Government.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, does the Senator recollect that when General MacArthur was up here testifying about the Wake Island conversations, and when asked about his conversations with the President, he very properly said that was a private conversation with the President?

Chairman Russell. I think the record will disclose that.

Senator McMahon. I thank the committee.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith?

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I have a slightly different approach from those suggested here. I want to suggest to the committee that I think we are in great danger of spoiling what has heretofore been the high tone and fine relationship between the members of this committee, and I shall oppose in every way I can precipitating an issue of this kind, which might make me consider whether I have to vote for or against General Bradley, for example, and put General Bradley in the position of being in contempt of this committee. I do not want to be put in that position.

CONSULTATION WITH PRESIDENT ON QUESTION

What I feel very strongly is this: That so far as I am concerned, it seems to me, that General Bradley's original suggestion that he confer with the President on this matter is the sound one.

General Bradley can decide with the President whether the thing that happened there should be disclosed to the committee. If the President decides it should not be, I think, it is just the same situation that we would be in because we cannot subpena the President and ask what he has done. That is beyond our power.

If General Bradley gets consent, why, of course, he will come voluntarily and maintain the pattern of this committee of not trying to put the heat on our witnesses, so to speak, to compel them to answer questions that embarrassed them.

I am sorry that General Bradley did not feel willing to answer these questions; but I am entirely in sympathy with the position he took, that he had a confidential relationship. If I had been in his position, I certainly would not have disclosed confidential matters without conferring with the gentleman concerned, the President of the United States.

I am very hopeful, therefore, that the suggestion of Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Knowland and Senator Lodge and Senator Brewster will be followed.

MOTION TO RECESS

I hope very much that the Senator from Wisconsin will withdraw his request for a ruling and withdraw his request for an appeal, and even withdraw his request for a ruling on this matter, because I believe this committee, by handling these issues correctly, can get the full cooperation of the witnesses and get the facts without precipitating an issue which unfortunately might have political implications which we should not get into these hearings. So, I am glad to second the motion of the Senator from Maine that we recess at this time.

Chairman Russell. To when?

Senator Brewster. I would like to inquire from the Chairman whether or not you contemplated an afternoon session?

Chairman Russell. Well, that was a matter I intended to submit to the committee in view of the legislation that was on the floor at the present time. I assume that if the members of the Foreign Relations Committee feel that they should be on the floor, we will go over until tomorrow morning.

Senator Brewster. Then with respect to the Foreign Relations Committee's desire, I might inquire, inasmuch as the matter which they had reported was up, does the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee wish to express himself as to whether he wanted to be on the floor?

Senator Connally. Senator Gillette is handling that wheat bill, and I have not conferred with him.

Senator Brewster. He indicated to me, as my seat-mate here, that he hoped that we would not go on this afternoon because he was sorry to miss it.

Unless there is objection, I would move that we recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, and I would like in that connection to commend the candor of General Bradley.

COMPARISON TO PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

As in the Pearl Harbor case, we had Admiral Leahy, who was placed in a similar situation, and he testified in great detail to the conversations of Admiral Richardson with President Roosevelt.

He told every word that Admiral Richardson said in a very parallel case, when you remember that Admiral Richardson was dismissed from Pearl Harbor.

However, Admiral Leahy could not recall one word that the President said. He did not raise the issue of confidence; he just could not remember a word that President Roosevelt said. I respected his approach. I felt he was taking what he felt was the proper approach with respect to the loyalty he felt toward his Commander in Chief in that matter. But I think General Bradley has taken a very proper position in raising this issue of confidence.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I make some remarks?

Chairman Russell. A motion to recess is not debatable.

Senator Morse. I was going to ask the Senator to withhold his motion for a moment, because I think there are some points, important points, that I would like to comment on for the record.

WITHHOLDING THE MOTION TO RECESS

Chairman Russell. Does the Senator withhold his motion until the Senator from Oregon makes some remarks?

Senator Brewster. The only thing I would ask would be the amount of time.

Senator Morse. That is up to the Senator from Maine. I certainly will not enter into any agreement to limit myself in my discussion. But I want to say that I think we have a very important issue before this committee, and I do not think a recess at this time is serving the public very well until we reach some conclusions about it; because

I think you are not fair to the witness if you recess at this time unless you get a few things in the record, to which I think the witness is entitled.

I ask the Senator from Maine—I will not be long, but I am not going to put any time limit on myself—I ask him to withhold his motion to recess until I comment.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I am very much embarrassed, because certainly ever other member of the committee should be accorded the same courtesy, and I do think that no great public damage would be done if the position of the various members, most of whom have not had a chance to state their position, comes up at a later time. This is without any disparagement to what the Senator from Oregon may contribute, and who already stated a portion of his views.

I wish that the Senator from Oregon would not press the request.

Senator MORSE. I am going to press the request, and the Senator from Maine can exercise his own discretion, and I shall ask for a roll call on the motion for a recess.

Senator BREWSTER. I will withhold.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Maine says he will withhold.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I think you now have a humpty-dumpty issue before the committee, and there is nothing you can do to put the pieces back together again, and I certainly think the recess should be with the understanding that the chairman's ruling stands as of now as the ruling of the committee. I think I can see the headlines in the papers, right now, as to the reflection on General Bradley if this committee does not recess with the understanding that his refusal to answer Senator Wiley's questions is supported by the ruling of the Chair, subject, of course, to any later modification that this committee may wish within its prerogatives to enter into.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that General Bradley demonstrated his high professional ethics here this morning by refusing to disclose to this committee the verbatim conversation, personal conversation, that he had with the President of the United States on April 6.

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP OF ADVISORS TO PRESIDENT

I disagree with my very good and warm friend, Mr. Wiley from Wisconsin, on several particulars, but I want to mention two: First, I do not think that a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has had a conversation with the President of the United States on such subject matter as was under discussion on April 6, is under any obligation to this committee or to the public to disclose the details of that conversation.

I think it is highly privileged under the separation-of-powers doctrine, and I think General Bradley would be guilty of misconduct if he came before this committee and disclosed to this committee the personal conversation that he had with the President of the United States.

How could the Commander in Chief of the Armed Services ever carry on his executive functions as Commander in Chief if he had to carry on every conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense or any other high military official in our Government, with the fear or with the thought or with the knowledge that possibly that officer was going to be called before a

Senate committee to disclose under a threat of being indicted for contempt, the personal conversation that he had with the President of the United States.

I am willing to curbstone, Mr. President, and risk my reputation as a lawyer on the fact that I do not think you can get a court in America, of last appeal, to sustain any ruling of this committee that he would have to disclose that private conversation.

In the second place—I disagree with my good friend from Wisconsin, that when you put a doctor on the stand in a court room, that any privilege of that doctor, in relation to the patient, automatically disappears, and he has to answer any and all questions in relation to that patient, and I think the cases are long——

Chairman CONNALLY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator MORSE. No; I will not, Mr. Chairman, and I do not say that disrespectfully, but I do not want to be charged with taking any more time than I need to make my remarks.

WISDOM OF CHAIR'S RULING

I want to say, my last point is, Mr. Chairman, that the ruling of the Chair is a sound ruling in regard to protecting the executive powers of this Government. I think that General Bradley should be commended in the exercise of discretion that he used here this morning, in refusing to give verbatim the conversation that he had with the President of the United States.

General Bradley has not said that he will not testify as to the conclusions that were reached at that meeting; but I don't think that a member of this committee, in private conversation with the President of the United States—and I think we have all had private conversations with the President of the United States—would come before this committee and, under oath, proceed to disclose verbatim his conversations with the Chief Executive in regard to problems of the Executive.

FINAL POWER RESTS IN COMMITTEE

I want to commend the chairman of this committee for his curbstone opinion, because I think when you get through with all the legal research, you are going to find the chairman's ruling is sound in law. I think we ought to look at this ruling with the understanding that although the appeal had been withdrawn, the ruling of the chairman stands until such time, if and ever, this committee, by a majority vote decides, by motion, as it has a right to do, to adopt a procedure inconsistent with the ruling of the chairman. We have that power residual in us. We can exercise that power any time.

We can get rid of the chairman's ruling by adopting an affirmative procedural policy of this committee, and so no right of the committee is lost by the Senator from Wisconsin withdrawing his appeal.

We can, tomorrow, if we want to, adopt an affirmative ruling, but until we do, I think it should go out to the public that the chairman's ruling stands, and if the members of this committee don't want to abide by that ruling, as of now, then let them be free to press for a vote on an appeal now.

Senator STENNIS. I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Mississippi.

WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAL BUT NOT RULING

Senator STENNIS. Isn't it true that the situation is that there has been a withdrawal of the appeal, and therefore the ruling of the Chair stands as the ruling of the committee?

Isn't that the present situation?

Chairman RUSSELL. I had understood the withdrawal of the appeal was conditioned upon the withdrawal of the ruling of the chairman.

Senator STENNIS. I didn't so understand.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was Senator Hickenlooper's statement——

Chairman RUSSELL. That was the suggestion of Senators Hickenlooper and Knowland.

Senator STENNIS. The Senator from Wisconsin is a man that can speak on that point.

Would the Chair ask him what his opinion is?

Senator WILEY. I am very happy to have another shot at this problem.

First, let me make it clear that I have only the highest regard for General Bradley, despite the statement of the Senator from Oregon.

I am a United States Senator, secondly, trying to develop the facts.

Thirdly, I withdrew my appeal because I thought it was better to see whether there were legal precedents that involve this case.

NEED FOR INFORMATION ON CONFERENCES

I still stand firmly on my proposition that when a doctor comes in to court and testifies about a specific accident, in his communications with his client, he opens up that accident before the court; and that is what I stood here for. When a man comes before this body and tells general conclusions as to what happened and what took place, I say that that rule is applicable here. I am not trying to invade the prerogative of the President. The President should have said, "Now, don't testify on this issue at all," and we would not have gone into it. If it is not a question of public policy involved, or it is not a question of injuring the rights of the public, certainly it is simply a question of developing what went on; what was said and done in relation to getting MacArthur; who laid the plans; who made the suggestion; what did the various people say.

Even MacArthur said, on the stand, that he understood, and he named Acheson—he understood he spoke in his favor.

I want to know the facts.

Senator KNOWLAND. Senator Fulbright spoke——

(There was a chorus of voices.)

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I renew my——

Senator WILEY. My idea about the appeal is: I have asked to recall my appeal because I felt that what should be done is at least wait until tomorrow morning and see if there are any precedents on the matter.

I am not pressing for any charge of contempt. That is an insinuation thrown into this case without my consent or suggestion. I am simply stating the fact that as one of this committee, as a United States Senator, if you please, and there are only 96 of us, we have a very important function here to perform.

RECESS

I am not impinging upon the President's prerogatives, and do not intend to waive any of our own.

Senator GREEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. I want to put the motion.

I want to say that General Bradley has had to pass on this matter. The Chair has passed on the matter.

Of course if the committee wishes to carry it over to some future date, that is a matter for the committee to decide upon, and it is perfectly within its right.

Those in favor of the motion of the Senator from Maine——

Chairman CONNALLY. What was his motion?

Chairman RUSSELL. To recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

All those in favor say "Aye."

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, would the Chair repeat what he said about the ruling? Is the Chair asking the committee to rule on it?

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not asking the committee to do anything.

The Chair is trying to carry out what he conceives to be his duty here, and I expect every member of the committee to do the same.

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me for repeating, but as I understand the situation, there is nothing before the committee to pass on with reference to the Chair's ruling. The Chair has ruled, no one has appealed from that ruling, and therefore the ruling stands as the ruling of the committee; otherwise, I am ready to vote in favor of the chairman's ruling, but I understand that is what the effect of the situation is now; so there is no objection to recessing.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair will again place the motion of the Senator from Maine, who moved that the committee stand recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

All those in favor of that motion say "Aye." Opposed, "No."

(There was a voice vote and the motion was carried.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The "ayes" seem to have it. The "ayes" have it. The committee will stand recessed until 10 oclock tomorrow morning.

Be back with us, General. I don't know whether you will have an opportunity to testify or not.

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m. Wednesday, May 16, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:02 a. m. in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith (New Jersey), Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, Hunt, and Long.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcos, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be recognized.

REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, might I before we begin today make a request that certain documents which were connected with statements that General Bradley made yesterday be incorporated in the record. My point is this: General Bradley made a very interesting analysis of three documents, one of which he called a military directive, and next the study by the Joint Chiefs, and next the letter of the President of January 13. The directive was in answer to a request from General MacArthur of January 10 for instructions. I cannot find in the record that we have the text of General MacArthur's request or the text of the military directive of January 12. I do find in the record the President's letter of January 13. The research study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff we have referred to before, and we do not need that, but I would like to request that the text of General MacArthur's request for instructions of January 10 and the text of the military directive of January 12 be made a part of the record so that the testimony of General Bradley will be clear.

Chairman Russell. I thought that both of them were in the record, but, General Bradley, you will bear that in mind.

Senator Smith, I regret very much we will have to deduct 1 minute from your time.

Senator SMITH. I will be glad to have you do that. I just wanted to make this request.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is not a procedural question.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

PROCEDURE OF THE HEARINGS

Senator WILEY. I have a suggestion to make this morning, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. In view of the fact that General Bradley must get away, according to his previous commitments—and we want to accommodate him—and in view of the fact that it is probably very important that the committee decide the issue that I raised yesterday, I have this suggestion to make: that General Bradley go on with his testimony with those on the committee that follow me, and that tomorrow morning I raise the subject on the appeal from the decision of the chairman, and that tomorrow morning we argue out the legal phases of this subject and arrive then at a decision. Thus we will not discommode General Bradley but rather make it so he can get away to make his engagement.

I might say that I have talked this matter over with a group of my Republican associates, including Senator Bridges and others, and we arrived at that conclusion—that in order to accommodate General Bradley and not to take the whole day arguing the legal phases of this matter this might be an advisable way to pursue our course.

In the meanwhile it will give those who have a little time an opportunity to examine the precedents and go into the background of the issue that is involved.

It is not new. It has been raging back and forth over the decades since the inception days of our Republic. There has been some change in the statutory law that may have some bearing. That is a suggestion that I make at this time, Mr. Chairman, feeling that it is convenient to General Bradley, and it also gives everyone an opportunity to satisfy themselves as to what their votes should be.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate the desire of the Senator to accommodate General Bradley and assist him in his arrangements. I share interest in extending to General Bradley every courtesy that this committee can properly show, but, after all, we are a committee who are taking evidence at the present time, and it is my own opinion that where a matter of this kind arises, that the committee should determine it before proceeding with the testimony, in order that all the testimony might be received in an orderly manner.

I understood yesterday, and I think that the record will support my statement, that the Senator from Wisconsin had withdrawn his appeal. I shall not rely upon any technicalities if he wishes to press it.

I will accord him that full right, but I do think that the committee, despite the fact that it might cause General Bradley to listen to a considerable legal discussion on which we were not prepared yesterday, should decide this matter now before we proceed with this testimony in order that we may tell what questions can be asked and what cannot, and preserve the coherence of this testimony.

DETERMINING PROCEDURAL MATTERS AS THEY ARISE

Where a procedural matter arises, it should be determined, I think, as quickly as possible in order that the committee might have that decision for its guidance in the future examination of all of the other witnesses.

The matter has come up twice. A question was asked General MacArthur as to what transpired, what conversations were had with the President, and he declined to answer that question. The same question was addressed to General Marshall and he declined on the grounds of confidential relations. The same matter, of course, as was asked of General Bradley but it was not pressed to the stage in which we find ourselves with respect to this issue at the same time.

Senator STENNIS. The same question was asked General MacArthur.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. You said Marshall.

PARTISANSHIP AND THE HEARINGS

Chairman RUSSELL. I regret that the Senator from Wisconsin has been having huddles with just members of his party with respect to this issue. I have tried to sit here not as a Republican or Democrat but as an American. I have devoutly hoped from the moment these hearings opened that they would not degenerate into a partisan fight where the Republicans would have huddles here and the Democrats would have huddles there.

I had hoped that we might settle these matters not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans around this table as a committee of the Congress of the United States, charged with a very definite and specific responsibility.

It seems to me that if there ever was a time in our country, or a matter before a committee, that is peculiarly unsuited for partisan handling, it is the matter that is under investigation.

I merely feel that I should here express my regrets that events have taken this turn.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a moment, please. I did not interrupt you, sir.

SETTLING THE PROCEDURAL MATTER

It is wholly up to this committee to take the steps that they feel should be taken. If the committee wishes by a majority vote to postpone this matter and have it hanging over the committee as a matter of procedure undetermined, where all of the witnesses will undoubtedly have to be marched back if the position of Senator Wiley and those whom he says are supporting him are sustained, the committee has a right so to do. But I have my own views about orderly procedure, and I shall not, under any circumstances, be drawn into any partisan fight in connection with these hearings. I care not what the other members of the committee might do. I say, I will do my duty as I see it.

I think that when there is an important matter of procedure which is raised, the committee should settle it before proceeding to the examination of witnesses, and it just means that we will have to rehash all of these hearings again in the light of what might have transpired in some private conversations at the White House if we do not conclude the issue now, but I am perfectly willing to——

Senator LODGE. May I ask a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator LODGE. Does the able chairman contend that if we settle this question today that we have forever foreclosed ourselves from citing any subsequent witness for contempt if we ever feel we should do it?

Chairman RUSSELL. I made a statement the other day that I thought was very much adapted to the question when I said that the Senator had been around here too long to think that such a thing could be done.

I have forgotten to what he was referring, but a man does not have to be here more than 4 weeks to know that the Senate or a committee can reverse itself at any time it sees fit.

It is not done too often; as a rule, when procedure is agreed upon the committee always pays some attention to precedent. Apparently, the committee is not bound by precedent. The committee can establish a rule today, they will compel General Bradley to answer these questions, and if he refuses they can proceed as the law indicates with a witness here; and then another witness might come along, and the same question be asked, and the issue be raised, and the committee could reverse itself and say that they recognize the rule that those conversations were privileged, and therefore they would not proceed against the witness.

The committee is not bound, of course. Neither the committee nor the Senate has rules that are as immutable as the laws of the Medes and the Persians.

Senator LODGE. Will the chairman yield for a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

POSSIBLE CITATIONS FOR CONTEMPT

Senator LODGE. Would it not be perfectly feasible to have a practice whereby we did not do any citing for contempt at this stage of the proceeding. Toward the end if there were three or four questions that emerged which we thought were important, we could undertake that action at that time, isn't that possible?

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course.

The Chair is not the master of this committee. I am not endeavoring to impose my views on the committee. The committee can take any course it sees fit. They can overrule the Chair, and not cite General Bradley. Of course, that would be slightly inconsistent; but, the committee is wholly within its rights if it takes that position.

I wish to make it clear, of course, that this is not an ordinary citation proceeding, wouldn't be. Some of the press seem to throw this mention of a citation in the same category of some witnesses who have refused to state whether or not they have been a member of the Communist Party.

These questions have no relation whatever to such an issue as that. Of course the same issue of law would control it that does control any other witness the committee deems recalcitrant.

This is a matter of privilege, wherein General Bradley has not failed to state his own views with respect to the subject under consideration, but has declined to disclose a private conversation occurring between himself and the President of the United States, and other conversations, when he was serving in the capacity of confidential adviser to the President.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

ROLE OF PRESIDENT TO BRADLEY TESTIMONY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I might suggest the possibility that the controversy might be eliminated. I don't know, but yesterday it seemed to me that General Bradley said he thought he should contact the President, and if it was all right with the President, he might feel that it was O. K. to discuss the matter, and answer questions; and perhaps he has that authority now.

If he does have, I would assume that would automatically make the question before us moot at the moment, as far as those questions are concerned.

Chairman RUSSELL. I agree completely with the Senator. Of course, it would. I don't know whether General Bradley wishes now to answer the question.

Chairman CONNALLY. I want to register my protest against any such action referring to the President the question whether a witness before this committee shall answer or not. I think the question is much deeper than that. It goes to the very integrity of confidential communications between the President and his trusted and confidential adviser.

If you adopt this practice, there can't be any confidential conferences any more, because they cease to be confidential when they are divulged or even when they call the President in.

You might as well put the President on the stand and let him testify as to what took place if you are going to send the witness back to the President and ask his permission or consent to divulge a private conversation in a confidential relationship.

I just wanted that to be on the record.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I think fundamentally and basically it is a privilege that General Bradley has, whether he will divulge anything of a confidential nature; and even though the President might excuse him, it would still be a matter for him to decide, whether or not he would divulge it, whether or not he would make answer.

If there is a confidential relationship and if the question goes to things that occur growing out of that relationship, it then becomes a privilege for the witness himself as well as the President.

So I think that if General Bradley had an express green light, so to speak, from the President, it would still be up to him to decide whether or not he wished to disclose what took place in a conference of the nature and character we are discussing.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not intend, of course, to submit the question of whether or not the President had released General Bradley.

That is a matter, of course, I think of proper testimony from him if he desires to make that statement.

Senator GEORGE. That is true.

LEGAL PRECEDENTS

Chairman RUSSELL. Whereas, on yesterday I delivered a curbstone ruling on this issue when it was raised, as I regret I had not foreseen it would come up, so I could have studied the precedents. I have had a night intervening since then, and I have gone into this mattter rather fully from a legal standpoint.

I have quite a number of precedents. Now, the President has a place in this. Under the ruling in the Burr trials, the impeachment of Vice President Burr, a lettter was requested of the President, and the President was subpenaed to appear at that trial.

He refused to appear. He sent the letter to the prosecuting attorney, the district attorney who was prosecuting the case, and left it up to the discretion of the district attorney as to whether or not this letter that was subpenaed from him should be released.

Chief Justice Marshall sustained the right of the President to handle the matter in that way. He ruled that the President, if he did not wish to disclose it, he was fully within his rights in not disclosing it; but if it was delegated to another, that then it came into the custody of the court.

So the President does play a part in it. I am not depending on whether or not the President told General Bradley—after all, General Bradley is the witness before us—he did indicate that he would like to discuss the matter with the President.

From a purely legal standpoint as to whether the President did or did not give General Bradley the authority to disclose this private conversation that occurred between the President and his intimate advisers, is not too material.

It might have some bearing on General Bradley's views on the testimony, but I don't think it would directly affect the legal question involved.

Senator WILEY. Now, Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley is recognized.

QUESTION OF PARTISANSHIP

Senator WILEY. I tried to get in several times before you got into the legal argument. First I want to say that I didn't like the way the chairman suggested that because a few of us Republicans got together and talked the matter over that it was a partisan matter.

The chairman well knows that after I talked with him, I went over and talked with him and Senator Bridges.

Chairman RUSSELL. You didn't discuss the procedure you were going to take with me.

Senator WILEY. That is the very thing we did discuss. We started from the very beginning and suggested what we thought might be the way out of this thing. You came around to the point that your decision should stand; but that is neither here nor there.

Chairman RUSSELL. You wanted me to withdraw my ruling. You discussed that much of the procedure.

Senator WILEY. That is part of the procedure, to see if we couldn't evolve some method.

The only thing I say is that it was the inference that some of us are not judicial, are not bipartisan——

Chairman RUSSELL. I challenge the record as to the judicial part. I did question the nonpartisan aspects of your meeting.

Senator WILEY. I know it, Mr. Chairman. And the chairman has the right to preside but not to occupy all the time.

Chairman RUSSELL. I apologize for the interruption.

POSTPONING APPEAL TO HEAR BRADLEY FIRST

Senator WILEY. I made the suggestion, I might say to those gentlemen of the committee who were not here in the beginning, that in order to accommodate General Bradley we postpone the discussions of the issue itself until tomorrow morning so that General Bradley could get away; then tomorrow we could discuss the legal issue without interfering with General Bradley. That was the point I made this morning, and suggested that then I would appeal tomorrow to the entire committee and we could argue out the legal phases of it. The chairman does not seem to approve that procedure, so I suppose the only question before this group is whether we should move to postpone the discussion of this issue until tomorrow morning in order that General Bradley can carry on today; and then tomorow morning we can have the legal arguments and vote. That is what I am suggesting at this time.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator WILEY. What?

Senator BREWSTER. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Do I understand that the chairman has ruled that it would not be permissible for you to file an appeal tomorrow morning?

Senator WILEY. No.

Senator BREWSTER. If he has not so ruled, then is there any motion or appeal before us? I do not understand the chairman is intending to control procedures.

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman is reasonably careful not to infringe on the prerogatives of the committee. I have undertaken to be—and if any Senator here feels I have not other than my inadvertent interruption of Senator Wiley a few minutes ago, since these hearings started, I would like to have him arise now and state the instance on which he bases that charge.

Senator BREWSTER. Does my question imply any attribution of such action?

Chairman RUSSELL. I could not escape that inference.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, if he proposes to make a motion——

Chairman RUSSELL. No, I propose to make no motion.

Before a great many of you came in Senator Wiley stated, just as he has now since we have a full attendance here, that he thought that this matter ought to go over until tomorrow morning as a matter of accommodation to General Bradley so we could proceed with his testimony today. I stated that in my opinion as a member of this committee—and I trust the fact that I am presiding here does not deny me the privilege of being a member of the committee—that in the interest of orderly procedure this committee should settle this matter now before proceeding with any witnesses. Because if the committee should decide that it is entitled to ask these questions of these personal and intimate conversations that occurred at the White House, we should establish that at the very earliest date so it will not be necessary to continue to call witnesses back here and go over and over and over again the ground.

I stated that as a member of the committee; I made no ruling. And I stated specifically if the committee wishes to postpone it until tomorrow, that it was perfectly agreeable to me. So it is my own feeling it ought to be settled now.

I further stated that from my reading of the record, Senator Wiley at least twice on yesterday withdrew his appeal, but I will not rely on that technicality and would permit it to be considered as entered before the committee, and I will not submit to the committee as to whether or not we shall——

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster.

PRESENT STATUS OF APPEAL FROM RULING

Senator BREWSTER. Do I understand that there is now any question made by any member of the committee before the committee?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley has suggested that the appeal go over until tomorrow.

Senator BREWSTER. Senator Wiley I did not understand had any appeal pending.

Chairman RUSSELL. If he hasn't, of course there is no issue here.

Senator BREWSTER. That is what I understand is the case.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the appeal is not pending, certainly he can't revive it tomorrow if it is not alive today. The corpse can't lie there and suspend the situation like Mohammed's coffin. It is either an issue here today or it can't be one tomorrow.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. There is no question that the Senator from Wisconsin withdrew his appeal yesterday, is there?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, there is a question because he has asked to have it carried over until tomorrow and I have conceded that the appeal is pending.

Senator BREWSTER. I heard his later statement which was that he proposed to revive the appeal tomorrow. That is what I understood him to say, and that he would raise the question at that time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in my judgment as a member of this committee I shall state it for whatever it may be worth, that we should clear up a procedural matter of this nature before we proceed to take any more testimony. I shall throw the matter open for discussion. I recognize the Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important to clear up this procedural matter this morning before we hear any witnesses. Then we can recess until tomorrow and continue the debate on procedure tomorrow. That might be feasible, but I do not think we should sit here and listen to other witnesses not knowing what questions we can and cannot ask those witnesses.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in order to make that matter of issue at the moment, I appeal the decision of the Chair and I wish to say I am making the appeal for the purpose of getting it settled.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think it is necessary for the Senator to do that. We have already agreed the appeal is pending here despite any technicalities that might be involved. It is before the committee for discussion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

POSSIBLE CONSULTATION BETWEEN BRADLEY AND PRESIDENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I again respectfully renew my suggestion a while ago that we might eliminate the matter at the moment under discussion. If General Bradley still has the same objection that he had yesterday, then this discussion is very much in order.

If General Bradley feels that he is willing and ready to answer the questions, why, the discussion would fall by the wayside, until, at least, the issue would be raised on some other questions; and I merely again renew the suggestion that we find out whether we have anything to talk about here.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Connecticut.

Senator MCMAHON. Mr. Chairman, that appears to be a very naive and very unsophisticated suggestion by the Senator, but I have too much respect for the acumen and intelligence of the Senator from Iowa. It would be a great thing if all during this investigation each witness, when asked questions that he shouldn't answer, if we are to maintain the integrity of our Government was to say, "No, I have talked to the President, but he has told me to keep quiet and listen."

I just make that observation to prove to the Senator from Iowa that at least I was not deceived by his suggestion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, gentlemen——

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

POSSIBILITY OF FINAL DETERMINATION OF QUESTION

Senator LODGE. I do not think we can clear up any procedural question definitely and finally by any vote we take here today. I just cannot understand and the reasoning of the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Oregon that it is possible to do such a thing, because you cannot possibly anticipate what other questions will be asked, and in some cases we may next week wish to cite somebody for contempt on some question that nobody has yet asked or nobody has yet ever dreamed up, and it is inconceivable to me that we can establish any precedents or that we should attempt to conduct these proceedings in a legalistic manner as though it was in court.

In fact, I think nothing can shake the public confidence more in the work of these two committees than the impression that gets out that we are doing it in a legalistic way, because, if we once start acting that way, then the whole flow of information will cease, and the atmosphere that we have had so far, which has developed a great deal of information, will change into something that is absolutely rigid and artificial, and we might as well give the whole proceeding up.

The experience that we had in the Tydings committee indicates absolutely clearly that once you introduce a legalistic atmosphere and start citing people for contempt the whole business of getting information just stops; and I think it is a consistent position and a realistic, common-sense position to oppose the raising of this question now, and to be completely able to raise it 2 weeks from now or 3 weeks from now, when we have heard all the other witnesses, and we have concluded that there are three or four questions that are really absolutely vital questions; and, so, I just do not follow the idea that we are going to settle once and for all any procedural question now that is going to have any lasting effect on the work of these two committees.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not know that anyone had contended that you could settle once and for all the procedural question. I undertook to specifically state that it was my own opinion that any member of the committee could raise the question again at any time he saw fit.

PRESENT POSITION

We have to determine each case on its merits as it arises. But now we are in this position—this is the position we are in at the present time:

General Bradley has been asked a question. The general declined to answer it on the ground of immunity, if I understood him correctly; that it was a personal conversation between him and the President in which he, as a personal adviser, confidentially discussed matters with the President; and that he invoked the ruling or the precedent that that was a confidential matter and he was protected from having to state what transpired in that private conference or conversation with the President and his advisers.

The ruling of the Chair was invoked. The Chair ruled that General Bradley did have the immunity that he sought. That is the position we are in today with this witness at this moment before the committee.

The mere fact is that it may arise again, and while precedents are still controlling with some people, and they are respected in the Senate on most parliamentary questions, I have seen the Senate override a precedent, but it does it very seldom.

The precedent does have a bearing in a committee, and I think that, so far as I am concerned as an individual, I would rather have it settled now than to have it hanging over the head of this committee, even though the Senator from Massachusetts, if he wishes to raise a question which is identical to the question respecting this witness, with any other witness, or even with this witness, can do so.

He can do it during the progress of this hearing, and he has a perfect right to do so.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. I recognize the Senator from Arkansas.

PRECEDENT FOR RULING

Senator FULBRIGHT. For whatever it may be worth, this matter did arise a week ago. As a matter of fact, it was last Friday, I think, in the Subcommittee on the RFC, when Mr. Dawson, who is a confidential associate or—what is he?—a secretary of the President, pleaded a very similar immunity from that, the same as the general has; and I ruled as the chairman ruled, and no one on that committee—that is, of either party—raised any question about it. They just accepted it, and we went right on; and so, for whatever it is worth, that was certainly accepted at that time.

I am in thorough accord with the ruling of the chairman, and if there is any way to settle it I am willing to see it settled at this time on this issue.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a parliamentary question?

Chairman RUSSELL. I regret to say that I will have to recognize the Senator from California. You desire to ask a question of the Senator from Arkansas; is that it?

Senator GREEN. No, of you. I would like to ask a parliamentary question.

Chairman RUSSELL. A parliamentary inquiry? Very well, sir. I will undertake to answer it. I am not competent to settle it.

STATUS OF THE APPEAL

Senator GREEN. It seems to me that yesterday a question was asked and a ruling was made, and an appeal taken from that ruling, and then the appeal withdrawn; so, it seems to me, we are just where we were before the question was asked, and I do not see why we should not proceed with the examination of the witness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Senator, of course, has a right to vote when the question is submitted, if he sees fit.

Senator WILEY. That is what I suggested.

Chairman RUSSELL. For my own part, I think it would be very unfortunate if we followed that course of action.

With respect to this appeal, I shall not rule that that appeal will be alive tomorrow if it is not alive today. It is inconceivable to me that an appeal that is not here today can be pending before the committee tomorrow; and so, if it is going to be raised, it will have to be raised, unless the Chair is overridden, on a new set of questions addressed to some other witness.

Now, I recognize the Senator from California.

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to, first, Mr. Chairman, fully approve the statement made by the Senator from Massachusetts.

It seems to me that if get into a distinctly legalistic situation here a great deal of the confidence which the Congress and the country has in the job this committee is doing will be seriously shaken.

DEVELOPING FULL INFORMATION FOR THE COMMITTEE

Our effort, I take it, as a combined committee of two of the most responsible committees of the Senate of the United States, has been to get the facts, to get all the facts, so that, when this committee finally makes its report, the Senate of the United States and, I hope, the House of Representatives, insofar as they may be interested in reading it, and the country, will have confidence in the decisions we finally arrive at.

Now, we can only arrive at those sound decisions if we have adequate information.

The fact of the matter is that all information is not being volunteered by this committee. The documents, pretty largely, that we have, with some exceptions, are documents which were requested by the chairman, acting on his own initiative, or through requests from other members of the committee, that would throw light upon the questions that we are going into, on our general military and foreign policy on the Far East, and facts leading up to the removal of General MacArthur; but those documents are not all being made available.

The documents that we have requested, at least to a partial extent, have been made available to this committee.

Now, the administration, of course, has a tremendous advantage in this situation. They classify certain documents "Top secret" or "Secret," that are not made available either to the Congress or to the country.

As an example, the Wedemeyer report on Korea, which had been requested by responsible committees of the Congress, was suppressed for a period of 4 years, and was only made available for the purposes of this hearing.

Other documents which the Congress of the United States had requested, from time to time, have either not yet been made available or were not made available until long after they could have served a useful purpose.

Now if, in addition to that, another iron curtain is to be lowered in the testimony of the witnesses, then it becomes a question as to whether this committee can properly discharge its duty, and whether or not we do not have a responsibility, at least to the Senate, to go back to them and report that, under the conditions which we face, we may not be able to carry out the obligation which we felt was resting upon us.

RELATIONSHIP OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS TO CONGRESS

I submit that the various executive branches of the Government are the creatures of the Congress. They are not set up under the Constitution. The Department of State, the Department of National Defense, and other departments of the Government are set up by statute.

The Departments cannot speak through the stones and bricks and mortarwork of the Pentagon Building or the State Department. They can only speak through their responsible spokesmen, the Secretary of National Defense and the Secretary of State.

I call your attention to that fact, Mr. Chairman, that we are now engaged in a war in Korea. Our casualties, that have been officially testified to here, approximately 65,000.

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE KOREAN WAR

The fact of the matter is that in the Revolutionary War we had casualties of 12,172; in the War of 1812, we had 6,765; in the Mexican War we had 16,399; in the Spanish-American War, we had 9,530, a total for those four wars of 44,866.

For the five military expeditions of the Philippine Insurrection, the Cuban Pacification, the China Relief, the Mexican Border Incident, and punitive expeditions, we had 7,382, or a total of 52,258; so, already we have had 65,000 in the Korean War.

Now, the Constitution clearly gives the Congress the constitutional right to make war. The Congress was not called upon for a declaration of war either before the event or to recognize by resolution that a state of war existed.

If this committee permits this precedent to stand—that in the matter of a discussion between the responsible department heads of the Government that has been testified Secretary Acheson, Secretary Marshall, Mr. Harriman, and General Bradley attended a conference where this general policy of the removal of General MacArthur was discussed—if we are foreclosed from going into the discussions of those responsible heads because of this alleged private conversation, then, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that a precedent is established that when we get to the point which is very pertinent to this inquiry of the Blair House conferences which took place immediately following the invasion of South Korea by the Communist forces of North Korea, the same statement can be made that those conversations by the department heads are not subject to discussion because they were also on a confidential basis.

Now, Mr. Chairman, what in effect that means is that the Congress finds that we are in a war without a constitutional declaration of war where perhaps five or six people sat down together and agreed that we would go into the war, despite the fact that the advice of the military prior to that time was that Korea was not a good place to engage in hostilities.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator will state his point.

Senator BREWSTER. I do not understand that there is any question before the House except the examination of the witness and that the examination should proceed.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order. I think the record will show that the junior senator from Oregon took an appeal from the decision of the Chair, and I am going to insist upon a consideration of my appeal.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, in either event, the Senator from California has the floor. There is no rule of relevancy in the Senate or in any committees of the Senate that I know anything about, and he has a perfect right, as I understand it, having been recognized, to elaborate on the views that he expresses.

ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION FOR COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to say that I feel my discussion is pertinent, is relevant to the question, because it is a very fundamental question here, and, if you decide this, I think we are going to be foreclosed from other information.

Now, as I was saying, that immediately in my judgment forecloses, if this precedent is sustained by the committee, from going into the discussions which took place at the Blair House at that time. In other words, when we make an inquiry of the Department of State and their representative as to whether or not the State Department urged that the United States immediately become involved in Korea, the answer can come back that was a confidential discussion with the President of the United States.

Now here we will find ourselves completely foreclosed from a great new constitutional question which has arisen where the power to make war has been taken from the Congress of the United States where perhaps six men meeting with the President of the United States put this country into war where we have already suffered over 65,000 casualties in an inquiry in which the American people have a vital interest, one in which we were all aprpoaching this situation with an open mind in order to get the facts, we find that certain documents are hard to get.

We are now going to find that certain testimony is hard to get, and I doubt very much, Mr. Chairman—and I say it most respectfully—that if we are foreclosed in these instances, I doubt if this committee can perform its obligation to the Senate of the United States or to the country, and if that happens, it seems to me that we must go back to the Senate and say that our hearings must of necessity be greatly circumscribed, and with the facts that we gather we cannot come to the conclusions in which the Congress and the country will have confidence.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentleman, at the risk of being criticized for taking too much time, I am going to make a brief statement in connection with Senator Knowland's comments. I do not intend for this record to go out of here with any reflection upon my fairness, if I can help it, as I am trying to be as fair as I can.

Now the Senator has made a very powerful and moving argument in favor of the appeal that Senator Wiley has entered, but says he does not think action can be taken on it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Oh; I have not said that.

Chairman RUSSELL. You certainly did. You said if you decide this thing now, it will foreclose everything. You do not want the issue decided now, after making a very vigorous argument in favor of your position, which you are perfectly entitled do do. You are wholly within your rights.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO RULING AND APPEAL

I did not get some of the connections with respect to your comment on the legalistic situation as if the chairman was forcing some legalistic situation on this committee. Being repetititious, I want to point out that the Senator from Wisconsin raised this issue. The Chair did not raise this issue.

He appealed from the decision of the Chair, then, as I understood him, he withdrew his appeal and he renews it here this morning by wishing to carry it over until tomorrow, so I think that as issues arise in this committee, they ought to be decided and each member can vote with full appreciation of the situation which the eloquent Senator from California apprehends might result here as a result of their vote.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would the Senator yield for a question at that moment?

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a moment. It is certainly something for every Senator to bear in mind when he votes upon the issue of the appeal whenever that vote may be had.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Senator will recall, however, that when this situation arose yesterday very unexpectedly the Senator from

Iowa, Mr. Hickenlooper, had suggested that due to the fact that we had proceeded in such a way and this issue had not been raised before, that what might properly be done was that if the Senator from Wisconsin would withdraw his appeal and the Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the committee, could see fit to withdraw his ruling, that the situation then as suggested by the Senator from Massachusetts, we may get a number of these situations which we could then decide at a later date as to just what action should be taken.

I think if the record will be read very carefully, even the Senator from Louisiana, Mr. Long, had the impression that the withdrawal by the Senator from Wisconsin of his appeal—at least the impression was that it would be tied in with several other moves.

Now, the chairman quite properly—which is entierly within his rights, and I certainly raise no question on it—the Senator felt that he should rule at the time that he ruled, not of his own volition, but because the matter had been put up to him by the question raised by the Senator from Wisconsin.

A reading of the entire record, I think, will indicate that the Senator from Iowa was suggesting that this whole process that led up this thing might be back-tracked from for the moment and not precipitate the type of situation we now confront.

LEGALISTIC ASPECTS OF QUESTION BEFORE COMMITTEE

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, I don't think I need any higher and better evidence of the fact that it appears there are legalistic aspects of this matter that were not introduced by the Chair. The statement that the Senator from California just made shows that in all of the various legalistic ramifications of this hearing the Chair played no part except to discharge his duty here as the unfortunate individual who is called upon to preside over these hearings.

There has been a great deal of legalism about the entire thing. There has been a great deal of hairsplitting and suggestions that are wholly unprecedented by any parliamentary rulings of which I have any knowledge, either in the Senate or in the committee.

CHAIR'S ROLE IN OBTAINING INFORMATION FOR COMMITTEE

But the Chair, in the discharge of his duty, has undertaken to follow the parliamentary procedure, as I understand it is outlined for the benefit of a committee, and I will leave it to any precedent that any Senator can find as to whether or not the chairman of a committee, of his own volition, should refuse to rule upon a point of order that was submitted.

The Senator talked a great deal about documents, and in view of the fact that I made that ruling, I think I should state that I have not only requested every document that any member of the committee has suggested to me, but I have requested a great many documents on my own initiative.

I further wish for the record to show that the Wedemeyer report, referred to by the Senator from California, was specifically requested by the chairman of this committee, with a suggestion that it be downgraded to where it could be given to the world, and that action was taken.

On the Senator's statements and inferences as to the withholding of information, the Chair is not involved. The only way I am involved is the fact I have ruled as I have seen fit on General Bradley's claiming immunity to answer this question.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator do me the courtesy——

Chairman RUSSELL. I will.

Senator KNOWLAND. Certainly there was nothing in what I said that gave the slightest inference the chairman had not, both on his own volition and at the request of the committee members, sought to get everything he felt and some of the rest of us felt should be produced. There was certainly nothing in my statement directly or indirectly which cast any reflection upon the chairman in the performance of his duty, and I did not want the chairman's statement to——

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not think the Senator intended that. But from reading the record, I think that people who do not understand the procedure here might clearly draw that inference, and, therefore, I thank the Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. My statement was directed entirely to some of the executive agencies of the Government and not to the manner in which the chairman is performing his duties.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Senator LODGE. May I make a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator LODGE. Can we have stated completely the precise issues before us?

STATUS OF THE APPEAL

Chairman RUSSELL. If I understand the issue, subject to correction by the committee, Senator Wiley this morning renewed his appeal—that was the effect of it—with the suggestion that it be carried over until tomorrow.

Senator LODGE. Appeal from what?

Chairman RUSSELL. From the ruling of the Chair yesterday on the question as to whether or not General Bradley was compelled to answer the question he asked him on yesterday.

Senator LODGE. And the chairman ruled he was not compelled?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; I yield.

Senator WILEY. I am sure if you read my statement that you will find what I have said was: First, that we, in view of the fact that General Bradley needs to be accommodated and has got to leave, carry on with his testimony; second, that I be privileged tomorrow morning to take the appeal, and that then we spend the time arguing the legal issues.

Then, in response to that, the chairman took the position, as I understood it, that he would not recognize it tomorrow morning, but he would recognize it today, and read into it that I had noted the appeal for today. Now I have not noted the appeal for today. I made this suggestion as a way out. Yesterday in our conversation with the chairman he stated that he would not recognize that anyone else had any right to appeal except me.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Senator, of course, understood that was on the fact that the Senator had withdrawn his appeal, and not that he was going to renew his appeal today or tomorrow or the day following. I shall certainly not be bound by that statement, and I will recognize any member of the committee who wishes to appeal.

Senator WILEY. I am just saying what the chairman said.

Chairman RUSSELL. No notice was served on me that he intended to renew the appeal tomorrow.

POSSIBLE FUTURE APPLICATION OF RULING TO WITNESSES' ANSWERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a parliamentary question as to the view of the chairman in the question that is before us because I think it is important in arriving at any conclusion on this decision or any appeal?

That question is this: In spite of the fact that a witness may be perfectly willing to answer questions which might come under the rule of prohibition of the chairman, that is, on conversations with the President or in the presence of the President, does the chairman feel that it is inherent in his ruling that the witness would be barred in any event from answering those questions?

Chairman RUSSELL. I cannot understand what possibly motivated the Senator to ask that question. I made no such ruling at any time. I am dealing with the concrete issue that is here before us at this time, not with some speculative matter in the future that might arise.

Of course, I have stated again and again that this matter can arise with any Senator's questioning of any witness, and that the committee would be compelled to pass on them as they arose. It is entirely within the discretion of General Bradley, and I understood him to exercise his discretion and decline to answer questions as to what transpired in confidential communication with the President in his role as the military adviser to the President of the United States. That is the issue before us.

Of course, General Bradley has got a right here and now, if he sees fit, to answer the question propounded by Senator Wiley as to whether or not he wishes to tell the details of that confidential discussion at the White House.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, the chairman asked whatever raised that question in my mind, and I want the record to show why I asked the question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Senator from Texas, if you will read his statement a moment ago, indicated, at least so far as I understood his statement, that under no circumstances should any witness be permitted to testify on those things. I want to be perfectly sure as to what inhered in the chairman's ruling and what the committee was going to act upon. Because I certainly have the feeling that the witness must claim the privilege, and that if the witness does not claim the privilege, that irrespective of the source of his conversation or information, it is his affair as to whether or not he testifies to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have a great respect and great affection for the Senator from Texas, but it so happened that the Senator from Georgia has undertaken to preside at these hearings and I cannot be responsible for statements any Senator makes around here. I have a great deal of difficulty in keeping up with my own statements.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I hope the chairman does not feel I am offensive in attempting to clear up a matter that was quite confused.

Chairman RUSSELL. Not at all.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. I will recognize the Senator from Oregon and then I will recognize the Senator from Louisiana.

ISSUE BEFORE COMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I wish most respectfully to make a brief reply to the Senator from Massachusetts, but before I do that I wish to state the issue as I understand it before this committee.

General Bradley was asked by the Senator from Wisconsin yesterday to testify about a conversation that took place with the President at a meeting on April 6, and General Bradley said, in effect, he considered that a confidential conversation and that he did not desire to so testify. The Senator from Wisconsin, the record will show, raised the question as to whether or not he should be required by the committee to answer his question, and the Chair ruled that he should not be required to answer the question, and an appeal was taken.

Chairman RUSSELL. On the ground it was privileged, you might say.

Senator MORSE. Yes. The Chair ruled that he was not required to testify on the ground that the conference was confidential and the conversation was privileged.

Now, gentlemen of the committee, I listened to two radio programs last night—I do not know how many others covered the same point—and both of those radio programs left the impression with the people of this country that listened to the programs that our witness today was running the risk of being cited by this committee for contempt. The whole twist of the program, in my opinion, reflected adversely on General Bradley. I think that in fairness to General Bradley it is the clear public duty of this committee to get this matter settled today, and I am not in favor of hearing one more word of testimony from him until we get this question of procedure settled. This leads me to the comment on the remarks of the Senator from Massachusetts.

IMPORTANCE OF SETTLING LEGAL ISSUE

Since the argument that I made off-the-cuff and curbstone here yesterday afternoon, I have spent a good many hours in the lawbooks on this particular issue. I am ready and prepared, here or on the floor of the Senate today, to argue at some length in support of the legal basis for the position I took yesterday that this whole matter involves a fundamental question of constitutional law in relation to the separation-of-powers doctrine of this system of government.

My good friend from Massachusetts may think that is a legalistic matter, but I say respectfully to him, it goes to the whole question of the rights and freedoms of the Senator from Massachusetts, as well as every other American. I am not going to permit an issue as important as this in our constitutional system to be laid aside or bypassed by a remark that this committee should not engage in legalistic procedure. I want to say that the responsibility of this committee is to lay out an orderly procedure for the conduct of these hearings. That is what the chairman was attempting to do.

When a question is raised as to whether or not a witness shall be compelled to disclose confidential information which under the separation-of-powers doctrine of our system of government he is not required to disclose to any committee, there is nothing legalistic about that, Mr. Chairman. That goes to the question as to whether or not we are going to preserve in this country the three coordinated branches of government, or whether in this hearing an attempt is going to be made to subordinate the executive power to the legislative.

My good friend from Massachusetts spoke about the Tydings hearings last year and said that they got involved in a lot of legalism. This is not the time and the place for me to discuss with the Senator from Massachusetts what happened in the Tydings hearings other than to make this reference to his comment—namely, that I think if they had paid more attention to sound procedure in the Tydings hearings they would not have gotten into some of the difficulties they got into in that hearing.

I have never known the laying out of a sound procedure for the examination of witnesses in accordance with the constitutional power of a committee to be a mistake. I want to say it would be a great mistake if we followed the advice of the Senator from Massachusetts here this morning and laid aside a question which goes to the very heart, in my opinion, of the separation-of-powers doctrine, as we will find if we go into the cases of the Supreme Court itself in some instances.

I say it would be a great mistake to lay that aside and leave a question among the people of the United States as to whether or not the Senate has the power through a committee to call the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before a Senate committee and say to him, "You have got to tell us what happened in a confidential conversation that you had with the President of the United States on April 6."

If you insist on it, then believe me you will get into court on it, because I want to tell you there will be some among us who will make a fight in court as to whether or not any Senate committee will purport to upset a line of precedents during our history that the Senate doesn't have that power.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long has been seeking recognition for some time. I recognize the Senator from Louisiana.

Just a moment. Senator Bridges has told me on two or three occasions here he wished to be recognized. When the Senator from Louisiana concludes, I shall recognize Senator Bridges, and then I shall recognize the Senator from Washington, Mr. Cain.

URGENCY OF SETTLING ISSUE NOW

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, since the name of the Senator from Louisiana appeared in the record with regard to the suggestion made by Senator Hickenlooper yesterday, I would like to make it clear that it was my feeling when the point first arose that we would probably do well to go along with these hearings and see whether or not a witness' refusal to answer any question was keeping us from getting the necessary facts we were trying to develop.

However, after hearing the argument made by the Senator from Oregon, I am inclined to believe we should go ahead and rule on this question.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we do proceed to vote on this thing as soon as Senators can find themselves prepared and ready to vote on it, because it does appear to me that we are holding up this matter of fighting a war. We have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff here. We have all these members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff waiting to testify. We are having to hold up other matters until they can come and testify before this committee, and they are having to keep up with the testimony until that time.

And, in any event, we are not going to get the information that the Senator from Wisconsin wanted.

It is my opinion that if the committee should hold that General Bradley is ordered to answer the question, anyway, that the courts would maintain and uphold him if he doesn't, and all we are now doing is delaying a hearing that should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

DECIDING EACH ISSUE ON ITS MERITS

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, in the first place, I do not want to see this ruling as a precedent for any future witness; and I understand the chairman said that each issue, as it arises, will be decided on its own merits, and therefore, if we pass on this, then it is no precedent for any future thing.

Did I understand you correctly, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think it would be a precedent, but no Senator is bound by the precedent. The committee can vote to change its position on an identical question.

Of course if some slightly different question arises, it will stand on its own merits.

That is what I said.

PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE ON ISSUE AS A SENATOR

Senator BRIDGES. On this particular question, it so happens that when the Truman committee was in existence, of which Senators Brewster and Connally and I were members, for a part of its existence, the present President of the United States, who was then its chairman, took a very definite position on April 3, 1943, in a hearing to which Secretary of War Patterson testified.

The Secretary had been asked to furnish certain information regarding a confidential report which was being prepared for the Inspector General. The report was being prepared by a Lieutenant Colonel Amen.

On April 3, Secretary Patterson appeared to explain his previous action, and furnish the information which was requested; and in response to the opening statement, the then Senator Truman said:

> You know, Mr. Secretary, my attitude, and I am not going to quarrel with you on that; but while the Inspector General has confidential duties to perform for

> the Secretary of War, he gets the wherewithal to perform these duties from the Congress, and I don't think the Congress should be shut off from any information which it may deem necessary for legislative purposes, no matter what it is.

They go on, and later, Mr. Truman, then Senator, said, as chairman of the committee:

> I don't want to carry this contention to its conclusion, but I maintain that I don't think he has got any right to shut off the information from those in Congress who want it.

Now, that was the position of the President of the United States when he was chairman of a committee investigating things similar to this.

I don't know what his position is today, but I gather it is the same as General Bradley's.

DISMISSING BRADLEY WHILE PROCEDURAL QUESTION IS SETTLED

Now, if this is going to go on, I suggest that we dismiss General Bradley and devote the rest of the morning—I don't think General Bradley should be kept here except when he is being questioned, because he has a war to fight, whether General Bradley, or the administration, admits we are in a war or not he has a war to fight and I don't think he should be kept here for us to prolong a legal argument.

If it is in order, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that General Bradley be released.

Chairman Russell. I shall first hear from Senator Cain, and then I have a suggestion of my own with respect to procedure.

I will hear from the Senator from Washington now.

Senator Cain. Senator Bridges just about said what I have in mind, along with a lot of other Senators at this table.

I am tremendously impatient to offer some considered questions to General Bradley. It appears obvious, however, that there is a vast difference of opinion on a question before this committee.

On yesterday, Mr. Chairman, it was agreed by the committee that General Bradley would be excused some time today, not to appear again before next week.

I would suggest that we thrash out this problem before us, and promptly excuse General Bradley until next week, for the good of all concerned.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard?

ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION GIVEN TO COMMITTEE

Chairman Russell. Yes, I recognize the Senator from Connecticut, who has been seeking recognition for some time.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, there never has been a hearing as long as I have been in the Senate which is, of course, going on 7 years, and none that I have ever heard of where more information has been given to a committee and thence to the public than there has been in this one.

It runs some 750,000 words at the present time. In fact, I have trembled more than once at the amount of information and the kind of information which we have given in this unprecedented hearing.

I say that because there are those who now I feel would like to introduce the impression into this hearing, for purposes that do not bear the light of day, that things are now going to be closed up and hidden.

The fact of the matter is that we have been here for over 2 weeks, and this is the first question that has arisen despite the fact that we have covered the entire broad scope of our foreign policy and even, of our military operations and, I regret to say in some cases, our world plans.

That statement is brought forth from me because of the speech by the Senator from California. I feel that there are some of those who had a vast enthusiasm for this investigation 10 days ago who find their enthusiasm for it ebbing somewhat as developments have occurred, and they would like to introduce now certain extraneous notes, which should not be introduced into this hearing.

MAC ARTHUR REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTION

I would like to conclude my brief, if somewhat painful, remarks by reading from our own record in the examination of General MacArthur.

> Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, may I ask this question on a slightly different subject. In this so-called Wake Island conference statement on page 8, on the printed copy, the President is quoted as saying this:
>
> "General MacArthur and I have talked fully about Formosa. There is no need to cover that subject again. The general and I are in complete agreement."
>
> I believe, says Senator Saltonstall, that was also the purport of a communique issued at that time. Is that a fair statement of the President's and your position when you conferred on Formosa, if you care to say? That was a private communication, of course.
>
> General MACARTHUR. I don't think the communique had any reference to Formosa, Senator, and I think that when the President said that he and I were in agreement about Formosa, that he meant the agreement was that both of us had dropped the question of discussing it there at Wake Island, at any other time.
>
> The strategic situation of Formosa, its value, and its general relativity to security in the Far East was not discussed by me with the President.
>
> Now, I would not feel at liberty to reveal what was discussed by the President with me in our conference before the main conference.
>
> Senator SALTONSTALL. I respect that.
>
> General MACARTHUR. But I do offer that explanation of what I am sure the President had in mind when he made that statement.
>
> Senator SALTONSTALL. I respect your position with relation to your conference with the President.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING INFORMATION OR SETTLING LEGAL ISSUE

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I intend to vote against the motion of my good friend from Oregon at this time because of my belief that it will seriously hamper if not actually prevent the obtaining of further information.

On many occasions I have observed citation for contempt and the development of this kind of a situation since I have been here, which is going on 11 years now, and I have never noted that such citations or such tactics obtained one single scrap of information.

When we have heard all of the witnesses, then I may vote for citations against some of them if the questions appear to be vital enough, but I would do so as a last resort. We have proven time and again that you can't make a man talk if he does not want to.

To me, the introduction of these tactics at this time will probably destroy any chance of obtaining any more information. Now I feel very strongly, I say to my friend from Oregon, that this is not basically a legal question. I am certainly not going to undertake to match his skill and his knowledge of the law, because I am not a lawyer, but although I am not a lawyer, I am just as wedded to the Constitution as he is and I am just as wedded to the principle of separation of powers as he is, and I know he is just as wedded to the security of this country as I am, and this hearing has been remarkable up to date in the information that it has obtained, and I hate to see this note introduced which I think will result in the shutting down of information that is vital to the security of our country.

I do not think we have reached such a sorry situation here in America that our constitutional processes are in conflict with the security of our country.

I have heard people say that. I have had somebody say to me that we have these eighteenth-century institutions of government that are impractical in the modern world. I repudiate that idea.

I think we can maintain our democratic institutions and we can look out for the security of our country and we can do them both, but we are not going to get any more good out of this investigation if we introduce these tactics at this time.

When we have heard our principal witnesses, when we have seen what the points are that we can's get the information on, then will be the time to resort to these tactics.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman.

CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF ADVISOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO PRESIDENT

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a brief statement about this matter. I am in favor of determining this situation now.

We face all of these issues when they arise and determine them then. We cannot wait until we are all through and have a whole mass of these matters.

Now this is a fundamental question to my mind. If this committee can bring General Bradley up here and force him to testify regarding what he says was a private confidential conversation between him and the President of the United States, when he was acting as the President's confidential adviser, if we can do that, then there can be no consultations by any President or anybody else that a committee of Congress cannot go in and pry open and find out what transpired.

That would be absolutely destructive of the independence and the integrity of the President and of every other confidential officer in this Government.

It seems to me that that is so fundamental that you don't need any legalistic argument about it. It is perfect common sense. You don't believe that. I don't believe there is a Senator here that will admit openly that is his belief, that we can go into these conversations.

General MacArthur respected it, as quoted by the Senator from Connecticut, when he said that conversation that he had with the President was personal and confidential and he didn't think he could reveal it; and it was agreed to by this whole committee, including the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Saltonstall, who had asked the question. He didn't press the question.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I can't ever agree to a policy like that. I agree with the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse, that if it should come down to that, I would join with him and others in a determined effort in the courts or in the Senate or elsewhere to maintain the integrity of our system of the division of powers.

How could a President do anything if all you would have to do would be to station a man out in front of the White House and take down the name of anybody that should go in and see the President and then jerk him up before a committee and say, "You were down to the White House last Tuesday, the 15th"—whenever it was—"and you saw the President, didn't you?" "Yes." "Well, tell us what he said. Tell us what you said to him. Tell us all of the confidential conversation that transpired between you and the President of the United States."

Mr. Chairman, it is unthinkable. It is absolutely destructive of our constitutional concepts. It is absolutely ruinous. it is tragedy. I am surprised that any Senator should advocate such a policy.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

ISSUE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Senator WILEY. If we could arrive at the procedure we are to follow this morning, I would like to be heard on this legal phase of this matter. I, too, have given some study to it.

In every law suit the facts determine generally the law that is applicable. Speaking to my good friend from Connecticut's viewpoint, that there has been extraneous matter, I call his attention to the fact that on the first examination I had of General Marshall I stated I thought there was but one issue.

General Bradley yesterday named the second issue, but the one issue I said was whether or not in my opinion, before the bar of public opinion, the facts justified the action of the President.

I compared it to the case in the Senate where a Senator, when an appointment is made by the President from his State, can say the oppointee is personally obnoxious. That is equivalent to the President's absolute power, because in the Senate we have recognized that as the privilege of a Senator, and we have generally said, "Senator, we will follow you."

But when the Senator comes through and starts to say why he is personally obnoxious and tries to substantiate that conclusion, then it is our function and our duty to examine into the facts.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in my humble opinion, the President of the United States, and I think General Bradley himself, unless the President prohibited him, would be willing to tell the facts that surround the episode.

That is what the people are entitled to. The facts are undisputed that until the letter came to Congressman Martin there were no criticisms of General McArthur's public expressions, and even yesterday in his letter Marshall said in substance that the directives did not apply to the so-called war issue, but did apply to the political issues.

Now I go back to the facts. This man was dismissed. The President and the committee hears all those who participated in consummating the dismissal. We are not asking anything in relation to—anything that is going to injure public policy or injure the safety of the country.

All we are asking, Mr. Chairman, is to tell us what went on in these group hearings. I call your attention that the President wasn't always present. The first hearing the President wasn't there. Are you going to apply the rule to that?

When General Bradley called the Chiefs of Staff and held a meeting at 5 o'clock in the afternoon in his office, the President wasn't there. Are you going to claim that is privileged, confidential?

The next day the President called him over. It was that discussion on the 6th that the general said that he thought was confidential. People say the incident in relation to MacArthur has application. It has no application. At the time of MacArthur he wasn't fired.

We are investigating the justice and the merit and the equity of this firing, gentlemen. That is the basis, that is the issue. Certainly the President can exercise a certain right, prerogative. When Senator Morse says there are hundreds of cases, yes, there are hundreds of cases every way. And when the distinguished Senator from Georgia, our chairman, cites the matter of Marshall—what Marshall of that day said—it is very pertinent, because the President complied with his order. There are hundreds of cases where the President has complied and others where he hasn't complied.

I say for the sake of justice, for the sake of truth, for the sake of the people, the witnesses should tell us how this thing was engineered, what was said, what the facts were that they said justified the act.

It doesn't have anything to do with the military policy of his country, endangering this country. It seems to me very clear that the President should follow what he said as a Senator, that Senator Bridges quoted.

If we are going ahead, Mr. Chairman, on the argument of the law, I would like to be heard.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

STATUS OF THE APPEAL

Senator GREEN. Would the Senator make it clear whether he is renewing his appeal made yesterday, which was withdrawn, or whether he is making a different motion now that we postpone action until tomorrow.

Senator WILEY. I made the suggestion, I did not renew the appeal. Senator Morse made the appeal. What I suggested twice before was that we postpone this argument that has been going on until tomorrow so that in the meanwhile all the Senators could arrive at their conclusions from investigation of the precedents.

Senator GREEN. That is what I understood, but the chairman——

Senator WILEY. Then in reply the chairman made the statement, as I got it, that he didn't think that I would have the right tomorrow to exercise the appeal pursuant to my suggestion.

Thereupon, Senator Morse said he would take the appeal. Thereupon, I stated that I understood the chairman to say to me and Senator Bridges he didn't think anyone else had the right to take an appeal except myself, and that he had questions as to my right; and that, however, he would not raise that question of my rights.

Senator MORSE. Will the Senator yield?

Chairman **Russell**. Just a moment. I want to set this straight. Just a moment, please.

The Senator from New Hampshire and the Senator from Wisconsin did me the honor to call on me in my office and discuss this matter with me. I stated to them that in my opinion the appeal had been withdrawn, that I thought the matter stood now on the record that it was ended, that I had just finished perusing the record and I just read the last line before these two Senators came into my office, and I told them undoubtedly in my opinion the thing was ended.

I did tell the Senator from Wisconsin that I would not rely upon a technicality of that kind with him, that if he desires to press the appeal today, that he would have a perfect right to do so.

I didn't think that I would permit any other Senator to appeal, because of the fact that the matter was concluded, but that was one proposition entirely.

The Senator from Wisconsin did not state he intended to renew the appeal today or suggest that the matter be carried over until tomorrow. Those matters were not mentioned in my presence.

So when the Senator from Wisconsin—however, I might say here I requested the Senator, if he changed his mind, to please let me know at the earliest possible date.

I was in my office this morning considerably before 8 o'clock, and I received no communication until I walked into this committee room, when the Senator said that he was going to suggest that an appeal go over until tomorrow.

In my opinion of equity, justice, and fairness, that reopened the entire question here, and therefore I have stated that, in view of that fact, I thought the appeal could properly be taken by any other member of the committee.

EXCUSING OF BRADLEY

I will recognize the Senator from Wyoming.

Senator **Hunt**. Mr. Chairman, we have now consumed fully 2 hours of General Bradley's time. He is a very busy man. He has most important functions to perform. If it is in order, I move the General be dismissed—rather, that he be excused.

Senator **Fulbright**. I second the motion. Not "dismissed" but "excused."

RESTATING QUESTION TO BRADLEY

Chairman **Russell**. Just one minute before you vote upon that motion. I think it is debatable. I should make a statement. The suggestion has been made here, I believe by Senator Hickenlooper, that the questions be again propounded to General Bradley before he is excused.

I want the record to show that suggestion was made so that if anyone desires to make a motion to that effect, he is at liberty to do so.

Senator **Wiley**. I so move.

Senator **Saltonstall**. I make the motion that General Bradley be asked by the Chair, that the Chair read the record—let me put it in the formal way.

General Bradley refused to answer some time ago. I should like to ask if the question is read and General Bradley answers, what issue is before us at the moment? I ask: Will the Chair read the question from the record of yesterday or permit Senator Wiley to ask the question and see if General Bradley now wishes to answer.

I make that, sir, as a motion or as a suggestion.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. May I ask the chairman a question or two? Does the chairman share my understanding——

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, the original question is on page 1994 of the transcript, the fifth line down.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I complete my question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. The Senator was recognized.

Senator MORSE. Does the chairman share my understanding that General Bradley has not refused to explain to this committee the conclusions and the decisions that were reached at the April 6 meeting with the President, but that he has only refused to testify as to the conversations which took place between himself and the President at that conference?

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall take the liberty of reading into the record the question that caused this whole controversy to arise. I am starting on page 1993.

> Senator WILEY. All right, now; we are coming to April 6, the one you just mentioned, Friday morning.
>
> You said that at that time there was the President; there was the Joint Chiefs of Staff——

General Bradley intervened there and stated:

> No, sir; I did not say the Joint Chiefs.
>
> Senator WILEY. I beg your pardon.
>
> You said there was Marshall, Acheson—and who else?
>
> General BRADLEY. Harriman and myself.

I read that to show that the President was present.

> Senator WILEY. All right.
>
> Now tell us what was said then?
>
> General BRADLEY. Senator, at that time I was in a position of a confidential adviser to the President. I do not feel at liberty to publicize what any of us said at that time.

If anyone desires any more of the record read, why I shall be happy to read it, but I think if you read it all you will not have the issue any more clearly presented than it was at that time.

TESTIMONY ON CONCLUSIONS AND CONVERSATIONS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, is it the chairman's understanding, and it certainly is mine, that General Bradley stands ready to testify as to why they reached the decision they reached in regard to the dismissal of General MacArthur?

He is willing to set forth the conclusions of the President and the others at that conference, but that he does stand on his confidential relationship with the President in not disclosing conversations that took place?

Now, I think if we proceeded to examine it on the reasons for the decision, on the conclusions that have been reached, you would get the evidence that you need, but I think the moment you get, as the Senator from Wisconsin did, into a request that he disclose a conversation with the President, that he stands on sound grounds and important grounds in refusing to give that information.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the Senator's opinion. That is one thing that the committee will have to determine.

Senator MORSE. I suggest you ask General Bradley if that is his position.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now what was your motion, Senator Wiley?

Senator WILEY. I moved that the question suggested by Senator Hickenlooper be asked General Bradley.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, you have been here through the entire discussion that has taken place. You have not been permitted to put in your oar because members of the committee have been speaking either as to their own views or as to what they think yours are or should be.

I shall ask you now as to whether you refuse to give this committee, decline to give this committee in answer to any question asked, any of the conclusions that were arrived at in any conferences you might have held with the other Joint Chiefs of Staff or with the President and other confidential advisers?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that it be desirable, at least as I see it, to merely ask a simple question of General Bradley, does he desire to respond to the question that was asked him yesterday.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Chair has given up long since any hope of pleasing all the members of this committee. But the Senator from Oregon suggested the question I have asked. I understood that other Senators on my left here joined in in requesting that that question be asked. The Chair cannot ask but one question at a time. He will then reach the question suggested by the Senator from Iowa.

Senator MORSE. I respectfully renew my question.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you want it read back to you, General Bradley?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON—Resumed

General BRADLEY. I understand the question.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

General BRADLEY. I do not believe I have refused to answer any question as to conclusions reached. I have not been asked yet to give the military opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I am prepared to give, and I think that is the important issue that I can testify to, and I can testify to it, because the reasons, the military reasons, that they gave General Marshall for thinking that General MacArthur should be relieved, were discussed before this committee when General Marshall was before it, and he said that I would give them.

Since he said that I could give them, and would give them, and they were made to him, I feel perfectly free to give those reasons which I think are the principal ones upon which I am qualified to testify.

However, I will not refuse or decline to answer any questions as to the outcome of the various conferences held at the White House.

I still think that if I could try to remember conversations and repeat them here, in the first place, it would be difficult; in the second place, as

I stated yesterday, I do not think it proper for me to try to repeat conversations with the President.

General MacArthur begged off from answering that question, as was stated on page 104 of the testimony; General Marshall declined to answer a similar question on page 1081 of the testimony, and there was nothing said about his declining to answer a similar question.

I am perfectly willing to answer questions as to the result of these conferences; I am perfectly willing to give you the reasons advanced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their statement to General Marshall, because General Marshall has stated I can give them.

INTERVENTION OF ARMED FORCES DAY

May I add a little more on this, sir, because I have been listening here for the last 2 days?

Chairman **Russell**. I think you are entitled to make a statement, General.

General **Bradley**. I would like to bring out that my asking to get away today is not for my personal convenience. It is in connection with Armed Forces Day, which is held once a year, in which we try to present to the people in the various parts of the country what we are trying to do and establish a closer relationship between them and their Armed Forces.

My statement yesterday,, I want to emphasize, was in connection with that Armed Forces Day. So far as I am concerned, I would be very pleased if I never had to make a speech. It is work and I don't like to make them. I feel it is my duty to make them once in a while, and that is why I make them.

When I retire, I don't expect to ever make any. [Laughter.]

BRADLEY'S POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

One other thing I would like to clear up. I was referred to here yesterday as the President's witness. I thought I was the committee's witness.

I would like to point out that I am neither a Democratic nor a Republican. I think it would be improper if I were, in my position. I have never voted, and if I ever do, which I expect to after I retire and settle in a community, I expect to vote on the issues. It is a little bit late in life to become either a Democrat or Republican, I expect, so I want to point out that I am here, in my opinion, as a committee witness.

WILLINGNESS TO TESTIFY ON REASONS AND RESULTS

Now, the statement has been made here to the effect that an "iron curtain" has been pulled down over my testimony. I do not think it has, Mr. Chairman.

I have only declined to answer one question on a confidential basis. I am perfectly willing, as I say, to give what I think is pertinent, and that is the conclusions reached at those conferences; and I am perfectly willing to tell you the reasons advanced by the three Chiefs of Staff when they gave their reasons to General Marshall.

I hope I have answered your question, but I hope that it will not be considered as having been given in too full a form.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I think you did answer it, General, to my complete satisfaction.

I would like to know from the members of the committee now if they wish any further questions propounded with respect to the issue that is immediately pending before this committee?

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, when Senator Morse requested that, I understood that he included not only the conclusions reached at such a conference, but the reasons for the conclusions, is that right?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course.

Senator MORSE. I understood his answer to mean that he would give the reasons.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let me ask the question then. General, as I understand it, your claim of immunity as a confidential adviser to the President of the United States, being compelled to disclose what took place in a confidential conference or in confidential conferences, between you and the President and other advisers is up to this time limited merely as to what was actually said by individuals at that conference?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; and I think if you will look up the record you will find that General Marshall testified as to the general results of all of these conferences held.

Chairman RUSSELL. But that question we will have to go into later.

Does that clarify it?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

REQUEST TO ASK QUESTIONS OF BRADLEY

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just ask two or three questions, since we have had this thing up.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, let's have a vote here.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am perfectly willing, so far as I am concerned, Senator Wiley, for you to ask questions; but I think if you do so, I will have to permit any other members of the committee to ask them.

Senator WILEY. As I precipitated this matter, I want to ask about three questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I shall take the liberty of ruling that Senator Wiley is entitled to ask three questions of this witness, without any other members of this committee——

Senator FULBRIGHT. Had the matter been settled on the question of proceeding?

Chairman RUSSELL. No. Senator Wiley wanted to ask some questions with respect to some of the matters General Bradley testified to.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't understand our order.

Where are we, with regard to the appeal, and so on? Is that all forgotten?

Senator MORSE. I have not withdrawn it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will the chairman please elucidate on it?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley asked unanimous consent that he be allowed to ask two or three questions.

Senator LODGE. Senator Morse's motion is pending, is it not?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

REQUEST THAT BRADLEY BE EXCUSED

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, would it be in order to ask unanimous consent, to ask that General Bradley be now excused?

Chairman Russell. It would be in order.

Senator Brewster. My purpose is this: As I understand, we are not going to have a meeting this afternoon, is that correct, that we are not going to meet this afternoon?

Chairman Russell. The committee?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Chairman Russell. No. As I understand, there is a unanimous-consent motion on the floor that will prevent us, this afternoon.

Senator Brewster. Are we not going to begin to vote at 12:30 on grain to India?

Chairman Russell. Twenty minutes after.

Senator Brewster. You mean to say we will still meet?

Chairman Russell. I said we would not.

Senator Brewster. That is what I understood; so that I think there is no member of this committee who would question that, if we are going to dispose of this appeal this morning, General Bradley will not be heard between now and 1 o'clock, so it would seem to me that, in justice to him, and to the cause with which he is primarily concerned, that he should be excused.

Chairman Russell. I know of no rule that controls parliamentarily, when two unanimous-consent motions are pending at the same time.

I shall put the last one first.

The Senator from Maine has asked unanimous consent that General Bradley be excused from any further attendance upon this committee today.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object——

Chairman Russell. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator Morse. Reserving the right to object, I think it would be a great injustice to General Bradley to excuse him at this time, as, within the last 5 minutes we seem to have made great progress.

Senator Kefauver. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Senator Wiley. Let me ask my questions.

Chairman Russell. Objection being heard to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Maine, I shall now propose the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Wisconsin, that he be permitted to ask some questions, I think he limited it to three, of General Bradley.

Is there objection?

Senator Fulbright. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman——

Chairman Russell. The Senator from Arkansas.

CONDUCT OF THE HEARING

Senator Fulbright. Reserving the right to object, I wish to speak about 1 minute with regard to the statement made by the Senator from California a moment ago.

For the record, I hope the inference from the rather long speech that he made, which could be drawn, does not become a fact.

I hope the Senator has not decided to sabotage and discredit the hearing simply because the evidence now being presented does not support General MacArthur.

As a member of this committee, I will, of course, share whatever discredit may accrue to this committee.

The Senator from California, among others, was extremely anxious to get these hearings, and now, he seems to be threatening to condemn the whole hearing as a whitewash.

He stated, if I understood him correctly, that an iron curtain is being drawn over the evidence, by General Bradley and the others, which would be interpreted as a preliminary to an effort to say that this whole proceeding is a whitewash, and that the democratic administration is drawing an iron curtain down upon the whole investigation.

I simply wish to say that I hope that inference does not prove to be correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Might I make a statement, as a matter of personal privilege?

Chairman RUSSELL. You may reserve the right to object.

Senator KNOWLAND. I will reserve the right to object, Mr. Chairman.

I submit that I have been in regular attendance. I do not believe that I have missed 5 minutes of the testimony of any witness before the committee.

I resent very much the suggestion that I am trying to sabotage this hearing. I have entered into it in good faith. I feel that I have an obligation, as a Senator of the United States, to get the facts and all the facts, and the truth and all the truth.

I have supported, in the 6 years I have been in the Senate of the United States, what I believed to be a policy that would protect the defenses of this country, both in Europe and in Asia.

I have supported Senator Vandenberg, and others, in the development of a bipartisan foreign policy.

I have only been critical of its because I felt they were leaving the door to communism wide open in Asia, when they were closing it in Europe; and I deeply resent the suggestion by the Senator from Arkansas, or anyone else, that I was motivated by any motives other than getting the facts which I believe this committee, and the Congress, and the country are entitled to have.

I shall continue to discharge by duties, both in the committee and on the floor of the Senate of the United States, to such an extent as I believe I will be properly serving this country.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question is:

Is there objection?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair hears none.

Senator Wiley, you may proceed.

PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON BRADLEY'S ANSWERING QUESTIONS

Senator WILEY. General Bradley, is there any objection on the part of the President to your giving the conversation that took place on April 5, in your office, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when the President was not there; and

Is there any objection, by the President, to your giving the conversation that took place in his office on the 6th, and any subsequent date when you were considering ways and means of recalling General MacArthur.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is a long question. Do you want it read back to you?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I have it.

As far as the meting on April 5 was concerned, between the three Chiefs of Staff and myself, I do not believe that the President would be concerned, because, as you say, he was not there and has no idea of what was said.

However, normally, minutes kept of such a meeting, if minutes had been kept, the release of them might be questionable.

In this case there were no minutes kept.

Senator WILEY. I don't hear you, sir.

General BRADLEY. In this case, there were no minutes kept of the meeting on April 5. It was merely, as I told you yesterday, to warn them that this thing might come up, and to start studying about it.

As far as the President's objection to my repeating conversations held in his office on April 6——

Senator WILEY. And subsequent dates?

General BRADLEY. And subsequent dates, in connection with this——

Senator WILEY. MacArthur——

General BRADLEY. This matter, I do not know.

As a result of the ruling of your committee yesterday, and of the discussion before this committee, before I left here, I assumed that I was not supposed to ask that question, so I did not ask the President that question.

CONSULTING PRESIDENT ON ANSWERING QUESTIONS

Senator WILEY. Well, question No. 2.

Will you find out, so that you can report at a subsequent hearing, whether the President will claim that the conversations at those meetings are confidential, that he makes that claim, and will you make that claim?

Chairman CONNALLY. I make a point of order on that Mr. Chairman. That goes to the question that we have before us now; and I think it is out of order to ask General Bradley what if the President so-and-so, and so-and-so.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, there are hundreds of cases where the President has yielded up information, when the opposition would claim that he need not have done so. There are all kinds of cases; and of coruse, in the last three Congresses, the issue has come to the fore.

This is a perfectly proper question, asking him whether or not he will find out from the President whether he claims what went on is confidential.

Chairman CONNALLY. I withdraw the point of order. I think General Bradley can answer the question properly.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, a point of order: General Bradley has said he would give the reasons and the conclusions, so that the only point is, who actually said what.

Is that what the Senator from Wisconsin wants to find out, whether he is willing to try to reconstruct the whole conversation?

Senator WILEY. I think my question is very clear.

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman is ready to rule on the point of order.

But, as I see it, this issue involves the Office of the President of the three coordinate branches of the Government.

The views of the President of the United States are not compelling on a committee, and when a committee requests anything of the President, or any executive branch of the Government, that is not compelling on the President.

It is not only not compelling on the President, it is not compelling on the witness; if the witness, from his own sense of propriety, feels he should not testify to a certain issue, he is not compelled to consult with the President of the United States.

This does not, as I see it, involve just Harry S. Truman.

His views as Senator, might be pertinent, they might be persuasive to some members of the committee.

But, as I see it, this issue involves the Offce of the President of the United States; the Chief Magistrate, you might say, should be completely divorced from Harry S. Truman.

I think General Bradley is entitled to answer that question.

Do you wish to confer with the President, and you can tell the committee so?

If he wishes to rely on his own immunity as confidential advisor to the President, he may do so.

Do you want the question red back, or do you have it?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Read it back, Mr. Reporter, so we can have it.

Mr. Chairman, might the question be read?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Massachusetts asks unanimous consent that the question be read back.

Is there any objection?

(There was no response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair hears no objection.

Will the reporter please turn back his notes, and read the question of the Senator from Wisconsin.

(Question No. 2, asked by Senator Wiley, was read by the reporter.)

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion I should not be placed in the position of going to the President of the United States asking for a breakdown in this confidential relationship.

After listening to the various arguments by the members of this committee who apparently know constitutional law and other law, it seems to me that I would be placed in a very bad position if I should go to the President and ask him for permission to discuss in public and to release the conversations which I have held with him.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. I understood from your statement yesterday—and that is why I asked the second question—that there was something in your mind to the effect that you were going to find out whether it was considered confidential.

CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF CONVERSATIONS

Now if I was mistaken, why that is all right. Now this is my third question. On your own authority without consulting anybody else, are you taking the position that the conversation on the 5th and the

6th and the subsequent matters are not subject, on the same ground of the same being confidential, subject for the people of this country to have?

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you want that question read back to you, General?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I took that position entirely on my own initiative. As a matter of fact I did not expect it to come up. If I had, I might have consulted some lawyer on it, but I did not expect it to come up because you had accorded General MacArthur that privilege, you had accorded General Marshall that privilege, and consequently I did not expect to get into the question at all. I thought you would extend to me the same privilege you had to them.

RECOLLECTION OF MEETING WITH JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, APRIL 5, 1951

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you care to answer that part of the question which referred to your conference with the Joint Chiefs on the 5th, General Bradley? That was involved in that question. That is the reason I asked you whether you wanted it read back.

General BRADLEY. Well, actually I do not remember the actual substance of the conversation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 5th.

I probably would have forgotten that I had called them except that in looking back on my diary I found the following week when I started looking it up, that I had called them at that time and then that reminded me that I had called them to warn them that this thing might come up, and I still do not remember where I got any information which led me to call them.

It has been suggested by someone in my office since yesterday that maybe that was the result of the tickertape thing that was brought in, saying that this was now up. I don't know. I honestly cannot remember just what brought it up.

I don't know quite what bearing it has on it. I just know from looking up the notes, the diary, that I did have that meeting and then I talked to one of the chiefs this morning. He couldn't remember my stating where I got the information, but that we had been called together to discuss this briefly and be ready to give an answer later on if called upon.

BRADLEY EXCUSED FROM FURTHER ATTENDANCE

Chairman RUSSELL. The question occurs on Senator Hunt's motion that General Bradley be excused from further attendance upon this committee today. Those in favor of this motion will say "Aye."

(Chorus of "Ayes.")

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed will say "No."

(Chorus of "Noes.")

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair is in doubt and the roll will be called.

Mr. MUDGE. Mr. George?

Senator GEORGE. Aye.

Mr. MUDGE. Mr. Green?

Senator GREEN. Aye.

Mr. MUDGE. Mr. McMahon?

Senator MCMAHON. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Fulbright?

Senator Fulbright. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator Sparkman. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Gillette?

Senator Gillette. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Wiley?

Senator Wiley. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Smith?

Senator Smith. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Lodge?

Senator Lodge. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Tobey?

(No response.)

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Brewster?

Senator Brewster. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Chairman Connally, of the Foreign Relations Committee?

Chairman Connally. No.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Byrd?

Senator Byrd. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Johnson?

Senator Johnson. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Kefauver?

Senator Kefauver. No.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Hunt?

Senator Hunt. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Stennis?

Senator Stennis. No.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Long?

Senator Long. No.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Bridges?

Senator Bridges. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator Saltonstall. No.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Morse?

Senator Morse. No.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Knowland?

Senator Knowland. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Cain?

Senator Cain. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Mr. Flanders?

Senator Flanders. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. Chairman Russell?

Chairman Russell. Aye.

Mr. Mudge. The following Senators are recorded in the affirmative: George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Brewster, Byrd, Johnson, Hunt, Bridges, Knowland, Cain, Flanders, Russell.

The following Senators are recorded in the negative: Chairman Connally, Kefauver, Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse.

Chairman CONNALLY. I want to say that my reason is not because I want to inconvenience General Bradley. I want to accommodate him, but I just voted that way because I thought we ought to go on and settle this question that has been pending here today without any further delay.

Chairman RUSSELL. On the motion of Senator Hunt the ayes are 19 and the noes are 6.

General Bradley, you are therefore excused from further attendance today. I do not know just when——

Senator BRIDGES. Will you yield?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. May I point out there are not that many Senators present—19 and 6.

Chairman RUSSELL. There are 25 here.

Senator BRIDGES. All right. Then there is just one absentee.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Everyone is here but Senator Tobey.

Chairman RUSSELL. Everyone is here but Senator Tobey.

Senator BRIDGES. I am in error.

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I make a question of procedure before General Bradley is dismissed?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

BRADLEY EXCUSED UNTIL MAY 21, 1951

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, may I not ask whether we did not agree yesterday that tentatively at least General Bradley would be allowed to leave the city tonight that he might fill his engagements?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the question I wished to raise here when Senator Saltonstall interrupted with some other procedural question.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would like to say that I agree General Bradley should leave this afternoon. I did not mean by voting in the negative not to do that.

My question is: If General Bradley is dismissed now, is it the intention of the Chair to get another witness or what? I do not understand that Senator Wiley is now pressing his question on these conversations. Is there anything pending before the committee—appeals or anything else?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair does not agree with that statement. I can give you my views on it. I think there is a question pending.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that General Bradley be allowed to proceed to fill his engagements as he detailed to us yesterday and he not be required to report until further notified next week.

Chairman RUSSELL. If I could have had an opportunity to have made a statement to the committee, Senator—the Chair must ask he be permitted to make a statement with respect to the testimony of General Bradley. It was my understanding on yesterday that the committee did agree, at least no objection was raised, that General Bradley should fill his engagements over the week-end. I think that has already been done, but I will put the motion for unanimous consent of my distinguished colleague that it is the understanding of the committee that General Bradley will be excused from attendance upon this committee until he has concluded the engagements which he outlined on yesterday.

I believe you stated that you could be available on Monday?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. Now, General, I do not know how long the committee will discuss the issue which is pending before it. It may consume quite some time. But I should like to ask you if any other of the Joint Chiefs is available to testify on either tomorrow or on Friday in the event the committee should determine the procedural matters pending prior to that time.

General Bradley. Yes, sir; I believe General Vandenberg and Admiral Sherman will both be available tomorrow and Friday.

Chairman Russell. Do you have suggestion as to which should be called first?

General Bradley. I would suggest you call General Vandenberg first.

Chairman Russell. They will both be available through Friday?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. Now, Senator Saltonstall; excuse me. I wanted to take up the unanimous-consent motion.

Senator George. The only reason I suggested unanimous consent was because the former motion by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming, Senator Hunt, it was my understanding, merely asked the general be excused for the day; and it was my understanding that we tentatively agreed that General Bradley would be allowed to leave us tonight anyway.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object——

Chairman Russell. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator Morse. I thought we all understand General Bradley could not be back after today, and my vote against excusing him at the present time was a vote, I thought, for keeping him here until 1 o'clock, which I understand is our adjournment hour, because I thought we were making great progress with regard to the procedural matter before us while he was here, with his help.

Chairman Russell. No objection has been heard by the Chair to the unanimous consent proposed by the Senior Senator from Georgia. Therefore, General Bradley, we excuse you from further attendance upon this committee until Monday morning. I hope we may be able to resume your testimony by that time, but I will see that you are notified by the staff of the committee.

Thank you, General.

(At this point General Bradley left the room.)

BACKGROUND OF APPEAL

Chairman Russell. Well, gentlemen, the question recurs here upon the appeal from the decision of the Chair that General Bradley was entitled to claim immunity from testifying with respect to private conversations transpiring between the general, the President of the United States, and two other advisers, which were held confidentially at the White House on April 6.

The general claims immunity from being compelled to go into details. The general has contended that he was entitled to immunity, and the Chair delivered a curbstone opinion at the time, upheld the contentions of the general, and ruled that under the division of powers between the three coordinate but equal branches of the Government that neither had the right to inflict upon the prerogatives of the other as to private matters wholly within the sphere of the operation of any one branch of the Government.

Now on yesterday I had not anticipated this matter would arise, and if the committee will indulge me, I wish to make a brief record of matters and rulings in support of that ruling.

POSSIBLE RECESS

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, is there a question about the continuance now of the committee in view of the session of the Senate?

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall desist here if the Senator wishes to make a motion.

Senator BREWSTER. I feel it is certainly not going to be possible to dispose of this matter in the time allotted, so I believe I should raise the point we should now recess.

Senator MCMAHON. May I raise a point of parliamentary inquiry? Can that motion carry an amendment to recess in 15 minutes?

Chairman RUSSELL. I might say to the Senator that I would just as soon recess here as any other stage of the proceedings.

PROCEDURE OF DEBATE ON APPEAL FROM RULING

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator would withhold his motion for just a minute, let me inquire as to what—as one who has been very much interested in this subject but who has tried not to take up any time here—will be the procedure if we do not go on and wrestle with this matter and bring it to a head and decide it?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course, the committee has a number of parliamentary weapons available to terminate this matter. A motion could be made to lay the appeal on the table; and if a majority of the committee thought it should be laid upon the table without clearing up this parliamentary matter at this stage, they would be wholly within their rights to vote to lay it on the table.

If that motion is not made, the appeal is in itself debatable and will be debated, and members will then be permitted to vote on the appeal.

The question that will finally be decided in that event is, Shall the ruling of the Chair be, and is the ruling of the Chair the sense of the committee?

If a majority of the members vote that in the affirmative—vote affirmatively on that question—the ruling would stand.

If a majority of the members disagree with that finding the matter would then be before the committee as to what further procedures should be taken to enforce answers to questions propounded by Senator Wiley.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, with the idea of expediting the committee's work, of which this is just one question, and which is important, but it is, after all just one question, may I suggest to the chairman that Senator Bridges and two other ranking members, Senator Wiley and Senator Connally, try to work out some plan—say, we discuss this thing for 2 hours, or 2½ hours, with the minimum time allowed each Senator, at the most, and I believe that it would be timely if we could set up some procedure and dispose of this matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. I would have no objection. Of course, I think that can only be done by unanimous approval.

Senator STENNIS. Yes; I am sure it must have that.

PENDENCY OF APPEAL

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask most respectfully if it is not possible to ask Senator Wiley if he still insists on his question. I understood by his unanimous consent to ask General Bradley the three other questions that as a practical matter this issue for the present, at least, was withdrawn, and that we were going ahead with this hearing in an orderly way, as we had been.

Now, if I am wrong in that, and Senator Wiley insists on the questions, then, of course, what the chairman is saying, under the ruling is to the point.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not sure which motion an appeal is pending to, but I know there is an appeal pending, unless it is withdrawn, because the Senator from Wisconsin took an appeal and the Senator from Oregon likewise took an appeal from the chairman's ruling.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would most respectfully ask the Chair as a point of order, if Senator Wiley withdraws his question, is there any appeal then pending from a question which has been withdrawn?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not see how the Senator from Wisconsin, in withdrawing his question, would have any effect whatever on it. The thing has proceeded now to where a ruling has been made by the Chair, and withdrawing the original question I do not think would vitiate the ruling. It might. I am perfectly willing for the committee to take a vote on that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I most respectfully say, and I want to cooperate with the Chair, because I have a great deal of confidence—I have utter confidence—in the Chair's fairness and in his attempts to rule as he has.

In a parliamentary way would it not be very helpful if Senator Wiley decided to withdraw his question, to end this discussion, and thus it might never come up again; it might never come up in these hearings, and we proceed for the purposes for which we came here, without getting sort of sidetracked on legalistic and very difficult questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. I must say to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts for whom I have great respect and personal affection that I think if there is any effort by the Chair to dispose of the question now, it would be an infringement on the prerogative of this committee. I think any member of the committee could object to some action here by the presiding officer to waive out this whole record and all of the motions and issues that have been presented, and I do not think the Chair has any such authority, without attempting to usurp such authority.

Senator SALTONSTALL. As a parliamentary issue, Mr. Chairman, would it not be in order for a member of the committee, such as myself, to ask Senator Wiley if he still insisted on his question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Senator has a right to ask that question, all with the consent of the Senator from Maine who has made a motion to recess, as I understand it.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I most respectfully then, Mr. Chairman——

Chairman RUSSELL. Does the Senator agree?

Senator KEFAUVER. He did not make a motion; he just made a suggestion.

CAREFUL STUDY OF LEGAL PRECEDENTS

Senator BREWSTER. I would like, if I may, heartily to concur with the suggestion of the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Stennis, as a practical way to seek an adjustment of this.

I have here—why I asked for the recess—a 24-page brief prepared within the past few years in the Congress on this question citing precedents from the beginning. I have the earliest case by the Supreme Court here on the matter.

I think the matter should be carefully studied and thoroughly presented to the committee, and I think that if you would agree that the chairman on one side, Senator Wiley on the other, should have a, let us say, time of 1 hour, or whatever time is determined, to present this case tomorrow morning, to argue it out, and then to have a settlement, I think it will accord with the proprieties and the dignity of this body; and I frankly say that in my own mind it is not clear. I think we all should give as careful consideration as we can, and I would be glad to withhold my motion if the Senator from Mississippi wanted to submit such a proposal or if it appealed to the chairman as a practical thing. Then by tomorrow noon we would have this disposed of.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I suppose that the full committee could delegate to a subcommittee any powers which the full committee would have.

Senator BREWSTER. What I contemplated, and I understood he did, that you two gentlemen would allocate the time for an hour, you and any associated with you in presenting the case, Senator Wiley and any he might designate exactly as we do in the Senate, and then at 12 o'clock we take a vote.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to ask Senator Wiley if he still insists on his question that he asked General Bradley yesterday.

Senator KEFAUVER. Will the Senator withhold that until the chairman reads what he has there?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not care about reading a statement.

Senator KEFAUVER. I think you might——

Chairman RUSSELL. At this stage of the proceeding Senator, I had just——

Senator KEFAUVER. I should like very much to hear what the chairman has to say. It will come up again if it does not come up now.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would respectfully insist on my question.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, I object.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from California.

PROCEDURE FOR ARGUMENT OF APPEAL

Senator KNOWLAND. My inquiry is whether now, since objection has been made, whether the motion of the Senator from Maine which had previously been made is now the order of business. I think the chairman is quite right—this whole discussion of the legal aspects of it would probably be better for all at the same time, the chairman's discussion and Senator Wiley's discussion, and so on, which would take place tomorrow, and, as I understood it, it was agreeable with the chairman if we took this point to recess.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I have a unanimous consent on this point of procedure?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have recognized others for that purpose and I will recognize the Senator from Mississippi.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the chairman of the committee and Senator Wiley, with two additional, one to be selected by the chairman and the other by Senator Wiley, be authorized to work out a plan for fair presentation of the issue to the committee, agree upon time to be allotted to each side, and include if they see fit the idea of the entire matter being presented by a limited number or by some time being allotted, and that they adopt that plan as the plan of the committee.

The committee would reassemble then at the call of the Chair for hearing on this matter, hearing and decision.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, there has been something said about public attitude about the work of this committee. I think we can get into a week's discussion on this parliamentary situation, that we are going to look ridiculous in the eyes of the public.

I think the public wants to know what the conclusions were at these conferences and the reasons for them, and it seems to me that we ought to try very hard, if we can, to get this matter terminated now.

After getting into a week's discussion on this parliamentary situation, it is going to make this committee lose some standing in the public eye, so in the interest of trying to get the matter expedited—and I know the Senator from Mississippi has the same interest but I do not believe his unanimous consent is going to expedite the problem—I would have to respectfully object to his unanimous consent.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator would withhold his objection, we apparently cannot dispose of this matter this afternoon. We have these votes coming up. My unanimous-consent request was merely to provide some machinery which would lead to a plan whereby this committee could come back with something definite and we could thrash it out and vote on it.

Chairman RUSSELL. If I understood the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Mississippi, it was that the ranking members of the two committees who are meeting jointly here, meet after the recess today to devise some means of limiting or regulating the discussion on the issue that is now before the committee.

Senator STENNIS. That is correct, a fair presentation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Based upon a fair amount of time.

Senator FLANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question for information on this. Is this a committee with power or do they come back and make a recommendation?

Chairman RUSSELL. That was a question I was going to raise next as to whether or nor the Senator from Mississippi included within his request that the committee agree that if an agreement is reached, it would be binding upon the committee.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, sir; that is expressly in the request, that they agree upon and adopt a plan which will be a plan of the committee.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, speaking for myself I shall never agree to any procedure which forecloses me the day before the hearings close from voting to cite somebody for contempt if I think it should be done.

I shall never agree to that and I do not think we can settle this issue in the sense that we can arrive at a procedure which is going to be a strait-jacket and binding upon all possible future questions that nobody can possibly even dream up now.

Chairman RUSSELL. No one has suggested that except the Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator LODGE. The Senator from Georgia, the Senator from Oregon, the Senator from Mississippi all talk about settling the issue.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is wholly in error and evidently has not been following the discussion. It related only to this specific question raised here at this time.

Senator LODGE. I say to my friend from Georgia that if we look up the stenographic record, we will find the Senator from Georgia, the Senator from Oregon, the Senator from Mississippi have used the words "settle this issue."

Chairman RUSSELL. I said settle this appeal, and that is the issue pending here.

Senator MORSE. That is the issue here.

Chairman RUSSELL. But the Senator has a right to object.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, has this been settled now? Has objection been made?

Chairman RUSSELL. The question occurs on a motion to recess.

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to ask the Senator to withhold that objection. I have been trying to get recognition for some little bit.

Senator BREWSTER. I understood the Senator from Mississippi desired to make a motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is a wholly erroneous conception of what was proposed, but he has a right to object.

He is wholly entitled to object to any conclusion that he suspicions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Am I recognized?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

POLICY OF VOTING BY PROXIES ON APPEAL

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask this question. I have a long-standing engagement for tomorrow that will take me out of the city. I have very deep feelings on this issue in this particular case that is pending before us. I think it has been well settled. I think it goes to the very integrity of Government as set up under the Constitution as among the three branches, and I hate very much not to be here to vote on it. I want to ask, Mr. Chairman, if in voting proxies of absent members may be cast.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, all the Chair can state is that that has always been the policy in these committees, or at least the procedure. The committee can, of course, change that if any one Senator wants to raise an objection. He can object to proxies and the committee would have to pass on it as to whether proxies could be voted.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, if proxies are to be allowed and this vote comes to an issue, I want my vote cast to sustain the chairman in the ruling that he made yesterday, and in the event proxies are not allowed, I want the record to show clearly that that is my view.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Massachusetts, if he will withhold his objection for a moment, I think now is the time to settle that little question.

At the risk of being thought to be too legalistic, Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to offer either a motion or unanimous-consent agreement that it be the policy of this committee that proxies may be used in voting upon issues coming before the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have heard the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Oregon that proxies may be allowed in voting upon procedural matters coming before this committee.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Procedural matters.

Senator MORSE. No; all matters.

Chairman RUSSELL. All matters coming before this committee. Is there objection?

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I do not know as people who are not here would be in a position to have their proxies cast on some things. I think the procedural thing is a little different from perhaps the final report of the committee or some other issues that might come up. On a procedural matter I certainly will not object. If it is on a general matter, I may.

Senator BYRD. The Senator from Oregon, may I ask, Is that a written proxy?

Senator MORSE. The usual procedure we follow is by written proxies where instructions are given for the purposes of casting the proxies.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object when I said I had no objection to Senator Sparkman being recorded on this, I do not think we can anticipate what kind of problems are going to be raised, so I do not think we should foreclose ourselves at this time, particularly with some members absent. Several members have already gone.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Senator from Maine objects.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the two senior members of each of these two committees be authorized to devise a plan or procedure for presentation of this appeal within such time limits as they may see fit to prescribe, and that that be adopted as a plan of the committee to dispose of this appeal.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair would be compelled to rule that that motion is not in order. It can only be done by unanimous consent.

Senator KEFAUVER. I withdraw my objection to the motion of the Senator from Mississippi if he——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sympathetic with the position of the Senator from Maine about an adoption of this with respect to a general situation at the present time, but I feel Senator Sparkman on these specific issues should have the right to vote by proxy, or any member, on these issues.

I, therefore, would like to narrow it down.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection to the unanimous consent request of the Senator from Iowa that the Senator from Alabama, Mr. Sparkman, be permitted——

Senator Hickenlooper. Or any other member.

Chairman Russell. Be permitted to cast his vote at this time? Let's clear it up one by one.

Senator Hickenlooper. On the issues presently before us.

Chairman Russell. On this appeal.

Senator Lodge. Senator Morse's appeal?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Lodge. No objection.

Senator Wiley. You say at this time. Some of us might be absent when the vote comes. In other words, we can give our proxies then.

Senator Hickenlooper. I made the request and my request included on this particular issue which is before us, regardless of when the vote comes. I don't mean today.

Chairman Russell. Well, gentlemen, I thought that had been proposed here once and objection had been entered. I will submit it again. I hope that the Senator who entered the objection has not left the hall.

The Senator from Iowa asked unanimous consent with respect to this appeal—I see the Senator from Maine is present—that proxies be allowed. Is there objection?

The Chair hears none. Though I might say it will look somewhat strange in the record in view of the Reorganization Act that bans proxies.

Senator Green. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Green.

Senator Green. Taking advantage of this right that has now been recognized, I desire to give the chairman my proxy on this issue, because I unfortunately will be obliged to be away tomorrow for engagements made long before this committee was appointed.

Chairman Russell. Under the order just adopted, the Senator has that right, as I understand it.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Stennis.

SUBCOMMITTEE TO AGREE ON PROCEDURE FOR APPEAL

Senator Stennis. I propose a unanimous consent request, Mr. Chairman, that the two senior members of these two committees be requested——

Senator Brewster. On each side?

Senator Stennis. On each side—be requested to propose a plan for reasonable presentation of the question involved in this appeal, with limitations on the time to be equally divided, and that they present that plan to the committee at the next sitting of the committee.

Senator Morse. To the committee for approval?

Senator Stennis. To the committee for approval at the next sitting of the committee.

Chairman Russell. I don't like to do a vain thing. If the Senator from Massachusetts is going to object——

Senator Lodge. I don't object to that, because that doesn't seek to lay down a general principle. That is a practical working out of this particular problem.

Senator Stennis. The only question involved is the appeal.

Chairman Russell. Permit the Chair, then, in an effort to make progress—if the Senator from Massachusetts doesn't object to this particular issue, suppose the Senator propound a unanimous consent request that with respect to this appeal the four Senators be permitted to agree, if they can agree, upon an equitable time for debate and for division of time, which if they do agree, it will be binding on the committee—on this specific appeal. That is the only thing I tried to discuss.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I was trying to get to the point that the question be confined to the Wiley-Morse appeal and no other question be involved, and I am willing, if it seems like it is going to get unanimous consent, to let that plan be binding on the committee when we reconvene at the call of the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection?

Senator GEORGE. When is that going to be presented?

Senator BREWSTER. Next meeting.

Senator STENNIS. At the next meeting called by the Chairman.

Senator LODGE. We will then vote on the recommendations that this subcommittee makes to us; is that right?

Chairman RUSSELL. No; you can't put it through by vote.

Senator LODGE. You mean whatever you four men work out we take?

Chairman RUSSELL. It will have to be adopted by unanimous consent.

Senator BREWSTER. You mean to say that the committee could not itself determine a procedure?

Chairman RUSSELL. I beg your pardon?

Senator LODGE. I thought Senator Stennis' motion was to have those four Senators bring back a report to this full committee. Am I in error on that?

Senator STENNIS. I meant in my unanimous-consent request to let it cover a plan which they would agree upon and bring it back and it will be binding on the committee.

Senator LODGE. Without our voting?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Senator LODGE. I wouldn't agree.

Senator STENNIS. I will amend my request to leave out the compulsory feature.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will be glad to have someone else serve, but the Chair would not serve on a committee of that kind, because it will provoke new debate as to the agreement. If the Senator wishes to ask unanimous consent for anybody other than the Chair——

Senator STENNIS. If those members agree on a plan, I think it will be readily adopted by the committee.

Senator KNOWLAND. May I take a request for a unanimous-consent agreement that will perhaps get around the objection of the Senator from Massachusetts. Could we not make a unanimous-consent agreement that when the committee meets tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, assuming we do meet tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, that the time be equally divided between the time when we meet and when we recess at 1 o'clock, time be equally divided one-half to be under the control of the chairman of the committee, one-half to be under the control of the Senator from Wisconsin, to allocate for the proper presentation of the views of the two contending points of view. That gives this committee, as we do in the Senate, the right to pass on it and meets the objection, I think, raised by the Senator from Massachusetts.

It does give us a reasonable limitation of time where we can all see this thing being brought to a head and where we can proceed with our business. Might I make that unanimous-consent motion?

Senator CONNALLY. When will you vote?

Senator KNOWLAND. One o'clock.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does anyone wish to have the unanimous-consent request clarified? If not, is there objection to the unanimous-consent request propounded by the Senator from California? The Chair hears none, and the order is adopted.

The committee stands in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10:20 a. m. Thursday, May 17, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:20 a. m., in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Wiley, George, Smith of New Jersey, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson of Texas, Moore, Kefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Stennis, Flanders, and Long.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

FULFILLING UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

We have experienced a delay here of 20 minutes in securing a quorum. The chair does not state that in any critical vein but as a preface to the statement I shall now make.

The time on yesterday, by unanimous consent, between now and the hour of 1 o'clock was to be equally divided on this subject. I did not understand that all of the time must be used, but if there is any desire to use the time between now and 1 o'clock, it should be equally divided.

In view of the fact that we are 20 minutes late in getting underway, I think it is fair that each side should contribute 10 minutes of their time. Is that agreeable to you, Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. It is agreeable.

Senator Lodge. Is not the calendar being called at 12 o'clock, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. I am not sure about that, Senator Lodge, but this committee entered into this unanimous-consent arrangement on yesterday, and I know of no way it could be changed now other than by unanimous consent.

Senator Fulbright. I wonder would it be in order to ask unanimous consent that we vote at 12 o'clock instead of 1?

Chairman Russell. I think it would be in order. The committee does not divest itself of the privilege.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I make that request to see what the situation is.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Senator LODGE. I may have to leave, Mr. Chairman, because I have bills on the calendar I am interested in.

Senator WILEY. Let's get underway then.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I desire to make a reasonably brief statement with respect to the ruling of the Chair.

OUTLINING THE PROBLEM

The question that is now before this committee may be stated in very simple terms: It is, Does this committee, or any other agency of the legislative branch of the Government, have the power to compel a witness who is a confidential adviser to the President of the United States to relate the details of private conferences occurring with the President and other confidential advisers in cases where the witness claims immunity?

The relation between General Bradley, who is the witness whose testimony is under consideration, and the President of the United States, is one that is established by statute.

Section 211 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 reads as follows:

> There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the chairman, who shall be the presiding officer thereof but who shall have no vote, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

I shall not read all of this section, but I do wish to read a few of the duties as outlined.

> Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform the following duties, in addition to such duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct:
>
> (1) Preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces.
>
> (2) Preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment to the military services of logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans.

And I ask the committee to make special note of subparagraph (3):

> (3) Establishment of unified commands in strategic areas.

It seem to me that this statutory relation created by the act which I have just read creates a confidential relationship of the highest order between the witness, General Bradley as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President of the United States.

There can be no higher confidential relationship, none upon which the safety and security of our Nation must depend, than that existing by law between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States.

This is particularly true on occasions when the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is called upon to advise the President on matters of this nature where the President requests such advice, and to perform his other duties pursuant to the National Security Act.

The Constitution of the United States is the source of all power vested in the three equal but coordinate branches of the Government.

It has been properly described as the most remarkable work to have been produced by the mind of men at a single stroke.

The future freedom and security of our country depend as much upon the maintenance of the delicate system of checks and balances designed by the founding fathers as upon our armies, our navies and our fleets of airplanes. Among the most valuable of the checks and balances devised are those which prevent one of the branches of the Government from imposing its will upon the other.

As I see it, that is one of the fundamental issues that is here before us at this moment. I have made some study of the precedents involved in this matter. So far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no single exception of a judicial determination that protects the confidential communications between the President and the advisers which assist him in the discharge of his duties.

They are held to be of the highest privilege.

While the power of the President to withhold information or documents, within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch, has been frequently challenged, I do not know of any occasion where any legislative or judicial agency has insisted upon the right to have extended to it the words spoken in a highly confidential conference between the President and his advisers.

It is, of course, a matter of common knowledge that the legislative branch of the Government, within itself, has no powers of enforcement against any witness, it matters not what his position may be, or the contempt with which he might treat any committee of the Congress.

We are compelled to rely upon the courts of this land for the enforcement of any proceedings which might be had, growing out of the refusal of a witness to answer, in any specific case.

Therefore, as I see is, the rulings of the courts, the only enforcement agency that is available to the legislative branch of the Government, are controlling in this question.

DEFERENCE SHOWN MARSHALL AND MAC ARTHUR

Now, before proceeding to deal with these questions, and to cite some of the precedents, I think it is only fair that the record should show that when General MacArthur was a witness before this committee, he was asked, in effect, to relate here, from that stand, what transpired in the private conference with the President of the United States, at a conference held on Wake Island.

General MacArthur declined to answer that question, on the grounds that such disclosure would be improper.

The general's refusal to answer the questions was not challenged.

I think the record should further show, at this point, that the same, or similar, question was asked of Secretary Marshall when he was before us as a witness, and that he declined to answer, on the ground that private conversations that he held with the President of the United States, were privileged, and that his disclosure would be improper.

No challenge was entered at the time that the failure of the Chair to compel either of these witnesses to answer this question was improper or was keeping from the American people information that they were entitled to have.

The question arose after General Bradley had completed his statement and after he had claimed the immunity which had twice been used as a cloak by other witnesses.

Now, from the administration of President George Washington down to this good hour there is no decision in any court of competent jurisdiction of which I have any knowledge which has held in any single instance that a witness who was an agent of the President or a witness who occupied a confidential relationship with the President or a witness who was the head of an executive department could or would be compelled by the courts to produce any documentary material relating to the exercise of the executive functions without the consent of the President.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

A private conversation of the nature involved in this case, relating to matters of the highest import would seem to me to be entitled to even a higher degree of immunity than the documents that are involved in other cases that have arisen.

Those cases begin with the request of the Congress for certain papers and reports relating to the ill-starred campaign of General St. Clair against the Northwestern Indians.

Over a period of more than a century and a half, when a very natural conflict has raged between the legislative branch and the executive branch of the Government——

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield for a question or would he prefer not to?

Chairman RUSSELL. I would prefer not to yield. The unbroken line of decisions, so far as I have been able to determine, sustain the ruling made by the Chair on day before yesterday.

This is true in innumerable cases where the matters involved are of greater or lesser import than the one before us. The precedents reveal, as far as I can determine from a reading of those that I have been able to locate, that the President may reveal, but that if he chooses not to do so, he is wholly within his powers. He is the judge of his powers.

I wish to make it clear that this issue does not involve any individual in the office of the President of the United States, it involves the rights and powers which inhere to the office of the Chief Executive or the Chief Magistrate of this Nation.

Now I shall not burden the record here with a reading of innumerable authorities which I think are pertinent to this case. I shall read a general statement which is from one of the most reliable texts of which I have any knowledge—from the 58 American Jurisprudence Witnesses, section 535, and I quote:

> Courts will not compel the disclosures of State secrets by other departments of Government in ordinary judicial proceedings or require the publication of a State document that may involve danger to the Nation—

here is the pertinent one—

> or of communications between Government officers of a confidential nature.

That is a general statement that appears in this text.

> As to State matters the Governor is the absolute judge of what official communications to the executive department may be revealed.

MARBURY VERSUS MADISON

I think it is generally conseded that perhaps the leading case on this subject is that of Marbury versus Madison, a case that perhaps has been cited as much or more than any other decision ever handed down by the Supreme Court. It is found in First Cranch 137. I wish to read merely one paragraph from that decision.

> By the Constitution of the United States the President is invested with certain important political powers in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion and is accountable only to the country and his political character and to his conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties he is authorized to appoint certain officers who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders. In such cases their acts are his acts, and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political; they respect the Nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the Executive, the decision of the Executive is conclusive.

During the administration of President Abraham Lincoln, his Attorney General, James Speed, delivered an opinion which, in my judgment bears very cogently on this issue, and I shall read one paragraph from that:

> Upon principles of public policy, there are some kinds of evidence which the law excludes or dispenses with. Secrets of state, for instance, cannot be given in evidence and those who are possessed of such secrets are not required to make disclosure of them. The official transactions between the heads of departments of Government and their subordinate officers are, in general, treated as privileged communications. The President of the United States, the heads of the great departments of Government, and the Governors of the several States, it has been decided, are not bound to produce papers or disclose information communicated to them where, in their own judgment, the disclosure would, on public considerations, be inexpedient. These are familiar rules laid down by every author on the law of evidence.

MYERS VERSUS UNITED STATES

I shall also wish to quote from an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Taft in the case of *Myers* v. *United States* that the highest and most important duties the President's subordinates perform are those in which they act for him. In such cases they are exercising not only their own but his discretion, and this is the quotation from that decision:

> This field is a very large one. It is sometimes described as political. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.

The Chief Justice, after his service as President of the United States, wrote a book entitled "Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers," and I wish to quote briefly from that to show that he did not change his opinion after he had been the President of the United States.

> The President is required by the Constitution from time to time to give to Congress information on the state of the Union and to recommend for its consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, but this does not enable Congress or either House of Congress, to elicit from him confidential information which he has acquired for the purpose of enabling him to discharge his constitutional duties if he does not deem the disclosure of such information prudent or in the public interest.

TOTTEN CASE

I was particularly happy to find the so-called Totten case dealing with this subject because they used some of the language and argument that was submitted by the Chair to sustain his position at the time the ruling was entered.

This was an action that was brought by Totten to recover compensation for services alleged to have been rendered by intestate Lloyd under a contract with President Lincoln made in July 1861, by which he was to proceed South and secure information as might be beneficial to the United States.

I shall not comment upon the fact that there were probably some people in my section of the world who thought that was a rather ignoble mission, but the Court held that the President was wholly and completely within his rights in making the contract, and I shall now read the pertinent extract from that decision:

> It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated On this principle, suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of communications by a client to his counsel for professional advice, or of a patient to his physician for a similar purpose. Much greater reason exists for the application of the principle to cases of contracts for secret services with the Government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.

That was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Totten, Administrator* v. *U. S.* (92 U. S. 105), and the decision was written by Justice Field.

SAME SITUATION ON STATE LEVEL

Now I think it casts some light upon this subject to consider some of the cases that have arisen in the several States with respect to the power of the governor, because cerainly if a governor is protected in his confidential communications, the same protection or even a greater degree of protection would be afforded the President of the United States.

That is particularly true in the cases of this nature where the relationship between the parties is established by statute as under the National Security Act. I quote from the opinion of *Gray* v. *Pentland, 2nd Sergeant and R.*—that is a Pennsylvania case, page 23:

> Communications relating to matters of state have generally been held privileged, and the officer entitled to refuse to disclose them. Likewise, communications which do not so clearly relate to matters of state have also been held privileged. The governor of a State has been held to have a discretion to refuse to furnish a communication contained in a letter addressed to him with reference to an officer in a subsequent suit for libel.

Now that case was specifically approved in the decision in the case of *Thompson* v. *German Valley Railroad* (22 New Jersey Equity Case Reports 111), and again in Hartranft's appeal, 85 Pennsylvania 433, the governor was held entitled to refuse information to a grand jury concerning the military or other means used in the suppression of riots which were under investigation by the grand jury. The court stated that the propriety of withholding information required by the grand jury must be determined by the governor himself, and the weight of the reasons influencing the conclusion at which he arrives is for himself, and not for the court, to consider.

PARALLEL CASES

It might be interesting to observe a parallel to the case we have under issue that the Adjutant General and two officers of the National Guard were involved in this case. Their testimony was sought, and they were held to be governed by the same principles which controlled in the case of the Chief Executive, the court stating that if the governor is exempt from attachment, or from subpena, his immunity protects his subordinates and agents.

I shall not read the body of that decision.

I might say that from the earliest days of the common law it has been clearly held that any communication between a governor, even a colonial governor, and any person is privileged and is entirely within the discretion of the governor as to whether he shall disclose it.

I regard that as being paralleled by the precedents in the case of the efforts to secure information from the executive department of the Government on the Federal level rather than the State.

It is firmly settled constitutionally—I don't think anyone would dispute that, it is very elementary—that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government are coordinate. If any matter is privileged before the judicial department, it is equally privileged before the legislative department.

I want to read briefly from an opinion on this subject which was delivered by then Attorney General Robert Jackson, who is now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, because he in very brief form refers to a number of instances which, in my mind, are wholly in point in this matter.

> In 1825 the House of Representatives requested President Monroe to transmit certain documents relating to the officers of the Navy of the United States on the Pacific Ocean and of other public agents in South America.
>
> In his reply President Monroe refused to comply with the request, stating to do so might subject individuals to unjust criticism, that the individuals involved should not be censured without just cause, which could not be ascertained until after a thorough and impartial investigation of their conduct and that under the circumstances it was thought that communication of the documents would not comport with the public interest nor with what was due to the parties concerned.

If that holding of President Monroe, in a case of that nature, and requested by a resolution of the House of Representatives, was not challenged, but permitted to stand as a precedent, as was the case, it would appear to me all the more applicable in a case of this nature which involves not documents relating to officers stationed in the Pacific, but to confidential communications between the President and his statutory military advisers.

In 1833 the Senate requested President Jackson to communicate to that body a copy of a paper purporting to have been read by him to the heads of the executive departments, dated September 18, 1833, relating to the removal of the deposits of the public money from the Bank of the United States.

President Jackson declined on the ground that those documents relating to the removal of money from the Bank of the United States were privileged.

How much more highly privileged would be, in this case, a private conversation between the President and his confidential advisers.

In 1835, the Senate passed a resolution requesting President Jackson to communicate copies of the charges, if any, which might have been made to him against the official conduct of Gideon Fitz, late Surveyor General, south of the State of Tennessee, which had caused his removal from office.

In reply, President Jackson again declined to comply.

I continue to read from this opinion:

> This discretion in the executive branch has been upheld and respected by the judiciary. The courts have repeatedly held that they will not and cannot require the Executive to produce such papers when, in the opinion of the Executive, their production is contrary to the public interest.
>
> The courts have also held that the question of whether the production of papers would be against the public interest is one for the Executive, and not for the courts to decide.

There follows a citation of a large number of decisions. I shall not read all of those citations. They appear on page 6259 of the Congressional Record of proceedings in the Senate, May 21, 1948.

I will read this further statement because it relates directly to our American system, depending upon a written Constitution, and division of powers as between the three equal and coordinate branches of the Government.

KILBOURN VERSUS THOMPSON

This is taken from the case of Kilbourn versus Thompson:

> It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law that all of the powers entrusted to the Government, whether State of National, are divided into the three grand departments—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial—that the functions appropriate to each of these branches of Government shall be vested in a separate body of public service, and that the perfection of the system requires that the lines which separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined. It is also essential to the successful working of this system that the persons entrusted with power in any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other.

When I was compelled to rule upon this matter on day before yesterday, I stated that my ruling was dictated altogether by my conception of the rights of each of the coordinate branches of the Government. I stated then, and I reiterate today, that I would defend jealously the prerogatives of the Senate of the United States, of any committee of the Senate of the United States, were those prerogatives threatened by encroachment from the Chief Executive or from the judiciary. I shall insist upon extending to the executive branch of the Government, without regard to personalities, without regard to feelings that may be involved in this particular issue, all of the rights that I would defend as being inherent in the legislative branch.

RESPECTING CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS

The question of confidential relations is nothing new in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. There are any number—I have already cited most of them—that of husband and wife, attorney and client, doctor and patient. In my opinion to an even higher degree immunity attaches to the witness General Bradley in the facts as they are presented to this committee.

Here is a case where there is a statutory relation between the parties of confidential advisers. The general has offered to relate all facts, all conclusions, all reasons, but he stood upon his immunity in declining to go into the details of conversations that he had with the President and other confidential advisers on the subject which is under inquiry.

I think he is fully within his rights. I ruled as I saw the facts to protect our form of Government and to keep from involving one of the branches with the other.

If we ever arrive at the time in this country when, whatever be the heat of passion, whatever the political consequences, whatever issues of the moment might be involved, that we permit or contribute to, or ourselves motivate the invasion of the prerogatives of one of the branches of the Government, why, we would in my opinion have taken a long step toward the ultimate destruction of our institutions.

AN APPEAL TO CONSCIENCE

I regret very much that this matter has developed here. I regret even more deeply that, from the indications of the discussion around this table, it has developed along party lines, and that it has a political overtone.

I have endeavored to be as objective as I could in this matter, and I wish to conclude my remarks by appealing to the members of this committee, to each and every member of this committee, whether he has a label of Republican or Democrat, to vote his conscience, vote as his intelligence dictates on this issue, which is far more important than the mere matter of General Bradley's being compelled by action at law—even if he could be compelled, which I am confident he could not—to testify as to the details of a personal conference of a highly confidential matter.

Senator Wiley?

MAINTAINING DIGNITY AND POWER OF THE SENATE

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, may I open my argument by saying there is no partisanship in what I have to say, unless it is to maintain the dignity and the power of the Senate. In this aspect, I am partisan.

I would likewise be partisan in maintaining the dignity and the power of the other branches of the Republic. I resent the statement that there is any political overtone in this matter.

Now, let us get that washed out once and for all. Before I am through with my argument I expect each one of you, as I know you will, to decide the case according to your conscience, according to the justice of the situation, and according to the law.

I shall discuss briefly the facts and the law as it pertains to this situation.

In the words of Harry Truman, when he was a Senator:

> I maintain that we don't think he has got the right to shut off the information from those in Congress who want it.

Those words are applicable.

I ask you Senators, do you want the information of what went on beginning with April 5 or don't you? Apparently, some of you have the information, according to Senator Fulbright, when he asked the question of MacArthur, he had some information to the effect that Acheson did not support the President.

Now, why are we not entitled to that? All right.

Now, the authorities support generally the above propositions. I do not disagree with the law as quoted by my distinguished colleague from Georgia. I do not disagree with the principles he quoted, but I shall show you they do not apply.

I agree that the authorities generally follow this line: One, that the scope of a congressional investigation is as broad as the legislative purpose requires—Townsend versus United States.

Two, that the subpenaing by a duly authorized investigating committee of the Congress is no more restricted than that of the grand jury.

My colleague quoted to you the Marbury case. Listen to what Marshall said:

> The President of the United States may be subpenaed and examined as a witness and required to produce any paper in his possession. It is not controverted that the President, although subject to general rules which apply to others, may have sufficient motives—

get that now—

> for declining to produce a particular paper, and those motives may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing the production.

Three, the right of a legislative body to demand and receive from the executive branch information, papers which it deems pertinent to the legislative process, is established.

Four, that this established right has been vigorously asserted at times by the Congress of the United States against the President and the executive officers.

Now, are we mice or men? This is our nest. I have been in it 12 years, and I am not going to befoul it by laying down a precedent that is going to deprive it of its power that has been asserted by men in Congress for one-hundred-and-fifty-odd years.

Five, that the President and the executive officers have vigorously defended it against such asserted right on the basis of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government.

Six, that the Congress has merely asserted its right to obtain information without attempting to enforce it.

Now, these are definitely laid down conclusions established by law.

Seven, that the Congress has never attempted to invoke against executive officers the law which provides that every person who, having been summoned by either House to give testimony or to produce papers upon a matter under inquiry, willfully makes default is criminally liable. There is a statute to that effect.

Now, I ask you to particularly pay attention to this line of argument, because it answers, in my judgment at least as a practicing lawyer of thirty-odd years, the argument of my distinguished friend from Georgia. The facts generally determine the law that is applicable thereto—the facts.

FACTS OF THE CASE

What are the facts? I remember a wise counselor said to me, Don't look up the law until you get the facts, because if you attempt to look up the law first, you may try to slant the facts to the law.

That might be suborning perjury.

These are the facts: A joint investigating committee is investigating the recall by the President of General MacArthur and the facts generally relating to Korea.

Now, there is no question about that. The right of the President as Commander in Chief to recall MacArthur is conceded. The basis and the justification therefor are not conceded. We are seeking the facts.

Some of you have some of the facts, as I indicated. A witness appears, either by subpena or voluntarily, before us and tells this committee that he will only tell us some of the facts.

It is conceded that the letter that MacArthur wrote to Congressman Martin precipitated a chain of circumstances, including conferences, conversations, and consultations, which eventually resulted in his removal.

The facts, as far as we know them, relating thereto are as follows: Bradley does not recall who telephoned nor what was said, but he later phoned the Chiefs of Staff who met at 5 o'clock that afternoon, April 5, 1951, at Bradley's office. The President was not present.

What was said and done there is relevant and pertinent. The next day General Bradley, Acheson, Marshall, and another met with the President.

I asked Bradley what was said. He claimed that what was said was confidential. Now, get this. You are a judge and a lawyer. You remember the law that was quoted by this distinguished citizen from Georgia.

There is nothing in the record to show that the President claims that conversations on the sixth and subsequent thereto were confidential. That is his right.

You remember the questions I asked yesterday, General Bradley does not want to ask the President anything relative to the subject. He testified to that effect.

Bradley took the position that the conversation was confidential, entirely on his own initiative. That is a pretty important fact, my friends.

There is another fact we can't ignore in this case. The President has not stated one way or the other whether the public is entitled to have the facts resulting from these conversations by those who were present during the time when the MacArthur recall was planned and executed.

Why? Why hasn't he told the public? Isn't he a servant of the public, the same as you and I? Neither has the President expressly determined that the information that we ask would be contrary to public interest. Every decision and authority cited by the gentleman from Georgia says "where the President determines that."

In regard to evidence in this case that he has said to be confidential, does he say it is contrary to the public interest? No. The witness that comes here wants to be excused. Every witness could be excused on that basis. Nothing is in the evidence to the effect that it is contrary to the public interest.

I challenge anyone to show in this record one iota that says that this evidence of these hearings, if produced, is contrary to the public interest. Read decisions. What do they say? Just refer to what the gentleman from Georgia said: That when the President exercises his right—and that is all—the other rule would be ridiculous.

Let us bear in mind what the purpose of these meetings was. We are inquiring into that purpose. In plain vernacular the purpose of these meetings was to get MacArthur, and to lay a basis for his removal.

I am not just drawing inferences. A member of this committee has asked Bradley, "Don't you know that Acheson defended you," or words to that effect, "don't you know" implying he knows, with whom has he been talking. But we can't talk to that person or hear him.

I repeat that the President has not said that what was said at these meetings would be contrary to the public interest. The law requires that before he can exercise his right or privilege. I speak to you as men of the Senate who have been elected as representatives of the people in the States, not subordinates, not yes men, but men who are now defining a policy that may rise up to haunt you and those who come after.

What is the position of the joint committee when a committee witness declines to answer questions on the ground that his conversation was confidential with the Chief Executive, although said witness and others are perfectly willing to give the conclusion of their conversation with the Chief Executive?

Now you are judges and lawyers. Stop and think. In this case stated above, the witness takes the position that he would be out of order to answer specific direct questions stating the facts, but he would tell the conclusions.

Now in reply to my friend from Georgia, please note that this question does not involve the controversy which has been raging bitterly for the last three Congresses and for over 150 years.

PRESIDENT HAS NOT REFUSED INFORMATION

What can the Congress do to secure information from the Chief Executive when the latter refuses to cooperate? That has been an issue for 150 years. That is not involved in this case. The President has not made known his refusal. A witness refuses.

Now you have got the facts before you, my associates. It is my opinion that the Congress has the legal right to have that information even if the President refused to give it, but he did not refuse. If the President refused, it would raise simply a question of power, first, the power of Congress to force the answer over the objections of the Executive, and secondly the power of the Executive to withstand successfully congressional demands. That is not the issue here.

There is no Executive refusal yet. There are many cases on the record whereby Congress has successfully secured information from the Chief Executive and/or his servants over objections. There is no better instance of that than the Marbury case cited by the distinguished gentleman from Georgia.

President Jefferson came through 100 percent, and the law was laid down there definitely, as I have read to you, stating definitely that the President of the United States would be subpenaed.

Now, before continuing further this line of thought, I believe it is to be recognized that when an officer of the President comes before Congress and declines to answer questions, a survey of the reasons for refusing to answer is in order.

Why does he refuse?

If his reason for refusing to answer is not capricious, but soundly within his own discretion, it does not involve the question of Congress versus the Executive—

Please, let me carry on.

And, such is the case here.

However, if it is, in fact, a question of the President ordering his witness to decline the information, then the witness becomes more or less a hand tool of the President, and then you are up against the problem of the Congress versus the President; but you are not up against that problem here.

My distinguished colleague from Georgia mentioned the statute, saying that the military adviser is "subject to the orders and direction."

Of course.

Did the President give the order or direction in this case?

No. Bradley testifies positively not. It was his idea that it was confidential and therefore he would not have to respond.

That is why the ruling of the Chair is wrong.

If there was, before this committee, one iota of evidence that the President determined that in the public interest he should not answer, you would have a real question.

But I would not even agree then that a witness who comes voluntarily before a congressional committee can stultify the committee.

He should justify his reasons, but he didn't do that.

For, if his reason for refusing, as I say, is not capricious, but soundly within his discretion, then it doesn't involve the question of Congress and the President.

However, if it is, in fact, the question of the President ordering the witness to decline the information, then the witness becomes, as I said, the hand tool of the President.

Under article 1 of the Constitution, the legislative authority is granted to Congress. Implied with this authority to legislate is the implied authority to do those things that are ordinarily necessary to carry out the express power.

Are we going to say that we can't?

It is well admitted, concededly, that in order to legislate, Congress must find the facts upon which to base its conclusion in law.

I remember the case of a Republican Attorney General. The Supreme Court spoke in that case very definitely. It was the Daugherty case.

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF COMMITTEE

The right of the Congress to investigate officials in the administrative and executive branches, and the power of investigation and interrogation is almost plenary. Thus, when a committee of Congress is interrogating the witness along said line, the first question is whether or not the committee has a legislative purpose in mind.

In the case of hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur and the conflict in Korea, we can go further than that and say we are now investigating the officials as in the Daugherty case. I believe most people will agree that the committee is duly constituted and acting within the authority and has a legislative purpose in mind. Thus questions propounded to the witness along the lines of the dismissal of the general are in order and within the legislative power. When the witness refuses to answer he could be in contempt.

This power or right of asking the question and receiving an answer resides in the Congress when it bumps up against another coequal power such as the Chief Executive, although we did not do that in this case. He did not say he could not answer; he did not say it would hurt the public interest. Mere confidential communication does not in such a case answer the problem.

PUBLIC INTEREST AS DECIDING FACTOR

I will quote what Judge Taft said, as quoted by the distinguished Senator from Georgia. When the President says information is against the public interest, it is, of course, confidential. It follows that the President is the one who makes the judgment that a matter must be regarded as confidential when it is against the public interest. The courts will not ask the President to determine whether his finding is sound or right. He makes it. But he did not make it in this case.

The way to enforce the answer to a question propounded by the committee is through the contempt process. In order to fully understand this question it is necessary to review the contempt machinery in Congress. When a witness refuses to answer a committee question, he is in contempt not of the committee but of the parent body, be it the House or the Senate; and he is only in contempt when a majority of that parent body so decides. Thus a refusal to answer before a committee only becomes contemptuous when a majority of the committee cites to the parent body and when a majority of the parent body votes that it is contempt.

That is not the issue, here. We are not considering that. All we want to find out is why this joint committee cannot extract from a witness, who knows them, get the facts of the conversations, of the transactions, of the plans and schemes, the final way it was consummated. Anything against the public interest there? The answer to that question must be, "No, it would be in the public interest to tell us."

But the President has not made the finding yet that it was against the public interest. So the authority cited by my distinguished friend has no application.

Thousands of contempt cases in history boil down to this: voting machinery that I mentioned. There are many instances where a witness representing the Executive or his departments have been forced to answer by the voting process or by threat of it. I say thousands of cases. There are many cases in history where a witness with immunity has refused to answer because the House or Senate refused to vote a contempt.

Now, briefly, I contend that General Bradley should be required to answer my question. If he refuses to answer, then it would be up to the committee to determine whether any further action in relation to contempt should be used. If the President directs him not to answer, if the President says that it is against the public interest, then that raises an entirely different question from the one we have here.

I say there is no privilege between the President and a general which would excuse the latter from answering this question. The privilege arises when there are additional facts. When we are dealing with pure sovereignty questions, of course, settlement then is like treaties between nations. But we are not dealing with sovereignty questions here; we are dealing with the refusal of General Bradley, who has no direction or authority from the President regarding what to say or not to say. He said that yesterday; he did not think he should consult with the President about that. It is a strange coincidence. He recalls definitely the incidents relating to General MacArthur but the General MacArthur incident has no bearing on the subject we are inquring into. It occurred when General MacArthur was in command. It was with the President when the President and he walked apart. No one raised the issue because it was not pertinent because the President himself exposed all the facts afterward through General Marshall when they produced this memorandum which he said was gotten down by a witness listening in behind some partition. That is not relevant. The question of what General Marshall did is not pertinent. He could or could not because we did not press it.

What we are saying is that no one now raises the issue of fact.

Let me put it this way: The situation is not dealing on a basis of sovereign with sovereign. This is not the case because of the facts in this case. That is, the President has not directed General Bradley to refuse to answer, and the President has not stated that the disclosure of the information would be contrary to the public interest.

SETTING A PRECEDENT

In the event this joint committee upholds the decision of the Chair, what sort of a precedent will we be setting?

The answer to that is that in effect we will be giving carte blanche to any individual who has ever discussed any matter however inconsequential with the President of the United States. This is ridiculous. Only the President has this power.

The question was asked, "Supposing you went up and talked to the President tomorrow, could you be subpenaed?" Of course I could be subpenaed. The President could be subpenaed, as Marshall says in the Marbury case.

I say we will be giving such an individual the right to refuse to answer a duly constituted committee. I ask again, are we mice or men? Are we going to say that the Senate of the United States, recognized throughout the world as the most deliberative body, is at long last going to say, "No, the President has all the power in this direction; we cannot investigate"? We had better read the Daugherty case.

I for one do not feel we should be setting such a precedent, which will in effect be gravely limiting the rights of a sovereign body of the United States, Congress.

It is a fact that in this instance a very distinguished soldier, Gen. Omar Bradley, has made the determination on his own, that he should not divulge conversation. He has made that determination on his own. That is the undisputed fact. He wouldn't even consult with the

President. He said the President hadn't directed him he should not divulge this matter.

But suppose some other individual on some other occasion, some individual far less important than Bradley, chooses to tell the committee the same thing. Suppose another witness will not cooperate with the committee because of what he thinks is confidential. A fine rule we are asked to lay down. Remember, the rule you lay down pertains to the facts that are developed. So I say that both General Bradley and any other individual, no matter how high or how low a position, should be required to testify.

As a matter of fact, I would contend that even if the President of the United States had said that the information should not be divulged, this committee is entitled to the facts; but again I repeat, the President of the United States has said no such thing.

The testimony has been given by Bradley and Marshall relating to these meetings and is in the nature of conclusions. That is another legal situation. It is just common sense that, when a part of a transaction is disclosed by conclusions, the whole transaction should be developed before the body that has to pass upon the correctness of the act and the conclusion.

I trust that I have presented these thoughts clearly, as I would in court, and I must say that I have some pretty strong convictions, gentlemen, upon the act and the consequences upon which you are about to act here.

THE BAR OF PUBLIC OPINION

Now, I address a thought before the bar of public opinion. I say that the American people will be deeply disappointed that high individuals do not feel that the American people are entitled to the facts on so crucial a matter which affects the lives of a quarter of a million American boys now in Korea and the millions of American boys who might be engaged if a third world war is not averted. The American people are entitled to know how the removal of MacArthur was brought about.

In view of the fact that the President has not seen fit to claim that the conversations in question were confidential disclosures, and in view of the fact that the public is entitled from every viewpoint to be given the facts, and in view of the further fact that the President has not found for the record or otherwise that the disclosures of such conversation would be contrary to the public interest—I want to repeat, and I want to ask Senator George, particularly, to pay attention to this statement, because he just came in late—in view of the fact that the President has not seen fit to claim that the conversations in question were confidential disclosures, in view of the fact that the public is entitled from every viewpoint to be given the facts, but in view particularly of the further fact that the President has not found for the record or otherwise that the disclosure of such conversations would be contrary to the public interest, it would seem that in the public interest the President now should sanction all witnesses who participated in this undertaking to tell the facts and the conversations and the various steps which took place until the recall of MacArthur was finally consummated.

I am, in effect, urging that the President release General Bradley and any subsequent witness from any pledge, open or implied, even though Bradley said there wasn't any; he had not talked to the President. He should release them and direct them to come through.

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE

The people are entitled to that information.

I esteem loyalty to one's superior as much as any man, but the public interest should come before any personal loyalty on so crucial an issue as this.

The only reason that I have fought for this cause is in order that we in the Congress and the American people might get the facts.

I want to point out most respectfully to my colleagues that a vote in opposition to sustaining my appeal will, in effect, be furthering the trend of making the legislative branch what it was back in the early 1930's, a group of "yes men" for the executive branch.

DIGNITY OF LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

I do not want this situation to recur. I want the legislative branch to stand on its own feet, to maintain its own dignity, to stand where our forebears in this branch have stood for 150 years, and to maintain, in effect, the legal prerogatives and the power of the Senate.

Now, Mr. Chairman, my good friend quoted Jackson's opinion. If you will refer to Jackson's opinion, you will find that he concludes with practically the identical language that President Taft used in his book, where he said in speaking of the President:

> Congress or either House cannot elicit confidential information which the President has acquired in enabling him to discharge his constitutional duties if he does not deem the disclosure of such information prudent or in the public interest.

"He" does not deem it. I emphasize "he." That is Taft in his book.

Now, if you will find the case, you will see that it refers to this language:

> The courts have repeatedly held that they will not and cannot require the Executive to produce such papers when in the opinion of the Executive their production is contrary to the public interest.

"When in the opinion of the Executive"—is there any opinion in this case?

I repeat, Bradley said, "I had not yet consulted with the President." No; he had nothing to do with it. It was his own idea. The witness says it is his own idea about what he is going to testify before the committee.

I imagine what some of you would do, in presiding in court, if a fellow says it is his own idea, and, therefore, "I won't testify. I claim it is confidential. I claim I talked with the President. I went up and talked with the President today."

This committee had a perfect right to call him in. I am citing better authority than my own. I am citing Marshall, where he said that the President himself could be subpenaed to testify; and, when he would be, he would have to give his excuse, to wit: "In my opinion, it would be against the public interest." That is sufficient; a court recognizes it, and you and I will recognize it, too. The President has not said that.

How much time have I used? Thirty-three minutes. I will close at this time and reserve for myself more time in the end, if necessary.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you desire to yield to anyone here?

Senator WILEY. Not at this time. If you want to yield——

Chairman RUSSELL. I will yield to my colleague, the senior Senator from Georgia.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Senator GEORGE. I wish you would hold over for the time being and let me hear someone else, if you have someone else who wishes to express an opinion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse wanted some time. He will be back at 12 o'clock.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I would have only a brief statement to make on this matter.

I indicated yesterday that in my opinion the question of immunity is not involved here; it is purely a question of privilege of the witness who is called to testify. If the witness is called to give testimony with respect to matter confidential in character and in nature, it is a privilege which he may claim.

I am not discussing in my brief statement any aspects of the power of the Chief Executive himself, the President, but only General Bradley as the witness before the committee. Now, in 1947 and by an elaborate amendment of 1949 the Congress passed the National Security Act and passed the National Security Act amendments of 1949 thereto. Under section 211 (a) of that act it will be noted:

> There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer thereof but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

The subsection (b), I quote again:

> Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform the following duties, in addition to such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct:
>
> (1) Preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces.
>
> (2) Preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment to the military services of logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans.
>
> (3) Establishment of unified commands in strategic areas.

Under subsection (d) of section 211 (a), which I have read, is a further subsection (e), which reads as follows:

> In addition to participating as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance of the duties assigned in subsection (b) of this section, the Chairman shall, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, perform the following duties—

which are set out in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3). It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the undoubted relationship here created is one of the highest confidence, as General Brădley is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the body which is declared by the act of Congress itself to be the principal military adviser to the President, to the Natonal Security Council, and to the Secretary of Defense.

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP AS ACT OF CONGRESS

I do not see how a higher relationship, confidential relationship, could be brought into existence, and this high confidential relationship is the act of the Congress itself, which act had in fact the approval of the President of the United States. So, I think that General Bradley, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could undoubtedly claim the privilege to withhold any statement made by him or any member of the council or of the President.

There is not here any suggestion of bad faith. There is not here any suggestion of the arbitrary withholding.

There is here, on the contrary, the express statement, by the witness, of his willingness to disclose all of the conclusions reached, and all of the things finally done, as the result of any conference had by him as a member of this council on the 6th of April.

There is expressed here that so far as the conversation that might have occurred between the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the 5th of April, the general also had no recollection, and was unable to make any statement to the committee; and through his whole testimony, up to the point, I take it that there is no suggestion of any arbitrary attitude upon the part of General Bradley.

He appears before this committee in his official capacity.

He was called upon to relate conversations that occurred in an official meeting held pursuant to an act which creates an office of the highest confidence, as I have said before.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not, myself, believe that any exceptions to the general rule can be admitted, because to admit exceptions would destroy the rule itself; but I have recited the fact that there is nothing in this record to disclose any arbitrary conduct on the part of General Bradley, in declining to make answer to the question relating to the conversations on April the 6th, at which the President, of course, was present.

Now, Mr. President, what is the character of General Bradley, the official character, I mean?

He is here as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal military adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and to the Secretary of Defense, with regard to matters that affect the general welfare and vital security of the country.

In ordinary relationships, if it appears that an attorney is approached by a prospective client for the purpose of employing him, and if he discloses to that attorney facts adverse to his interests; if it appears to a court that the relation of attorney and client existed, or that the disclosure was made in the course of the creation of that relationship, no court in the land would permit the attorney to disclose any part of the conversation that took place with his client.

When that fact appears, that is the end of the matter, and it doesn't matter what the client would have to say about it. It doesn't matter that the client himself would waive his rights.

The attorney has a position which under the law, under our own system, he is entitled to protect, and which, moreover, it is his duty to protect.

PRIVILEGE OF JUDICIARY AND CONGRESS

Whatever privilege is recognized by the judiciary, an equal and coordinate branch of this Government, should, in my judgment, be recognized by the Congress, either House of the Congress, or by any committee of the Congress.

Indeed, the reasons would seem to me more impelling upon the Congress, particularly in this matter where the general himself is the creature and is acting under, in his official capacity, the mandate of a law passed and approved by the Congress.

Now, the basis of this privilege to the witness undoubtedly is that it is not in the public interest and cannot be in the public interest, that it is destructive of the integrity of Government itself, and that any communications, oral or written, relating to high matters of state should be revealed.

That is the basis on which General Bradley in his official capacity here has declined to make answer to these questions.

It seems to me that undoubtedly the privilege exists, and undoubtedly General Bradley is entitled to exercise that privilege, he has exercised that privilege, and that is the end of the matter, so far as mere conversations that lead up to the final conclusions or the final actions taken, which are not withheld from the committee, and which General Bradley himself disclosed and expressed a willingness to completely disclose.

Suppose it should occur in a meeting of this National Security Council that General Bradley had advised against the appointment of, let us say, General Ridgway in Korea. Nevertheless, the President appointed General Ridgway. Suppose it should occur that General Bradley had urged someone else over General Ridgway.

Could we, without destroying the whole function of this important officer of the Government, in his position of high confidential relation to the President, could we compel the general to detail the conversation that took place?

It might, and unquestionably in that case would, be perfectly proper to say what action was finally taken, what the judgment is finally, but not the successive steps that were presented by him or other members of that official body then advising with the President in a high matter of state.

ADVISERS MUST MAINTAIN PRESIDENT'S CONFIDENCE

It does not seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that there ought to be any doubt about it in this case, and that it does not present a conflict between the executive power and the legislative power. It simply recognizes the necessity of permitting one who is created to advise the President to remain the adviser of the President in a true sense.

If that adviser may be questioned about what he said and what someone else said, and the arguments that went pro and con, would it be possible to imagine that he could retain the confidence even of the President?

Therefore, he could not discharge his functions, and as I see it, this case should be determined upon General Bradley's own right to claim his privilege and to assert it here to the committee.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

Senator LODGE. I wish to say——

Chairman RUSSELL. You will have to get your time on this, Senator.

Senator LODGE. I would like to make an announcement that I have to leave.

Senator GEORGE. If I have any time, I will be glad to yield it.

Chairman RUSSELL (to clerk). How about the status of time?

Senator LODGE. I want to take 30 seconds.

Senator WILEY. I will yield 30 seconds.

Senator LODGE. I simply wish to say that since we made our decision to vote at 1 o'clock yesterday the decision has been made to call the calendar. Now, I realize that a point of order, an objection could be made over there to further sessions of this committee; and if it was decided to bring it to a vote, it is possible to take the floor and hold it for an hour and prevent this committee from doing any business. I shall not do this, because I think the sooner this deplorable incident is settled the better, but there is legislation on the calendar for which I have an immediate responsibility.

So I shall have to leave at 12 o'clock; and, of course, if there is voting today, I shall be glad to be polled.

Chairman RUSSELL. There will be a vote at 1 o'clock under the order heretofore fixed.

Senator WILEY. I yield to Senator Knowland.

DOING THE COMMITTEE'S JOB

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, the importance of the issue before us rests in the precedent that has been set. While it is true that the courts have not always upheld the Congress on certain specific cases which have reached the judiciary, it is also true that Congress itself has not previously abdicated on a wholesale basis its position to gain facts even though it has not seen fit to carry all cases to a final determination.

For this committee to do the job assigned to it by the Senate, and in order to satisfy the Nation and the Congress, the doors to pertinent information, the subject of this inquiry, should not, as a matter of public policy, be closed to us.

When the issue came up in the administration of President Coolidge as to whether certain executive papers should be made available to the Senate committee, he did not hide behind any narrow legalistic interpretation, thought the then Attorney General apparently advised him to do so.

To the contrary, he changed his Attorney General and ordered the information made available to the Senate. He recognized that the issue involved the public business; that Government was a servant of the people, and that only complete cooperation would demonstrate that he and his administration had nothing to fear from the truth and the whole truth being developed.

In the great discussion that now divides our country, this administration would do well not to stand on legal technicalities.

I quote from the Congressional Record of November 9, 1945, as it appears on page 10755, quoting Senator Burton K. Wheeler, and I quote:

> I call attention to the fact that in the Daugherty investigation I sent for files; I asked for files from the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Daugherty.

He refused to give them to me. I have forgotten the grounds he stated, but at any rate he refused to give them to me. When he did so, the President of the United States, Mr. Coolidge, called him in and asked for his resignation, and Mr. Daugherty was eliminated from the office of Attorney General. After that time, when the new Attorney General was appointed, every single file I ever asked for as a minority member of the committee was furnished to me.

If the discussions between the heads of agencies created by the Congress are privileged and confidential when they relate to the summary removal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, will the same rule be used to block information relative to Yalta, Potsdam, and the Blair House meetings in June of last year?

If so, a tremendous handicap will be placed upon this committee's being able to accomplish its mission.

In a responsible government, operating under our Constitution, it requires that our public officials be both responsible and accountable.

TWILIGHT CONSTITUTIONAL ZONE

Article I of the Constitution gives the power to declare war to the Congress and not to the Executive. We are apparently now drifting into a twilight constitutional zone where the Executive can put us into a war, the fourth largest in our history, without a congressional declaration or a congressional resolution recognizing that a state of war started by others already exists.

When Congress acts under its constitutional power, every statement for or against the resolution is part of the Congressional Record, and the press and the public are fully informed.

The roll-call vote shows how each Member voted. This is responsible and accountable government.

If five or seven men can meet in a closed session in the Blair House or the White House, and put this Nation into the fourth largest war, from a casualty standpoint, in our history without their statements and recommendations being recorded or available, and without their positions on this matter being known, we have the war-making power transferred from the Congress, operating in the open, to the Executive, operating en camera.

If that can be done once, it can be done again. That is not, I submit, either responsible or accountable government.

It impinges on the constitutional powers of the Congress and is a pertinent subject of the fullest inquiry.

Are we to be faced with the defense that these men, whoever they may have been, were merely confidential advisers to the President, and such discussions were privileged under the same precedent?

Much has been made of the fact that this committee did not press General MacArthur for further information relative to his private discussions with the President at Wake Island—at the Wake Island conference.

There is no parallel between that case and this. In the Wake Island notes, the President is quoted as saying, and I quote from page 8 of the committee release of the Wake Island conference, quoting the President:

> General MacArthur and I have talked fully about Formosa. There is no need to cover that subject again. The general and I are in complete agreement.

That is the end of the quotation.

The inference is clear that there had been a complete meeting of minds on the strategic importance of Formosa and the steps which should be taken to help defend it or to abandon it. MacArthur's reply made unnecessary any further questioning on the subject. The strategic importance of Formosa had not even been discussed.

The pertinent fact was that the misleading paragraph in the Wake Island release had been cleared up. Now what kind of a rule does the administration operate under?

At the Wake Island conference with high advisers to the President and classified top-secret information, an eavesdropping stenographer was placed behind a panel to record all conversations, including the President's. Dir the President know it? Did he approve this action? I do not know.

These notes were released to the New York Times which are still classified as top secret. Had this the approval of the President? I do not know.

Is the rule to be that there is a one-way privilege, that which supports the President's actions and policies can be made available, and that which might be critical must be forever suppressed? That, it seems to me, approaches a doctrine that the king can do no wrong, or if he does, it should not be discussed.

THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Now let us take the case of the Yalta Conference where the members of the American delegation there were confidential advisers to the President. When actions are taken that lead to hundreds of millions of Chinese and Poles and other eastern Europeans going into the Soviet orbit with the destruction of their lives and their liberty, is this private business? Is it comparable to the relationship of a doctor and his patient, attorney and his client, priest and the parishoner? I think not.

Of the participants at Yalta, three are dead, Roosevelt, Stettinius, and Hopkins. One is in prison, Alger Hiss. If we do not get the facts now, we may never get them. Let me cite you a concrete example, and I read from the hearings of this committee of May 11, 1951, page 1473.

Senator KNOWLAND.—

speaking to General Marshall—

> Were you familiar at Yalta with the Manchurian provisions of giving Dairen and the rights on the Manchurian Railroad and Port Arthur to the Soviet Union?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think I was, sir.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND. You were not. Was that made in the political——
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Yes.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). Committee?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Those were entirely separate from the military.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND. They were separate from the military?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND. Well, didn't they have a considerable amount of military significance, as, of course, we have hindsight now, which we didn't have then, but didn't those decisions have a considerable amount of military significance?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. As to the future, yes, sir.
>
> Senator KNOWLAND. And that feature of it was not discussed with the three chiefs?
>
> Secretary MARSHALL. Not to my recollection, Senator.

Senator **Knowland**. With the exception of the Manchurian-Chinese features of the Yalta agreement, on the other phases of them, were there any conferences where the entire American delegation got together and discussed, for instance, the Polish terms on holding free elections, or the——

Secretary **Marshall**. Not with the military.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I call your attention to the House committee hearings on un-American activities on August 5, 1948, reading from page 656 of the record.

Mr. **Mundt**.—

questioning Mr. Alger Hiss—

Mr. Hiss, you have gone into some detail concerning your work and responsibilities in the Department of Agriculture. I would like to ask you a few questions concerning your work and responsibilities while working for the Department of State.

Mr. **Hiss**. Yes.

Mr. **Mundt**. Did you participate in the Yalta Conference?

Mr. **Hiss**. I did, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Mundt**. Did you draft or participate in the drafting of parts of the Yalta agreement?

Mr. **Hiss**. I think it is accurate and not an immodest statement to say that I did to some extent; yes.

Then further on on that same page, Mr. Mundt said:

Did you participate in the portion of the Yalta agreement which gave Russia control of the chief Manchurian railroad?

Mr. **Hiss**.—

and I call your attention particularly to this—

That was not part of the political agreement. I knew nothing of that until many months later. That was the military talks in which I did not participate.

Now, Mr. Chairman, that is pertinent information to this inquiry. How is this committee going to get the facts as to just what took place at Yalta which led to hundreds of millions of people having their liberties destroyed and going into either slavery or death, if we are not permitted to interview the advisers of the President of the United States as to what was said?

Here is a clear-cut difference of opinion. Secretary Marshall said that the matter was not discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Yalta but was discussed with the political advisers. Mr. Hiss, one of the chief political advisers, says it was not discussed with the political advisers, it was discussed with the military. What is the truth at Yalta? I do not know. Do you?

CITING CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

Now this conversation, I submit, Mr. Chairman, is very pertinent. I submit that if we once establish this precedent, we will close to the American people information to which they are entitled at Yalta, at Tehran, at Potsdam, at the Blair House conference out of which conference this country was precipitated into a war in Korea, which is now the fourth largest war in all history.

The same defense can be made by every one of the advisers of the President who were at the Blair House conference.

I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that we are departing from our constitutional basis in this country: we are in this twilight period where we move the war-making power and the war-declaring power from the Congress of the United States into the hands of the Executive, where instead of being done in public, it can be done in camera.

I do not believe that the American people want any such doctrine established.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders asked for 1 minute, that he might propound a question that he sees.

NATURE OF THE VOTE

Senator FLANDERS. I want to ask this question, Mr. Chairman:

Quite irrespective of the merits of the particular situation before us, on which I would be prepared to pass judgment on my own, I do want to know whether, if I vote not to cite General Bradley——

Senator WILEY. That isn't the vote.

Senator FLANDERS. General Bradley——

Senator WILEY. That isn't the vote. The vote is to sustain the——

Senator FLANDERS. Sustain the Chair—it amounts to the same thing.

Senator BREWSTER. No; it doesn't amount to the same thing at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute, gentlemen.

Senator FLANDERS. Let me ask my question the best way I can.

If I vote to sustain the judgment of the Chair, am I voting to break a precedent which Congress has upheld over many years, as to its right to get access to information from the executive department?

I might feel one way toward this particular situation, and another way toward the breaking of a long-established precedent.

Chairman RUSSELL. I yield to Senator Connally 5 minutes.

PRESIDENT'S TRANSACTIONS

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I will take 5 minutes.

I want to briefly repeat what I said yesterday about the impossibility of the President transacting business if every caller on the President, who sees him and talks to him about a matter, can be called before a committee and questioned.

If all that were allowed, all they would have to do would be to station a man outside the White House and watch everybody that goes in to see the President, and when he comes out, summon him up here before a committee and say: "What did you talk to the President about? What did he say to you? What did you say to him?"

That is so ridiculous and so unfounded that it is readily apparent that the President could have no business whatever transacted.

And, General Bradley says that he was the confidential adviser to the President.

The law made him that. We passed the law making him the confidential adviser to the President of the United States.

If the Chair is not sustained, then you have no confidential adviser; you have got no confidences whatever.

How can it be confidential when you can drag a man up here and made him tell everything that transpired? Where does the "confidence" come in? It absolutely goes out the window.

Senator Wiley, I believe it was, referred to the information for legislative purposes. We have no legislative matters before us calling for information that will influence us as to the passing of a law—none whatever.

IMPORTANCE OF SUSTAINING CHAIRMAN

I want to suggest that this particular matter is more important than the case of a lawyer and his client.

I adhere to the rule of the lawyer and his client. It is perfectly sacred to me; but what transpired between a lawyer and his client doesn't affect the public interest. It only affects the interests of the client and the lawyer.

This matter is one that affects high public interests; it affects the security of the United States. It will affect the whole set-up, as to the organization of our Government, the functions of the President, and the functions of his confidential military adviser. I think it is on a higher level than even the case of the lawyer and his client, or the physician and his patient, or any of the other relationships that have been suggested here.

Now, in closing, I want to thank the Chair for giving me this time. I don't want to take up the time of the committee, but it seems to me that this quesiton is so fundamental, that any other course than to sustain the chairman would be quite ridiculous, and quite out of harmony, not only with the decisions of the courts that have been cited here by the chairman, but as contrary to the Anglo-Saxon concept of free government and free institutions, contrary to our own theories of free government, and to our own theories of the responsibiilties of the advisers of the President to advise him confidentially.

As to the course that he should pursue, General Bradley has stated that he is willing to announce the conclusions of this conference, but he refuses to detail the conversations, as to what was said to him by the President, and what was said to the President.

That is absolutely sacred. If that relationship cannot be preserved, if it cannot be respected, then the integrity of government, itself, is decreased and, in this instance, it would be destroyed.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman——

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley——

Senator STENNIS. May I have an extra minute?

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute, please——

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will the Chair yield to me, 2 minutes?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley, I think, is next.

Senator WILEY. Do you want me to go forward?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator WILEY. I yield 5 minutes to Senator Hickenlooper.

PRESIDENT'S PRIVILEGE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I may not take that much, Mr. Chairman, because most of these arguments either have been made, or will be made by others.

It seems to me that Senator Wiley has put his finger on exactly the situation we are in.

Privilege is a rare exception in the jurisprudence of this country, or Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence or, so far as I know, any other nation.

The privilege which is accorded and which has been recognized in some courts in this land to the President has not been raised in this case. This goes merely to the desire of a witness to avoid answering questions, and he says he thinks it was confidential.

The privilege is extended to the President, if it is a privilege, of saying that the disclosure of certain facts would be against the public interest. That has not been raised in this case, and therefore it resolves itself entirely down to a point of whether this committee as a matter of mechanics wants to excuse a witness from answering the question where he has in my judgment no technical protection or technical right until he raises himself the objection that his superior, the President of the United States in this transaction, deems this to be contrary to the public interest for him to testify.

If he raises that issue, a totally different question arises. He has not raised it. It is not therefore before this commitee.

The only issue before this committee is does this committee want to excuse a reluctant witness from answering a question which he has been asked. Now we have heard a lot about conclusions. General Bradley says he is willing to testify to conclusions. Why, the conclusions in this matter, members of this committee, are well known to everybody.

If it was just finding out what the conclusions are, there would be no cause for this investigation whatsoever. The conclusions are that certain policies are in effect in the Orient. The conclusions are and the facts are known to everyone, that General MacArthur was recalled. Those are the facts, those are the conclusions.

LEGAL STANDPOINT

It is the underlying reasons and the underlying purposes behind those conclusions that this committee must ferret out if this committee is to arrive at any sound conclusions of its own. If we are talking from a legal standpoint, so far as I know there is no jurisdiction, Federal or State, in this country that will permit a witness to take the stand and state his conclusions, with the possible exception of professional testimony in certain instances, to state his conclusions without permitting a probing of the facts and the evidence upon which those conclusions are based.

In fact most jurisdictions will throw out a question on the objection that it calls for an opinion or a conclusion of the witness. The court says the facts must be stated so that the jury can make up its own mind as to the rectitude of this course.

For fear someone will say this is a professional situation, I mentioned the fact that a doctor may be put on the witness stand and posed a hypothetical question, but he still can be examined on the facts underlying that in all the jurisdictions that I know. His conclusions are subject to probing as to his professional knowledge and the facts upon which a broad conclusionary question may be asked.

If we talk about strict legality, then the offer to give conclusions falls, in my judgment, and has no validity. We know the conclusions, and therefore there would be no purpose for this investigation.

Mr. Chairman, the argument that is used that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are created by statute has no validity, in my opinion, either. Congress created the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress can abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress can direct their activities. Congress can prescribe by statute.

That power comes from Congress, not from the Constitution, and so the idea that we have created the Joint Chiefs of Staff——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am advised by Dr. Wilcox that the 5 minutes allotted to the Senator has expired.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I have one more minute? The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a creature of this Congress, subject to the control and even the abolition of this Congress. We are charged here in our own responsibilities with requiring and producing the facts and the evidence.

I shan't attempt to canvass—and I only asked for 5 minutes—the very able statements made by the Senator from California and the Senator from Wisconsin, but certainly if we follow this procedure now, every witness who is reluctant that comes on this stand can crawl under the blanket of immunity that "I don't believe I should answer that question," and we will be denied evidence that we must have.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am very sorry. Senator Wiley, do you claim that you are entitled to conclude the argument?

Senator WILEY. Yes. You opened it. I think that Senator Morse should go on now. I do not know how much time he will take.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I shan't argue with the Senator about it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, may I have 2 minutes, please? I believe it is agreeable with the Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have 18 or 19 minutes.

Senator MORSE. Give the Senator 2 minutes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, might I just interrupt a moment? I mentioned before this meeting began that I ought to have a couple of minutes before the vote is taken to state my own position in this matter. Is that understood?

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Senator from Oregon will be good enough to allow the Senator from New Jersey a minute and a half or 2 minutes?

Senator MORSE. Leave me 15 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right. Very well, Senator, proceed.

ISSUE OF A WHITEWASH

Senator FULBRIGHT. I listened, Mr. Chairman, to the Senator from Wisconsin with much interest. I do not agree that this inquiry has no political overtones. In fact, I think it has strong political overtones.

After all, there is no resolution, no bill, pending before the committee. It is an inquiry arising out of an action which certainly has political implications.

I think one of the principal result to be expected is political in nature.

If we refuse at this time the Republicans' demand for information, this information or any other information, I am quite sure they will raise the issue of a whitewash.

In fact, as I interpreted the statements of the Senator from California yesterday, both in this committee and two different places, and I believe on the floor, he gives notice in a sense that that will be charged.

I do not feel like taking the responsibility for such a charge, particularly in view of the experiences with the Tyding committee of last year.

So I believe that the only way to minimize the political overtones of this inquiry is for the courts to decide the matter. I dislike very, very much not supporting the chairman, in whom I have the greatest confidence, not only in his wisdom but certainly in his fairness and integrity, but under these peculiar circumstances I would not like to be charged later on that I participated in any effort to cover up anything as a political matter in this inquiry.

I just want the record to show why I take the position that I intend to take.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is recognized for a minute and a half.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, my present intention is to sustain the chairman's ruling, and I want to state briefly my reasons for that.

I want to say that I am very much impressed with the arguments I have heard, with the position taken by my colleagues, Senator Wiley, Senator Hickenlooper, and Senator Knowland, but I feel there are other issues here that I want to state to the committee.

DISCOVERING FACTS FOR AMERICANS

First I desire to support the chairman in this issue, because I feel he is endeavoring to conduct these hearings on the highest possible plane of fairness, without partisanship, and with an earnest desire to get all the facts.

So my vote to sustain the chairman will be partly a personal vote of confidence in Chairman Russell.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate the Senator's remarks, but I don't ask him to do that.

Senator SMITH. Second, I desire scrupulously to avoid partisanship or any suspicion of politics in these proceedings. The very fact that that reason has been raised is another reason for my feeling that we should be very careful in this matter.

Third, the exact question at issue in this ruling is on the borderline zone, so far as the law is concerned, in my judgment. In my opinion, the law is not entirely clear to me either way.

I want to commend the arguments that have been made here and the very fine record of this issue.

My fourth reason is that General Bradley's declination to answer was not, in my judgment, an attempt on his part to conceal facts to which the Congress is entitled. I accept the sincerity of his petition.

I believe that we can get the essential facts from other witnesses, and many essential facts from General Bradley himself. I do not propose to let up on the attempt to get those facts.

Fifth, my vote to support the chair on this issue is not a precedent for any future action of mine, nor do I consider it a precedent for the committee, whichever way the vote goes; and in that respect, I cannot agree with my distinguished colleague, Senator Knowland. I see no precedent in this matter. Each case rests on its own merits.

Sixth and finally, my primary concern in these hearing is to discover the facts for the American people of this tragic case. A discovery of those facts may lead us to a sound American foreign policy.

I believe we must seek this end result by maintaining a united and objective spirit and approach during these committee hearings.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair must observe, and I apologize to the Senator from Oregon, that while I appreciate the compliment paid me, I hope that no single Senator here will cast his vote on this issue with the slightest regard for any consideration for the feelings of the Chair, because I have none. Vote your conscience as you see it.

Senator SMITH. I might say, Mr. Chairman, I was not considering the feelings of the Chair. I was trying to endorse what I felt was an unpartisan attitude the Chair has taken, and his sense of fairness, and I think we all ought to observe that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator.

I yield the balance of our time to the Senator from Oregon.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I will not be able to complete the argument that I prepared, but if necessary will complete the argument at a later hour on the floor of the Senate at an appropriate time. At this time I will summarize a summary of the argument.

Senator WILEY. Please speak a little louder.

Senator MORSE. I think we are dealing here with a fundamental question of the meaning of the separation-of-powers doctrine under our constitutional system.

I would like to say to my good friend from Arkansas, Mr. Fulbright, that I am at a complete loss to understand the reason for the vote that he has informed us he intends to cast.

If I am correct in my belief that he thinks the power of the President under our Constitution entitles him to have his advisers treat their conversations with him as confidential, and that the documents of the President likewise are entitled under the separation-of-powers doctrine to be treated as confidential—if that is the opinion of the Senator from Arkansas, then I think under his oath of office, it is his duty to sustain the doctrine of the separation of powers under our Constitution, and not pass the buck to the courts for final determination.

The next point I want to make is that I shall attempt to answer the question, as I understand it, put by the Senator from Vermont, Mr. Flanders.

If I understood his question, it was to the effect that he wanted to know if he voted to sustain the Chair, would he be voting contrary to a long list of precedents in the form of attempts on the part of the Congress of the United States in the past to seek the kind of information that is being attempted to be sought in the instant case before the committee.

I think there is only one answer that can be given to the Senator from Vermont, and that is there have been many instances in the history of our country when various Congresses have attempted to seek comparable information to that that is being sought in this case, but in those instances in which Presidents of the United States have claimed under their executive power the right to withhold that information from the Congress, I know of no decision of the courts in which the power of the President has been overruled.

In other words, the Senator from Vermont is confronted with a situation: If his question is to be determinative on his vote, as to whether or not he is going to be bound by precedents of the Congress in Congress' attempt to get information from the President which he, in the exercise of his executive power, has decided to withhold from the Congress, in which attempts Congress has always failed, and which attempts have not been sustained by the courts.

CHECKS ON THE LEGISLATIVE

That brings me to a comment I want to make on the argument made by the Senator from California, Mr. Knowland. He raises, it seems to me, this fundamental question of separation of powers, and he points out that there is a danger that the power of the Executive may or cán be abused, and so there is that danger.

There is no question about the fact that an Executive in the White House can abuse his executitve power, but there is nothing in the Constitution that says that when the President of the United States may abuse his executive power that the Congress can come in and demand that he disclose information that he does not want to disclose.

We have some checks, but that does not happen to be one of them, that is, the power to force the President, by subpena or otherwise, to disclose confidential information or information that he considers confidential, that he does not want to disclose. That is not one of the checks that we have on the President.

We have some checks. The American people have the check at the ballot box.

We have some checks by way of legislation. When we pass legislation we can refrain from giving to the President the broad arbitrary blanket power that we are prone too frequently, may I say, to give the President.

We have checks, if we wish to use them for punitive reasons, by way of appropriations and otherwise.

But I would say to my good friend from California, there is no check in the constitution by way of vesting in the Congress the power to subpena from the President of the United States confidential information or information that he considers confidential in carrying out his constitutional power and his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law.

POWER OF CONGRESS

So I think the Senator from California in pointing out that a President can abuse his power, did well to point out that some past Presidents, in the case of the Coolidge administration, for example, have volunteered information—and any President can volunteer information. But we are dealing here, gentlemen, with the question of the power of the Congress under the separation-of-powers doctrine, I respectfully submit that you will look in vain in the law to find any case sustaining the point of view presented by the Senator from Wisconsin that the legal power on the part of the Congress exists to force from the President information that he considers confidential and related to his constitutional duty to execute the laws.

Now, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the committee should recognize that it may be, and I hope it will be true, that the present President of the United States will volunteer some of the information, or all of the kind of information that the Senate from California referred to this morning in regard to the Yalta Conference and other conferences.

But the major thesis that I want to argue in support of here this morning, gentlemen, is that under the constitution, in accordance with the separation of powers doctrine, there is no power vested by the Constitution in the Congress of the United States to compel the President to produce that information.

DEFENDING CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

Now may I say, if it is permissible to refer to myself as a Republican in the eyes of my Republican colleagues, that I hope in 1952 we will have a Republican President in the White House; and if and when we do, the junior Senator from Oregon will make the same fight as he is making now to protect the executive powers of whoever is in the White House, Republican or Democratic, because I think you destroy our constitutional system if you destroy or weaken this system of separation of powers.

As the chairman of this committee has so ably said in his opening argument this morning, we have got to look at this issue from the standpoint of ultimate power of enforcement. Where it is? It is in the courts. And where are the decisions in American jurisprudence that support any conclusion that the President of the United States has to make available to a Congress or a committee of Congress confidential information which, in his opinion, he wishes to keep secret, private, confidential in carrying out his constitutional duties to execute the law?

I have found no such decisions, and I think that to the contrary the authorities are overwhelming against that conclusion.

Now let me say a word about the argument of waiver of privilege. It is asserted by some that General Bradley's appearance before the joint committee must be considered to constitute a waiver of privilege not to divulge information obtained through a confidential relationship.

WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE

The doctrine of waiver of privilege is drawn from private law analogies such as lawyer-client, priest-parishioner, doctor and patient. It in my opinion has no application in the field of constitutional law where the executive privilege not to have confidential communications or conversations divulged by subordinates derives from the doctrine of separation of powers and from the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

This doctrine and this duty make it implicit that where the President believes it is in the public interest, confidential information will be disclosed; where he believes it would be detrimental to the public interest, confidential information will be withheld. If the separation of powers doctrine is to have any validity at all no one but the President, in any given case, can make the decision. And if we read the press right in this instance, we read that the President has made the decision that General Bradley should not disclose the conversation itself. It is my argument that it is his executive power to do it.

As the Senator from Texas pointed out so clearly the other day, if you adopt any other principle in regard to this instant dispute, then you will find the country in a situation sometime where you have an opposition Congress of one party and a President of another party.

The Congress then would be in a position to hail before committees of that opposition Congress conversers with the President of the United States and on the threat of having them held for contempt of the committee try to force out of them the conversations that they had with the President. That is clearly, in my judgment, the type of thing that the founding fathers in their wisdom had in mind when they laid down a constitutional system of three branches of coordinate, equal, and independent departments of Government.

Thus, I say, gentlemen, that the President, having made the decision to have one of his subordinates testify on a given issue, to say then he is precluded from delimiting the scope of the testimony which that subordinate may render would do violence simultaneously to the doctrine of separation of powers and to the President's duty under the Constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

DISCRETION OF PRESIDENT

As stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, page 1488, second edition, 1929—

> it is practically established that the President may exercise a full discretion as to what information he will furnish, and which he will withhold.

Even if the analogies as to a waiver of privilege drawn from common-law doctrines had any validity here, they would not show that in General Bradley's case there has been any waiver. For instance, as to the attorney-client privilege, Wigmore on evidence, section 2327, third edition, 1940, says—

> the privilege is designed to secure the client's confidence in the secrecy of his communications; hence, the privilege is not violated by receiving such disclosures as the client by his own will permits to be made.

Clearly the appearance is not in itself a waiver of the privilege, that is, General Bradley's appearance, as supported, I think, by Montgomery versus Pickering, 116 Massachusetts 227. This even though the witness is called by his own attorney; much less, if the analogy applied to General Bradley since he was called by the investigating group, this committee.

Even if the client, in whom the privilege lies in the attorney-client relationship, discloses the attorney's communications to him, the attorney may not divulge the client's confidential communications to him—77 New York Supplement Second 716, 1948.

Chairman Russell. The Chair regrets very much to advise the Senator from Oregon that his time has expired. So I am advised by the timekeeper.

Senator Morse. I will finish my argument on the floor.

Senator Wiley. I yield time to the Senator from Maine.

Senator Brewster. How much time is it, do you know?

Senator Wiley. You can have 10 minutes.

REALM OF THE INVESTIGATION

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the very admirable tone in which the chairman presented this matter this morning and to express my regret that the discussions of the last 2 days could not be wiped out of the record. My only regret is that anticipating the very fundamental character of this question that was raised, that it could not have perhaps been considered desirable to have a presentation by the committee after careful examination. However, I think we have repaired most of the ravages, and I am only regretful that there was one suggestion of partisanship this morning, which I am sure is not in anyone's mind.

I regretted the chairman commented on a huddle of some of the members. But I am quite sure the chairman himself, if he has not huddled with any of the other members, would be very wise to do so in taking counsel with all of his colleagues who might have something to contribute.

I feel very strongly that we must be very careful that this does not become a committee upon the conduct of the war. That is the thing which I think is very fundamental and very dangerous. I think the discussions here going to the matters of policies that are involved is far more within the realm that we should approach. The questions raised by the Senator from California, which are not on the conduct of the war but as to how we got into the war and how we became involved in this situation, are very appropriate.

INVESTIGATIVE POWER OF CONGRESS

The Senator from Texas suggested that we did not have a resolution, that legislation was not being considered. The investigative power of the Congress, I think, however, is equally great, and as I understand from the unanimous-consent agreement under which we are proceeding, it did cover all the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter. So it seems to me we are not limited in that regard.

It is gratifying to me that apparently everyone concurs that this could be confined to Presidential discussions and not extended to other employees of the Government. I think that is highly important and I understand that that is very generally recognized by all who are discussing it here.

Now, as to the legal problem involved, I am not prepared to close my mind on either side. There is certainly a great deal to be said on both sides. It is a very fundamental question. Accordingly, I am going to give my conclusion, the benefit of the doubt, to the congressional power.

I am extremely reluctant to have the Congress recognize a surrender of its power of exploration. In the final analysis, under our constitutional system, it may become a matter for determination by the courts.

This, however, is not here raised, because there is no proposal here now to cite for contempt but simply to determine whether or not in the judgment of this committee the question is relevant to the problem we are presented with and that the President, as the Senator from Wisconsin pointed out, has not raised the issue of privilege.

It seems to me, agreeing with the Senator from Iowa, that is very important.

TRUMAN'S SENATE COMMITTEE

Now, the only contribution I think I can make from my experience is that in my service here I have seen this issue come up first with the Truman committee, when the President was chairman of it.

I saw him militantly defend the power of the legislative branch. I saw him threaten to cite for contempt the Secretary of War, Mr.

Patterson, who is a very great lawyer himself and a circuit judge. Mr. Patterson bent the knee and decided he would disclose, though they considered and had insisted, on the advice of his Under Secretary, Mr. Royall, that it was a confidential matter, and they wouldn't disclose it.

I saw Senator Truman demand from President Roosevelt the so-called Stettinius report, which was concerned with determining the industrial mobilization. We understood in the committee that it confirmed the reports of the Louis Johnson plan, which was our mobilization plan. President Roosevelt impounded that document. He refused to give it to the committee.

We recognized, as Andrew Jackson said, that Marshall had made his decree—now let him enforce it. We recognized that power.

Subsequently as chairman of the committee, succeeding Mr. Truman, I asked it of the President, then Mr. Truman; I received it, and it confirmed completely the concern of the committee.

Bernard Baruch testified before that committee subsequently that if those plans had been adopted in the early stages of the war, it would have meant the saving of thousands of lives and billions of dollars.

I cite this as as showing how profoundly important it is that the Congress shall recognize that the President also is a human being and possibly prone to err.

I saw one other illustration of it when there was a so-called confidential report in the executive department concerned with one of the highest officials of our Government, on which President Roosevelt refused to act.

Knowledge of it came to me, and I took it to the Truman committee and stated that I thought it should be considered on the floor if action were not taken. They asked me to delay disclosure for 1 month.

The President had refused to act. Before the month was up the official had resigned.

I cite that as an indication that even Presidents cannot always confidently be trusted with the enormous powers that undoubtedly reside within that office.

That is why I am very reluctant to see a committee of the Congress or the Congress itself, which must, after all, determine finally on citations for contempt as to whether the circumstances warrant, recognize a policy which under the expanding powers of Government in these days may easily lead us by transition to a power in the Executive which Anglo-Saxon concepts have been developing for a thousand years, from the days at Runnymede when King John I ruled and when the Parliament took off the head of one king because he exceeded the executive power.

SACREDNESS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

I feel, in the final analysis, the legislative power should be the thing which we should all view with a jealous regard as the one repository in the people that may finally preserve us from the same development of totalitarian concepts which are the menace of a republic such as ours on every hand.

These are the reasons why I am not prepared at this time to vote as a member of this committee to sustain the proposition that this committee has not the power and should not exercise its power, so far as it can, to secure the information, which is not of a private character. This is not a lawyer and client. This is the highest public interest involving the lives of unnumbered Americans. This is perhaps the very future of our society; and I do not want to see the legislative branch of the Government consent to a derogation of the authority which, in my judgment, should finally reside within it.

JUDICIAL APPROACH

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, in concluding this argument today, it appears to me that everyone feels that you have done a grand job in the conduct of this committee up to date, and that, too, you have made it very plain that it is not a question of loyalty to you or anyone else.

It is a question of one's conviction on the legal issues that are involved that you want decided by this vote, and I am grateful to you for that fine judicial attitude.

When I entered this argument I said the law and the facts should determine the case. I said that a lawyer who looks up the law before he gets his facts is in very poor shape because he may have to suborn perjury to make the facts fit the law.

Now, first of all, it is very clear that in this case the President has not stated that it would be against the public interest, and in all the cases that have been cited that is the significant feature.

Second, neither has the witness said it would be against the public interest to disclose it, nor has he consulted the President to authorize him to say that it was confidential.

PRESIDENT-BRADLEY RELATIONSHIP

Now it seems to me that under those circumstances most of the argument we have had today goes out the window. The argument that I want to particularly address myself to at this time is the argument of Senator George. He raised a new point.

As I understood from his statement, he conceded that it was not a question of division of powers whatsoever because of the facts. Senator George's argument is based upon the theory that section 211 of the statute creates the situation of privilege between the President and General Bradley. I read the statute. There was nothing in it that says that whatever, so his theory must be that the relationship creates an implied privilege.

Well, let's see. General Bradley, as suggested by Senator Hickenlooper, is our creature also. We have created him. We have had to O. K. him. We have to pay him. We have a right to get the benefit of his judgment.

And what does Willoughby say on that? He has been quoted by the opposition. I quote:

> In a very true sense all the administrative officers of the Government, including the President himself, when in the performance of administrative duties as entrusted to him are but agents of Congress and subject to the orders and the control thereof.

That is Willoughby that was quoted by the Senator from Oregon. Now I want to go back to this statute that was argued so effectively by Senator George, and frankly as I look over this statute, it said:

> Subject to the authority and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform the following duties in addition to such other duties as the President or Secretary may direct.

Then it enumerates preparation of strategic plans, preparation of logistic plans, establishment of unified command, review of major material and personal requirements, formation of the policies for joint training, and formulation of policies for coordinating and providing United States representatives to the military staff committee of the United Nations.

Now, what are the facts we want to elicit? We want to elicit the facts, the conversations, and the statements that took place in these meetings of April 5 and 6 and thereon when the method was engineered to get rid of MacArthur.

But even here under these reasons I say we would have a personal right to call a witness, if you please, and inquire about it unless the President said, in his humble opinion, it is against the public interest.

Then, according to all the decisions, that ends it. The courts wouldn't inquire into it.

Now, what does the statute say on which Senator George bases the opinion that there is an implied privilege? Does it say that it is privileged?

Why, my good friends, you can't legislate, except by express legislative enactment, this condition of privilege.

It came out of the common law and every State in the Union has got what they call the attorney-client doctrine, doctor and patient, priest and parishioner. When they extend it, they extend it by direct legislation.

So it seems to me that this is just another argument to say to us Senators: "Now, let us just say that any witness who comes before us and says, 'I have had confidential relationships with the President; therefore, I cannot testify,' cannot."

We are laying a precedent so dangerous in its implications that if I had any fear in me—and I haven't—I would tremble.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield for a question?

DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE RELATIVE TO PARTIAL DISCLOSURE

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Is there not also a doctrine of privilege being waived in instances where a partial disclosure is made?

In that connection I am thinking of what the Senator from California spoke about: Yalta, Cairo, Tehran, Potsdam, the Blair House, and Byrnes, Stettinius, Admiral Leahy, Hopkins, and even the most recent case of Mr. Daniels, with the President. Does this not involve disclosures of every character?

Senator WILEY. The Senator has anticipated my next argument. There was no objection to this witness coming. There was no objection for him to state to Senator Hickenlooper the conclusions. If we assume that there arises out of this statute an implied privilege—and

I don't assume it—then let us refer again to the case of the doctor and the patient.

The attorney questions the defendant and he reaches all these conclusions about this fellow; he has examined him and has got the facts, and he says now that he cannot live over 6 months; he has got a broken ankle, and so forth. All right, and now you leave him there.

I do not think the analogy is comparable at all, but I am using it because you, my associates, used it.

Waiver? Why, if the law of waiver did not apply in a case like this, it would not have any vitality any place.

It is important to remember to bear in mind that, one, the President does not say that this testimony will affect the public interest; two, the witness does not say so; three, the witness has not consulted with the President on the subject. He just raised it himself. Those are the facts.

Senator KNOWLAND. Will the Senator yield for a very brief question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you yield to the Senator from California?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. He yields.

AUTHORITY OF THE COMMITTEE

Senator KNOWLAND. Is it not a fact that relating to this committee's having some legislative jurisdiction, that the so-called Wherry resolution has by unanimous action of the Senate been referred to this combined committee and is now before us?

Senator WILEY. Well, if you will read the Daugherty case, you will find there that a congressional committee possesses the power to make such investigations as may be necessary for the purposes of legislation and also for the investigation of executive officials. It was the Attorney General who was investigated there.

Of course, we investigate Senators here, and we have not got the courage to claim we have the right to investigate administrative officers and executive officers, if they are guilty of malfeasance. It's ridiculous.

Under the Reorganization Act, passed in 1949, there is perfect authority to do whatever we are doing here. The language is specific there. There is not any question about that. So, under the Daugherty decision, and under the best rules now, and especially in view of world conditions and the situation that our Government is in, there is the inherent power in this legislative branch to correct evils by legislation, and by investigation, not only for the purpose of recommending legislation, but to see whether there is malfeasance in office.

I have no question about the authority of the committee. I did not think that was raised until, I think, Senator Connally said something to that effect.

Now I want to quote to you what Jackson said, because we all know Robert Jackson, and I might say that the Senator from Georgia cited President Jackson. Those all concerned me because President Jackson specifically denied the right, in both instances, and then afterward conceded they could have the material.

The same thing occurred with Jefferson in one of the first cases and he later turned all the papers over; but that was a question of a conflict of sovereign power. That is not this case, because of the facts.

DECISION RELATIVE TO PUBLIC INTEREST

Now, let me show you what Robert H. Jackson said:

> Discretion in the executive branch has been upheld and respected by the judiciary.

Of course, the executive branch is not asking for discretion.

> The courts have repeatedly held that they will not and cannot require the Executive to produce such papers when in the opinion of the Executive their production is contrary to the public interest.

When in the opinion.

Now, just put there the testimony instead of the papers and you have got the law.

> The courts have since held that the question of whether the production of papers would be against the public interest is one for the Executive and not for the courts to determine.

Yes, gentlemen, I am simply repeating, because many of you were not here when I made my argument, and I repeat again and again, that the citations by my distinguished friends on the opposition, do not fit the facts of this case for the simple reason that there is no finding which the Executive has made that this is against the public interest. There is no finding or statement that this is confidential or privileged.

In fact, we want the Executive to state something. So far he has not, and even Bradley will not inquire of the Executive. He acts on his own initiative. If this witness appearing before the committee were not such a wonderful man and such a wonderful character, under ordinary conditions you would say that he was flouting the committee when he claimed a matter such as this was confidential.

Now, let us be realistic. If the President wants to say to this group that the testimony of General Bradley in these conferences with him is not confidential, but that the giving of that testimony to the public would be against the public interest, then his word is final.

He has not said so. We asked him, no matter which way this turns, to tell his officials in the interest of the public to give us all the facts, not relating to other matters. As Senator George said, supposing in these conversations something had come up about the qualifications of Ridgway, and Bradley said he was not any good or words to that effect. How would that affect the war in Korea? We are not asking about Rirdgway. We are asking about MacArthur.

We are saying that that is one of the fundamental issues that this committee is investigating, and you cannot pass the buck by saying it is privileged or that there is a conflict of sovereignty here.

Now, gentlemen, I ask you, as Senators of the most august body in the world, to contemplate the result of what your vote is going to mean.

There is no question, I say to Senator Flanders, of citing the man in question for contempt. What we want to do is bring out the facts and, second, we want to stand by the guns of those who went before us in 150 years and who have maintained the dignity and the power of this Senate.

INTERPRETING THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator WILEY. You will have to hurry along.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask the Senator if the argument that the statute creating the Joint Chiefs of Staff creates an immunity so far as the President is concerned? Since the Secretary of Defense is mentioned in there, would not the same argument hold that the Secretary of Defense would have the same immunity and be privileged not to testify as to what the Joint Chiefs of Staff might have done?

Senator WILEY. I have no question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean, it would be logical to extend that immunity then to an administrative officer in his own capacity and not in connection with the President.

Senator WILEY. If the statute covers and relates to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I think it would be only logical, following the very logical statement of Senator George, to say that the privilege, the implied privilege, arose as to them, too. In other words, it would be a direct blow at the power of this august body to arrive at the truth and the facts.

Gentlemen, I have no object in mind to detract from the power of the Executive. I only have in mind the great purpose of maintaining the power of the Senate of the United States, and the duly constituted committee of that Senate.

RESTATING THE QUESTION

Chairman RUSSELL. All of the time has expired. The question before the committee is, Shall the ruling of the Chair stand as the sense of the committee?

Those who favor the sustaining of the ruling of the Chair will vote "Aye." Those who favor overruling the decision of the Chair will vote, "No," and the roll will now be called.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a parliamentary inquiry?

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume that would be in order if it does not involve too long a discussion, Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It is a parliamentary inquiry of the Chair.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The question specifically before the committee is the ruling out by the Chair on page 2000 of the report of the question asked by Senator Wiley on page 1994 of the report of General Bradley on the fifth line—"Now tell us what was then said"—and General Bradley's refusal to answer that question as a confidential adviser to the President was sustained by the Chair.

Is that the specific ruling that is before us?

ROLL CALL

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that that might fairly be a statement of the ruling; yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. The clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. George?

Senator GEORGE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Green?

Senator GREEN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. McMahon?

Senator McMAHON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator CONNALLY. I have his proxy. Aye. I have his written proxy.

The CLERK. Mr. Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Wiley?

Senator WILEY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith?

Senator SMITH. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Lodge?

Senator LODGE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Tobey?

Senator SMITH. I have Mr. Tobey's proxy requesting me to vote him aye on this issue.

The CLERK. Mr. Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman Connally?

Senator CONNALLY. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Kefauver?

Senator JOHNSON. Aye. I have his written proxy.

The CLERK. Mr. Hunt?

Senator HUNT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Long?

Senator LONG. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Morse?

Senator MORSE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Cain?

Senator CAIN. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Flanders?

Senator FLANDERS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Inasmuch as this vote relates directly to my ruling, I ask the committee to be excused from voting.

Chairman CONNALLY. I think you ought to vote, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I ask to be excused. It is my ruling. My position in the matter is perfectly clear, I think, but under ordinary parliamentary rules in the Senate of the United States, the Presiding Officer——

Senator WILEY. I so move.

Chairman RUSSELL. If he is the Chair, he is not permitted to vote except in case of a tie. Inasmuch as I made this ruling, it is not material; my position is perfectly clear.

I have no real objection to voting, but I prefer not to vote.

Senator WILEY. Is there anyone absent—I so move, Mr. Chairman, that you be excused from recording your vote, if you so desire.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you.

Senator WILEY. Is there any objection to that? If not, so ordered.

Senator MORSE. I object.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is objection to it, and the chairman votes "aye."

Senator WILEY. Who objected?

Senator MORSE. I did.

The CLERK. Voting in the affirmative are Senators George, Green, McMahon, Sparkman, Smith, Lodge, Tobey, Connally, Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, Flanders, and the chairman.

Senators reported in the negative are Messrs. Fulbright, Gillette, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Brewster, Bridges, Knowland, and Cain.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, may we ask—pardon me.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair will now announce the vote. On this vote the "ayes" are 18, the "nays" are 8, and the decision of the Chair therefore stands as the sense of the committee.

SENATE'S REASONED JUDGMENT

Now gentlemen, I have a couple of very important announcements to make, if you will be generous enough to keep your seats for a couple of moments.

I wish first to refer to the information that has been requested of the various branches of the executive department. I have been privileged to serve in the Senate for almost two decades. I think I consider it the greatest legislative body on earth.

It has features that are unknown to any other parliamentary body that has ever been established in any other country, powers and prerogatives that do not adhere in any other parliamentary body. I have great respect for the collective judgment of the men who constitute the Senate and the committees of the Senate, whether they are Republicans or Democrats.

I tried to imbue as much as I can the simple faith of the fathers of this country. One of the cardinal tenets of that faith was that the United States Congress could resolve crucial issues in the light of facts and reasoned judgment rather than the shadow of rumors and with the impulse of emotion.

There will come a time soon, perhaps not too soon, when we must come to a decision on some of the matters that we now have under hearing. I do not mean that I can see any definite date, but that time will come, and our decisions and our conclusions will be no better than the information that we have and our determination to consider that information in a manner that will justify our faith in our institutions.

COLLECTING ESSENTIAL DATA

I am endeavoring to secure all of that information. I have asked departments of Government for every scrap of paper pertinent to the issue before us. I called the Defense Establishment again this morning. I told the official whom I had been in communication with since these hearings started that those facts must be presented here at the earliest possible moment.

Many of them have been submitted, some have not, and in one or two instances no reason has yet been assigned as to why the matter requested has not been submitted. I told him that if there was any matter there that was so highly classified it was for eyes only, to send it down under guard, have it available in the security room in order that the subcommittee appointed by the Chair, the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. McMahon, and the Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, would have an opportunity to read it and report back to this committee.

I told him that time was of the essence here. This investigation was in progress, and that I desired that this committee have all of the facts, precise, actual, trustworthy facts. I trust we will receive all these documents, but of course our responsibility will not end just when we get the documents. It will require that we give them careful scrutiny and act in the greatest measure of responsibility on them.

I cannot conceive of anything that would be more calculated to unify this Nation in this hour than for this committee to be capable in the ability to pursue this matter to an actual conclusion without any element of partisanship.

ARRANGING COMMITTEE SCHEDULE

Now I want to present to this committee one other question. As you all know, the Armed Services Committee has been in conference with the House with respect to the military manpower bill. We held a long number of conferences. We were unable to agree on four or five of the vital questions that were at issue.

I do not think that anyone would controvert the statement that that bill should be enacted if it is possible at all to get an agreement, at the very earliest possible date. I am seeking to arrange a conference with the conferees on the part of the House.

About 2 weeks ago we apparently reached an absolute stalemate. No progress whatsoever is being made. I hoped that the time that intervened would permit us to make progress with that important measure. It seems to me that in view of the importance of that bill, that I would be justified in carrying this committee over until Monday.

If we meet tomorrow, we are going to hear either Sherman or Vandenberg. We will get just so far with that testimony and then we will have to go back to General Bradley, and if I do not hear any objection to the contrary, it is my purpose to recess this committee until Monday morning to enable the conferees to attempt over the week end, Friday and Saturday, to reach an agreement on that bill. Is there any objection?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Iowa.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not going to object to the procedure, but I call attention to the fact that I had an engagement of long standing to speak in Houston, Tex., tomorrow. I had airplane reservation for this morning.

Considering the importance of our business, I assumed that this committee was going to carry through as rapidily as possible and there would be no particular delays in getting witnesses before it. I therefore canceled my engagement.

It is too late to get to Houston, Tex., for tomorrow morning now. The airplane is gone and I canceled that engagement. It will be extremely embarrassing to me to explain now why I could not be there because this committee is not in session tomorrow. I just merely express that personal embarrassment. I am not objecting to the procedure.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Senator has a right to object if he desires to do so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There would be no purpose in my objecting at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. I certainly did not design this meeting on what I regard as being a bill of vital importance to all the people of the United States, with any idea of inconveniencing the Senator with respect to his appearance in Houston, Tex.

It may be a great loss to the citizens of Houston, but this other bill affects all of the people of the entire United States.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, the note of sarcasm which I detect in the chairman's statement I think is probably appropriate. I merely announced the fact that I had anticipated the fact that we would decide this issue today and that we would continue with the hearings at least this afternoon or tomorrow. I therefore took that step.

The people of Houston and otherwise will, of course, have to forego that matter and I will have to forego the great pleasure of going.

Senator WILEY. Will they suffer much?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think there will be any loss particularly.

But I express the fact that at least I hope that I am attempting to meet our best interests, conscientiously, by remaining here and taking part in this important matter, in view of the fact that I thought the committee was going to continue with its meetings.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has a right, of course, to read a note of sarcasm into the chairman's statement, that I did not intend; just as the Senator saw fit to read into some casual remark some other Senator made, inferring that the Chair had ruled on some matter that had not been brought to my attention.

I was expressing my genuine regret that the Senator was inconvenienced, and was assuring him of my desire to protect his right to object.

I meant no offense, and if the Senator takes any, it can only be regretted.

LETTER TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to object to that arrangement, and neither is what I am about to say intended to have any reflection upon the outcome of this decision recently made. We are 18-to-8.

I have in mind that it is important that if there is no evidence of a nature that would damage the public interest in those hearings or consultations or conversations that took place on April 5 that we, and the public, ought to get that evidence.

Now, my question is: Will the chairman ascertain from the Chief Executive whether he would be willing that the participants in those conversations, or gatherings, give us what was said? If not, is this based upon the general thesis that it would be damaging to the public if it were given?

That would settle, more or less, controversies that I am certain, in light of this precedent, will come up between now and the termination of these hearings, not only on my own part. I am satisfied that men on both sides of the political fence will feel, as the facts develop, that there are certain things we ought to know, such as I indicated to Senator Fulbright, who apparently said he knew, when I inquired.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let me state, if the Senator will pardon me for interrupting, that we adopted at the outset of this hearing, a rule, which I have announced, and repeated on several occasions, whereby, if any Senator desired any information relating to these hearings, and he would address a letter, outlining that information to the Chair, the Chair would transmit it to the proper authority.

If the Senator from Wisconsin will follow that course, the Chair will follow the same policy I have in connection with every other request for information that has been submitted.

Senator WILEY. You shall receive the letter, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I want to make an announcement.

The Foreign Relations Committee will meet this afternoon at 2:30, to consider an important matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will now stand in recess until Monday morning.

(Thereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee stood in recess until 11:05 a. m., Monday, May 21, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, MAY 21, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11:05 a. m. in the caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Bridges, Johnson of Texas, Morse, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, and Stennis.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will be in order.

Before we start todays' proceedings there are a few procedural matters I would like to bring to the attention of the committee before we resume the examination of General Bradley.

PROGRESS ON PRINTING HEARINGS

The first one is a brief statement of the progress being made in printing the hearings. The Government Printer has completed what I believe they call the half galleys covering the first 3 days of the hearing. There are several copies of this available in case any member of the committee wishes to glance through them.

The reason I call it to your attention is because of the fact that considerable titling and subtitling has been used in the preparation of the proofs, and for that reason I thought that the members of the committee ought to have an opportunity, if they desired, to see the form that this material is in before the final printing is accomplished.

The other procedural matter I desired to bring to the attention of the committee involves a communication that I, as chairman of the committee, received from a member of the committee. Inasmuch as that member is not present, I think it would be best to proceed with the examination of General Bradley.

Senator Johnson?

Senator Johnson. Mr. Chairman.

MEETINGS LEADING UP TO MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

General Bradley, it has been stated that you personally recommended relieving General MacArthur. I should like for you to state for the record whether or not that is true and, if so, give the committee some details and elaborate on the reasons for your recommendation and the conclusions that you reached.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON—Resumed

General BRADLEY. I think I could probably give a better answer to that if I would go back just a little bit to the meetings preceding the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator JOHNSON. General, I purposely made my question as brief as possible in order that you could make your explanation as lengthy as you desire.

General BRADLEY. All right, sir.

The first meeting which I attended at the White House was on Friday, the 6th of April, in which the President called the four of us in—I believe that has been stated—Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman, and myself, and we discussed the various things involved in the matter.

He told us to go back, and the four of us to get together and discuss it further among ourselves, which we did that afternoon. At neither of these meetings were any decisions made.

Then when we went back to the White House on Saturday morning, we suggested to the President that he make no decision until he had studied it over the week end and other people had had a chance to study it, and he said he would discuss it with other Government leaders.

MILITARY REASON OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR RELIEF OF MAC ARTHUR

Who they were I do not know, but at that same meeting on Saturday he directed that we get an opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the matter, strictly from a military point of view. So I called such a meeting on Sunday afternoon with the three Chiefs, and we discussed the matter, and then we went up to General Marshall's office at 4 o'clock, and the Chiefs gave him their reasons why from a military point of view they thought that General MacArthur should be relieved, and they set forth these from a military point of view, as follows:

1. That by his public statements and by his official communications to us, he had indicated that he was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea. This would make it difficult for him to carry out Joint Chiefs of Staff directives. Since we had decided to try to confine the conflict to Korea and avoid a third world war, it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington.

The second reason advanced by the Chiefs was that General MacArthur had failed to comply with the Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public. He had also taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice and had made that statement public despite the fact that he knew the President had such a proposal under consideration from a governmental level.

The third reason advanced by the Chiefs was that—

they, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country.

They have always adhered to this principle and they felt that General MacArthur's actions were continuing to jeopardize the civilian control over the military authorities.

These reasons were given by the Chiefs to General Marshall on Sunday afternoon.

Senator JOHNSON. General, this paper that you just read, is that a paper that was concurred in by all three of the Joint Chiefs?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. We sat down afterward and wrote these up. First, they were given orally to General Marshall. We sat down afterward with the three Chiefs and they agreed that these were the reasons they gave to General Marshall on that Sunday afternoon.

BRADLEY'S CONCURRENCE WITH JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REASONS

Senator JOHNSON. Did you personally concur in those recommendations that you have just read or did you just transmit the recommendations of the various Chiefs?

General BRADLEY. I transmitted these to the President the next day as the three statements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Marshall, and General Marshall has stated that I would make these known, and since they were given to him as an adviser, I think that releases me to give these to you by his statement before this committee.

Senator JOHNSON. First, I want to ask you this: You told us about the position taken by Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg, and General Collins.

Now, did you share the same views, and did you express those views to the President?

General BRADLEY. I expressed these to the President as the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you express any personal views to him?

General BRADLEY. I did not express any, one way or the other, because I pass on to him the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If I had not concurred in them I would have said so.

Senator JOHNSON. But you did concur in the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. I did.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you indicate to the President that you did concur?

General BRADLEY. No; except the fact that I did not state any nonconcurrence. I transmit to him the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and if I did not concur in them, I would have said so; that is according to the law.

Senator JOHNSON. So then, the President——

General BRADLEY. That is acording to the law. You see, they have the vote, and I am their spokesman on certain occasions.

Senator JOHNSON. I am not asking about any votes. I am just asking about opinions. We know what that opinion was, and is it fair to state that you had the same opinion?

General BRADLEY. I did.

BACKGROUND OF DECEMBER 6 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Senator Johnson. General, had there been any discussions in the Joint Chiefs of Staff about General MacArthur's public statements, and official recommendations, prior to your calling them together just before this April 5 meeting?

General Bradley. Yes; from time to time there had been discussions of the matter; and as a matter of fact, it had been through the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the message went out on December 6 to all commanders requiring them to submit statements on policy for clearance.

Senator Johnson. Would you care to give the committee some details of what led to the issuance of the December 6 directive?

General Bradley. I will be glad to, sir.

The first matter that was called to our attention was last summer, on the VFW statement. However, that was merely taken cognizance of, because the President made the decision to direct him to withdraw it without referring it to us.

Then, there was a statement in the New York Times, December 1, and another one December 2, which indicated that General MacArthur had given certain interviews, discussing policy, and those were of concern to the Chiefs.

That lead to the sending out on December 6 of the directive from the President, directing field commanders to clear statements.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF VIEWS ON PREVIOUS MAC ARTHUR STATEMENTS

Senator Johnson. Then as early as last fall the Joint Chiefs were discussing the desirability or undesirability of certain of General MacArthur's statements?

General Bradley. That is right, and the propriety of his making them.

Senator Johnson. Could you tell us what opinions were expressed, what your view was about the propriety of these statements?

General Bradley. Well, we didn't think he should make them. They impinged, however, primarily on Government policy and at that time we discussed more or less their application under this third one, I would say, they fell more under that than the others.

Senator Johnson. Were the Joint Chiefs of the unanimous opinion that the statements were not desirable?

General Bradley. Yes.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN REMOVING MAC ARTHUR

Senator Johnson. General, it would appear to be obvious that a number of important factors would have to be considered before removing a general of the stature and proven ability of General MacArthur from his key post in the Far East.

I would think one of those factors would be the consequences of not removing him. In other words, what would happen if, in the light of all the facts that appeared, you left him in the post?

Was that factor taken into consideration before the decision was made to dismiss General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes; that was taken into consideration and his military views, because it is possible that by not trying to confine the conflict to Korea we might find our war enlarged beyond our capability to carry it out successfully.

Senator JOHNSON. Was it your estimate of the consequences—good or bad—that would have flowed from leaving General MacArthur in the Far East—what is your estimate—is it good or bad—of what would have happened if he had been left in, in the light of all the facts?

General BRADLEY. Well, I expect that it is more or less conjecture as to what would happen in certain instances. We were afraid that we might become too much involved if he did not try to confine the war to Korea.

That was stated in the first reason that the Chiefs were worried about, but whether or not it would happen I don't think anyone knows. There was that danger that it would happen.

Senator JOHNSON. At the time you recommended he be relieved it was your opinion that one who entertained the views he had expressed should not be left in command in view of the fact that those views were quite different from the Joint Chiefs' views?

General BRADLEY. That is right, and that is, as I stated, from a military point of view. We realized there are other considerations than military, and we confined our statement to the military reasons why we thought he should be relieved.

Senator JOHNSON. But from a military point of view it was your personal opinion, as well as the opinion of each Chief of Staff that serves on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that General MacArthur should be relieved?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

WHEN MAC ARTHUR FIRST RECOMMENDED BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator JOHNSON. At the time the January 12 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs was prepared had General MacArthur recommended the bombing of Manchuria and Chinese mainland targets?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember the date. For a long time he did not make a specific recommendation to bomb across the Yalu. He merely suggested that he was being hampered by not being able to do so, without a specific recommendation that he do it. Later on I believe he made a specific recommendation, but I don't remember the date offhand.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you think you have it available there?

General BRADLEY. I think I can find it.

I can't answer that question hurriedly. I can look it up and give you a chronological——

JCS JANUARY 12 STUDY AND BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator JOHNSON. Did the January 12 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs recommend the bombing of Manchuria and Chinese mainland targets?

General BRADLEY. The study of January 12 you are talking about now?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes.

General **Bradley**. It set that forth as part of the objectives and actions to be taken under the assumptions that we had made when we wrote the paper—that if we suddenly found ourselves at all-out war with China, either declared or undeclared, we would have to have certain objectives and take certain lines of action, and that was included in that study at that time to be taken under those conditions.

Senator **Johnson**. But the bombing was to take place only in case of retaliatory attacks; is that not correct?

General **Bradley**. No; not necessarily. But if we were driven out of Korea and found ourselves in all-out war with China, recognized as such, that might be an action taken. But as far as making a specific recommendation to bomb beyond the Yalu into Manchuria, we never did make any such specific recommendation that the action be taken.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF FORMOSA

Senator **Johnson**. General Bradley, speaking from purely a military viewpoint, what is your estimate of the strategic value of Formosa?

General **Bradley**. I think it has great strategic value in the hands of an enemy. It would seriously affect our line of defenses if it fell into the hands of an unfriendly power, particularly in time of war, because of its naval and air bases which would extend the action of ships and planes a considerable distance along our line of communication between the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan. So the Joint Chiefs have always felt that it is very important that it not be in the hands of an unfriendly power during war with such power, but that we should not try to occupy it with United States forces.

ADDITIONAL FORCES NEEDED FOR FULFILLMENT OF MAC ARTHUR PROGRAM

Senator **Johnson**. In the event General MacArthur's program should be adopted, General Bradley, do you have a rough estimate of what our additional needs would be, if any, in terms of manpower, ships, planes, and other types of equipment?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; not an accurate one. All I can say is that it certainly would require more air power, more naval power, and——

Senator **Johnson**. Substantially more?

General **Bradley**. Beg pardon?

Senator **Johnson**. Substantially more?

General **Bradley**. Substantially more air, and I would say substantially more naval.

Senator **Johnson**. Is that available?

General **Bradley**. Well, if you stripped everything else you might get it, but we would hate to see our other defense requirements stripped to the extent that you would have to do it to carry it out at this time.

Senator **Johnson**. What about manpower?

General **Bradley**. The size of manpower would have to be increased, and your whole defensive effort would have to be stepped up some; because, if you get into an all-out war with China and start blockade, shelling of coastal centers, of supply and communications and start bombing centers of communication and supply, you are spreading your effort a great deal more than it is spread at the present time.

You are going to require more bases and more units, both naval and air to do it. You are going to require more people to back them up here at home, more supply and service troops in your line of communications. We have never tried to estimate just what that would be because so much would depend upon how deeply we became involved in it.

Senator JOHNSON. I realize it is very difficult to estimate ahead of time all that would be required, but you are familiar with the testimony of General MacArthur before this committee as to his view of the additional requirements, and as I remember it he felt that it would not be substantial.

Now it seems to me if you have given serious consideration to the alternate course that he proposes, that the Joint Chiefs would have some general idea about what they should have before launching onto that course, and that is what I would like the committee to get from you.

General BRADLEY. As I say, we have never made that estimate. Had we been driven out of Korea, we could have used the units that we are now employing in Korea to do these other things that we had set forth in this January 12 study as objectives in the possible lines of action, so that you would have been using the same forces there partly at least and possibly almost wholly that we are now employing in Korea.

Senator JOHNSON. And it is fair to say that none of our military leaders has made any estimate of the requirements and the needs to carry out the MacArthur program?

General BRADLEY. Not to carry those out in addition to what we are doing now.

Senator JOHNSON. But you do believe that the additional requirements would be substantial in both air power, ships, and manpower?

General BRADLEY. I do.

Senator JOHNSON. And you do not think that we have available, without stripping our continental defense or commitments we have made to our allies, sufficient power to carry out that program?

General BRADLEY. No. You would have to take them from somewhere else at this time.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF WESTERN EUROPE TO UNITED STATES

Senator JOHNSON. Speaking purely from a military point, General Bradley, what is the value of the western European allies to the United States? Will you elaborate on that some?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. We estimate that the manpower, that is the population, of the countries that would be involved is something over 300,000,000.

Their industrial capacity is very substantial, and if that were added to that which Russia already has, it would make them even more formidable, and increase their chances, and their possibility of being able to extend their war over even more area than Western Europe.

Further than that, people in Europe are very capable allies, if they can be maintained on our side and their security built up; and, in fact, it seems to me that one of our best chances to avoid war and finally get out of this period of tension is to get the power of Europe built up to the point where their security forces are adequate, and would cause any nation to hesitate to start a war.

If we don't do that, I am afread we are going to be in a period of tension or worse for many, many years. So, I consider that our relationship with Europe is highly important from a military point of view.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you care to discuss that from the standpoint of either air bases or strategic material that we rely on them for?

General BRADLEY. Yes. If we lose Europe, we certainly would lose the oil in the Middle East, which now supplies part of our own needs, as well as the needs of Europe, and that would be a very serious blow.

We would also lose other strategic materials concerned. There was one other part of the question——

Senator JOHNSON. Bases and strategic materials?

General BRADLEY. Bases, yes, sir.

On bases, we would be deprived of certain bases which we consider essential for use in any war with Russia.

Senator JOHNSON. If we were deprived of those bases would you think that it would seriously cripple our ability to wage war against Russia?

General BRADLEY. It would very seriously affect our ability to destroy Russia's industrial capacity and war-making machine.

Senator JOHNSON. Do we have the bases from which we could launch retaliatory bombing attacks against industrial centers within Russia?

General BRADLEY. We do now, yes.

Senator JOHNSON. But if we lose our allies, would we have them?

General BRADLEY. We still would have some, but we would lose some very important ones.

Senator JOHNSON. We would lose a great deal of our air strength, would we not, General?

General BRADLEY. I beg your pardon?

Senator JOHNSON. If we were confined to our own bases we would lose a great deal of our potential air strength?

General BRADLEY. We would lose a lot of our effectiveness; yes.

UNITED STATES PROGRESS ON MOBILIZATION

Senator JOHNSON. General, in the light of current world conditions are you satisfied with the progress that this country is making on our manpower and our industrial mobilization?

General BRADLEY. Not entirely; no, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you tell us why you are not?

General BRADLEY. Well, to go back to the statement I made a minute ago, I think we face a period of tension for a long time, and I would think that the only way to solve that is by some long-range policy, military policy, which would provide adequate defense and security forces, and more or less along the line that we have recommended to the Congress last fall, so that we can eventually reduce the size of our active forces that we have to keep on daily duty.

It is very expensive to keep troops on active duty the way we have—3½ million of them—for an indefinite period of time. Not only is it costly in money, in taxpayers' money, but it means that more people have to stay away from home in the service than we would like to have over a long period.

If we could work out some long-range military policy whereby we could have a certain number of units readily available, quickly available, and the rest of our forces to come from well-trained reserves who are available, trained, and equipped, and ready for action in much less time than it now takes, in my opinion we would be much stronger.

We would carry more weight at the council table.

It would act as a greater deterrent to war, and we might, given time, be sufficiently strong so that we would no longer fear war the way we do at the present time.

In other words, anyone would hesitate to jump us, if we had a highly trained reserve that could be called out very quickly.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you think, under the terms of the manpower bill passed by the Senate, that your manpower requirements could be met?

General BRADLEY. Senator, I haven't studied the final draft of your bill recently. I was given the impression that it very nearly fulfilled all the recommendations that we made last fall, and I am hoping that whatever comes out of the conference, and that your Congress sees fit to pass eventually, will provide that long-range military policy which will strengthen us materially.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAC ARTHUR AND ADMINISTRATION COURSES

Senator JOHNSON. General, would you give us a brief summary of your position in connection with the two proposals that have been presented to this committee, the MacArthur proposal and the course we are now following in Korea; and, give us your reasons for your preference?

General BRADLEY. Well, actually I don't think there are too many differences. I think that all of the lines of action open to us, we are following the ones that General MacArthur thinks proper, except in four or five instances.

I think it might be well——

Senator JOHNSON. Would you point out those exceptions?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; but may I first analyze what I think is back of this question, and then I will come back to the differences?

I can readily understand why the people of the United States, collectively and as individuals, are worried about the situation in the world today, and have a feeling of frustration.

TENSIONS FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II

We won a war, and finished it in 1945, the biggest war that had ever been fought. We won it, and we came back from it with the idea that now we were through with wars for a long time to come. I know I had that feeling; but in about a year, we began to realize that things were not quite as smooth and lovely as we had hoped they would be, and it was through no fault of our own. It was because one nation, and its satellites, saw fit to keep the world stirred up, and in a period of turmoil.

We also found ourselves in a position of leadership in the world, which we had never occupied before, which placed a great deal of responsibility on us to maintain the peace and keep the world from going communistic.

It is hard for our people to realize this change in our position. It is hard for them to understand why it is necessary to have bigger services, Army, Navy, and Air Force; why we have a Berlin situation; why we have a Greek situation; why we have a Korean situation; and I think it is readily understandable why they feel confused and frustrated.

I think we all do.

This is not a situation to our liking at all, but we find ourselves in it, and what we are facing up to now, is what is the best way to solve it.

So far, our Government has seen fit to try to solve the Berlin blockade; to keep Greece and Turkey from communistic domination.

Our European recovery plan helped keep France and Italy from going communistic; and, I think we have done pretty well under the circumstances.

But, as I say, still we are faced with a world of tension. We don't like it, but we don't seem to have the immediate answer to stop it.

CONTAINING AGGRESSION IN KOREA

We are trying to contain aggressions, and this action in Korea is one of them, and containing it in Korea, from a military point of view, we have tried to confine it to Korea.

Now, in fighting that war in Korea, there have been certain actions taken. Some people feel that we should take additional actions, and among those, for example, was the use of Nationalist troops in Korea; and the use of Nationalist troops against the mainland, both of these sources coming from Formosa.

ADVISABILITY OF USING NATIONALIST TROOPS

If all of those troops on Formosa were well trained, well equipped, well supplied, well led, those courses of action might be very proper, and some day they may be proper; but right now, we feel that the capabilities of the troops on Formosa, that is, the Chinese Nationalist troops, their capabilities are such that it wouldn't be proper action to take.

In other words, we would not get return for what you do. If you take them into Korea, you are going to have to fully equip them, transport them, furnish the logistic support, and as I say, they are of doubtful value when they get there.

To turn them loose against the mainland, they do not have the air power and the naval power and the Navy transport to be effective, unless we are willing to commit a lot of our forces to support them.

[Deleted.]

ADVISABILITY OF BOMBING MANCHURIA

A fourth point is the bombing of bases in Manchuria. The limit of the bases you can bomb in Manchuria are naval bases—excuse me—I mean air bases and certain supply and troop concentrations.

The planes that have been coming up at our planes and engaging them in combat have mostly come from just across the river, so that we do know in general where they come from, and it is true that we could go over and destroy a lot of Chinese planes. On the other hand, they have not been effective to date.

They have confined their efforts almost entirely to attacking our formations that approach the Manchurian border. They have not caused any serious difficulty with our troops, and so far we have not felt that it was necessary to go after them except, as I pointed out the other day, we did think it would be advantageous if we were permitted to follow across the river in hot pursuit because in getting into a dog fight near the river, it is quite a handicap if you can't pass the river at all.

If you could cross over for 2 or 3 minutes even, it would give our fighters a better chance to shoot them down, but other than that, we have not seen fit to recommend the bombing of the bases in Manchuria.

We have a supply line about 200 miles long to work on now and we can exercise very concentrated attacks on that supply line. If you extend the length another hundred miles back into Manchuria, you can get certain other bases, but with the same air power you would thin out your present attacks against the 200 miles of supply line that is in Korea.

Normally you go after certain targets with strategic bombing that are producing the war materials of a nation. In this case most of these supplies are not made in China, but they are made in Russia, so that you cannot go after the real source of supply. You can only get the supply installations where they are moving them down toward the front.

There was one other minor one that General MacArthur mentioned, and that was the bombing of Rashin. I believe I explained that to the committee. We authorized its bombing twice. In one case the bombing was carried out, and in the second case it had to be diverted to a secondary objective.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry, Senator Johnson, but your time has expired.

Senator George.

HOT PURSUIT OF ENEMY FIGHTERS

Senator GEORGE. General, please explain exactly what is meant by hot pursuit. General Marshall told this committee that the proposal to permit hot pursuit was vetoed by the 13 nations that were contributing something more or less to the Korean fighting.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. By that we meant that when we got into what is commonly termed a "dog fight" between fighters of our two forces, that we not have to stop the minute we get to the Yalu River. At the time this came up——

Senator GEORGE. In other words, you could pursue the planes as long as you were in hot pursuit; is that right?

General BRADLEY. Yes, we could follow the planes back across the border.

Senator GEORGE. That is what I was getting at, General. Now, when did this come up?

General BRADLEY. It came up early in November.

Senator **George.** Early in November. At that time General MacArthur's forces were in North Korea, were they not?

General **Bradley.** I did not get the last part.

Senator **George.** At that time General MacArthur's forces or a great part of his forces were in North Korea?

General **Bradley.** Yes, sir.

Senator **George.** And they were moving toward the northern boundary?

General **Bradley.** That is correct.

Senator **George.** And motion was in that direction. And he proposed hot pursuit. Now we understood that the General Staff approved of the hot pursuit.

General **Bradley.** We did. The State Department approved it and the President approved it.

Senator **George.** But the 13 nations or some number of other nations vetoed it?

General **Bradley.** Yes. Certain other nations who had troops in Korea——

Senator **George.** How many troops did they have there at that time? In the actual battleline, how many troops did they have up in North Korea fighting?

General **Bradley.** Approximately, I would estimate around 30,000 ground force and navy and air forces supporting.

Senator **George.** I am not talking about the air particularly, but the ground forces.

Anyway, that was vetoed. From a strictly military point of view, the General Staff found no difficulty in approving General MacArthur's request to pursue these planes—that is, to continue hot pursuit of planes?

General **Bradley.** That is correct; from a military point of view we thought it was desirable, because it would be tough for a man in a dogfight to keep one eye on the Yalu River and stop the minute he gets there. It is very difficult.

Senator **George.** I think you were very sensible about it. I am not a military man, but it looks like common sense to me.

[Deleted.]

Senator **George.** With respect to the handling of his air power there, there is no substantial disagreement, except at one time he wished to bomb Rashin, and after insistence, he was given that privilege—or, that is, the Air Force was given that authority.

General MacArthur, when he had his forces in North Korea moving toward the northern boundary of North Korea, was insistent that he have the right to bomb concentrations of forces in Manchuria, down near the border. I believe you said that. That was his viewpoint?

General **Bradley.** Yes; he expressed himself as various times as feeling that he was fighting under certain restrictions, which should not apply.

AWARENESS OF MAC ARTHUR POSITION AND WARNING ON PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Senator **George.** Well, now, general, let me ask you this. At all times did the General Staff know General MacArthur's viewpoint about this Korean fighting, about this question of the use of his airpower and the taking off of the wraps, as he expressed it, of the

Nationalists down on Formosa, and other points. Was his viewpoint understood by the Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. I think, as I recall, although he did not make a specific recommendation originally, he indicated he felt he was being restricted, which is the same thing, and I think he felt that we realized he felt we should allow him to bomb in Manchuria.

Senator GEORGE. Now, in answer to Senator Johnson you recited three points that were in the mind and were expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I believe your first point was you said that the Joint Chiefs didn't approve, didn't find it desirable to have General MacArthur expressing his opinion about certain public policy matters, certain questions of policy. Did you communicate that decision to General MacArthur specifically?

General BRADLEY. We did on December 6. Up to that time we had not called his attention to it. As a matter of fact, up to that time we had not thought it was necessary because it is tradition and custom and common practice of military men, when speaking on policy matters, to submit them, submit their views, for approval.

Senator GEORGE. I understand, General; but you had not thought it necessary up until December—December 6?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. And in the December 6 statement that went to General MacArthur, you did undertake to call his attention to what you, the Chiefs of the General Staff or the Chiefs of Staff, thought he should have in mind, should bear in mind; is that right?

General BRADLEY. That is correct. It went to all theater commanders, not only to General MacArthur.

Senator GEORGE. Yes; I see. It went to all of them.

Wasn't General MacArthur's views and viewpoints about the value of Formosa well known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; and——

Senator GEORGE. To the President? Was there ever any doubt about where he stood upon that question, General?

General BRADLEY. Not that I know of. As far as the finding out of what was needed on Formosa, the defensive importance of Formosa, the value of Formosa, in the hands of an enemy——

Senator GEORGE. That is what I mean.

General BRADLEY (continuing) There is no difference in the opinion of General MacArthur and ourselves on that.

Senator GEORGE. I understood that. That is the thing that mystifies me.

DECISION TO DEFEND FORMOSA

Now, General, you speak of losing our allies. When the decision was made to go into Korea did you consider the question of losing your allies?

General BRADLEY. Well, we went into Korea on a resolution of the United Nations, and I don't think——

Senator GEORGE. I understand; but then did you give any consideration to whether or not you would be weakening your hold with your allies at that time?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't think so, because they were fully with us on this in the United Nations voting.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

General, tell me in plain language why did we send our Armed Forces into Korea?

General **Bradley**. Well, the decision was made that here was another act of aggression that, if we appeased in this case, something else would come along, and you either appeased again or took action in the next one, and I think it was fully realized by everyone, and it seemed to meet the approval of the people at that time, that one appeasement leads to another, until you eventually make war inevitable. That is——

Senator **George**. That is the reason?

General **Bradley**. And that is the reason, perhaps, that the people thought we should take action at this time.

MISSION OF OUR TROOPS IN KOREA

Senator **George**. What did we mean for our troops to do when we sent them into Korea? Specifically? The defending forces in South Korea had been driven down a considerable distance in South Korea when we got into it, had they not?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George**. Most of the——

General **Bradley** (continuing). And the South Koreans were retreating when we first went into it.

Senator **George**. They were retreating. Very well.

What did we mean for our troops to do when we sent them into Korea?

General **Bradley**. Well, the first commitment of troops was to help get our nationals out; and then the further commitment was to stop the aggression and carry out the United Nations resolution of stopping aggression of the North Koreans in South Korea, and drive them back.

Senator **George**. Well, that required fighting, did it not, General? You meant for the troops that were put in under General MacArthur and committed to Korea to fight, did you not?

General **Bradley**. Yes; yes, indeed.

Senator **George**. Yes, sir.

MILITARY FACTORS IN BOMBING MANCHURIA

Well now, General, General Marshall stated to this committee that if he knew or if we knew, that the Soviets would not come into this fighting, if we should bomb the supply depots, concentration points in Manchuria, that we would take that action, is that right?

General **Bradley**. I think that is correct. In other words, you would extend your bombing of a line of supply.

Senator **George**. That is it exactly, General, exactly. I think it is quite correct to say that that is true. That means then that from a strictly military point, the request to bomb the supply depots and concentration points in Manchuria was correct?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; I don't agree with that, sir.

Senator **George**. From a strictly military point of view.

General **Bradley**. No, sir; and I will tell you why I don't think so from a military point of view.

Senator **George**. Yes, sir.

General BRADLEY. Korea is a poor place to fight a war, and a lot of military implications are involved in extending the war.

Now if Russia should come into this war, it would be very difficult to supply the troops in Korea or to get them out, and so speaking entirely from a military point of view, we do not want to take that risk.

Senator GEORGE. I understood, General, but I said if we knew Russia was not coming in, there would be nothing wrong in us striking back at the concentration points in Manchuria.

General BRADLEY. Yes; but who can tell us they won't?

Senator GEORGE. Well, I can understand that, General. How can you tell us that we won't get into war if we go into Iran tomorrow with the British and say that you must not take this oil or you must not nationalize? We are taking chances, General, everywhere.

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator GEORGE. And that is all I am saying. I was asking you this simple question: That from a strictly military point of view, with the assurance that Russia was not going to intervene directly, there was nothing wrong with General MacArthur's request that his planes be permitted to break up the concentrations across the Yalu River, troop concentrations that were coming down on his own troops.

General BRADLEY. If you put in the condition, the assurance that Russia would not come into it, naturally the answer to your question is, "Yes, it would be a military advantage."

Senator GEORGE. That is what I meant.

General BRADLEY. But no one can give us that assurance.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that, General. I am not insisting that anyone can give us that assurance.

TAKING THE WRAPS OFF THE NATIONALISTS' TROOPS

Now then, I did not understand General MacArthur—I listened very carefully to him. I did not hear his speech before the Congress except over the radio. I was ill, and I heard his opening statements here before this committee and most of his statements before this committee.

I did not understand that General MacArthur ever at any time recommended that Generalissimo Chiang's troops in Formosa be sent to the mainland of China.

My understanding and my interpretation was that he said, "Turn them loose and leave Generalissimo Chiang to determine himself where, if at all, he would employ his troops." That was my understanding of his position.

And with respect to retaining Formosa, that is to the extent of not allowing it to fall into unfriendly hands, I have never been able to see any difference between the viewpoint of General MacArthur and the General Staff, the Chiefs of Staff.

There was at one time a difference of viewpoint, a very different and very marked difference of viewpoint on the part of the State Department, but that is a different matter and would not involve you in it. At this time, according to Secretary Rusk in New York just within hours, it is very difficult to see why he has not gone all the way that General MacArthur would go in taking the wraps off of Chinese Nationalist troops in Formosa and leaving it up to their own generals, their own commanders to determine what, if anything, they would do with those troops.

General BRADLEY. Well, from the military point of view there is no objection, as I see it, to removing any restrictions on his doing these things, provided he doesn't get mixed up in such a way as to involve our own forces.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I do not agree myself, General, with everything that I have heard here from General MacArthur's viewpoint about the use of those troops, but so far as turning them loose is concerned and leaving it up to their judgment, with the provision that you have put in, I can't see, strictly from a military point of view, why it would be harmful.

General BRADLEY. I can see none from a military view except that if by so doing they took such losses both in men and equipment that they then jeopardized the security of Formosa. Then you might get into military reasons.

Senator GEORGE. I think undoubtedly that would be true if we were going to supply them heavily. That raises in my mind a different question altogether. If we are going to supply them for an invasion of the mainland, why, the obligation that would be implied, of course, would be very clear, and I think that would be altogether a different question. But I do not see, General, why General MacArthur's suggestion could be objectionable from a strictly military point of view—to take the wraps off of Chiang Kai-shek down in Formosa and off his troops.

The element of uncertainty, certainly, of what he might do might have proved helpful to General MacArthur when he was moving up toward the northern boundary of North Korea and when the Chinese had not come in in force. Now when the Chinese came in in force, why, it looked then, of course, that China is in this war. There is not any doubt about that is there?

General BRADLEY. No.

Senator GEORGE. You speak of an all-out war with China, and you mean all-out on our side, do you not, General? So far as you know China is doing about as much to us as she can at this time, is she not?

General BRADLEY. By that I mean the extension of it outside of Korea, so that you——

Senator GEORGE. Yes. General, of course, everybody I think would agree that we would not want to extend this war.

General BRADLEY. May I finish the answer to the other question?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

General BRADLEY [Deleted.] There are a lot of things that they can do that they haven't done yet. So I don't think we could say that China is at all-out war against us yet any more than we are at all-out war against them. In other words, the conflict is being plyed under certain ground rules which are short in the case of both China and the United States as to what each can do to the other one.

CASUALTIES OF UN IN KOREA

Senator GEORGE. General, let me ask you a question on an altogether different line right now. How many of your troops, that is, of the UN troops or of the American components of the UN army in Korea, who have been recorded as missing in action or taken as prisoners of war, do you estimate are still alive? Have you any means of estimating the number of the missing in action troops that are still alive?

General BRADLEY. We have no way of estimating that. We do know that of those taken by North Koreans before China came into the war, many of them undoubtedly lost their lives. We do know that some of them were moved north and kept just out of reach of our forces as they advanced rapidly into North Korea. We also know that in certain cases the Chinese have released prisoners of war who have come back. So I think it would be very difficult to try to estimate the number that are alive either in the hands of the North Koreans or in the hands of the Chinese—that is those that are listed as missing; because a lot of those that are listed as missing in a retrograde movement undoubtedly are killed and left on the position. Others are captured and others are wounded. So those that are killed and left on position we naturally carry them as missing in action because we do not know whether they are dead or prisoners, and I do not see any way you could make an estimate of it.

Senator GEORGE. No.

INITIAL REQUIREMENTS TO REPULSE NORTH KOREANS

Now, General, I asked this question of General Marshall, and I think he rather referred the matter to you. I think my recollection is correct. I asked what was the initial estimate of the number of troops that would be necesary—ground troops I am speaking of now, in connection with whatever air we employed—would be necessary to repel the invasion of South Korea and drive the North Koreans back. Can you give the committee the initial estimate of the number of the troops that would be required?

General BRADLEY. We estimated early in the conflict that the divisions that were in Japan, plus the additional divisions we sent them, would be sufficient to accomplish the mission.

Senator GEORGE. Well, was that in the beginning or as it progressed?

General BRADLEY. That was after it progressed to some extent. The first few days we did not know just how good these North Koreans were, and it was some time before we could get a good picture of it.

MAC ARTHUR'S ACTION ON MILITARY ORDERS

Senator GEORGE. Do you concur with General Marshall's statement that with respect to strictly military orders there had been no insubordination on the part of General MacArthur in that he failed to carry them out?

General BRADLEY. I know of none.

Senator GEORGE. You know of none?

General BRADLEY. No.

Senator GEORGE. Your judgment and the judgment of the Chiefs of Staff was very largely based upon the three points which in the beginning of your testimony this morning you detailed to the committee?

General BRADLEY. That is correct; and we never did say that we thought he had been insubordinate.

Senator GEORGE. So far as his strictly military duties and responsibilities were concerned?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

DIFFERENCE IN GLOBAL VIEWS OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THEATER COMMANDERS

Senator MORSE. General Bradley, do you care to say that it is your opinion that General MacArthur looked at the Korean War primarily from the standpoint of the theater and there was too little consideration being given to the global problem involved?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think in general, yes. And I think that is not unsuual. Every theater commander naturally is more interested in his own theater than he is in some other one, and I would not say that was a fault, I would say that in a way is what he should do—think more of his own theater. He is not in a position to know the world-wide implications and has no responsibility for world-wide commitments.

Senator MORSE. It is a very natural position for a theater commander to take, is it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I think if you will go back into the last World War you will find that the Chiefs of Staff here at that time were dealing with about six different theater commanders, all of whom thought theirs was of primary importance.

Senator MORSE. It is true, is it not, that the responsibility and obligation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contrasted with the responsibilities and obligations of a theater commander, are responsibilities and obligations to make global planning for the defense of our country in this period of crisis?

General BRADLEY. Yes. The Joint Chiefs must consider at all times the whole world-wide commitments of our Government and be prepared to meet them.

Senator MORSE. Therefore, is it not true that since the outset of the Korean War, while General MacArthur had been concerned with the conduct of the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been concerned with war plans on a global basis in the event war should break out on a global basis?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. In your opinion, does the difference in the responsibilities between General MacArthur as the theater commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as global commanders, so to speak, explain in a large measure some of the differences in points of view that developed between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur as to the military policies that should be followed in the Korean War?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir, I think it does. I think that condition is more or less always going to exist—the differences in opinion between a theater commander and the Chiefs who have to look at all these theaters simultaneously.

KOREA IN THE GLOBAL DEFENSE SETTING

Senator MORSE. In looking at your global problems as the men charged with the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did you not at all times have to give careful consideration to the then existing evidence at any given period of time of the military potential of the

United States, including both troops, Navy, Air Force, and military matériel?

General BRADLEY. Yes. We have these commitments and responsibilities in all parts of the world, and we must take a look at those. We must always study the capabilities of our forces here at home, their state of equipment, training, and readiness for combat and possible places where they may have to be employed.

We must consider all those at all times.

Senator MORSE. Was one of the reasons why the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted since the outbreak of the Korean War to keep it on a basis of a limited war, as that term has been used in these hearings, due to the fact that they thought it was dangerous to the security of our country on a global basis to commit on an all-out basis the military potential of the United States in Asia?

General BRADLEY. Yes. We do not think that Korea is the place to fight a major war. In other words, in case you get into a third world war, I don't think you would choose Korea as a place to fight it.

So that we would like to have our forces committed to Korea limited for that reason, and we would also like to limit our commitments there so that these other forces would be available in other parts of the world if something else happens.

CONSTANT PLANNING ON GLOBAL STRATEGY

Senator MORSE. Would it be correct to say, General, that in preparing the plans for the global defense of the United States the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given a great deal of consideration to what they surmised might be the Russian strategy on a global basis?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. It is true, is it not, that one of the chief responsibilities of any group of American military officers such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with the responsibility of the global defense of the United States, is to try at all times to figure out, within the realm of reasonable conjecture, what the enemy may do if we follow one course of action, in contrast with another?

General BRADLEY. Yes; we are constantly working on world-wide war plans in case of war, and as part of those plans we have what is called an intelligence estimate, in which we study the enemy capabilities in various parts of the world as compared to our own capabilities, and we discuss in that estimate not only his capabilities, but probable lines of action.

Those are under constant study in our Joint Staff all the time. They don't come up every day before the Joint Chiefs, of course, but frequently they come up for revisions and we have committees working on those plans continuously, an intelligence committee and a planning committee.

ROLE OF ASIA IN STRATEGIC PLANNING

Senator MORSE. General, would it be fair to say that in view of the military plans and war plans which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had constantly under study and revision since the outbreak of the Korean War, it has been the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during that period of time, that if they were running the military plans of the Russians, they would like to draw the Allies into an all-out war in Asia?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. We are very definitely of that opinion, that Russia, right now, is following a policy of trying to cause as much trouble in the world as possible, even to the point of conflicts and wars, and using as much as possible, her satellites' troops, and not her own.

Senator Morse. At the risk of repetition, but for the purpose of emphasis, I put the question this way, General:

Has it been the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since the outbreak of the Korean War, that on the basis of the military potential we have been in a position to muster during that period of time, the security of the United States, on a global basis, dictated that we do what we could to avoid an all-out war, and keep the Korean War on a so-called limited basis?

General Bradley. Yes. We feel that we are not in the best position to meet a global war. We feel that we are improving all the time our own position, and that of our allies, and we would like very much to avoid a war at this time, not only as to our own readiness, but the longer you can avoid a war the better chance you have of avoiding it altogether, in the end.

Senator Morse. During the period that the Korean War has been fought, has it been the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that keeping the war within the limitations that it has been fought in Korea would save us many more American lives and allied lives than would be the case if it had been extended into an all-out war in Asia?

General Bradley. Yes; and we also feel that by fighting this war in Korea, even on a limited basis, that we may be postponing other actions which may have been on the timetable, and we have possibly avoided the outbreak of war in other parts of the world.

And if we can continue to keep the attention focused on Korea without becoming too much involved in it, in other words if we can fight this limited action in Korea without its being spread, we may be going a long way toward avoiding world war III.

Senator Morse. Is it not true, General, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never taken the position that in the event our enemies followed a course of action in Asia that might precipitate world war III, we would not be in a position to do them great damage immediately?

Rather it has been the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that although we can do them great damage, we can come closer to giving them an immediate knock-out punch if we first get our defenses stronger on a global basis?

General Bradley. That is right. We are very anxious to improve our own military stature as fast as we can, both manpower wise, and as I stated a while ago, with a long-range policy and by our industrial mobilization and industrial production and a betterment of our equipment situation.

We are very anxious to get those things done very quickly so that if something does happen, we will be in a better position, and we are hoping that nothing will happen until we are in that better condition.

[Deleted.]

EFFECT OF ADOPTING MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator Morse. Is it your opinion, General, and the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that if prior to this time we had adopted General MacArthur's recommendations for a blockade, and for bombing the mainland of China, we would have greatly weakened America's military power as the result of the conflict that would have followed in Asia if Russia had decided to come into the war at that point?

General **Bradley**. Well, if I can answer your question in two parts: The extension at one time of bombing just across the Manchurian border when we only had a short distance to bomb it, might not have taken any more strength, but if by doing so it had brought Russia into the war, we would be in an infinitely worse position than we are today.

Now, no one knows whether or not Russia is going to come it. Some people think that if we bomb bases in Manchuria and China they will. Others think that they would not come in.

I do not think that they know—I do not think anyone knows, other than probably the 14 people in the Kremlin that form the Politburo.

However, our feeling is that as long as we are not suffering too much from the avoidance of going across and bombing it, that we shouldn't take the chance, whatever it is.

Now, it may be a big chance; it may be a little chance, no one knows; but we don't think the advantages of doing it now are great enough to outweigh the disadvantages of the possibility of bringing Russia into the war.

RISK OF WAR AND MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator **Morse**. In other words—in a way, General, you have just answered my next question, but I want to pin it down in the record, so I will put it this way: Has it been your personal opinion, in view of your knowledge of the military potential of our country on a global basis, that it would have been a military mistake for us to carry out General MacArthur's recommendations for a blockade, with all that a blockade means, including the sinking of ships, if they try to run the blockade; and the bombing of the Manchurian bases, because of the possibility that that might run too great a risk of bringing Russia into the war before we are ready to meet her in Asia or elsewhere?

General **Bradley**. Yes. I think it would increase the chances of war very materially, particularly the blockade.

As you say, where if you start out to stop Russian shipping going into Port Arthur, for example—which would naturally fall under the blockade—you are apt to find yourself committing an act of war, and find yourself at war. So that those things very materially increase the chance of war, in our opinion.

Senator **Morse**. Therefore, General, has it been your opinion that implementing General MacArthur's recommendations in respect to bombing and blockading would run a very great risk of bringing Russia into the war?

General **Bradley**. Yes; I think it would run that risk.

[Deleted.]

CHANCES OF SETTLING WAR WITHOUT MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator **Morse**. Would it be fair for me, acting as a juror on this committee, General Bradley, to form the conclusion that the primary difference between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur in respect to implementing his recommendations has been a difference of timing?

General BRADLEY. It might eventually come down to a simple question of timing. I think it goes a little bit beyond that. In other words, if in our opinion we have a chance to solve it without this; if we can't, then it will devolve down into a question of timing.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that to date the difference might be described in terms of timing in the sense that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended against adopting General MacArthur's recommendations because of the risks involved and because they have felt that at the times he has made the recommendations the timing has not been right?

General BRADLEY. And that there was a chance of solving it without doing it.

Senator MORSE. That is, it is true, is it not, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been preparing their plans in the prayer and the hope that an honorable peace can be negotiated in Asia?

General BRADLEY. Yes; and we hope we can do that without carrying out some of the courses of action which are open to us, but which we think should not be taken at this time, for the reasons stated.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "MILITARY" AND OTHER MATTERS

Senator MORSE. Now, General, there is one point that I wish you would clear up for my own thinking that has cropped up over and over again in these hearings in the form of questions that have been put to you, General Marshall, and General MacArthur, in the form of observations that have been made by various witnesses and various members of the committee from time to time.

That is the difference, if any, between a strictly "military"—in quotation marks—a strictly "military" proposal or recommendation or opinion, in contrast with a proposal or an opinion that isn't military.

You have already testified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the job of taking into consideration global policy. I always get a little lost when someone says to you, "Now, General, from a strictly military standpoint, what would your answer be to this or that?"

Is it possible, in view of the global problems of the United States to draw the line of demarcation that is attempted to be drawn in these hearings between the strictly military and the strictly diplomatic—the strictly military on the one hand and the strictly foreign policy on the other—or are they so intermingled and commingled that as Joint Chiefs of Staff you have to look at the security of our country and make plans to protect the security of our country from the standpoint of the over-all problem—diplomatic, military, including every other conceivable factor?

General BRADLEY. We have to take all those into consideration. However, in some cases before a decision is arrived at, we are called upon merely to submit the military side of the question and somebody else presents the other side, the additional points—that is, the political and diplomatic—and then the man making the decision weighs all those things—sometimes there is conflict, sometimes there isn't—and arrives at the decision.

However, as you say, naturally the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to know considerable about the diplomatic and political implications of these questions also.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, General, that we no longer in the world can fight a war on a strictly military basis, but that we have to fight it also after giving consideration to diplomatic problems as well as military problems?

General BRADLEY. That is correct, and certainly your objectives in a war are not entirely military. In other words, the end results of a war are a combination of military and political considerations, and you use the military to obtain your political objectives.

EFFECT OF MARCH 24 MAC ARTHUR STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALLIES

Senator MORSE. That leads me to ask you a few questions concerning General MacArthur's notice to, or ultimatum, as some have called it, to the Chinese Communist leaders, that he would meet with them in the field, and indicating in his statement if he didn't meet with them in the field on terms of surrender, there was a danger that military action would be taken against the mainland of China.

Of your own knowledge, General Bradley, do you know whether or not that statement of General MacArthur's to the Chinese Communist leaders created difficulties with our allies?

General BRADLEY. Yes; it happened that our Government had consulted certain other governments who had troops in Korea as to certain negotiations which we should try to open for a peaceful settlement.

These various considerations and possible terms were sent to General MacArthur for his comments while they were being discussed with the other governments.

Before we had finished discussing with the other governments, General MacArthur came out with his statement, offering a truce and stating that if they did not accept it, the war would be extended.

As a consequence, we had to drop our negotiations with the other powers without making negotiation proposals, and it caused our Government some embarrassment because while Washington was talking to them along one line General MacArthur came out along a little different line.

Senator MORSE. General, when you read or heard that General MacArthur had made the statement to the Chinese Communist leaders that he made, were you surprised?

General BRADLEY. As a matter of fact, Senator Morse, I was away at the time and heard about the whole thing when I came back; so I got the whole picture at one time. I am afraid I couldn't say how I was affected by any one part of it.

Senator MORSE. I cross-examined General MacArthur with regard to that incident, and I think I report the record accurately in meaning when I say he took the position that as a commander in the field he thought he was within his military rights in attempting to negotiate with the opposing military commanders a surrender in the field and that he saw nothing wrong in his reference in his notice to them as to what might happen on the mainland of China if they didn't meet with him in the field.

My question is: Do you as a high military officer believe, in view of the fact that the secret exhibit before us showing the communications between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur leaves no room for doubt that he had been advised of the President's negotiation, that General MacArthur exceeded wise discretion, to say the least, in issuing that ultimatum to the Chinese leaders?

General Bradley. Well, I can say, Senator, that certainly I would not have thought—would not have looked at it in the same light that apparently General MacArthur did.

I certainly would not have issued any such statement under those circumstances.

General MacArthur saw fit to do it, but, in my case, I would not have issued any such statement under those conditions.

Chairman Russell. I regret to advise you, Senator Morse, that your time has expired.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, could you indicate about your afternoon plans?

Chairman Russell. I thought we would run on here until about 1 o'clock, and recess until tomorrow morning. The reciprocal trade agreements will be on the floor, in charge of the Senator from Georgia, my distinguished colleague, and I suggest that we wait until tomorrow before we try to decide to work out something for two sessions.

Now, Senator Smith.

Senator Smith. General Bradley, could you advise me when you became Chief of Staff—I don't mean chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Chief of Staff?

General Bradley. I became Chief of Staff of the Army on February 8, 1948; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15, 1949.

CLARIFYING STATEMENT ON JCS AND IRAN

Mr. Chairman, may I correct something which may be a little bit wrong, in the record, from the last two questions; which I think ought to be straightened out before we start another period of questions?

Chairman Russell. If you wish, sir.

General Bradley. I think two points may not be clear, here; and it is my fear they will not be.

A double-barrelled question was asked me a while ago by Senator George. One involved going into Iran; and there was a second part of the question, to which I think I answered "yes."

I don't want it to stay in the record that I am saying the Joint Chiefs would advocate our going into Iran. I think that should be cleared for the record's sake, and it was inadvertent on my part. I forgot that was part of the question I later answered.

We have no commitment of going into Iran with the British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff certainly have not made any such decision, and that ought to be cleared up.

CLARIFYING STATEMENT ON AVOIDING WAR

The second one—I made the statement, in answer to Senator Morse's question about not going to war until we were better prepared. I stated by not going to war now and avoiding war now, we could avoid it for all time; and I want to make it clear that my statement—we do not want to go to war until we are better prepared—really means that we hope to not go to war at all, but we don't want to take any more chances than we have to.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

Senator SMITH. General Bradley, are you familiar——

Senator MCMAHON. Would you mind if I interrupted for this observation?

If the general thought that was important enough, Mr. Chairman, to interrupt to correct his statement, I would think it would be wise for it to go to the press at once so that the addition will go at the same time as the original statement.

If we could get another stenographer up here, so that it would be possible for it to be taken down right away, do you think there might be something in that?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that is a very good suggestion.

Of course it doesn't look like we are prepared to go to war anyway.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I couldn't hear very well.

Do I understand he wanted to eliminate all reference——

Chairman RUSSELL. No; he didn't want to eliminate it. He wanted to arrange to have the press get the statement General Bradley just made at the same time they got the one that could have been the subject of some confusion.

Senator BREWSTER. You don't feel that it would be expedient to eliminate the whole thing?

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't understand that was proposed.

Senator BREWSTER. I am very reluctant to say we will or will not go into Iran.

I would like to leave the Russians a little in ignorance if possible.

If it could all be eliminated, I would think that best.

General BRADLEY. The point I was making was: I didn't want to show, in the record, that we had made a decision to do it. We made no decision either way.

Senator MCMAHON. Would it not be best, Mr. Chairman, to call down to the censors, to say that the general, in the light of his statement, now feels that that should go out of the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. The only difficulty is, as I see it, the question was raised by Senator George, in his question; and it was a two-pronged question, as I recall it, and after the Senator said something about going into Iran tomorrow, he went on to something else about Korea, and General Bradley answered the Korean part of the situation.

Senator BREWSTER. Has it gone to the press yet?

Chairman RUSSELL. I hardly think it has.

Senator BREWSTER. If it hasn't gone, couldn't it be treated as a security matter?

Chairman RUSSELL. I rather think Admiral Davis would handle that, which he has before.

Will you look into that, General Mudge?

Senator SMITH. General Bradley, have you covered that? Are you satisfied you have got your position clear?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

POSTWAR CHINA POLICY

Senator SMITH. Were you familiar with the details of the Yalta Conference? I understand you were not at Yalta.

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I was not; and I am not familiar with the details of the arrangements there, sir.

Senator SMITH. You know nothing about the secret agreement at Yalta with regard to China?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Were you familiar since you have become Chief of Staff with the fact there was a big difference of opinion in the State Department and with many of our military and naval leaders in the Far East over our China policy? There has been difference of opinion, especially with those questions, or do you take the position that you have all been agreed on it from the beginning?

General BRADLEY. Well, the question of the China policy other than the arming of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa was taking place at the time I was over in the Veterans' Administration and pretty much occupied, and I never did follow it too closely.

By the time I became Chief of Staff the situation in China was pretty bad, and there wasn't too much you could do about it, apparently, and so I never did study that too much from the military point of view until we got to studying the importance of Formosa if it should fall into somebody else's hands.

DIFFERENCE WITH STATE DEPARTMENT ON FORMOSA

Senator SMITH. As I recall, when I came back from the Far East in December of 1949 there was some discussion then about Formosa, whether we should or should not let it fall into hostile hands, and I understood the Joint Chiefs thought it should not fall into hostile hands, and then the President, in a statement on January 5, 1950, was very clear that we would not do anything further to help the Nationalists arm themselves; in other words, to cut off any further military supplies or aid at that time.

I was wondering whether there was a conflict of view there between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State that was advising the President on that point.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended in December of 1949 a modest program of military assistance. This was dropped after the President made a public statement in January 1950 that the United States would no longer provide military advice to the Chinese National forces.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF FORMOSA POLICY

The next time this came up was when the Chinese Nationalist Government offered 33,000 troops in response to the United Nations resolution calling for assistance in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on June 30, 1950, that the offer be not accepted in view of the political implications and the questionable military value of the forces.

Senator SMITH. I think General MacArthur testified that he was in accord with that view at that time.

General BRADLEY. General MacArthur was informed and he was in accord with it. And he in a conversation with General Collins on the 13th of July expressed his opposition to moving those forces from Formosa to Korea on the grounds that they would be ineffective and also that they were needed on Formosa to secure Formosa against being taken by the Chinese Communists.

In response to a request from the State Department for views on Formosa, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1950 reaffirmed that Formosa was strategically important to the United States and that resistance by Chinese Nationalist forces was militarily important to the United States.

They recommended denying Formosa to the Communists, modifying policy so as to grant military aid, and a survey of the Chinese Nationalist forces by General MacArthur and his staff.

This survey was made—incidentally, this recommendation was approved at this time by the State Department and a survey was made in August, and as a result initiation of shipments of critically needed ammunition was approved.

The survey report made by General Fox, who was on General MacArthur's staff, was received in September, and that was used to develop programs for military assistance to the Chinese Nationalist on Formosa.

CONSIDERATIONS IN FORMOSA POLICY

I think an important consideration is the fact that up until November the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered there was less to be gained in utilization of Chinese Nationalists in Korea than would be lost if the Chinese Communists were provoked into entering the Korean conflict in great extent.

Another important consideration was a threat of invasion of Formosa which seemed great in the summer and fall in view of the reported Chinese Communist concentrations for amphibious operations. In late November, after the Chinese Communists had appeared in force in Korea, General MacArthur recommended that he be authorized to negotiate with the Chinese Nationalists for use of certain of their forces in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that the proposal was being considered, and they cited certain political objections to it. At the end of December, General MacArthur recommended among other things the use of Chinese Nationalist forces from Formosa to reinforce in Korea and to take diversionary action against the Chinese mainland.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 9, in answer to General MacArthur, indicated the use of Chinese Nationalists in Korea was not favored due to their probable usefulness elsewhere and improbability of a decisive contribution from them in Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tentative agreement on courses of action which have been talked about so much here, dated January 12, did include the use of these Chinese Nationalist forces against the mainland if feasible but not in Korea, and near the end of January the 1951 supplemental program for the army military assistance from Formosa was approved, and air and navy programs were approved in late February.

And in March the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended establishment of a military assistance advisory group and training mission for Formosa. This was approved by our Government, and the mission is now in Formosa. A total military-aid program of something like $300 million has been studied and recommended for the Nationalists on Formosa to be provided in due course.

ADMINISTRATION AND MAC ARTHUR POLICY ON FORMOSA

Senator SMITH. Is not that policy which you have been discussing there practically in line with General MacArthur's position with regard to Formosa, except the interpretation has been made by some that he was advocating an attack on the mainland from Formosa? It was brought out this morning, I think, by Senator George, that General MacArthur never advocated an attack on the mainland. He advocated taking the wraps off and leaving it up to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists to take the course they saw fit to threaten the Chinese Communists and hoping to divert the troops putting pressure on us in Korea.

General BRADLEY. I said in answer to that question that the only military danger is if by so doing he lessens the capability of defending Formosa.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH. There might be a difference between a large-scale invasion, which might call for a great deal of shipping and so on, and an attack where they might send a force over and make a beachhead, which I understand from Dean Rusk's speech the other day we were inclined to approve of.

General BRADLEY. Well, I have not read his statement. I was out on the west coast and missed it. But they do have some Chinese Nationalist forces now on those small islands off the coast which can be used for such purposes.

DUTIES OF THE JCS

Senator SMITH. Now, General, to go to another subject. I am not quite clear in my mind as to the powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Do they make decisions or do the Joint Chiefs meet and make recommendations which are reported to you as Chairman, and then those recommendations go to the President and his group of national security advisers? Would major policy, for example, be determined by the Joint Chiefs, or would that be recommended and then cleared by you through the President's group?

General BRADLEY. I think it might be well to just read it out of the law. I think it is set forth pretty well in the law itself. It says in section 211, beginning with subsection B:

> Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform the following duties in addition to such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct:
>
> 1. Preparation of strategic plans and provisions for the strategic direction of the military forces;
> 2. Preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment to the military services of logistic responsibility in accordance with such plans;
> 3. Establishment of unified commands in strategic areas;
> 4. Review of major material and personnel requirements of the military forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans;
> 5. Formulation of policies for joint training of the military forces;
> 6. Formulation of policies for coordinating the military education of members of the military forces; and
> 7. Providing United States representation on the military staff committee of the United Nations in accordance with provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

All of this, you see, pertains to the preparation for war.

Now, after any fighting starts we are working under the arrangement or under the requirement that any directives to a field commander, that is fighting a war, will be cleared by the Secretary of Defense; and if there are political implications, by the State Department, and then final approval by the President, before they are sent to the field commander.

So, to that extent we prepare the directives for the military operations.

Now, there was one case, as I mentioned the other day, in which there was a question that arose as to whether or not there should be included in the JCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directive to General MacArthur, certain political reasonings, and at our request those were taken out of the directive and sent separately by the President on January 13, so that our directives, and the one that went out on January 12, were purely military.

Senator **Smith**. And that, as I understand it, was in reply to a request that General MacArthur had made on January 11 for instructions.

MESSAGES IN THE RECORD

I asked you the last time you were here, I think, if you would put the full text of the request to General MacArthur into the record and also the full text of that military directive of January 12. I am just checking up again because I think it is important that we have the full text of both of those documents in order to fill in what you testified to right now.

I did not see them in the transcript, so I am wondering if they were presented for the record.

General **Bradley**. I thought I read the directive of the 12th. I can read you a paraphrase of General MacArthur's message on the tenth if you would like to have it at this time.

Senator **Smith**. That is the 10th or the 11th?

General **Bradley**. The 10th, sir.

Senator **Smith**. The 10th?

General **Bradley**. January 10th.

Senator **Smith**. I did not mean to go into that now. If they have already been put into the record or you have given us quite an extensive bit of testimony in relation with those documents to your previous testimony, so I do not think it is necessary for you to do that.

General **Bradley**. The directive of the 12th, a paraphrase of it, went into the record the other day.

Senator **Smith**. It went in?

General **Bradley**. The paraphrase of General MacArthur's message to the Joint Chiefs on the 10th has not been put in the record.

Senator **Smith**. Let us put it in now, if it is not too long. Is it very long?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; it is about a page and a half, sir. If you would like for me to read it into the record now, I will do so.

Chairman **Russell**. Let him read it.

Senator **Smith**. I think we might have it read into the record now.

MAC ARTHUR MESSAGE OF JANUARY 10 TO JCS

General **Bradley**. This was a message to General MacArthur—from General MacArthur,? headed "Personal for the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It is as follows:

> Personal for JCS.
>
> This refers to your message of January 9. Clarification requested of your directive in the light of its qualified requirements that (1) I continue to defend in successive positions subject to my basic mission of protecting Japan and to primary consideration of the safety of my troops; and (2) that if in my judgment it becomes evident that evacuation is essential to avoid severe loss of matériel and men that I withdraw from Korea to Japan.
>
> In view of the self-evident fact that as presently constituted my command is of strength insufficient to hold a position in Korea and protect simultaneously Japan against external assault, strategic dispositions taken in the present situation must be based upon overriding political policy establishing the relativity of American interests in the Far East. That a beachhead line can be held by our existing forces for a limited time in Korea, there is no doubt, but this could not be accomplished without losses. Whether or not such losses were regarded as "severe," would to a certain extent depend upon the connotation one gives the term. The command was committed to the Korean campaign to fight the North Korean invasion army which in due course was effectively destroyed. It was not the intent that it engage the armies of the Chinese nation and had there been foreseeable prospects that it would find it necessary to do so in its own defense, doubtless it would not have been committed at all. The troops are embittered by the shameful propaganda which has falsely condemned their fighting qualities and courage in misunderstood retrograde maneuver, are tired from a long and difficult campaign, and unless the political basis upon which they are asked to trade life for time is clearly delineated, fully understood, and so impelling that the hazards of battle are accepted cheerfully, their morale will become a serious threat to their battle efficiency.
>
> I am in full agreement, as I stated in my message of December 30 in reply to your message of the same date, with your estimate that the conditions and limitations, namely: no reinforcements, no measures permissible against China's continental military potential, continued restrictions upon Chinese Nationalist military action, and the concentration in the Korean-Manchurian sector of China's military force, will eventually render untenable the military position of the command in Korea. In the absence of overriding political considerations, under these conditions the command should be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it is feasible tactically to do so. If, on the other hand, the primary political interests of the United States in the Far East lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to accept any attendant hazard to Japan's security and whatever casualties result.
>
> The issue involves a decision of highest national and international importance, far above the competence of a theater commander guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing upon a very limited field of action, and really boils down to the question of whether or not the United States intends to evacuate Korea. Nor is it a decision which should be left to the initiative of enemy action which would in effect be the determining criterion under a reasonable interpretation of your message. Therefore my query amounts to this: Is it the present objective of United States political policy to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished, or to maintain a military position in Korea—indefinitely, for a limited time?
>
> Under the extraordinary limitations and conditions imposed upon the command in Korea, as I have pointed out, its military position is untenable, but it can hold, if overriding political considerations so dictate, for any length of time up to its complete destruction. Your clarification requested.

JCS ANSWER OF JANUARY 12 TO MAC ARTHUR

Chairman **Russell**. Have you read the clarification that you sent him? Did you read that?

General **Bradley**. I read it in the record the other day, but it might be clearer if it was repeated.

Senator SMITH. I think it is important to have the two documents together, what General MacArthur requested in the way of a directive, and what the reply was. If it is already in, it can be done by reference, and I would be satisfied with that.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is perfectly all right. I do not object to its being read again.

Senator SMITH. In that case, let us have it read again.

General BRADLEY. This is the answer to MacArthur on the 12th of January from the Joint Chiefs, and this is the one which suffered 1 day's delay because it was a question of whether or not to put in political considerations in the same message or whether to limit this one to military and follow it by political, and the latter decision was made, and this is the military directive here.

Senator SMITH. As I understand, this is the military directive, and the President followed with the political of the 13th?

General BRADLEY. That is right, sir.

Senator SMITH. But in the meantime the Joint Chiefs also had their research report which covers those four controversial points.

General BRADLEY. That is a different study, to be taken in case of certain eventualities.

The message to General MacArthur on January 12, 1951, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was, in substance, and is paraphrased as follows:

> We are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the factors known to us, including particularly those presented by you in your present message, that it is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold the position in Korea for a protracted period.
>
> It would be to our national interest, however, and also to the interest of the UN, before you issue firm instructions for initiation of evacuation of troops from Korea, to gain some further time for essential military and diplomatic consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort.
>
> It is important also to future of UN and NATO organizations to the United States prestige world-wide, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia that maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations.
>
> In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces.
>
> [Deleted]
>
> In your messages of December 30, 1950, and January 4, 1951, you had indicated that it would not be necessary to make an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had arrived at the old Pusan beachhead.
>
> Including consideration of factors outlined above, your estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea.
>
> Directives contained in paragraph C our message of January 9 meanwhile remain in effect.

Immediately after this message was approved by the President, General Collins and General Vandenberg left that evening for Korea so as to get a first-hand knowledge of the actual condition of the morale and the fighting capabilities of the troops in Korea.

ROLE OF JANUARY 12 STUDY IN MAC ARTHUR THINKING

Senator SMITH. I got the impression from General MacArthur's testimony that when it was decided that they would not evacuate, they were to hold there, it was at that point that he thought he was working along with the Joint Chiefs in those four points in the controversial study of January 12; and I am wondering whether he was ever advised that those recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were not to be followed.

That is what troubles me.

General BRADLEY. They were never sent to him as a directive, and I should think that he would have known that they were not a directive, because the January 12 study was first presented to him and explained to him personally by General Collins, who can tell you first hand about it when he gets here, but it was first presented to him by, in person, General Collins. And I understood from talking to General Collins that he explained to him it was a study.

It was later sent to General MacArthur by more or less routine procedure in the form of a message dated January 22.

In other words, it was not sent immediately, because General Collins carried it to him; and, of course, as I said, the other day, when you consider any one JCS paper, unless you consider the whole series of papers dealing with that subject, you do not get the full picture. And in this case the full picture was not sent in a telegram. Whether or not it was all presented by General Collins when he presented it to him orally, I don't know, and he can answer that better than I can.

Senator SMITH. I think it is one of the important matters in this whole discussion here, whether General MacArthur understood fully that he was not working along the line of those four recommendations of the Joint Chiefs and that other document. At least, he implied that in his testimony.

CONTACT BETWEEN JCS AND THE PRESIDENT

Now, to follow up a little bit on the Joint Chiefs—you testified, General Bradley, that on April 6 you were at the White House with this group—the President and others—and that it was suggested that the matter as to whether or not General MacArthur should be removed go over until Sunday, (and you were asked to check with the Joint Chiefs as to the military reasons for or against the removing of General MacArthur.

Now, you testified also that on Sunday, April 8, you met with the Joint Chiefs, and then after meeting with them, you met with General Marshall. You gave us the reasons this morning—military reasons—why it seemed desirable to remove General MacArthur. I want to ask this question:

Were the Joint Chiefs ever directly in contact with the President on this matter, or did they meet separately with you and then you reported to General Marshall and then you and General Marshall together reported to the President that these were the views of the Joint Chiefs?

General BRADLEY. The Joint Chiefs—the three Chiefs of Staff did not meet with the President.

The President on Saturday directed General Marshall to get the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the military point of view, and that was obtained from the Chiefs and given to General Marshall on Sunday afternoon.

Then when we met on Monday, General Marshall asked me to repeat the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the reasons why they took those views, to the President; and I did that.

Senator SMITH. But the Joint Chiefs were not present at any of the discussions in regard to the removal?

General BRADLEY. Not present with the President; no.

Senator SMITH. No.

General BRADLEY. I carried their views to the President for them, sir.

Senator SMITH. And then the decision to dismiss General MacArthur abruptly was made without the Joint Chiefs having anything to do with it. They had no part in the abrupt dismissal at all?

General BRADLEY. The Joint Chiefs merely stated their views from a military point of view as to why General MacArthur should be relieved, and those were stated to General Marshall. The Joint Chiefs were present with General Marshall. They were not present with the President.

TIMING OF DISMISSAL

Senator SMITH. Were they asked whether in their judgment this act had to be taken suddenly rather than contact General MacArthur first and avoid all this humiliation of the general?

General BRADLEY. I don't believe the matter of timing was discussed by the Chiefs.

Senator SMITH. That is what I assumed—the Joint Chiefs were not in on that particular discussion.

General BRADLEY. The Chiefs did discuss the possibility of relieving him of command in Korea and not in Japan. They discussed that angle of it, and they felt that that could not be done very well, because it would be a very unusual situation where General Ridgway would be operating in Korea with all his bases back in somebody else's command. So the military feasibility of that was discussed, but the method of the relief, I don't remember that that—and the timing of the release—I don't believe that was discussed between General Marshall and the Chiefs.

BRINGING MAC ARTHUR HOME FOR CONSULTATION

Senator SMITH. Did you ever consider the possibility of asking General MacArthur to come on here to consider this difference of opinion on strategy or having some member of the Joint Chiefs or yourself posibly going to Korea, I mean to Tokyo, to discuss it with General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I don't believe the method of relief was discussed along that line. I think in arriving at their final views as to the military reasons why he should be relieved, I think there was some discussion—well, if he is not relieved, is there some step we can take to try to straighten the matter out? I think some of those things were discussed, but they were not included in the reasons why, but merely steps that might be taken in case he was not relieved by the President.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will allow you this last question, but your time is up.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much. Just this last question. When General MacArthur was here I asked him specifically if he had been invited to come to Washington to discuss this matter or if any one of the Joint Chiefs or a representative of the President had gone to Tokyo to discuss it with him. General MacArthur agreed that if there was a difference in judgment as to strategy and he had been requested to turn his command over to General Ridgway, he would have said, "Of course I would have. I was seeking a directive of what was the right thing to do. I would have turned it over if I had been requested without any hesitation."

The record shows that. I did not give his answer very correctly, but the record is very clear on that. I am still in great doubt in my mind as to the justice that was done him as a five-star general with such a great career. It could not be that you had to act in a day. There was no crisis pending at that time.

Why didn't the group think in terms of going to the general and requesting him to turn his command over? Then you could have discussed with him the whole situation of the Japanese treaty and the effect it might have of giving up the SCAP job, those things, and things that are giving us so much concern now because of his removal from the Japan situation.

I think it is a very serious matter from the standpoint of the whole country, and I want a good reason why it had to be done in a great rush with a group of eminent men like yourself considering it. Can you clarify that for me?

General BRADLEY. Well, the decision to relieve General MacArthur and the timing of the release was made by the President, sir, and was not included in these views, that is the method of relief and the timing was not included in the views of the Joint Chiefs.

It was not their responsibility. It was the President's responsibility to make the decision and decide upon the timeliness.

Senator SMITH. I have some more questions, Mr. Chairman, but I will reserve them on the second round.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am afraid you will be compelled to.

Senator SMITH. Well, I do it gladly without being compelled to do it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, there has been considerable complaint about the acoustics in this room, and in view of the fact that our visiting audience has declined considerably at this stage of the proceeding, I thought it might be well for us to try meeting tomorrow down in the Armed Services Committee room. It probably will be necessary for us to return here before the hearings are concluded, but I think we would all feel a little easier asking our questions if we were downstairs, and we can take care of the audience there that we have had for the last 2 or 3 days without any difficulty.

Is there any objection to trying that? Senator Brewster particularly has been complaining about the acoustics. If there is no objection we will meet tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock in the Armed Services Committee room.

The other procedural matter to which I adverted will, of course, have to wait the return of the member of the committee involved. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

Thank you very much, General Bradley.

(Whereupon at 1:10 p. m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Tuesday, May 22, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICE AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally, (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Hunt, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, and Cain.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, gentlemen. There are two matters I desire to call to the attention of the committee before we start the examination of General Bradley this morning.

STATUS OF REQUESTS FROM DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

I have been in almost constant contact with the Department of Defense with respect to the material that has been requested by the committee.

Senator WILEY. Might I suggest, Mr. Chairman, you are talking to those down that table. If you turn around the other way, we can get the benefit of it too.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have received a letter this morning from Mr. Larkin in accordance with my request that he furnish a summarization of the status of requests that have been made to him showing the information requested that has been furnished, and the status of the request of that which has not been supplied yet.

General Mudge has the copy of that letter and that summarization, and if any Senator wishes to see the status of his requests, he is at liberty to do so. If he has any further suggestions as to any action that might be taken by the Chair or by the committee to secure the information requested, I shall be glad to have him submit it to the Chair.

LETTER FROM SENATOR WILEY TO SENATOR RUSSELL

Now gentlemen, there is another matter before we proceed that I wish to bring to your attention. On Friday afternoon rather late as

I was emerging from the conference with the House on the military manpower bill, I was met by a group of reporters.

They brought to my attention a publicity release by the senior Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Wiley. It is headed "For release 8 a. m. Saturday" and bears the headline that "Wiley protests to Russell against whitewash and washout tendency of Joint Hearings thus far."

I went on up to my office, of course, without any comment and found there the letter from the senior Senator from Wisconsin. I wish to read this letter to the committee at this time. It is addressed to me.

Re whitewash on washout hearings.

HON. RICHARD RUSSELL,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On Thursday, May 17, in the joint hearings of our two committees, I stated:

"Will the chairman ascertain from the Chief Executive whether he would be willing that the participants in those conversations or gatherings give us what was said and if not (that is, if Mr. Truman refuses) is his refusal based upon the general thesis, that it would be damaging to the public interest if the information were given."

You stated in reply that if a letter were addressed to you, asking for such information, you would transmit it "to the proper authority."

Then I commented: "You shall receive the letter, sir."

However, yesterday afternoon, the President stated in effect to his press conference that his conversations with his advisors before coming to decisions were his business and his business alone.

This pronouncement of the President answers quite clearly, albeit very unsatisfactorily, one of the questions I was going to ask him in my letter, namely, whether the President would release his staff from any pledge, open or implied, to keep their conversations with him confidential. The President apparently will not release his staff from such a pledge—going on the theory that neither the public nor the Senate has any right to get such detailed information relating to the recall of General MacArthur or for that matter, any subsequent question which we will raise in committee.

It is my contention that circumstances which led up to a decision affecting the whole future peace of the world definitely are the people's business and must be revealed to the people's representatives. If the President is allowed to maintain his iron curtain over this information regarding events leading to MacArthur's dismissal, we will never be able to lift the iron curtain over other events which led to the downfall of Nationalist China, the blunders at Yalta, Teheran, Potsdam, and any other critical issues which our committees may want to explore. Now, Mr. Chairman, no one has fought harder than I to preserve the system of checks and balances between three separate and coequal branches of government. But I ask now how can the Congress check and balance abuses of Presidential power, errors of Presidential commission or omission, if it cannot even get the facts? Are we to legislate in the dark; is the past to be shrouded in secrecy; is our policy in the future to be based on severely limited information?

We 96 Senators were elected to represent 154,000,000 people. We cannot go back to those people and tell them that decisions affecting the lives of 150,000 American boys fighting in Korea—that such decisions and their origins are the "President's business and his alone."

I want to point out that the President has not stated that the disclosure of the facts as to his conversations, consultations, and conversations—that such disclosures would be harmful to the public interest. He has simply stated an arbitrary edict that whether his conversations affect the national security or not, they are nobody else's business but his.

I hesitate to conclude at this early stage, but I must say that from the way the joint hearings have proceeded thus far they may end up being considered not only a whitewash but a washout. I hope that future events may not justify such a conclusion. I am not making these remarks on the basis of any individuals or personalties involved but solely on the basis of objection to the "cover-up" tactics thus far condoned by the joint committee majority.

Let me also state that as one who has supported bipartisan foreign policy in Europe in every single one of its stages since the end of the second World War, I deeply resent any charge or any innuendo to the effect that my own or my minority colleagues' approach is partisan in its goal or in its motivation. We are simply trying to get the facts, letting the chips fall where they may, because we feel that a country which has suffered some 66,000 casualties including over 11,000 dead, is entitled to know everything that led up to such losses and worse losses to come so long as such information does not violate national security. It is the committee majority which has been partisan in its frantic desire to cover-up and whitewash.

I would appreciate your courtesy in transmitting this respectful message.

Sincerely yours,

ALEXANDER WILEY.

Now, gentlemen, when this committee met for its organization on April 30, I made a statement to the committee with respect to procedure, and it was approved by the committee without objection.

I stated that where any member of the committee desired any document, information, or fact that was in the custody of the executive branch of the Government, if the member of the committee would address to me a letter briefly describing the information sought, that I would be glad, as the agent of the committee, in my capacity as chairman, to use every resource available to me, to undertake to get the committee the information.

I read this communication three or four times.

In my opinion, it does not comply with the procedure outlined, and is vague and indefinite as to any fact it might seek.

It is, instead, as I regard it, a rather serious reflection upon the integrity and motives of a majority of the members of this committee.

Now, as chairman of this committee, and its agent, I have not thought it was proper for me to transact the business of the committee in the press. I have, however, decided in my own mind, that this communication does not fall within the procedure which we have outlined.

Unless I am instructed by the committee to the contrary, I do not propose to forward it to any branch of the executive branch of the Government.

Of course if the committee sees fit to instruct me to forward it to any portion of the executive branch of the Government, I shall comply with those instructions, as the representative of the committee.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN HEARINGS

Senator WILEY. They haven't bothered to read the various statements I have made, and I am very grateful to you that you have read them, because they have attempted to put words into my mouth. They tried to impute to me things I never said.

I wish they would read my comments, therefore, before judging and coming to conclusions. For those comments I refer individuals to the May 21 Congressional Record, where beginning on page 5644, I reproduced the text of my releases thus far.

The first release related to my letter to the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Russell, which he just read.

In that letter I made certain observations against the President's contention at the White House conference, which preceded General MacArthur's dismissal, that it was his business and his business alone.

I make no formal request on the President. I make that clear. Because he had made that statement after I had made the previous statement in the record here. Then he talked. That is the sequence of events.

Then he said it was his business. I implied, however, that I felt that the Nation would applaud a reversal of the decision on his part, that the Nation would applaud if the President were to announce, "I do not intend to hide anything. I release General Bradley and all other individuals to participate in such conferences from any pledge, open or implied, to keep those converations confidential."

I repeat I made no formal request on the President, and I told you why. I merely submitted observations to him through the chairman of the joint committee. I asked that the chairman of the joint committee transmit those observations to the President. He says now he doesn't think he should. That is okay with me.

I will present some personally to him myself. I presented my case in effect before the bar of public opinion, just as I have been presenting what I feel to be constructive suggestions for a long time before that bar.

The second release consisted of my statement to the effect that consideration might be given to inviting the President to testify before our joint committee.

I am sure if some of you people were President, you wouldn't hesitate in the public interest, and it surely is a matter of public interest. I am just back from the State, wasn't here yesterday morning, and I know what I am talking about in the Middle West.

I further state if the President does not choose to testify, consideration might be given to having the joint committee subpena. I said "consideration." I didn't say "subpena him."

I pointed out that some individuals who had not thought the issue out or had not consulted constitutional law might think that the idea of subpenaing the President is absolutely absurd. Nothing of the sort. I have quoted Chief Justice Marshall in the 1808 decision in the Aaron Burr case. If you want to read something that would be stimulating to all of us, read what the counsel, Botts, said on that occasion, what he said were the rights of the public, and it was his argument that brought about John Marshall's decision that issued the subpena to the President of the United States.

If anyone here thinks that John Marshall's decision can be lightly dismissed, I suggest they look up the biography of that great jurist. I want to point out, however, that I very definitely did not state that I was going to request the committee to subpena the President or that I was going to request the committee to invite the President to testify.

I merely made a suggestion before the bar of public opinion. I stated when asked by reporters that if members of the joint committee see any merit in my proposal, I hope that might follow through on it.

If, on the other hand, they did not like the proposal that was their prerogative and I for one would not press the issue because I believe that to the greatest extent possible there should be united action in a joint committee.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

I might stop here and ask, Mr. Chairman, what we are here for. We are here to get the facts; we are here to develop the truth. And why was the committee brought into being? Was it to get just part of the picture?

I should just like to present one further thought. There have been various inspired newspaper reports to the effect that the Senator from Wisconsin was a party to a strategy of getting some administration witness. I say that is a damned lie. I never talked with any of my associates until just a few minutes before I saw the chairman the other day, and that was after the matter had broken here in committee.

There was no strategy of any kind nor any thought, and I want to say if you look through my record you will not find that I have attacked personally one individual. I would like to reiterate that it has been my intention neither in this hearing nor any other proceeding in the 12 years I have been in the Senate to get anyone. I do not believe in attacking personalities. I do not believe in smearing individuals.

I believe in getting at the issue and fighting for principles, and whether you people believe it or not, I say that one of the most vital principles is involved in this case that has ever come before any committee or before the Senate.

I also believe in securing the facts. I haven't been a trial lawyer for thirty-odd years without knowing some of the tactics, the psychological tactics that go on, and go on in Government, too. I want to know why MacArthur was fired and so does the public. Have we got the answer?

Senator McMahon. Yes.

Senator Wiley. We will see about that later. Is there anything wrong with the approach? I would like someone to tell me.

The gentleman says yes, we have got the answer already, the case isn't closed. I say you have become advocates instead of investgators. In this committee you are supposed to investigate, you are not supposed to arrive at your conclusion after one witness has told you conclusions.

I have never sought to embarrass any individual. I have never sought to belittle any individual and I challenge someone in the Senate here to say that.

I am not interested in individuals or personalities as such except insofar as they convey facts and insofar as they stand for or lack certain like principles.

In summary let me say my whole aim has been to make what I feel to be respectfully constructive suggestions to this joint committee and to the American people. As a minority member, leader of the minority party on the Foreign Relations Committee, I ask you what Vandenberg would have done in a case like that. I know what he thought of MacArthur. He is gone. I know what he would do. He would get up on his feet like I think I have and stand for principle.

I have received a great many telegrams and letters endorsing my effort to try to get the facts for the public. I intend to persist in that endeavor, but I am not aiming at getting anyone or sparing anyone. Fundamentally I have been seeking to strengthen the legislative branch rather than to see it further undermined and weakened.

I respect the right of my colleagues to differ with me as they see fit, but I will not back down one iota in my personal contention that the legislative branch is entitled to the facts and that an investigating committee is supposed to investigate rather than to become a rubber stamp or arrive before the thing is all through at conclusions.

Now I know how the news has gone out. One newspaperman came to me just yesterday after I got back from Wisconsin and he said, "Well, you notice what happens. The minute you dare to oppose anyone in Government or stand for a principle, see what happens?"

"All I have to do is to send word to the hounds and the hounds will bay."

Look at the cartoons, look at the noted columnists. Not having studied the legal principle involved at all, they don't argue that. They just sort of smear ironically, sort of indulge in light-headed statements. Why? They don't want the public to get the issue.

PERSONALITIES AND FACTS

Aren't they interested in the facts? Well, I never said that the committee is a whitewash. I want that straight. I see the gentleman from Arkansas has just come into the room. What a beautiful statement he made after someone had said that I said the committee had whitewashed.

I said if we don't get the facts, it will be a whitewash or a wash-out. Can anyone deny that if we do not get the facts?

I saw several other of my brethren who thought that they had to go off the deep end and indulge in personalities. That is no argument. Lincoln said—and I have used it a hundred times and won lawsuits with it—"that when I notice a man is always damning the opposition, indulging in personality, it is sure evidence he has got a damn poor case of his own."

Let us argue the facts and the principles that are involved here.

That is what Senator George did, too. He did a grand job.

Senator JOHNSON. Will the Senator yield, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield?

Senator WILEY. He said there was no immunity, but he said there was the privilege; and many questions arise as to who can exercise the privilege in a case like this. Is it a governmental privilege? The courts have held it was the privilege of government and not the witness.

There is also the question—If there was a privilege, which I deny here, is there a waiver?

There is also the question whether or not the President of the United States will say that it is against the public interest. If he does, that closes it. But he has not said that. He said it is up to him personally.

Now I will yield.

Senator JOHNSON. To whom does the Senator——

Senator WILEY. I can't hear you.

Senator JOHNSON. To whom does the Senator from Wisconsin refer in the next to last sentence of his letter to the chairman of this committee when he says, and I quote, "It is the committee majority which has been partisan in its frantic desire to cover up and whitewash?"

Senator WILEY. The majority is the majority party.

Senator JOHNSON. Well, the Senator from Texas has been sitting here next to the Senator from Massachusetts and we have been voting alike on the matter. I should think if because I am a Democrat I am to be charged with covering up and whitewash and my vote is identical with the Senator from Massachusetts, that he would be subject to the accusation of "covering up and whitewash."

Senator WILEY. Well, you are entitled, of course, to your conclusions here. On the contrary, I have pointed out very clearly that it would be wholly premature to judge a committee at this stage, but I have said that if it persists in its present policies, it will end up by being considered a whitewash and a wash-out.

I repeat, I suggest that those who are so quick to criticize take a little time out and read what they think they are criticizing before committing themselves against something they may not quite understand.

Now I felt in view of what I read in the papers coming in, in view of what continues to go on in cartoons, I as a member of this committee would just express myself in that way, and I call your attention I am not indulging in personalities, I am simply claiming definitely and clearly, gentlemen, that we should have the facts.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair has stated his position with respect to this communication.

PROCEDURE

If there is no motion, the Chair will recognize the Senator from Massachusetts.

On page 1976 of the record of May 15, we found that the Senator from Massachusetts protected his position, and I will read a brief statement so that there can be no confusion, or charges or acrimony:

> Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield for a question of procedure, Mr. Chairman?
>
> Senator WILEY. Without losing any of my time.
>
> Senator SALTONSTALL. I have a matter on which I would like to be over on the floor at 12 o'clock, and I would not like to lose my place in asking my questions.
>
> Chairman RUSSELL. I will have to submit that to the committee. We have a request from Senator Saltonstall that he not lose his place in the questioning. Is there any objection to the Senator from Massachusetts not losing his place? The Chair hears none.

Senator Saltonstall, you are recognized.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

Has this other matter been disposed of? Are we going forward with the regular questioning?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is my intention, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I apologize. I had set a hearing of the RFC, and was chairman and wasn't here.

I didn't realize this was coming up this morning.

If I may be permitted 2 or 3 minutes, I would like to comment on the observations, part of which I heard, made by the Senator from Wisconsin.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair is very loath to carry this matter any further.

However, inasmuch as the Senator from Arkansas was mentioned by name, I think he should be recognized.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, with all due deference to the Senator from Arkansas, are we not going to proceed in regular order here, since we have General Bradley here, and everybody is here to hear his testimony?

I make that observation, Mr. Chairman——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair will permit the committee to settle the matter. The Chair had to make a disposition of the communication from a member of the committee. I thought the Senator from Wisconsin was entitled to be heard.

I was leaving it to the committee; and the Senator from Wisconsin was heard at some length.

He mentioned particularly the Senator from Arkansas, by name, and in view of that fact, I thought it was appropriate that the Chair would allow the Senator from Arkansas an opportunity to speak.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It won't take long. I have no written statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope that the committee won't get off into a prolonged debate on a matter of this kind, unless the committee desires to take some action on it.

If the committee desires to take action, that is another thing.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I think the Senator from Arkansas should understand that before he came in the chairman did state that he did not intend to submit this to the President.

Chairman RUSSELL. Nor to any other agency.

Senator BREWSTER. The Senator from Wisconsin said it was all right with him.

I think the Senator should understand that so far as the committee is concerned, it is disposed of, but I think the courtesy should be extended to the Senator from Arkansas to make his observations.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will recognize the Senator if he wishes to be heard on a point of personal privilege, but I hope he will pardon me in saying so, but I hope he does not invoke any lengthy discussion.

INTEGRITY OF THE HEARINGS

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would like to say, particularly to the Senator from Wisconsin, that whatever I may have said was not intended as a personal reference at all.

The observation that I made the other day—that I originally made—bearing on this general subject was apropos of a remark made by the Senator from California.

My concern has been—it is not a matter of personality at all—that this hearing be so conducted that the people of this country would feel that they had the truth of the matter, and that it was not a whitewash. I was really seeking to try to persuade the Senator from California, particularly, and the Senator from Wisconsin, secondarily, after he entered the matter, that we should be extremely careful not to use the word "whitewash," which is a word that gained great currency last year with regard to the Tydings committee.

Now, we know the effect of it on that committee. All I am seeking, and sought then, to do was to minimize any such implications that might arise out of this hearing.

I think that it is extremely important that both parties and the people begin to have confidence in what our purposes are, and in their Government.

I have been greatly concerned with it in another connection, the RFC. I think we have gone a good way, and with the full cooperation of the Republican Party, I might say, in reestablishing some confidence in that agency.

I feel the same way about this matter. I felt it was very dangerous when the attacks were made upon the integrity of the leading military people of our Government, and particularly in wartime. All I am seeking to do is to see that we come out of this hearing without its being partisan or without either side feeling that they had been mistreated in the matter.

Now, the vote that I cast the other day, I have been criticized for in somewhat the same way everybody is, I guess, when they do those things, but I was seeking merely to minimize this whole business of its being partisan.

There were two elements in it: I voted with the Republican side, with the Senator from Wisconsin, partly for that reason, and partly because I felt that there should be no excuse for saying that anything was held back.

I happened to feel that what was being held back was something to which we were not entitled, on the one hand, and the next is that it is not particularly germane or important to this inquiry.

We differ on that substantive matter. I do, with the Senator from Wisconsin, but I certainly want to say now that I had no intention of having a question of personality arise in this. I thought it was the principle, and I regret that the Senator from Wisconsin has interpreted my remarks in a personal way, because I have nothing but the highest regard for him, as he well knows, having, I believe, as I have evidenced it, in the association on the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Chairman, that is about all I have to say on it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON—Resumed

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Bradley, I have just three or four questions. I was not here yesterday, but I read the record of what you said yesterday. There is one question that appeals to me.

You stated that the first you heard of this matter of the release of General MacArthur came from a telephone call from someone, you did not remember who it was.

INITIATION OF MOVE FOR DISMISSAL

My question is: If you heard of the telephone call, and as a result, cautioned the Chiefs of Staff to be ready, the criticism of General MacArthur did not come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it came from somebody up above the Joint Chiefs of Staff or from some other department to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Is that a fair interpretation?

General BRADLEY. Senator, as I have said several times, I am sorry I cannot remember where the information came from that caused me to call this meeting. As I stated in answer to a later question in here, it may have come from someone in my own office who brought me a ticker announcement of the thing.

It is my business to try to keep the Chiefs informed of what may come up and whether it was a telephone call or this ticker, I am sorry, I cannot remember.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What my point was—the Joint Chiefs of Staff as such under your chairmanship were not at that time, on April 4, considering the dismissal or relief of General MacArthur.

General BRADLEY. No, except that we had been concerned over a period of time, as I stated yesterday, about various statements made by General MacArthur, which more or less indicated his unwillingness to carry out the war in Korea according to our ideas of trying to confine it to Korea, and his many statements which worried us as jeopardizing civilian control over the military.

It wasn't just a brand new thing, this thing had been going on for several months, as was illustrated by the fact that we sent him this directive on December 6.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, I would like to ask two or three questions on the policy regarding Korea. I refer to this Joint Chiefs of Staff report for Senate committees on Korean operations.

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield there? He used the date, the fourth. Was it the fourth or the fifth?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I thought the telephone call came on the Thursday, which was April 4. Is that correct?

General BRADLEY. I believe Thursday—April 5, I believe. It was Thursday.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thursday, April 5, because you had your first message after the Security Council meeting on Friday, April 6.

General BRADLEY. The first meeting with the President was on Friday, April 6.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So it was Thursday, April 5, when you received this telephone call.

RESULTS OF MEETINGS OF DEFENSE AND STATE OFFICIALS

Now, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for the Senate Committees on Korean Operations, page 93, paragraph numbered 17, you state—and I won't read it all:

> In their meeting of 6 February 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff and conferees from the Department of State considered five possible lines of action as outlined by representatives of the State Department:

[Deleted.]

Then on February 13 in paragraph 23 it states, and I quote:

> During the course of the discussion it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State would prefer not to express political objectives with respect to Korea until military capabilities there were established. On the other hand, the consensus of the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that a political decision was required before there could be suitable determination of military courses of action.

Therefore, on February 13 there was no specific policy with relation to Korea. Is that a fair statement?

General BRADLEY. I don't think you could take it in that very form, Senator. The question of what your policy should be with relation to the 38th parallel or whether or not you should get out or whether or not you should reinforce the troops in Korea hinged to a great extent on what success we had against the Communists.

At that time we were reasonably sure a new attack would come sometime in the spring, and if you can bump that off, as it were, you are in a much better position to negotiate than you would be if you couldn't contain it, or actually you would be in a better position than you were on February 6 when we discussed this matter.

So that while the military would like to have some political guidance, which will help them formulate military policies in Korea, we can understand that until the situation is a little better known as to whether or not we can contain it, that the United Nations would have some trouble formulating policy.

You might accept one thing under one condition and you wouldn't accept such conditions under another.

I believe that is in substance what this discussion was about in here—as to whether or not you could get a political decision out of the United Nations at this time, while it looked pretty black up to that time, but it was beginning to look better—whether or not you wanted them to make a political decision under those conditions or whether you wanted them to wait and make a political decision and furnish political guidance after things looked better.

Senator SALTONSTALL. There was an agreement on affirmative policy—more a wait-and-see-what-is-going-to-happen?

General BRADLEY. That is correct. More wait-and-see and see whether or not we couldn't be in a better position to formulate a political policy.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, I refer to paragraph 38 on page 99:

> On March 15, 1951—

now, that is just about a month after February 15—

> the Joint Chiefs of Staff held an informal conference with representatives of the Department of State and among other things discussed the Korean situation. It appeared to be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement should be reached on the objectives in Korea. It was suggested that the Secretary of State talk to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If this question was not settled before the next meeting, the question would be discussed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff-State Department meeting on that date.

That would confirm the meeting of February 13. Still a month later there was no definite military, political, or diplomatic policy with relation to Korea. Is that a fair statement?

General BRADLEY. That pertained primarily to whether or not we crossed the thirty-eighth parallel in the spring, and at this time it was pretty much understood that we would not be able to get any political-military policy until we had been able to see what would happen to this next offensive. It is fact, of course, that this is still a wait-and-see proposition.

DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT POLICY IN KOREA

Senator SALTONSTALL. And then that wait-and-see proposition—what was important it seems to me, and interesting, certainly, that wait-and-see proposition developed into what I would call a negative policy, the negative policy of trying to stop the will of the Chinese to be aggressors by killing them off or by stopping them in any other way.

General BRADLEY. Well, that and the fact that this all added up to the proposed armistice terms, if you want to call it that, which our Government was discussing with the other governments involved in Korea, and which was sent over to General MacArthur for comment. These discussions all led up to that proposal which was being submitted to the countries involved. This being a United Nations action, the political guidance more or less has to come from the United Nations. Of course, we show the leadership in it. But these discussions all led up to this proposal which we submitted to the other nations and submitted to General MacArthur for comment, and which he later announced himself and voided any chance of submitting it as a United Nations proposition.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What it comes down to then, General Bradley, and from listening to General Marshall would be my reaction—what it comes down to is that we hope through an aggressive resistance to the Chinese attacks that ultimately there will be an effort or an opportunity to end these operations in Korea?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. We had thought here in March was one chance and were proposing such and getting a clearance from other nations on it, and that was then abandoned. We still hope that we will be in a position to again propose something through the United Nations which would end up in negotiations and cessation of hostilities.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But as a result of these hearings there has been a more definite affirmative policy established, for instance, with relation to Formosa, with relation to the economic blockade, and with relation to the Nationalist troops of Chiang Kai-shek. That is a fair statement, is it not?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I——

Senator SALTONSTALL. A more affirmative policy has been established?

General BRADLEY. I don't know that I would admit that. As far as the military is concerned, our policy has always been on Formosa that we should improve their equipment and their ability to hold Formosa. We do not want it to fall into hostile hands, and as far as the military point of view on Formosa, it has not changed. As far as our military view on economic sanctions, that has not changed. We have argued economic sanctions ever since China got into the Korean situation.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that you feel from the military point of view that these hearings have brought out or certainly made public the policy on the diplomatic side, on the political side, along the lines that the military had hoped they would make them clear?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think somebody on the political side would be much better able to answer than myself. My answer is entirely a military one in that I say we have always felt this way about the Nationalist troops on Formosa, about rearming them, and we have felt this way about economic sanctions. We have not changed our attitude toward the use of Nationalists.

[Deleted.]

REASONS FOR RELIEVING MAC ARTHUR

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now may I ask you just one more question? I read yesterday your testimony with relation to the reasons that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt from a military point of view that MacArthur should be relieved. Did you read Mr. Pearson's column this morning with relation to the JCS role in MacArthur firing?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; but I would recommend that you take it out of the record and let me read it again rather than reading the statement there.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I will not ask you to repeat the reasons. You stand by your reasons that were given yesterday and do not agree with the reasons given in this article?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you say there is no basis for the statement given in the article?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think he has part of them right, the same as I read into the record yesterday. I do not remember. I glanced through it rather hurriedly, but I know some of them are not in accordance with the reasons I have given yesterday.

ROLE OF CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now it is true, is it not, and a fair statement that your position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is really one of guiding the meetings and calling the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Their decision under the law is final as regards to strategy, military strategy. Your relation with the President and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your influence is really an influence from a personal point of view rather than a legal point of view. Is that correct?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't think that is entirely correct. I have a legal position which you gave me as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when you amended the National Security Act in 1949.

It is true that you put into the bill that I have no vote, but voting does not play too big a part anyway. We have discussions, and if there is one of the three Chiefs that dissents, then we try to find some solution which is satisfactory to all of them. It is not a question of two against one in the voting. We usually end up with a solution which is satisfactory, or acceptable, at least, to all three of the Chiefs.

I help guide those discussions, present the argument sometimes on both sides so as to bring out all the points before a decision is reached. I would not say that my influence was entirely just acting as a conductor of meetings.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I did not mean that. I said that a lot of the importance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the personal reputation in which he is held, not only by the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also by the President and by the people of the country. I would say most respectfully that you had great influence because of your personal reputation and personality.

What I am trying to bring out is that it is a personality and a reputation that gives the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff his influence. Is that not right?

General **Bradley**. That is a big factor, yes; and I hope always whoever is sitting in the chair of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have the confidence of Congress and of the people and of the President.

It should not be any other way, and I hope that you will always see to it that when someone is appointed, that he does have your confidence, and that he does have such ability and reputation as you call it that he will exercise that influence and his arguments will carry some weight and he will be able to represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff at various meetings and present their views for them.

DANGER OF BOMBING THE UNITED STATES

Senator **Saltonstall**. There is just one final question, General. I am not sure whether this has been brought our through you or not. Is it not more dangerous from the point of view of the security of the United States and the bombing of the United States to make sure of our defenses in the Far East even than it is in Europe? In other words, isn't it easier to bomb the western part of the United States from the far eastern parts of Asia and Siberia than it is for Russia to bomb over the other way.

General **Bradley**. No, sir; I don't think so. I think you can best answer that by taking a globe and measuring distances over the top, and I don't think you will find that the distances from the Far East, as you call it, Vladivostok, for example, to San Francisco or Los Angeles, I don't think those are as short as some other possible routes of approach.

Senator **Saltonstall**. But Japan and Okinawa and Formosa and the Philippines are important bulwarks of defense to keep any possible enemy from getting any closer to the United States.

General **Bradley**. Yes, indeed.

Senator **Saltonstall**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Green.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR PROGRAM ON DURATION OF WAR IN KOREA

Senator **Green**. I would like to ask a couple of questions which I think have already been answered several times, but not directly. They relate to the proposal to establish a naval blockade along the Chinese coast and to bomb the coastal cities or military establishments. I think it has been brought out clearly that that is waging war, is it not?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir; I believe that a blockade is normally taken as an act of war. It certainly could be one anyway, and a blockade in this case would not only affect China but it would affect Port Arthur, which is a Russian port, and Hong Kong, which is a British port, and our view, that is the Joint Chiefs of Staff view, has been that for a blockade to be effective, a naval blockade, it should be a United Nations blockade and not a United States blockade.

Senator **Green**. That is not just the point that I wanted to bring out. It is this: If that is waging war against China and possibly against Russia, since I understand the Russo-Chinese Treaty calls for mutual action in case of attack on either one, would it shorten the fighting in the Far East, if you took this action in China, rather than confining it to Korea alone? The argument has been made for this action, that it would shorten the fighting in Korea.

General BRADLEY. Well, there is a possibility that you might affect the fighting in Korea and thus shorten the campaign there by extending your bombardment into Manchuria, your attack on coastal cities, and your blockade. You certainly would cut down the supplies, both strategic and otherwise going into China, and it might have the shortening effect on the operations in Korea. However, it has been our experience heretofore that air action in itself is not decisive and, therefore, you are taking steps which, while they might affect the operations in Korea, there is no assurance that they will be decisive and, at the same time, what worries us most is you are running a risk of starting world war III, and extending the conflict rather than shortening the one you have now.

Senator GREEN. In other words, it would be more likely to prolong than to shorten the fighting in general, even if the fighting in Korea were terminated?

General BRADLEY. When you consider the possibility of getting Russia into it, and weigh that against the effect it might have on the operations in Korea only, and also take into consideration the fact that taking this action might also cause our bases to be attacked, it is pretty hard to say that it would shorten it. In fact, it might very much prolong it and go into a world war III.

Nobody knows. The fact remains that we, at this time, do not think we should take that chance.

Senator GREEN. But you say it might develop into world war III. In that case would it not be more likely to develop in case we provoked a war with China than if we limited it to Korea?

General BRADLEY. We think it would, because of certain provisions of the Chinese-Russian Treaty. They have a mutual defense pact, and so forth. We have not attacked China itself. We have attacked Chinese troops in Korea, yes, but we have not attacked China itself; and the provisions of that treaty then do not necessarily have to come into effect.

But if you attack China itself, then they might claim that they had been attacked and, therefore, Russia must come to their aid. Whether she would or not, no one knows.

Senator GREEN. Thank you. That is what I wanted to bring out; that there was more likelihood that it would develop into a third world war if we did that, than if we pursued our present policy.

General BRADLEY. We think it would be more apt to.

Senator GREEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

DISTRIBUTION OF NOTES AT WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator KNOWLAND. General, did you prepare the notes of the Wake Island conference?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you classify them as top secret?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. How many copies were made of the Wake Island report?

General BRADLEY. Fifty, I believe.

Senator KNOWLAND. Have you furnished the list of names of those to whom those Wake Island notes were furnished?

We requested that prior to the opening of the hearings.

General BRADLEY. When they asked me yesterday, I told them to go ahead and furnish it. I don't know where they are right now.

Colonel CLIFTON. They were being sent to Mr. Larkin's office to be transmitted to the committee.

General BRADLEY. We sent them to Mr. Larkin yesterday to be transmitted to the committee here.

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to thank you. It has been somewhat delayed, but I wanted to make some inquiries about that phase of the matter.

General BRADLEY. I may be able to answer your specific questions, because I remember where quite a number of them went.

Senator KNOWLAND. How many went to the Defense Establishment?

General BRADLEY. Five went to each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—or to the Chief of Staff of the three services; that is, 15; some went to Mr. Pace, I think 5; and some went to the White House——

Senator KNOWLAND. How many?

General BRADLEY. Well, you are taxing my memory a little too much, right now.

I think it was five.

The list will be up here——

Chairman RUSSELL. I might say I have just sent out to find out whether it is available.

Senator KNOWLAND. We will pursue that in the second round of questions, if necessary.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will know, in just a minute.

PREPARATION OF NOTES ON WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator KNOWLAND. General, at the time the Wake Island conference was being held, the actual conference was under way, did you know that Ambassador Jessup's secretary was taking notes behind the partition?

General BRADLEY. No. May I explain that fully, because——

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. I think that explanation is needed.

General BRADLEY. At the time the conference at Wake Island was proposed, the President first said he wanted to take all of the Chiefs of Staff. We thought it would be very bad for all four of the Chiefs to be out of Washington at one time, in one place, with a war going on in Korea; so, after we called this to the President's attention, he agreed to let me go along as the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and let me report back to them.

Consequently, I took notes during the conference. My executive, Colonel Matthews, took notes. Colonel Hamblen, representing the Defense Department, in the office of—he carries on the occupation duties—took notes. Various people took notes, around the table, because this was a historic and important conference and I had to report back to the Joint Chiefs.

After the meeting was all over, and we went into the next room, I was very surprised to find that Miss Anderson had been taking down these notes; as she said afterward, I believe, it was just more or less automatically.

I was very surprised to find that she had taken down quite a bit of conversation, and was able to fill in some of the notes that Mr. Jessup had taken, Mr. Rusk, Colonel Matthews of my office, and myself; so we took all of those notes that each of us had taken, and we compiled what we called or thought was a rather complete report of the meeting.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, General, I find it a little difficult, and have some incredulity to understand how, on an island where there are other civilians located, and where the President of the United States is very closely guarded by the Secret Service, and I understand there were Secret Service men along on this trip—how someone could be placed behind a partition, without the responsible people in this conference knowing about it.

Suppose it had been an assassin behind the partition? Do you mean to tell me that, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as the chief military adviser of the President of the United States, that someone was surreptitiously taking notes behind the partition, and you had no knowledge of it at the time?

General BRADLEY. It was not behind a partition. There were two rooms in the building. The door was open between the two rooms.

True, the building was guarded. It was a building set way out on the island, nowhere near any other building.

Miss Anderson was part of the party. She was Mr. Jessup's secretary and accompanied him to help on stenographic work while they were on the trip, and no one ever questioned her being in the building because she was a Government employee, and a trusted one and, I suppose, cleared for very top secret matters, otherwise she wouldn't be working in Mr. Jessup's office.

WISDOM OF NOTE TAKING AT WAKE ISLAND

Senator KNOWLAND. General, to your personal knowledge, did the President of the United States know that there was a stenographer in the next room?

General BRADLEY. Not that I know of. We went to the building first, while he and General MacArthur were having their private conference; and then he came into the building, and whether he saw her there or not, I don't know.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, doesn't it strike you as being a rather audacious thing, when we are talking about the confidential communications and privileged communications of a President, that there should be someone eavesdropping in the next room, taking a verbatim report of what the President of the United States said, what the Supreme Commander in the Far East said, what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, in a meeting which was so important that you personally classified the document as top secret, without you, or presumably the President, or—certainly General MacArthur testified, without his knowledge, notes were being taken by someone in the next room?

Doesn't that strike you as being a rather unusual procedure; and if that meeting was so important, it was a very important meeting in which top secret information was being requested, wouldn't it have been far more fitting to have had a stenotype operator in the room so that each of the participants of the conference would know that the notes were being taken?

General BRADLEY. It doesn't strike me as being too unusual that she was there.

As I have said, we would have had practically as full notes without hers. It was very helpful to have them checked from hers, but we had made notes ourselves, in longhand. Everybody saw us making the notes. We all had pads, around the table, as you have, here. We all took notes at the time, and we would have been able to put them together in about the same way.

Senator KNOWLAND. Outside of Mr. Jessup, to your own knowledge, did anyone know that there was someone in the next room surreptitiously taking the notes?

General BRADLEY. Not that I know of. Maybe someone else did; I didn't.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was there a wire recording made of the conversations at Wake Island?

General BRADLEY. No.

DISCUSSION OF FORMOSA AT WAKE ISLAND

Senator KNOWLAND. What was your interpretation of the President's remarks that he and MacArthur were in complete agreement relative to Formosa at the time he made that statement, at the big meeting at Wake Island?

General BRADLEY. I just assumed that in their hour's conversation together they had reached an understanding between the two.

Senator KNOWLAND. When did you first learn that the strategic importance of Formosa and the general situation on Formosa was not even discussed at Wake Island?

General BRADLEY. I don't know that yet; because I don't know what was discussed between the President and General MacArthur.

Senator KNOWLAND. General MacArthur testified here that the strategic importance of Formosa was not discussed; that, in effect, what the situation was—that the President indicated he had his views, that General MacArthur had his views, and therefore the matter was not placed on the agenda and the matter was not discussed.

General BRADLEY. The matter was not discussed at the big meeting which I attended.

What was said between the two, I don't know.

Senator KNOWLAND. But your impression was, at that time, that Formosa had been fairly thoroughly discussed, and the general and the President had come to a complete agreement?

Is that what you understood from the President's statement?

General BRADLEY. I assumed that they had discussed it.

Senator KNOWLAND. If, as the President now states, he first decided to fire MacArthur as a result of the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter, which dealt with the strategic importance of Formosa, and that issue alone; and the President states that he went to Wake Island to try and bring about an understanding, how would you account for the fact that Formosa was not the subject of widespread conversation on Wake Island?

General BRADLEY. I have said, I don't know what was said about Formosa on Wake Island.

DISCUSSION OF THE LETTER TO VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, the President, in his press conference of last Thursday, indicated that for about a year he had had in mind the necessity of changing generals. That was modified on the following day by Mr. Short, the Presidential secretary, saying that he was speaking in general terms regarding a year, but that the exact date that set off the chain reaction was the letter of General MacArthur to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which came in late August, as you might recall.

Now if that is correct, did you attend the meeting at the White House attended by Secretary Johnson when the President first received word of the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember. I remember some discussion about the letter but I don't remember just what conferences are connected with it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, do you recall the incident, General, when the Supreme Commander in the Far East in late August of 1950——

General BRADLEY. Yes, I recall the letter.

Senator KNOWLAND. Sent a letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars?

General BRADLEY. And I recall the fact that the President let it be known at that time that he was displeased with it and I believe directed General MacArthur to recall it. What conferences were held on it back last August, I am sorry, I don't remember.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, weren't you called to the White House along with Secretary Johnson at the time that the President directed that the letter be withdrawn?

General BRADLEY. I don't know. I might have been because I think the message finally went out through the Joint Chiefs of Staff message center.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you check your records, General—you keep fairly good records—on the fact whether or not on the 26th day of August or the 25th day of August of last year you and Secretary Johnson were called to the White House or to the Blair House at the time the President first received a copy of this Veterans of Foreign Wars letter, and at which time the President directed either you or Secretary Johnson or both to send a message to General MacArthur directing him to withdraw his communication to the Veterans of Foreign Wars?

General BRADLEY. I will check that. I know that the matter came up for discussion and that a message finally went out to withdraw the letter, but I am sorry, I can't remember offhand any conferences in connection with it.

I just remember that the President indicated his displeasure and ordered its withdrawal.

Senator KNOWLAND. So far as you know, and based on your present recollections, did the President at these conference indicate that he was annoyed enough to be thinking of the removal of General MacArthur at that time?

General BRADLEY. I don't recall any such. I don't think that he would have stated that.

As a matter of fact, the only time that I heard him say that he had made up his mind was when he made his decision on Monday, April 8 or 9, whichever it was, that is when he made his decision known and that is the first time that I had heard he made the decision.

WHO NOTIFIED BRADLEY OF PRESIDENT'S THINKING ON APRIL 5, 1951

Senator KNOWLAND. Now as I recall your testimony, General, you have previously testified that you did not remember who called you on the phone on April 5 with the first information relative to possible action against General MacArthur; am I correct in that?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, isn't it normal procedure to keep a log in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that there is a record of all telephone conversations with the exception of telephone conversations from the White House?

General BRADLEY. It wouldn't come through the Joint Staff. It would come into my office. There is a record kept there, but the record is not kept of those coming in over the White House phone. No record is kept of notes brought in to me from any member of my staff or of any message given me—oral message given me—by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator KNOWLAND. If the call came over the White House phone no record would be kept——

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). In your log.

Would you recall if Mr. Harriman called you?

General BRADLEY. Beg pardon?

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you think you would recall if the call had come in from Mr. Harriman over the White House phone?

General BRADLEY. I think I would, because I seldom talk to Mr. Harriman over the phone.

STATE DEPARTMENT VIEWS ON STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, in November–December of 1949 did the Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs advise the State Department that Formosa had no strategic value?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. We have always had the view that Formosa had very considerable strategic value, if held by the enemy. We have always said it did not have sufficient strategic value to justify our occuping it by our own troops.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was the same general position you took regarding Korea, that Korea was not a place you would pick to fight a major war, is that generally correct?

General BRADLEY. We have said that about Korea; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I call your attention to the fact that on December 23, 1949, the Department of State put out a confidential bulletin to its representatives overseas which held, and I quote, "Formosa has no special military significance," and again——

Senator WILEY. What date?

Senator KNOWLAND. December 23, 1949. This was a confidential memo put out by the Department of State.

It also said in that same communication, "largely because of the mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to the United States defense in the Pacific."

Now, I understand from your testimony that the Joint Chiefs have always felt that Formosa had a strategic importance. You have testified that you believed that it would be detrimental to our national interest to have Formosa in unfriendly hands; General Douglas MacArthur has testified to the same thing. He has also testified that insofar as he knows there was no responsible naval or air or military commander in the Far Pacific who did not agree with that point of view, and Secretary Marshall has testified that in his judgment it would be detrimental to the national defense of this country to have Formosa fall into unfriendly hands.

Would you know, General, of your own knowledge, who was advising the State Department as to the strategic importance of Formosa when they issued such a statement?

General BRADLEY. I wouldn't know. I have stated the military point of view.

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON ENTERING KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator KNOWLAND. General, going to the Blair House conference of June 25, on Sunday, did you attend that meeting?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you indicate to the committee who else attended the meeting on the 25th of June?

General BRADLEY. I doubt if my memory would permit me to give all of them. I can tell you some.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, could I call the roll and see if you can recall any of them?

General BRADLEY. I know the Chiefs——

Senator KNOWLAND. Secretary Acheson?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAN. Secretary Johnson?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Secretary Pace?

General BRADLEY. I think so, but I am not certain.

Senator KNOWLAND. Secretary Matthews?

General BRADLEY. Navy, you mean?

Senator KNOWLAND. Secretary Symington?

General BRADLEY. I don't know, sir. I think we can look that up for you and have a record of it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Vice President Barkley?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember that he was there.

Senator KNOWLAND. General Bradley?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. General Collins?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. General Vandenberg?

General BRADLEY. I think so. I think he and Admiral Sherman were both there; I think the three Service chiefs were there.

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral Sherman. Who else attended that you can recall at this moment?

General BRADLEY. I think there were two or three other people from the State Department, assistant secretaries.

Senator KNOWLAND. Dean Rusk?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember who they were.

Senator KNOWLAND. But you thought there were two or three other people?

General BRADLEY. Two or three other people from the State Department.

Senator KNOWLAND. I see.

Would your notes show who attended that meeting?

General BRADLEY. I don't think so, but I think Admiral Sherman kept a note of who was there.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you secure that information for the committee?

General BRADLEY. I think I could.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right.

Now, at that meeting at which time this country was placed into the Korean War, could you indicate what the conclusions of the spokesmen for the State Department were at that time?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; no, sir. I don't remember them, in the first place.

Senator KNOWLAND. And in the second place?

General BRADLEY. I wouldn't attempt to state them here unless I could remember them, and then we would get right back into the same question.

Senator KNOWLAND. Not even the conclusions?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't remember the conclusions of any individual at that time.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, had it not been the policy of the Department of Defense, prior to the 24th day of June, that Korea was not the most desirable place to become involved in a war?

General BRADLEY. We had said it was not the place to fight a major war.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you give the conclusions as expressed at the Blair House meeting of June 25 of the spokesman of the Defense Department, Secretary Johnson?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't remember what was said by any individual at that time, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would Admiral Sherman's notes indicate the conclusions? I am not asking for the personal conversations now; I am just asking for the conclusions——

General BRADLEY. I don't know.

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). Of the several departments.

General BRADLEY. I don't know whether he has such notes or not.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you inquire of Admiral Sherman?

General BRADLEY. I think he will be before your committee, and you might ask him that question.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I thought, perhaps, you might inquire before he gets before us.

General BRADLEY. Well, anything that he would——

Senator KNOWLAND. Because you are the chief military adviser to the President, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

General BRADLEY. Yes, but any notes he kept would be his own, and he would be better qualified to testify to their accuracy than I would.

CONCLUSIONS OF BLAIR HOUSE MEETING OF JUNE 25, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. And could you give your own conclusions, as expressed at the Blair House meeting of June 25?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I suppose—on what basis?

General BRADLEY. In the first place, I don't remember them verbatim. There was a considerable discussion, the pros and cons.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, I am not asking for your conversations. I am only asking for your conclusions as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of this Government at a conference on the 25th of June, wherein these people believe this country was involved in a war, entirely regardless of the desirability or lack of desirability of going in and without a declaration of war by the Congress or a resolution by the Congress stating that a state of war already exists.

All I am trying to find out is that inasmuch as apparently the prior decision of the military authorities was reversed, and the country was placed into a war in which there have already been over 65,000 casualties, which is the fourth largest war in our history, with more casualties than those combined in the War of the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War; and I merely am now requesting, not your personal conversations, but the conclusions you expressed as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that placed us in the Korean War.

General BRADLEY. Well, in the first place, I want to assure you I am just as much concerned about casualties as anybody else in this United States. I went through the last war and suffered with a lot of casualties in my command. I always tried to fight the battles so I would have a minimum of casualties.

I would like to make it plain I am just as much concerned about casualties of American boys as anybody else in this United States.

In the second place, I honestly do not remember the conclusions reached by any of us. I know the decision reached at that meeting was that we would furnish air and naval power to try to get our nationals out of Korea.

With that decision I was in full accord.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was a meeting of the 25th and the over-all conclusion reached was we would furnish air and naval power to get our civilians out of Korea. There was a meeting at the White House the following day; was there not?

JUNE 26, 1950, BLAIR HOUSE MEETING

General BRADLEY. I believe there was one on the 26th.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you attend that meeting?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Can you recall who else attended that meeting on the 26th?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; and in general it was the same group as before—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representatives of the State Department, including the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, can you give first the over-all conclusion of that meeting, as to how far we should go? The previous day we having determined to use our air and naval power to get the American civilian personnel out of Korea, what were the general conclusions of the meeting of the 26th?

STEPS TAKEN IN BEGINNING OF KOREAN CONFLICT

General **Bradley.** I cannot remember specific dates. There were various steps. The first step was to help get our nationals out of Korea.

The second step was to let the Air try to give support to the South Koreans in stopping the aggression.

A still later decision was made to let them operate north of the thirty-eighth parallel as well as south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

At a still later date the decision was made to commit ground troops, first to protect the bases from which we were trying to evacuate our nationals and later on to let those troops—the decision was made to let those troops participate in trying to stop the aggression.

That was a series of meetings; I don't remember the dates of each one of them.

Senator **Knowland.** Well, would your records show or would Admiral Sherman's records show the dates on which this series of meetings took place, which step by step involved us deeper into the Korean War, and would they show who attended each of those meetings?

General **Bradley.** I have no record of it, I don't know whether he has or not.

Senator **Knowland.** It is customary, is it not, for somebody in the Military Establishment when they attend a meeting of this importance to indicate and have a memo as to who attended?

General **Bradley.** Yes; normally we do, particularly if it is one of our regular meetings around our own building.

Senator **Knowland.** Well, do you know of any meetings since VJ-day that have been any more important than the Blair House meeting of June 25 and the subsequent meetings which put this country into war?

General **Bradley.** Probably not. We did not know it at the time, however.

MAC ARTHUR LETTER TO THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS AND FORMOSA

Senator **Knowland.** Now going back to the letter that General MacArthur wrote to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in late August of 1950, which on August 26 the President through either Secretary Johnson or yourself directed General MacArthur to withdraw, had substantially that same information been made available to the Defense Department prior to that time, relative to General MacArthur's views on the strategic importance of Formosa?

General **Bradley.** I believe so. I think that we knew that General MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff had the same general view about the importance of Formosa. But that was not the question. It was a question that our Government had made a clear decision. As I stated in my opening remarks before this committee, we provide the military point of view. We realize that may not be the Government's decision, and when the Government makes a decision we abide by that decision, realizing that there are considerations other than military involved in making the decision.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, let's go back to this letter that General MacArthur wrote to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. I have read the letter and I have reread the letter, and I hope to during the noon hour, so if we get into a second round of questioning we can examine this situation a little further. As I read the letter it deals with nothing except the strategic importance of Formosa.

Now you have testified that you believe it is strategically important; the Joint Chiefs, you had said, believe it is strategically important; the Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Marshall, has testified that it is strategically important; the President of the United States apparently on June 26 or 27 thought it was strategically important enough to put the Seventh Fleet in there to prevent it from being attacked and to neutralize it, as they say. Now in August, after all of those things had taken place, the Supreme Commander in the Far East writes to a veterans organization and all he says in the letter is that the island is strategically important and in the interests of this country it should not be allowed to pass into Communist hands. Now what in the letter of General MacArthur, in view of the testimony before this committee, do you believe violated either American policy or sound military strategy?

General BRADLEY. I haven't read the letter for a long time and I don't know, but I didn't make the decision in the first place. The President made the decision that he didn't like the letter and directed it withdrawn.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now either you or Secretary Johnson—and I was under the impression that both you and Secretary Johnson went to the White House—did Secretary Johnson indicate to the President that these views that General MacArthur expressed in his letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars had heretofore been known to the Defense Department?

General BRADLEY. Will you restate your question?

Senator KNOWLAND. I said, did Secretary Johnson when he went to the White House indicate to the President that the views which General MacArthur expressed in his VFW letter had previously been made known in substantially the same form to the Defense Establishment?

General BRADLEY. Whether he did or not I don't remember.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I do ask, though I realize it cannot be printed at this point, that in the appendix of the record, even though it is in our side booklet, that the full text of General MacArthur's letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars be printed in the appendix of the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. The matter referred to by the Senator from California will appear in the appendix.

(The document above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Senator KNOWLAND. I hope, General, if you have time over the noon hour, that you will read the letter because frankly I think that General MacArthur thought he was expressing the policy of the Government and the military authorities of this country when he said that Formosa should not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands, and I have not been able to find out anything in the letter, unless somewhere in the Government there was a desire to let Formosa be turned over to the Communists; that is the only possible explanation you could have as to why the letter of General MacArthur to the VFW should have set off this chain reaction which the President now says led to his ultimate dismissal, and if you would read the letter and be prepared to comment on it, I would appreciate it very much.

General Bradley. I will read the letter. I don't know what my opinion would be worth on it, because as I say, the President made the decision it was against his policy, not myself making that decision.

Chairman Russell. Senator Knowland, I am afraid your time is up.

Senator Knowland. All right, we will pick this up on the second round.

Chairman Russell. Senator Hickenlooper.

CASUALTY LISTS

Senator Hickenlooper. General Bradley, General Marshall testified the other day that he was very much distressed each morning when the latest up-to-the-minute casualty lists were put on his desk. I take it you see the casualty list every day, the numbers?

General Bradley. Yes, practically every day.

Senator Hickenlooper. Composite reports. What is the sum total of all casualties up to this particular date, regardless of whether the next of kin have been notified or not?

I noticed in Sunday's paper that the list as of May 11 of those whose next of kin had been notified according to the newspaper dispatch was 65,000. I am asking you what is the total complete up to this morning's number of American casualties in Korea regardless of whether the next of kin have been notified or not?

General Bradley. I don't know them, Senator. I was told that General Marshall had made arrangements to furnish your committee with a statement each week bringing them up to date during the time you were in session, and I saw the last one he sent up here, and I do not remember the particular ones, in fact I haven't seen them this morning——

Senator Hickenlooper. What were they yesterday, General, the total up to yesterday morning's report?

General Bradley. I didn't see the total yesterday. I saw the total for the last several days, but I was interested more in the fighting at this particular time than the totals up to date.

Senator Hickenlooper. What I am trying to get at is a round figure as nearly as possible of the up-to-date list. The casualty lists have always been 2 to 3 weeks late and then they say that those are only the ones whose next of kin have been notified.

I think this committee—whether it desires to make it public or not is a totally different thing—has a right to know what the casualty lists are up to this date regardless of notification of next of kin.

General Bradley. I can get those for you tomorrow morning, but I do not have them with me today.

Senator Hickenlooper. I understood General Marshall to say that the lists were laid on his desk every morning, and I know we all feel the same way about seeing those lists every morning.

General Bradley. I do not get the totals every morning. I get those about once a week. I get the reports on the casualties of the last few days during this heavy fighting which I am interested in, to see how the fighting is going.

RECENT CASUALTIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many casualties have we suffered in total in the last 10 days?

General BRADLEY. The total American casualties from the 16th to the 20th of this offensive, the 16th of May to the 20th, a total of 882 killed and wounded. It does not include missing which we do not have a full report on yet because some of those keep coming back.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And the dispatches in the paper say that casualties of that small number, we killed seventy to eighty thousand of the assaulting forces.

Chairman CONNALLY. Not killed. Casualties.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the headlines say seventy to eighty thousand. I do not have the headlines here, but you do not have the list on the missing?

General BRADLEY. No, sir, I do not have. It varies from day to day. Ones reported missing one day will probably be very much in use the next as they work their way back through.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the last report I saw in the papers was for May 11 as I recall it, in Sunday's paper, and I feel that the casualty lists as reported to the public are continuously misleading, that is, they report 2 or 3 weeks back and they say that these are the ones where the next of kin have been notified and so on.

There may be a sound reason for not releasing names until the next of kin have been notified.

PRESENT OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

General Bradley, we have had a great deal of discussion about this action in Korea, and I thoroughly realize that our general objective is peace, peace and victory, but just specifically what is our objective in Korea?

What are we attempting to do in Korea? We want to defeat the enemy, yes, but how are we going to do it? What is our objective and what do we consider a victory or a defeat of the enemy?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think that is a very fair question, and I think it is one that has bothered the people. We have tried to stop this aggression and not appease in the matter, and in doing so we have gotten mixed up in a pretty good fight.

From the military point of view we hope that by inflicting severe casualties on the enemy and proving to them that they are not invincible, that they cannot gain anything by aggressive action, that it is too costly a matter, that they have been let down by Russia in getting in it, that they will be willing to negotiate a peace with the United Nations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right, what will that peace consist of? What will the negotiations, what will the basis for the negotiations be?

General BRADLEY. Well, that I don't know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it a part of our objective to drive the Red Chinese and the North Korean armies clear out of North Korea?

General BRADLEY. At the present time that is not our objective.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is our objective? How far do we go? Are we going to the thirty-eighth parallel and stop or are we coming back and stop? Are we going halfway to the Yalu and the border and stop? What is the military and even the diplomatic objective if that is in the military program? What is our objective?

General BRADLEY. We are fighting an action without regard to the thirty-eighth parallel if necessary. In other words, we are not at the present time contained at the thirty-eighth parallel from the military point of view, we are trying to inflict maximum casualties with a minimum to ourselves, so that we can get some kind of a negotiation.

That may take place where we are now, north of it or south of it, but in any case we hope to get a negotiation and a settlement out of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right, what is it from a military standpoint, inasmuch as we have emphasized that considerably here? What will be victory and a satisfactory settlement in Korea?

[Deleted.]

General BRADLEY. That is a political decision and eventually will be a United Nations political decision.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, let's see, one of the military objectives of a military action is to destroy the enemy, is it not, that is to destroy his fighting capability?

General BRADLEY. Yes, one of your objectives.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As far as I can get it, the only program we have is to keep fighting and shooting and suffering casualties in the hope that these fellows in the north, the Chinese, will get tired and pick up their ball and bat and go home and end the game

Now it still appears to me that we have no objectives that I know of except this indeterminate operation with the hope that they will get exhausted, and I am concerned and I think the public is concerned, where are we going? What is our purpose?

General BRADLEY. As I stated, I believe once before, it has been stated here, we have three possible lines of action. Either to get out and forsake South Korea, try to fight it out in general where we are now without committing too great forces, or going to all-out war and committing sufficient forces to drive these people out of Korea.

At the present time we are following the second course.

RISKS CONSIDERED IN JUNE 1950

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now General, you were in on the conferences where the decision was made to send our forces into action in Korea. I believe it has been testified here, that first the Navy and air went in to afford additional protection to those of our own people there and, secondly, to support the United Nations activities to send a ground army in there.

At the time the decision was made to support the sending of a ground army under the command of General MacArthur, was it considered in these conferences leading up to this decision that the Chinese Communists might come in?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it known at that time that there was a military alliance between the Chinese Reds and Russia?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it considered that ground action in event of the defeat or the pushing back of the North Korean Reds and the intervention of the Chinese Communists might bring Russia into this war?

General BRADLEY. It was realized that they might eventually get in; yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was a risk?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You accepted that calculated risk at the time you committed our ground forces—that is, by "you" I mean those who made the decision; first, that the Chinese Reds might come in—and they did come in—and that if the Chinese Reds came in, the Russians might come in.

So that that was all taken into consideration when we committed our resources to Korea; isn't that true?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But we, nevertheless, took the risk?

General BRADLEY. Yes; and I believe it received the approval of all the United Nations, except Russia and her satellites, and I think it received the approval of the majority of the United States, because they realize that one appeasement leads to another, which eventually makes war necessary.

CALCULATED RISK IN BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why don't we take the calculated risk and destroy the potential resupplying ability of the Chinese Reds in Manchuria? Is there an arsenal at Mukden?

General BRADLEY. Yes; there are supply bases at Mukden and some of the others; but that in itself we don't think will be decisive, and as I have stated here before, we think we should try to get a decision otherwise [deleted].

Senator McMAHON. Mr. Chairman.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am perfectly willing——

Senator McMAHON. I have a unanimous-consent request. I have an appointment with the President at 12 o'clock. I will be back here, I assume, at 12:25, and I would like to not lose my place. I would like unanimous consent for that.

Senator KNOWLAND. I certainly would have no objection as long as it is understood that he wouldn't interrupt whoever is then in the process of——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair will not permit a member to be interrupted in his examination. Without objection, the Senator is granted that privilege.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you.

CHINESE USE OF AIR POWER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Bradley, it has been testified to here, I believe, by you and General Marshall, that the Red Chinese have a very substantial number of military aircraft in Manchuria, for instance.

Why haven't they used that aircraft?

General BRADLEY. I wouldn't know, sir.

[Deleted.]

I wouldn't even try to guess other than just what I would do in their case.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aren't the Red Chinese more adept at using ground forces than they are at using aircraft in military action, so far as our evidence indicates?

General BRADLEY. I don't think they are doing very well in either one right now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we have suffered a great many casualties as a result of their action. So they must have been doing something.

In other words, isn't it reasonable to think that they are not using aircraft because they are not adept either with sufficient pilots or sufficient operational facilities, to make the use of aircraft a successful operation, whereas they can furnish unlimited amounts of manpower, subject only to their ability to equip them?

General BRADLEY. I wouldn't know. They certainly have had soldiers over a longer period of time than they have had aircraft.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And is there any reason to believe that they would be much more active with their aircraft if we destroyed a bunch of them on the ground than at the present time? In other words, is there any military reason why they are not using aircraft to attempt to win a victory for themselves?

There must be some reason why they are not using aircraft in order to advance their own positions.

General BRADLEY. Possibly they have some reason for it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You stated, I believe, on Tuesday that it was our objective to inflict maximum punishment on the Communist aggressors. We are not inflicting maximum punishment when we don't destroy their concentrations in Manchuria, across the Yalu, are we, or when we don't destroy their supplies with the strategic Air or the bombers that we have?

General BRADLEY. I also said that we did not want to extend the war beyond Korea, and thereby increase the risk of a world war. I think that was understood in my answer, that we were trying to inflict maximum casualties without extending the war outside of Korea and increasing the chance of war.

JCS JANUARY 12 RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff so-called study—I realize it was not in the form of a directive—but in the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations of January 12 last, as testified to in General Marshall's testimony, I believe, the four points were: Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

General BRADLEY. That has been pushed by the military at all times. As you know, the United Nations have been taking action in it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That has been done. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

Now, I call your attention to the fact that on May 11 you stated that the Joint Chiefs or some of them went over there to Korea on January 12. We have not evacuated Korea and did not evacuate Korea, and you stated that shortly after January 12 the situation became stabilized in Korea.

Your words are from the record on page 1315 at the top of the page:

> Now, the situation became stabilized, in fact, some time after that, did it not?

I beg your pardon. This is Marshall's statement on stabilization, in which he said technically "No," but I believe you stated affirmatively the other day that the situation did become stabilized in Korea. I think those are the exact words you used.

General BRADLEY. I may have, but may I remind you that I stated here before that this January 12 study was a study, it was not a directive.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

General BRADLEY. It was based on a directive sent to part of our staff on the 28th of November to make such a study of objectives and lines of action which should be taken in case we find ourselves in an all-out war with China, declared or undeclared.

As far as we are concerned, when we take up one of these studies we consider all the papers in connection with it, and that paper said these are tentative agreements and——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has that paper been put in the record in full, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. It has with the exception of some two or three items that Secretary Marshall thought involved the national security. He gave most of them for the record, I think. Those are available, Senator, if you wish to see them, I understand, in the security room.

WHY IS OUR ENEMY IN KOREA?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General Bradley, you said we want to confine this war to Korea? Is there any question but what we are at war with the North Chinese Reds? Are they not committing acts of war against us?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; but they are fighting the war in Korea also, and so are we.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are then, of course, picking the theater of operations.

General BRADLEY. No; not necessarily. I think the United Nations took action in Korea, and they came in and met us in Korea, and we were there first.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But someone elected to start this business in Korea.

General BRADLEY. I think we all decided that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The North Koreans started it first, we met it, and then the Chinese Reds came in. Now, is there any question but what the North Chinese Reds are being supported by the Soviet, by Russia?

General BRADLEY. I don't think anyone doubts that they are getting equipment from them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the Russians are backing the North Chinese Reds at least to the extent of vast amounts of equipment; is that not true?

General BRADLEY. I think they are; yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And who do you consider our main enemy in the world today, potentially?

General **Bradley**. I don't know that you could say enemy, but the nation which is causing the most trouble, in fact the one causing the great deal of it, or all the trouble is, of course, Soviet Russia.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I meant to use the word "potential enemy," that is, the greatest potential enemy we have in the world today.

General **Bradley**. And if we get into world war III, she is the nation which must be defeated.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Yes. Now with the Soviet backing the North Chinese Reds and the North Chinese Reds being our enemy in this war have not in effect the Soviets elected at least at this time to make an issue out of this situation in Korea?

General **Bradley**. Apparently; yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. And so by that reasoning we are actually resisting and opposing, although it is not in active military forces necessarily—we are actually opposing the Soviet ambitions in that area, are we not?

General **Bradley**. Yes. It is another point in which we chose to try to stop their aggressive tactics. We did it in the Berlin blockade; we have helped in Greece; we have helped in Europe to keep it from going Communist; and this is another one of those instances in which we are trying to stop the Soviet from gaining control over more manpower and more resources and getting more people under their domination.

SOVIET INTENTIONS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Do you believe that the Soviet will start a third world war merely because it has a treaty to defend Red China against Japan? Do you think they will start it merely because of a treaty or will it start a third world war, if it does, if, as, and when Red Russia feels that the time is propitious?

General **Bradley**. It would be pretty hard to try to guess what the men in the Kremlin are thinking. They have a timetable; they may be willing to step up that timetable to meet certain conditions; and my opinion is the fact that they started this—and I say, I think they started in Korea—the North Koreans started it at their instigation—I think the fact that they started this is an indication that they were in a position now where they were willing to risk war and, therefore, they must be willing to accept it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, they started the Berlin blockade.

General **Bradley**. Yes; but this is a little bit more than——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Two years ago.

General **Bradley** (continuing). The Berlin blockade. I think that is an incident, and this is another one. I wouldn't know, and wouldn't profess to know, what the men in the Kremlin will do under any circumstances. They don't think like we do. Whether or not they would start it only on a timetable or to be induced to step up such timetable, if they had one, no one knows.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. General, if they do not think like we do, then they are probably not going to start a third world war, because we think it is very dangerous that they may start a third world war, if we bomb the supply lines in Manchuria, or if they differ with us——

General **Bradley**. If they thought like us they would be perfectly willing to have world peace, and would not be doing any of this.

WISDOM OF WAR WITH CHINA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But in the light of the fact that Red Russia is in this thing, through supplies and equipment, and backing the Red Chinese, and the Red Chinese are at war with us, I fail to understand your statement the other day, or the comment that, "it is the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

It seems to me that the enemy is involved, and it might be the wrong place. Certainly, war at any time is the wrong time, so far as I am concerned, but where do we expect to fight this war; where is the right time, the right place, and what is the right enemy?

General BRADLEY. I made that remark in connection with going into an all-out war with China. In my opinion, we don't want to get mixed up, devote all our resources to trying to defeat China. If we did, and went to war with China, and sent all our resources there, I think we would be fighting the wrong enemy. I think it would be better to keep some of our resources in case we are jumped by an all-out war, world war, and not have them all committed against China. I think we would be fighting the wrong nation in the wrong war and in the wrong place.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know of no one, General, military or civilian who is of any importance at all who advocates an all-out war with China. That has been talked about a great deal—an all-out war in China. I don't know that anyone is advocating an invasion of the Chinese mainland, but it seems to me that we should adopt some policy which will have more chance of ending this thing than an indecisive policy which leads only to the hope that the Chinese Reds will get tired.

They have not tired of revolution in the last 10 years, and I don't know that they will be tired at this time.

General BRADLEY. Senator, the Chiefs of Staff are unanimous in believing that we should fight this war as we are now fighting it, and try to run it this way.

[Deleted.]

I have full confidence in those three Chiefs, and in addition to the three Chiefs that believe that way, their staffs believe that way.

Now, if we are following the wrong tactics in trying to get a decision, then all of our military people, all of our top people, that are here and who are responsible for world-wide strategy and who have knowledge of our capability are all wrong, and you are right; and I am sorry if we don't agree on it; but we would like to try to make it this way.

POSSIBLE WEAPONS AGAINST RED CHINA'S AGGRESSION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has not General Vandenberg advocated the bombing of Manchurian bases and supply lines?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Sir?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. He does not believe that it would be decisive. If you could go after the centers of production, they then would have something.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the question of decisiveness—there is no particular arm of the services that can be absolutely calculated to be decisive. It is the ground forces, the artillery and the naval forces that we are using now which have not been decisive up to this point.

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But there are weapons which we are not using to disrupt their supply, and to hurt them, that we are not using. I do not think it is a question that any weapon must be absolutely probably decisive in order to warrant its use.

General BRADLEY. I think it boils down, too, to the fact that the military people do not think we should bomb bases in Manchuria. The people who are responsible for making our military policy, none of us, think we should. The fact remains, though, that we would prefer to try to win it this way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Bradley, yesterday for the first time was read into the record the request of General MacArthur for clarification, and I would like, if possible, to put in the full Chiefs of Staff reply of January 12 to General MacArthur's inquiry. I do not believe that has been put in the appendix yet, has it?

General BRADLEY. It was put in yesterday.

Chairman RUSSELL. It has been put in the record. General Bradley read it on yesterday. I am sorry, Senator Hickenlooper, your time has expired.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

Senator HUNT. General Bradley, it would be, I am sure, a repetition for me to attempt to even remotely touch on a few of the many questions that have already been answered so many times.

I think, for all practical purposes in this hearing, certainly for anybody who cares to read, they can see, and I think if anybody cares to listen, they could certainly hear, and they should now have a very clear understanding of the differences of opinion with reference to the conduct of the Korean War, that exist between General MacArthur, on the one hand, and the present field generals and the Chiefs of Staff and yourself and the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the three branches, on the other hand.

UNITED STATES PREPAREDNESS FOR ANOTHER WAR

However, I think—and I do think this is important, General—that the effects, the results of a third world war on this country have not as yet been completely explored. They have not been explained in detail, or have not been discussed, and I do not think they are in the record so far in this hearing—only in a very meager way.

Now, General, in the event we should start world war III, we must expect, for we would be inviting, an immediate offense against this country on the part of Russia, and I want to ask you some questions with reference to what we should anticipate, and expect, with special reference to one phase of modern warfare, and that is namely, the bombing of the United States by Russian air forces.

I have before me here a report of proceedings of a hearing that was held before the Armed Services Committee on April 16, and as a basis for the questions I want to read briefly from the statement of General Cabell. He said:

> Mr. Chairman, there is no single development in the postwar period that has been more charged with significance for the security of the United States than

steps taken by the Soviet Union to build a stockpile of atomic bombs and an air arm capable of delivering them against the United States.

Now, General, at this hearing, we were briefed by General Cabell, who is Director of Intelligence for the United States Air Force, and a gentleman by the name of Lester Kullenberg, who is Director of Operational Research Division of the Civilian Defense Administration, and Mr. James J. Wadsworth, who spoke very briefly. I believe he is a deputy to General Cabell.

Now, this testimony on their part is highly classified, and I mention that for the reason that the censor of these hearings, if he wishes to do so, will delete the questions and answers that I am going to ask you, from the record, if he thinks they should be deleted.

To refresh the memory of some of the gentlemen seated around the table here, present were our chairman, Senator Russell, Senator Stennis, Senators Long, Saltonstall, Knowland, Flanders, and myself; also present were Senator Carl Hayden and Col. James F. Pinkney, I believe, United States Air Force.

General **Bradley**. Well, again, Senator, I have never made a detailed study. These people in the civil defense have, and the people here interested in the effects of bombs and development of the sizes of them certainly go into that. Whether or not those figures are accurate within 1 percent or 10 percent, I wouldn't know. But I think we must all realize that Russia has the bomb. How many we can only estimate from certain sources of information. She has the ability to deliver them. She has planes with the necessary range to deliver them. We do not have the ability to stop all of them. In fact it is almost impossible that any sized defense air force can stop all bombing. They couldn't do it in Germany, they couldn't do it in England when Germany bombed London. So I think we must admit they have the bomb, they can deliver it, and some of them would get through.

We also know that the bomb is very destructive, will kill a lot of people, will be very destructive to industry.

We also must concede that they have every means of finding out where our industries are. They must have a very fine target folder for each one of them, and that should enable them to deliver the bombs on the target.

So I think all of us will concede that with these facts a third world war in which the A-bomb is used extensively will be more severe, more destructive, and more terrible and awful, if you want to use that word, than any previous war has been. I think we can get some examples of that by the two that we dropped during the war and even by comparing the results of some of our conventional bombing, which you can get in terms of kilotons, also just how destructive bombing can be.

[Deleted.]

I wish we could feel sure that Russia realized the destructiveness of these bombs, as well as we do, and would consent to a period of peace.

Apparently they are not willing to do so, and their announced intention today is to some day rule the world. They have announced that capitalism and communism cannot exist in the world together.

Now, whether or not we can avoid a war by a deterrent like the A-bomb, and by building up our strength long enough to let them change their minds and get in a new regime—maybe the man following Stalin will have a falling-out with somebdoy else and by some kind of a turn-over we will have a condition where they will abandon their presently announced intention.

And, that is one reason I am of the opinion we should always try to avoid war as long as possible, with the hope that in the end, we will avoid it altogether.

[Deleted.]

RISKS IN BOMBING MANCHURIA AND BLOCKADING CHINA

Senator HUNT. A few minutes ago the Senator from Iowa, Senator Hickenlooper, asked you, I think, this question. The wording may not be quite the same. He said, "Why don't we take the calculated risk of going into Manchuria?"

I think what I have just given you with reference to what might happen in a bombing attack would probably be a good answer to why we do not take the calculated risk of going in and bombing Manchuria at the present time. Would that be an answer to the Senator's question?

General BRADLEY. I think in a way yes, because as I have stated here several times, we are trying to fight this war in such a way as to avoid a world war III, and of course if you don't avoid world war III and actually have it come upon you, you must look forward to destructive attacks on the United States.

Senator HUNT. Now General Bradley, one more question. You mentioned this morning about the blockading of China ports, and I think from your testimony that you feel that might start a third world war. Whether it would start a third world war or not, it would certainly call for retaliation of the bombing of our ships in that area as well as making them a prey for Chinese submarines. Would that be a true statement?

General BRADLEY. Well, that is a possibility, yes. Whether or not they would actually do it no one knows. We do know that China has certain air forces and certain submarines.

I think it is reasonable to assume that she would certainly give consideration at least to using them aaginst any of your ships if you tried to blockade the coast of China. Whether she would or not, she would have to decide.

Senator HUNT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

USEFULNESS OF THE HEARINGS

Senator TOBEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I have an observation I would like to make, if it is in order.

I have not attended as many of these meetings as most of you have, but I am impressed with the futility of much that is going on here and very definitely so. Here are a lot of men, well-intentioned men, with absolutely no military training or gumption or common sense coming in here to pose questions to men whose life-long service has been in the military and naval establishments and the air force of this country.

We have got the whole country by the ears putting out bulletins. Mr. Stalin subscribes to it day after day. We are wisely holding closed hearings over open hearings, against the ill-advisement of some members of this committee who insisted upon the hearings being opened.

And so what are we doing? We are getting opinions. We are asking questions many of them being very, very piddling, if I can use that word. Here we have the country looking upon us a little askance of what is going to come over the Congress of the United States and the Nation.

When we get all through Mr. MacArthur will still be deposed from his position, Mr. Marshall will still be the man in charge of the defense of this country, the Joint Chiefs will still be the same as they are now, but some men will have gratified their passion and desire to ask pointed questions to try to stir the animals up, and men, while the situation goes on from bad to worse, and men are dying in Korea.

I fail to see the value of holding the test tube up to the light of day, and I would like to have somebody point it out for the good of the country and the good of the Congress and the good of the service.

I listened to my friend, Mr. Hunt, a few minutes ago give his statement about the eminent authority, and before God the picture he drew makes me stand aghast. Tomorrow or the next day, the month after that this thing may descend on this country and what will we look like then in the face of all these things that may happen?

Let us get on to ourselves and be strong and forget the little piddling stuff and the gratification of asking questions and mixing up the gears and throwing sand in the gear box.

And I want to say also as a Republican that in my honest judgment we may not realize it ourselves, we Republicans and we Democrats, but there is a very distinct political trend in a lot of these hearings, subconsciously at least.

I think the whole thing is unfortunate.

I wish we could ring the curtain down, for the good of the country, and the men in the service in Korea, for generations to come.

That is all I have to say. I speak frankly; I feel that way.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think anyone will challenge your frankness, Senator.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, I am one of those impatient persons to whom you made reference in your opening statement, and I believe your reference was valid.

My impatience, however, I believe to be justified and legitimate, for it has resulted from four developing convictions, and I wish to state them in order that I may ask you some questions.

Again, may I hope that you can change those convictions of mine?

The first of these convictions is that on the basis of its conduct in recent years, and in Korea, I individually am convinced that the free world is full of fear, which I believe to be unjustified, and is much less determined to save itself than the aggressor is determined to destroy our free world.

Secondly, from what you, and others, and the record tells me, I am becoming convinced that the United Nations, which includes the United States, entered the Korean conflict without giving any reasonable consideration to the risks, hazards, and likely consequences which were obvious and recognizable last June;

Thirdly, I am convinced that the free nations of the world are on the defensive everywhere, and that the power of decision, choice, and initiative have been defaulted by the free nations to Russia; and

Fourthly, because of what you and General Marshall have testified, and because of what the administration constantly repeats, I am convinced that we are unnecessarily inciting Russia to wage war against us by notifying Russia that the free nations will not be prepared for a show-down until 1953, or later.

ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS IN KOREA SITUATION IN JUNE 1950

Against that background, sir, I offer some questions.

May I ask if the President of the United States requested an estimate of the situation from the JCS, or from the National Security Council, before our Air, Navy, and Ground Forces were committed in Korea last June?

General BRADLEY. As to a formal estimate of the situation, no.

Senator CAIN. May I ask, General Bradley, if the President requested a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or did he merely seek information concerning the capabilities of our forces to accomplish the mission which the President and the United Nations were to give those forces?

General BRADLEY. As I remember, we gave the capabilities of our forces, as to what they could do.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, did the President request, from the JCS, or from the National Security Council, an estimate of the requirements to be demanded by the Korean mission in those Blair House conferences?

What I am endeavoring to find out, sir, and you are a highly qualified and respected witness, is—what were we thinking about when we entered that conflict so rapidly in June; and therefore, I wish to find out whether or not the President requested of his chief military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what forces, in the opinion of the JCS, would be required to carry out the Korean mission?

General BRADLEY. I think I answered that once before, in a way; and that is—that we did not try to estimate the total required to start with, because we didn't know what was involved. No one believed that the North Koreans were as strong as they turned out to be.

In other words, from the information we had, you might say we underestimated their numbers, and their equipment and their ability to fight—at least to start with.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir?

General BRADLEY. When we made the Inchon landing, and cracked their defenses open, why, then, they were pretty much the way we thought they would be at first; and possibly our first estimate was wrong only in the fact that they had such numbers they would swarm around our flanks; so that I don't think you can say that any of us knew, to start, when we went into this thing, what would be involved.

It was a piecemeal commitment, because that was the only way we could commit them. We had to take them out of Japan. The units were understrength, and so we had to send them in as we could get those units ready and get them over to Korea.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General Bradley, I understood you to say, in answer to my first question, that the President did not, in late June, request a formal estimate of the Korean situation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General **Bradley**. That is right—a formal statement, you know, where you sit down and write out and consider all the pros and cons, and come up with a very formal estimate.

Senator **Cain**. Is that to say, General Bradley, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal military advisors to the President, were not provided with an opportunity to discuss the situation, which had involved in it, the possible entry into the conflict of Red China, and then, of Russia?

General **Bradley**. Senator, you are asking about a formal estimate. We certainly did discuss, orally, what troops we had available, how quickly they could be used, what supplies were available to them—that was all discussed orally.

Your question was about a formal estimate.

Senator **Cain**. Yes, sir; but I am very curious as to whether or not any consideration was given in June to the problems which are of such great concern to you, the JCS, to the President, to the Congress, and to the people today.

RISKS CONSIDERED IN JUNE 1950

We are faced today from your testimony and that of other qualified witnesses with the possibility of entry into the conflict of Russia. We know that Red China has been in that conflict for a number of months, and I ask the question as to whether or not consideration was given to those possibilities before we committed ourselves to Korea last June?

General **Bradley**. Yes; I think both of those possibilities were considered at that time in meeting the North Korean thrust only as they advanced toward the south of Korea. I know my own opinion was—and I think it was pretty generally held—that the chance of Russia or China coming into the war in South Korea was rather remote. There was that possibility, and it was considered, but we did not think they would come into the fighting in South Korea.

Senator **Cain**. But the possibility of Red China and Russia becoming our enemies was considered at those Blair House conferences before American and allied forces were committed in Korea?

General **Bradley**. I think so. I know right from the start we considered that possibility. How much it was discussed that night, I can't recall.

NONBATTLE CASUALTIES

Senator **Cain**. General Bradley, you and others have only offered figures covering battle casualties. How many nonbattle casualties have we suffered, and if those figures are not presently available to you, I would appreciate you sending them along.

General **Bradley**. We can include those. I think they are being furnished the chairman weekly; are they not?

Chairman **Russell**. I think they are coming up on a weekly basis.

General **Bradley**. May I ask if those include nonbattle?

Chairman **Russell**. Is that correct, General Mudge? Have we started receiving battle casualties, all casualties?

General **Mudge**. I am not sure whether they include that.

Senator **Cain**. General Bradley, would you have an approximation of the total of our nonbattle casualties since last June?

General **Bradley**. I don't remember seeing those figures totaled recently, because they include colds, a man going back for 1 day to the hospital, he is carried as a nonbattle casualty even though he is out of the line just 1 day; a man hurt in a jeep accident goes in the hospital for a day or two or any length of time and then goes back—they are all included.

A rather large percentage of those eventually go back. Some of them last summer were merely heat prostrations where a man would have to be taken back and given a rest for a short time. I can get those.

Senator **Cain**. But many nonbattle casualties are quite serious, are they not, resulting in amputations, from frostbite, trench foot, and so forth?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Cain**. What is the general rule of thumb concerning the ratio of nonbattle to battle casualties?

General **Bradley**. I don't believe I know of any ratio. It varies as to the time of year, nature of the fighting, nature of the roads, and so on. I don't know of any ratio that would hold.

Senator **Cain**. I personally will be grateful for those figures because the American people generally know only that we have suffered some sixty-five-thousand-odd casualties, when the fact of the matter must be that in the field of non-battle casualties that figure is far about 65,000.

NOTES ON WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

From your earlier testimony today did I understand you correctly to testify that you and others in authority took particular pains to take very careful notes of the Wake Island conference in October while you and others in authority took no notes of the Blair House conferences, which involved the United States in war last June?

General **Bradley**. That is correct. In one case I was representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I took notes so I could report to them when I got back. In the other case they were all present.

Senator **Cain**. But history will not be able to relate the circumstances surrounding the beginning of the war because the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no notes on the subject. Thank you, sir.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR ALLIES

General Bradley, give me your very best answer concerning this question, please. Why have fifty-odd free nations contributed only approximately 20,000 ground troops to Korea in almost a year of war?

I ask that question, sir, because you have no prophecy as to how long that war is going to continue, and we are awfully anxious to get as many more contributions from our friends as we can; so we have got to understand why they have done so little up to this time.

General **Bradley**. Well, I wish they were furnishing more, too, Senator Cain. At one time, last October, we possibly even discouraged their sending some over at that time because we thought the war was going to be over, and I think everyone thought it was, and then at that time some of them were held up. But since then, as far as we are concerned, we have been wanting just as many troops as can be furnished effectively. I say "effectively" because some of these people have offered to furnish troops if we furnish all the equipment, all the training, all the transportation over and back, and all the logistical support. They were not trained to start with.

DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS OF OUR ALLIES

Senator CAIN. Does that mean, sir, if we get into world war III in due time that those same nations are going as our allies to train them, to feed them, to clothe them, to ammunition them, to take care of them from start to finish?

General BRADLEY. I think the trouble is they made the same mistake we did—they demobilized after World War II and got down to a very low state of training and equipment, and they don't have the capability of doing it as quickly as we have.

Now as time goes on we hope they are aroused by these present happenings and they will start to build up those defenses the same as we have. It is true they were all pretty low in their defenses and so were we. But we are improving ourselves and we hope they are going to improve theirs. I am hoping since this has turned out this way that more of these people can raise troops and send them over.

You take Canada, for example. Canada, as you know, has practically no army in being. They have some air, some army, but not a very large one. They had to raise, equip, and train the units which they have sent to Korea. They originally started in to send a complete brigade, or regiment as we would call it, and then when things got better in the fall, they sent only one battalion, and now they have finished training the rest of them and sent them over.

I hope that some of the rest of them will do the same.

What the status of those negotiations are with the State Department with the various countries, I don't know at this particular time. I know they are negotiating with various countries to furnish additional troops.

Senator CAIN. And you have, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a very deep-seated interest in the success of those negotiations, do you not, sir?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

DIFFERENCES IN ALLIES' CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator CAIN. Here is an example that puzzles me a little bit, General Bradley, and perhaps you can satisfy that curiosity. How does it happen that Greece and Turkey, who are not members of the Atlantic Pact and might be therefore called minor allies of ours, contribute many more ground forces proportionately than do the United Kingdom and France who are members of the Atlantic Pact and commonly and properly known as our major allies?

General BRADLEY. Because of various conditions and because of our help, Greece and Turkey are much better prepared than Great Britain. To use the number of divisions they have—as I remember it, Greece has some nine divisions of trained troops. In fact they had about as many as we had to start with in this operation. Turkey has something like 25 or 30 divisions of well-trained troops. Surely they are not equipped quite as well as ours, but are fairly well equipped because we have been helping them with your assistance in the last 3 or 4 years; so that Greece and Turkey are much better prepared proportionately than England or France or even ourselves.

Senator CAIN. That is interesting to bear in mind as perhaps we are facing a third world war.

General Bradley, I have heard it said—I do not know it to be so—that both Greece and Turkey have offered additional contributions of ground forces to the Korean conflict and that those offers have been turned down. Do you know anything whatsoever of such a report?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't.

RELATIVE DEFENSE EFFORT OF OUR ALLIES

Senator CAIN. I want the record to show what appears to me to be interesting as we seek to understand and study this war, that the United Kingdom today has 16 men per 100,000 of population in the Korean War; France has 2 men per 100,000; Greece has 12 men per 100,000. Fortunately, and I would say thank God, Turkey has 27 men per 100,000, and the United States has 135 men per 100,000.

Genral BRADLEY. May I comment on part of that statement, sir?

Senator CAIN. On any part of anything I say, sir.

General BRADLEY. I think in comparing the contributions of Great Britain and France we must also realize that they have commitments elsewhere. France has something like 140,000 soldiers in Indochina.

Senator CAIN. I understand that, sir.

General BRADLEY. I believe all of us admit that is a rather important place to hold against communism also. So that I think we ought to give them some credit for their contribution to Indochina. The United Kingdom has got a problem in Hong Kong, and at the same time they are fighting communism in Malaya, the Malaya Peninsula. So that they also contribute something. I am not saying they are contributing as much as we are or Greece or Turkey, but I think we ought to make the record clear that they are also helping contain communism in other places.

Senator CAIN. As we both understand, sir, ground forces, or any other sort of military forces come out of the resources of the nation involved, and for that reason I would only point out that the United Kingdom has a population of 50 million-plus, France a population of 41½ million, Greece, which has 12 men per hundred thousand of its population in Korea today has only 7,780,000 for a population, and Turkey, which has 27 men per hundred thousand committed in Korea, has only a population of 19,500,000.

DISTRIBUTION OF WAKE ISLAND MEMORANDUM

Now, General Bradley, I would like to make this observation, sir: The top secret Wake Island conference report which was compiled by yourself as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was made available to a part of the public press before a deleted report was made available to this committee and to the public. So far as I know, no explanation has yet been offered by anyone in authority concerning how a top secret document was stolen or given away.

I think the record ought to carry the Wake Island distribution list. Somebody in that list is responsible for this disclosure. I personally hope that we find him and publicly charge him with violating and betraying our Nation's security. The distribution list is as follows:

The President, one copy.
Mr. Murphy at the White House, five copies.
Mr. Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army, five copies.
General Vandenberg, five copies.
General Collins, five copies.
Admiral Sherman, five copies.
Averell Harriman, one copy.
Col. A. M. Hamblen, Special Assistant for Occupied Areas, five copies.
Vice Adm. A. C. Davis, Director, Joint Staff, five copies.
Gen. Omar Bradley, one copy.
The Secretary of Defense, three copies.
Mr. Bendetsen, Assistant Secretary of the Army, one copy.
The Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, one copy.
File copy, 1.
Dr. Philip Jessup, Department of State, 10 copies.

ADVERTISING OUR INTENTIONS

General Bradley, on yesterday you stated, as did General Marshall, a few days ago, that you were against taking the war to Red China because of your fear that Russia would enter the conflict.

This, to my mind, advises Russia that the free nations intend to resist aggression in Korea and anywhere else, but only to a point short of risking war with Russia.

If the Russians believe what you and others in authority have repeatedly said, would you tell me why such statement will not encourage Russia to initiate limited but very destructive aggression in areas other than Korea?

General BRADLEY. I don't think any of us can be sure but what Russia will continue these things and be encouraged by the statements that we have had to make here.

I would like to supplement what General Marshall said when he was here. I think it is very harmful to our security and to our country and to our future security to have to pass on to Russia all of our intentions, all of our thoughts, all of our capabilities.

I would be perfectly willing to come up here before your Appropriations Committee and advocate a very large appropriation to buy similar information on Russia; and I think that what you say is probably very true, that we are unnecessarily inciting Russia to war—maybe not unnecessarily—but it becomes necessary because of the nature of these hearings very largely. In a way it is inherent in our form of government. We must educate 154,000,000 people instead of trying to get a decision out of 14. I am sorry we have had to do this, but since it is demanded by the people, and is inherent in our form of government, here it is, and I just hope it doesn't cause too much trouble in the future.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, before these hearings began, sir, the President of the United States on the evening of April 11, notified Red China and Russia of what our intentions were going to be, namely that we were not going to take the war to Red China regardless of what it might do by way of destroying our force on the ground. I thought at that time that was a very serious mistake.

I asked General Marshall that question. He was necessarily indifferent in his reply.

[Deleted.]

PREVENTIVE AND LIMITED WAR

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, on August 25, 1950, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Francis P. Matthews, spoke out strongly in Boston in favor of a preventive war. His superiors rebuked him but did not remove the Secretary from his office.

May I ask, sir, if you believe in a preventive war?

General BRADLEY. I do not, because I do not believe that is a solution.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, may I ask if the Korean War, which began in June 1950, has not become a preventive war?

General BRADLEY. Well, i na way it may have; not a preventive all-out war, but I believe that by taking this action in Korea we may have postponed or avoided a third world war, because, as I stated here before, one appeasement leads to another until eventually war is inevitable.

Furthermore, I believe in my mind that Russia was surprised by the action we took in Korea. I think that this was one of several actions they may have had in mind.

[Deleted.]

In my opinion they evidently are postponed or abandoned because of the fact that China is completely tied down in Korea, and that a lot of Russian equipment is being used up in Korea. So, in a way, if we can avoid world war III with the millions of casualties by taking casualties in Korea, and that actually works out that way, we may decide 5 years, 10 years or whatever time it takes for history to prove it, it was well worth while in avoiding world war III.

Senator CAIN. Then, you agree with the President that we are trying to prevent world war III by fighting a limited war in Korea at this time?

General BRADLEY. Well, I don't know whether I would state it quite that way or not. I think that could be stated that way, yes.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

OBJECTIVES OF OUR MISSION IN KOREA

General Bradley, will you please tell me what the United States and the United Nations set out to accomplish in Korea? I know that you and others have given definitions from time to time, but I just wish to burden you a little bit by asking you to define our objectives in terms of the mission which was given to the Supreme Commander when the conflict began in June.

General BRADLEY. The mission given him at that time was to repel this aggression and drive the North Koreans back north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In substance that is what it was.

Senator CAIN. General Marshall testified that our mission in Korea was to make Korea a free, independent, and democratic nation. General MacArthur testified as I recall that our mission in Korea was to make of Korea a free, united, and self-controlled nation.

General BRADLEY. That has always been our Government's political objective and it has never abandoned that as I understand it since 1945. In fact when arrangements were first made in 1945 that was set forth as an objective.

Russia prevented it by putting down a curtain along the thirty-eighth parallel. When we went in originally it was to repel the aggression and then as we went farther north and the United Nations again came out with a resolution to establish a unified Korea, united and free Korea; that was the mission then given to General MacArthur in late September.

Senator CAIN. And yet to carry out that mission from a military point of view or that objective from a political point of view, it will, before we are through, if we do not change that mission, be required to defeat the enemy and to repel him, not from South Korea but we must repel the enemy from Korea, or otherwise, sir, how can we make Korea a free, indepedent, and democratic nation?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think we could have an intermediate military objective without abandoning the long range political objective which we agreed with the Russians on in 1945.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, on Saturday last I asked General Marshall this question, or this was now 10 days ago, I think. Have we reason to believe that the Allied mission in Korea is a different mission today than it was for several months after the war began last June, and General Marshall replied, "I am sorry, I can't answer that offhand. I should be able to, but I can't."

General Bradley, will you give us your opinion concerning whether or not our mission in Korea is a different one today from what that mission was in the early months of the Korean War?

General BRADLEY. I doubt if there is any change. I think our long-range political objective is still that we would like to see a free and united Korea.

Senator CAIN. But at the present time——

General BRADLEY. As far as the military, immediate military objective, is concerned, I think we would consider it a victory with something less than that.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, your time has expired.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate your time, General Bradley, very much, and I have a sequence of questions which I would like to complete asking you at a later date.

STATEMENT ON CASUALTIES

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish to state here that there was furnished the committee from the Department:

1. Complete set of cumulative weekly reports on battle casualties by services for the period August 25, 1950, covering the period since June 25 to May 11, 1951;
2. A complete set of weekly increases in battle casualties for the period August 25, 1950 to May 11, 1951;
3. A statement of the relative percentage losses of our troops in Western Europe in World War II and in Korea;
4. Statement of ratio of United States casualties to Communist casualties in Korea;

5. Statement of the ratio of the Allied and German casualties in Western Germany.

This letter indicates that the Korean casualty figures presented for United States troops in each case do not include frostbite cases.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, I have not yet ordered that this be printed in the record. It is quite a lengthy statement here. I had assumed that matters that were brief could be properly printed in the appendix each day, and then if it was thought wise when we conclude the hearings, we would have one volume printed of these more lengthy exhibits, and have all of them in one volume, but I am perfectly willing to be guided by the committee.

Now, these statements of the latter three that I read, the ratio of United States casualties to Communist casualties, are very brief, less than two pages; so I think it might be well to have those printed in the record—and I am perfectly willing to have all of them.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are they United States casualties versus the Communist casualties?

Chairman RUSSELL. I will read the four lines, and we will get it in the record that way:

RATIO OF UNITED STATES CASUALTIES TO TOTAL COMMUNIST CASUALTIES IN KOREA

The ratio of United States casualties to total Communist casualties in Korea is about 1 to 12. Many of the Communist losses have been inflicted by our allies, including ROK troops, and, therefore, cannot be entirely credited to American forces. If ROK and other United Nations losses are included, the ratio is only 1 to 3.

Senator CAIN. My question ran to the noncombat casualties.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the reason I read that last phrase showing it did not include frostbite cases, so all members of the committee would be aware that these were battle casualties, these figures we have.

Senator CAIN. I and others would like to know the total suffering we are going through so we can do a better job in the future.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will have these three printed in the record.

(One of the three documents was read by the chairman immediately above; remaining two read as follows:)

RELATIVE PERCENTAGE LOSSES OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE IN WORLD WAR II AND IN KOREA

The battle casualties of the first six American divisions engaged in Europe averaged 3 percent a week of strength June 6, 1944, through May 11, 1945. In Korea Army battle casulaties have averaged nine-tenths of 1 percent a week since June 25. For the first 4 months of this year (1951) these Army Korean casualties have averaged five-tenths of 1 percent.

It will be seen from this that in the fighting in Europe against Hitler's forces the weekly losses of our troops were at a rate approximately three times as great as those experienced by our troops in Korea since June 25 and approximately six times as great as losses experienced in the last 4 months.

RATIO OF ALLIED CASUALTIES OF GERMAN CASUALTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

The ratio of Allied and German casualties in Western Europe was about 1 to 5, according to estimates of enemy losses in General Marshall's Biennial Report. Figures of German casualties compiled from German documents for the period from June 1, 1944, to February 1, 1945, provide a ratio of only 1 to 1.2, but it should be remembered that these are incomplete. It is impossible to separate German casualties inflicted by United States troops from those attributable to our Allies.

Senator CAIN. I would like to say this off the record.

(A discussion was had off the record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. It doesn't seem very likely that we are to have a vote on the floor of the Senate this afternoon and in the hope that we can carry on these hearings, I call a session for 2:30 this afternoon in this room.

(Whereupon, at 12:57 the committees recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. in the same room.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Knowland, and Cain.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator McMahon?

Senator McMAHON. General, our policy in the world is to develop all of the collective security that we can, is that not so?

General BRADLEY. That is correct; and that is why we, in my opinion, joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and why we have made certain other bilateral arrangements in the nature of mutual defense.

Senator McMAHON. I appreciate as well as, I suppose, everybody does, that we can pay—we could pay—too high a price for having allies; but within that limitation, certainly, the tighter we can keep our allies bound to us, the better off we are going to be mobilizing our strength.

Wouldn't you agree with that?

General BRADLEY. I agree with that, yes.

HISTORICAL RESULTS OF NOT OPPOSING AGGRESSION

Senator McMAHON. Now, General, you were asked today on a couple of occasions about what our objectives were in Korea. It might be useful at this point simply to review some fairly recent history, as history goes, and I recall to your mind the Japanese aggression in Manchuria. You are, of course, familiar with that Japanese aggression when Secretary of State Stimson in Mr. Hoover's Cabinet advocated that we take collective measures to stop that aggression?

General BRADLEY. Yes; I believe that was in about 1932 if I remember correctly.

Senator McMAHON. Yes. Then, you remember, I think, General, in 1936 that Hitler in defiance of the Versailles Treaty marched into the Ruhr?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator McMAHON. And there was touch and go for about 48 hours. The French wanted to punish him, and the British got weak-kneed about it, and he got away with that aggression.

Then, you remember, General, that in the case of Mussolini's aggression upon Ethiopia in 1938, although there were conferences at the League of Nations, there was no action taken by the nations in the League of Nations to put down that aggression on Ethiopia?

General **Bradley**. That is correct.

Senator **McMahon**. I presume, General, that it was these events that certainly had some bearing upon the thinking of our Government and its responsible officials in backing up the United Nations' policy not to repeat Ethiopia, Hitler's aggression on the Ruhr, and the Japanese aggression upon Manchuria, China? Am I not right about that?

General **Bradley**. I imagine it was. It has always been in my mind in studying these cases, because it has been my firm conviction that had positive action been taken in some of those instances like Manchuria, Ethiopia, I belive Hitler has said that had he been opposed when he marched into the Ruhr that he would have had to withdraw.

Whether or not everybody had those things in mind when they were thinking about stopping this aggression and avoiding appeasement I don't know. There are further examples, of course, of Prime Minister Chamberlain when he gave away certain things to Germany when they started further aggression in 1938 and 1939.

All of those things I think were in our minds. Whether or not they were mentioned I don't remember, but certainly they were in the back of our minds.

Senator **McMahon**. And, General, I thought that everyone was pretty much agreed that it was a wise thing for this country to engage in company with its allies under the United Nations charter, in an effort to see to it that the said history that we have had over the past 25 years was not repeated due to the failure of the nations of the world to take action and put down aggression immediaely upon its occurrence.

I thought there was unanimity upon that, but apparently there is now some difference of opinion and I am glad that you still believe in that principle.

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA

General, I think it is worth developing, if we can just briefly, the situation that Japan faced in China in the thirties after she made her invasion of China. I think it is important that we should review it so that those who think that there is some magic to be accomplished by making an unlimited war on the mainland of China should well take pause and take heed of what happened to the Japs in China.

Now, as I recollect it, I think you said they had the third greatest navy in the world, they had the second greatest land army in the world, and they had entire control of Manchuria which was the best industrial area of China, and they put great forces into China and yet they never did accomplish the domination and the pacification of China, is that not correct?

General **Bradley**. The figures you used on the size of the land army are somebody else's, but I would agree that it is correct they had the third largest navy and large land forces and so on. And I stated in my opening remarks that in spite of some 5 years of effort, even after the World War started, they never controlled more than just a portion of China and were never able to get a decision over China.

MAC ARTHUR RESPONSIBILITY AS UN COMMANDER

Senator McMahon. General, General MacArthur occupied a most unique place in our history in that he was the first commander of United States forces who also was a commander of the United Nations forces in actual battle. That was an honor that went to him; is that not correct?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Senator McMahon. I would ask your opinion, General, of the effect that General MacArthur's statements on policy in the east had with relation to his duties as a United Nations commander rather than in his capacity as a United States commander.

General Bradley. Well, of course, we had furnished a larger proportion of the troops than any other country. South Korea, of course, was next. But even though the total forces furnished by the other United Nations was considerably less than our own, the fact remained that he was a United Nations commander and, as such, had dual responsibility—one to the United States Government and one to the United Nations. In fact, as you know, he was required to render reports to the United Nations on the accomplishments and on the state of affairs in Korea.

With that responsibility, in my opinion, I should have tried to carry out the policies of the United States, and of the United Nations, insofar as possible; and I don't believe in any case the military policies laid down by the United States, as executive for the United Nations, differed from the opinion of the United Nations, at least those involved in the effort.

An example was that one time when we preferred to do something else, and they didn't go along, we followed the United Nations wishes and did not accord hot pursuit; and as the United Nations commander, I think he did have a certain responsibility to carry out the wishes of the United Nations, particularly insofar as they didn't conflict with the policies laid down by his own Government.

NOTES OF THE WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator McMahon. General, to refer, for just a brief reference, to the conference at Wake Island, as I recollect it, five copies of that report, of the fifty copies that were made, were sent to General MacArthur in Tokyo.

Do you know whether they were receipted for by him personally, or by one of his deputies?

General Bradley. They were receipted for by one of his aides.

Senator McMahon. One of his aides?

General Bradley. And I believe the receipts is dated October 27. I saw it a few days ago, and I think I remember correctly.

May I say something more about that, since it has been brought up here; and—I went back and checked, and this information can be given first-hand, by the witness, if you want it, but Colonel Matthews, who was my executive officer, said that before this conference started, and before any notes were taken at the conference, in other words, during the hour we were waiting for General MacArthur and the President to join us, that General MacArthur's aide, Colonel Storey, and his adviser, General Whitney, both saw Miss Anderson there and talked to her.

In fact, it seems that Miss Anderson had been in Japan in connection with the Japanese peace treaty once before and so they were both talking to her before this thing started, and they apparently knew she was in the building.

I think that is something that might be worth knowing.

Senator **WILEY**. Where did they see her?

General **BRADLEY**. In Wake Island, in the two rooms, and it was in the room that had the table in it, until General MacArthur and the President came over, and Miss Anderson went out in the other room.

Senator **McMAHON**. But I think it is important to emphasize for the record here now, General, that as far as I can recollect, General MacArthur or no one on his behalf, including his press agent, General Whitney, operating up at the Waldorf-Astoria, has ever challenged the accuracy of that report that was sent to him, whether it was made by a stenographer or by notes or simply from recollection. Is that not corect?

General **BRADLEY**. No one has ever challenged the accuracy of it; no, sir.

Senator **McMAHON**. Let's get that really straight in the record, that the accuracy of that report has never been challenged. Not a single word of it, not a single statement of it.

General, there was some reference made this morning about what our military objectives are in Korea and there has been some discussion of both our military objectives and our political objectives.

As I understand it, the military objective is to repulse the aggression. Is that correct?

General **BRADLEY**. Yes, sir.

Senator **McMAHON**. The political objective is to accomplish the unification of all of Korea?

General **BRADLEY**. Yes, sir.

PREVIOUS WARS WON WITHOUT TOTAL VICTORY

Senator **McMAHON**. General, in the course of our history I believe there have been a number of instances in which we accomplished our objectives without what might be called a final and complete defeat of the enemy, such as was visited on Germany. Certainly in the War of 1812 we fought the British on the sea and on our own mainland to maintain the security of our commerce and the safety of our nationals.

We didn't insist on a military victory over England as essential, did we?

General **BRADLEY**. No. We accomplished certain defeats of their forces in this country, but we did not have to carry it all the way to them and defeat them on their own ground.

Senator **McMAHON**. And the treaty that we signed accomplished the objectives for which that war was fought, as I recollect.

General **BRADLEY**. Yes, sir.

Senator **McMAHON**. Now, in the Spanish-American War when we accomplished the liberation of Cuba, we didn't proceed to Madrid to capture Madrid, did we?

General **BRADLEY**. No.

Senator McMahon. We negotiated a treaty after accomplishing our objectives.

I am reminded of one war, and one perhaps less well known, in 1798 to 1800, when we fought a limited naval war against France to protect our commerce and our shipping.

It is recorded that the Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering, who had insisted on an all-out war with France at that time, was retired as the Secretary of State, and the President, Mr. John Adams, President Adams, accomplished a settlement of that thing through negotiation and by treaty.

The point that I want to make, General, to find out if you are in agreement with me, is that when you say that the object of war is victory, you must have a definition of what constitutes victory, don't you?

General Bradley. I think you must, and you vary from being willing to accept a rather small thing that you start out to correct up to an objective which we set in World War II of unconditional surrender.

There are many variations in between the two.

Senator McMahon. Right.

General, has our military policy in the Far East shifted—and that includes, of course, Korea—due to General MacArthur's statement and his testimony?

General Bradley. It made no change in the last month or two that I can recall.

FIRST REQUEST TO BOMB MANCHURIA

Senator McMahon. General, when was it that General MacArthur first recommended bombing in Manchuria?

General Bradley. Well, I had looked up here the whole series of messages on this bombing. It is a rather long list, and I don't know whether you want to put all of it into the record or not.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, what is the chairman's disposition on that?

Chairman Russell. I was not paying close attention. I understood the Senator's question to be when did General MacArthur first recommend bombing in Manchuria.

Senator McMahon. Bombing in Manchuria.

Chairman Russell. It seems to me that that would be embraced in one document, and if the General wants to offer it for the appendix—wants to offer such compilation—

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, without impinging on the Senator's time, with respect to the question of does anybody want this list of things or messages in the record, rather than to have my silence indicate I do not want them in the record, I would like to say I think they ought to go into the appendix or the compilation.

Chairman Russell. They will go into the record in accordance with the procedures of this committee up until now.

Senator Hickenlooper. Senator McMahon is questioning the witness, and I do not mean to take over and request anything, but just for my own personal opinion, in answer to the question.

Chairman Russell. Yes. I had ruled that the question asked the first time that the recommendation was made.

Senator McMahon. General, is it so complex that it is not easy to give an answer to that question?

General Bradley. I cannot find it right now. All of these are first messages, and had to do with restrictions on movements and bombing in the vicinity of the border.

While we are going on, I will ask Colonel Clifton to look through this summary here and see if we can find the date on which he first asked for permission to bomb across the border.

MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON USE OF GROUND TROOPS

Senator McMahon. Well, perhaps I will ask another question while he is looking that up. I assume that General MacArthur knew all the factors of risk since he was a theater commander and since the risks were being taken in his theater, when he advised going into Korea as he did—well, perhaps it is unfair to say that he advised going into Korea, but that he approved going into Korea very forthrightly.

I would like to ask you if he recommended after we got in there that we put in ground troops into Korea?

General Bradley. Yes; he asked for authority to move ground troops in there, I believe, and the first movement was into protect the bases, and then he asked for authority to employ ground troops in stopping the aggression.

Senator McMahon. And that authority was given to him?

General Bradley. And that was approved and I think everyone concurred in it.

MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator McMahon. Now I am still somewhat confused, General Bradley, about General MacArthur's position. Some references was made yesterday or the day before to the fact that he had not recommended that Chiang be used in any specific place, but that that be left to the Generalissimo. Is that your recollection of his position with relation to Chiang?

General Bradley. I think in all of his discussions of this with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he specifically recommended only two things. One was in November when he recommended that certain of Chiang's troops be brought to Korea to reinforce his ground troops, and the other one I believe the only statement he makes is that any restrictions against the Nationalists on Formosa be removed, with no further explanation on that so far as I know.

Senator McMahon. But, of course, he in his testimony here has talked as he did in his speech before the Congress about our giving logistical support to Chiang in any effort he wants to make.

Now I take it that the election then is to be with Chiang as to whether we should go to the mainland of China, but if Chiang says "That is what I want to do," then according to General MacArthur that is the thing that we should provide the logistical support for. Am I unfair in stating that as his position as you recollect?

General Bradley. Well, I don't remember his exact statement, but be could not go to the mainland without logistical support and furnishing of certain shipping, and that would have to come from us.

Senator McMahon. Well, now they claim—I say they claim—there are more different figures concerning the number of effectives on Korea than I have fingers on both hands.

General Bradley. On Korea or Formosa?

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator McMahon. Formosa, I mean. We have a military policy which I think is a wise one, namely, that we do not hand a handful of rice and a rifle to a man and say, "Get up there and fight." We give him proper support. We give him all the firepower, all of the food that he can eat, we can get to him, hospitalization, and that is the way the American people I think want our Armed Forces treated, General. I suppose if we were to engage in the logistical support of Chiang that it would not be on quite as elaborate scale as for our own troops, but nevertheless we would have to make their firepower effective. That would take a tremendous effort on the sea and in the air, would it not?

General Bradley. Yes. If you make any kind of an amphibious operation, it would take considerable sea power and air power to put them ashore. And you have to have well-trained, well-equipped troops with a lot of ammunition to do it.

Senator McMahon. Now I would like to ask this, and maybe it is an unfair qffuestion, General, but it is one that has disturbed me because I cannot find the answer to it.

Let us assume that we started in with Chiang and got him a beachhead through the use of our air and sea power, and then the Chinese Reds were to withdraw behind the Yalu and say to the United Nations and to us, "Now we are through and we want to make peace." What position do you think we could take with regard to Chiang? Would we abandon him at that point or would we have to proceed to carry on the war to put Chiang back in control of the mainland of China?

General Bradley. Well, that poses a pretty hard question, but it would depend on the terms under which the Chinese would agree to fall back behind the Yalu. I cannot see that they would want to fall back of the Yalu and give up all of Korea and at the same time give up the beachhead. They would certainly proceed afterward to take some kind of action, I should think.

RED CHINESE STRENGTH IN SOUTH CHINA

Senator McMahon. General, there are, I am informed, about a million Chinamen, Red Chinamen, down on the coast opposite Formosa. Is that approximately accurate?

General Bradley. You mean soldiers?

Senator McMahon. Yes, troops.

General Bradley. I don't think you will find that many on the coast. You will find that many in South China probably but not necessarily all along the coast.

Senator McMahon. But you think there are approximately how many which would be available to repulse this adventure that we are to engage in with Chiang if General MacArthur was to have his way?

General Bradley. There is a very large number in various parts of South China that could be moved to meet it. They are not right now on the coast, but they are in positions where they could be made available to meet such a movement.

Senator McMahon. I take it gettting Chiang in there then would be a terrific military operation, to say nothing of continuing him there in a continuing advance?

General Bradley. To put him ashore with any considerable body of troops would be a very big effort. Now some may maintain that they are not talking about amphibious operations, they are talking about infiltration or something else.

[Deleted.]

In fact, there is nothing to keep him from going ashore in China now. He has some boats. If he wants to infiltrate himself and go over and lead them, he can do it. But to take an army with him requires more logistical support and better equipment and better trained troops and better air and naval power than he has.

Senator McMahon. I would like to advise the censor—of course, my wishes on the next question are certainly not controlling, but I just call his attention to this question:

As far as your information goes, General, are the guerrilla forces now operating in south China in harmony and sympathy with Chiang?

General Bradley. Well, as I understand it, some of them possibly are, but a very large part of them are not. They are just guerrillas. They are "anti's," and anti-Communist or antimost anything that is in power. To that extent I don't think you can count on their supporting Chiang.

Senator McMahon. General Bradley——

General Bradley. Maybe I didn't make myself clear about Chiang going back. Of course, we have got a restriction on him going back with troops, but I mean as far as he as an individual going back, I doubt if anybody could stop him. That is what I meant—if he wants to go back himself and set himself up as a leader of this movement, I doubt if anybody could stop the movement of an individual. That is pretty hard to do. That is what I meant by nobody stopping him now.

There are restrictions on him going back with a group, an armed force, yes, and that restriction is still in effect.

MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATION TO BOMB MANCHURIA

Senator McMahon. Now, General, have you been refreshed in your recollection by the colonel concerning the first appeal that was made by General MacArthur to bomb in Korea?

General Bradley. The first message that we can find in which he mentioned the sanctuary at all is on the 7th of November, in which he said, and his message indicated:

> Hostile planes are operating from bases west of the Yalu using hit-and-run tactics and that present restrictions provided a sanctuary for hostile air force.

At that time he requested instructions for dealing with this new and threatening development, and that was the time when we picked up the matter of hot pursuit and we turned it down.

On the 30th of December, his message stated or suggested that a large number of actions were included in this, and—

> under existing restrictions our naval and air potential are being only partially utilized. We could destroy Chinese industrial capacity to wage war through our bombardment and naval gunfire.

It still was not a specific recommendation, but was suggested.

The only other ones—there is one of the 11th of February in which he stated:

> It is evident the enemy has lost his chance for achieving a decisive military decision in Korea, but it retains a potential as long as its base of operations in Manchuria is immune to air attack.

Senator McMahon. Of course, General, I suppose it can be emphasized that we could take out the industrial potential in Manchuria, and you can take out the industrial potential in China, but if Soviet Russia continued to supply the Chinese then we would have to make the next election to start bombing the Soviet Union itself.

General Bradley. Well, that would be so; but even if you could take out the industrial potential of China, our experience with Germany during the last world war was that you cannot completely take it out. In fact, the last 6 months of 1944, when were hitting the Ruhr very hard, the Ruhr was producing more during those 6 months than it had any previous 6 months in the way of war materials; so that the air action in itself will not completely destroy the industrial production.

If you want to go into it with atomic bombs, why, yes, you can have a greater effect on it, but conventional bombing can have the effect of hampering it; it can slow it down, but when they get organized to repair it, they can get back into production discouragingly fast.

Senator McMahon. Yes.

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon, your time is up.

Senator McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. This is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Stennis.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask any questions.

LIMITING THE QUESTIONING

I want to say that I have been very much impressed with the examination here of General Bradley; and I have been very much impressed with his testimony, too—his very clear and forthright answers.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, let me observe that I question the wisdom of just a lot of repetitious questioning of General Bradley, or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The time of these gentlemen is valuable, and our time is valuable, too.

We have had General Bradley here, now, for the second week; and three other members, three other Chiefs of Staff are coming in. I think we ought to well consider now putting some kind of limitation on ourselves, Mr. Chairman, and to the duration of the questioning of these military men, the top military advisers of the Nation.

I have been trying to think of some kind of proposal, not with reference to General Bradley's testimony, but with respect to the next three military men, the Chiefs of Staff; and it seems to me like it should be 2 hours of questioning of each one of the witnesses—to be handled by the two senior members of each committee would certainly be satisfactory.

Senator **Knowland**. Mr. Chairman——

Senator **Stennis**. I don't propose that now. I think we ought to be thinking about it; and that is not with any idea of trying to limit any individual, of course, but just as a reasonable limitation on our time, and their time.

I think they have other things that they should be doing, and I believe that will afford the information we need here. So with that sentiment and again reiterating that all the matters I have had in mind have already been covered—otherwise, I would question General Bradley—but they have already been fully covered, and I therefore think it my duty not to repeat. Thank you very much.

Chairman **Russell**. Thank you, sir. Senator Lodge.

MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS AT BEGINNING

Senator **Lodge**. General Bradley, do you know whether General MacArthur was consulted on the decision to enter Korea?

General **Bradley**. Prior to sending troops over, I don't believe he was asked his opinion on it. However, he stated he fully concurred in it.

Senator **Lodge**. On the question of troops—did he express any opinion on the question of sending troops into Korea?

General **Bradley**. Yes, he requested that he be authorized to send troops into Korea.

Senator **Lodge**. He did?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Lodge**. Do you know whether he expressed any opinions on sending the Air Force or the Navy to operate in Korea?

General **Bradley**. No, I don't remember that he made any statement on that. The plan that we had drawn up for Korea provided for the withdrawal of our nationals in case of trouble. Due to the rapidity of this movement of the North Koreans south, it was thought it was necessary to cover part of that evacuation, which was done by air, with the use of our own Air. Otherwise, the North Korean planes could have shot down our planes clearing out our nationals.

Senator **Lodge**. You stated in your opening statement that the United States, and I quote, "is not in the best military position to have a show-down" and "not prepared to deliver an ultimatum."

SHOW-DOWN WITH RUSSIA

I think I am quoting you correctly. This suggests two questions. First, is it not true that the show-down, if there is to be one, must be with the Kremlin, since they could stop the war in Korea if they wanted to?

General **Bradley**. Will you repeat your last question?

Senator **Lodge**. Is it not true that the show-down, if there is to be one, must be with the Kremlin, since they could stop the war in Korea if they wanted to?

General **Bradley**. Well, if they elect to carry it on for a long period of time or elect to spread it, the show-down eventually might have to be made with them.

However, there is a possibility that they would be willing to call this thing off on the part of their satellites something short of a complete show-down with the Kremlin itself.

Senator LODGE. Well, let me phrase it another way. If we could put enough pressure, diplomatic pressure, on the Kremlin, they have it within their power to call off this fight in Korea; have they not?

General BRADLEY. They have the power to call it off, I am sure, but under what conditions they would be induced to do that I don't know.

Senator LODGE. But we have not the power to put the pressure on them; have we?

General BRADLEY. I don't think we have.

Senator LODGE. Well, you have stated we did not have the wherewithal to launch an all-out war.

General BRADLEY. We are not in the best position to launch an all-out war, certainly.

PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

Senator LODGE. Well, that leads me to the second question which is, Are we making the best use of our time to build up our military position as rapidly as possible so that we can put enough pressure on the Kremlin to stop this aggression?

General BRADLEY. I answered that yesterday or a couple of days ago, in answer to Senator Johnson's question, that in my opinion we probably were not doing everything we could do.

I would like to see us establish a firm long-range military policy as to use of manpower and training and the equipping of them. We haven't done that yet. It is in the process, and I know that your committee is doing all it can to accomplish that, but that has not been accomplished yet.

Now, so far as the progress of the industrial mobilization is concerned and production of war materials is concerned, I think you will find the Chiefs of the various services can answer that much better than I can. I did not have time to check on it during the noon hour to see just how it is progressing. I know that they are making very considerable progress.

Whether or not they are keeping up to the schedule they set 6 months ago I can't answer, because that is a rather detailed study with which the Chiefs should be able to furnish you when they come here, with which I am not familiar without going to them and getting a detailed report, and I did not have time to do that today.

Senator LODGE. So if it is a question involving the size of the Air Force and the rapidity with which we are building that up, you would rather I asked that of General Vandenberg.

General BRADLEY. He can answer it much better than I can.

Senator LODGE. But you would agree, speaking now as a citizen and not as a military expert, that we have a moral obligation to the men who are fighting in Korea to make the maximum use of the time that they are gaining for us in order to get ready as quickly as possible—wouldn't you say that just as an American citizen?

General BRADLEY. Yes, I do. I think that we must get ready to meet any eventuality because otherwise we are taking a chance with our security and our whole national set-up.

Senator LODGE. Haven't we got an obligation of honor to the men who are over there in combat to make the fullest possible use of the time that they are getting for us?

General BRADLEY. Well, unless we make full time—full use of the time they gain for us, certainly we are not taking full advantage of the time they are gaining for us and to that extent we are probably letting them down.

Senator LODGE. Now I have got two or three questions that keep popping up in my mail. I have some notions of my own as to what the answers are, but I would like to get the answers from you.

POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING PEACE WITH CHINESE

Is our mission in Korea to defeat enough Chinese so as to have a negotiated peace, or is it to clear Korea and keep it cleared?

General BRADLEY. At the present time the military mission given to General Ridgway does not include the clearing of all of Korea. It includes the inflicting of maximum casualties on the Chinese with minimum losses to ourselves and with due regard to the safety of our troops in order to get into a position whereby we may negotiate some kind of a peace.

Senator LODGE. It is generally understood that we have practically come to the conclusion that it is impossible to negotiate with the Russians. Why do we think that the Chinese are any easier to negotiate with?

General BRADLEY. They are being hurt more than the Russians. They are the ones that are directly involved in this.

Our relationship with China through the years has been much better than it has been with Russia, and I would think that you would have a better chance to talk with the Chinese than you would with the Russians.

Senator LODGE. You think there is a better chance of their word being good than with the Russians?

General BRADLEY. I think I would; yes, sir.

RISKS OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION

Senator LODGE. If the Chinese are winning in Korea, the Russians are not expected to intervene, but if the Chinese are losing in Korea, it is said the Russians may intervene. It is not true, therefore, that regardless of how you accomplish it, a Chinese defeat in Korea runs the risk of incurring Russian intervention?

General BRADLEY. You always take that risk by any action you take in stopping these aggressive moves on the part of the Communists. Each one of them involves a certain risk of war and we don't deny that we are taking that risk now. We just say to extend the war into China itself would increase the risk. We don't say are not running any now.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions, but before I yield the floor, I would like to say that at the appropriate time I shall join with other Senators in seeking to limit the amount of time that Senators are taking on questions.

I think this proceding is dragging on too long, and that we ought to take steps to shorten it up.

Thank you, General Bradley.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I have here a list of questions that Senator Flanders requested me, or some member of the committee, to propound in his behalf if he were not present. He is next on the list.

I should like to have the authority to reserve those questions because Senator Flanders, I think, will return here tomorrow, and he naturally would much prefer to ask them himself, but in the event that we reach a stage where his questions would not be asked, I shall propound them in behalf of Senator Flanders at that time. Thus, we reach here Senator Long.

EFFECT OF KOREAN CONFLICT ON OUR MOBILIZATION

Senator Long. General Bradley, if the Korean aggression had not broken out, isn't the probability that this Nation would not have begun to arm at the rate that we are arming at the present time or to prepare ourselves for the danger of a third world war?

General Bradley. I think that is a fair assumption. I think the aggression in Korea, the nature of it and the size of it, made us all realize that Russia had reached the point where she was willing to risk war, and that in order to meet that, or in order to try to prevent it by raising a great deterrent to war in the form of larger security forces that we had better get busy and increase our security forces; and I think it has not only had an effect on us to increase our own security forces, but it had a very marked effect on a lot of our friends in Europe with whom we are allied.

Senator Long. Now, prior to that time there were some of us who found it difficult to get our people in our home States to agree that we were justified in spending the amount that we were spending at that time on our armed services. I believe that was around $13 billion; was it not?

General Bradley. Yes.

Senator Long. There were some of our people who felt that was too much, and that was about the major portion of our budget. Since the aggression occurred, however, those people were some of the first to realize that we should spend much more.

Now, we are spending about how much on our preparedness effort on an annual basis?

General Bradley. I believe the President's request has been submitted to the Congress, and it is approximately $60 billion for defense.

Senator Long. So, roughly, you might say that dollarwise we are making about five times the defense effort now that we were at the time the Korean aggression broke out. Would that be a fair statement?

General Bradley. That is approximately so.

Senator Long. Now, it had always seemed to me that if the Communists hoped to destroy this country by aggression their best chance would be to sit by and lull us into a sense of security for a few years while they armed to the teeth and then to strike us suddenly, with an all-out attack. Would that have seemed to you like a feasible plan for them in their idea for conquest?

General Bradley. I should think that would be a reasonable deduction, but apparently that does not always hold, because at various times, to my knowledge, during the last several years, about the time that we were having trouble getting certain appropriations, they came through with some act that would make it quite easy to get the appropriations for defense.

Senator LONG. Such as the Berlin blockade.

General BRADLEY. It is rather hard to figure out just what their psychology is on it.

IMPETUS OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION ON UNITED STATES REARMAMENT

Senator LONG. So that the Berlin blockade could have been a good example of them initiating an action that made it easier for you to get the necessary funds for the armed services?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Now, this Korean aggression has made it possible, probably, to get four or five times as much for the armed services as you might have had available otherwise; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. It made it possible, and it made it necessary, I think, because a large part, a considerable part, of this money is being used up in Korea itself. It serves a dual purpose, however. The ammunition being used there makes it necessary and requires us to set up certain ammunition procurement lines which were absolutely essential, and which had been worrying us very badly beforehand.

Senator LONG. Looking at this thing from a point of world strategy, do you believe that the Russians expected us to call their hand in Korea?

General BRADLEY. I don't believe they did.

Senator LONG. Why do you say that?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think that if they had expected us to move in they would either not have started it at all or else they would have started in on a larger scale to start with.

I think they estimated they could accomplish what they had in mind and that we would not intervene.

Senator LONG. If they could have taken Korea without us intervening at all, do you think they might have anticipated that any great rearmament effort might not have started in the United States?

General BRADLEY. I don't know. I have ceased trying to figure out what the people there would guess on.

I think it is a possible deduction that they might have thought that. I don't know. They are hard to figure, as to what they are thinking about, and whether or not they anticipate some of the results that come about from their actions.

I sometimes think we don't—they don't—figure quite the way they should.

EFFECT OF KOREAN CONFLICT ON RUSSIAN STRATEGY

Senator LONG. From your own point of view, looking at it in terms of world strategy, take the whole Korean incident, do you believe that if Russia had in mind conquering the entire world she made a serious mistake in letting the aggression break out in Korea, looking at it from hindsight?

General BRADLEY. Oh, I don't know. If you look at it, if Russia is trying to cause as much trouble in the world as possible, and is trying to conquer additional peoples and additional resources, by the use of her satellites, in which she doesn't lose very much, maybe it wasn't any mistake. She hasn't lost anything yet, in men.

True it has cost her equipment, but she makes that under State-controlled industry, and it keeps her war industries going; and I wouldn't know whether she would think it was a mistake, from that angle, or not.

Certainly she hasn't lost any of her own forces yet. She has used up some equipment, and as long as she can get satellites to do these things for her, it would be hard to guess whether or not she feels that she has lost something, or has gained something.

I think possibly in my opinion she has had her timetable set back and the fact that we intervened in Korea has kept her from taking action elsewhere, and to that extent I think our intervention in Korea has been a considerable disadvantage to her. The fact that she started the Korean incident is just one of several she probably had planned; and I doubt if she would be sorry she started it.

I think she is probably sorry we intervened.

INCREASE IN TROOPS' STRENGTH AND EFFICIENCY

Senator LONG. How do the number of combat-ready ground troops of this Nation compare with what we had at the time the Korean aggression broke out?

General BRADLEY. Well, we have considerably greater strength now than we had at that time. We had in numbers approximately a million and a half men under arms. At the present time we are approaching three and a half million.

[Deleted.]

Senator LONG. Judging by the results we are seeing today of the tremendous casualties that our troops are inflicting, with light casualties to themselves, I take it also our troops have learned a lot about how to fight against Communist tactics; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. We think we have improved the battle efficiency of our units very materially, and not only will it improve the battle efficiency of the troops in Korea, but by the rotation system and the information we are getting out of Korea otherwise we will very materially increase the combat efficiency of the units here at home.

Senator LONG. How much do you think our allies have increased their readiness—I have particularly in mind our European allies—since the Korean fighting broke out?

General BRADLEY. Well, they have all speeded up their preparedness efforts and have all increased—so far as I know, all, and I say "all" advisedly, I would have to check—I think all people in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization who have military obligations have increased their defensive efforts by at least 50 percent.

POSSIBLE PETERING OUT OF KOREAN WAR

Senator LONG. Will you express an opinion on this, General? Do you think there is some possibility of this war simply petering out around the thirty-eighth parallel even without negotiating a peace? In other words, our forces getting back to the thirty-eighth parallel, a little below, and the Communists simply ceasing to come down and attack our troops.

General BRADLEY. That is a possibility which we have to consider. It petered out in Greece, and that is one way it could end here.

Senator LONG. In other words, in Greece you finally had peace without ever agreeing at all. There was never any agreement there, it simply gradually passed away, and the guerillas simply ceased to come down any longer. There is some possibility that type of thing might happen in Korea?

General BRADLEY. I think that is a possibility; yes.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General Bradley, I have had to conduct another hearing, and many of these questions—I have only two or three—if they are already answered, just say so and I can look in the record. I do not want to detain you any more than necessary.

DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS PRIOR TO RED CHINESE ATTACK

There was one question that grew out of General MacArthur's testimony that interested me, and if you have not answered it, I wonder if you would comment on it. I believe he said if he had it to do over again he would deploy his troops exactly as he did, as they were deployed at the time the Chinese attacked in Korea, which I put sometime in November, I guess, or early December. I wonder if you would comment on that. Do you agree with that—that his troops were deployed in the best possible way under the existing conditions?

General BRADLEY. Well, Senator, we were a little bit worried, looking at the map from here, as to those dispositions, and we asked General MacArthur if he needed any additional or changed directives and he said he did not. We did not send him any message as to our worries about the disposition because you cannot fight a battle and conduct a battle from 7,000 miles away, which we were. You must let your field commander fight that battle.

General MacArthur is a man of long, distinguished service, and experience, and I think it would be quite improper to try to tell him from here how exactly to dispose his divisions, and so we did not do so.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I understood that you did not tell him to do it. But I was asking more specifically—were they deployed in a way that you consider now—and it is hindsight, it is true—the best possible way? Looking at it from now, do you think in reviewing the situation that they were deployed in the best possible way?

General BRADLEY. Well, I can only say that were I deploying them, I think I would do it a little bit differently. Maybe General MacArthur had some information which I did not have. Certainly I would have deployed them differently, if that is the answer to your question.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could you indicate very briefly how you would have deployed them? I am not a military man, and, of course, it may not mean anything to me, but I ask in view of the disastrous series of defeats there, and his comment apparently was nothing could be done, that it was just done in the best possible way, and nevertheless we lost a very large number of casualties and a great deal of momentum, of course, and position.

POSITION OF TROOPS IN KOREA DURING RED CHINESE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE

General BRADLEY. Well, on the 28th of November he informed the Joint Chiefs that he estimated the strength of the Chinese Communists in North Korea to be at 200,000 and the North Koreans at approximately 50,000. And he further reported that the strength of his own forces was not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese. As a result he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his strategic plan for the immediate future was to pass from the offensive to the defensive, with such local adjustments as might be required by the fluid situation.

The Joint Chiefs advised him on the 29th of November, then, of their approval of his plans to pass from the offensive to the defensive in the face of a large-scale Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean situation. They stated that strategic and tactical considerations were paramount. They also requested information concerning the coordination of operations between the X Corps and the Eighth Army and regarding the positioning of the X Corps, the units of which appeared to be exposed.

He replied on the 30th of November that the X Corps geographically threatens the main supply lines of the enemy forces bearing upon the right flank of the Eighth Army. The enemy's penetration southward could not be safely accomplished until this threat of the X Corps is contained or nullified. Any concept of actual physical combination of the forces of the Eighth Army and X Corps in a practically continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea is quite impracticable due to the length of that line, the numerical weakness of our forces, and the logistical problems due to the mountainous divide which splits such a front from north to south. He further went on to state that the X Corps would contract its position as enemy pressure develops, into the Hamhung-Wonsan sector. The Corps Commander has been enjoined against any possibility of piecemeal isolation and trapping of his forces. While geographically his elements seem to be well extended, the actual conditions of terrain make it extremely difficult for an enemy to take any material advantage thereof.

I read that because it explains, I think, why he thought it was unnecessary to change those dispositions. I say, looking at it from here it looked to us like the flank was exposed and the X Corps was exposed.

Senator Fulbright. It looked that way at that time to you.

General Bradley. At that time. He was the commander, however, and this was his estimate of it.

Senator Fulbright. It looked that way at that time. Now the developments, would you say, confirmed his estimate of the situation or not?

General Bradley. Beg pardon?

Senator Fulbright. The developments, what actually happened, did that confirm his estimate of the situation or not?

General Bradley. No; I doubt if you could say it did, because later we were able to join the two corps and form a continuous line which extends across the peninsula.

WISDOM OF TROOP DISPOSITION IN NOVEMBER 1950

Senator Fulbright. As I say, I am inexperienced in military matters, but in view of what actually happened, it seems quite incredible to me that nothing could have been done to have improved our situation as of November 29. Maybe that happened, I don't know. But it would have seemed to me that some kind of deployment could have been effected that might have limited the reverses or prevented the reverses that we suffered. Maybe I am naive in military matters.

Would you say that is a reasonable assumption that they might have been deployed in such a way that we would not have suffered as great losses as we did?

General BRADLEY. I think a lot of people were worried about the fact that the Tenth Corps was isolated from the rest of the Eighth Army and that the right flank of the Eighth Army was exposed. In looking at it on a map, I think a lot of people were concerned about that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Military people were?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, is it fair to say then that on that point there was disagreement at the highest level on the military situation there? Is that right, there was disagreement?

General BRADLEY. Well, I don't know whether you would call it disagreement or not. It was a difference of opinion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. All right, difference of opinion.

General BRADLEY. But we refrained from trying to tell him how to do it from here.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is right, on the principle you do not undertake to direct the tactics of a battle, but you did differ as a matter of opinion as to what was the most favorable disposition.

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. One other question on that. Was there any lack of liaison between the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps?

General BRADLEY. Well, General MacArthur says there was not. He says there was liaison by radio and by communications back through his headquarters in Japan.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I understand what General MacArthur says. What do you say? What do you Joint Chiefs say?

General BRADLEY. I don't know whether there was that radio communication or not. I assume there was, but there was no physical contact between the two forces. In fact, there was quite a gap between the Tenth Corps on the east Coast and the Eighth Army on the west coast.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Have you had any reports since that time to indicate whether or not there was adequate liaison between those two forces?

General BRADLEY. No; and whether or not they were exchanging messages by radio, keeping in touch with each other, wasn't too important anyway considering the disposition, because the Tenth Corps was scattered pretty much up into the northeast of Korea, part of the force due north around the reservoir, and the Eighth Army was on the other coast.

Their communication back and forth between them, while its liaison didn't mean too much, I never did look into it as to just how much of a radio communication liaison they had.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, then is it fair to say that that particular point is not particularly important or relevant, that because of the disposition of the forces, they could not do much differently from what they did whether they had liaison or not?

General BRADLEY. Whether or not they had radio communication is not too important.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That would not make much difference?

General BRADLEY. No.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Due to that disposition they had to operate independently anyway?

General BRADLEY. Yes; they operated independently, and the Tenth Corps was pulled out by water and brought back around the tip of the peninsula and put in action again through Pusan, while the Eighth Army withdrew on the west coast.

NEGOTIATED PEACE AND APPEASEMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. One further question. Maybe you have already developed that. I was not here—if you had that particular point. One other question about the negotiated peace. I believe you said you looked forward—no—that you regarded it as a possibility that the losses of the Chinese would become to great that they might be willing to accept a negotiated peace.

I would take it from that that you do not feel that any kind of a peace, that is anything short of a complete victory, would be appeasement; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. I think that something short of driving them out of Korea would be satisfactory and would not be considered as appeasement.

THE FIRST GREAT TEST OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that the United Nations organization—this probably is not a military question, but you, after all, are a citizen, too—do you think that it can be developed into an organization to preserve peace?

General BRADLEY. The United Nations?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General BRADLEY. I think so. I don't think we ought to give up on it, at least. It takes a long period of years to develop nations as big as the United States. A lot of nations take many, many years to develop into one nation; and I don't think we should become too discouraged just because the United Nations may not have accomplished some of the things we hope to accomplish in 6 years. It is only organized 6 years.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What I was working up to was a line of questions or a thought here, and that is that it seems to me that this is the first great test of the United Nations—this campaign that is being conducted in the name of the United Nations, where we happen to be the largest contributor at the moment. If it is designed, reasonably designed, to accomplish this purpose—I mean it is not something fatally wrong—this approach which we have made through the United Nations—it seems to me that if we can succeed in this particular campaign with respect to the war in Korea that we will have taken a very great step toward the establishment of an effective system of collective security. Does that appeal to you?

General BRADLEY. I think that is right, and I think, on the other hand, if we fail——

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General BRADLEY (continuing). That we have delivered very much of a set-back blow to the United Nations.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I agree with you. It seems to me that that is, perhaps, the justification for it. I mean a lot of people have written me, you see it in the press, and they say why are we in Korea?

It seems to me that we are in Korea for that reason; that is, as an attempt to make effective the United Nations; that is, to meet the first great test. To use as an illustration the two instances when we did not do it, they are when we or the French or the British did not respond to the challenge of Hitler when he entered the Rhineland, and if we had, I have always thought that might have made a great difference. Do you feel that way about it?

General BRADLEY. I feel that way, yes. I think if we had taken positive action against Hitler when he marched into the Ruhr that year, in the middle thirties, that might well have stopped World War II.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I understood from my colleague that you have already developed that question. I say if any of these questions have been answered—I do not want to bore you or burden the record by going over that subject; but if that has been developed, I will desist, with the final word that while it is not perfected, I would gather from your point of view that we are on the right track, assuming we can follow it out and be effective in this and future tests; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. I think that is quite important.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, it seems to me extremely important, and it is the one real hope in this situation. If that was not so, I would be at as much of a loss as many of my constituents are as to why we are in Korea.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey? I believe he is next.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. General Bradley, there are not many questions left that I care to ask, so I will be brief.

THE MESSAGES OF JANUARY 1950

One thing I want to get at, and it has to do with these messages that were exchanged in January of this year with General MacArthur.

Now, as I recall, first, there was a message from General MacArthur of January 10 or 11—tenth here, eleventh over there.

General BRADLEY. January 10.

Senator SPARKMAN. January 10.

The next message that went out was the directive of January 12, and the letter from the President of January 13, and I am omitting this study of January 12, which came in at the same time, but I am trying to confine it to that exchange of three messages.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, you read the message from General MacArthur into the record a few days ago. You read the directive, as I recall, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent him. Previously I think General Marshall read into the record the letter that President Truman sent him. So they are all in the record.

I want to call your attention to a newspaper item from the Washington Post, United Press item, given on page 1775 of our record, headlined New York, and it says this. I will not read all of it, but I want to read enough to form the basis of my question to you.

> Geenral MacArthur's spokesman said today that until January 13 of this year MacArthur believed the Washington officials wanted our forces evacuated from Korea and made a scapegoat for some political advantage.

Do you know of any fact or set of facts that would serve as the basis for any such statement as that?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

DISCUSSIONS ON POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF KOREA

Senator SPARKMAN. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff at any time communicate anything to General MacArthur from which he could correctly arrive at a conclusion that you wanted, first, him to evacuate Korea, and, second, that you wanted the Eighth Army made a scapegoat for political reasons?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. To answer the second part of your question first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not let any political considerations enter any of their military decisions, their military thinking.

As to the first one, the only time we mentioned withdrawal from Korea was in communication with him as a result of his messages there early in January in which he indicated that he thought he would have to withdraw from Korea because he was greatly outnumbered and could not hold.

At that time we queried him as to what time in his withdrawal he would feel it was necessary to make that decision. He later said, well, he would not have to make that decision until he got all the way back to the Pusan bridgehead.

The only times the Joint Chiefs discussed with him a withdrawal from Korea was as a result of his messages in early January which indicated that he felt we had to withdraw from Korea and could not hold.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, the only suggestion as to a withdrawal from Korea was derived from his messages back here?

General BRADLEY. Yes, because he had——

Senator SPARKMAN. Then——

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a moment, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Excuse me, if you had not fully answered.

General BRADLEY. Because he indicated, from those messages in early January, in his opinion he could not hold; and then we started making plans as to how we could get out, and studies as to what we would do if we had to get out.

Senator SPARKMAN. And in his message of January 10, which you read into the record, he drew a pretty gloomy picture and, as I recall, said that in his opinion it was going to be necessary to withdraw?

JANUARY VISIT OF CHIEFS OF STAFF TO KOREA TO ASSESS SITUATION

General BRADLEY. Well, he at least intimated that, and that is why two of the Chiefs of Staff went over to get first-hand information or knowledge of the situation in Korea at that time.

They left here on the evening of January 12.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe both you and General Marshall have testified that they went to Korea, talked to the men, visited the various fronts, and—what I am trying to say—headquarters, command posts, and came back with, and reported that they found the morale excellent, and that, in their opinion, they could hold.

Am I correct in my recollection of that?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it was as a result of this personal investigation by these two Chiefs of Staff that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the situation in Korea was not hopeless, as presented in the message from General MacArthur of January 10?

General BRADLEY. Well, that contributed to their feeling.

About this time, also, the messages coming back from the front indicated a better situation, as we got daily reports; and by that time the line had stabilized pretty much, and in some cases, started moving back; and there was no indication that the Chinese were pushing down on us; and those daily reports, plus the reports from the Chiefs of Staff, I believe, convinced us that the situation was not such that we would have to get out of Korea.

THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JANUARY 13

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, I will quote further, General Bradley, from this newspaper article which is quoting Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, as General MacArthur's spokesman, and he says this:

> * * * said a January 13 message from President Truman was the Government's first clear statement to MacArthur to "hold" in Korea.
>
> Before receiving the message, said Whitney, MacArthur and his command had been led to believe the administration wanted to evacuate the Eighth Army from Korea, pretending the enemy forced an evacuation which would be used as an international political weapon.

I will ask you again, do you know of anything, any fact, or any factual situation that would justify any such conclusion as that?

General BRADLEY. I don't know of any basis for General Whitney's statement of that nature.

Senator SPARKMAN. Nor for the belief that General MacArthur provided his spokesman, General Whitney, was correctly stating his view?

General BRADLEY. I don't know how either the spokesman or General MacArthur, if he were being quoted correctly, could obtain the view that we thought we had to get out of Korea for any political reasons whatsoever.

Senator SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, in the letter from President Truman, which of course he says was the first clear message that he had to stay in there, it was made very clear, was it not, that for political purposes, international, to sustain our international relations, I will put it that way, it was essential that we hold on in Korea?

General BRADLEY. Well, in one place I believe it was mentioned that it was necessary for the preservation of the United Nations, or something to that effect, that we hold on in Korea, if at all possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Now, I will read further from General MacArthur's spokesman, Major General Whitney, as he is quoted directly:

POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF KOREA IN JANUARY

> You must understand that prior to the receipt of this message it appeared to be the prevailing view in Washington that our forces should be evacuated from Korea as soon as diplomatic discussions then under way in the United Nations had been concluded.
>
> It seemed to be the prevailing view of the authorities in Washington that if the evacuation was conducted as the result of enemy pressures some political advantage would be served.

Did you ever communicate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or anyone, as far as you know, communicate anything to General MacArthur that would justify any such conclusion as that?

General BRADLEY. On the last part of it, I believe that we are all agreed that if we were driven out of Korea, that would be one thing; if you just got up and pulled out of Korea, and abandoned the United Nations effort, that would be something else, and that certainly we would not get out of Korea unless we were driven out.

Senator SPARKMAN. You never suggested to him that he pretend to be driven out, did you?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

BACKGROUND OF NOTE-TAKING AT WAKE ISLAND

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, General Bradley, I don't care to labor this Wake Island situation very much, but some of the other people seem to attach considerable importance to it.

You started to tell us, this morning, just how this building was constructed.

Were there two rooms, separate and apart, or were the walls complete, or was it a partition, or just what?

I have seen somewhere a reference to a "slat partition." I don't know just what that means. I wonder if you would tell us?

General BRADLEY. No. As I remember it, it was a solid wall, with one door through it, and the door was open; and, as I was reminded at noon today by my executive who was with me at that time, before the President and General MacArthur came over from their private conference, Miss Anderson was in this principal room talking to General MacArthur's aide, Colonel Storey, and to General Whitney, because she knew them from a previous trip to Japan with Mr. Jessup, and they were talking to each other there; and then, when General MacArthur and the President came, she stepped into the other room, and the door was left open.

That is what I was reminded of today by Colonel Matthews. He remembered their talking, and remembered the fact that Colonel Storey and Miss Anderson were on a first-name basis, and in fact they had been in contact before, apparently, in Japan. She was there a considerable time with Mr. Jessup; so, even if General MacArthur didn't know she was there, I don't know whether he did, or not, certainly General Whitney and Colonel Storey knew she was in this building.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, someone used the term that she was "surreptitiously placed," and also used the term "eavesdropping."

Do you think those terms are correctly descriptive?

General BRADLEY. I think it is a very improper use of the term "surreptitiously placed."

She had come there with Mr. Jessup; as I say, General Whitney and Colonel Storey knew she was in the next room, knew the door was open, so I think that is a rather poor use of the word.

I think eavesdropping possibly is. I don't know why anyone should object to our making notes of this very important meeting. As a matter of fact we could have taken a stenographer along and taken the whole thing down and had it verbatim if anybody was going to question it, but we had to come back and make some reports, certainly I did to the other Chiefs, and that is why we kept these notes, so we could tell the Chiefs what had been discussed.

Then when we found that we had all taken notes and they were so complete, they decided that I was the one that should compile them. Why, I don't remember, but I happened to be in the military, had the facilities for getting out a top secret message and we compiled Mr. Jessup's notes, Mr. Rusk's, mine, Colonel Matthew's, Colonel Hamblen's, and I remember Mr. Pace had a few.

We put them all together, put them together on a plane coming back so that we could have one complete report which we could all use and it would be complete, and I never dreamed that anybody would question the method of it, the necessity for it, or the purpose to which it would be put.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now just one other question regarding that. I have read somewhere in the paper—I don't know whether it was a statement by the young lady or by whom it was—which said that she was in the room but there were not enough chairs or space to take care of the whole crowd, and that she went out. Do you recall whether there was anything to that effect?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember under what circumstances she went out.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now you did send five copies of this report immediately to General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. You have never heard any word of criticism from him regarding the accuracy of it, have you?

General BRADLEY. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. Either after his aide receipted the copies that you sent him or even in his testimony before this committee?

General BRADLEY. No.

ACCEPTANCES OF UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. Now General Bradley, some discussion was had here this morning with reference to troops being sent by other members of the United Nations, and you said that various nations had offered troops, that we found it not expedient to accept. Who had the authority to accept or not accept the troops?

General BRADLEY. Well, we asked General MacArthur what criteria we should use in accepting troops from foreign countries, and he stated in his opinion to be of any military value they should be in groups of not less than a thousand with ability to furnish their own replacements and as much logistical support as possible, and he thought that any group of less than a thousand fully equipped and capable of being maintained at approximately that strength would be of questionable value although he admitted that from a United Nations viewpoint that maybe we should accept some forces smaller than that, and some of the battalions over there do have less than a thousand in them.

BATTLE AND NONBATTLE CASUALTIES

Senator SPARKMAN. With reference to our casualties, approximately 65,000, there was some discussion here this morning as to just what that contained, and I believe it was admitted that it did not contain frostbite or nonbattle casualties. I suppose that means it does no contain service people who just get sick from some reason or another?

Let me ask you this: Does it contain all battle wounds regardless of the degree of disability or whether or not they recover in a short time from them?

General BRADLEY. Yes; and I think this might be an appropriate time to enter these figures which I looked up during the noon hour, because it is an answer to your question and one previously asked.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

General BRADLEY. The United States Army nonbattle casualties from the beginning up to the 20th of May were 41,668. I also have the South Koreans and the UN if you are interested in them.

There is also a report dated May 18 from the Director of the Office of Progress Reports and Statistics, which says:

> "Nonbattle casualties"—

in quotation marks—

> is apt to be a misleading term, for it ignores the fact that in any army there is always a certain incidence of disease and injury. For example, during the occupation of Korea the Army's average monthly rate of admissions to hospitals and quarters because of disease, rigors of weather, and other causes was 6 percent. Since the conflict in Korea began, the average monthly rate in Korea has been 9.5 percent. Medical records show that since the conflict started only 117 men had died in the Far East Command from diseases contracted in Korea.

One other paragraph in this same report says:

> Approximately 70 percent of those wounded in action since the beginning of the Korean conflict have been returned to duty. Service experts advise us there is no way of accurately determining the number of wounded who are now in action. Less than 3 percent of our wounded have died of their wounds.

The reason you can't give the number of those who were wounded and who are now in action is because of the rotation policy and the Marines have a policy that any man who has been wounded twice in combat is automatically qualified for rotation.

Here is one other report—this is an old report. I hate to give it to you, but I couldn't find a later one. It is dated February 2, and is on percentage of nonbattle casualties returned to duty.

The total up to that time from nonbattle casualties was listed returned to duty, 85 percent.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me it might be well if all of these might be set out in the appendix.

Chairman RUSSELL. It will only take a moment to read those ROK and United Nations casualties.

Senator **Sparkman**. Is that all that is left off?

General **Bradley**. I think that is all that is applicable.

The ROK Army nonbattle casualties up to the period of April 29—the other period for the United States Army was up to 20th of May—for the South Korean forces we had them only up to April 29—total nonbattle casualties, 27,789.

The United Nations, other than United States and South Koreans, 4,458. And that is a report up to the 20th of May, the same as the United States forces.

I think it might be interesting to note that the nonbattle casualties of the South Koreans are lower than ours, because they are better acclimated, and I noticed that particularly last summer on the very hot days. We would have a lot of heat prostrations, and they would have very few, because they were used to that heat. I think that possibly explains why they have fewer battle casualties than we have.

Furthermore, they may not have——

Senator **Fulbright**. Fewer nonbattle casualties.

General **Bradley**. Fewer nonbattle casualties.

Senator **Fulbright**. You said fewer battle casualties.

General **Bradley**. Fewer nonbattle casualties.

Chairman **Russell**. Fewer battle casualties, too.

General **Bradley**. Fewer nonbattle casualties because they are more used to the climate and can get along better with it.

Senator **Sparkman**. General Bradley, in reporting casualties, is everything that is——

General **Bradley**. Everything that has to go to the hospital, yes; whether it is a wound or nonbattle, if it goes to the hospital and it requires medical attention.

Senator **Sparkman**. Regardless of the degree?

General **Bradley**. Yes; whether or not they have to be evacuated. For example, even if you go to an aid station and you are wounded and get a wound dressed and go back in you are still carried as wounded in action.

Senator **Sparkman**. If I got a scratch working around a gun and took an antitetanus shot, would that be listed as a casualty?

General **Bradley**. I don't know whether that would be carried as a nonbattle casualty or not. I know it would if you had to go away from your organization some place to get it treated. Whether or not it is listed when you go to your own aid station, I am not too sure, whether it would be counted or not.

Senator **Sparkman**. How many prisoners—of our boys are held prisoners as prisoners of war?

Senator **Wiley**. Unaccounted for.

Senator **Sparkman**. How many prisoners of war?

General **Bradley**. I have seen that figure within the last few days, but I cannot put my hands on it right now. As I remember it is approximately over 4,000, of which something like 1,400 have been recaptured, and the rest of them are still missing. That is just approximately, and it is only from memory. I saw the figures within the last 2 days and that is the way I remember it.

Senator **Sparkman**. General Bradley, I wonder if you would have someone prepare a very short memorandum which could be put into the record when you are next here describing what constitutes a casualty. I would like to know, because I am not clear in my mind how minor a wound or injury would cause one to be listed as a casualty.

General BRADLEY. You want that both for battle casualties and nonbattle?

Senator SPARKMAN. And nonbattle, yes.

TIME OF OUR HEAVIEST CASUALTIES

When did our heaviest casualties occur? Did they occur during the Chinese offensive last fall, and during the early days of the war when we were pushed down into the small beachhead or have they been fairly evenly distributed?

General BRADLEY, I think our percentage of casualties ran higher last summer and last November when we were hit hard by the Chinese. Of course, they ran heavier in November than they did last summer because we had more people committed. I thought that General Marshall had presented those figures by months.

Chairman RUSSELL. He did, and they are available here.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right. I will not ask anything further on that then.

General Bradley, I want to talk to you a little about the question of Formosa.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA

I have just read General MacArthur's letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in which he discussed Formosa. There has been a great area of doubt in my mind or, should I say, curiosity, as to just what the real strategic value of Formosa is.

General MacArthur explained it, as I recall, by showing that it would be a very dangerous thing in enemy hands because it would advance both the air bases and submarine bases by something like 90 to 100 miles, I believe; but he said the effect of that would be virtually to push us back to our western coast.

What I have never been able to understand is what the position of Okinawa would be, with Japan on the north and the Philippines on the south. How would pushing away 80 or 90 or 100 miles from the Chinese mainland break through that line?

General BRADLEY. Well, that is apparently his opinion. The Joint Chiefs did not go that far. We say that it would be bad if it were held by hostile forces. On the other hand, it is not of such importance and so located that we would want to occupy it ourselves because that would expose us sticking out. On the third hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the mere loss of Formosa would jeopardize our whole Pacific position and force us back to the coast of California.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I was going to ask you about that because, as I remember, we did not bother about taking Formosa during World War II, did we?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; we bypassed it.

Senator SPARKMAN. General MacArthur's own command bypassed it?

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. And at that time we had exactly the same line, did we not? We moved up to—well, did we first take the Philippines and then move to Okinawa?

General **Bradley**. Yes; we took the Philippines and then Okinawa, and then Japan.

Senator **Sparkman**. All the way up to Japan. We had exactly the same line then, or would have had had we taken Japan, that we have now; is that right?

General **Bradley**. Yes. Of course——

Senator **Sparkman**. And we did not consider Formosa then as such a threat that we felt that we had to take it before moving on toward Japan; is that not right?

General **Bradley**. That is correct. Of course, you must realize the situation is a little bit different in that we were advancing from south to north and fighting a bypassing action. But certainly part of your deduction is correct, and that is that we ended up holding the Philippines and Okinawa and were willing to function and fight along that line from there on to Japan without taking Formosa.

Now we all admit that Formosa is important, but certainly we do not thing that the loss of Formosa would jeopardize our whole Pacific position. It would be bad, yes, but not that bad.

Senator **Sparkman**. Well, I am glad to hear you say that because I must confess that if our whole western defense must depend upon a little island that is just 60 or 85 miles off the coast of the mainland of China, it seems to me it becomes rather precarious.

General MacArthur in his letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars indicates, and I think he did in his testimony before this committee, that were Formosa held by an enemy, our whole line of communications from the Philippines through to Okinawa up to Japan would be imperiled to the point that he didn't think it would be possible to hold. In fact he used the exact expression, if I remember it, that we would be pushed back to the western coast of this country. You do not share that feeling?

General **Bradley**. No.

Senator **Sparkman**. Nor do the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General **Bradley**. No.

Senator **Sparkman**. You do feel, as I think we all do, that Formosa ought not to be allowed to fall into enemy hands?

General **Bradley**. That is correct. We think from a military point of view that if it were in the hands of an enemy, a power which was at war with us, it would be a threat to our communications between the Philippines and Okinawa and make it necessary to bypass or go considerable distance out to avoid being hit from Formosa.

FORMOSANS' VIEWS ON DIPOSITION OF FORMOSA

There is another point about Formosa which I don't think has been brought out, however, in all this discussion, and that is that Formosa is occupied, as I remember, by some 7,000,000 Formosans and not Chinese, although they are Chinese extraction; and it seems to me that it is only fair that they be given some right in their final disposition rather than just to decide it on something that was said 5 or 6 years ago. I think that also enters into our thinking on Formosa from the United Nations angle.

Maybe I am getting out of my field just a little bit now, but I am speaking only as a citizen in this case, and I think it is possible that some of our people in talking about Formosa have forgotten the fact that maybe they should have something to say about their own disposition, too.

From the military point of view we think it is important it not be held by the enemy, and not important enough that we should go occupy it. We do not think that its loss to an enemy would jeopardize our position to the extent that we would lose all of our other positions in the Pacific.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am glad to hear you say that, General Bradley; I feel the same way.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to transgress 20 seconds, if I may. I feel that other members have.

I just want to say, General Bradley, I feel that you have made a very helpful statement with reference to the Formosans themselves having some say in this. As a matter of fact, more than half of the members nations of the United Nations have a smaller population than Formosa.

Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair wishes to clear the record before calling on the Senator from Iowa. Pardon me.

ROK CASUALTIES

I evidently misunderstood General Bradley a few moments ago when he was reading the ROK casualties and reading the figure of 27,000 nonbattle casualties.

General BRADLEY. 27,789 up to the 29th of April.

Chairman RUSSELL. I thought you were reading the battle casualties. What were the battle casualties? Do you have them?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I do not have the battle casualties.

Chairman RUSSELL. They are perhaps in the matter submitted by Secretary Marshall, but I misunderstood you, General, and thought you said that was battle casualties.

General BRADLEY. If I did, I misstated myself.

Chairman RUSSELL. And I thank the Senator from California for calling it to my attention.

Senator Gillette.

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman. General Bradley, I will try not to use more than 10 minutes of your time.

At the outset of these hearings I stated in my own mind there were two issues.

One was the justification for and the necessity for the recall of General MacArthur. So far as I, as a member of this joint group is concerned, that issue has been resolved in my own mind. I do not need to ask any more questions or hear any more testimony after listening to General MacArthur, General Marshall, and yourself.

OBJECTIVES IN OUR MISSION IN KOREA

The second issue, however, as I see it has not been cleared up in my mind, and judging from the questions that are asked here, it has not been cleared up i nthe minds of a number of the Senators. That is represented by the questions asked by the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Massachusetts.

What are we doing in Korea? What is the mission? What is the objective? What is the purpose? Yesterday when you put the statement of January 10, I think it was, or 9, from General MacArthur in, I noticed this portion of his statement, that—

> I am supposed to continue to defend successively positions subject to my basic mission of protecting Japan.

Do you understand that that was the basic mission of General MacArthur and our troops there?

General BRADLEY. That wasn't his basic mission in Korea. That was considered by him as his basic mission as commanding general of the Far East.

Senator GILLETTE. Not as Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces?

General BRADLEY. Yes; as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern forces and the allied powers before Korea, his primary mission was the security of Japan, but he was given another problem by the United Nations in Korea, and when he said that his primary mission was the security of Japan, I think he was thinking of his over-all position, not of his position in Korea. He certainly wouldn't fight in Korea to protect Japan, so we can safely assume, I think, that he was talking about his combined over-all mission.

Senator GILLETTE. Now I will refer again to the statement that General MacArthur made in his address to the joint session of Congress on his return, referring to the advance that had been made up in Northern Korea. I quote:

> Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy and it urgently demanded a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy. These decisions were not forthcoming.

Do you want to comment on that?

General BRADLEY. As far as military directive was concerned, I think he was given sufficient directives. He was told that he no longer should consider it his mission to clear all of North Korea of the enemy and that the safety of his troops was paramount, and that his mission should be to inflict as severe casualties as possible on the Chinese with minimum to himself, and, of course, later on, as was brought out, that he should stay in Korea if at all possible to hold.

Now as far as the poltical decision is concerned as to whether or not we intend to drive them entirely out of Korea or whether or not we are willing to stop at the thirty-eighth parallel or what other political decision is concerned, I think it is fair to say that he has not received that from the United Nations or from the United States.

[Deleted.]

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA

Senator GILLETTE. Now General Bradley, there were three resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. The first one was on June 25, and I quote:

> They determined that the action of the North Koreans constituted a breach of the peace. They called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, called upon

> the authorities of North Korea to withdraw to the thirty-eighth parallel, and requested the United Nations Commission on Korea to communicate its fully considered recommendations with the least possible delay, and to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel.

On June 27 they passed a second resolution in which:

> The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, and having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel, and having noted that this had not been done, recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Then on June 30, the President of the United States made à statement in which he said that:

> In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, the President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in North Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.
>
> General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.

Now that action was taken pursuant to the second resolution before there had been any request for a United Nations army, and our President acted on that request, as he stated.

Now the third resolution with which you are fully familiar, but for the purpose of my question I want to call attention to it, was on July 7:

> Recommends that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;
>
> Requests the United States to designate the commander;
>
> Authorizes the use of the flag and directs reports to be made.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 7, 1950

Now do you know of any other resolution or action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations supplementary to or changing that in any way, that objective?

General Bradley. I believe there was another one about the end of September, Senator.

Senator Gillette. To what effect?

Senator Knowland. October 7, wasn't it, General?

General Bradley. Somewhere around there, October 7. My notes show that on October the 6th the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted to General MacArthur the text of the proposed United Nations General Assembly resolution on post hostilities in Korea. He was informed that the General Assembly would probably vote on the resolution on the 6th of October 1950 and that any textual changes would be immediately transmitted to him.

The Joint Chiefs further stated it was considered that the resolution provided support for operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel. After approval of the resolution by the General Assembly, General MacArthur was requested to transmit immediately the text of the resolution to the North Korean authorities and to call upon them to lay down their arms.

On October the 7, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the commander in chief, Far East, that the General Assembly had passed a resolution on post hostilities in Korea with certain minor textual changes of which he was informed, so that indicates there was another one on October the 7th.

Senator GILLETTE. Do you know of any directive or resolution passed by the Security Council of the United Nations which is the agency to which you reported, other than the three that I have quoted? This was the General Assembly you were just quoting from.

General BRADLEY. I don't know of any other than those three, and this one, all of which came out of United Nations.

WHO DETERMINED OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator GILLETTE. Well, just a short time ago—this afternoon, I believe—you stated what was the mission now of General Ridgway. You stated that for the hearing here. When was that determined as his mission? Was it determined by the Security Council of the United Nations or was it determined by our Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. That was determined by us as the military executive agents in carrying out the United Nations resolution.

Senator GILLETTE. When was that decision made as to a new mission?

General BRADLEY. The latest one I believe was given to him, a directive—that is, the one that changed that was January the 12th.

REPORTING TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator GILLETTE. Was that reported to the Security Council?

General BRADLEY. I assume so. I don't remember, but as executive agents, military executive agents for carrying out the military actions for the United Nations, we have written those directives and the President has approved each one of them because he was charged with appointment of the commander in the carrying on of the operations.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, acting as agent, as you were an executive agent for the United Nations, you certainly would make a report of an entire change of policy and mission, would you not?

General BRADLEY. I assume that that report was made; yes. I don't know.

Senator GILLETTE. You don't know?

General BRADLEY. We have representatives at the United Nations and I assume that they made it. I don't know frankly if they did or not.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, that brings me to this question. You stated also this afternoon—and I believe this is your exact language—in referring to the contribution that had been made of the various allies to the enterprise in Korea:

> I believe that in most cases our policies were acceptable to the United Nations.

Don't you know?

General BRADLEY. As to what policies was I talking about?

Senator GILLETTE. The general policies on the conduct of the war.

General BRADLEY. I assume they are, because we have not been informed to the contrary.

Senator GILLETTE. But, General acting as an agent for the United Nations in the conduct of this enterprise, and under a directive to report to them regularly as to what was done, don't you believe you ought to be in a position to more than assume that reports had been made, and that the policies were approved?

General BRADLEY. General MacArthur, as the field commander, was rendering reports regularly to the United Nations.

Senator GILLETTE. Through the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. Originally they came through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and later on he was informed that as long as he reported only military operations that he could report those directly to the United Nations.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

QUESTION OF INSUBORDINATION

General, yesterday you made the statement that there was no insubordination with respect to any official act, relating to military matters, of General MacArthur.

General BRADLEY. That is correct. I stated I did not know of any direct violation of the directives that had been given to him or insubordination on his part so far as the military matters were concerned.

Senator BYRD. Do you regard his letter to the convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars as being insubordinate?

General BRADLEY. From a military point of view, I would not. As I stated once before, various statements made on policy, without being cleared by the Government, were contrary to custom in the services, and, in my opinion, if allowed to continue on indefinitely would jeopardize the civilian control of the military.

Senator BYRD. Well, would the letter to Speaker Martin be in that same category?

General BRADLEY. I think it would be; yes.

Senator BYRD. Isn't the peace proposal that he made without the approval of the President a different category or not?

General BRADLEY. It might be considered a slightly different category, except that it was sort of the same attitude of moving independently of the policy of our Government, and I think the bad part about the offer of an armistice and threatening certain other actions if they did not accept it, the bad part of that was that here our Government was negotiating with other governments who had furnished troops to Korea, to agree on terms to be offered the Chinese, and then when he spoke up, it placed us in a position of speaking with two heads, really, the Government in Washington proposing one thing, being ready to propose something, and then General MacArthur in the field as United Nations commander, proposing it himself in the field in a slightly different form, or at least jumping the gun on an agreement by the nations concerned. So, it was a sort of divided authority which was not too good an example to set for the first United Nations commander we ever had in action.

Senator BYRD. Do you regard that act without the approval of the President as being an act of insubordination by General MacArthur?

General Bradley. I doubt if General MacArthur intended it to be an act of insubordination. I don't know what prompted him to do it, but I would doubt that he would really do it intentionally as an act of insubordination.

Senator Byrd. Well, was there any act on the part of General MacArthur, either military or not military, that you would regard as insubordinate?

General Bradley. Well, I don't think you would say that they were insubordinate from a military point of view. Maybe by stretching it some you could say the fact that he failed to comply with custom, and failing to comply with a specific directive on December 6, to submit policy statements to the Government for approval, I suppose you might stretch it to say that those were insubordination acts in that he did not comply with custom and the order of December 6. But I doubt if that—I say if he thought of it in those terms at all.

Senator Byrd. As a commander in the field, do you believe that General MacArthur had the right to state publicly his conception of military strategy even though he knew that that differed from the views of the President?

General Bradley. No, sir, I don't believe he did. I think he has a perfect right to express his difference of views in strategy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the President, but I do not believe that any commander who is on active duty and commanding troops has any right to carry the difference to the people.

INSUBORDINATION NOT NECESSARY FOR RELIEF OF COMMAND

Senator Byrd. But, so far as you are now willing to say, there is no specific act of his that you would regard as insubordinate, that is to say, an act that would justify his dismissal or recall?

General Bradley. No, sir; I am not saying that. When you talk about insubordination, deliberate insubordination, you are accusing a man of something for which he might be tried, for example.

But a man may do many things short of that for which you would be justified in relieving him from command. And in my opinion the President has authority to relieve any of us from our duties, our command, at any time he sees fit.

If he loses confidence in us or he thinks that somebody else can do better, or any other reason, I think he has that right.

I know during the last war we found it necessary to relieve many commanders, even division commanders, and it was not because they failed to do something. It was just a question usually that we lost confidence in them, they didn't do as well as somebody else could in the job. Sometimes they lost confidence in themselves.

I think you must recognize the right of a senior commander or the Commander in Chief to relieve someone in whom he has lost confidence or does not have full confidence in being able to carry out his orders and directives.

Senator Byrd. I don't think anybody could question that because the President is the Commander in Chief.

What act, in your judgment, was most responsible for General MacArthur's recall?

General Bradley. Well, as I understand it, it was rather an accumulation, Senator Byrd, and the President has stated that he has been worried about it ever since last summer, according to his statement to the press the other day.

As far as I know, he did not announce any decision until recently, and I think the last one that came up was the statement that was made to the editor of Freeman magazine, when he was queried as to why he did not arm more South Koreans, and he replied that that was a polical decision; whereas, as a matter of fact, when he had been queried about it, he had recommended against it himself on the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal.

I think the start of it last summer was on the VFW letter and the last statement up to the time the decision was announced by the President, so far as I know, was when he blamed Washington for not arming more South Koreans.

UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES ACTION ON KOREA IN JUNE 1950

Senator Byrd. Yesterday you said in answer to a question from Senator George that when we went into Korea on a resolution of the United Nations—is it a fact or not a fact that the President ordered that our troops begin the action in Korea before the adoption of the resolution in the United Nations?

General Bradley. I don't believe we committed anything before the first one, which was on the 25th. Of course, that did not call for armed force. Our first action was to try to get our own nationals out of Korea and then after that these other two resolutions that were read by Senator Gillette followed that first one.

Senator Byrd. What resolution did you refer to? "We went into Korea on the resolution of the United Nations."

General Bradley. That is right.

Senator Byrd. You mean you went into the war or went in only to get the nationals of our country out?

General Bradley. The first movement was to get our nationals out. When we went in in force was in consonance with the resolution of the United Nations.

Senator Byrd. Is it correct or not that our troops actually went in in combat prior to the passage, or rather, they were ordered into combat prior to the passage of the resolution of the United Nations?

General Bradley. I would have to check those dates, but I don't think we went into action——

Senator Byrd. It is a very vital question.

General Bradley. According to this compilation of certain published information on the military situation in the Far East, it says that on June 27 at 12 noon President Truman revealed that pursuant to the Security Council's call upon UN members to render every assistance to execution of the June 25 resolution, he had ordered United States air and sea units to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

So apparently that was in consonance with the resolution of the United Nations.

Senator Byrd. Did you get a directive from him? Who would get that? Where would that be sent?

General Bradley. He would tell——

Senator Byrd. To whom would he give the direction, General MacArthur, or who? Was General MacArthur appointed at that time?

General **Bradley**. He was the United States commander in the Far East. He was not the United Nations commander until after the resolution, I believe, of July 7; but he was the United States commander before that.

Senator **Byrd**. Did you get a copy of the order that the President gave to whomever it was given as to when and what our troops were directed to get in the war?

General **Bradley**. I will see if I can find it here.

Senator **Byrd**. What was the date of the action by the United Nations?

General **Bradley**. The first one, I believe, was on June 25. Second on June 27. And the third one on July 7.

Senator **Byrd**. What was the one on June 25? What was the character of it?

Geenral **Bradley**. That one was the one that called upon the North Koreans to cease their offensive action and get behind the thirty-eighth parallel.

WHO ACTED FIRST

Senator **Byrd**. That was not an order to put our units into the war?

General **Bradley**. On June 26 the instructions were furnished General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing for the employment of United States naval and air forces against North Korean units south of the thirty-eighth parallel only.

Senator **Byrd**. When was the resolution authorizing that passed by the United Nations, what date and what hour?

General **Bradley**. The first one calling upon them to desist was on the 25th. The next one was on the 27th. The use of ground forces——

Senator **Byrd**. Wait a minute. What was the second one, the 27th?

General **Bradley**. On June 27 the United Nations Security Council called upon the members of the United Nations to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel armed attack.

Senator **Byrd**. As a matter of fact, then, our forces went in the day before the resolution of the United Nations authorized them to?

General **Bradley**. The air units went in the day before, and the naval forces went in the day before to help evacuate our nationals.

Senator **Byrd**. Well, that does not say that, though, in here. I have a copy of it:

> Instructions furnished CINCFE by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 26 June 1950 provided for the employment of United States naval and air forces against North Korean units south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

That does not say anything about evacuating our nationals. That means they got right in the war.

General **Bradley**. That is correct.

Senator **Byrd**. And they did it 12 hours before they were authorized to do it by the United Nations.

General **Bradley**. That was considered necessary to help cover the evacuation of our nationals.

Senator **Byrd**. That may be all right, but it does not agree with your statement of yesterday when you said we entered Korea on resolution of the United Nations.

General **Bradley**. We did when we went in in strength. I think I made it very clear at various times that we first went in to help evacuate our nationals, and then went in in strength after June 27. Before June 27 we had not committed any ground forces.

Senator BYRD. But you had committed naval and air forces against North Korean units.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir, to help cover evacuation of our nationals.

Senator BYRD. The record does not say that.

General BRADLEY. This is just a very brief statement of what was in those various messages.

Senator BYRD. Well, the fact is then that you were actually in conflict with the North Korean units one day before the resolution was passed by the United Nations.

General BRADLEY. By air and naval, yes. Probably the naval had not reached there yet, but the orders had been given.

Senator BYRD. Now, General, I want to ask you during the balance of my time a question about Russian troops in the Manchurian area. Can you give the committee an estimate of those troops?

[Deleted.]

One other question. What do you know about the mutual defense pact between Red China and the Soviet?

IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY

General BRADLEY. Well, I have read the pact as announced. One paragraph has particular application and that was the one that stated that if anyone allied with Japan or joined with Japan should attack either one of the forces, China or Russia, that the other one would come to her assistance. I have forgotten what numbered article that is in the treaty, but to me that is a rather important one when we are operating out of Japan if we attacked Manchuria. I think they might very well interpret that as our working with Japan because we would be operating out of Japan against one of the two signatory powers, and therefore the other would be bound by that article to come to their assistance.

Senator BYRD. If we bomb China, do you believe Russia would then use that in order to carry out this pact, that they would then get into war?

General BRADLEY. I think China might very well call upon Russia to carry out her part of the treaty.

Senator BYRD. Would the letter of the pact be such that Russia should do it if she kept her treaty or not?

General BRADLEY. Well, it would be subject to interpretation, of course. But I think that it might very well do that. I think I have the article right here.

Article I says:

> Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.
>
> The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness in the spirit of sincere cooperation to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring

peace and security throughout the world, and will do all in their power to achieve the speediest implementation of these tasks.

Senator BYRD. What is the date of that?

General BRADLEY. This is official release by the USSR Information Bulletin with reference to treaty between Soviet Russia and Red China and dated February 14, 1950.

Senator BYRD. I have one other question, General.

REASON FOR DIFFERENCES IN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN TROOP EFFECTIVENESS

You stated in your testimony of yesterday that for the first few days we did not know how good these North Koreans were. I have been very much puzzled as to why the North Koreans, who are exactly the same type of people as the South Koreans, fought with the Communists with much greater zeal and effectiveness than the South Koreans that fought with us. What is your explanation of that?

General BRADLEY. Well, in the first place, they are not much better when they are man for man. They may be a little bit. They are better led than the South Koreans, I would say is the principal reason.

When we withdrew from South Korea with our occupation forces and formed the South Korean forces, we were dependent upon leaders who had very little military experience, people who had lived in South Korea. On the other hand, the North Koreans drew on some of the Koreans who had lived in Manchuria for several years and who had fought with both the Chinese and with the Russians during World War II.

So that the North Koreans were able to furnish leaders with many years of experience. Some of the men, the Manchurian Koreans, if I make myself clear—there were about 70,000 of these troops that were in Manchuria—and some of those people, according to Mr. Stalin, at one of these conferences, I believe he told General Marshall, some of them were fighting at Stalingrad with the Russians, so that they were able to furnish leaders with a great amount of combat experience.

The South Koreans were not with that experience, and I personally think that that accounts for a large part of the difference.

At the same time, the ruthless methods used by the Communists do get better temporary results, at least when you are on the advance, than our more humane treatment of troops.

They will shoot anybody who steps out of ranks, for example, and violates march discipline. They shoot anyone who starts to the rear. That is quite an incentive under certain circumstances, and the Communists do not hesitate to apply those methods.

Senator BYRD. They are both about equally equipped?

EQUIPMENT AND ADVISERS OF NORTH KOREANS

General BRADLEY. They are now, I think; they were better equipped than the South Koreans, to start with, because we had only equipped the South Koreans for security purposes and not for offensive purposes.

Some people thought that we should not arm them that well, because at one time, I believe, they had some idea that they would start something if they were properly equipped, and so when we pulled out, we left them only defensive equipment, and equipment sufficient for maintaining internal security.

The North Koreans were much better armed than that when they started the action. They were equipped for offensive action.

Senator Byrd. Have you any evidence of Russian officers who were in charge of the North Korean troops?

General Bradley. Yes. When we first started the action they had Russian advisers with the North Korean units, and they had them with division headquarters and down to regiments, and in some cases battalions; they had Russian advisers with the North Korean units.

Senator Byrd. We had Americans.

General Bradley. We had Americans with South Korean units.

Senator Byrd. After the war broke out, have you had any evidence that Russian soldiers or Russian officers were with the North Koreans?

General Bradley. No. So far as we know the Russian advisers all went home about October 1.

Senator Byrd. Any Russian airmen?

General Bradley. We have not shot any down back of our lines.

Senator Byrd. But they have used Russian planes?

General Bradley. They have used Russian planes. The planes which are used mostly to combat our approaches to the Yalu area are so-called MIG 15's, which are fast jet Russian-built planes.

Senator Byrd. They furnished Russian tanks, too?

General Bradley. The tanks are Russian.

Senator Byrd. And rifles and artillery?

General Bradley. I think most of the artillery is. I think the rifles are more or less of a mixture of some American weapons that we had furnished the Chinese Nationalists, and which were captured; some Chinese-made ones; some Japanese-captured ones, so I think their small arms have been more or less of a conglomeration of various national weapons.

Senator Byrd. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

RECESS

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, I think I shall recess the committee at this time. I do not want you to take that as a precedent though for other afternoon sessions, because I think we should proceed to undertake to pursue these hearings with the greatest vigor of which we are capable.

General Bradley, several Senators have indicated their desire to propound further questions to you and, therefore, we must request you to be back here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse.

Senator Morse. May I make one brief comment on a procedural matter?

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. I was absent this morning because I was attending a departmental conference on behalf of a problem affecting some of my constituency and I was not here at the time the Chair ruled on Senator Wiley's letter.

I want to say to the Chair that had I been present, I would have shared the chairman's view that because of the terminology of the letter, which in my opinion reflects upon the committee, and unintentionally, I am sure, but nevertheless it has that effect, that I would have shared the chairman's view that a letter of that type should not be transmitted by this committee to the President of the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. I might state that no member of the committee made any motion. I appreciate the Senator's making that statement, but no member made a motion.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, has the Chair considered having night sessions in order to hasten these matters along?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I would not desire to have night sessions without taking it up with the members of the committee, but I do think we should carry on later here in the future when we have afternoon sessions. Of course, I shall be happy to have night sessions, if it meets with the approval of the committee, but I would not call a night session without submitting it to the committee.

If there is no further matter to come to our attention, we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, May 23, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Gillette, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey, Brewster, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Stennis, Long, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. I believe that this provides Senator Brewster with his first opportunity to examine a witness since he has become a member of this committee. Senator Brewster.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. CHESTER N. CLIFTON—Resumed

INCHON LANDING

Senator Brewster. I appreciate the chairman calling attention to the fact that we have reached page 2598, but up to the present time at any rate my questioning has not prolonged the hearings. I shall certainly try to cooperate with the chairman in his endeavor to expedite this just as far as practicable.

I wondered whether or not General Bradley took account of the calculated risk of these proceedings when he concurred in the relief of General MacArthur, or whther he underestimated the potential of the enemy.

General Bradley. No, sir. And that part of the relief of General MacArthur was not a military question.

Senator Brewster. I quite concur, but as a civilian in the political field, the fact remains that you did, General, as I understood, base your chief feeling on the supremacy of civilian control. I remember you emphasized that.

General Bradley. That was one of the three military reasons by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't say we disregarded the political implications of this entirely. Naturally we realized that it had military implications and political implications, but we were called upon to express a point of view from the military side only.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to say for myself as everybody has done a little self explaining, that I have always been a profound believer in the dangers implicit in congressional committees on the conduct of the war. I became very firmly of that view in working with Senator Truman as he then was, and the Truman committee, and we had that as our guiding light in the whole conduct of the Truman committee and I think it worked out very well.

I recognize that here the situation is somewhat more complicated and difficult and we seem to be verging somewhat onto the things as Senator Fulbright who is certainly one of the most devoted supporters of the military policies went into the dispositon of the troops which verges into the military certainly.

The only question I will ask on that is you do concur General Bradley do you not in the brilliance and success of the Inchon landing?

General BRADLEY. Oh, yes, sir. As I have stated here a couple of times, I am not in any way trying to discredit the illustrious career of General MacArthur. He rendered a wonderful service to his country, and he has been a brilliant military leader. In answer to some of the questions here yesterday I tried to say that I felt that looking at it from here I might have made different dispositions. I think I would have. But I had different information from what General MacArthur had. He was on the field of battle. He had the feel of it. I hestitate very much to say that had I been there and had the same information he had, I would have done differently. I think I would have.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General BRADLEY. But you find that no two military leaders probably would do exactly the same thing under the same circumstances.

Senator BREWSTER. Military men are like politicians—they do have different views?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

DIFFERENCES OF VIEWPOINT

Senator BREWSTER. And in the European operations you have had differences of viewpoint as to military procedures, and you have expressed yourself rather strongly about them, very properly.

General BRADLEY. Yes, and I admitted that I might have been wrong when I wrote it, too. I tried to write a book which would be helpful to future commanders and wrote in sort of the vein of a critique afterwards. I admit that I was wrong in some of those cases.

Senator BREWSTER. That is the beginning of knowledge.

General BRADLEY. We are all human, we all make mistakes, and we all do it differently.

HOT PURSUIT VETOED BY UN

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. I know that is the spirit in which we are all trying to approach this matter.

In connection with the civilian aspect there is one other matter that I think should be clear in the record—that the overruling of the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of all the military and civilian authorities of this Government regarding hot pursuit was vetoed by 13 anonymous diplomats at Lake Success, presumably civilians. That is the case as far as you know, is it not?

General BRADLEY. Whether or not they consulted their military leaders, I don't know; because I think we would all admit that carrying the war in any form into Manchuria takes on political aspects as well as military.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General BRADLEY. Now how many of those people consulted their military advisers and which ones didn't, I would have no way of knowing.

Senator BREWSTER. But the final votes were cast by the diplomatic representatives there at Lake Success against our Government proceeding, although we were in charge of the operation?

General BRADLEY. Well, whether it was to the United Nations representatitve or to the State Department, I don't know, sir. The State Department handled it because it was primarily dealing with the foreign governments. That is always handled by the State Department and they handled it, and how they handled it I don't know.

Senator BREWSTER. The State Department was the one that advised you that they did not approve.

General BRADLEY. That the other nations did not approve.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; that the other nations did not approve.

General BRADLEY. Yes.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Senator BREWSTER. Would you agree, General Bradley, that coincidentally, at least, with this episode here in the last 6 weeks we have made very material gains in achieving some of the objectives we had in mind in the operation there? I refer, for instance, to the matter of economic sanctions which we had long urged, but we did not achieve that in the United Nations until coincidentally with these hearings?

General BRADLEY. Well, certainly, we have made progress in the last 6 weeks. Now, what effect these hearings had on England and France, I wouldn't venture to say.

Senator BREWSTER. I did not ask you that.

General BRADLEY. But certainly we have made progress.

Senator BREWSTER. It is coincidental, at any rate. It would seem they suddenly changed what had hitherto been a firm resistance to economic sanctions in London.

General BRADLEY. I would not say it was an opposition to it; we just had trouble getting them to go along with it.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General BRADLEY. We had been advocating these economic sanctions for a long time.

MILITARY MISSION TO FORMOSA

Senator BREWSTER. Now, we have also provided a military mission to Formosa.

General BRADLEY. Yes. We furnished the first aid last fall. A decision was made in August, and the first deliveries on that were in November.

Senator **Brewster**. You refer now to military aid?

General **Bradley**. Military aid, yes, to the Nationalists on Formosa.

Senator **Brewster**. That was a decision last August?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir. And since the report came in by General Fox's committee, which came in in September, we have outlined additional military aid for them, and have requested funds for it, and some of them are up for consideration at the present time, for additional funds for helping the Nationalists on Formosa.

Senator **Brewster**. Do you know if there has appeared in the record, the report of how much military aid had been furnished prior to April 1, since the change of policy last August?

General **Bradley**. I don't believe so.

I think I stated, at one time, that about $10 million worth of ammunition and key equipment was furnished last November; and the total which has been recommended to date is something over $300 million; but how much of that has actually been delivered, I don't know, sir.

Senator **Brewster**. Would there be any objection if either quarterly or monthly reports of those shipments could be provided? I mean, over the past 6 months.

General **Bradley**. Well, I am sure there would not be any objection to furnishing them to anyone interested, on a confidential basis; whether or not you would want to publish that, I would doubt.

Senator **Brewster**. I would say that would be something for our confidential record.

It was announced, was it not, when the statement regarding the military mission to Formosa was announced here 2 weeks or so ago, that we were sending this aid for defensive purposes?

General **Bradley**. Yes; I believe so.

Senator **Brewster**. Has that been the policy up to the present?

General **Bradley**. Well I don't know that you can distinguish entirely between defensive and offensive.

Our principal aim has been to strengthen the Nationalists on Formosa so that they would have the defensive capabilities to hold the island themselves against any projected attack from the mainland.

[Deleted.]

CHANGE IN POLICY

Senator **Brewster**. Now did that August decision represent a change in our policy that had heretofore prevailed against giving military aid to Formosa?

General **Bradley**. Yes; to the extent that we had not furnished any military aid to the Nationalists prior to that time for a year or two; so it was a change from one we had been following a year or two before that.

Senator **Brewster**. I have in my hand the President's statement of January 5, 1950, when he said:

> Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.

That was the position up to August of 1950?

General **Bradley**. I would say that that was the policy up until June 25 or 26 when the President intimated that he would not permit an invasion of Formosa from the mainland.

It was the first time, of course, as you say, in August, when he actually O. K.'d military equipment and ammunition for them. He had changed his policy to the extent that he had directed the Seventh Fleet to prevent any invasion of Formosa.

RUSK'S SPEECH

Senator BREWSTER. Were you or your associates in the Joint Chiefs consulted regarding the address by Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, at the Chinese Institute dinner at the Waldorf Hotel, New York City, Friday evening, May 18, 1951?

General BRADLEY. Not to my knowledge.

Senator BREWSTER. So far as you were concerned, you have no knowledge whatsoever of that?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Have you since read the speech?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I have seen it referred to in the papers, but I have not read the full text of his speech.

Senator BREWSTER. I will ask that this speech, of which I have a copy, shall go in the appendix of the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

(The document referred to above is to be found in the appendix of the record.)

Senator BREWSTER. In that speech Secretary Rusk took a very clear and very strong position apparently as to Russian domination of the Communist Government of China.

To what extent have you formed any opinion on that subject, General Bradley?

General BRADLEY. As to the Russian domination of the Chinese Government?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General BRADLEY. That is largely a State Department matter. I do have some views on it, of course, and have considered it. I think it is rather hard to know just what influence the Russsians have on the Chinese Government.

According to some information available, Mao-Tze-Tung is a rather rabid Communist in his own right. Now whether or not the other people in the government with him are as rabid Communists as Mao-Tze-Tung, I don't know.

I think we must admit that for the time being, while Russia is furnishing equipment, they must have some influence on their policies. On the other hand, no one has ever dominated China for very long. At some time in the future that might change, but right now it is very hard to know just how much is due to Russian influence and how much of it is due to the rabid communism, and he admits he is a Marxist Communist, of Mao-Tze-Tung himself.

ALL-OUT WAR

Senator BREWSTER. General Bradley, do you know of any responsible person in America at least who is urging an all-out war on Red China?

General BRADLEY. No; I don't know of anyone who is advocating an all-out war.

Senator BREWSTER. You, in answering questions by Senator Johnson, qualified your statement in this way. You said ,"Well, if we were in all-out war, why there are a great many things that would be required," but you do not know of anyone at present who is urging such a thing?

General BRADLEY. No; but I think that the American people might have demanded some such war had we been driven out of Korea. As it is, I don't know of anyone that is demanding it at the present time.

Senator BREWSTER. Now in the requirements for the more limited war proposed by General MacArthur, it would be quite different from the requirements of an all-out war to dominate and conquer the China mainland, would it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes; but to extend it beyond what we are doing now requires some additional forces but would not require all the forces that an all-out war would require.

Senator BREWSTER. Would the analogy which has been repeatedly suggested here of the Japanese difficulties in the conquest of China apply to the far more limited program proposed by General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. It would apply in this way, I think, Senator Brewster, and that is that Japan went into this in a very big way and it was not decisive. To go into it some smaller way we doubt whether or not it would be decisive.

In other words, to extend the war beyond what we are doing now might have some effect, but it would not in our opinion be decisive, and at the same time you are running a greater risk of provoking a World War III.

In other words, if you were sure this would be decisive, then you might want to take that risk but, since something less than the Japanese did would be of doubtful decsiveness, then why take the risk at this time?

Senator BREWSTER. I can understand that. The original objective of the United Nations was to clear Korea of aggression?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. And if that limited objective could be pursued, aside from the hazard of Soviet involvement, as a military matter, would it not be far more practicable to follow the conventional methods of war and bomb the enemy's communications and destroy their supply dumps and so on?

General BRADLEY. Yes, there might be some advantages sometimes to extend your attack on something beyond the 200-mile line that we are working on now. To hit a lengthened line with the same intentness with which we are hitting this one would require additional forces.

Of course, you could hit a longer line with less intensity than we are hitting the present one, possibly with the present forces.

TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD

Senator BREWSTER. General MacArthur made the point on logistics which gets somewhat away from battles. He believed that the Siberian Railway was being taxed to its limit to supply the present operations. Has that been given consideration?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. Every intelligence estimate we make of the Far East must take into consideration the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and of the shipping which comes around during the summer, around the north; we also take into consideration the war industries which have been built up in the Far East in order to remove and relieve that road of some of its load in case of war. All of those things are taken into consideration.

Seantor **Brewster**. Do I understand that you disagree with General MacArthur on the general proposition that logistically it would be extremely difficult for the Russians to supply any very material increase in operations if they were confined to the Siberian Railway.

General **Bradley**. We—I think I would differ in degree, because they have built up certain depots of supplies; they have certain industries there that manufacture war materials.

The Trans-Siberian Railroad will handle about 17,000 tons a day in addition to its own tonnage-maintenance requirements, and all of those taken into consideration still leaves the Russians in the Far East with a considerable military capability.

Senator **Brewster**. Which they could supply over a period?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Seantor **Brewster**. He intimated that they would be progressively curtailed because of the choking of their transport on the Siberian Railway.

General **Bradley**. Well, certainly if you got into a war with them that would be a consideration in your planned campaign.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

General **Bradley**. But I think our difference is that I feel that they, in spite of the limitations of the Trans-Siberial Railroad, still have a very considerable military capability.

CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD DEATH

Senator **Brewster**. On the matter of attrition of the Chinese, is not their attitude toward life and death quite different from ours?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Brewster**. Had you taken into account that they had reported last year that there was around 40,000,000 starving in China, which is not unusual apparently, as a result of their making grain available to Russia, and of their organizing their military potential?

General **Bradley**. Well, I think just the subtraction of a few hundred thousand casualties from the total population of China does not mean so much; but when you subtract them from its trained manpower——

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

General **Bradley** (continuing). And when you consider the effect on the morale of those that are left, and also the effect on the morale of the soldiers and of the civilian population, and the drain on the resources when all the wounded have to be taken back and taken care of, I don't think you can measure it just in terms of the subtraction of so many lives from 450,000,000 Chinamen.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

JCS MEMO OF JANUARY 12

In the 16 points that were discussed under your memorandum of the study of January 12, Secretary Marshall stated on page 846 of the testimony that—

Offhand, a glance at the document would say 12 or 13 out of the 16 had been put into effect.

Is that substantially your impression of them?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember the exact number, but quite a number of them have been put into effect and have been in effect for a long period of time.

Senator BREWSTER. Regarding the imposition of the naval blockade, which was discussed there in all of the reports I have seen, apparently the qualification that the naval blockade would be considered if Korea were evacuated or if conditions in Korea were stabilized was a qualification on that item of the naval blockade alone. Do you know if that is correct?

General BRADLEY. No. You have to go back to the original reason for the study, which I believe has been stated here.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; I am familiar with that.

General BRADLEY. It was if we find ourselves in all-out war with China, a declared or undeclared war, then you would have certain objectives and certain lines of action, and that was the basis of the study. Unfortunately, as I have said, that phrase was dropped out in the final paper, which was about the third or fourth of a series.

AIR WARNING SERVICE

Senator BREWSTER. To what extent are the estimates of the difficulty of detecting air raids based upon the possibilities of continual preparedness, not knowing what hour it may strike? To what extent would it be modified if you were only compelled to keep alert for a week or a month? Would there be a difference in the alert which you were able to maintain for a limited period?

It means a good deal to us up in Maine because we're kind of stuck out there where they first come along, although we are not probably worth bombing.

General BRADLEY. I am not so sure I get the significance of your question, but, in the first place, we feel that we must have an air-warning service which covers our whole northern approach.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General BRADLEY. So after we get that, get it installed and get people trained for it, I think that you must maintain it on a continuous basis. There may be times when you would step up the alert, and you don't step that up so much in the air-warning service as you do in the readiness to meet something that is reported. For example, if you are in a period of tension, you might have a certain number of pilots sitting in their planes on the fields during a week or 10 days or 2 weeks of alert.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General BRADLEY. And then, you might be satisfied to have them on the field and not sitting in the planes, a different kind of alert; but we might just require them to be on the base, and to that extent you might have various degrees of alertness.

But, as far as warning service is concerned, when it is once installed, I think we should keep it in operation continuously.

Senator Brewster. That question of alertness was one of the problems at Pearl Harbor, as to what stage of the alert they might be, and how imminent might be the attack.

General Bradley. Yes; and unfortunately I believe they had only installed one radar station and it was going through a period of training and was not in full-time operation.

IRANIAN SITUATION

7/23/

Senator Brewster. Now, to what extent are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if you feel free to state, giving consideration to the apparent imminence of trouble in Iran, as making more desirable the liquidation of our problem in Korea?

General Bradley. Well, of course, the longer the problem in Korea keeps up, the less we are prepared to meet any movement anywhere else. I would prefer not to say as to Iran, because I am not too sure that has too much application in our case.

There is a danger, of course, of the Russians moving into Iran and starting another aggression. Whether or not that is any more dangerous than Yugoslavia or Indochina or some other place, I am not prepared to state; but certainly it is a point of danger and we would like to be in a better position to meet any further aggression, if it occurred.

Senator Brewster. The modification of our objective in Korea from the original objective of clearing Korea of aggression to the more moderate one of accepting some solution along the thirty-eighth parallel is modified not only by military considerations, but also by the general world picture. If we should be required to move forces into Iran to support the British moves there, would we not be compelled to call on some of our rather limited reserves?

General Bradley. Well, can I answer that in a general way, not confining it to Iran?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

General Bradley. I think that is true, that we would be better off if we could get through the situation in Korea and be in a better position to meet any movement anywhere else in the world. I think that is fully understandable.

I would like to explain also that my answer here about being satisfied with something less than complete clearance of Korea is merely my own answer here. That is not a United Nations answer.

Senator Brewster. I understand.

General Bradley. You understand that what we finally do is a political decision and must be reached by the United Nations and by ourselves based upon the situation as it exists in Korea; and my answer of accepting something less than that certainly doesn't commit our Government to that. That is my own opinion as brought out here in this committee.

Chairman Russell. Senator, your 30 minutes has expired. Senator Flanders.

Senator Flanders. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for getting me in. I am somewhat out of turn. I am sorry I was not here yesterday.

Chairman Russell. I am glad to protect the Senator from Vermont.

STRUGGLE FOR POWER

Senator FLANDERS. General, in your opening testimony I was struck by one of your remarks. You said:

> One of the great power potentials of this world is the United States of America and her allies. The other great power in this world is Soviet Russia and her satellites. As much as we desire peace, we must realize that we have two centers of power supporting opposing ideologies.

I would like to ask if this passage indicates that you and perhaps military men in general feel that this world-wide struggle is primarily a struggle for power.

General BRADLEY. I think it is a struggle for power possibly on the part of one of these ideologies, because Russia has announced, I believe, on several occasions that she felt that capitalism and communism could not live in the world together, and by her acts over the last several years has indicated that she intends to spread by aggressive means and by threats, propaganda, and other means, her power—in other words the spread of communism over more and more people and more and more nations.

I think that our country at the present time represents the leadership of the free nations which are opposed to that aggression and that spread of communism.

To that extent I think you might say Russia and her satellites represent one ideology and on our part a struggle for freedom and our way of life.

On our part our struggle is not for power, it is for peace. On the part of Russia it is a struggle for power and the spread of communism.

Senator FLANDERS. Now, that is a satisfactory answer, of course, from our standpoint, but if the idea gets firmly ingrained in the minds of neutral or half-hearted nations that this is primarily a struggle for power, it seems to me we should be very careful to avoid expressions which support that idea instead of its being a struggle between two ideologies, two sets of ideas.

I think we should be very cautious about giving any support in our words to, for instance, Nehru's assertion that this is an old-fashioned struggle for power between two powerful countries.

General BRADLEY. I agree with you, Senators Flanders, that we should make it plain on every occasion that this is no imperialist move on our part, but I think at the same time we must increase our own strength so as to act as a deterrent to war and to further the provisions and the carrying out of peaceful intent.

STABILIZATION OR EVACUATION

Senator FLANDERS. General, I have been voting that way.

Now, according to the testimony that was sent to General MacArthur, or rather according to testimony there was sent to General MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12 a series of proposals for study of which General MacArthur referred particularly to four.

It was said that these proposals as I remember were to be considered for practical application in case the situation became stabilized or in case it was deemed necessary to evacuate Korea.

Just why was practical consideration of these points made dependent on stabilization or evacuation?

General Bradley. Senator, I have said here several times that the part of the paper which started this study unfortunately was omitted from the final edition of it. This January 12 study was one of a series, and the series was started on a directive to a part of the Joint Staff to study objectives and lines of action to be taken in case the war in Korea became an all-out war with China, either declared or undeclared.

That unfortunately was dropped in the final edition of the paper, but that was the purpose of the whole series of studies, and these were actions to be taken in case we found ourselves in all-out war with China.

[Deleted.]

DEFINITION OF STALEMATE

Senator Flanders. That word "stabilize" is what puzzled me. I have wondered how stabilization differed from stalemate, and whether we were not being stabilized and stalemated right now.

General Bradley. Well, as long as we have certain powers of maneuver which we have at the present time, I would say it is not entirely a stalemate. At that time, as has been brought out here, General MacArthur had sent in a rather gloomy message dated January 10 indicating that we might be driven back to the Pusan beachhead which he might or might not be able to hold.

[Deleted.]

Senator Flanders. Now is not the official policy, which the military arm is to support, a policy of a stalemate?

General Bradley. No, not entirely. It all depends on your definition of a stalemate. If you get down to a salemate where each of us is at one particular place and we sit there and look at each other for the next year, you might call that a stalemate, but as long as we have certain powers of maneuver which we are carrying out right now and inflicting severe punishment, I would not say that that fulfilled all the requirements of a definition for a stalemate.

IMPORTANCE OF THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator Flanders. I suppose it would be a fact that you are not expected to go far north of the thirty-eighth parallel under present policies and present rulings, or is that something that you do not want to comment on?

General Bradley. I think the question of whether or not we are or we go north of the thirty-eighth parallel right now is not too important, because we are fighting back and forth in that vicinity; but right now we are mostly south of it.

As long as we are going to fight there, the thirty-eighth parallel really means nothing. I mean, you might cross it a few miles or you might be a few miles south of it. It has no military significance.

Senator Flanders. But does it not have a political significance which determines military policy?

General Bradley. It has a political significance, but until the United Nations gives us a political directive that we are not to cross it, I don't think it has military significance.

It is, I think, more a policy right now of fight and negotiate under better conditions than we have been able to enjoy for some time.

Senator FLANDERS. You say "fighting and negotiating." It is, perhaps, unfair to ask you, but with whom are we to negotiate? Perhaps, we ought to ask that of Dean Acheson. Have you any notion of your own with whom we are to negotiate? Is it with some North Korean Government? Is it with the Chinese or is it with the Russians?

General BRADLEY. Well, of course, that, as you say, is primarily a diplomatic one. Actually the field commander on one side is a Chinaman, and on our side it is an American.

Senator FLANDERS. You do then definitely know who the field commander of the forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel is, and it is a Chinaman?

General BRADLEY. I don't know his name right now, because, I think, the last one has been relieved because of certain failures, and I don't know the name of the present one.

ENDING THE WAR

Senator FLANDERS. It has struck me, General, from the very first, that this is a most peculiar war; peculiar in its vagueness, peculiar in our being almost forbidden, either by circumstances or by instructions, to bring it to a conclusion, and I am hoping we are going to find out more about the possibility of ending it with succeeding witnesses than we are at the present time.

I think that General MacArthur's strong appeal has been because he had an idea of how to end it, General Bradley.

Have you ever been in a war before in which you were not supposed to be pursuing the enemy clear to the limit with all the resources of the country back of you?

General BRADLEY. I don't know of any war we have fought up to the present time where that is the case, except the one in Greece, which we helped in, and the Berlin blockade. But I would like to point out, and I think it ought to be made clear in the record, that there is no one putting any restrictions on people with a design, with the purpose, of not ending this war. I think that is implied in your question, Senator, and no one wants to get this war over with any more than the military advisers.

We are not prolonging this war just for the fun of it. The only difference is General MacArthur thinks that to do certain additional operations would be decisive and we do not think they would be decisive. They might help a little bit, but to offset that you run the risk of opening up world war III. I think the difference lies in the fact that he has said, and the people, some of them, believed him and jumped at this solution that it would be decisive and end the war. We don't think it would. There is nothing in history or in military operations, or the study of military operations, which would prove that such actions on our part now would be decisive and end the war. In my opinion they would not end the war.

Senator FLANDERS. Well, thank you, General. I hope we will get a clearer idea perhaps from the Sate Department than we have had as yet as to how you win a war of this kind. I am sure that I am in a state of confusion. Thank you.

LESSONS OF KOREAN WAR

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, that completes the first round of questions. I have just two or three questions I desire to propound on the second round.

General, on yesterday Senator Long was asking you about some of the good that has been derived from this war as contrasted with the loss of many valuable American lives. You touched upon the preparedness feature and the fact that we were in a much better position to resist aggression, and that our allies had likewise strengthened their military power.

Have we learned anything from this war that would be helpful to us in case of a world-wide conflagration from a military standpoint?

General BRADLEY. Yes, I think we have learned a few lessons. We certainly have been up against one type of warfare which we never had before, and that is the guerrilla type, in which you have infiltration of your lines by large groups.

For example, last fall we found whole divisions had infiltrated through our lines and assembled in our rear; and I think this is the first time we ever experienced warfare of that nature, so I think we have gained some experience in the new type of warfare.

How helpful it will be in the future, no one knows, but certainly it is something that we should have experience in.

I think we have improved the cooperation of our three services. I don't think we have ever reached, before, the perfection, almost, of the cooperation of the three services in working together.

We had fine cooperation in the last war, but I think it has been improved even more this time.

USE OF PACK ANIMALS

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, due to the mechanization of armies everywhere, we have done away with our cavalry and pack animals.

Would not cavalry and pack trains have been helpful to us in this war, General Bradley?

General BRADLEY. They might have, because in any mountainous-country operation, you find horses and mules very advantageous; for example, in the operation in Sicily, with my two corps, I think when the campaign ended we had accumulated 1,500 mules and horses which we had rented from the Sicilians to help us out in that mountainous country.

However, I think they are using Koreans to carry loads, and as a matter of fact, from what they tell me, a Korean can almost carry as much of a loan as a pack animal in the mountains.

I think, too, they have been making extensive use of such carriers to help get their supplies in.

We are also making extensive use of air drops to supply units on top of hills. Every day shows from 1 to 200 tons of supplies dropped from the air as being the most economical and efficient way of supplying those units; so that, instead of the pack mule, I will say we have substituted air drops and South Koreans who are helping us pack in the loads.

Chairman Russell. You don't think the lack of cavalry has anything to do with the successful infiltration of whole divisions into our lines?

General Bradley. As I understand, some of these mountainous regions are too steep even for cavalry to operate in. They climb along the ridges and ledges and infiltrate that way, and I am not too sure that cavalry would be effective against it.

I think possibly General Collins, who has gone over the area on several occasions, might be better qualified to answer that question than I.

EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR POWER

Chairman Russell. General, before we became involved in Korea, there had been, of course, a continuous debate on the effectiveness of air power, not only strategic but tactical.

Do you not think that our experience in Korea indicates that we had possibly overestimated the efficiency of air power against ground troops?

General Bradley. I don't know whether you could say whether or not we had overemphasized it——

Chairman Russell. Overestimated, I didn't say "emphasized."

General Bradley. Overestimated, I stand corrected.

I think that all of us realize that ground action without air support is much less effective.

On the other hand, I think that we have all felt that air action, by itself, is not decisive; and General Vandenberg will tell you that just as quickly as I will, and probably cite the fact that in Italy, where we had as good chance as any I ever heard of, of stopping a large hostile army by air, because much of their supplies came through Brenner Pass, they continued to supply about 25 German divisions, even though we bombed Brenner Pass practically every day.

So that air action, in itself, will not stop ground troops. It takes the combined action of ground troops and air, to stop a hostile army.

Chairman Russell. I suppose we nonmilitary men have not had too clear an idea about that.

To keep from asking repetitive questions, General Bradley, North Korea touches both Manchuria and the Soviet Union, the territories, the boundary lines; is that correct?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Chairman Russell. You have stated that a large proportion of the supplies that are being used by our enemies in Korea is being supplied by the Soviet Union.

If we were to bomb out the bases in Manchuria and did not bomb those across the border from Rashin or whatever this town is, would we have any assurances that we would stop the flow of supplies from the Soviet to our enemies in Korea?

General Bradley. I don't think you would stop them completely. You certainly could affect them, yes, but you can't ever stop the flow of supplies completely by air. That was illustrated last summer when the North Koreans continued to supply their armies way down in the south tip of Korea around Pusan beachhead, they continued to supply artillery, ammunition, and other supplies in spite of the fact that we bombed all the bridges all the way up into North Korea and tried to keep them knocked out.

It is also illustrated by the fact now that we are working on a couple of hundred miles of Chinese supply line from the border down to the battle line, and you can't stop it entirely.

You certainly do affect it, and as a matter of fact our working on the supply lines last summer had a great deal to do with our final break out of the Pusan beachhead and make the Inchon landing simultaneously more or less, so while it is very effective, I think the point is that it is not decisive.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well the question that has troubled me about it is that I could not see how even if we knocked out the sanctuaries in Manchuria, that we would be completely successful without likewise assailing the sanctuary of supplies that exists in Soviet territory in Siberia.

General BRADLEY. That is true; to be entirely effective you should hit those also. The others would be effective some, but to be more effective you would have to bomb both.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any doubt in your mind that bombing of the Soviet territory would involve great extension of the war?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

FIRST LAND TROOPS DISPATCHED TO KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not want to get high up in the box score of repetitious questions, but did I understand you correctly yesterday that you testified that General MacArthur first suggested sending land troops into Korea?

General BRADLEY. That is the way I remember it; yes, sir. His suggestion requested authority to use ground troops. I think we must remember that in all parts of the world we have plans for the evacuation of our nationals.

Those plans are in existence all over the world, and the first move in Korea was to evacuate our nationals. First we covered it by air and by navy and then we authorized General MacArthur to use ground troops in helping protect the port in order to get them out, and as I remember it, and I think it is brought out in this summary here, his suggestion to use ground troops came late in June and was approved here, and I am sure he never did differ in that decision. I think he has said here he was in full accord with that decision.

FIRST USE OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. You undertook to differentiate yesterday in your testimony between the movement of our forces to protect the nationals, our nationals, American citizens in Korea, and those who went into Korea to stem the tide of Communist aggression.

Was General MacArthur's recommendation limited to sufficient troops to protect the American citizens and to assure that they would be able to be evacuated from Korea or did it relate in any wise to having land forces in Korea to stop the aggressor?

General BRADLEY. I cannot remember the exact sequence but I do know that he was in full accord with the use of ground troops to stop the aggressor, as well as get our nationals out.

Chairman RUSSELL. You know he was consulted on that?

General BRADLEY. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I cannot answer that question offhand. I don't have the exact dates in front of me.

Chairman Russell. I think it is likely to be important in the minds of some people.

General, if you can get that up I would appreciate it. I will not take any more time now. I have taken more than I had intended to.

Senator Saltonstall. Will you repeat that question, sir?

Chairman Russell. I don't know that I can repeat it verbatim, but I think I can get the text of it.

General Bradley on yesterday in his testimony differentiated between the use of our forces for the purpose of effecting the safe evacuation of American citizens in Korea as contrasted with the use of our forces to stem or to stop aggression in Korea.

He had stated that General MacArthur had recommended the landing of forces in Korea to protect our citizens, to see that they were safely removed from Korea.

I wished to find out if the subsequent action of sending land forces to Korea to stem aggression likewise originated with General MacArthur.

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. Or where it did originate, as a matter of fact?

General Bradley. On page 11 of this compilation, paragraph 23, it refers to this:

> On 30 June 1950, CINCFE informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a reconnaissance of the Korean battle are, that the South Korean Army was in confusion. Supplies and equipment had been abandoned or lost. Without artillery, mortars, and antitank guns, the most the South Koreans could hope to accomplish would be to retard the advance of the enemy. The South Korean Army was incapable of united action, and there was grave danger of a further breakthrough. CINCFE further stated that the only assurance of holding the Han River line and to regain lost ground would be through the commitment of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. Accordingly, he stated, if authorized, it was his intention to move immediately a United States regimental combat team to the combat area in Korea as the nucleus of a possible buildup of two divisions from Japan for early offensive action in accordance with his mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces.

Chairman Russell. Prior to that time had he received any instructions or directives or recommendations that the United States ground forces in Japan be used for the purpose of stemming this aggression?

General Bradley. Up to that time I believe the only discussion had been in connection with the evacuation of nationals.

Chairman Russell. Senator Connally.

Senator Connally. General Bradley, I don't want to take much of the time of the committee or your time. I want to congratulate you on the fine knowledge that you have revealed as to all of the military and other problems involved here.

I think this question is hardly necessary but I want to ask it anyway.

JCS REGARD FOR MAC ARTHUR

In handling this matter from the start by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was there any prior disturbance or any prejudice or anything of that kind among any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as against General MacArthur, or was it handled in an impartial way, purely from a military standpoint?

General Bradley. It was handled entirely in a military way. As I have stated here, we had been worried from time to time about his not clearing certain statements and realized that maybe he was jeopardizing the civilian control of the military.

But other than that, we had not been worried from a military point of view as to General MacArthur as the commander there. I think the answer to your question is that except for these things, it had not worried us too much.

Chairman CONNALLY. I mean there was no personal animosity of any of the Chiefs of Staff against General MacArthur.

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Or any disposition to be unfair to him.

General BRADLEY. So far as I know, all the Chiefs of Staff admire General MacArthur and his military record and what he has contributed to the country.

RISK OF WAR

Chairman CONNALLY. As I understand, really the crux of your testimony is that there is great danger of involving us with Russia if we adopted the suggestions and recommendations of General MacArthur to bomb the Manchurian bases and to send Chiang Kai-shek into the mainland of China.

General BRADLEY. I think that you can sum up the difference in opinion here as being we don't think those additional steps would be decisive and they do increase the risk of war.

Chairman CONNALLY. With Russia?

General BRADLEY. With Russia.

[Deleted.]

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, as a matter of fact, it has been urged here that we should equip Chiang's forces, we should supply them, and then when they have been trained and supplied we ought to turn them over to Chiang and let him do what he pleases with them. Would it not be a strange proceeding for us to furnish the arms and the ammunition and the supplies and turn them all over to Chiang and let him go anywhere he wanted to with those troops?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think there are two safeguards we would want to put on it, and that is that he does not get us involved by his operations; and the second thing is that he not dissipate the equipment we give him and the capability we give him to the point where he again exposes Formosa to being taken by the Communists.

CHIANG'S USE OF UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, your caution about dissipating the supplies and equipment no doubt was suggested by the fact that when he was on the mainland in North China with over $2,000,000,000 worth of our equipment which we gave him, those arms and equipments were dissipated either by voluntarily surrendering them or by capture by the Communists. Is that not true?

General BRADLEY. Yes. Undoubtedly he did not make very effective use of the equipment we gave him. Whether or not it would be the same kind of dissipation would depend upon circumstances under which he tried to get to the mainland.

Chairman CONNALLY. If Chiang were armed and equipped and turned loose, might not he do something that would involve us in a war with Russia by invading the Chinese mainland or doing some other act that was unwise?

General Bradley. I suppose that is a possibility, yes, sir. I don't know how immediate that would be if he confined his operations to South China.

Chairman Connally. Well, but whether it is immediate or a little further off, wouldn't the result be the same. Would we not be in great danger of becoming involved in a war with Russia?

Would you regard it as a good military policy to become a partner by the furnishing of arms, ammunition, supplies, and equipment, without any control whatever over the general receiving them?

General Bradley. Well, I think you always want to make sure that he uses them along—well, he uses them in such a way it improves the security of the United States and improves the chances for eventual peace.

Chairman Connally. Well, how could you guarantee that unless you had somebody standing right by his side controlling him and dictating to him what he should do and what he should not do? To my mind it would be a very, very dangerous thing just to turn him loose, to arm and equip him and give him money and supplies and say, "Now, Mr. Chiang, you just do what you please and go where you please." That is what has been advocated here by some men.

General Bradley. I think the advisability of that is going to depend in very great measure on the circumstances at the time and actually what he does propose to do. I think it is rather hard to say in a categorical answer that what he did would endanger you because you don't know what that is. I think you have to wait and see what is his capability and what he proposes to do. Then I think, as you say, certainly we would want to have something to say about it if it is going to involve us.

Chairman Connally. It would be a little too late to say something about it after we got involved in a war with Russia.

Now one other point and then I am going to let you go.

AIR FORCE AS DETERRENT TO LAND INVASION

It seems to me it has been demonstrated clearly in the war in Korea that the Air Force alone cannot stop an invasion by masses of ground troops. Is that not true?

General Bradley. That has been demonstrated there and it has been demonstrated before. I think we all admit that.

Chairman Connally. I am for the Air Force; I have always voted for it and expect to continue to vote for it. I think it is a very valuable arm of our service.

I read in a recent paper, however, that in this last drive where the North Koreans and Red Chinese came sweeping over, that our Air Force made over 600 sorties. That means 600 planes had gone over, and I suppose attacked the incoming army, and yet their casualties of those 600 planes attacking these masses of troops was about 500 and something, less than the number of sorties.

We did not even average one casualty to a sortie, so that demonstrates to my mind that just air force alone cannot stop the invasion of great hordes of hostile troops. You say that is true?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I believe that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges? Senator Byrd? Senator Saltonstall?

FIRST SUGGESTION OF MAC ARTHUR'S REMOVAL

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Bradley, I have just one question and I have written it out, and I will try to state it accurately.

From what you have just said to Senator Connally and to others including myself, I gather the impression that the removal of General MacArthur was, first, not the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of the failure on MacArthur's part of any military operation, and, second, was not being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until the message of April 5—that was on a Thursday—to you and your alerting the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Is that a fair statement?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I don't think it would be quite complete without saying again that we had been concerned about some of his statements, and you can appreciate the fact that it somewhat jeopardized the civilian control over the military.

We had been concerned about the action of General MacArthur on the armistice terms in March because we had thought that maybe we had something started which would end the conflict, and we were concerned that his independent action had voided any possibility of anyone presenting that at that time, but as far as coming up with any specific recommendation for his relief, you are correct. We had not proposed any such action.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you were far enough from it that you felt you had to alert the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 5 that it was a possibility?

General BRADLEY. Yes, that the President again was concerned. He had been concerned about other statements by General MacArthur and had shown concern again.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you, sir.

OFFICIAL MEETINGS DETERMINING MAC ARTHUR'S RECALL

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. General Bradley, when this session of this committee opened, I stated that I thought that one of the issues that was not defined by any resolution but probably defined by the facts was whether or not before the bar of public opinion there was justification, not legal justification because the President had the power, justification by the facts for the dismissal of General MacArthur of his command.

Now the other day when my half hour was up, you had replied to a question of mine that precipitated the argument which resulted in an 18 to 8 decision sustaining the Chair.

Now, I didn't have a chance to pursue that course, so I am going to pursue it now.

How many meetings, including April 5 and subsequent thereto, did you attend where the subject of discussion was the recall or firing of MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. There was a meeting on April 5 with the Joint Chiefs which lasted about half an hour; there was a meeting on Friday morning at the White House; a meeting Friday afternoon in General Marshall's office.

Senator WILEY. Was that the 6th?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator WILEY. Two meetings on the 6th?

General BRADLEY. In the morning and afternoon.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Was the President at both those meetings?

General BRADLEY. The first one, the one in the morning was in the White House. The one in the afternoon was in General Marshall's office.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BRADLEY. There was a meeting Saturday morning at the White House; a meeting Sunday afternoon, first with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then we all joined General Marshall——

Senator WILEY. Was the President at only one of those meetings?

General BRADLEY. In General Marshall's office. The President was at neither of those meetings.

Senator WILEY. The President was——

General BRADLEY. The President was at neither of those meetings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff first met at my office at 2 o'clock in the afternoon and we went up to General Marshall's office at 4 oclock in the afternoon. There was a meeting in the White House again Monday morning.

Senator WILEY. That is the 9th?

General BRADLEY. The 9th; yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BRADLEY. At which time the President announced his decision.

Senator WILEY. Now, when the controversy was precipitated the other day, I understood you to say that you felt you couldnt say what was said because it was confidential. Does that apply to all these meetings?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; except the one with General Marshall in which the Chiefs of Staff stated to him the military reasons why they thought that General MacArthur should be relieved, and I have given you those.

Senator WILEY. What date was that?

Chairman RUSSELL. Let him answer.

General BRADLEY. That was Sunday afternoon as I just stated there in which the Joint Chiefs met with General Marshall at 4 o'clock Sunday afternoon, April 8.

Senator WILEY. Since I have interrogated you, have you discussed with the President whether what was said and done was considered by him confidential and privileged?

General BRADLEY. I have not seen the President since you requested me last time. Neither have I talked to him over the telephone.

Senator WILEY. Then you don't know whether he claims that it is privileged—these conversations?

General BRADLEY. Except from what I saw in the press in which I believe he intimated he thought I was right in not answering and I think he stated what was said there was his business. I think that was stated in the press. Other than that I do not know.

Senator WILEY. In other words you have no information from him personally that he claims that the conversations relating to the planning and the execution of this matter were privileged and confidential. You have nothing from him personally.

General BRADLEY. Personally; no sir.

PURPOSE OF JCS MEETINGS

Senator WILEY. All right.

Now let me ask this question: Was the sole purpose of these meetings or the main purpose of the meetings you have talked about to discuss means and ways of removing MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. No sir. The principal purpose was a discussion of whether or not he should be relieved.

Senator WILEY. Do you want to say in conclusion form what went on at the White House on the 6th?

General BRADLEY. A discussion was held of various aspects of the case and no——

Senator WILEY. Discussion of what?

Chairman RUSSELL. Let him answer. Let him finish his answer.

Senator WILEY. Just a minute Mr. Chairman. I have some rights as a Senator to interrogate or to ask a question when I do not hear his words. I asked what that was.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; you have all your rights and I am protecting you in all your rights but I think the witness also has a right to answer a question. There is nothing personal about this. I have done it with other Senators here when they have interrupted the witness before he has concluded his answer.

Senator WILEY. If that was the chairman's purpose, I apologize. That was my purpose; I did not understand, and I am sure General Bradley does not think I want to interrupt what he has to say, do you, General?

Chairman RUSSELL. I can understand the zeal of the questioner. I have done it myself on occasions. I have to restrain myself constantly, and other Senators when they have another question in their minds to propound before the witness has had an opportunity to answer.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, when was it when I started in? I must keep track of my time.

Chairman RUSSELL. I put down 11:12.

Senator WILEY. There is no time limit on this.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thirty minutes.

Senator WILEY. To the second round?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. When did I start?

Chairman RUSSELL. 11:12.

ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS CULMINATING IN RECALL

Senator WILEY. Well now, would you mind telling me who was present at the White House on April 6?

General BRADLEY. General Marshall, Secretary Acheson, Mr. Harriman, myself, and the President.

Senator WILEY. All right. Who was present at the meeting with Marshall on April 6?

General BRADLEY. In the afternoon?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General **Bradley**. General Marshall, Secretary Acheson, Mr. Harriman, and myself, the four of us.

Senator **Wiley**. Who was present on April 7 at the White House?

General **Bradley**. It was in the President's office, and the same four people were present.

Senator **Wiley**. All right. There was only one meeting on April 7?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. Who was present at the meeting of April 8, in Marshall's office?

General **Bradley**. General Marshall and the three Chiefs of Staff, General Vandenberg, General Collins, Admiral Sherman and myself.

Senator **Wiley**. And who was present at the Chiefs' meeting? Weren't there two meetings on the 8th?

General **Bradley**. At the Chiefs' meeting?

Senator **Wiley**. Yes.

General **Bradley**. General Vandenberg, General Collins, Admiral Sherman and myself.

Senator **Wiley**. Who was present at the meeting of April 9, at the White House?

General **Bradley**. That was in the President's office. Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman and myself.

Senator **Wiley**. Was there anyone else at this meeting or at any of these meetings?

General **Bradley**. Up to and including the time the President announced his decision, no.

Senator **Wiley**. Were any communications from any of our allies in relation to MacArthur considered in any of these meetings?

General **Bradley**. Not that I know of.

Senator **Wiley**. Now, you claim to be one of the President's military advisers, do you not?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Wiley**. Who constitutes his political advisers?

General **Bradley**. Well, I suppose his Cabinet, and Mr. Harriman; I suppose certain leaders of Congress. I wouldn't know of any others, but I would assume that all those might be classed as political advisers.

Senator **Wiley**. Were any of the political advisers called in?

General **Bradley**. I would say that you consider the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Harriman all political advisers.

Senator **Wiley**. Has he any psychological adviser, that you know of?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. What?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. You, I assume, listened and participated in the conversation that took place relating to the procedure that resulted in MacArthur's discharge.

Would you give me a summation of what took place on April 5, when the President was not present, but when the Chiefs of Staff were there with you?

General **Bradley**. Well, as I have stated, I do not remember the substance of the conversation. I had gained the impression somewhere, as I said here, and I honestly do not remember where I got that, it may have come from the Secretary of Defense, it may have come from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, it may have come by means of ticker-tape, which is brought to me from time to time. I don't remember; but in that, the various angles of the relief of General MacArthur were discussed.

Senator WILEY. Yesterday you stated, in reply to a question, that the President, on a certain date, decided to remove MacArthur.

That was what date?

General BRADLEY. The first time I heard any announcement on it was on Monday, April 9.

Senator WILEY. Was there anyone, among the Chiefs or among those who have been named, who participated in the meetings, who were distinctly distressed by the discharge of General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I don't know that I care to answer that.

Senator WILEY. Do you claim that as a personal privilege?

General BRADLEY. To answer your question specifically, I would have to tell you what they said.

Senator WILEY. But, do you claim your refusal as a personal privilege?

General BRADLEY. I think I could answer that this way: That I don't believe any of the people concerned in these various conferences were adamant and pushing for General MacArthur's relief. I think it was more or less of a discussion of the various things involved, pros and the cons.

Senator WILEY. Well now, I repeat the question:

Do you claim your refusal to give the conversation as a personal privilege?

General BRADLEY. If you are asking me to repeat the conversation of any individual, yes.

Senator WILEY. From certain questions asked yesterday, I got the impression that the one who had asked the questions assumed that you contended that MacArthur was for unlimited war on the mainland of China.

That is not correct, is it?

General BRADLEY. I don't think that you could say that he is for unlimited war at this time. The actions he advocated are not, in themselves, unlimited war.

They might lead to unlimited war.

PLAN TO EVACUATE UNITED STATES NATIONALS FROM KOREA

Senator WILEY. Yesterday you said a plan was drawn up in relation to Korea. I didn't quite get when this plan was drawn up.

Was it before we got into the Korean War?

General BRADLEY. I am not sure what plan you are talking about.

Senator WILEY. Well, any plan.

General BRADLEY. There was a plan for the evacuation of our nationals from Korea, drawn up before the war started; yes.

Senator WILEY. How long before?

General BRADLEY. I don't know. We have those plans for all the countries around the world, and they are modified from time to time.

What the date of this one was, I don't remember; but it was certainly soon after we had evacuated our troops from Korea in June 1949, I guess.

Senator WILEY. Was MacArthur consulted about the plan you are talking about now.

General BRADLEY. I don't remember; but as a matter of fact, I think it was his headquarters that was charged with the plan, because normally the theater commander in the particular theater is charged with making the plans and executing them in case an emergency develops; and I believe General MacArthur's headquarters were the ones responsible for drawing up this plan.

Senator WILEY. Will you check that, and put it in the record, for our information?

You know that at that time MacArthur had no jurisdiction over Japan.

General BRADLEY. He had no jurisdiction over Korea.

Senator WILEY. Over Korea, I mean; I beg pardon.

General BRADLEY. Except that the same thing applies to, say, the Mediterranean theater, where the theater commander there does not have jurisdiction over some of the countries in the Mediterranean, but he has the responsibility of evacuating our nationals from those countries if anything happens.

Senator WILEY. Will you find out if he was consulted?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator WILEY. You said, in reply to a question by Senator George, that it was not until December 6 that you thought it was necessary to send all theater commanders the memorandum that was sent and that you knew MacArthur's view about the value of Formosa, and there was no difference between the opinion of General MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff.

Did you not say that yesterday?

General BRADLEY. That is part of what I said. What I said was that we had not thought it necessary to send such a statement to General MacArthur or any other theater commander prior to that time because that is custom, it is regulations that we do not say things about our Government's policy without making sure they are in accordance with the Government's policy at that time, so normally such directives are not necessary, and that is why we had not issued it prior to the 6th.

Senator WILEY. I think we can get along better if you can answer the questions. If it is correct, I think you made those statements. I took them right from the record. You could have answered that "Yes."

General BRADLEY. Some questions just can't be answered "Yes" or "No" without giving the wrong impression.

WORLD-WIDE COMPARED TO THEATER POINT OF VIEW

Senator WILEY. You said in reply to Senator George's question that you know of no insubordination on the part of MacArthur with respect to military orders. He did not fail to carry them out, is that correct?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator WILEY. General, you brought out in response to questions that General MacArthur looked at the Korean War from the standpoint of his theater and yet you said that was not a fault and that he was not in a position to know the world-wide implications and had no responsibility for world-wide commitments. Now I want to know whether you meant to infer from that that he failed in any respect to comply with his military directives?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I thought I made that perfectly clear, that that was the natural thing for any theater commander to do.

Senator WILEY. Then you mean that he did not fail in respect to any of his military directives?

General BRADLEY. That is correct, and the purpose of the answer was to bring out that while General MacArthur was looking at this from a theater point of view and did not have world-wide responsibities, it doesn't mean that the people who do have those world-wide responsibilities are necessarily wrong when they fail to carry out his recommendations as to that theater.

Senator WILEY. In a question that was asked you stated that the differences of opinion between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff resulted from a difference of opinion between the theater commander and the Chiefs who have to look at all these theaters simultaneously and that that was the reason that you felt that you had to maintain that the war be conducted on a limited basis and that Korea was no place to fight a major war. Do you remember the substance of that?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator WILEY. Have you any communications from the time MacArthur was put in the position of commander to the time he was fired that indicated that he wanted to fight a major war on Korea? I think you have answered that.

General BRADLEY. I take it you mean a major war against China?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BRADLEY. I don't think we did. I think the whole difference was in the risk run by extending it out of Korea.

MESSAGE INFORMING MAC ARTHUR OF PROPOSED UN CEASE-FIRE

Senator WILEY. Yesterday you testified, and the day before I think too, that a message had been sent to General MacArthur stating allegedly the terms and conditions under which our Government and 13 other governments were proposing a cease-fire. Now where is that message?

General BRADLEY. It is in the files certainly. It was dated about the 20th of March.

Senator WILEY. You mean the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur on March 20, 1951, is that the message you mean?

General BRADLEY. Yes; it is on page 100 of the compilation of the messages which reads:

> On March 20, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the following message which was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, to General MacArthur:
>
> "State planning a Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors United Nations now preparing to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea."

Senator WILEY. Now you have answered that question——

General BRADLEY. Do you want the whole message?

Senator WILEY. No. I just asked you where that message is. Now you have answered that.

General Bradley. It is quoted in your book.

Senator Wiley. All right. I ask that that be placed in the record at this time.

Chairman Russell. Without objection, it will appear in the appendix of the record.

General Bradley. You will find it on page 100, paragraph 40.

Senator Wiley. Have you got evidence that General MacArthur ever got it?

General Bradley. Well, I am sure he did. I can check the message for the acknowledgment of it, but I don't believe he has ever denied he received it.

Senator Wiley. Well, I have been reliably informed that maybe no such message ever went to General MacArthur. No one out there in Tokyo ever heard of such a message; the only document ever sent to General MacArthur was one given out on the night of April 11 when the President dismissed MacArthur. This document, it was stated, said that the State Department was planning Presidential announcement. Now to me the State Department is planning something every day. When you send a message to the United States commander you might give him something more definite than what you have testified to.

Now have you got any evidence to show that you showed what these Presidential announcements were that you sent to MacArthur?

General Bradley. Shall I read the whole message?

Senator Wiley. All right.

General Bradley (reading):

> State planning a Presidential announcement shortly that with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors United Nations now preparing to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea——

Senator Wiley. Well, that is——

General Bradley (continuing):

> United Nations feeling exists that further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of thirty-eighth parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked Joint Chiefs of Staff what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for United Nations forces and maintain contact with enemy.
>
> Your recommendation desired.

IDENTIFYING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Senator Wiley. All right, now that is in the record twice. There is no record in that message or any that I have seen of the Presidential announcement, or information of what the Presidential announcements were to be, with the State Department that was trying to persuade the President or foreign governments. On previous occasions the State Department did send through JCS messages telling about resolutions pending in the UN. Why was not this particular message sent? Why was General MacArthur deprived of an opportunity of knowing the facts about the war in which he was supposed to be Supreme Commander?

Now, Secretary of Defense Marshall testified that MacArthur's message to the Chinese commander upset these peace negotiations. What did it upset? Where are the documents that show that there were any peace negotiations? If there were any such peace documents in existence, where are they, and if so, who has them? Why have they not been proffered here? Do you know of any of these documents?

General BRADLEY. Well, he was informed of this negotiation that was going on, and I would say from that message it indicates that we are consulting these other governments, and he replied to that the next day.

You say there is no acknowledgement that he received it. He replied to that message the next day, dated the 21st of March.

Now, as to the terms of that, and just what negotiations were going on in the meantime, I think the State Department would be in a much better position to testify than I am. I don't know just what the status of these various negotiations were with these other governments when it was upset, according to them, in their opinion, by the fact that General MacArthur came out with his own announcement in Korea.

PRESIDENT'S REASONS FOR DISMISSING MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. General, the President gave his reasons the other day in his press conference. He said the reasons for dismissing MacArthur, which were not contained in his message that he sent out at the time, were the message that went to the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the message MacArthur sent to the Chinese commander.

Now, in these meetings that were held with the people you mentioned, were these alleged reasons for his dismissal——

General BRADLEY. You are talking about the——

Senator WILEY. The meetings from the 5th to the 9th.

General BRADLEY. All of the various things that had come up, the violation of the December 6 directive, certainly was discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the fact that he had issued this ultimatum, an armistice proposal, was discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; yes, those were discussed.

Senator WILEY. Then, am I correct in assuming that the President alleged that these two things were grounds for the dismissal?

General BRADLEY. Was that a question, sir?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BRADLEY. If you are asking that I state what the President said about these, I am sorry, I can't give it; but I have told you that all of these things certainly were considered at these various meetings.

Senator WILEY. That is, it is your position that it is a personal privilege and that you can go on and tell conclusions but cannot tell what led up to those conclusions. That is my understanding of your position.

General BRADLEY. I told you that these various things were considered, but I cannot tell you what was said about each of them by each person present.

Senator WILEY. Now, putting the differences that have been brought up before between the Chiefs' concepts as they were and MacArthur's concepts as they were, it seems to resolve itself down to the following:

General MacArthur wanted authority to bomb north of the Yalu where the nests of the Chinese Communists were breeding; you disagreed. He suggested an economic blockade, which has now been put into effect and which will be put into effect by the Allies. You disagreed to that in the beginning, did you not?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; I never did. We have always been in favor of economic sanctions.

Senator **Wiley**. He wanted to blockade the China coast, which the Allies have not yet agreed to, but you did not agree to that.

General **Bradley**. I do not unless it is made a United Nations blockade.

BRADLEY'S INTERPRETATION OF MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator **Wiley**. Well, the United Nations haven't agreed to that.

I now refer to these suggestions that MacArthur made, in which he differed from you or the President. He didn't put his suggestions into operation, did he?

General **Bradley**. No; I don't think that you can say that General MacArthur was relieved for having different opinions from those of us here in Washington. I think you must realize that the basis for his relief—the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a military point of view—was that he carried this to the public, not that he had different views.

We all have different views and we settle them without carrying them to the public. I think the big point here is that he carried them to the public. And before our country and before our allies and before the United Nations we found ourselves speaking with two voices—that of the Government in Washington and that of General MacArthur in Tokyo.

Senator **Wiley**. At any of these meetings that we have been discussing was anything said about the attitude and the position of our allies?

General **Bradley**. I don't remember. It may have, because I think we all know that our allies were concerned about spreading this war and taking additional risks and that was illustrated by the fact that they would not go along with us on this hot pursuit.

It is quite possible——

Senator **Wiley**. Was there any communication——

Senator **Green**. Mr. Chairman, may the witness be permitted to finish his answer before another question is asked?

Senator **Wiley**. Were there any communications——

Chairman **Russell**. Have you concluded, General?

General **Bradley**. I was going to say it was quite probable that when we discussed all the pros and cons, all of the things involved in General MacArthur's having carried this to the public, and all the things that were involved in it and the implications, we probably did discuss that.

Senator **Wiley**. Were there any messages exposed at the meetings?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

[Deleted.]

CLARIFICATION OF COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Chairman **Russell**. Your time has expired, Senator Wiley. Senator Johnson.

Senator **Wiley**. Mr. Chairman, might I ask when this restriction on the second round was placed at a half hour?

Chairman **Russell**. Colonel Galusha, will you see if you can find the record.

Senator WILEY. I just want to know approximately from the chairman. I wasn't here at the time.

Chairman RUSSELL. It was done just before General Bradley started his testimony on the motion of the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse, that each Senator be limited to 30 minutes on each round of questioning.

Senator WILEY. Was it each round?

Chairman RUSSELL. It was agreed to unanimously by all the committee present.

Senator WILEY. That wasn't the understanding of my associates here or myself. They thought it was unlimited the second time. If so, that is all right with me.

Chairman RUSSELL. The time is limited, but the number of rounds is not limited. No member is being denied the right to ask questions. It is a matter of dispersal among the members of the committee.

HEARINGS COMPARED TO COURT PROCEDURE

Senator WILEY. Might I make just one suggestion? I think that while certain questions are asked definite and certain, that it is not the privilege of the witness to argue. It is the privilege of the witness to answer, but sometimes he goes on and tries to justify when a question could be answered "Yes" or "No." If we are going to follow any procedure that applies to a court, he can't argue the case.

It is no criticism of General Bradley, but that is one of the reasons we go on interminably. We are trying to elicit the facts and that is all I try to do. I am sure that in spite of the newspaper comments and those of some of my associates, they have got to accept my word that I have no prejudice nor am I acting as an advocate in this case. I am trying to act as an investigator to get the facts.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I hope we won't adopt the procedure that applies in court.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just a minute, Senator Lodge. I want to say, of course, that these investigations have never been conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence which apply in a court.

I have never seen a committee hearing that was conducted in that manner. If that were true, we would have to have an official objector here to these questions. A great many of these questions are leading, they call for hearsay testimony, the witnesses are asked what did so and so say to you, which would be in most cases ruled out completely under the ordinary rules of evidence, and I don't think that we can confine ourselves to requiring the witnesses to make categorical answers to these questions. It is unfair to a witness.

Some Senators might devise some questions like that ancient and historic one when a witness was asked, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" and demand that he answer it "Yes" or "No."

Well, that isn't fair, I don't think, to a witness. Under these rules every Senator will have a right to ask any questions that he desires. It may get down to an endurance contest between the witness and the committee, but in that case the witness is certainly handicapped, because he has got to contend with 26 questioners; whereas, there is only one witness at a time.

The witnesses, I think, in a hearing of this kind, particularly involving military matters and opinion, when we have wandered so far from the ordinary rules of evidence that obtain in a court of law, should have a right to state their reasons for their conclusions.

A witness is entitled to do that if he is an expert witness in a court of law. The Senator will have an opportunity to ask any of his questions, but unless the committee decides to the contrary, I intend to give the witness a little leeway as to his answers.

If the committee wishes to adopt some rule that each questioner shall be the judge of whether a witness shall be permitted to discuss his answers, why of course I will be bound by the majority of the committee, but until that does occur, I am going to give these witnesses an opportunity to explain their reasons for their testimony.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, when you get through I want to say a word.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I am sure if you read what I say, I did not say you shall apply all the rules of evidence. I simply want to make it clear that in view of the fact it has already been stated over the radio, not by myself, that we are dragging along here that I think that under the guidance of the distinguished chairman, who is a good lawyer and who is also a man of great experience here, that there are times when perhaps under his guidance we can facilitate matters. If he sees that the witness himself—and there is no reference on the present witness—rambles off into a 40-acre lot when we have got a limitation of 30 minutes, I think his fellow Senators have a right to be protected a little bit, too.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the Chair has never particularly liked the word "filibuster," but if any witness here indicates that he is filibustering against any time limit and not undertaking to answer questions, why the Chair will bring it to the attention of the committee.

Until that is very manifest, the Chair is not going to compel these witnesses to make categorical yes or no answers to the very lengthy and involved questions that are being propounded.

Every Senator has a right here within the limits of 30 minutes to propound any questions that he sees fit, and if he does not get through that round, why he will be reached again on another round and have another 30 minutes in which to propound questions.

I think we are getting along very well here now and these witnesses are all professional witnesses, at least I think they are. There might be a difference of opinion as to that in some quarters, but I think all of the witnesses who appear certainly qualify as professional and experts in the field in which they are being examined, and I think they are entitled to state the reasons for their conclusions.

Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, just a word. Isn't it well established over a long period of years in the Senate and in the House that the ordinary rules of the courts do not obtain?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have never heard any effort made to apply them, and I am not going to do it unless we have got some official objector here. We will have to get some skilled lawyer to object to the questions before I will overrule the objections made to the answers.

Senator WILEY. I never contended that, Mr. Chairman. I made a suggestion, that was all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS TO FOLLOW MAC ARTHUR PLAN

Senator JOHNSON. General Bradley, when General MacArthur appeared before this committee, he was asked and answered in somewhat general terms his estimates of the initial requirements of the forces that would be necessary to inaugurate his program. He was asked and answered in somewhat general terms his estimates of the requirements on our forces that would be required to put into effect the program he recommended.

We have had many repetitious questions in these hearings, some repetitious answers, and although I have attempted to obtain some estimates from our own Defense Department, I do not think the record shows that they have made it.

In view of the fact that General MacArthur has recommended a positive program that specifies certain action be taken, I wonder if you are in a position at this time—and if you are not, if you would ask the Chiefs of Staff to be in a position when they come here—to tell this committee the requirements in terms of Army, Navy, air, men, ships, planes, tanks, et cetera, that they should feel they would need to inaugurate and carry to a successful conclusion the program recommended by General MacArthur.

I understand on the basis of the course you are now following in Korea that you have general estimates of the sea power, the air power, that you feel you will be called upon to use. You have estimates on the replacements that will be required, and so forth.

Now, do you have at this time or are you in a position to give the committee during your testimony any estimates on the requirements of the MacArthur recommendation?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I believe those could be furnished better by the individual chiefs, and I will warn them that that question will be asked.

Of course, it applies primarily to the Air Force and to the Navy; the Navy, in what would be required to carry on an effective blockade of China; and of the Air Force, General Vandenberg, of what additional Air Forces should be used in order to make further bombardment of the supply lines up in Manchuria effective.

Senator JOHNSON. Will you ask them to be prepared to give us some estimates in that field because you realize, I assume, that one reading the record would gather there is a substantial difference of opinion on those estimates.

In other words, as I remember it, General MacArthur felt very little additional power would be required over what we had there now, and, I believe, you testified yesterday or the day before that you felt it would be substantial.

So, in the light of the testimony that has taken place heretofore, I hope that you will ask the chiefs of the services to be able to give us their specific estimates of what they will need, because on yesterday you testified that you felt it would result in stripping our forces, and taking away certain forces we had committed in other parts of the world; and if we should do that, obviously, we would have to increase our manpower requirements and step up our present production goals.

That is all, General Bradley.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally is presiding.

Chairman CONNALLY. Who is next?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith is next.

Chairman CONNALLY. Senator Smith of New Jersey.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CONNALLY. I have to identify you because there is such a large family of Smiths.

WAS MAC ARTHUR AWARE OF UN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS?

Senator SMITH. General Bradley, just a little further on one of the questions that Senator Wiley asked of you. I am still confused about this famous message of General MacArthur's of March 24, and I refer to the record of May 21, where Senator Morse asked you this question on page 2328, where he said:

> Of your own knowledge, General Bradley, do you know whether or not that statement of General MacArthur's to the Chinese Communist leaders created difficulties with our allies?

You answered:

> Yes; it happened that our Government had consulted certain other governments who had troops in Korea as to certain negotiations which we should try to open for a peaceful settlement.
>
> These various—

I am still quoting your answer—

> considerations and possible terms were sent to General MacArthur for his comments while they were being discussed with the other governments.
>
> Before we had finished discussing with the other governments, General MacArthur came out with his statement, offering a truce and stating that if they did not accept it, the war would be extended.

I assume when you say "his statement" that refers to the statement of March 24 you are referring to.

> As a consequence, we had to drop our negotiations with the other powers without making negotiation proposals, and it caused our Government some embarrassment because while Washington was talking to them along one line General MacArthur came out along a little different line.

Senator Morse said—

> General, when you read or heard that General MacArthur had made the statement to the Chinese Communist leaders that he made were you surprised?

You answered—

> As a matter of fact, Senator Morse, I was away at the time and heard about the whole thing when I came back.

Now my question—and it is very important in this testimony—is whether or not General MacArthur was ever sent this memorandum of these negotiation terms.

On page 188 of the document which has been prepared by the staff, "Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East," we note item L, which is entitled "Message of General MacArthur to Newsweek Magazine," published April 16, 1951. This was the message that General MacArthur sent to Newsweek magazine apparently commenting on some article in the magazine having to do with this situation, and I quote General MacArthur's message:

> The statement contained in your issue of April 2d to the effect that prior to the issuance of my statement of March 24 of the military situation in Korea

I had been furnished a copy of a policy statement by the President cleared by the governments having military forces in Korea is entirely without basis in fact. I have never seen such a statement and do not know if it even exists. Please publish this in the interest of truth.

Now when General MacArthur was before us he said distinctly that he had not received any such statement of what these negotiations were, and therefore my question to you is with regard to your reply to Senator Morse where you said, "These various terms were sent General MacArthur." Can we have in the record definitely the terms that were sent to General MacArthur and which you claim he disregarded when he made this statement of March 24?

General Bradley. The only way to do that is to get the full message, Senator Smith. Of course, these in here are paraphrased and are not complete. If you like, I will take steps to get the full message that was sent him on March 20. Of course, it will have to possibly come out of the record because of cryptographic security, but if you want the whole message read, I will take steps to have it brought up here.

Senator Smith. The reason I am pressing this is because here is a difference of testimony. You say it was sent to him. He said he never received any such thing and his testimony said he never received any such thing. The implication is that he ignored this thing, that he put our people in embarrassment in negotiations with other countries, and yet we have never had in the record any indication that he knew what those negotiations were. That is the thing that troubles me.

General Bradley. He certainly knew they were going on.

MAC ARTHUR'S CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

Senator Smith. What the terms were. Now that leads me to this further question, and let me say I do hope you will get that exact statement of the information he had in the record, if we are going to decide whether his statement of March 24 was really based on just an arbitrary action by him, which is implied, as though he was ignoring these other negotiations, which is hard for me to believe.

The suggestion in the President's recent statement to the press was that it was this statement that made a great deal of trouble. You suggested it was this statement. General Marshall suggested it was this statement that made a great deal of trouble. I asked General Marshall whether the implication was that he had sort of jumped the gun on the President in a willful way, and General Marshall said that that was a fact. He actually did jump the gun, whether he intended or not, he did. And I gathered from your testimony that he jumped the gun; is that correct?

General Bradley. That is the impression I obtained when I came back here and heard about this whole matter. Again, as you say, this testimony that I gave on that is hearsay if you get down to rules of evidence. But you asked me the question, and that is the way I was given to understand it as I came back. When I come back from a trip I have to catch up on what has gone on while I was gone, and that is the information or story told me when I came back.

PREVIOUS MAC ARTHUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH ENEMY

Senator Smith. Were there not two previous occasions when MacArthur, as commander in the field, endeavored to deal with a leader of the enemy forces?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir; but both times on suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I noticed that General Whitney the other day said that on these two previous occasions he had not received any communications from Washington. I am afraid General Whitney had forgotten about the dates of these things because on September 27 the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur to broadcast to the North Korean commander in chief calling upon the commander and the forces under his command to lay down their arms and cease hostilities, and the broadcast was made by General MacArthur on the 1st of October.

You notice that he was authorized from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Again on October 6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested General MacArthur to transmit to the North Korean authorities the message which would include the United Nations resolution of October 7, the message calling on the North Korean armed forces to lay down their arms in accordance with the broadcast message of October 1.

We sent to him on the 6th of October the terms of the resolution then before the United Nations and told him we would tell him of any changes in it and would notify him as to when it was passed. These changes were transmitted to him, and this message to the North Koreans was transmitted by General MacArthur on October 9.

As far as I know, those were the only two previous occasions upon which he issued such a call to the North Koreans to lay down their arms and both times they were suggested—in one case he was authorized to do it, and in the second case we requested him to do it.

AUTHORITIES OF COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD

Senator **Smith**. Well, let me ask you this: At any time was he told not to do it? And is there any established regulation that a commander in the field has no authority to deal with the commander of opposing forces with regard to an armistice? I understood that the commander in the field is expected to be in a position in light of circumstances to deal with the opposing commander on a question of peace terms and armistice terms.

General **Bradley**. As long as his proposals to the opposing commanders are in full accordance with the policy of his Government, I don't think anyone would object to his doing it. The bad part of this one, as I understand it—what caused this embarrassment—was that he certainly knew that this was up for consideration by our Government and Allied Governments, and his statement here as you read a minute ago, on page 188—"The President, cleared by the governments,"—it had not been cleared. That was slightly an error in timing. It was being cleared or trying to be cleared with these other Governments at the time he made the announcement. That I think was the embarrassing part—our Government was trying to deal with our allies here in Washington on one set of proposals and he took action in the field on slightly different proposals. And whether or not he knew the exact proposals, the fact that he knew that our Government was considering it and was talking to other governments about it, that it was up before the United Nations, seems to me like I would have hesitated very much—in fact I would not have issued any such proclamation in the field, knowing that that was pending before our Government and before the United Nations.

Senator SMITH. Well I am still not clear what MacArthur did that was so wrong unless he did know exactly what these negotiation terms were and just tried to bypass them.

Let's take this position now: Assuming that MacArthur did not know, which is his statement, what these terms were, what is there in his statement of the 24th of March that was contrary to our policy or that could be criticized in his making his appeal to the opposite commander?

General BRADLEY. Primarily that is a State Department question, because the thing he included in that which is questionable is matters of policy and action toward the rest of China, which had not been included in any previous directives.

Senator SMITH. Well the only thing I have heard criticized is one paragraph which appears on page 184 of this same document, and that is this, and I quote:

> These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

I understand all the way along we were not going to involve Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations in these armistice negotiations. I have tried to check that with my visits to New York to discuss with our UN representatives there, and they have distinctly said we were not going to let these things come in, even though previously we had agreed to a sort of a cease-fire where those things might have been considered.

I am confused as to what there is in this statement of MacArthur's that is contrary to policy. You would not say that you disagree with that paragraph I just read?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't disagree with that paragraph, but I think there is something in here about threatening to carry the war outside of Korea if he doesn't get the terms, as I remember it.

Senator SMITH. All it says there—I will quote that——

General BRADLEY. The paragraph just above the one you read.

Senator SMITH. I will read that:

> The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that the decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war in the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

Just a suggestion of where they would be in case we did not continue our present tolerant course. That might be open for criticism, but I can't see it is the basis to just abruptly dismiss a man of MacArthur's standing in doing what apparently he thought was the thing to do in dealing with this.

I want to stress this because so much importance has been laid on the terrible action of MacArthur in this particular thing, and I am having difficulty in finding out just what the terrible sin was that was committed.

ACTION CONTRARY TO UNITED STATES POLICY

General BRADLEY. I think from the military point of view the Chiefs thought this was one of many things which showed independent action——

Senator Smith. That is what I am trying to get at and also with General Marshall. He said one of many things, and I cannot find in this record except for this, the Martin letter which was explosive but it wasn't really basic, and the other is the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech in which all I can find is a statement of the strategic importance of Formosa. Are you familiar with the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech yourself?

General Bradley. Yes.

Senator Smith. Well, do you disagree with what General MacArthur said about Formosa then, its strategic importance?

General Bradley. As far as the strategic importance of Formosa is concerned, I do not. May I add one other thing to your last question?

Senator Smith. Certainly. I want to get all the light I can.

General Bradley. You asked about these various things. You named some of them. There were certain others like independent statements in interviews, and particularly the statement to Freeman magazine which blamed political decisions for not arming more South Koreans, and I think everyone that knows the details of that thinks that is a very unfair statement because back in early January the Chiefs had queried General MacArthur on the advisability of arming additional South Koreans, and he had recommended against it, and it seems to me that all he would have had to say to this query from Freeman magazine was, "Yes, we have considered it but we don't think it advisable at this time," but instead of that he said it was a political decision and implied that he would like to do it and he was being hamstrung from here, and I think that unfair statement—at least we thought it was an unfair presentation of the case—was a rather important one in all these things.

Senator Smith. Well I will say as I recall General MacArthur answered questions about that and stated very clearly that he thought that the arms for the South Koreans might be better used in Japan in building up a constabulary there. It was something to that effect, at that particular time.

General Bradley. That was part of the answer.

[Deleted.]

Senator Smith. I did not recall that any special stress had been laid as a cause for his dismissal to something he may have said to Freeman magazine.

JCS-MAC ARTHUR FRICTION BEFORE KOREA

General Bradley. It was just one more thing that came at about this time which indicated that——

Senator Smith. Now General, there is one thing that I have been trying to get at from the beginning of these hearings. You keep saying there was one more thing. There are a lot of things, and yet we haven't got anywhere in the record a succession of things as to why this was done.

Were there any misunderstandings or disagreements between General MacArthur and the Department of Defense or the Department of State prior to the Korean aggression in June 1950 or does everything date from the Korean aggression and the handling of the matter in Korea?

General BRADLEY. There was no great difference of opinion that I know of prior to the Korean thing.

Senator SMITH. Now I know from my experience in my trip to the Far East that MacArthur had a great many problems on which he wished he had more contact with Washington or somebody coming out to see him. Yet the testimony shows that, prior to the Korean aggression of 1950, none of the following were out there. I take the Department of State first: Secretary Marshall, Under Secretary Lovett, Secretary Acheson, Under Secretary Webb, Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk, Ambassador Jessup.

None of those men had ever been to see him prior to the time that I was there in '49 and prior to the Korean outbreak in '50. I am told that General Eisenhower was there in 1946.

I think that appeared in the testimony from yourself or General Marshall, and I think Secretary of the Army Royall went out in sort of a round-the-field study.

From the Department of Defense I can't find that either the Secretaries of War and Navy were there prior to unification, Secretary Marshall of Defense of course has not been there, Under Secretary Lovett of Defense has not been there, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air, none of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or yourself were there prior to the Korean business.

Whatever policy MacArthur may have had in that area, he was left alone to deal with. I am only mentioning this because he seemed to feel that he was expected to make some of these decisions because they had not been taken up with him. If there were differences, he did not know about them.

General BRADLEY. May I be permitted to correct one part of your statement?

Senator SMITH. I wish you would.

General BRADLEY. I was there twice before the Korean incident.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad to hear that. Were you there prior to 1949?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Not prior to that?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. That was where I was misled because when I was there in 1949 he told me he had not had the benefit of a visit from any of the Chiefs in Washington. He did not know how to act about certain matters.

He said he felt our interests were in Europe. He said the Chiefs had gone to Europe, and that they were discussing there. He understood that, but felt that there were some far eastern problems he did not have a chance to clear.

General BRADLEY. May I make a statement on that?

Senator SMITH. Yes, indeed.

General BRADLEY. Twice I planned trips to Japan while I was Chief of Staff of the Army. One of them I had to call off because of some hearings before a committee of Congress, the other one because of a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Most of these commanders came home from time to time in which case we always get them down with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and go over their problems very clearly. General MacArthur had never come home.

He thought it was necessary for him to stay there, so he was the one commander of a theater which had not been back and given us a chance to talk to him either, but I think it must be remembered that we have been over there, the various members of the Chiefs, since this thing started. I was over there twice before that happened.

Senator SMITH. Oh, yes. What I am trying to find out, General, is whether when you think back on this whole relationship, considering the apparent friction between General MacArthur and the Department of State and the Department of Defense, did that friction exist prior to the Korean outbreak or can we locate the differences since June 1950 when the Korean outbreak came?

General BRADLEY. Well, speaking entirely from the defense point of view, the only difference that I know of came up when General MacArthur wanted to have more troops and we would have liked to have given him more troops but they just were not available.

Senator SMITH. You mean prior to Korea?

General BRADLEY. Prior to Korea; because, as you remember at one time, the Army got down below 600,000 and you have your German occupation, Austria, Trieste, as well as Japan and the other stations, and we just couldn't increase his garrison to the point where he wanted it.

Senator SMITH. Well that did not cause any real friction. That was a normal difference between regional responsibility and the head office in Washington. Now let me ask you this question, General: Did any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or yourself ever go to Formosa?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Never went. Why didn't they?

General BRADLEY. Because it is not United States territory. We have no troops there. We had no mission there, and I think it would be a little bit awkward if we tried to go into a foreign country where we have no troops, no mission, and no other connections.

At that time we were not furnishing military aid. When we decided to send military aid, then we did send people from General MacArthur's staff since he had the responsibility. In fact he went down himself, and we now have a major general there heading a mission, but, up until the time we sent that mission there, there really wasn't any requirement for us to go there. We really had no excuse to go there.

MAC ARTHUR-PRESIDENTIAL DIFFERENCES

Senator SMITH. Well, now may I ask you this question. The Wake Island conference as I recall it was about the middle of October?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Were there any disagreements with General MacArthur taken up with him at Wake Island? In this recent statement of the President I think he used the language that he traveled under his own steam 14,000 miles to try and settle some of these differences, and yet this report of the Wake Island conference implies that everything was agreed to and thoroughly understood. Were there to your knowledge actual differences with General MacArthur taken up at Wake Island such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech?

General BRADLEY. I don't know because the President and General MacArthur had a private conversation of their own for about an hour prior to the big conference, and they then had a shorter conference after the big conference. At the big conference the matter of the VFW letter was not discussed.

Senator SMITH. And at that time they complimented General MacArthur in many ways for his wonderful service and they decorated him. The President decorated him and the impression given in the United States was that there was the best accord and cooperation between Washington and General MacArthur in the Pacific.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That is the impression I certainly got. Yet the President has stated in this last press statement, that he had differences, and that he traveled 14,000 miles to straighten these differences out. Still these were the troubles which were the background for abruptly dismissing General MacArthur.

How can we reconcile those statements?

General BRADLEY. They are not my statements, sir.

Senator SMITH. That is true.

General BRADLEY. I might point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message of commendation and congratulation to General MacArthur on the success of the Inchon landing and the operations connected with it, because it was a very brilliant operation.

Senator SMITH. That is, of course, the impression we all had in this country, and I was surprised, the other day, when the President said he was upset over the differences, the VFW speech, and had traveled 14,000 miles to settle them. I was surprised to hear you say and to hear General Marshall say that there was an accumulation of incidents; and I am trying to get at exactly what this incident of March 24 was. I want to know whether General MacArthur did or did not know what these negotiations were.

I think there is great danger here of our leaving a record that isn't very clear on just exactly what the charges were against MacArthur.

I understand the difference in strategy. I have no quarrel with that. I would not, as a layman, even get into that discussion of whether this strategy or that strategy was right. I assume you Chiefs of Staff know more about that then we do; and General MacArthur said here that had he been asked to withdraw and turn over his command, he would have done so.

So, that isn't the reason for his abrupt dismissal. That abrupt dismissal is because of some prejudice somewhere, and I am trying to locate that; and the report came to me that the removal of General MacArthur had been planned by the executive department for a long time, even before General Marshall was made Secretary of Defense.

There was a determination to shift MacArthur at the first available opportunity.

That is what is troubling so many of us about this whole thing.

I am just asking you if you know anything about that. I assume your answer would be "No."

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I do not.

MAC ARTHUR'S FIELD INTELLIGENCE

Senator SMITH. Now, let me ask two more, and then I am through.

MacArthur has been charged by some people with whom I have discussed this matter with falling down at the time the Chinese Communists came in. They felt that he ought to have known they were coming and it was a terrible blunder on his part that he didn't know; therefore he ought to get out for that one thing alone.

What I want to ask is: Did our military intelligence fall down so that we were not adequately alerted to the aggression of the Chinese Communists in Korea?

If it fell down, was it MacArthur's intelligence staff, or was it the CIA in Washington, or where was it?

Could you say, as a military man, whether MacArthur was to blame for the apparently wrong intelligence in the Chinese coming into North Korea?

General **Bradley**. The intelligence on which he had to base his decision had to be primarily field intelligence.

Now, there were evidences from captured prisoners of from late October, that Chinese had come in to some extent into the operation.

Then, on November 6 General MacArthur sent in a message that the Chinese were pouring across the bridges across the Yalu, and they were coming across in great numbers. That was on about November 6.

Now, what happened between November 6 and the time that he was hit by the Chinese attack of about November 26 or 28—the 26th, I guess— it is hard for us here to know, because a lot of that intelligence should have come from his own field command.

That concentration on the right flank of the Eighth Army should have been picked up by air reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance; in other words, by patrol and aviation put in there.

How much of that he had, Senator Smith, we don't know here, because we don't get all the field intelligence that a commander gets in the field and acts on. But certainly there was enough coming in to indicate that there was a considerable Chinese build-up somewhere in North Korea.

Senator **Smith**. Was MacArthur prevented from sending reconnaissance planes across the border in Manchuria to see whether there were accumulations there of troops?

General **Bradley**. We knew all the time that there were concentrations in Manchuria. It was a question of how many of them had moved over into Korea, and that, as I say, could have been obtained or should have been obtained by air reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance.

Now, you must realize, of course, also that the country in there is very heavily wooded by evergreens, and it is rather difficult to pick up troops and, as I say, it is very hard to sit here in Washington and say he should have known or just what he did know. That is up to the field commander, and I certain would not blame him or G–2 or anyone else for the fact he did not get it, and the fact that he may have had certain information and may have evaluated it wrong.

Senator **Smith**. Let me ask you this, General: What provision have we got here in Washington for getting in touch with world conditions, with the situation in Peiping, and with the probable policy of the Chinese Communists? Do we get intelligence through our offices here about that that could have been or should have been transmitted to him?

General **Bradley**. He is transmitted all the information we get in here. Of course, you have to evaluate it. We get a lot of reports out of China; some of them are absolutely wrong, some of them have a certain amount of truth in them; and we have to take all of them and evaluate them, and I believe all of these messages were sent to General MacArthur, and I have asked General Collins to be prepared to testify on that because he is the executive agent who passes on to General MacArthur's headquarters all the intelligence information, and he would be able to tell you this, and I know he has looked into it, and he will tell you exactly what he has sent.

Senator SMITH. I thank you, General. Have I more time?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have a half minute.

SENDING UNITED STATES GROUND TROOPS TO KOREA

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you just one more question, if I may. Referring back now to the meeting at Blair House on June 25, and to the meeting of the White House conference, on June 26, where as I recall, I was present. I think it was on June 26 that Senator Connally and I were both present when the discussion of the Korean outbreak came up. I am just wondering what records, if any, were taken of the conversations of those meetings. Do you recall?

General BRADLEY. I did not keep any, and whether or not anyone else kept any record of the meetings, I do not know, sir.

I might add just as I said the other day, I think Admiral Sherman took a few notes, but how extensive they are I don't know.

Senator SMITH. Could I make just one final observation there?

Chairman RUSSELL. It has got to be by unanimous consent. We have to follow the rules. I wish we did not have to enforce it. Dr. Wilcox is keeping time, and he informs me that your time is up.

Senator SMITH. I will abide by the chairman's ruling.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, the Senator can make his observation.

Senator SMITH. I recall at the first meeting I was at when we were told about the Korean outbreak, the only thing discussed was sea and air support. We were going to give sea and air support.

The question was raised at that meeting of whether it meant any troops, and they said no, at that meeting.

At the second meeting of June 30, the President advised us that it would be deemed necessary to send some supporting ground troops, and I just wanted to get that clear, because that is my recollection. Do you recall that?

General BRADLEY. I think that is correct, sir, because no ground troops were committed until about the 30th of June; yes, sir.

DEFENSE OF HEARINGS

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I have quite a few questions to ask. I am sure I cannot finish them in the first half-hour period, but in view of the fact that I have so many questions to ask, I think it is only fair that I make a very friendly reply to the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Tobey, in view of certain remarks that he made in the record yesterday.

I did not happen to be here, as I explained yesterday; I was at a departmental meeting, taking care of some constituency problems, and did not get in until the afternoon session. Therefore last night, when on the radio, I heard various radio reports about what Senator Tobey was purported to have said, then when I picked up the Washington Post this morning and read what purported to be a quotation of Senator Tobey, I neither could believe my ears on the radio reports nor my eyes on the newspaper reports, so I came in this morning and got the record.

I read what he said, and I assume it is a correct transcription. I feel I ought to make a little statement about what he said.

I had his office advised that I would reply to him this morning, because I do not share the Senator's views on many of the observations he made yesterday. Therefore I make these following comments. He said:

"I have not attended as many of these meetings as most of you have"—and I read from page 2460 of the transcript—and I think that is perfectly within the discretion of any Senator. We cannot always be here. I will not be able to be here at tomorrow afternoon's session or the Friday morning session.

The Senator from New Hampshire hasn't been able to be here for many sessions. There is no question of his right to be absent. I think we have had 21 sessions up to this morning, and I think he has attended 11 of the 21.

I know there are good reasons why he hasn't attended the 10 that he was absent from. But he goes on to say:

> * * * but I am impressed with the futility of much that is going on here and very definitely so. Here are a lot of men, well-intentioned men, with absolutely no military training or gumption or common sense, coming in here to pose questions to men whose lifelong service has been in the Military and Naval Establishments and the Air Force of this country.

When he says that, I feel I must make an observation. I have no objection to the Senator from New Hampshire so characterizing himself if he cares to, but I do raise a polite word of protest in behalf of my colleagues on this committee to having such descriptive language inserted into the official record of these hearings in regard to them.

In the first place, it just isn't an accurate statement. We have a considerable number of men on this committee who not only have had military training, but who in my opinion have had such distinguished military service that I am inclined to think that some of them could be put on the witness stand themselves and qualify as experts on some military problems.

I think we can take judicial notice that members of the committee are not lacking in what the Senator from New Hampshire describes as gumption and certainly they are not lacking in common sense, even though the Senator from New Hampshire is privileged to have a contrary view if he wishes to.

Then he said:

OPEN OR CLOSED HEARINGS

> We are wisely holding closed hearings over open hearings, against the ill-advisement of some members of this committee who insisted upon the hearings being opened.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the Congressional Record will show that on some procedural votes in the Senate—and I assumed all of us knew when we were casting those votes that the fundamental issue was not the procedural matter before us at all, but whether or not the hearings would be open or closed—I note from the Record that the Senator from New Hampshire voted with those of us that voted procedurewise in an attempt to get open hearings.

Again he is entitled to his judgment as to whether or not those of us that advised open hearings gave ill advice or not. For the record let the junior Senator from Oregon say that although I think these hearings have been conducted in as fine a fashion as executive hearings could possibly be conducted, I haven't changed my mind one iota from the basic principle that investigations of this type ought to be conducted in public hearings.

That is a difference of opinion, but I just didn't want that statement of the Senator from New Hampshire to remain in the record without my polite reply to it.

Then he goes on to say that he fails to see the value of holding up the test tube to the light of day, and "I would like to have somebody point it out for the good of the country and the good of the Congress and the good of the services."

EFFECT OF HEARINGS ON PUBLIC

I want to say, Mr. Chairman—and this is the last part of his comments that I shall reply to—I would prefer to dismiss them if they weren't having the effect I think they are on public opinion, as simply an emotional outburst, but I shall not dismiss them that way.

I want to say that I think these hearings are producing a tremendous effect for good on this country, because I think at the time these hearings started, public opinion was seriously split in this country—confusion, perplexity, doubt prevailed in America.

I think these hearings are having the effect of stabilizing public opinion. I think they are having a tremendous effect for good on this administration in that I think they are resulting in a clarification of a great many objectives in regard to foreign and military policy.

Sure, I, along with the Senator from New Hampshire, would have preferred that the incident which gave rise to these hearings had never arisen—but once it arose and the public reaction to it was what it was, then I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that in my judgment, in the interests of national unity, trying to get us back pulling together again on a military and foreign policy that will give us the maximum of unity against the threat of communism, we have to go through with these hearings.

I think we must continue with these hearings until we get these issues clarified and let the record speak for itself.

Therefore, I shall make no apology to this committee or to the Senate or to the people of the United States for asking such questions as I have asked heretofore in these hearings and such questions as I intend to ask before the hearings are over. I intend to be my own judge as to the propriety of my questions and then again let the record speak for itself.

I want to say to my friend from New Hampshire that my personal feelings of love and affections for him haven't changed a bit just because of my strong feeling of opposition to what I think were very indiscreet and unwise observation that he made yesterday afternoon on the record.

I think it is such observations as he made yesterday that cause disunity and disaffection in this country rather than the orderly procedure of this hearing.

With that observation, Mr. Chairman, I now ask General Bradley these questions.

MAC ARTHUR'S RECOMMENDATION REGARDING GROUND TROOPS

You were examined this morning by one of the Senators, General Bradley, about the early recommendation of General MacArthur concerning the sending of troops into Korea.

It is my recollection of General MacArthur's testimony—and he gave this testimony, I think, in answer to questions that I put to him, as the record will show—he testified that his first instructions were to proceed to protect our interests in Korea with air and naval forces and give such assistance to the South Koreans as he could with our air and naval forces.

As you have brought out, his first job was, of course, to help evacuate or to implement the evacuation of our nationals in Korea.

He then testified that he made a personal trip to Korea and as a result of his personal reconnaissance, he became satisfied that he could not carry out his mission in Korea with just naval and air forces, that he would need some ground forces, and that he recommended that he be allowed to take some troops then in Japan and send them to Korea for ground support.

I think that is all a matter of record, and I now ask you: Does that account of General MacArthur's recommendation in regard to ground troops square with your understanding of what happened?

FREQUENCY OF JCS-MAC ARTHUR COMMUNICATIONS

General Bradley. That is my remembrance of it; yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Now the Senator from New Jersey in a question this morning made a comment that left the impression with me that he thought MacArthur had been left out in Japan and in Korea to deal with the Korean problems alone and he asked questions as to whether or not you had been to the theater in Korea. I ask you this question:

Assuming that no one from the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone out to Japan or to Korea personally, would it follow that MacArthur was left alone in the dealing with Japanese and Korean problems?

General Bradley. No; I don't think that that follows in the sense that most people would take it, because there is constant communication back and forth.

In fact, the fact that a man is left alone to do a job is not an indication necessarily that you are not interested in him, but that you have confidence in his being able to carry it on without coming around, so that it works both ways.

We were always in constant communication with General MacArthur and exchanged views back and forth.

Senator Morse. I again hold in my hand, General Bradley, the secret exhibit, which is on the desk of each member of the committee, entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations," which exhibit purports to set forth paraphrases of the various communications that were transmitted to MacArthur and that MacArthur transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I ask you this question about the exhibit: Does it not show that from June 25 on the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept in very frequent communication with General MacArthur and sent him a great many messages and communications in regard to American military and foreign policy?

General BRADLEY. I think it does show that, and it also shows in here the various visits made by the Chiefs since that time.

Senator MORSE. Do you know of any time, General Bradley, that General MacArthur was not given an answer to any request that he made of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I do not mean given an answer that he considered satisfactory in that he was able to always agree, but do you know of any time when the Joint Chiefs of Staff left him alone out in Asia by not communicating with him in reply to any request he made of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you know of any time when the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to maintain a constant vigilance in accordance with their military duties as Joint Chiefs of Staff in respect to MacArthur's problems in Asia and kept him informed as to the conclusions that they reached in respect to those problems?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I know of no instance.

AMERICAN TRADITION OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE

Senator MORSE. Now, the other day the senior Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Bridges, examined you along this line: He said, "General Bradley, the firing occurred on a political level, is that true," and he asked you if you would speak out as MacArthur had spoken out to the public and you answered that you would not, but that you would go through your line of superior authority.

I ask you this in connection with the Bridges examination: If you spoke out, General, as Senator Bridges suggested, would not our military command soon become a babble of raucous conflicting voices and the line of command destroyed so as to produce a detrimental effect on military discipline?

General BRADLEY. Well, if I may answer that a little bit in full——

Senator MORSE. Answer it in your own way.

General BRADLEY. I think it can be illustrated by the fact that during the war the Chiefs of Staff had six theater commanders, all of whom thought their theater was all-important, and asked for additional means of carrying out their mission.

Had each one of these six carried their demands to the public over the heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I think we would have had the condition which you picture, one in which an orderly conduct of the war would have been broken down, and that our Government, our military authorities, would have been unable to carry on a war with any efficiency whatsoever.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that it is an historic custom and a long-established tradition in the American military system that while men are on active duty in responsible positions as high officers, they do not take their disagreements with their superiors directly to the public for a public debate, but they try to iron out their differences through the channels of command?

General Bradley. We are taught to argue and present all the reasons that we can think of with reference to any action until the decision is made, and we argue that with the man who is going to make the decision. After the decision is made we abide by that decision and do not carry it to the public.

Senator Morse. Would it be accurate for me to say that it is very much of an unwritten law within American military tradition that if a high officer of the military finds himself in such complete disagreement with his superiors that he cannot, in his opinion, with intellectual honesty and good ethics execute their orders that he should resign his commission, and then as a civilian take the issue to the country?

General Bradley. I think that is a general principle, and it doesn't apply only to the military. I think it applies to any civilian occupation. If a vice president of a company does not agree with the policy of the board, I think he normally gets out. I think we would follow the same principle.

Senator Morse. Am I correct in my understanding of your testimony that if you had found yourself in General MacArthur's position and believed as he believed, as he appeared to believe, that the policies of his Government in some respects were wrong, that you would have resigned your commission and taken the issue to the country if you felt that you had to discuss the matter?

General Bradley. I think, Senator Morse, that what I said was that I would have asked for relief from the job; and whether or not I would have carried it to the public would depend upon what I considered at the time the vital importance of the issue.

Senator Morse. Am I correct in my understanding that by that answer, you mean you would not have taken it to the public until you had been relieved from your job?

General Bradley. I would not have, no, sir.

NO MILITARY INSUBORDINATION

Senator Morse. Now, yesterday Senator Byrd examined you on the insubordination issue; and if I understood your testimony correctly, my understanding is that you do not believe that General MacArthur was guilty of insubordination, as far as the legal definition of the term "insubordination," in military law, is concerned; because the term "insubordination" carries with it intent or willful act or deliberate purpose, and that you do not believe that he intentionally committed an act which would fall within the definition of insubordination, as far as military law is concerned.

Am I correct?

General Bradley. That is correct. In other words, I do not say that General MacArthur was insubordinate.

Senator Morse. Am I correct in my understanding that you do believe, however, that some of the acts of General MacArthur embarrassed his Commander in Chief?

General Bradley. I think that can be assumed, because the President has so stated, himself.

Senator **Morse**. Am I correct in my understanding that you personally think that the notice, or the ultimatum that he issued to the Communist Chinese military leaders was most likely to embarrass his Commander in Chief?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Morse**. Am I correct, then, in view of that answer, General, to reach the conclusion that a military officer does not have to be insubordinate, in the legal sense, according to military justice, to commit acts that are embarrassing to his superiors and make the administration of their duties more difficult?

General **Bradley**. I think that is a fair statement.

DUTY OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Senator **Morse**. Is it likewise a fair statement to say that a Commander in Chief, finding himself in a position where the conduct of one of his commanders proves to be embarrassing to him, that he not only has the right, as you testified yesterday, to remove that commander but if he is to keep faith with his own obligations, responsibilities and duties as Commander in Chief, he has the duty to remove such a commander?

General **Bradley**. Well, you are asking me to pass upon the President's idea of his own duties. I think that is a little bit beyond me.

Senator **Morse**. Let me rephrase my question, because it has a principle involved in it that I think you are highly qualified to testify in regard to, and give me an answer to.

So, I will speak to you hypothetically, for a moment.

If commander X follows a course of action, be that action by way of issuing public statements that are embarrassing to his Commander in Chief, or any other conduct that embarrasses his Commander in Chief, so as to make it more difficult for his Commander in Chief to carry out the duties, responsibilities, and obligations of Commander in Chief; under those circumstances, then, does not the Commander in Chief not only have the right to remove the commander who is embarrassing him, but really has the duty to remove him, in the interest of the more efficient carrying out of his duties as Commander in Chief?

General **Bradley**. Well, I think that if the Commander in Chief should decide that such actions were interfering with his functioning in his job as Commander in Chief, interfering with his carrying out the duties assigned to him as Commander in Chief, then it would probably be his duty to remove that restriction and that interference.

Senator **Morse**. If a commander in chief did not relieve a subcommander who was interfering with the commander in chief's carrying out his duty, then the commander in chief, in turn, would be subject to criticism and censure, would he not?

General **Bradley**. He undoubtedly would, and he would become responsible for any actions that resulted from his not removing him.

Senator **Morse**. Of course our discussion over these hypothetical questions is all based on the assumption that as a matter of fact it is true that the commander in chief is being embarrassed and interfered with in carrying out his duty by some act of a subcommander.

REMOVING OFFICERS FROM COMMAND

Now I will close this line of questioning with this additional one on the insubordination matter. I think you testified, but I want to have it crystal clear in the record, that there are many grounds for removing commanders in the field, such as a loss of confidence on the part of a superior commander in a lower commander, or a feeling that the lower commander lost confidence in himself, I think you testified to. There are many discretionary grounds that are exercised constantly in removing officers from command; is that not right?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. That no commander has a right to be left in command, does he?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. He has no vested interest in a command?

General BRADLEY. No vested right; no, sir.

Senator MORSE. He serves at the pleasure of his superiors and the commander in chief in that particular post, does he not?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator MORSE. I think you testified that there are many, many instances in which men have been removed from command and given different assignments, and I suppose frequently they have been removed from command and given other assignments with no reason being given them as to why they have been removed and given other assignments; is that not true?

General BRADLEY. I expect that may have happened. When I relieved a man in battle I usually told him why I was relieving him, but I don't suppose it was inherent that I had to tell him.

Senator MORSE. Nothing in military law would require you to, is there?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

FIRST UN CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL

Senator MORSE. Now yesterday Senator Byrd also examined you in regard to a procedure that was followed after the first meeting in the Blair House when it was decided that we ought to reenter Korea based upon the first resolution of the Security Council, the one in which the Russians absented themselves, which, as I recall, was in effect a cease-fire resolution, was it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes. It called upon the North Koreans to desist and move back behind the thirty-eighth parallel.

Senator MORSE. And it was that resolution, was it not, on which our Government based its authority as far as the United Nations was concerned to proceed with the evacuation of our nationals?

General BRADLEY. Will you read that question?

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't believe any such resolution would have been necessary for evacuation of our nationals, because we have those plans in all countries, as I have stated, in case of an emergency, to get our nationals out. Every theater commander has those plans and the transportation arranged for them.

Senator MORSE. Are you through?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

APPENDIX OF NON-PUBLIC RECORD

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural matter that I would like to call to the attention of the committee, not present at the moment, but I do feel for the interests of proper procedure that I should say that it relates to the document of December 23, 1949, put out by the Department of State relative to the strategic importance of Formosa.

The State Department under date of May 22 finally supplied this document which had been requested by the senior Senator from California, and the document is available to the committee. However, they indicate that it is only presented with the understanding that as a classified document—and I might say that the classification of it is confidential—that it shall not be made a part of the public record of the hearings.

I do not want to violate that injunction which they have indicated in their letter to the chairman, but I would like the opportunity—it is not too long a statement—to read it into the record with that foreground so that Admiral Davis can take due notice, and I have no objection if he strikes it from the record today but I would like then to be able to ask in the normal committee procedures that we have set up that Senator McMahon and I should consult with the State Department and others with regard to this, because I personally do not feel that this in any way would violate national security, the security of our troops, any cryptographic situation or any other security for which I can at least see a valid reason.

Now, the State Department has outlined their reasons and at the proper time they, of course, could be discussed back and forth before this committee, but I would like to get the document into our classified record which will not be released to the public, and then at the proper time when we have a full committee present, raise the point and ask that the procedural discussion be made.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we can do that, Senator, by having it appear in the appendix. I think that any matter in the appendix is subject to the scrutiny of Admiral Davis as any matter that is in the main part of the record. It will conserve a little time.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is perfectly agreeable with me.

Chairman RUSSELL. My suggestion would be, if the Senator from California does not object to the suggestion, that if he would consult with the Senator from Connecticut and show him that matter, it might be that you could arrive at some kind of an agreement that would considerably shorten the procedure here.

Senator KNOWLAND. Fine, but I merely in fairness to the State Department wanted to raise the point that they had requested that it not be made a part of the public record and said it was being furnished with the understanding it would not be made a part of the public record, so I think if General Mudge can indicate to Admiral Davis this conversation that we want a part of the appendix of the nonpublic record and then we can take it up with Senator McMahon.

Chairman RUSSELL. That course will be followed.

Senator Green, you stated you had a few questions.

CLEARANCE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Senator GREEN. It will just take a few moments, General. From time to time during the questioning, reference has been made to a directive of clearance of public statements, and I think it would be a good idea to have for the record a statement from you as to how that clearance is effected and to whom it applies.

General BRADLEY. That directive was sent out on December 6, and was sent to all theater commanders.

Senator GREEN. To all what?

General BRADLEY. To all theater commanders.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General BRADLEY. It was a directive from the President dated December 5 to all officials in Government, high officials in Government, and then was sent out by us the next day to all theater commanders, because the President's directive applied not only to Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials in Government, but applied also to high-ranking military, and this directive stated that all statements involving policy should be cleared by the Government. That applied to all the high-ranking people, as I say, in Washington and in the field.

Now, if somebody in the field had anything to say that he felt might be at variance with that, it was up to him to send it in here for clearance. I don't know whether that answers your question or not, sir.

Senator GREEN. No, not quite. How far down, to what levels does it go?

General BRADLEY. Well, it goes to the senior in the field, and it is up to him to enforce it for everybody under him.

Senator GREEN. Then, it was up to General MacArthur to enforce it on everybody who was under him?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator GREEN. Reference was made in some of the questions to magazine articles that had been published by General Stratemeyer and also by General Ridgway. Were they not under General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. Then they should have been cleared by General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; if there was anything in that statement that was contrary to policy that should have been cleared with him; if there was any question in his mind, then he should have forwarded it on to Washington.

Senator GREEN. Yes; but otherwise if there was no question in his mind he would not have it forwarded?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; he has the authority to clear it or not clear it.

Senator GREEN. Then, we may assume they were cleared by him, if we didn't have any information to the contrary?

General BRADLEY. I assume so, sir, or else they thought they were in accordance with General MacArthur's policy and his statements.

Senator GREEN. Thank you very much; that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, the committee will now stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

General, we will have to ask you to be back with us again.

General BRADLEY. All right, sir.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. the same afternoon.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), McMahon, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Stennis, Long, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will be in order.

Senator Knowland.

MEETINGS HEADING TO MAC ARTHUR'S DISMISSAL

Senator KNOWLAND. General, I should like to go back and make some further inquiries relative to the meetings that led up to the dismissal of General MacArthur.

As I recall the testimony you had first received either from the telephone call or from some other source the fact that something was in the wind on April 5. Then, as I recall, you had gone to the White House on April the 6th, and at that meeting presumably in addition to the President was Secretary Acheson, Secretary Marshall, Mr. Harriman, and yourself?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. At that meeting no specific decisions were made as to the time of his removal, the circumstances of his removal, or in fact not even a final decision, so far as you knew, that he was to be removed. Though, as I understand the testimony, it was suggested that thought might be given over the week end and in the meantime you would meet with the Joint Chiefs. Am I substantially correct in my understanding?

General BRADLEY. Almost. At the meeting on Friday morning in the White House, with those that you mentioned, the matter was discussed, no decision reached; but the President directed the four of us to further discuss the matters among ourselves before we came back to him, which we did that afternoon, and went back to him on Saturday, at which time we still did not make any specific recommendation except that we recommended he not make any decision until after the week end.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now going over until the following Monday, on that day was the decision made to remove General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. It was at the meeting on Monday the decision was made by the President; at least it was announced by the President that he was going to remove him.

Senator KNOWLAND. Remove him. Now, was the situation left at that time that the Joint Chiefs were to draft the necessary orders and directives accomplishing that order, or was that matter still left open?

General BRADLEY. No. At the meeting on Monday when the decision was made, the President directed that the necessary implementing instructions be drawn up and presented to him on Tuesday, and various people participated in that—the State Department and General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, now, in addition to these people that you have already testified participated in the meeting of April 6, could you indicate who else participated in the meetings?

General BRADLEY. No other than the five of us participated in the April 6 meeting.

Senator KNOWLAND. No, no, I mean the subsequent meetings.

General BRADLEY. After the meeting on Saturday when he directed that I obtain or directed General Marshall rather, that he obtain the military viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then the Joint Chiefs met on Sunday, the four of us, and then we went to General Marshall's office. That included three others at that time, three Chiefs of service.

Senator KNOWLAND. The three Chiefs did not meet with the President, as I understand it.

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now what I am trying to find out, at the subsequent meetings with the President you have already testified that at the first meeting you, Mr. Harriman, Secretary Acheson, and Secretary Marshall met with him.

Now the record so far as it stands at the moment is that there were subsequent meetings and presumably only those same four people met with him. Was the group enlarged?

General BRADLEY. The group was the same or at least when I was there up through Monday. When we met on Tuesday to discuss various drafts of instructions, and so forth, there was one other added to it and that is Mr. Joe Short, the executive for press relations to the President.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now was he the only one that was added to the group at any of the subsequent meetings? Didn't Mr. Dean Rusk attend one of the meetings?

General BRADLEY. Not with the President; no, sir. I think Mr. Rusk was probably present at a meeting, at a later meeting with Mr. Short, but not with the President that I know of.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now do I understand you to say that the definite decision to remove General MacArthur was made on Monday, the 8th, was it?

General BRADLEY. I don't know when the President made up his mind.

Senator KNOWLAND. No, but I mean so far as you were notified.

General BRADLEY. So far as I know that is when he first announced his decision was on Monday, the 9th.

Senator KNOWLAND. At the time that he announced the decision, were his orders—and I assume they were verbal because you have previously testified you were not given a written order on it—were they sent to the Secretary of Defense or to yourself giving you a special directive to remove General MacArthur forthwith?

General BRADLEY. Well, his instructions were to prepare the necessary orders to remove him, and as I remember those were given to General Marshall because they would have to go out through the Secretary of Defense's office, but he told all of us present to participate in the drawing up of the order.

Senator KNOWLAND. What I am trying to get, General, I have never raised, and, so far as I know, no one else has raised, any question as to the President's legal power or constitutional authority to make the change. But the manner in which it was made, this order that went out, that he was relieved as soon as he read his order, without the customary turning over of the command to his successor, I am trying to find out, without too many questions here, as to how did that originate.

Was that a recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff? Was that the direct order of the President that it be done in that way? Was it the suggestion of someone else that it be handled in that way?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember the exact wording. I think it was the general understanding that the President wanted it done right away.

Senator KNOWLAND. Might I ask, General, was there a final meeting in the Pentagon meeting on the evening of the 9th—either the 8th or 9th of April—at which the final decision relative to his forthwith removal was considered?

General BRADLEY. On the 8th, the meeting only pertained, as far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned, to the views that for certain military reasons they thought he should be relieved. There was nothing else done by the Chiefs in this connection, on the 8th.

There was a regular meeting on the 9th, Monday afternoon. We had a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting all afternoon, and I don't remember just how much of this was discussed at that time. Probably it was discussed, because it was a very important part.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did Secretary Acheson attend either of those meetings?

MEETINGS WHICH LEAD TO ENTRANCE IN KOREAN WAR

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Calling your attention now to the questions of the other day, regarding the Blair House meetings of the 25th of June—you were to see if you could find out just who attended those meetings, and the subsequent one.

Could you read that into the record at this time?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

According to my diary, which is kept in my office and it is made out when I go back, I usually give the girl the names of the people present at the meetings, and, of course, while my memory may have been at fault, at the time I left the meeting until I gave it to the girl, I don't think so, and these are the names that it showed:

At the meeting on the 25th of June, from 7:45 p. m. until 11 p. m., the President, Secretary of State Acheson, Deputy Secretary Webb, Assistant Secretary Rusk, Jessup, Hickerson, Secretary of Defense Johnson, Secretary of the Army Pace, Secretary of the Air Force Finletter, Secretary of the Navy Matthews; the three Chiefs of the services—Vandenberg, Collins, and Admiral Sherman—and myself.

At the meeting on the 26th of June——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman. Can you give the date of that list?

Chairman RUSSELL. The 25th of June.

General BRADLEY. The 25th of June. The time I show here is from 7:45 p. m. until 11 p. m.

At the meeting on the 26th of June, which lasted from 9 p. m. until 10 p. m., in addition to the President, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Jessup, Secretary Matthews, Hickerson, Secretary of Defense Johnson, Secretary of the Army Pace, Secretary of the Air Force Finletter, General Vandenberg, General Collins and Admiral Sherman, and myself.

Senator **Knowland**. That completed the meetings leading up to the entrance into the Korean War?

General **Bradley**. Well, there was another meeting the morning of the 27th. I don't remember whether—this was at the White House, and whether or not it had to do with this, I don't remember; because at this particular time I was briefing the President every morning, so that it is rather hard for me to keep track of what was said each time.

But this time may have been a special occasion, because Secretary of Defense Johnson, Secretary of the Army Pace, Secretary of the Air Force Finletter, Secretary of the Navy Matthews, General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman were there at the same time, and myself.

Senator **Smith**. Would the Senator yield for a question to clarify this?

Senator **Knowland**. Yes.

Senator **Smith**. General, could you tell us what was the day that certain Members of the House and Senate met with you all on the Korean crisis? I recall Senator Connally, I know I was there, Senator Wherry was there, and I think the chairman was there, Senator Russell.

Chairman **Russell**. No; I wasn't there.

Senator **Smith**. Somebody from the armed services.

General **Bradley**. I think this is the date, the 27th of June, but I only put down the ones from the Defense Department. I am not sure, but I think possibly it was this 27th of June meeting that you attended. It was right in there, I know, and it was about 11 o'clock in the morning.

Senator **Smith**. That is right.

General **Bradley**. I think that is the one you attended, but my notes don't show that. I only show the ones from the Defense Department.

Senator **Smith**. I will check my diary on that.

Chairman **Russell**. I would like to have the record show I didn't attend any of those meetings; at that time I was not chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Senator **Smith**. It was the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I think, and I think Senator Bridges as the ranking Republican. Senator Wiley, I think, was on his campaign.

Chairman **Russell**. I have heard that Senator Tydings was there at the time he was chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

MESSAGE TELLING MAC ARTHUR OF FUTURE UN NEGOTIATIONS

Senator **Knowland**. General, you have testified this morning that the statement, so far as you believe, that was sent to General MacArthur regarding the so-called cease-fire negotiations was that which is paraphrased on page 100 of the record. Am I correct?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir; and in answer to that query I looked up the complete message, which I will read in here, with the understanding, of course, that this is not a paraphrase and may suffer some change by the censor, because of cryptographic security.

Senator KNOWLAND. I might say that if you will merely indicate that the paraphrase in your judgment is a full paraphrase of the message, I have no desire to have something that might jeopardize the cryptographic situation even read into the record.

The only point I am getting at, General, is: Was the general in Tokyo informed of any of the terms or was he merely informed, as the paraphrase indicates, that sometime in the future, or shortly, that certain negotiations were going to take place, without any designation as to what the terms were?

General BRADLEY. I find that the message sent him did not give the terms, but it did very plainly state that it was being considered by us and by the United Nations, but did not state the terms to it.

Senator KNOWLAND. The paraphrase says "State planning a Presidential announcement." Does the message itself indicate that that is the situation?

General BRADLEY. It indicates the same sense.

Senator KNOWLAND. I see. So that the terms are not given but the announcement that something was in the wind was sent; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. Yes; that is right.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, at that time, General, were you familiar with the terms that were under negotiation and presumably the other nations were being sounded out on?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I didn't happen to be in town at that time, Senator, and I had to catch up on this when I came back.

Senator KNOWLAND. To the best of your knowledge, were the Joint Chiefs familiar with the detailed terms that were under discussion?

General BRADLEY. That I could not answer with first-hand information.

OBJECTIONS TO MAC ARTHUR'S VFW SPEECH

Senator KNOWLAND. Referring now, General, to the period of August 26, when General MacArthur sent his letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, have you had an opportunity to review the letter and also to review your notes as to whether you were called to the White House at that time?

General BRADLEY. I read over the message, but it is rather hard to tell from my notes just how much I participated because, as I say, I was going to the White House every day.

I have a vague recollection only of something being said about it while I was briefing the President and those around him.

When I would go over to brief the President every morning, usually a considerable number of his staff would come in, and I have a vague recollection of someone bringing this matter up. I did not bring it up.

As a matter of fact, it never did come through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as I remember it, any principal objection to it was not from a military point of view, but from a policy point of view, and it was not made by us.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like at this point, General, to ask if in your rereading of the letter of that period, of August 26, and in view of the testimony before this committee that Secretary Marshall believes that Formosa is of strategic value and should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the Communists, and you have so testified, and you have testified that is the position of the Joint Chiefs, General MacArthur has so testified, and indicated that in his judgment, it was the views of Admiral Radford and other commanders, naval, military, and air, just what in that letter of August 26 do you believe violates either military, strategic concepts of this country or our policy? I am seeking information because, frankly, I read it again last night, and I cannot in the light of the testimony see how it violates in any way, and how General MacArthur could have considered anything other than that he was fully backing up the announced policy of the President of the United States, and I was wondering whether any explanation was given.

General Bradley. Well, I can only answer I think as to the military part of it, and I don't believe there has ever been any difference of opinion between General MacArthur's views and the Joint Chiefs' views on the importance of Formosa and desirability of increasing their power to resist. I don't believe there has ever been any difference from a military point of view.

Now as to what is in that speech that is objectionable from a policy point of view, I don't think I am qualified to answer and I think you are going to have a witness here who is much more qualified than I am and that would be the Secretary of State.

MENACING SITUATION IN KOREA PRIOR TO WAR

Senator Knowland. Now I would like to call your attention, General, to several paragraphs here. I believe in no case are they taken out of context, so I will cite the full reference so it will be available to you.

On the 1st of June 1950, which was 24 days prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the President of the United States sent a message to Congress, and in that message he has this to say, and I quote:

> The security of the Republic of Korea is under the constant menace of the Communist-dominated regime in North Korea, whose purpose is to destroy the new republic established after free elections held under the auspices of the United Nations.

This was 24 days before the invasion. General, if there was again created a North Korean Communist regime, don't you believe that the Republic of Korea would be under the same menace as indicated by the President of the United States 24 days before the current aggression took place?

General Bradley. Yes; I think that is correct.

Senator Knowland. I would like to call your attention to a statement issued by the American Ambassador to Korea, the Republic of Korea, issued on June 9, 1950, which was some 15 or 16 days before the aggression, and reading from an official State Department document, Bulletin of June 26—that is the date on the cover, though the publication came out a little before that—and I quote:

> Although the threat of North Korean aggression seems temporarily at least to have been successfully contained, the undeniable matériel superiority of North Korean forces would provide North Korea with a margin of victory in the event

> of a full-scale invasion of the Republic. Such superiority is particularly evident in the mater of heavy infantry support weapons, tanks, and combat aircraft with which the U. S. S. R. had supplied and continues to supply its Korean puppet. It has been aggravated also by the recent Communist successes in China, which have increased considerably the military potential of the North, particularly by releasing undetermined numbers of Korean troops from the Chinese Communist armies for service in Korea. The threat to the Republic will continue as long as there exists in the north an aggressive Communist regime desiring the conquest and domination of the south.

Would you not say that the Ambassador to Korea had made a very clear analysis of the dangers confronting the Republic of Korea? And that was made on the 9th day of June 1950, some 15 days before the aggression.

General BRADLEY. I would agree that events proved his analysis very accurate.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would you say, General, in the event of a re-creation of a North Korean Communist regime, with a common border with a Communist China and a common border with Communist Russia, that those same dangers would be inherent in the situation as far as the Republic of Korea was concerned?

General BRADLEY. Yes; I think that is so.

PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN A DIVIDED KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. I call your attention next, General, to the Bulletin of the Department of State issued October 2, 1950, in which they give the report of the UN Commission on Korea, report to the Assembly, which was issued at approximately that time. I am reading from page 541, and it says:

> The division of Korea by the thirty-eighth parallel, the Commission declares, is artificial and unnatural and runs counter to the fervent desires of the whole Korean people for unification.

Would you say that that was a rather clear statement of the problems involved in a divided Korea as put out by the United Nations Commission?

General BRADLEY. Yes; and I think that explains why our long-range policy and the long-range policy of the United Nations is to eventually have a unified and free Korea.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, from the point of view of a competent military commander of wide experience, if a cease-fire proposal was entertained which permitted the Chinese Communists to merely withdraw to the Yalu River and reestablish in effect North Korea and its Communist regime, and at the same time the United States and the United Nations forces had to withdraw from South Korea, and, as far as our forces were concerned back to the United States, would you feel that under those circumstances the Republic of Korea would be under constant threat of additional aggression?

General BRADLEY. Well, in the first place, the final decision on that, of course, would be political and not military, as you understand.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand.

General BRADLEY. Of course, from a military point of view, I think we all realize that the same threat as visualized in these various documents which you read will still exist. However, this won't be just an isolated instance where they exist. Threats exist in many parts of the world, and what we will accomplish, as I see it, we will go back to the same kind of a threat we had at that time. The question of decision that is going to have to be reached if this is put up to us is whether or not that is acceptable from all angles—political, military and so forth—and it is going to involve more than just the simple things, that we both withdraw. I think it is going to have to have certain other safeguards in at the time, but it may boil down to a question of whether or not you accept that or nothing.

Senator **Knowland**. I am merely asking, however, from a military point of view, who would be in the most advantageous position. If the North Korean regime was re-created north of the thirty-eighth parallel and the Chinese Communist forces, which have been in open aggression on their side, only withdraw to the Yalu River, are they not within a few days' march in the event they determine on aggression again, whereas, if the United Nations forces are pulled back to their respective countries and the United States forces are pulled back to the United States, from purely a military point of view, is not the Communist regime in a much more advantageous position?

General **Bradley**. Yes; they are there; and they are in many other places. Just like in Europe, for example, they have many divisions within striking distance of the iron curtain, many more than we have, and can get there much quicker than we can. It is one of the disadvantages we labor under and one of the advantages they possess by operating on interior lines. I don't think there is any question but what from a military point of view they are in a more advantageous position to renew the conflict.

CONCURRENCE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY POLICY

Senator **Knowland**. My time is rapidly drawing to a close here, General, but there is one thing that was raised by—I am not sure whether it was Senator Smith or someone else, earlier, I believe yesterday. Senator Saltonstall it was I believe—relative to our policy as far as complete agreement between the Department of State and the Department of National Defense.

Now, as I read the documents which we have before us, as late as, I believe, April 5, there was an indication that there had not been a complete understanding on the situation as between the two departments.

There were other indications at an earlier period of time. Could you explain how it is that at least 10 months after the outbreak of hostilities that the Defense Establishment and the State Department had not arrived at a common policy in regard to Korea?

General **Bradley**. I assume that you are talking about the inability to get a political objective?

Senator **Knowland**. Yes; since you have testified that some of these major decisions are going to be political as well as military.

General **Bradley**. Well, we have asked for political guidance several times with relation to the thirty-eighth parallel, for example, because, unless there is some political reason for not crossing the thirty-eighth parallel, then from a military point of view it has no great significance, and it is in connection with that general area that we have been somewhat at a loss as to whether or not we should or should not pay any attention to the thirty-eighth parallel, and as I have brought out here before.

[Deleted.]

Senator KNOWLAND. One final question. Wasn't the interpretation that General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff placed on the October 7 resolution of the United Nations that it directed him to consolidate all of Korea so there would be a free and independent Korea? Wasn't that your understanding also?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. On the October 7 directive?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

DECISIVENESS OF KOREAN FIGHTING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Bradley, there has been repeated mention here, and the expression has been used repeatedly, that bombing of bases in Manchuria by our Air Corps would not be decisive, and I understand the position to be that it would not necessarily be decisive. I ask you if our present operations in Korea are decisive.

General BRADLEY. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, to frame the question, and I am not trying to lead up to anything particularly that is to embarrass you in any way, but it appears that we are therefore fighting or conducting an operation today that is not decisive and we justify that.

We fail to justify, or our military and State Department and others fail to adopt a policy, which would additionally hurt the Red Chinese but we say we fail to adopt it because it is not decisive.

General BRADLEY. But we don't say that entirely because it is not decisive; we say we don't want to do it unless we have to because it increases the risks of world war III.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Any activity that we take along a military line has a tendency to increase the possibility of world war III, doesn't it?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

RUSSIAN-CHINESE TREATY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you believe that Russia will come in to help Red China just from the sole moral standpoint of having a treaty to defend her against Japan?

General BRADLEY. Well, I don't think anyone can say positively that she will, because I think we all know that she has not always kept agreements; but, I guess that is the point you are trying to make, that she doesn't always keep her agreements; however, sometimes she does.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am trying to make, which is my firm opinion, from what I have heard in the last several years, is that Russia will move according to Russia's own convenience and without regard to any moral considerations or relationships with any other country. She will either come into this conflict, if she thinks it is the proper course for her to pursue, or she will stay out, depending entirely on what Russia thinks is to her own interests, without regard to any morals or treaty. What is your opinion on that?

General BRADLEY. I think there is a lot of justification, Senator Hickenlooper; but also there is a question to which I have given considerable attention, and that is, when she gets ready, or approaches that time, or even gets in a position where she is willing to accept it, isn't she going to have to consider the value of world opinion to a certain extent?

She has certain Communist cells in all countries, and I think what she must do, if she goes into this war, she would like to create conditions under which it will make it look much more logical that she will keep these friendships among the Communist cells in other countries.

CONSIDERING RUSSIAN TIMETABLE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I can only judge the future by the past, and I call your attention to the fact that Russia was on both sides of the Nazi question. When she was in an alliance with Hitler the Communists all over the world whooped it up for us keeping out of the European thing. When Russia suddenly overnight confounded all the Commmunists in the world and broke with Hitler, then the Communists immediately changed the party line that very next morning and advocated invasion and fighting Hitler.

Your argument may be valid; I don't say that it isn't, but I don't view it that way. I view it that Russia is utterly cold-blooded, materialistic, lacking in any spiritual concepts, and that she will move when Russia's best interests in the idea of the Kremlin indicate that she should move, and she won't move until she thinks her best interests are served.

General BRADLEY. I don't like to be argumentative, but in answer to your question and in furtherance of my previous answer, as I remember it, Stalin made both of those decisions look plausible to his followers and tried to justify both of them. I think the more ammunition he can get, to get people to see his way of doing it, the stronger he is going to be, and I think he will try to create those conditions.

I don't think any of us knows under what conditions Russia will attack or what would bring them into the war. It is just the fact that we think it does increase that chance to a certain extent, and therefore we don't want to take it unless we have to.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to prolong an argument here, because I have some other questions, but Stalin personally approved the North Atlantic Charter, and yet he has no hesitancy in the world to go against it and defy it and violate all its terms from the moral standpoint.

When I say personally approved it, I mean he signed the document approving it. He was not present when it was drawn, but he later approved it.

Now, isn't it reasonable that if the collapse of Red China is inimical or dangerous to Russia's interests, they might consider it advisable to come into the war and start a third world war?

I mean if Russia considers that the defeat of Red China could be prejudicial to her interests in a major way, she might precipitate a third world war. Is that reasonable to assume?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; under one of those conditions in which we might think they might depart from their timetable.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we go into Manchuria, you feel that might step up that danger?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, if we defeat Red China in Korea—and it is Red China that we are fighting now—if Red China collapses in Korea, and they surrender or we defeat them seriously to the point where it endangers the collapse of Red China, isn't Russia coming in just as quickly because that is a matter of principle? That is, wouldn't the defeat and the loss of face of Red China be inimical or disadvantageous to the Russian interests?

General BRADLEY. Yes; it would be disadvantageous to them, but I don't believe anybody would advocate that we call off and that we quit trying to defeat China in Korea.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No; but the point I am trying to make, General, in expressing my own thinking, is that we are doing the very thing now; we are saying that we are out to defeat the Red Chinese in Korea. If the Russians are coming in, they undoubtedly, according to my view of the matter at the moment, will come in when they think their interests are being prejudiced by the defeat of the Red Chinese.

If we defeat them in Korea, it would seem to me to be just as much reason for the Russians to precipitate a third world war, because of that defeat in Korea, as because of a defeat resulting partially from the bombing of supply bases in Manchuria. In other words, it is the matter of the broad theory and not the specific place where the attack takes place or the destruction takes place, so long as it is not on Russian territory.

General BRADLEY. I agree with you there is that danger. I think the only place I disagree with you is that there is the same likelihood as in the other. I think the bombing of Manchuria adds something additional to the possibility.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand your position, and I do not want to labor it any further. I disagree with it because I think on the basic theory on which we are going, we are out to defeat the Red Chinese. If we defeat them in Korea and they collapse, it will be a defeat for Red China. If we hasten their defeat by destroying their bases in Manchuria and thereby contribute to the defeat of Red China it is a defeat of the Red Chinese. It is the defeat of Red China that appeals to me as a possibly valid argument as to why the Russians might come in if they consider their interests to be destroyed or depreciated by their defeat; so it seems to me it makes no difference whether we defeat them in Korea or contribute to that defeat by certain limited action over the border north of the Yalu. That is the reasoning or that is the basis that is behind my question.

I want to correct something I said a moment ago. Someone just handed me a note. If I said a moment ago that Stalin had personally approved the North Atlantic Pact, I did not mean that at all. I would like for the record to be corrected. It is the North Atlantic Charter in which he said specifically in so many words over his signature that he approved.

Senator LODGE. The Atlantic Charter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I did not mean the pact. It is a totally different thing.

COMPARING GREEK AND KOREAN SITUATIONS

Now, mention has been made repeatedly of our action in Greece, and that we were successful there.

The fact of the matter is that the Greek guerrillas were coming over the border from Yugoslavia, from certain other spots in Bulgaria, and that they were retiring back to a sanctuary for a long period of time. Isn't that true, General? That is, they were able to cross the border back and forth into Greece and Yugoslavia with comparative ease?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And we spent a lot of time and money and a couple of years or so, trying to catch them in the mountains and trying to drive them out of Greece.

I happened to be there during that period. Now, it is my definite impression, as far as anything I can read about the matter, that we never began to successfully clean them out of Greece, or the Greek Army did not, even though they had some 90,000 men to about a maximum of 18,000 guerrillas at any one time. We never were able to defeat the guerrillas and clean them out of Greece until the sanctuary, the points across the border where they could go and regroup and get new arms and come back over and fight, was closed to them.

Now, when Tito closed the border he put up the iron curtain for them, and then they were up against it. Their sanctuary was closed to them, so that they couldn't go to a rest camp, regroup, rest and come back and fight another day.

Now am I wrong about that?

General BRADLEY. Not completely. The sanctuary in Yugoslavia was taken away from them. As far as I know the sanctuary in Albania and Bulgaria was not taken away from them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, that is very true, but the main sanctuary where they had a big nation and they could get at least certain supplies and a certain haven was really Yugoslavia.

When they closed that border to them, we began to have success in driving them up against the wall and pocketing them and eventually they were cleaned out.

General BRADLEY. But in all justice to the Greeks, I would like for the record to show that they had something to do with that too because by the time we got to that stage, the Greek Army was in very fine shape, they had fine leadership, both junior leadership and senior leadership, and they had improved their weapons and the Greek Army did a much better job.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I understand; I do not mean to discredit the Greek Army, but I also think the record shows that there were some 90,000 in the Greek Army operating against a maximum of some 18,000 guerrillas, so that one might expect with even reasonable efficiency or moderate efficiency that 90,000 should eventually be able to do some damage to 18,000 even though the fighting was difficult and there was guerrilla warfare. The point I was trying to make is that when the sanctuary was closed so that they could not recondition, so that they could not regroup, so that they could not go back and rearrange their strategy, so they could not reestablish their liaison with the various scattered groups and come back to the attack again, we then began to make rapid progress and the Greek Army did a good job of cleaning them out.

BATTLE AREA CASUALTIES

Now, General, I had raised the question the other day about our losses, that is battle area casualties. I am thinking of killed, wounded, and missing, and eliminating the delayed statistics which I referred to the other day of May 11. I do not mean eliminating them but I mean eliminating them from the total question of delayed statistics. I wonder if you have our total battle area casualties, that is killed, wounded, missing and other battle area casualties as of this day, the 23d day of May 1951?

General BRADLEY. I didn't understand that I was to get them up to this date. They are furnished to your chairman each week and if that was understood, that I was to get them up to this date, I am sorry.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I asked about it the other day. I do not recall whether I specifically said will you furnish them, but I asked about it as of the day before yesterday on that date.

Now we got the nonbattle casualties yesterday, and as I say, I am not advocating that this be made public at this moment.

General BRADLEY. Do you want them furnished as of up to date?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like them furnished as of up to the date of the day they are furnished, if it is tomorrow morning, because I understand the reports come in every morning.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And those lists are filed.

Now as I say, I am not insisting that those be made public at this moment. I do not want to interfere with orderly procedure too much, but I think for the information of this committee it will be very helpful.

What I want is the total of all casualties. We have the nonbattle casualties. Then I would like the total broken into categories killed, wounded, missing, and so on, of the battle casualties or battle-area casualties.

General BRADLEY. You want United States casualties?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, United States casualties.

DOCUMENTS OF PROPOSED PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Now have you ever seen the text of the proposed peaceful settlement negotiations which the State Department submitted to the various United Nations and which is the controvery surrounding General MacArthur's armistice proposal that we have talked about so much? Have you ever seen the text?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember whether I have or not. When I came back here about the 26th or 27th of March, I tried to catch up on what had been going on beforehand and whether or not I saw the terms of that I don't know. It was primarily a State Department paper and I can't remember whether I saw it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know whether the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a copy of that official paper in their files?

General Bradley. I don't know, sir. It is a State Department paper primarily. I don't know whether we have it or not.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, could you have it checked please, General, and see? I think it has been asked for perhaps, but in case it has not, I would specifically like to have the exact full text of that proposal, telling what we proposed to the various other United Nations that we put in as terms of peace proposals to the Red Chinese.

General Bradley. Begging your pardon, may I suggest that you ask that of Secretary Acheson since it is a State Department paper?

Wouldn't that be more appropriate and he could explain it and discuss it. I wouldn't be in any position to discuss it.

Senator Hickenlooper. I have no objection to that, General, except that I hope it will be in the record now. I would think that the State Department or whoever has it could furnish it immediately for the record.

General Bradley. It seems like it might be a little bit inappropriate for one Department to introduce and discuss a paper of another Department when that Department is going to have a chance to present it and discuss it.

Senator Hickenlooper. Except for this point, General: That it is a controversial matter in connection with the military action, in connection with General MacArthur, and certainly it was taken into consideration in the military decisions.

General Bradley. No, sir, not the terms of it.

Senator Hickenlooper. No, but the fact that they claim that he embarrassed the Commander in Chief by speaking out on his own in this matter.

General Bradley. Yes, sir, but it wasn't the fact that he spoke out on the terms of the matter. It was the fact that he made a statement concerning this matter at a time when he must have known from the telegram we sent him that the Government and the United Nations had it under consideration. That was the point.

It wasn't the terms of the armistice that concerned us. It was the fact that he would come out with a pronouncement of his own while this was under consideration of his Government.

MAC ARTHUR'S MESSAGES TO THE ENEMY

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, General, let me ask you this question, and it is in the nature of a hypothetical question, but I think it is a real question.

Suppose that in answer to General MacArthur's demand that he stop fighting and consider surrender Mao-Tze-Tung had said, "All right, I will lay down my arms at this moment and we will have an armistice and talk this over." Would that have disappointed the Military Establishment?

General Bradley. I think if he had done all that, that would have come well within any terms which we were considering.

However, if he had offered something less than that, then certainly General MacArthur would have had to come back for instruction.

Senator Hickenlooper. It has been testified here that on two different occasions before, General MacArthur demanded a surrender or capitulation of some sort or a cease fire or some other cessation, in October and September, did he not?

General Bradley. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, in each case it was suggested to him that he do that or he was directed or some other approval was given by this Government that he do that; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And he did it on those two occasions. Was he ever thereafter instructed not to redemand a surrender of the enemy? That is, that our desire was to have the enemy surrender or capitulate in some way. Was he instructed that we had withdrawn that desire and that it mustn't be offered to them again?

General BRADLEY. No; I don't think it would have been necessary to issue any such instructions, and I don't think anyone would have objected had there been a complete surrender or unconditional surrender.

No one would object to that, because that would come under the terms anybody had in mind, but when you take something else, then, of course, it would be questionable whether or not it was Government policy.

May I state again that the Joint Chiefs of Staff weren't concerned about the terms of this thing, whether or not he offered terms in Korea, so much as the fact that he jumped the gun, so to speak, and made an announcement to them at a time when it was under consideration here, not the terms. It is the fact that he did it at that time that it concerned the three Chiefs of Staff.

PRECEDENTS IN DEMANDING SURRENDERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has it been customary in battle from time immemorial that a commander who believes that he has the enemy in a dispirited state, to either broadcast or send messages or send a flag of truce, demanding that the other fellow surrender now or suffer heinous losses and catastrophe in the future?

Haven't they done that on the field of battle and in campaigns from time immemorial?

General BRADLEY. Well, they have done it under certain circumstances; yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And wasn't it a custom in World War II and World War I, for the radios to broadcast back and forth that the commander of this theater demanded that the enemy surrender?

Were not our troops requested to surrender in Italy, repeatedly, with propaganda? Wasn't that done in Germany?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir, but that didn't come with authority from the commander, that came as a propaganda, over the radio, and Axis Sally and a few others, which I don't believe anyone recognized as an official demand from an opposing commander.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, of course, when we invaded north Africa, didn't we call on the French to surrender, that is, the Vichy French? Didn't our commanders, when we made the landing in north Africa, call on them to lay down their arms; and didn't we carry the American flag up over the landing field so that they would see that? We sent messages to them to surrender, and not fight the Americans? Didn't we do that there?

General BRADLEY. I expect we did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I read that we did.

General BRADLEY. I wasn't there, but I think that is what happened.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. My only point is that it seems to me that in military action, from time immemorial, commanders have repeatedly, when they felt the time was auspicious, demanded that the other man surrender or that action would be taken.

General **Bradley**. Senator, had this come on March 15, under favorable circumstances, I think your parallel would hold; but it doesn't quite hold in this case, because, in this case, he knew that this thing was being considered by the United Nations, and by our Government, and I don't believe it is quite a parallel case to going up and putting up a flag on a French field, and so forth, because at that time General Eisenhower or Gneeral Clark, or none of the rest of them had any knowledge that our Government was taking governmental action through other channels, so it is not a parallel, as I see it.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. General Bradley, isn't it a fact that is well known that our airplanes had been repeatedly scattering leaflets over the opposing forces, calling on them to lay down their arms and surrender, and that they would get good treatment, and to come on in?

Hadn't we been doing that routinely?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Were we doing it with the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and our Government?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well then, is it any different for the commanding general, in keeping with that propaganda which had been approved and O. K.'d, is it any different for him merely to send his voice out, or send a message out, which is completely in keeping with the leaflet dropping propaganda that we had been scattering over their troops with great regularity?

General **Bradley**. In my opinion it certainly was, when he knew that this thing was pending on a governmental level and was being discussed with our allies in the matter.

CIVILIAN ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS DECIDING MAC ARTHUR'S RECALL

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Now, in any of these meetings which you attended beginning in the forepart of April, beginning, I believe, on the 5th of April, in connection with the relief of General MacArthur, was Secretary Pace of the Army there?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; because he was in Korea and Japan at that time.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Was Secretary Finletter of the Air Force there?

General **Bradley**. No, sir. I think I have stated the ones present.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Was Secretary Matthews of the Navy there?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. They are the civilian heads of the three branches, are they not?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You said great concern was expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff about General MacArthur endangering the civilian control of our military forces.

It seems strange to me, then, that the civilian heads of the three branches were not present at these meetings, when this very vital decision to disrupt the situation, at least temporarily, in the Orient, was under discussion.

General BRADLEY. I imagine that Secretary Marshall felt that he represented the civilian part of the Defense Department. In addition to that, the President might be classified as a civilian, and so might Secretary Acheson and Mr. Harriman.

So that in the discussions at the White House I was the only man representing the military position; the other four were not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, the point I make is that these three men were actually the civilian heads of their various departments and they do not seem to have been present. So far as I know, they were not formally consulted about this very serious thing.

General BRADLEY. I think there is one other point pertinent to the question, Senator, and that is that General MacArthur was not under the Army Secretary.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that.

General BRADLEY. He is a unified commander under the Department of Defense.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Except that he received his directives from the Army Chief of Staff.

General BRADLEY. Well, only as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me. How much time do I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. About a minute and a half, Senator.

BOMBING RACIN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Bradley, I was trying to go through some notes here rather quickly. General Bradley, authority was given to General MacArthur at one time to bomb Racin. That has been testified to, has it not?

General BRADLEY. It has been testified to. I did testify that he was given permission twice.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Twice.

General BRADLEY. One of the bombings went through, the other one, because of weather, had to be diverted to a secondary target.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this, General Bradley: Do you know whether that was during the first couple of months of the Korean campaign?

General BRADLEY. I think it was somewhere around August or September.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Now, do you know or do you have any knowledge of whether or not the State Department wrote a most vigorous letter of protest, perhaps over the signature of Under Secretary Webb, to the military or to the Defense Department protesting certain of these bombings and, in effect, demanding that they cease?

General BRADLEY. The State Department has always objected to the bombing of Rashin because of its being 17 miles from the Russian border—17 miles is not a very long space in which to turn around and get back out, and that was their principal objection to it. The objection to the bombing of Rashin naturally comes primarily from the State Department because you are bordering on a political issue of crossing the border into Russia.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that it was the State Department objection that caused the recall of that authorization to bomb Rashin?

General BRADLEY. Well, the first time it was done anyway, and thereafter, upon their continuous objection to it, the dangers run, we didn't order it—didn't authorize it more than two times.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You withdrew the authorization?

General BRADLEY. Beg pardon?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You withdrew the authorization to bomb Rashin?

General BRADLEY. There were specific authorizations to bomb it on those two occasions, I believe. At least your statement is correct in substance—we withdrew, in other words, prohibited the bombing of Rashin, if you want to put it that way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. I have about two more questions but I shall wait my turn.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

BRADLEY'S DIARY

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, sir, you can answer this first question if you so wish in one word. Prior to April 5 had anyone in authority said to you as Chairman of the JCS or to the JCS that consideration had been given or was likely to be given to the removal of General MacArthur from his Far Eastern Command?

General BRADLEY. Not that I remember.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, from what source did you write that completely fascinating and detailed series of stories that I have been reading each week in Life magazine?

General BRADLEY. From what source?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General BRADLEY. From my memory, from notes kept by myself, by a diary kept by my aide who went through the war with me, by the daily records, and by the daily maps which were kept during the whole time.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Have I understood you to say that it has been your habit, and is now your habit, to maintain a diary within your present headquarters?

General BRADLEY. The girl just outside my office keeps a diary as to where I am at various times during the day, and if any telephone calls come through the regular line, a note is made of them as to whom the call was from.

Senator CAIN. Well, a few minutes ago you said that your diary included the names who were in attendance at the Blair House on those days just prior to and during the early part of the war.

General BRADLEY. Yes. When I come back from a conference outside, if I remember it, I give her the names of the people present at that time.

Senator CAIN. Well, would that diary, sir, include your own impression and résumé of what was discussed at the Blair House conference or other conferences?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I do not attempt to dictate that.

Senator CAIN. Well, it is then fair for me to assume that if in the future you as JCS Chairman, or a retired officer of distinction, at a later day writes a history of how America became involved in this war, you would have to do so largely out of your memory?

General BRADLEY. I wouldn't have enough information in this case to write it.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, however, much all of us in this room may disagree on different methods, I just take it to be so that everyone of us shares the hope that the aggressors, Red China and North Korea, can be forced to stop their aggression, and that Red China will withdraw from Korea.

Do we not all share that latter hope, sir?

General BRADLEY. I think all of us share the hope that this matter in Korea may be solved as quickly as possible and we get out of it.

DEFINING POLICE ACTION

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, late in June the President announced that American forces were undertaking a police action in Korea. Will you tell me, please, what is a police action, and with reference to Korea, when did that police action become a war?

I am trying to understand this problem, General Bradley, and these questions are directed by my very sincere curiosity.

General BRADLEY. I think it might take a Mr. Webster to define the two and create a distinction between them.

We actually went into Korea originally to stop aggression. As far as any individual mixed up in that was concerned, it was war from the time he entered the conflict until he got out of it. So that so far as any individual is concerned, it has always been war.

From a national point of view, when it ceases to be recognized as a police action and becomes a war, I frankly don't know.

LIMITED WAR

Senator CAIN. Is it proper to characterize the war in Korea as being a limited war, not because it does not involve hundreds of thousands of men, as it does, but because it thus far has been restricted to a limited fighting area known as Korea?

General BRADLEY. I think you might define it in that way, as a limited war, in that it is limited to an area.

Senator CAIN. But a limited war which involves the fighting assets and resources of hundreds of thousands of Americans is, in fact, a war in every true sense of that word. That would be my impression. I merely ask your opinion of it, sir.

General BRADLEY. Well, I think that someone might question whether technically or not it was a war, because normally Congress declares war, and I don't believe Congress has declared a war in this case.

ACT OF CONGRESS TO DECLARE WAR

Senator CAIN. That is a modest understatement, sir. I have a question to that point, and I ask it because I am a Member of the Congress of the United States, and as such I am extremely and daily conscious that the general public is in part apathetic to the Korean conflict, in part it is uncertain about the meaning of that Korean conflict, and in part is still laboring under the misinformation that America is engaged in a police action.

As a Member of the Senate, I should like to assume my full responsibility for helping to conclude officially what was undertaken unofficially last June, and because of that feeling, sir, will you tell me what factors in this modern day in which we live must be present before the United States should interest both the executive and the legislative branches of our Government and all of the people of our Republic in the Korean War by declaring war on the enemies who seek to destroy your country and mine?

General BRADLEY. Well, the question of when you declare war in this case, how you do it, and how you explain to the people the exact nature of it, I don't know.

I think that when we went into this everyone was agreed that it was a necessary action. I think that was explained to the people pretty much; but since China has entered into it, I think there is more confusion in their minds as to just what we are up against.

Now, if we are agreed that we should continue it, that is one thing; and I think it is up to the leaders of the people, the leaders of the community, to educate the people as to what we are up against. Maybe we are avoiding a third world war by being here.

Personally, I think we are doing a great deal toward avoiding a third world war. But whatever it is, I think it is up to the leaders of the various communities and the country to explain what we are trying to do.

That is the only way the people will understand, and if we can get out of Korea entirely and just pull out and come home, I think it is within the power of our Government to do that, if that is the will of the people to do it.

Senator CAIN. Well, General Bradley, ever since I, for example, first understood the mission which took our forces and allied forces in Korea, I have been in support of that conflict. The only reason I ask questions is out of my deep concern and hope that we can find a course of action which is designed to conclude what all of us undertook so willingly last June.

Now, sir, if we were to declare war against our enemy Red China, it would not necessarily follow that American forces would automatically become involved on the mainland of China?

General BRADLEY. Ground troops, no.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir. It might very well be a case similar to that of Spain, against which we declared war in order to win a victory, which certainly was won completely short of any attempt on the part of the United States to invade the mainland of Spain; that is correct, is it not, sir?

General BRADLEY. That is correct; and if you would declare war on Communist China, I would assume and hope that you would allow the military authorities to fight it according to their best judgment and the facilities at hand.

Senator CAIN. And were we to declare war on Red China it would be, I presume, the thought of the military that their objective and their mission was to drive the aggressor out of Korea and restore Korea to a free, independent, self-controlled status, am I correct, sir?

General BRADLEY. Yes, and I think they would probably then feel that you wanted them to take such additional risks as might be involved in some other actions to accomplish that end.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

BRADLEY'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

General Bradley, permit me to ask what is your relationship, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the National Security Council, and to the President of the United States.

General BRADLEY. I sit in with the National Security Council, not as a member of it, but am present at their meetings when I am available, and sit next to the Secretary of Defense, and help present the Defense Department's views to the National Security Council.

So far as the President is concerned, I usually carry to him the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I keep him informed of the military situation.

I used to go over every morning except Sunday, and sometimes on Sunday, to brief him on the situation, but as the thing became quieter to the extent that there were not so many great dangers of our being driven out, like there were in the old days of the Pusan beachhead, that was reduced to three times a week, and now I usually brief the President on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and if I have to miss it, as I am this afternoon, I send someone else to do it for me.

Senator CAIN. Do you go, may I ask, to the President and the National Security Council by invitation or by sufferance, call it what you will, or do you go by virtue of a statutory right? I ask that question partly, sir, because we designed the National Security Act in 1947, and if there are omissions in it, if there are weaknesses in it, should you care to reflect on them, this is a committee that would be sympathetic to your views.

General BRADLEY. Frankly, I don't know whether I sit there by statutory right or by custom. I know I always go, and if I cannot go, someone else goes in my place, some other military man.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General BRADLEY. I am not too sure; I would have to look it up as to whether, as I say, it is by statute or by custom; I am not sure.

Senator CAIN. Well, this question will help a little bit. By what means would you, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, get to either the President or to the Security Council, if, by way of argument, the Secretary of Defense denied a recommendation which you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed to be fundamental to your Nation's security?

General BRADLEY. Any paper coming up before the National Security Council, which has military implications, is referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for remark.

We comment on the paper, and it goes back to the National Security Council. Whether or not the Secretary of Defense agrees with it, it goes to the Council, and when it appears in the meeting, and is considered, the Secretary of Defense presumably could object to it, and state a different point of view, but I would be there to present the Joint Chiefs of Staff view, which is there in writing, and I could expand on the paper if necessary, and I have done so at various meetings.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

COMPARING MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF 1941 AND 1951

Because we are addressing ourselves to both war and peace, would you briefly describe the major differences between the status of our American Military Establishment today in 1951, and what that comparable status was 10 years ago in May of 1941, just a few months before Pearl Harbor?

I ask this question, sir; because it is my impression we have today the atom bomb; we didn't have that 10 years ago; we have allies today we didn't have 10 years ago; we have an organizational plan in Western Europe that we did not have 10 years ago; we have facilities not at our disposal 10 years ago, and yet today we are more frightened, I take it, than we were 10 years ago; and I would like your view as to our status of preparedness today.

General Bradley. Well, as far as our own country is concerned, as you say, we have what I consider, in my opinion, a better organization; we have a Department of Defense; we have an organized legal Joint Chiefs of Staff where we do joint planning, which we did not have 10 years ago, in the same sense, that it was more or less haphazard.

It is true we got together and planned with the Navy from time to time, but there was not that constant contact between the services.

At that time the Air Force was part of the Army, of course, and that was coordinated, but the coordination between those two and the Navy was not on the very firm basis that it is today.

As you say, we did not have allies, and we did not have the relationship already established, which we have today. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty organization, the heads of the military establishments of these 12 countries or the 11 countries, because Iceland has no military, and the ministers of defense, are on understanding terms. We know what each of us is thinking about, so that relationship has been established.

We have troops in Europe so that we are working together not only on a planning level, but on a troop level, holding us together.

As you say, we have the atom bomb, and the ability to deliver it anywhere in the world.

As you well might understand, there is a difference, however, on the other side, and that is that 10 years ago—maybe if you want to go back 11 or 12 years ago—but even 10 years ago, the people who were our friends in Europe then, and are now, had a much stronger security force than they have today.

France, England, and some of the other countries, had a very considerable military capability, so that they furnished, in a way, an outline or an outpost of defense for us.

Today, because of the drain on them during the war, both militarily and industrially, they find themselves in a much worse condition, so that they do not furnish that first line of defense that they were capable of furnishing in those days, so to that extent we are very much worse off than we were 10 years ago.

PREDICTING RUSSIA'S MOVES

Senator Cain. General Bradley, sir, I happen to believe that the time has come when America and her allies ought to defeat our enemies at this time.

I have believed for quite a long time, at least since we got into Korea, that we ought to assume and carry out any of the risks and hazards that were involved. Against that feeling and because of a question I have just asked you, I should like to say this:

In your opening statement in page 1919 you said this, and I would quote it:

"They"—with reference to the Communists—"are apt students of military power and fully realize that although we"—I suppose you are referring to the United States and our allies—"are not prepared to deliver any ultimatum, we could hurt them badly if they attacked us or our friends."

Then you went on significantly to say—and this to me is the most pregnant comment of all I have heard in these last several weeks:

> They also know that with our potential and the strength of our allies, in the long run they could not win a war with a United States that is alert and continuously prepared.

Against that strong statement, made by you on the first day of your appearance, I want to ask you this question: If you have sound reason to believe that the Communists feel as you have said they feel, why then, sir, do you and others seem to feel so strongly that Russia is likely to enter the Korean war if all we and our allies do is to attempt to defeat our principal enemies?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think that might be a reasonable deduction. However, as I have said before, I don't think anyone can predict just what Russia will do, and if she sees she cannot attain her ends by other means, I think she is going, in my opinion she will eventually resort to war unless she is convinced that she can't have even moderate successes, that she wouldn't start it.

Now Stalin indicated on several occasions during the war that he realized the importance of industrial production, and I think that is one of the things that acts as a deterrent today. He realizes we have so much more production than he has.

However, I don't think that that precludes war at all. If it did, I don't think that they would be taking all the gestures toward war that they have, and they might be willing to risk defeat.

The trouble of it is, as I see it, in any war today whether you win it or lose it, you lose in the long run because of the terrible destructiveness of war.

Senator CAIN. Well, that is what you said in this statement, that a war would result in an eventual victory on our side, but a total victory for no one at all.

General Bradley, we are all going on assumptions. Certainly I am among those who respect your views and give them deep thought and consideration. In the present question I feel a difference with some of your attitudes. My assumption is this: That if the Allied Nations will undertake to conclude and do it with vigor, what they undertook last June, that Russia is likely to be so convinced of its inability to win any total war with us that it will become much more reasonable in the future than it has been in the past. Is that among other assumptions which could be made validly?

General BRADLEY. I think so, and that is why we have come to you and advocated a military-aid program, North Atlantic Treaty, because we hope that we can get so strong that we will do and accomplish just what you say. We will discourage her to the point where she will be more reasonable and not start a war.

Senator CAIN. The only difference at the moment between us, for example—and you are a man of much greater experience than I—is that you don't think today we have the collective force necessary to accept the challenge which we did accept last June, or to carry out the challenge which we accepted last June.

General BRADLEY. We accepted a limited challenge, it is true, with the hopes that it would be limited to Korea and would not develop into a world war. We did it so we wouldn't have one appeasement lead to another one and make war inevitable.

My statement here was that I didn't think we were in a position to issue an ultimatum, because to make an ultimatum good you must have the apparent power to carry out what you are going to threaten them with, and right now I doubt we have the power to carry out that in giving an ultimatum.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, they are having a record vote over in the Senate. I would like to know what the pleasure of the committee is with respect to it.

Senator MORSE. I move we recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I, for example, will be through with my allotted time in just a few minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have five minutes, Senator Cain.

Senator KNOWLAND. How about voting and coming back?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is rather difficult to do, but suppose I suggest, unless I hear objection, that we recess, vote, and reassemble here as quickly as possible so that Senator Cain at least can conclude his time.

Senator CAIN. And it was my understanding that the general was willing to remain for a longer time this afternoon in hopes that we could conclude with him.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, we probably will be able to have some other Senator question, but there are circumstances that we will have to recess at 5 o'clock.

(Short recess.)

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, gentlemen, we will resume.

Senator Cain, you have five more minutes.

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, on yesterday you stated additional troops from our allies were badly needed in Korea.

May I ask if you have taken this question up officially with the National Security Council, or with the President, and how insistent has the JCS been that our allies ought to make additional contributions to the Korean conflict?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember the last time we discussed this with the State Department.

These approaches to other governments, of course, were made through the State Department, that being the normal chanel of communication between governments; so we have taken it up with them from time to time.

I don't remember the last date we discussed it. I suppose it has been some time now since we have discused the various phases of the different nations that have troops in process of getting them ready.

Senator CAIN. You are teaching me something, General. I understand you to say that the channel, with reference to this question of additional troops from our allies, is between the Defense Department and the State Department?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. It does not go through the National Security Council, or the President?

General BRADLEY. No.

COMMITMENTS OF UN PARTNERS

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, on yesterday you said that General MacArthur had recommended, in months gone by, that any self-contained units of about a thousand men could be usefully employed in Korea.

We know that only a handful of nations, aside from the United States and South Korea, have made any ground force contributions to Korea, up to this time.

Do you happen to know, as a military man of great distinction, of any free member of the United Nations which is not able to equip, supply and maintain a thousand men in the field?

General BRADLEY. Well, I don't know of any of them that couldn't maintain a thousand at home, but the equipping, transporting and supplying at a great distance from home, of a force of a thousand men, in addition to their other commitments—there may be some of them that are not able to do that.

For example, several of the South American countries offered forces in a strength of, say, a platoon or company; and it is pretty hard to set up a supply line for one platoon, or a company, over seven or eight thousand miles, as you can understand. It is a big problem, and that involves much more effort than maintaining a considerably larger number at home.

So, I think you would have to say—what countries are capable, rather, not capable of supporting a thousand men, five or ten thousand miles from home, with the other things involved in it; and there, you get into a little bit more effort.

TROOP ROTATION

Senator CAIN. I share a concern with many Americans as to what we can anticipate should we become engaged in a larger war at a later date, which we both hope never comes.

The other day, General Bradley, you mentioned that any marine who has suffered two wounds is rotated back home.

What such standard, if any, does the Army and the Air Force have? Now that we have a rotation system, how long, on the average, are men required to remain in action before being returned to the United States?

General BRADLEY. I have to be unable to answer these questions, Senator, but that is so much more appropriate a question to General Collins or the people involved? They could answer it outright, and I don't know, because, you see, it comes outside my province.

UN POLITICAL GUIDANCE

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

The last question at the moment, if I may—you stated in no uncertain terms that the JCS and the unified command, if I understood it, would deeply appreciate some political guidance from the United Nations.

I want to ask, General Bradley, what you meant by that, because I have assumed all along that you have had sufficient political guidance from the day we first entered Korea to satisfy anyone's requirements.

General BRADLEY. Well, we have had political guidance, except that there has been some question as to whether or not politically we should cross the thirty-eighth parallel in these present operations.

From a military point of view, as I have said, the thirty-eighth parallel means nothing, but we realize politically it may have a lot of significance. And that is why we would have liked to have some guidance along that area, which has not been given to us as yet by the United Nations.

As I say, I think I can partly understand it, because that is mixed up in any armistice terms that you would propose.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. How do you reconcile that doubt to which you have just addressed yourself, concerning the thirty-eighth parallel, with the mission originally given our Supreme Commander to repel and force the enemy out of Korea?

General BRADLEY. I believe most of us realize, and I know General MacArthur recognized, that he had a new situation on his hands when the Chinese came in.

So that we have changed his directive, his military directive, now so that it does not include the driving of the Chinese and North Koreans out of all of Korea. He does not have that military mission at the present time.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MAC ARTHUR

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, I have 60 seconds remaining, I have just been advised. I want to make my own feeling about General MacArthur clear and see to what extent you agree.

With reference to the removal of General Douglas MacArthur, my own individual view is this:

Last June the free nations resolved to crush and repel the enemy from Korea. The free nations selected General MacArthur to undertake that assignment. Until the Red Chinese entered the war the free nations and General MacArthur, so far as I am able to determine, were in complete agreement that the mission should be carried out. After the Red Chinese entered the war, General MacArthur continued to believe in the United Nations' mission and asked for authority to carry it out. On the other hand, the United Nations decided to change the mission from repelling the enemy to resisting the enemy. General MacArthur, therefore, had to be removed for he did not believe that the UN change in plan was in the best interests of the United States.

Now, this happens to be my conclusion. Do you consider there is some validity in it, sir, in terms of complete frankness?

General BRADLEY. Yes, but I wouldn't completely agree with it, if I may suggest, because I don't agree that General MacArthur was relieved because he disagreed on policy. He was relieved because he carried it to the people and not through the channels to the Commander in Chief.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we are getting down a little slim in our attendance, and I will have to check this list to see just where we go from here.

Senator McMahon?

Senator FLANDERS. Here he is.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon, you just about lost your place.

Senator McMAHON. Well, I am very happy about that. I do know how General Bradley feels about it.

JAPANESE MILITARY EFFORT IN CHINA

General, I will make you feel as good as possible by telling you that I will take 3 or 4 minutes.

General, I have done a little research on the Japanese military effort in China, and I would like to read it in the record.

The magnitude of the Japanese military effort in China throws some light on what the United States might expect if called upon to fight on the Chinese mainland.

When the Shanghai expedition started on July 7, 1937, the Chinese Nationalists had 30,000 troops in the Shanghai area. The initial Japanese force numbered 10,000; by late autumn of 1937 the Nationalists had 450,000 troops in this area and the Japanese had 250,000 troops.

In the first 77 days of the Shanghai expedition the Japanese suffered 73,000 casualties.

At the beginning of the year 1937 the Japanese had 250,000 troops in China; by 1940 they had 1,694,000 troops there; at the time of the Japanese surrender in 1945, their total armed forces in China were as follows:

Manchuria, 700,000; North China, 300,000; Central China, 750,000; South China, 123,000; and Formosa, 200,000.

AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA

Another thing, General, I would like to take advantage of my time for is to read into the record a statement taken from the Washington Post editorial of today as follows:

"Even the dullest traveler knows why Chiang Kai-shek was kicked out. Colonel McCormick was reported as follows during his trip to the Far East, according to the Associated Press of November 22, 1947:

" 'The Chiang Kai-shek government,' he said, 'cannot put down an insurrection which "is falsely called a Communist insurrection." Although Communist-backed, it is still a bona fide insurrection against a government which is little more than an agency of the Soong family.'

"It was only later that for political or war-mongering purposes the Acheson-haters and anti-Trumanites discovered otherwise. We even find Colonel McCormick's Washington outlet last week discoursing on 'Why We Lost China,' not why Chiang Kai-shek lost it. Actually the American people are being made to think China must have been an American possession."

Now I wanted those two things in the record.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FAR EAST AND EUROPE

General, after all, this whole disagreement in policy between General MacArthur and the Government has a familiar ring to me. I was not in official life, but I remember that during the war years there was a great controversy over where our primary efforts should be made between the Far East war with Japan and the European conflict.

As I recollect—and I think it will be borne out by the facts—General MacArthur at that time as a theater commander entreated the Defense Department—which was the War Department of that day, to make the Far East the primary theater of conflict, and to make the European conflict the secondary center of interest, of our interest. Does that accord with your recollection?

General BRADLEY. I have been told that, Senator McMahon, but I was not in Washington at that time. I was in the European theater, and my knowledge of that is only hearsay.

Senator McMAHON. Would it be, General, an imposition for you to direct some research in the files of your Department for the purpose of finding out whether what I have stated is a fact concerning General MacArthur during that time. I am not criticizing him for it. He was the theater commander then, he never ceased to be a theater commander. He naturally wanted the most that he could get in his theater. Would it be impossible to summarize that information?

General BRADLEY. I do not think so; most of the information will have to come from General Marshall himself, I expect, because during that time he was on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was in a position to know what the recommendations were.

I say, he is the best source of information, but I will try to find anything in the records, which I can. We can do that.

Senator McMAHON. I think a memorandum containing and combining the cables and the communications that came from General MacArthur during those years in which, I understand, he insisted on the fact that the Far East should be the primary theater of conflict would be useful as illustrating the fact that we are really now engaged in a discussion of the old controversy of which must have our primary interest, the east or the west.

THEATER COMMANDER'S VIEWPOINT

There is just this one more thing. I do not think enough attention has been paid to a couple of sentences in General MacArthur's message of January 10, which has been described as the gloomy message from the General. I can understand why he should feel gloomy about the situation at that time, because, after all, he had had such high hopes to get the boys home by Christmas, and here he was talking about an evacuation, and so his attitude is easy to understand.

In the course of this January 10 message, he said this:

> In the absence of overriding political considerations, under these conditions the command should be withdrawn from the peninsula just as rapidly as it is feasible tactically to do so. If, on the other hand, the primary political interests of the United States in the Far East lies in holding a position in Korea and thus pinning down a large segment of the Chinese military potential, the military course is implicit in political policy and we should be prepared to accept any attendant hazard to Japan's security and whatever casualties result.

I have just read that part of it for the background for this, which I want to emphasize:

> The issue involves a decision of highest national and international importance, far about the competence of a threater commander guided largely by incidents affecting the tactical situation developing upon a very limited field of action, and really boils down to the question of whether or not the United States intends to evacuate Korea.

I call your attention particularly to that, General, because I think it is important once again to emphasize in this record what I think you have pointed out, and what General MacArthur himself has pointed out; namely, that he was a theater commander, with a theater commander's viewpoint.

That bears that out, does it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; I think it does, because he says on the other hand, if the over-all political considerations and the political interests of the United States in the Far East require it, then we would take a different view of it.

CONFIDENCE IN BRADLEY AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Senator MCMAHON. I just thought that we cannot emphasize that point too much.

General, I think that concludes my questioning, and I want to thank you very much indeed for your courtesy.

I want to commend your testimony before this committee. It has been the reflection of your own inner character and your frankness. I want to take this opportunity to say that although there may be some who have said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Bradley have lost their confidence, I want to say to you, sir, that I believe that you have the confidence of the American people, which you merit as much as any American that ever lived. I thank you, sir.

General BRADLEY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I just came in. May I be passed in favor of Senator Flanders?

Chairman RUSSELL. By unanimous consent that may be done.

Senator STENNIS. I will go before the docket then.

Chairman RUSSELL. I will be glad to submit it.

Senator STENNIS. Proceed.

Senator FLANDERS. Would I come normally next in line?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge would come next.

Senator LODGE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders.

PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD KOREAN WAR

Senator **Flanders**. General, I feel it necessary to pursue a little bit further one of the thoughts that was in my mind this morning. I am making the assumption that the military plan is to fight back and forth somewhere near the border, somewhere near the thirty-eighth parallel, and to do it more or less indefinitely. Now, is that a reasonable assumption?

General **Bradley**. I think, Senator, it would depend entirely on your definition of "indefinitely." We hope, as I have stated here many times before, that by these operations going on now—and by "now," we can't every well define it as to length of time, because it depends on how long it takes to convince the Chinese that they cannot be successful there—but as a result of these operations going on now, we should reach a state where some kind of negotiations and settlement would be possible.

Senator **Flanders**. Isn't the situation at least unusual, militarily speaking. Wouldn't normally we be expected, other things being equal and old-fashioned former conditions being duplicated to some extent, wouldn't we be expected to put in more men and more materials and work the thing through to a military conclusion, so far as Korea itself is concerned, the whole territory?

General **Bradley**. That might be considered a normal way to do it, although we have done it differently in the past. We have fought wars where we did not commit our whole national effort. We might have another one here that would not require the whole national effort.

Senator **Flanders**. Althought it is a little bit different, is it not, more or less restraining ourselves from putting out our whole national effort?

This thing to my mind, General, has some serious connotations. It adds to our civil difficulties. You spoke a while back about our responsibility for educating the people of the country or taking leadership in their understanding it, but it is in itself an unusual thing to explain to people, particularly if it is a bit dubious to the teacher.

Now, I think that there is a great deal of importance to this unusualness, which shows up on the side of our controls, for instance. There is no question but what in the heat of an all-out war it is possible to submit to controls, to enthusiastically support them, as we did during most of the period when we had controls in the Second World War.

But this is not the kind of climate, this kind of war does not produce the kind of climate which gives any vitality to the people in their acceptance of civilian hardships, and so on. I wish that we could have some clearer picture of what we are doing and why we are doing it that we could sell to people, make them support enough so that they could support controls heartily. They don't and, as I see it, can't in view of the vagueness of this war.

General **Bradley**. May I comment on that, sir?

Senator **Flanders**. I made the observations in the hope that you would.

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Well, as to the latter point—I think the people might be given to understand, if it is possible, that these controls and the materials that the Defense Department are having to buy, and the large forces we now have in being are not all to fight the war in Korea. They are primarily, as I see it, to strengthen our over-all security position. It is true that some of this is being used up in Korea and it was the aggression in Korea which waked us up to the fact that we had better get busy and raise these forces and buy this equipment and establish these industrial lines. But they are not just solely to fight the war in Korea.

As a matter of fact, a great portion of them are going to a state of preparedness to act as a deterrent to war elsewhere and to get ready and help us to be ready to meet it if it does come. And I think if what you say is correct, maybe we have not explained it properly to the people. These sacrifices they are being asked to make are not solely to fight the war in Korea but to better our security position and be able to deter war and defend our freedom.

Senator FLANDERS. I think what you are saying is pertinent and should be understood and should be talked and explained. But somehow this vague sort of an affair over in Korea does make people wonder, I judge from my correspondence, as to whether there is any decisiveness of the whole military and diplomatic picture anywhere. I think we are undergoing an unusual experience.

CONFIDENCE IN THE UN

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. And, as I understand it, you are a believer in the United Nations.

Senator FLANDERS. I am decidedly so. And I supported it not only when we went in on June 25 or 26, or whenever it was, but I support our being there now with all my heart and soul.

General BRADLEY. The point I was going to make is: I believe in the United Nations. I haven't lost faith in their being able to accomplish things in the future. I think it is too early to become discouraged with them. But, as you say, we are in there on United Nations action, and I think the actions we take in Korea must meet the approval of the other members of the United Nations and must not be taken on a unilateral basis.

This is the first time we have had a United Nations field command and a United Nations commander, and I think we should be very careful to preserve the set-up of such a command and the prerogatives of a commander, and make it as effective as possible, and do anything we can to keep from breaking up a United Nations command and discouraging them from taking United Nations action in the future.

Senator FLANDERS. Let me say, General Bradley, that I think there is at least a modicum of wisdom in what you are saying. I am through, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright? Senator Tobey? Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.

[Deleted.]

MILITARY MISSION ON FORMOSA

Senator STENNIS. Now you have a military mission there, on Formosa, as I understand it.

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. And we are sending trained men in, officers to train them.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; we are sending in men to supervise the distribution of supplies and to help them supervise the training.

Senator STENNIS. Now you must have had some report on them then in addition to the September 1950 report. Did you send a new mission back in there to look the situation over before you sent these new men in there to train them? That is my point?

General BRADLEY. Well, we strengthened the attaché's staff on Formosa as one means of getting information, and we did not have a mission but we secured approval to strengthen the military attaché's in numbers, and that was the only step we could take until this military mission was approved, and that has only been over there a month or two, and I have not seen any report from them yet as to what has been accomplished.

As a matter of fact it is a little bit early for them to accomplish anything other than to get organized.

Senator STENNIS. What is the size of that mission that is there now?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember the size of it. It is a considerable-sized mission, both officers and enlisted men.

Senator STENNIS. Of course it hasn't been there long enough to get any results—just 30 days.

General BRADLEY. Just from memory, I think the size of that, the total size of the mission is somewhere between four and five hundred, but that is not an accurate figure.

Senator STENNIS. Now, did you cover the point as to whether or not you considered it safe for those troops to leave Formosa now, considering Formosa as on the defensive, do you consider it safe for them to leave Formosa and come over and do battle in Korea?

General BRADLEY. Well, that is a questionable matter; right at this minute, the concentration of Communist troops opposite Formosa is not too formidable. It was, a year ago. It has been increased at the present time, and there are still a lot of troops in South China, but not on the coast opposite Formosa.

It wouldn't take too long to assemble them there, but whether or not China could invade Formosa, with our fleet there, is questionable. It would take a bigger effort, in other words, than they have concentrated there right now.

I don't mean to say they couldn't invade Formosa. I think that under the present circumstances, they would have to make a considerable build-up of the Communists to invade Formosa successfully, with the troops that are there.

The trouble has been, heretofore, that a lot of the men on Formosa were not equipped, they did not have transportation to move around rapidly, so that their reserves were not mobile, and they did not have air.

[Deleted.]

I think the stronger we make the people on Formosa, the greater confidence they will have, and the better they will be able to move their reserves, that will make Formosa that much more secure.

Senator STENNIS. Well, there has been so much agitation about using the troops on Korea, and I suggested, myself, on the floor of the Senate, one time——

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean, Formosa?

Senator STENNIS. I mean, using them in Korea, or in the war, at least.

General BRADLEY. Using the troops from Formosa, in Korea?

Senator STENNIS. Yes; and after I became better informed on it, why, I had more doubt about it; and as I understand, there is still doubt in your mind about the feasibility and advisability of using those troops, as of now ? On the Korean Peninsula?

[Deleted.]

Senator STENNIS. That is the point I wanted to get your opinion on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. General, that concludes the second round of questioning.

It was my purpose to recess this committee not later than 5 o'clock. It is now 20 minutes to 5.

I do not wish to ask any Senator to have his time of questioning interrupted.

For my part, I have no questions on my third round, so, I will ask again, what is the pleasure of the committee? I don't desire to interrupt any Senator——

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

Senator LODGE. I have no further question to ask, but I would like to say that at the appropriate time I would like to make a motion that when the next witness is heard, that the time limit on questioning be 15 minutes, but there be no limit on the number of rounds.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I do not think we should undertake to pass upon that issue here.

I take it that you do not object if we carry it over?

Senator LODGE. I simply bring that up so the members can be thinking about it, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senatotr HICKENLOOPER. I do not want to go ahead, out of my turn. I have about three questions that I did not complete with General Bradley, and I can easily finish them well before 5 o'clock.

I can do that, if you are in a hiatus here, now; but I dont want to inject myself before anyone else's turn.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that will be most cooperative in helping us to conclude.

If there is no objection, I will recognize you to ask those questions.

ESTIMATING ENEMY CASUALTIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Bradley, we have seen statements of the losses of the Red Chinese, and they have been in very staggering numbers. As I recall the casualties of the Red Chinese and the North Koreans number way up in the hundreds of thousands—700,000 or 800,000.

How do we arrive at those figures? How do you know what their casualties are?

General Bradley. Well, in a lot of cases, they are estimates, Senator Hickenlooper.

For example, the casualties reported by the Air Force are usually reported as a result of pictures taken at the time. You know, when any plane, like a fighter plane, goes down and strafes, or gets in combat with hostile planes, and shoots it, they are automatically taking movies of the thing while it is happening; so when they analyze those pictures they get a pretty good idea of what they hit; and the planes following take pictures also and get a pretty good idea of the number that are lying out on the snow.

Now, we must realize that those estimates are, in some cases, probably big, and in some cases, probably small. I would like to cite one example. I mean this as an extreme; but last year they came in and reported, in one case, where they killed 72, where they hit a column. We took that ground the next day and counted approximately 1,000. That was an extreme the other way. They have overestimated in some cases, and certainly I think that was one case in which it was underestimated.

Senator Hickenlooper. The thing that bothers me is when we retreat, it is very difficult to count the number of casualties, because we are retreating away from the ground where the casualties exist. How do you know how many wounded they have?

What is our basis for estimating those casualties?

I am merely trying to test whether or not we are getting any kind of accurate information as to their casualties, based on any actual count, or whether it is merely guesswork.

General Bradley. They are not altogether guesses. They come from these pictures we take, from prisoners, from agents who are back in behind them, some civilian informants.

They are supposed to be a summation of all these sources of information.

USING FORMOSAN CHINESE TROOPS

Senator Hickenlooper. Just one question about the use of the Formosan Chinese troops.

[Deleted.]

Senator Hickenlooper. In other words, couldn't it be said that when we go out and pick up 200,000 American boys from the farms and cities to send over to fight, they are not prepared to fight until they are equipped and trained?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. And are we not about the only source of equipment and training that the Nationalist Chinese have and have had for a couple of years or so?

General Bradley. Yes, sir; either as grant in aid or by purchase.

Senator Hickenlooper. The fact is that we have not contributed any substantial amount to their training or their equipment over the past 2 years, and yet we now say we cannot use them, will never be able to use them, they are not equipped, and they cannot take the field. They could have taken the field had equipment and training been afforded to them substantially some time ago.

They would probably now be ready to take the field with more or less efficiency although I do not know about their ultimate efficiency at all. But the fact is that we have not given the equipment or made it available; we have had appropriations that have been voted here and have been held in abeyance and have not been made available to them, and so it appears to me that while it may be true that they cannot fight, to put the onus of being able to and ready to fight on the Chinese, is being a little far-fetched because they do not have any place to get the equipment except from us.

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Probably that is the fact. I do not dispute the fact that they were not ready to fight in substantial numbers, but they are just not ready to fight like a lot of our American citizens are not yet ready to fight because they are not armed and equipped, and they cannot fight until they are armed and equipped.

UNITED STATES AID TO CHINA

Now, I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this, but I have been informed by what could be called a high degree of rumor, that about all we have done in connection with the resupplying of Chiang until very recently, which means almost recent weeks, was to replenish the meager supply of ammunition and some equipment that Chiang had before he got into those island fights down there about a year or so ago, where he shot up a lot of his equipment and ammunition. About all we did was just merely to replenish that. We did not augment his supply any. That has been about the limit of what we have done until very recently. Would you care to comment on that?

General BRADLEY. I am sorry I don't know where the report came from or what the report is, Senator, so I don't know the source of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not asking you to verify the source of that information. I am merely inquiring as to whether the general thesis is correct, that we did send in enough to sort of bring his supplies back up to the meager level that they were before he got into those island fights when they repulsed some of the Communist attempts to take his islands.

General BRADLEY. I think we all realize that the equipment and ammunition and spare parts furnished him so far have been of a rather limited nature. We are trying to supply a lot of needs, including those in Korea, and I don't believe that we should give Formosa a priority higher than that we need in Korea.

As a consequence, I think it will probably take us some time to fulfill all these needs. I think I told you the first day that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended a program of something in the nature of $300 million.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General BRADLEY. And we hope we will provide him eventually with supplies. Now, just how much of that has been delivered up to the present time, I don't know; but I do know the first part of it, as you say, was ammunition, and badly needed spare parts for planes and other equipment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now this you may comment on if you care to, and if you don't, that is all right.

I shall not press the issue, but do you know whether or not, or would you care to comment on whether or not the National Defense Department, against the violent objections of the State Department and at least originally concealed from the State Department actually sent some ammunition and equipment to Chiang Kia-shek as a totally independent thing and under an attempt to keep the State Department from knowing anything about it?

General BRADLEY. Honestly, Senator, I don't know of any such shipment being done surreptitiously without the knowledge of the State Department. I don't say that it hasn't been done by somebody down the line, but certainly it is unknown to me as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now just one question and then I am through, Mr. Chairman.

As I understood Senator Connally's questioning of you a while ago, he said that it would be ill advised for us to put equipment into Formosa and to send people over there and to look after it and things of that kind. It is my understanding that it has now become the policy of the Government to send equipment over there. We are sending four or five hundred military personnel in a mission to supervise the application of that equipment such as we are sending.

General BRADLEY. Well, that wasn't the way I understood Senator Connally's questions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me then withdraw. I shall read the record in the morning on the matter. I don't want to in any way misinterpret, but it was my understanding at the time that Senator Connally was saying that such a program would be not advisable and I merely wanted to call attention to the fact that it had apparently become the program. I shall not comment nor draw any conclusions either way, and I will withdraw any conclusions that I may have indicated here, until I can actually read the record in the morning.

General BRADLEY. I wonder if you want the record to stand this way overnight.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As far as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing to have it just cut out of the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think that is necessary.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't say it is necessary. I don't draw any conclusions one way or the other.

SUMMONING WITNESSES

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, gentlemen, without any effort whatever to restrict or limit any Senator, the Chair is charged with the responsibility for getting witnesses here and the orderly conduct of these hearings, and it would be very helpful to me if the Senators would indicate just about how much more time they think it will require with General Bradley. I assume those who stay here are primarily those that have questions for him.

I am not trying to limit anyone, but just so I would know when to have another witness to be here before the committee.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would say, Mr. Chairman, as far as I am concerned, I think I could clear up a few loose ends that would not take me more than 10 minutes on the situation as of tonight.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not asking you to be bound strictly by it. The main thing is to know whether to have another witness here tomorrow.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. It is my present intention to limit myself to not more than another 30 minutes of examination of General Bradley.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. I do not think I will interrogate the general any more unless some matter arises.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I have one or two questions which would not take more than 10 minutes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think Senator Wiley said at the close of his questioning that he had a number of questions that his 30-minute time barred him from asking, and that he would ask them the next round.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had assumed he would take at least 30 more minutes.

Senator KNOWLAND. I wondered, Mr. Chairman, if you are going to run to 5 o'clock. If you are, I might clear up all of these things. I do not want to again get out of turn, but it might save some wear and tear on the general.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, then, you may start, Senator Knowland.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS IN SETTLING WARS

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand in some of the questions raised either today or yesterday they brought up some other wars in which we had been, namely, the War of 1812 with the British, the Spanish-American War in Cuba and the Philippines, and the situation in Greece. But the fact of the matter is, is it not, General, that we did not settle the controversy with the Spaniards being left in control of half of Cuba; we did not settle the Greek War with the Creek Communists being left in control of a substantial part of Greece; and we did not finish the War of 1812 with the British being left in control of New Orleans. While it is true that we did not carry the war into their home countries, nevertheless, we did clean up the particular situation in which we were involved.

General BRADLEY. We restored it in some cases to the status quo when we started the war and won our point. That boils down then to the question of what our point is. As I say, I believe everybody recognizes the long-range political objective of the United Nations is a united and free Korea, but that does not necessarily follow that we have to obtain that militarily at this time.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you familiar, General, with the article which appeared in the Manchester Guardian weekly of March 8? I want to read it to you, it is very brief.

> The Chinese armies, the principal instrument of these Russian tactics, have been beaten in Korea, and even their best troops have proved less dangerous than was feared. But Peking is not negotiating, nor does it seem very much disturbed at its military mishap. The military tradition of the Chinese Communists ever since 1927 has been to lose army after army and then to raise new armies and continue to fight until fortune changes in their favor. They

> rely on two things: First, doctrine and ideas to insure continuity of action; second, a cadre of officers to train the fresh ones to replace those which are lost. The Chinese Communist leaders can conscript and train new ones in a few months. For this reason Peking is not likely to give up its hostility to the west because of the setback in Korea. Communist China is likely to continue to be at Russia's disposal for the Soviet-Asiatic strategy.

That is the end of the quotation. Would you say that was a reasonable interpretation of the situation insofar as it affects the Chinese Communists?

General BRADLEY. I would say that that is one person's views and it might or might not be correct.

CHINA'S OFFER OF TROOPS FOR KOREAN WAR

Senator KNOWLAND. There has been considerable mention—and I think this needs to be cleared up—the fact that General MacArthur had originally indicated in June that he preferred not to have Chinese Nationalist troops. You will recall that the Republic of China delivered an aide memoire to the State Department on June 29 and again on June 30, offering 33,000 troops at that time.

Now, the fact of the matter is, isn't it, General, that the State Department through the Department of National Defense, advised General MacArthur not to accept that offer of troops? Isn't that correct?

General BRADLEY. I believe that is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. And wasn't a message sent to General MacArthur in June in which he was specifically told that if an offer of troops should come to him from the Republic of China, that he was not to accept them?

General BRADLEY. Yes. At that time there were both military and political reasons why we did not think they should be used and that was the political reason established by the State Department.

The political reasons were expressed by the Joint Chiefs and by General MacArthur. In spite of the fact that we thought from a political viewpoint they should not be used, General MacArthur was asked his views and expressed them to General Collins.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am speaking of the message that went out to General MacArthur on June 30. Didn't that advice come from the State Department, that if Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek should get in touch with him directly, he should turn down the offer?

General BRADLEY. I think it probably went from the Joint Chiefs, but it was certainly on the advice of the State Department, that it would not be advisable to accept them, and I think at that time the Joint Chiefs fully agreed with that, and so did General MacArthur.

Senator MORSE. Would the Senator from California yield for what I think is a needed correction in the record?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I think, Mr. Chairman, the transcript will show General Bradley said in his preceding statement that the political reasons were expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by General MacArthur, when I think he meant the military reasons were expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur and the political reasons by the State Department.

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVE RELATIVE TO THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator **Knowland**. Finally, General, could you throw a little more light on page 99 of the document which we have before us, which says, and I quote, ~~this is~~ number 38:

> On March 15, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held an informal conference with representatives of the Department of State and among other things, discussed the Korean situation. It appeared to be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement should be reached on the objectives in Korea. It was suggested that the Secretary of State talk to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If this question was not settled before the next meeting, the question would be discussed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff-State Department meeting on that date.

In reading that paraphrase, unless there is material which is not included, I can only draw the conclusion that as late as the 15th of March there had not been an agreement on the objectives in Korea and that at some future date it was hoped that they could agree on the objectives.

Could you throw some light on that?

General **Bradley**. Yes; I discussed that, I think, a few minutes ago. We were trying to get a decision, particularly with reference to the Thirty-eighth parallel, and we did not get it, and we haven't got it yet as far as the political objective and its relationship to the thirty-eighth parallel is concerned.

Senator **Knowland**. But, General, isn't this far broader than merely the Thirty-eighth parallel? You said the objectives in Korea. Since you have testified here that the political objectives deal with the Thirty-eighth parallel, aren't there other factors which enter the picture?

General **Bradley**. Oh, yes, indeed.

Senator **Knowland**. Such as this issue as to whether Formosa and UN membership for Communist China should be negotiated, and haven't there been other issues raised by the Department of State on which the Defense Department apparently at that time did not necessarily see eye to eye?

General **Bradley**. There were other objectives concerned, yes, the long range objective, and the terms under which we would accept an armistice, for example. We got up a special paper on that from a military point of view, what would be acceptable, what would be acceptable terms in arranging an armistice and negotiating with the Chinese.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Knowland, if you will pardon me, I have just received from the Department of Defense this afternoon and signed, a letter transmitting to you—I do not suppose it has been delivered to you here in the committee—in which they deal with that in response to some questions that you asked General Marshall. It is confidential and I told them to bring it to your attention.

Senator **Knowland**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ARMISTICE CONDITIONS

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Chairman, if you are going to close, with respect to the answer General Bradley just gave I was attempting to pursue that very thing yesterday. What are the objectives, and what would be a satisfactory settlement in the Korean situation from a military standpoint?

Now I did not get any clear answer to that yesterday. If there is such a document, then I think by all means we ought to have it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I perhaps made a mistake in undertaking to go into a letter that I scanned very hurriedly, but the letter will be available to you. Colonel Galusha, it is in the security room. Suppose you get it right now and let Senator Hickenlooper read it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No; I do not mean to hold this up except that letter may cover it. If it does, well and good. If it does not, then I earnestly hope that we can get the document which is the study of the objectives and the terms under which we would discuss a settlement from a military standpoint that General Bradley just mentioned.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we are talking about two different things, Senator Hickenlooper. You are talking about the armistice they were trying to work out in March when General MacArthur made that statement. Senator Knowland's questions were not addressed to that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we could refer to General Bradley's last statement, I understood him to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had put down a study or a recommendation as to what they thought would be the terms and the conditions for the discussion of an armistice or a settlement of this matter in Korea.

Now, I do not care about the letter. If it answers it, well and good. If not, I hope that we can get that study.

Chairman RUSSELL. If not we will reopen tomorrow and let you ask more questions about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no more questions to ask about it if we can just get the study.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have some material to go into the appendix of the record, an article which appeared in the London Observer and the London Times of March——

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you object, Senator, to letting me precede that with an answer that was supplied by Secretary Marshall in response to a question that was asked him? I think that should precede that, and I therefore offer for the record the answer of the Secretary of Defense to the following question:

"General, can you supply for the record the directives and orders and memoranda sent to General MacArthur by the Department of Defense containing these restrictions or any restrictions that were imposed on him in the conduct of the campaign?"

I might say that I think the members of this committee will find that right interesting reading because it contains each order imposing a restriction upon the conduct of the campaign in Korea. That will appear in the record. It will be followed by the newspaper article referred to by Senator Knowland.

(The documents above referred to will be found in the appendix of this record.)

Chairman RUSSELL. General Mudge, will you have General Collins on the stand for tomorrow around 11? We probably will not get to him much sooner.

The committee will now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon at 5:05 p. m. the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene on Thursday, May 24, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Brewster, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Flanders.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman **Russell**. The committee will come to order.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I desire to bring up a matter on procedure of this committee. For that purpose I would like to offer a motion for discussion at this moment, and the motion is as follows:

MOTION ON FUTURE PROCEDURE

Mr. Chairman, I move that at the conclusion of the current questioning of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a copy of the testimony of General Bradley, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall be furnished to Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, to Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and to Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, with the request that they each examine the testimony of the three witnesses named and indicate in writing to the committee what testimony of each of said witnesses they agree with and what testimony they do not find themselves in agreement with, together with their own views and answers in such cases, and together with such amplification of any answers to questions propounded to the three witnesses as they, each Chief of Staff, desires to give in his own independent testimony; that the said Chiefs of Staff be requested to respond as above outlined at the earliest practicable date, not later, however, than Monday, June 4, 1951; that following the conclusion of the current testimony of General

Bradley the next witness to be called be the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, followed by such witnesses as the committee may direct thereafter, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be not called before the committee until such time in the future as the committtee may see fit to direct.

I will give the chairman a copy of this so he will have the verbiage.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is that now—a motion?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a motion; yes.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may say in support of that motion—my reasons for filing this motion are briefly these:

This is a very broad inquiry into fundamental policy not only of the United States but of the United Nations and our Allies in connection with this aggression in Korea, the oriental situation, and other phases. We have canvassed the views of General MacArthur who was the Supreme Commander in the Far East; we have canvassed the views, at least in the first round of questioning, of the Secretary of Defense, General Marshall; we have now canvassed the views of General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has throughout his testimony told us of the general agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the position taken by General Bradley and by General Marshall.

In the last analysis, this inquiry, I think, is in essence an inquiry into broad policies. To spend a lot of repetitious time canvassing the opinions of three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, so far as testimony now indicates, are in full agreement with General Bradley, would seem to me to be unwarranted prolongation and repetition of testimony already given, which could be met satisfactorily for the moment by having them canvass the testimony, indicate their disagreement or agreement, and giving us the opportunity at a later date, if we want to, to bring them in on points of disagreement.

I think we should move immediately into the broad policy field, which can be canvassed from only two sources. One is the President, the other is the Secretary of State. I do not propose to call the President. That is not in my motion. But the Secretary of State is a very proper policy head under the President of this Government, and I think we should move rapidly and expeditiously into the broad policy field of this inquiry, and that we should move as rapidly as we can.

SPEEDING UP THE HEARINGS

I think it will aid in the speedy termination of these hearings, in the securing of such information as we can secure, such facts as we can secure, and I think it will contribute to at least stopping some repetitious testimony at this time that would take a long time to get through.

In other words, manifestly from the testimony of General Bradley, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all three of them are coming here, and after questioning by 26 Members and long days of going over these questions, they will probably be in general agreement with the testimony from the standpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we have already elicited.

If there are reasons why we should examine them individually, I do not attempt to foreclose that on this motion. I think they should be called, but I think we should move into the policy field immediately.

Now, the exact date on which Secretary Acheson is called, I think, is a matter that I would not specify the day or the minute. If the committee would want to call him immediately today, that is all right with me. If they want to call him tomorrow, that is all right with me. If they want to give him enough notice and say that we will start the testimony of Secretary Acheson beginning Monday morning, that might have some attractions.

I realize that members have been occupied afternoons and mornings on this hearing. They may have some studies of their own they want to get out of the way in the 2 days over the week end, so if the committee would like to set Acheson's testimony under this resolution for Monday morning, I would raise no objection. I do believe that this will expedite the hearings and get us to the major over-all consideration which is policy, broad policy. Secretary Acheson is the one man in the administration, that is, so far as a public official is concerned, who should first and primarily speak to that question of policy both domestically and internationally. It is for that reason that I make this motion and I urge it sincerely as a means of getting on with this and preventing needless repetition and also keeping the gate open for examining the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually at any time in the future when either their answers or questions in the minds of the members of the committee would indicate that they should be called for individual examination.

I earnestly suggest that and I offer this motion for the procedural consideration of the committee.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I would like to make a few comments in opposition to the motion. I completely disagree with my good friend from Iowa.

Senator SMITH. Louder.

NEED FOR CONTINUITY IN HEARINGS

Senator MORSE. I competely disagree with my good friend from Iowa. I think we have started, Mr. Chairman, to examine into the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the record has many references in it to the effect that certain questions should be asked either General Vandenberg or Admiral Sherman or General Collins.

I think it is very important that in the interests of orderly continuity of development of this case we should complete our examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before we proceed with another line of questioning in this case.

I say that for several reasons, but one I want to emphasize above all others. There isn't any doubt about the fact, Mr. Chairman, that General MacArthur left the impression in his speech before the joint meeting of Congress that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with him.

That, I think, had a tremendous effect on public opinion and was one of the chief causes of deepening the disunity that had developed among our people at the time of the MacArthur speech.

Senator WILEY. May I ask the Senator what he said?

Chairman RUSSELL. Will the Senator yield?

Senator WILEY. I didn't get your words. MacArthur said what?

Senator Morse. It was his understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with him.

Senator Wiley. Oh.

Senator Morse. I think, as this record is developing, Mr. Chairman, that that observation of General MacArthur's has been established by General Marshall and General Bradley to be contrary to the fact; and I think we now ought to hear the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pursue questioning, pursue the answers to questions on whether or not they agreed with General MacArthur's program, at the time for its application, that he recommended.

I think we ought to have a full record made of all the military aspects of this issue before we get into the diplomatic aspects.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a great mistake not to press on with the military phase of this investigation, before we move over to the diplomatic; because I think the American people are entitled to know, from the lips of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, themselves, as to whether in their opinion General MacArthur was justified in reaching the conclusion which I am satisfied was an honest conclusion on his part, but apparently a mistaken one, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the program that he was recommending in Asia.

I think we have got to get through the military aspect of that and then go into the diplomatic aspect.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I recognize the desire to speed up these hearings, but I think it would be a mistake to speed them up at the sacrifice of a full disclosure of everything bearing upon this issue that we can bring out by questioning.

I think it is going to take us probably 3 or 4 weeks to do the job, and I am for doing it, and I am for doing it without breaking into the list of military witnesses, which I have believed were going to be scheduled, by completing the examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Stennis.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman, I want to be recognized briefly but I thought, perhaps, the Chair might want to——

Chairman Russell. Let us have order, gentlemen.

Senator Stennis. I thought maybe the Chair might want to make an observation before it goes further.

Chairman Russell. I think it is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion of the committee; it is not one that I would undertake to direct.

Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman, I know you would not want to direct it, but I thought you might want to make an observation.

Chairman Russell. I will before we conclude here.

NEED FOR SPEEDING HEARINGS

Senator Stennis. I will be very brief. The first point I want to make here on this matter of procedure is to go and finish with the General's testimony, and not keep him sitting here while we argue out a matter strictly of procedure, and on the merits of the motion I hope that we continue on here speedily and without repetition, as the Senator from Iowa says, and complete the examintion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I think ought to be very brief.

I believe we are doing our cause harm rather than good in going into all these military phases. I think if Russia is planning a war on us that one of the most modern textbooks she could study is this record here that we are making, assuming that they do not see the deleted part; and I think in one way or another they are going to learn a great deal of that which has been deleted.

It is becoming more grave and serious in my mind. I believe we are playing right into the potential enemy's hand, and instead of extending this out, I think we should speedily conclude it, subject to every man's right, of course, for examination here.

I happen to know, incidentally, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some of them, want to go to some other part of the world, some to Europe and some to Asia, thinking that that is their call of duty; and I do not want to defer the gentlemen unduly, but if we can at least defer this matter until this witness is through and then dispose of it, I want to propose it heartily.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as I am concerned, I have no objection to deferring this motion until we have completed the questioning of General Bradley. I have no desire to have him sit here while we are arguing procedural matters. So far as I am concerned, I am heartily in accord with that.

I may say that I offered this as a means of preventing three repetitious methods and series of testimony. I have no doubt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because of General Bradley's testimony, which I sincerely accept, that they are in general agreement with the views that he has expressed.

Therefore, to have first one Chief of Staff here for a week—and he will be here for a week—and then to have another Chief of Staff to be here for a week—and he will be here for a week, every one of the twenty-six members will want to canvass his views and put them in the record and then to have a third one here, I think we will prolong it unduly from the standpoint of time.

The three Chiefs of Staff could be working on the testimony of these three heads, that is, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, the former Supreme Commander in the Orient, they can be working on that; they can indicate their agreement or their disagreement; and the motion provides that they amplify their views, if they care to.

Then, if there are divergences of opinion or indications of divergences of opinion, which are not in keeping with the other members of the administration, we can call them back under this, or we can call them at our convenience; but meanwhile they will be working on it, and we will get immediately into the policy field, and see where we are going.

Now, that is the reason for filing this, and those are the purposes that I have in mind, to attempt to expedite this matter. I have the opinion, and I think it is a very wise suggestion of the Senator from Mississippi, so far as I am concerned, to postpone it. I am perfectly willing to postpone it, until the current questioning of General Bradley has been concluded, and we can consider the procedural matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. In view of the statement made by Senator Hickenlooper, I would suggest that we proceed, and then when we conclude with General Bradley, we take this resolution, which is important and worthy of every consideration by this committee, under advisement, and decide on procedure.

I believe that Senator Wiley has some more questions.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I thought I was through with my questioning yesterday, but somebody suggested I wasn't, and as a consequence, I got a few more ideas last night.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was the one that suggested that, because I distinctly understood Senator Wiley at the conclusion of his first questioning to say that he wasn't through and he had some more questions; and I was merely trying to protect him.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. My views coincide with those of the Senator from Iowa.

Senator WILEY. I want to express my gratitude to all concerned that they were concerned about me.

REQUEST FOT INFORMATION

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask that this letter be delivered to you. It is a request that I am making, addressed to you. It says:

> In accordance with established committee procedure, may I respectfully ask that you as chairman of this joint committee request the Department of State to furnish for the use of this committee all communications, including summaries of conversation, if any, from any of our United Nations allies objecting to, or being critical of, the administration, military leadership, or public utterances of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.
>
> It is my opinion that this material will be of assistance in the present investigation, and I sincerely desire that it be obtained as expeditiously as possible.
>
> Sincerely yours.

Chairman RUSSELL. I shall be happy to forward this in accordance with the procedure of the committee.

Senator GEORGE. May I ask this, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Does that include the ultimatum or the armistice or whatever General Bradley called it that was going the rounds at the time that the message of March 20 was sent to General MacArthur, going around the State Department?

Senator WILEY. That doesn't include it, but I should be glad to have it understood that the request is for that. I understood that Senator Smith and Senator Hickenlooper covered that request. Whether they did it by mail, I do not remember.

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Senator will indulge me, I can't carry all these requests in my mind, but I seem to recall that the Senator from California did make a specific request for that data and that it has been submitted, I think. I will check the records to see.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON—Resumed

Senator WILEY. I note, General Bradley, that you stated yesterday but you did not seem to feel very sure as to whether or not the Iranian situation was actually more critical than, let us say, the possibility of satellite invasion of Yugoslavia. The British seem to regard the Iranian situation as infinitely more important.

DANGER OF AGGRESSION IN IRAN AND ELSEWHERE

According to reports, they may be ready to use parachute troops in order to prevent oil fields from falling into unfriendly hands. I wonder therefore how you would square your comments which seem to understate the case as against the reports of Great Britain which seem to point up the tremendous dangers there involved.

5/24

General BRADLEY. There have been many places in which there has been a threatened aggresison or threatened trouble in the last 6 months. Yugoslavia for example was very much in the limelight here 2 or 3 months ago and it is still a danger point.

Iran has always been one and right now it is in the limelight because of the dispute over oil between Great Britain and the Government of Iran.

So far as I am concerned, I think from a British point of view probably they look upon this as the most dangerous point right now. As far as I am concerned, I am not too sure the Russians are going to start something in Iran before they start it somewhere else, and that was the basis of my statement yesterday.

Senator WILEY. Have there been any joint Anglo-American discussions relative to military intervention in Iran?

General BRADLEY. Military?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BRADLEY. There have been no military discussions, no. I don't know whether or not anybody else has had any.

Senator WILEY. My next question has to do with the military power of the Tudeh, the outlawed Iranian Communist Party. I was wondering if you have any information as to the ability of that party to put strong military forces, that is either regular or irregular military forces, into the field in the event trouble came.

General BRADLEY. I don't have that information at hand right now. There are a lot of sources of trouble in Iran. That would be one of them.

Some of the tribesmen up on the Soviet border are probably more apt to cause trouble than this party, and I don't think anyone would know—combinations of the various parties if the Communists really started some outbreak in Iran.

ENDING THE KOREAN WAR

Senator WILEY. You stated yesterday that the longer the Korean War drags on, the less able we are to have reserve forces in order to meet trouble somewhere else.

Isn't it a fact, however, that the whole thesis of General MacArthur is that it is absolutely essential that the Korean situation be liquidated promptly, whereas the thesis of the administration is that this situation can be dragged on and on until the Chinese sue for peace?

In other words, aren't you defeating your own purpose when you allow the Korean conflict to drag on indefinitely and prevent America from being in a position to meet trouble elsewhere in the world?

General **Bradley**. Again, Senator, the difference is in opinion as to what would stop the war in Korea, and there is where the difference is. I think I have stated it any number of times. We doubt if taking these additional steps would be decisive. We are just as anxious to end the war in Korea as General MacArthur is or anyone else is. The difference in opinion comes in how much additional risk you should take in trying to take additional measures.

RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH KOREAN AND NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator **Wiley**. I recall that some of the Republic of Korea forces which were put into the field had an absolute minimum of military training, often of but a few weeks' duration. I wonder therefore how it can possibly be stated that America is right in using these comparatively poorly trained South Korean forces, and yet is wrong if she were to utilize Chinese nationalist troops, many of whom have had many years of combat experience. In other words, isn't a Chinese combat veteran who fought for years in the civil war there or against the Japanese infinitely better trained than some South Korean youth of 18 who has practically never seen a rifle?

General **Bradley**. The chances are that quite a number of nationalists on Formosa are better trained than some of the South Koreans fighting in Korea. However, the South Koreans are fighting on the ground and they are fighting for their own country. It is true that some of them are not as well trained as possibly some of the people on Formosa if you go in and pick out the best trained ones out of various units, but it is much easier to supply these people and use them right in their own home country than it is to transport some other people for a considerable distance and then try to organize them and use them.

Furthermore, the people on Formosa, who are trained and valuable, are also useful and valuable in trying to improve the training of the larger group which is there, and which we are trying to equip.

RELATIONSHIP OF OUR COMMITMENTS TO OUR STRENGTH

Senator **Wiley**. General Bradley, it has been the opinion of many of our people that American diplomacy has continually overcommitted our limited resources. You seem to confirm that fact when you state that the longer the Korean War drags on, the less able we are to meet trouble elsewhere .

In other words, the question I am going to ask you now it: Have we made far more commitments than our military forces will allow, and isn't it dreadfully wrong to give our allies the idea that we can defend more than we are actually capable of defending?

General **Bradley**. The question of whether or not we can carry out our military commitments to conform to our diplomatic commitments is very much one of opinion.

Senator **Wiley**. Very much what?

General **Bradley**. Very much one of opinion.

It may be that right at this minute, we do have more diplomatic commitments than we can carry out militarily.

Take the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example: The 12 Nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization do not have the capability, right now, of stopping an aggression by Russia. I don't see why that should imply, however, that we shouldn't go on and have the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and try to encourage them to build up their security forces, because that is the way you get built up to that commitment; and I think it is perfectly proper in a case like that, to make this commitment, if you want to call it that, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and try to build to it.

I agree with you that we should not just go around the world making commitments, military commitments, which we cannot fulfill; but I think it is perfectly proper, on the other hand, to make some, particularly where you are trying to build up a collective defense, and then build to it.

Senator WILEY. Now, just these one or two final questions:

JCS ATTITUDE TOWARD MAC ARTHUR

I listened to Senator Morse's argument this morning, on the Hickenlooper motion; and while I have heard all the testimony, up until the Martin letter broke, General Bradley, in what respect—put yourself back to just before that—in what respect did the Joint Chiefs of Staff have any quarrel with General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I think I have answered that before; but I will try to give a more complete answer .

Senator WILEY. Well, if you can, make it very brief, but make it specific.

Now, up to that time, where was your quarrel with General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. We had been concerned, many times, by his public statements, which seemed to carry his differences of opinion to the public, instead of back to the President.

I say, that had come up many times since last summer.

Senator WILEY. Did you identify those in your previous testimony? You identified those specific things that you are talking about?

General BRADLEY. I did; various interviews, and so on. To that extent we had been concerned about his statements.

As I have said before, here, we never did claim or accuse him of being insubordinate of any military directive. We did think that he was not in sympathy with our trying to confine the war to Korea, and that concerned us and that was discussed, we discussed it several times.

Senator WILEY. Does that complete your answer?

General BRADLEY. Well that—you wanted me to be brief.

I think that covers the most important thing that I discussed here before.

May I go back to your question?

I think you used the words "did we have any quarrel with him." We have never quarreled with him, if you want to use that term. We haven't always agreed with him, and we had been sorry that he had carried these things the way he had, but you used the word "quarrel"; I don't think we had ever been in a quarrel with him, haven't been, yet.

Senator WILEY. Well, the second question is: If there wasn't a quarrel, but there was this matter that you have discussed among yourselves, apparently, that you felt while he was not insubordinate, and that while he did not fail, in the slightest degree, to carry out any military directives, you felt that some of his communiques, as you might call them, overreached in some way his—what shall we say—his position or his right to speak.

CONFERENCES BETWEEN BRADLEY AND MAC ARTHUR

Now, if that is so, when did you see him first in Japan?

General BRADLEY. Your question is——

Senator WILEY. When did you——

General BRADLEY. Boils down to when did I first see him in Japan?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General BRADLEY. I first saw him in Japan around the end of January, or the first of February 1950.

Senator WILEY. Then when did you next see him?

General BRADLEY. In June 1950.

Senator WILEY. Then, next?

General BRADLEY. When he returned here in April.

Senator WILEY. Then between June 1950, which was substantially the date that the Korean War started, wasn't it, and the time that you saw him last month, here——

General BRADLEY. May I correct that? I saw him in Wake Island in October. I forgot that, sir.

Senator WILEY. Then, did you have any personal conversation with him at Wake Island?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. What?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did you complain to him then, in any respect, about any overreaching, as you might call it, in his communiqués?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. The conference at Wake Island was not primarily between me and General MacArthur, it was between the President and General MacArthur, and I would think it improper for me, at that time, to take up anything else.

Senator WILEY. Well, then, I will go back to my question. With the exception of Wake Island, commencing with June 1950 up to the time you saw him here, did you personally communicate the concern of the Chiefs of Staff as to any of his communiqués?

General BRADLEY. We sent a directive on December 6 calling his attention to these statements.

Senator WILEY. I remember that. That is in the record. Now, is that the only thing?

General BRADLEY. That is the only one I have any remembrance of.

WISDOM OF MANNER OF RELIEVING MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. A personal opinion, General Bradley—do you think that General MacArthur was treated in the way he should have been treated in handling this matter?

General BRADLEY. You refer to the relief or method of relief?

Senator WILEY. Relief and the method both.

General BRADLEY. From a military point of view, I agree that he should have been relieved. As to the method of relief, I agree that it probably could have been handled better.

Senator WILEY. And when did you come to the conclusion that he should be relieved?

General BRADLEY. About the first part of April of this year, when these final things came up. As I have said, the various things were under consideration from time to time, and then there last things were just that much additional to what had happened before.

BLAIR HOUSE MEETINGS ON MAC ARTHUR

Senator WILEY. You said yesterday that on the ninth the President informed you that he had reached the conclusion that he was going to fire MacArthur or recall MacArthur; is that right?

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator WILEY. Were there any meetings after that that you attended?

General BRADLEY. Yes. I think I testified that I went to one the next day.

Senator WILEY. The tenth?

General BRADLEY. On the tenth, at which the same people were present, plus the executive for press relations, Mr. Short, who is the executive to the President for press relations, and he was the additional member of the group.

Senator WILEY. Any meeting after that? What time of the day was that meeting?

General BRADLEY. That was at 3 p. m. Tuesday afternoon.

Senator WILEY. And nobody else was there except the ones you testified to?

General BRADLEY. That is right—the President, Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Short, and myself were in the President's office.

Senator WILEY. Now, was there another meeting after that?

General BRADLEY. Not with the President; no, sir.

Senator WILEY. But with whom?

General BRADLEY. Not in the White House with the President, no, sir. There was a meeting later that night at Blair House with some of the people who were working on these releases, who went over to see the President.

Senator WILEY. What was the date that the news went out to MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I believe it went out at about 1 a. m. of the 11th. I sent the message myself because I was directed to because our message center to Tokyo is a military one, and I was told to send the President's message to General MacArthur, and it was sent at 12:30 a. m. on the 11th, and was acknowledged by Tokyo at 12:42.

Senator WILEY. That is all.

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, may I correct a figure which I put in the record either yesterday or the day before?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

NUMBER OF NONBATTLE CASUALTIES

General BRADLEY. Which I have rechecked, and the staff made a mistake on it and that was on the question of nonbattle casualties. The report that came in yesterday—the report had not come in this morning before I left—was 72,679. Some staff man in getting the figure made a considerable error and I think the figure I gave the other day was something like 43,000.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. 41,000, I think.

Senator BRIDGES. 72,000 what?

General BRADLEY. 72,679 nonbattle casualties up to the report that came in yesterday.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is American casualties?

General BRADLEY. That is American nonbattle casualties. Remember, I read in the record at that time that the statistics people reported that about 85 percent of those people are returning to duty.

Also the figure was asked by Senator Hickenlooper for the battle casualties up to date, and these were the battle casualties up to and including the report that came in yesterday. It had not come in this morning before I left.

Total battle casualties, United States, up to the present time, 69,276, and as you know, those figures always are a little larger than the published figures because we don't carry them and don't release them until the next of kin have been notified.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if I may be indulged, because this was in response to my——

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, Senator Hickenlooper will be permitted to propound a question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just one question. General Bradley, then the total of 72,679 nonbattle casualties, plus 69,276 battle casualties constitute the full total of all casualties, or is there another category of casualties in addition to those you have listed as nonbattle and battle casualties?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir. I just wanted to know that we had the full complete total.

Senator BRIDGES. May I, without objection, Mr. Chairman, ask one question on that subject?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is your turn, Senator Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. General Bradley, I am glad you brought this out because we are after being asked in the Appropriations Committee for all these hospital facilities and all these things, and your medical people tell us one story and jutify an appropriation, and then there are given out to the public these other figures which do not coincide. It puts us, who are passing on appropriations, in sort of a middle position.

What you have actually had in the way of nonbattle casualties and battle casualties are 141,955; is that right?

General BRADLEY. I did not add the two up.

Senator BRIDGES. I mean that is the addition of 72,679 nonbattle.

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator BRIDGES. And 69,276 battle casualties.

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator BRIDGES. As I add it, it makes 141,955, which is a wholly different picture from the figures announced.

Now, true, a lot of the nonbattle casualties have gone back into service, but nevertheless, if a man loses a hand by frostbite or frozen off, or he is otherwise injured, he is just as much a battle casualty as the fellow who gets a bullet in battle; and, so, we have been struggling between our official figures, which you give out, limited to battle, and this nonbattle casualty figure, which runs higher than the other, and it is pretty hard for us to acknowledge one publicly, and then provide the money through appropriations for an entirely different problem when you consider these forces together.

PERCENTAGE OF NONBATTLE CASUALTIES RETURNED TO DUTY

I would like to ask you what percentage of the 72,679 nonbattle casualties have gone back into service. Do you have that?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir. According to the report that was given me by the Office of the Chief of Information here, as of up to the 2d of February—I don't happen to have one for nonbattle since then—but up to that time 85 percent had been returned to duty; and I put in the record the other day—I am not sure whether you were here or not—the fact that whereas our nonbattle casualties in our forces in Korea during occupation were 6 percent, nonbattle casualties since the conflict in Korea began, the average monthly rate is 9.5 percent.

Senator **Bridges**. What is there confidential on these total casualties? I mean, why are they confidential? You give out the battle casualties, and you do not give out the others, and yet we are asked to provide for them. I mean, is there any reason why they are extremely confidential?

General **Bradley**. No, sir. I think they are apt to be misleading if you do because a lot of those people just go back, for example, into a hospital or an aid station one night, with a cold or something else; a man that has to go back to have a tooth pulled, he is only out a day or two and goes back. It varies all the way from that to those who are hospitalized, and those who die as a result of nonbattle injuries.

Senator **Bridges**. What percentage of them, General, have died as a result of these non-battle casualties? How many? Do you have those figures?

General **Bradley**. Yes, I have them up as of the 16th of May. Nonbattle deaths have been 432. Wait a minute. That is Army only—612 is the total for all services. That would include deaths from pneumonia, accidents.

Senator **Wiley**. I did not understand that.

General **Bradley**. That would include deaths from accidents.

Senator **Wiley**. 612?

General **Bradley**. 612 nonbattle deaths.

Senator **Long**. That even includes automobile accidents, does it not?

General **Bradley**. Yes, anything other than result of battle action.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Was General Walker considered a battle casualty?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. I do not want to interrupt, but I would like for you to get permission from Senator Bridges.

Senator **Bridges**. All right. I yield to clear up this thing. It is against my time.

General **Bradley**. General Walker would be carried as a nonbattle casualty.

Senator Bridges. And that is the way—for instance, how is a man like General Dean now carried—as missing in action or casualty?

General Bradley. He is carried as missing in action, and he is included in that total battle casualties.

Senator Bridges. But he is listed as missing in action?

General Bradley. Yes.

Senator Bridges. To still classify him missing in action, you do that until his body is recovered?

General Bradley. I believe there is a time limit on that, Senator. I do not know just what it is now. I think the trouble with carrying him as dead, killed in action, that would probably be a practical way to do it because I think most people probably think he is, but there is still a chance he is alive and he will return. And in fairness to his family we should not report him to his wife as killed in action. There is always the hope and the chance he will show up.

Senator Bridges. If there is anything further on this casualty busienes, I would be glad to yield.

Senator Wiley. Total American dead?

TOTAL KILLED AND MISSING

General Bradley. Total killed in action came up to the 21st of May—that is the report that came in yesterday—was 10,680, and you would have to add to that then the nonbattle deaths of 612.

Senator Wiley. I did not get the first figure—10,000?

General Bradley. 10,680.

Senator Byrd. What is the usual percentage of those missing that are found dead? About what percentage is the average?

General Bradley. Senator, that would be pretty hard to say. In fighting the Germans we usually got back a very large percentage of them. In fighting the North Koreans I am afraid the percentage we get back will be much smaller.

Senator Byrd. And how many are missing now?

General Bradley. As of the report up to date yesterday it was 13,349.

Senator Byrd. Would you say that two-thirds of those are likely dead?

General Bradley. I would even hesitate to make an estimate, Senator.

Senator Bridges. What has been the experience on the people that you got back, missing in action, who have been held that have been liberated, and so forth, that have gone through the torturing procedures which some of them have suffered? What percentage of those have come through? Have half of them come through?

General Bradley. You mean that lived after we got them back?

Senator Bridges. No. For instance, when a particular unit, for instance, was captured by North Korean and Chinese Communists and the prisoners were finally liberated by your advance later, what has been the experience of the total number that have survived?

General Bradley. I don't have any figure on that, sir. The ones that we recaptured from the North Koreans when we first rushed north right after the Inchon landing, in general, I think they were in pretty poor shape. The ones we have taken back or have been released by the Chinese apparently have been pretty well treated.

Senator Johnson. May I ask a question there, Senator?

Senator Bridges. Yes.

Senator Johnson. What is your best estimate on the total casualties of our allies associated with us?

General Bradley. I am afraid I don't have an accurate figure on that. No, sir; I don't have a report on it.

Senator Johnson. What is your estimate of the total casualties of the enemy?

General Bradley. I don't have any summation of that either.

Senator Long. May I ask another question about that?

Chairman Russell. Senator Bridges?

Senator Bridges. Yes.

Chairman Russell. All right.

Senator Long. Do you have the number of amputations out of the nonbattle casualties?

General Bradley. No, sir, I don't have any breakdown on the various classes of nonbattle casualities.

Senator Bridges. If that is all on casualties, I will proceed.

Chairman Russell. Proceed. That has been on your time, you know.

ASSIGNMENTS OF GENERAL WEDEMEYER

Senator Bridges. General Bradley, is it or is it not true that Gen. Albert Wedemeyer has been offered the job as Assistant Chief of Staff of the United States Army?

General Bradley. I don't know, sir. The only thing I can testify to General Wedemeyer is what took place while I was Chief of Staff of the Army.

Senator Bridges. I mean currently. General Collins would have to testify on that?

General Bradley. Yes, sir. I have dropped out——

Senator Bridges. It is supposed to have occurred within the last 2 or 3 weeks.

General Bradley. I don't have anything to do with Army assignments any more, so I don't know. I do know that General Wedemeyer wanted the job at San Francisco and asked for it. I have been accused of shanghaiing him all the way to the west coast. I used to put down "Presidio, San Francisco" as either first or second choice on my preference list when I had a preference. I never did get it. But I used to put it down anyway. It is considered a choice station, and General Wedemeyer asked for it, but I have been accused of shanghaiing him to the west coast.

Senator Cain. That is a very nice place to be shanghaied, if you will pardon my interrupting, General.

General Bradley. I would think so. I would be willing to trade jobs with him.

Senator Cain. I can understand that, sir.

Senator Bridges. General Bradley, are we in a war or not today?

General Bradley. Well, as far as any individual fighting in Korea is concerned, this is just as hard a war as we have ever fought and harder than a lot of others we have fought. So as far as the man in battle is concerned, it is certainly a war.

Technically, as I said here yesterday, maybe someone would say we are not at war because Congress has not declared war.

Senator **Bridges**. But to all effects we are in war?

General **Bradley**. Certainly as far as any individual or any unit fighting is concerned, he is in war.

ROTATION SERVICE

Senator **Bridges**. General, what is the rotation system that is being worked out on the return of these men? How long a period of time will it be before your troops who have seen long service in Korea will have a rotation here under the present plans?

General **Bradley**. Each of the services has had to work out its own rotation system, because of the various problems concerned. May I suggest that you ask each of the service chiefs those questions, because they have them and I do not. They set their policy and they know what their schedule is. It is not under me. I would suggest that you ask the various individual service chiefs when they come before you, sir.

Senator **Bridges**. Thank you.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator George.

NUMBER OF UN TROOPS IN KOREA WHEN UN REJECTED "HOT PURSUIT"

Senator **George**. General, when I questioned you, I believe Monday, on your return from the west coast anyway, and asked you as of the day of the vetoing of the hot-pursuit order how many troops the countries associated with us in Korea actually had in battle, you said about 30,000.

Did they have 30,000 as of that date, General?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir; ground and navy and air combined.

Senator **George**. How many did they have in the battle line?

General **Bradley**. On the ground?

Senator **George**. Yes, sir.

General **Bradley**. At that time approximately 20,000.

Senator **George**. At that time, at the time when the hot-pursuit message or request was first O. K'd by you here?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir; to the best of my remembrance, it was 20,000 at that time. My figure of 20,000 is ground forces. The figure of 30,000 included additional naval and air units. I didn't know whether you got that straight or not.

Senator **George**. I understood that. I was speaking of the date when the hot-pursuit order was vetoed.

General **Bradley**. Both of those figures are——

Senator **George**. Would be applicable to that date.

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **George**. I wanted to get that clear.

Now, General, I think you would agree that it would be fair to adjudge of General MacArthur's views and his request here as of the date when those requests were submitted and not as of this date; is that correct?

General **Bradley**. I don't get the meaning of your question, Senator.

Senator **George**. I say would you not agree that it is fair to adjudge of General MacArthur's position from a military point of view as of the time that position was taken either with respect to hot pursuit or with respect to the bombing of installations and build-up depots in Manchuria, and not as of this time?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir. There has never been any dispute from the military point of view of the advantages of hot pursuit.

JUDGING MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator **George**. I understand that, General. The second question related, the second question I asked, you would agree that we should view General MacArthur's request to bomb build-up depots, troop concentrations across the Yalu River—let us put it that way—as of the date when that request was submitted by General MacArthur?

General **Bradley**. Yes, but that suggestion—it was not a request but a suggestion—that it was a sanctuary and the asking for instructions was not turned down on the insistance of any of our allies.

Senator **George**. Oh, I understand that, General. It was turned down here because, if that suggestion were followed, you differed from General MacArthur in that it would bring a decision in the war and you thought that the risk was greater than the possible benefit of acceding to his request.

General **Bradley**. That is correct.

Senator **George**. I understand that to be your position, but I wanted to emphasize the fact that you would adjudge that suggestion or whatever it was when first made by General MacArthur as of the position of his army in Korea at that time and not as of now.

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir. I thought you were still talking about numbers, and the position of his army at that time was much farther north.

Senator **George**. That is right.

General **Bradley**. And he had a shorter line of communication on which to work.

Senator **George**. That is right. He did not have any 200 miles in which to bomb.

General **Bradley**. Not at that time.

Senator **George**. That is what I mean. Well, now isn't it fair for us to adjudge the soundness or unsoundness of his request or suggestion, whatever it was, in view of the conditions actually prevailing, the position which his army actually occupied at that time and not as of now?

DIFFERENCES OF VIEWPOINTS

General **Bradley**. Yes; but you see we have never quarreled with him recommending anything to us.

Senator **George**. I understand that, General, but I simply wanted to develop those two points. As I understand it, you have never quarreled with General MacArthur because he had a difference of viewpoint if there was a difference of viewpoint?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; we have never blamed him for having a different viewpoint. That is perfectly proper for him to make recommendations.

Senator **George**. Perfectly proper and perfectly normal.

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George**. Your disagreement, if it has been a disagreement—and I do not use it except in that restricted sense—was the fact that he went to public with it rather than coming directly to the

President or through ordinary military channels, regular military channels?

General **Bradley**. That is correct.

Senator **George**. That is correct?

General **Bradley**. Yes.

Senator **George**. That is your viewpoint now?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George**. General, I was not here, but from reading some of the questions I judge that you were asked about the state of your feelings toward General MacArthur. I ask it directly, General: Were your relations to General MacArthur cordial, your personal relations? You could not answer for anybody else.

General **Bradley**. My relations with General MacArthur were very cordial. I have always admired him, I have admired his record. I have always when I have talked to him, it has been on a very friendly basis. We have had many common topics of conversation in which we are both interested and I have never been on anything except cordial relations with General MacArthur, and I hope I can always be.

We have differences of opinion in the service as elsewhere.

Senator **George**. I understand, but I was asking about the state of your own feelings. That is the only thing that is relevant in this point that I was questioning.

MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATION ON SENDING TROOPS TO KOREA IN JUNE 1950

Now, then I did not understand you yesterday—was it yesterday, it may have been the day before—to indicate that General MacArthur had himself asked for ground troops to be sent into Korea, first. General MacArthur did not ask for the sending of ground troops in Korea, did he?

General **Bradley**. He asked for authority to transfer a regimental combat team to Korea and later build it up to not to exceed two divisions, and that was approved here in Washington.

Senator **George**. That was after he had been appointed as commander in chief of the United Nations Army?

General **Bradley**. No, sir; that was before the United Nations appointment.

Senator **George**. That was before the United Nations appointment?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George**. But he had been designated to take over Korea?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **George**. What was his status then in Korea?

General **Bradley**. At that time he had been authorized, first, to use Air and Navy, and then later he had been authorized to use Air north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and to furnish any necessary supplies to the South Korean forces.

Then, he made a reconnaissance of the battle front in Korea, and came back and said that the situation was bad. They would not be able to hold the Han River line unless they were reinforced, and requested authority to send over one regimental combat team, and build it up not to exceed two divisions.

Senator **George**. That was agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; that was agreed to by our Government.

Senator GEORGE. Agreed to by our Government. In other words, you thought that judgment was correct?

General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator GEORGE. And acted affirmatively on it?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. No questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. General MacArthur—I think others have made that same mistake——

General BRADLEY. I feel complimented.

Senator SMITH. I want to straighten out something in yesterday's testimony that gave me some difficulty at the time.

MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATION ON ARMING THE SOUTH KOREANS

On page 2691 of the transcript I had been asking you about the different incidents that had caused MacArthur to be relieved of his command, and I asked you if you could give me other than the ones you had been talking about, the documents. You said there were others, like independent statements in interviews, and particularly the statement to Freeman magazine, which blamed political decisions for not "arming more South Koreans, and I think everyone that knows the details of that thinks that is a very unfair statement."

Now, in checking up the record on the matter, I find that back in January at the time that we were discussing the whole question of evacuation, from the testimony that has been brought out here, the Chiefs of Staff sent to MacArthur a request, apparently, with regard to arming some of the Republic of Korea manpower. It was in answer to that that MacArthur replied that he felt in the light of the threat to Japan, it might be better to arm the Japanese police reserves, the National Police Reserve of Japan. That was the gist of his statement. He thought at that time that is what it was, and you felt that, therefore, his statement about arming the Koreans was unfair.

Let me call to your attention that the Freeman magazine correspondence was much later, March 31, and was after Syngman Rhee, President Syngman Rhee, had asked that the Korean draftees be armed. In the Freeman magazine under date of March 31, which appears on page 186 of our compilation, Henry Hazlitt, the editor, asked:

> Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported New York Times, March 31, dispatch from Taegu? Previous statements President Rhee reported requests for such arms.

To which on April 5 General MacArthur replied:

> I have delayed reply to your message of the 31st pending receipt here of the referenced New York Times dispatch. There is nothing I can add to the information therein contained. The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government, and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.

It seems to me, from reading that record, that you had two totally different situations. One situation was where there was a threatened evacuation and withdrawal to Japan, where MacArthur thought it would be wiser to arm the Japanese there; and the other was later when the discussion was in regard to the 400,000 South Korean draftees, and the inquiry from the President of the South Korean Republic.

It would seem to me that General MacArthur was thoroughly justified in considering that a political decision was beyond his authority and was not misrepresentation.

General Bradley. Well, he had replied on January 6 to our suggestion, as you point out, and said that he would rather use the arms another way.

However, between that 6th of January and up to April 5 he had not sent any other message in on the matter, so we assumed he still had the idea that they should not have additional units armed.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DECISION ON ARMING SOUTH KOREANS

I would like to add two other points to this. The same suggestion has been made to General Ridgway and General Van Fleet since they have taken over to see if the situation is changed, and they still recommend against the equipping of additional units. In other words, they verify General MacArthur's judgment as of January 6.

Also, with reference to the 400,000 they say they have turned loose, those were not 400,000 trained men; in fact, none of them were trained reserves. A lot of them were physically unfit.

Those were 400,000 people, as I have been given to understand, that were collected during the retreat and placed in camps so that we could control them, and they included, for example—the figure that was given to me—30,000 malnutrition cases, which after we fixed them up as well as we could, they were still weakened cases, and we let them out. So, I think a lot of people have gotten the wrong idea from that 400,000 spoken of in that dispatch.

They were not trained men; they were not men who were readily usable, and the policy has been, by General MacArthur, and also by General Ridgway, to use any additional manpower in South Korea, to keep the units that we now have formed, the divisions and other units, up to strength, and to maintain certain independent police battalions to keep order in the rear areas, and try to keep down guerrilla activities.

Senator Smith. I am not questioning that point. All I am questioning is your statement that you thought that General MacArthur's answer to the Freeman magazine was unfair.

General Bradley. I think all——

Senator Smith. Obviously, after President Rhee had made this request to arm these people, there was a political question there that MacArthur could not pass on.

General Bradley. Well, I may be doing him an injustice. You asked me for my opinion, and my opinion is that he could have easily answered that question by saying, "Yes; it had been considered, but for the time being, we don't think it is a good thing," instead of blaming, trying to blame—what was an implied, in my opinion, criticism of our Government in not letting him rearm them.

Now, that is, as I say, the thing that formed in my mind—maybe, as I say, I am doing him an injustice—but that was my opinion at the time, and I thought it could have been answered so much easier, and without any implication that Washington was keeping him from rearming additional South Koreans.

Senator SMITH. I simply call attention to it for the record, because you said it was a very important matter in connection with the accumulation of various incidents that you build up in order to justify his dismissal.

It seemed to me that was a very questionable conclusion to draw, though I can see it might have been drawn if you want to draw it that way.

MEMORANDUM ON JCS REASONS FOR RELIEVING MAC ARTHUR

Now, there is another matter I would like to ask you about, General Bradley. You recall you said that there were three military reasons given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you recited. I won't go into those. But I would like to know when those military reasons were actually written down.

You said there was verbal discussion and then you talked with General Marshall, and then at some time in the proceedings of the discussion of military reasons for the dismissal there was a memorandum made, which you read to us.

When was that memorandum made? Was that made after all the discussions?

General BRADLEY. That was made afterward. I went back and dictated these reasons, as I understood them to be expressed by the Chiefs when they presented the case to General Marshall. I showed those, as I had remembered them, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to see whether or not I had correctly expressed the views that they had given to the Secretary of Defense, and they agreed that they were correct in substance.

They did suggest a few editorial changes in the way I had written it down, because I had written it in very rough form when I dictated it. But they agreed that these were the three reasons they had given General Marshall.

Senator SMITH. They were written down before General MacArthur was relieved? I mean it was done before he was actually relieved or after he was relieved?

General BRADLEY. To the best of my remembrance, I dictated them sometime the next day on Monday, and the decision was made on that day. The Chiefs themselves went over them sometime later to check whether or not I had stated them correctly.

Senator SMITH. What I was getting at was this: Whether you discussed with the President the military reasons and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the relief of General MacArthur; whether you presented to him an oral report of your meeting; or whether you presented to him these three reasons which, as you say, were subsequently written out?

General BRADLEY. I stated to him these three reasons, I stated them orally.

Senator SMITH. Now, there is one more thing in the record I want to get clear.

I understood, from your testimony yesterday, or the day before, that you felt that General MacArthur favored, or was recommending the evacuation of our troops from Korea. I want to get that clear, because I want to refer to his testimony on this matter.

MAC ARTHUR AND JCS VIEWS ON EVACUATION OF KOREA IN JANUARY 1951

I am reading from page 73 of the United States News of May 11, which has the full report of these hearings. I haven't got the original transcript before me; but Senator Johnson asked General MacArthur this question:

> Senator JOHNSON. In your conversations with General Collins from time to time he may have expressed himself on the wisdom of the course you outlined. Did he?

That was the different recommendations that General MacArthur had been making, and which General Collins was talking about.

General MacArthur's reply was this:

> General Collins visited the command after that. At that time the great question he raised was whether we could stay in Korea at all or whether we would evacuate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not sure we could stick in Korea. It was my opinion that we could.
>
> That was the great question at that time, whether we should evacuate Korea or whether we should not.

Now, that is the statement by General MacArthur. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought we might have to evacuate, and his thought was that we could stay. I want to know whether that is your understanding of General MacArthur's position?

General BRADLEY. Well, I have read into the record previously the digest prepared, or the paraphrase of his message of January 10, in which he mentioned, this—I can read it again if you would like—but the whole tenor of that message was that he felt he would have to evacuate Korea.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you this, at that point: Didn't he feel that we would have to evacuate if the measures which he, at that time, was recommending, and which he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff were recommending, to bomb the bases and put on the blockade and so forth, were not carried out. You would have to adopt one or the other; isn't that his point?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. At that time he had not seen our study of January 12. It was not based on that study at all. This was based on the situation, as I see it, as he knew it in the field.

Now, we have to depend, for our reactions here, upon the information furnished us from the office of the commander in chief, Far East, or the commander in chief of the United Nations Command, whichever way you want to look at it—in this case he signed it "commander in chief, United Nations Command," and we were of the opinion, from this message, that possibly we would have to evacuate from Korea; so General Collins and——

Senator SMITH. The date of that?

General BRADLEY. January 10.

Senator SMITH. January 10, and that is when General Collins went out?

General BRADLEY. General Collins and General Vandenberg went out to get first-hand information, or knowledge, and before they had a chance to go over to Korea and see for themselves, the only information they had was this message; so consequently when they talked to General MacArthur in Korea—they can testify to this better than I can, but I expect they were of the opinion that we were going to have to evacuate, because at that time they were basing their knowledge on his own telegram.

Senator SMITH. I am just calling attention to General MacArthur's own testimony before this committee where he said:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not sure we could stick in Korea. It was my opinion that we could.
>
> That was the great question at the time, whether we should evacuate Korea or whether we should not.

You probably could agree with that, although you draw the conclusion, from this earlier message of his, that he was thinking in terms of evacuation.

General BRADLEY. January 10 he was thinking of evacuation. That was the latest information we had; at the time that he says that we were thinking of evacuation—yes, we were, because he told us he probably would have to.

Senator SMITH. Would it be fair to say that his position was that he could stick it out, we would not have to evacuate, provided the limitations were taken off his operations, as he had recommended?

That is the conclusion I draw from all these documents, those that I have examined, and these confidential ones—that the Chiefs of Staff thought there was some doubt about it, and there was doubt. But General MacArthur rather thought that he could stay, on condition, of course, that the wraps, so to speak, were taken off and these things done that he recommended.

General BRADLEY. That may have been part of his——

Senator SMITH. I just want to be sure the impression isn't left that MacArthur was recommending the evacuation, in any case.

General BRADLEY. Well, I believe the record, where I put this message in, the 10th of January, would create some idea that he was thinking of evacuation, as you say, unless he could go to an all-out war, with a blockade and a few other things.

Senator SMITH. That probably is the right interpretation from your standpoint.

Now, I have a couple of questions that I asked General Marshall, that I would like to ask you.

One was, I asked General Marshall this in regard to the Department of Defense, and I would like to ask it of you in regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ADMISSION OF RED CHINA TO THE UN

Could you state categorically that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unalterably opposed to Red China's entrance into the United Nations?

General BRADLEY. The entrance of China into the United Nations is entirely a diplomatic matter, it is not a military one.

I can express a personal viewpoint on it, but I don't think that means anything. It is a diplomatic matter as is the disposition of how you handle Formosa.

That becomes a military matter, Formosa, if you give it away, but certainly the entry or nonentry of the United Nations—the Chinese Communists into the United Nations—is not a military one.

Senator SMITH. Well, would the Joint Chiefs of Staff be ready to consider the question of the entrance of Red China into the United Nations as a bargaining point in a Korean peace settlement?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. We think it has nothing to do with that.

Senator SMITH. You would leave it out of that?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Then you would agree I think with General MacArthur's position on that as he expressed it in his message of March 24.

Now this further question, General. Do you believe that what has happened in China is a conquest of that country by Soviet Russia and that there is consequently a control of China today by an external power, namely Russia?

General BRADLEY. I think there is a certain degree of control. Just how complete it is I don't believe anyone knows.

As I have stated before, Mao himself is a Communist and was a Communist many years ago, so it is very hard to make sure just how many of these actions are taken on his own initiative and how many of them are dictated by Russia. Certainly some influence is exercised by Russia. We have no way of knowing just how much.

Senator SMITH. You would think there was some external influence operating on China today?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. External power which of course is Russia?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Well, would this in your judgment imply the admission of Communist China to the United Nations would mean the recognition of the United Nations of the conquest of China by an external power, Russia?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think that is a diplomatic matter as to what it would mean diplomatically, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Well, I want to get the question in the record and get your thought on it because I think it is going to come up ultimately and we may have to deal with it.

RELATIONSHIP OF PACIFIC DEFENSE LINE TO AGGRESSION IN KOREA

Now there is another question I did want to ask you very much. The Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, in his speech at the National Press Club where I was present myself on January 13, 1950, sketched a line of primary United States defense in the Far East which did not include Korea, and, of course, did not include Formosa, but for the moment I am sticking to Korea.

United States occupation forces had previously been withdrawn from Korea. That leads to the question, why at the eleventh hour so to speak was it suddenly decided to defend Korea if we did not feel that that was part of our defense, primary defense in the Far East?

General BRADLEY. Well, it is not part of our strategic long-range defense, but we didn't go into it for that purpose. We went in to stop an aggression and avoid an appeasement in the case.

Senator SMITH. I am glad you said that. I hoped that was your answer because I felt right along we were justified in going in entirely aside from the defense question. But on the purely defense question, there was not an eleventh-hour shift of our feeling with regard to the strategic importance of Korea?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Senator **Smith**. Wouldn't you think that Korea is important from the standpoint of Japan, the safety of Japan?

General **Bradley**. Yes, it is; and in the hands of a hostile power would be an additional threat against Japan, but you always have to stop your front line somewhere.

Senator **Smith**. I can understand that. I want to get clear what your thinking was on that.

ALLIES SUPPORT OF CROSSING THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

One more question. Last fall about the time that our forces initially crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, that is the first crossing, this step appeared to have the firm support of our European allies. Do you remember that when we crossed the thirty-eighth?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Smith**. Weren't the European allies behind us at that time? I understood from my inquiries that they were.

General **Bradley**. They were behind it to the extent that they passed a resolution in the United Nations approving it.

Senator **Smith**. That is what I thought, and General MacArthur was authorized to cross the thirty-eighth?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Smith**. Now did the State Department or any of our allies officially advise at that time that there was a serious danger that the Chinese Communists might come in if we crossed the thirty-eighth?

General **Bradley**. Well, I think there were some reports that came in to that effect, indicating that there was a possibility that they would enter the war if we cross the thirty-eighth.

Senator **Smith**. Now here is the important question in this connection: Did any of our allies or all of them at that time indicate that they would support us only so long as the Chinese Communists stayed out?

General **Bradley**. Not that I know of.

Senator **Smith**. In other words, was there any agreement that their support was to be counted on only so long as the going did not become too difficult?

General **Bradley**. Not that I know of.

Senator **Smith**. They did join us in our crossing the thirty-eighth. Since then they have been putting heat on us to be careful not to get into a row with Soviet Russia or with the Chinese Communist themselves. I am a little bit confused about the position of our allies in this matter, and that is why I asked that question.

They certainly took the initial risk with us in crossing the thirty-eighth.

General **Bradley**. That is correct, but I think some of them feel the same way that our own Chiefs do, and that is that we should avoid any extension of conflict which would increase the risk of world war III.

FIRST USE OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES IN KOREA

Senator **Smith**. Now, a further question: You recall the meetings at the White House around the 26th or 27th of June, when some Members of the Congress were present?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Smith**. And the President announced to us the Korean invasion and his program for authorizing the use of our naval and air cover there to protect our nationals and also to back up the South Korean Army.

As I recall the first meeting—I want to get my recollection verified—no mention was made then of our using ground troops, although the question was raised, I think, at the meeting—I don't recall exactly what was said. We were told he did not contemplate sending any ground troops over there. That was the first meeting on June 27. That is, that it was contemplated to use only Air and Navy.

General **Bradley**. That is my remembrance, that at that time no decision had been reached to use ground troops.

Senator **Smith**. Similarly at a meeting on June 30, which I attended with some of my colleagues, I recall something was said about using some ground troops in order to strengthen the Pusan beachhead, if we had to withdraw there, and enable an effective evacuation there of our nationals but no large offensive was contemplated.

I am trying to understand whether we thought of sending them as a protective measure at Pusan and did not contemplate the use of ground forces for offensive purposes.

General **Bradley**. The first use of ground troops was to protect the port so we could complete the evacuation of our nationals. That was the first authorized use of ground troops. The second authorized use was to help try to stop the North Koreans.

Senator **Smith**. At what time were the decisions made to carry on what they called the big offensive by the United States, where our troops were put into Korea in larger quantities? That must have been a later decision then.

General **Bradley**. According to my notes here the decision was reached sometime on June 30 to employ United States ground combat forces in Japan in support of the Republic of Korea.

I'll see if I can find any further note on it.

On June 30, 1950, commander in chief Far East informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a reconnaissance of the Korean battle area, that the South Korean Army was in confusion. Supplies and equipment has been abandoned or lost. Without artillery, mortars, and antitank guns, the most the South Koreans could hope to accomplished would be to retard the advance of the enemy. The South Korean Army was incapable of united action, and there was grave danger of a further breakthrough. The commander in chief Far East further stated that the only assurance of holding the Han River line and to regain lost ground would be through the commitment of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. Accordingly, he stated, if authorized, it was his intention to move immediately a United States regimental combat team to the combat area in Korea as the nucleus of a possible build-up of two divisions from Japan for early offensive action in accordance with his mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces.

Senator **Smith**. That action, I take it, was approved. Now was General MacArthur at that time just acting for the United States or was he commander of the United Nations forces?

General BRADLEY. He was not made commander of the United Nations forces until around July 7 or 8. So it was before he was made commander.

Senator SMITH. Then we were taking heavy steps, you might say, to carry on an offensive against the North Koreans under our own steam and without the United Nations support in the sense of General MacArthur being the representative of the United Nations?

General BRADLEY. It was United States action.

Senator SMITH. That was approved here in Washington—was that approved by the Joint Chiefs and by the Department and all the authorities here?

General BRADLEY. Yes, that was approved. His request was approved.

Senator SMITH. So that he had full authority for that action in taking those troops from Japan over there?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

CLEARANCE OF RUSK SPEECH ON CHINA

Senator SMITH. Just one more question and then I am through. Recently Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, made an address that seemed to cause some excitement. I am just wondering whether that particular presentation of our policy in China was cleared with you as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or was it cleared with the Department of Defense or the State Department?

General BRADLEY. As far as I know, it was not seen by the Department of Defense.

Senator SMITH. It was not submitted to you for your judgment?

General BRADLEY. No.

Senator SMITH. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall concluded his questioning on yesterday.

Senator Johnson.

CASUALTIES IN KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. General Bradley, will you ask someone to supply for the record the information on the estimated enemy casualties to date, the same date you gave our casualties, as well as the estimated allied casualties?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON. And on allied casualties I would like battle casualties and nonbattle casualties.

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. General, since the Chinese launched their first offensive April 22 and then this second one, I believe, a few days ago, May the 16th, is it true that the South Koreans suffered heavy losses as a result of both of these offenses?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

TRAINING OFFICER CORPS

Senator LODGE. Just along that line, General, isn't it true that one of the slowest things to get set up in the military is a dependable officer corps? That takes more time than anything, does it not?

General **Bradley**. Yes. You have to start officer schools and noncommissioned officer schools, and it takes time.

Now those have been established in South Korea, so that eventually we will come out with some creditable leaders, I believe.

Senator **Lodge**. Looking back on it, hindsight, certainly it would have been an excellent thing if we had started in 1946 developing officer material in not only Korea but in a great many other places where there is available military manpower which could be used effectively if the leadership had been developed, isn't that true as you look back now?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir, that is a very important phase of a preparedness program, is the training of your officers, junior officers particularly and your noncommissioned officers.

Senator **Lodge**. Yes, and the Soviets, it seems to me, have never overlooked an opportunity to train satellite armies not only in the Orient but in Eastern Europe and every other place. The result is that they fight us without using their own troops, and we have to use our troops because we have not trained these natives, isn't that right?

General **Bradley**. We haven't trained them and we haven't equipped them sufficiently.

Senator **Lodge**. Doesn't that argue then as a future policy we certainly ought to go ahead and train young officers in all of these anti-Communist areas wherever they may be?

General **Bradley**. Yes, sir, we should, and whatever security forces they have I think we should insure that their system of training officers and noncommissioned officers, as you say, will meet the situation later on.

Senator **Lodge**. Because we have a manpower shortage in this country and we can't possibly carry the full load of combat for the free world by ourselves, can we?

General **Bradley**. No, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hickenlooper, did you conclude yesterday?

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Well, I had just a couple of questions, very short ones, that I had overlooked.

Chairman **Russell**. All right.

REASONS FOR WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator **Hickenlooper**. General Bradley, I have examined repeatedly with great care the report of the Wake Island Conference as it is reported, which is, I assume, not a complete report of that conference.

I would like to ask you what was the purpose of the Wake Island Conference? In other words, as I read the report, there is not a thing in the conversations that went on there at Wake Island as reported that would not have been elicited by a ticker or through a report. I find that rehabilitation is a major discussion, on what they would do about people.

I find discussion was about their utilities and railroads, how to rehabilitate those, and there was a little mention about certain prisoners, but that was not discussed in detail.

There is a very short discussion about freezing of land tenure and bank currency, just rather casual, and all of which it would seem to me could be perfectly canvassed in a ticker report or an official routine report.

There is a mention of the Jap treaty, but it is not detailed, and slight mention of the Philippines, which is in the broadest of generalities.

Then, there is the statement where the President says that he and General MacArthur discussed—let me get the exact language—the statement anyway to the effect—made by the President—that he and General MacArthur had discussed at length, in what I understand to be their 45-minute conversation privately, the Philippines; also that they were in agreement on Formosa.

Now, in reading this Wake Island report, I find no discussion of any on-the-spot details, such as visiting Japan or visiting Korea, or visiting the Philippines for personal impressions. I see nothing in the Wake Island conference that could not have been readily and speedily canvassed by simple routine reports.

Therefore, my question is, What was the purpose of the Wake Island Conference? Why did the President travel 18,000 miles in order to have that conference?

General BRADLEY. Well, as I understand it, the President thought that a personal meeting with General MacArthur might be helpful in arriving at an understanding between the two of them, and so he was willing to take that trip because he felt that he should not pull General MacArthur out of the battle area for any great length of time during this critical time in the campaign. That is why he went all the way to Wake Island instead of asking General MacArthur to meet him half-way, for example; and as I understand the President's visit it was for the purpose of getting a better understanding between the two of them.

There is nothing in this report concerning that hour's conference between the two of them. Also you will notice in the report from which you have read that there have been certain things omitted for security reasons.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have read the deletions.

General BRADLEY. I don't remember what they are.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as the deletions are concerned, they would add nothing to the serious import of this conference. There are certain statements there that, perhaps, for general purposes could well be deleted, but there are only a few lines.

I have been at a loss to understand the purposes of the Wake Island conference, other than a personal handicap and personal conversation; and certainly the report does not give me any aid or information, further than that.

I could understand the desirability of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of Defense, or even the President, going on the ground in an area of that kind to get personal feelings of the situation so that he could form independent judgments; I just wanted to make this observation and ask why the Wake Island conference was held, because the report gives me no aid in answering that question.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

MAC ARTHUR VIEW ON ARMING SOUTH KOREANS

Senator Morse. General Bradley, I share your view in regard to the import of General MacArthur's telegram to the Freeman magazine, and I want to ask you a few questions about it, in view of the examination that Senator Smith has conducted this morning.

Am I correct in my understanding that at one time General MacArthur advised against arming the South Koreans, an additional number of South Koreans?

General Bradley. That is correct.

Senator Morse. It is true, is it not, that at the time he made that recommendation our troops were in a precarious position in Korea? In fact, we were afraid that we might have to move to the Pusan beachhead and possibly evacuate.

General Bradley. That is correct. His reply was dated January 6, 1951.

Senator Morse. So in spite of the precarious position of our troops, with the possibility of evacuation, the general apparently thought so little of the ability of the South Koreans to help protect our precarious position that he recommended against arming them and recommended instead that possibly the equipment should be used for a constabulary in Japan.

General Bradley. Yes, sir; it might be helpful to answer these questions if I read the paraphrase of his message. It is only a half page.

Senator Morse. I will be glad to hear it.

General Bradley (reading:)

"On January 6, 1951, CINCFE commented regarding the effectiveness of ROK units in combat. [Deleted.] He also pointed out that the type and quantity of weapons suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being available could be used to equip the National Police Reserve of Japan and that it was possible that the over-all interests of the United States would be better served by making those weapons available to increase the security of Japan, rather than to arm additional ROK forces. He recommended that the short-range requirement could best be met in the Korean Army by utilizing available manpower to replace the losses in existing ROK units rather than to create new organizations. The long-range requirement for or desirability of arming additional ROK personnel appeared to him to be dependent upon determination of the future United States military position with respect both to the Korean campaign and the generally critical situation in the Far East."

POSSIBLE HELP OF SOUTH KOREANS

Senator Morse. General, if we had available to us effective troops from the South Koreans at the time that General MacArthur recommended that they not be armed and equipped, do you know of any military posture in which we could have found ourselves in which the use of effective troops to help protect our men, who at that time were in retreat, would have been more useful to us?

General Bradley. I am not too sure I get the question.

Senator Morse. I will repeat the question.

If it had been possible to get out of the South Korean forces effective troops to help protect us, at this very time when it looked as though we might have to retreat to the Pusan beachhead or even evacuate, could we possibly have made more effective use of troops than under such circumstances as that?

General BRADLEY. If I understand your question correctly, I would answer it this way: If these South Korean units—both those that were in existence and any additional ones we could have raised—would have been effective, this would have been the quickest way and most effective way to use the equipment available at that time and would have made a tremendous difference on our front and our ability to hold in Korea.

Senator MORSE. To put it another way—at a time when we needed effective help sorely, it was General MacArthur's military judgment that we couldn't get that kind of help by arming the South Korean men. Is that not true, as shown by the record?

General BRADLEY. That is correct; yes, sir. I think we might have to go back a little bit on this. This forming of additional units and the arming of the Korean youth organization was brought up by the South Korean Government just before this.

Their contention was that whether we formed units or not, we should arm every individual South Korean and let him fight to the death.

Our view was that unless these men are organized into units, they are ineffective and it is a waste of equipment. General MacArthur had the same view, and felt that there was no use to try to arm additional South Koreans or form additional South Korean units.

[Deleted.]

EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS

Senator MORSE. In your opinion, General, does the fact that at the time General MacArthur made his recommendation not to arm these troops that we were threatened with a full-scale defeat and possible evacuation make any difference in respect to the wisdom of his recommendation?

Wouldn't the same recommendation necessarily have had to follow if we had not been in retreat and were moving in the other direction?

The real question was: Were they or were they not effective as troops? His recommendation meant, did it not, that they were not effective as troops?

General BRADLEY. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

Now, whether or not General MacArthur was affected, in his recommendation, at that time, by the fact that they were in a retrograde movement and might have to evacuate, I don't know.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. General Bradley, from the time that General MacArthur advised against equipping the South Korean troops, in his message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 6, I think it was, to the date that he sent his telegram to Freeman magazine, did he ever send any communications to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect that he had changed his opinion about the inadvisability of equipping the South Koreans?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator Morse. And the channels of communication were open to him all the time, were they not, if he had changed his opinion?

General Bradley. Yes, sir.

NO CHANGE IN MAC ARTHUR VIEWS ON SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS

Senator Morse. If, at any time from January 6 to the time that he sent his message to the Freeman magazine, he was of the opinion that he could make use of the South Korean troops, was it not his duty, as commander in chief, to keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised as to the military potential that might be available to him in Korea?

General Bradley. Well, I suppose so.

I suppose that any time he saw additional strength that could be properly used, he would have recommended it.

[Deleted.]

Senator Morse. Then, the record shows that on January 6, he recommended against equipping them.

The fact is that the channels of communication were constantly open between himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if he came to a contrary opinion than that set out in his original recommendations; but in spite of those facts, he nevertheless sent a wire to Freeman magazine that left the impression with you, as it does with me, that the responsibility for not arming the South Koreans rested on other shoulders than his own, but he failed to disclose, in that wire, the full story, which was that he had never advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in his opinion, they would be a military asset to him if they had been armed, is that not true?

General Bradley. I think that is a fair statement, and that covers the reason that I gave to you yesterday.

I thought a little more complete statement by General MacArthur, in answer to that telegram, would have fixed it so there was no reflection cast upon the Government in Washington for not having armed them.

MAC ARTHUR VIEWS ON EVACUATING KOREA IN JANUARY 1951

Senator Morse. I think that is another example, as I may say, General, and as we hear more and more about the history and record of this case, that one of the chief difficulties with General MacArthur's case is what he did not disclose in his testimony to this committee; including, for example, 12 points out of 16 points in the January 12 message about which I will examine you shortly.

General, is there anything in General MacArthur's message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 10 that makes you think MacArthur thought at that time we could stay in Korea?

General Bradley. Would you read the first part of the question?

Senator Morse. Is there anything in General MacArthur's message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of January 10 which makes you think that MacArthur at that time thought we could stay in Korea?

General Bradley. Well, I would put it the other way, Senator Morse, that there was considerable in the telegram which leads you to think that he had doubts as to whether or not we could stay in Korea.

Senator Morse. Is there anything in that telegram that supports the conclusion that he thought we could stay in Korea if he were permitted to proceed with the bombing of bases outside of Korea?

General Bradley. Well, he merely stated that working under his present restrictions he felt that he would have to get out. He did not say whether or not he thought he could stay if he were permitted to do it.

IMPROVEMENT IN KOREAN SITUATION AND THE JCS JANUARY 12 STUDY

Senator Morse. Is it true that the message of General MacArthur of January 10 caused so much concern on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it had an influence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the tentative recommendations, 16 in number, that they made in their study of January 12?

General Bradley. Yes. The study of January 12 was started and finished under the thought that we might have to get out of Korea; and the message of January 10, of course, was available to us when the study of January 12 was finally completed.

Senator Morse. Is it true that when General Collins and General Vandenberg completed their personal reconnaissance of the situation in Korea, the tentative recommendations contained in the message of January 12, in their opinion, needed to be modified?

General Bradley. We never did modify the study. We just did not ever put them into the form of a specific recommendation or as a directive to General MacArthur.

Senator Morse. Is it true that you did not put them into the form of a specific directive to General MacArthur because the personal reconnaissance of General Collins and General Vandenberg satisfied them, and in their report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, satisfied the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the conditions either had changed or were different from the conditions that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed to be the case at the time the tentative study was prepared?

General Bradley. The reports of the two Chiefs when they returned, plus the daily situation reports, all indicated that the situation was much improved, both as to their position in the peninsula and as to their fighting qualities.

COLLINS DISCUSSION OF JCS STUDY WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator Morse. Is it your understanding that General Collins advised General MacArthur in his personal consultation with him, when he was over in Korea—after he went over to Korea, following General MacArthur's message of January 10, that the study of January 12 was tentative and was based upon conditions not changing?

General Bradley. My understanding is that he explained the purpose of the study to General MacArthur, but I think General Collins can elaborate on that and answer your question much better than I can.

Senator Morse. But it is your undertsanding, General Bradley, that General Collins specifically discussed the tentative study of January 12 with General MacArthur after he and General Vandenberg had made their reconnaissance over the front?

General Bradley. He stated when he came back that he had discussed this study with General MacArthur. Whether or not he did it before he went over Korea or after he returned from Korea to Tokyo, I do not know.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion that there is nothing in the history of the preparation of the tentative study of January 12 and its communication to General MacArthur, and discussions that were held with General MacArthur in regard to it, that justifies the conclusions that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with General MacArthur that his recommendations should be put into effect?

General BRADLEY. Well, that is a rather difficult question because it depends so much on how General MacArthur looked at this message and how much was told him by General Collins as to the nature of the study and what caused the study.

If the field commander had received only the telegraphic, that is the cabled form of the message but no background for it, he might be led to believe that this had been a specific recommendation, so I think the question as to how much General MacArthur would have thought that we were agreeing with him depends a great deal on just how much this was explained to him by General Collins that this was a study, and that I understand was the case.

He told him it was a study and showed him a copy of it before he said it was tentatively agreed as to these objectives and lines of action.

Senator MORSE. Is it your personal conviction that General MacArthur was advised both by the messages that were sent to him and by the conversations that were held with him in the January 12 document consisting of 16 points and not 4 was entirely tentative in nature and was dependent as to its final execution upon conditions as they developed in Korea?

General BRADLEY. Well, I would gather that that was explained to him by General Collins from what he told us when he came back.

As I say, General Collins is the best witness as to that.

BRADLEY RELATIONS WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. General Bradley, you have testified that you had the most cordial relations with General MacArthur. In fact I am very much impressed with the fact that on two occasions when by slip of tongue some questioner has referred to you as General MacArthur, you have responded that you considered that a compliment.

In view of those cordial relations with General MacArthur, was it therefore not a very difficult thing for you personally in carrying out what you considered to be your duty as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to in effect find against General MacArthur in this controversy and join in the recommendation of the President that he be removed?

General BRADLEY. Naturally I hated very much to see this action having to be taken, and our recommendations or our statements to the President that from a military point of view we thought he should be relieved came only after very deep thought and much discussion, and I think all of us lamented the fact we had to make this statement.

Senator MORSE. When I stopped my examination of you because of lapse of time the other day, I was examining you in regard to the resolutions of the United Nations under which our operations in Korea had been conducted.

CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION AND UNITED STATES NAVAL AND AIR ACTION

I think that in view of some subsequent examination of you by other Senators, it is still important to get this picture clear in the record on a chronological basis, so I now ask you in regard to this set of questions.

At the first Blair House meeting following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the decision was to protect American life and property by the use of naval and air forces to meet that immediate emergency, is that true?

General BRADLEY. The first action was to use air and naval forces to help evacuate our nationals; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Would you say that that decision was made by the President of the United States in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in carrying out a long-established tradition of this country to use military forces to protect American lives and interests abroad when they were subjected to attack?

General BRADLEY. I think that was a reasonable assumption because we have plans throughout the world to evacuate our nationals in case of trouble, and this was one of the areas.

Senator MORSE. Now at the time of this first Blair House meeting, what if any action had been taken by the United Nations, either the Security Council or General Assembly?

General BRADLEY. I believe the Security Council had passed a resolution in the afternoon of June 25 stating that the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constituted a breach of the peace, and the Security Council called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and at this time a representative of the U. S. S. R. was not in attendance at this meeting, but it was passed unanimously by the members of the Security Council who were present.

Senator MORSE. That first action of the Security Council has been generally referred to in the public discussion of this matter as the so-called cease-fire order?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. When the decision was made at the Blair House to use naval and air force to protect our nationals and interests in South Korea, was General MacArthur then given specific instructions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out whatever military commandership was necessary in order to carry out the President's decision?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Am I correct in my understanding that you testified that at that chronological step he was functioning as a United States commander, not as a United Nations commander?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

MAC ARTHUR RECONNAISSANCE AND SUBSEQUENT RECOMMENDATIONS ON KOREA

Senator MORSE. And as the United States commander is it true that the next thing that was done was for General MacArthur to make a personal reconnaissance of the front?

General **Bradley**. He made a reconnaissance soon after this. I don't have the date right now, but sometime between that and the 30th I know he did make a personal reconnaissance of the front.

Senator **Morse**. Is it correct to say that as a result of that reconnaissance conducted by General MacArthur personally, that he made the recommendation or asked for the authorization which I understand in military parlance is the same thing, that he be allowed to use some body of troops to help him carry out the instructions that had previously been given?

General **Bradley**. That is correct.

Senator **Morse**. Is it not true that it was that request of General MacArthur for authorization to use troops that constituted the first act or step that was taken by our Government in the use of ground troops in Korea?

General **Bradley**. Other than to protect the port to cover the withdrawal of nationals, yes.

Senator **Morse**. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff not being on the scene and not having the benefit of a reconnaissance at the front, did not make the recommendation to General MacArthur that he use troops, did they?

General **Bradley**. They approved it.

Senator **Morse**. But before they received MacArthur's request they did not initiate the suggestion that troops be used, did they?

General **Bradley**. Not that I remember of; no, sir.

Senator **Morse**. Did the President of the United States?

General **Bradley**. Not that I remember of.

MEANING OF "STABILIZATION" IN JANUARY 12 JCS STUDY

Senator **Morse**. Now, General, in the document of January 12 the words "or stabilize" are used, and there has been discussion from time to time in these hearings as to what the words "or stabilize" in that document mean as far as military terminology is concerned.

Am I correct in my understanding—and if not, I want to be corrected—that in the messages that were transmitted to General MacArthur, including the message of January 12, the word "stabilized" is used to connote and describe a defensive position and not an offensive position?

General **Bradley**. Is that the end of your question?

Senator **Morse**. That is the end of my question. In essence my question is what do you mean in military parlance by the use of the word "stabilized" and what did you mean by the use of the term in your message of January 12?

General **Bradley**. What we had in mind was a condition under which we would be forced to form one or more beachheads and hold either indefinitely or hold until we could evacuate, and "stabilize" in military parlance normally means where the two forces have reached a position from which neither advances.

Senator **Morse**. Then I am correct, if I understand your answer, that in the January 12 message the advice that you gave General MacArthur was that the proposals set forth in the study should be followed in carrying out either the evacuation, the retreat, or the holding of a defensive position in contrast to an offensive position?

General BRADLEY. Well, that was part of it, Senator Morse. I think I have stated here before that whole series of studies was drawn up under conditions which were to meet a war, an all-out war either declared or not declared, with China, and I say that original directive was dropped out of the January 12 paper although it was a whole series of papers considered when we took later action on it or used it for further action, so I don't think you can say that the whole picture was one of stabilization or evacuation.

It was that plus the fact that we might find ourselves at all-out was with China if we were unable to confine it to Korea, so all of those things were in consideration when we tentatively agreed to these objectives and lines of action.

PERSONAL DISCUSSION WITH MAC ARTHUR ON DISAGREEMENTS

Senator MORSE. Now in some questioning that you were put to this morning, you were asked if you at any time personally discussed with MacArthur what appeared to be the growing difficulties that were developing between himself and the President, and your answer was that you had not.

Is it a common practice in the military for you, a superior military officer, to engage in conversation with another officer in regard to his personal difficulties that be may be having with the President of the United States?

General BRADLEY. Oh, in some cases you might. It doesn't necessarily follow that you would, but in some cases you might talk to him.

Senator MORSE. Was it your feeling as you reflect upon it that you did not feel called upon to discuss any difficulties that MacArthur might be having with the President of the United States because you considered that a personal matter between himself and the President?

General BRADLEY. Well, the President and General MacArthur had met at Wake Island in the middle of October and his attention had been called to the necessity of clearing statements, and the message sent out on December 6, and those two actions had been taken.

I never felt it incumbent upon myself to talk to General MacArthur about it. Maybe I should have, but it didn't occur to me to do it.

I felt those two were sufficient.

INTERPRETATION OF "STABILIZATION"

Senator MORSE. I want to go back to the question of stabilization for a moment and direct your attention to the language on the bottom of page 29 of the secret exhibit we have before us on the exchanges of messages between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur. The language reads:

> The Department of Defense made a major effort to build up United States forces in Korea first for the purpose of halting the North Korean aggression, next for the purpose of stabilizing the front, and ultimately with the objective of passing to the offensive.

You used in that language the messsage, "Next important is stabilizing the military front." You were using the word "stabilizing" in that in connection with holding a defensive position, were you not?

General BRADLEY. That is right, where they could not advance.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that there was anything in any of the messages that you sent to General MacArthur at any time that would justify his making an interpretation that you were using the word "stabilized" in the January 12 message in any other light than that of holding a defensive position?

General Bradley. I don't believe there were any communications on the subject.

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse, your time has expired.

Senator Morse. That is all, although I have other questions. I will not try to ask them.

Chairman Russell. I thought we had almost concluded this examination yesterday afternoon, though I must say, Senator Morse, you stated you probably would use your full 30 minutes.

Senator McMahon?

Senator McMahon. I pass, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge, I believe, has already passed. Senator Fulbright? Senator Tobey? Senator Sparkman.

Senator Sparkman. Pass.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, I suppose you are going down the line. While I did ask a few questions yesterday afternoon, I do have a very few additional, so I do not want the meeting to be closed without being able to clear up a few points.

Chairman Russell. You will be given a full opportunity.

Senator Gillette? Senator Brewster? Senator Knowland?

REPORT OF THE TAX MISSION

Senator Knowland. General Bradley, calling your attention to the information the committee has as to the documents which have been requested and those which have been furnished, I want to commend the Defense Establishment for very promptly furnishing a large part of the documents which we have requested, and I feel that the reasons that they have given for not furnishing some of them have been valid and I have not to the moment at least raised an issue on it because we have a process worked out here so that certain of them can be seen by the subcommittee, but calling your attention to item 12 which is the Fox report which describes the number of effective Chinese Nationalists troops on Formosa which was requested by Senator McMahon on May 4 and by Senator Russell transmitting the message on May 5, and I not having known that Senator McMahon had requested it, also wrote a letter I think on the 12th requesting the same report, the action taken reads as follows:

> April 12: Secretary of Defense advised Senator Russell report falls within category of operational and war plans. Consequently unable to furnish.

I take it that means they are unable to furnish it even to the subcommittee which has been set up.

I want to call your attention to an article which appears in the Washington Post this morning by Mr. Marquis Childs, who is a well-known columnist, in which he indicates that this top-secret document, known as the Fox report, was submitted in September which, of course, you would know, because I think that much has been in the news, and then he gives some of the background and history of the setting up of this Fox mission by General MacArthur; and then I read the following paragraph:

> The Fox mission had been told to find out (1) whether the Nationalists could defend the island without the presence of the United States Seventh Fleet which

> had been ordered by President Truman on June 25 to set up a neutrality patrol between Formosa and the mainland; and (2) whether the Nationalist troops could defend the island if the Communists should get through the barricade of the Seventh Fleet and make a landing.
>
> The answer to No. 1 was most emphatically in the negative. The answer to No. 2 was also in the negative. In other words, Chiang's armies could not carry out a defensive action in the limited area they occupied.

Now, until I had read that article by Mr. Childs this morning I had not intended to go into some additional questions, but I think under the circumstances, it is essential that we do it, No. 1, because the committee had heretofore been denied the Fox report.

Now, I would like to ask you this question, General: My understanding of the Fox report was that General MacArthur sent the mission down to Formosa, following his visit to the island in August, I believe; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. Sometime in August; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. The Fox commission, or the Fox mission made its report sometime in September, is that not correct?

General BRADLEY. I think that is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. To General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I think that is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. General MacArthur then, by whatever endorsement he might have placed upon it, forwarded the report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington; am I correct?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF FOX MISSION

Senator KNOWLAND. Am I correct in believing that the Fox mission, and its report, made certain recommendations relative to the arms and equipment that would be needed by the forces of the Republic of China now on Formosa?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would it have been likely, General, in your opinion, for a man of the caliber of General Fox, or a man of the caliber of General MacArthur, with his endorsement to have recommended the equipping of forces on Formosa, if they believed, as Mr. Childs indicates, that it would be a hopeless thing to do?

General BRADLEY. Without referring to the newspaper article, which I know nothing about, I don't think that General Fox would recommend the expenditure of equipment on forces, unless they had some potential.

Senator KNOWLAND. I will want to pursue with you, General, later, as to whether it is necessary that that Fox report be denied to the committee, but we won't take up the time in doing it now.

MILITARY MISSIONS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Now, along those same lines, I had not had a chance, until this morning, to fully read the questions of Senator Connally, of yesterday, appearing on page 2642, and I read:

> Chairman CONNALLY. Well, as a matter of fact, it has been urged here that we should equip Chiang's forces, we should supply them, and then when they have been trained and supplied we ought to turn them over to Chiang and let him do what he pleases with them. That would be a strange proceeding, would

it not, for us to furnish the arms and the ammunition and the supplies and turn them all over to Chiang and let him go anywhere he wanted to with those troops?

And, you replied:

> General BRADLEY. Well, I think there are two safeguards we would want to put on it, and that is that he does not get us involved by his operations; and the second thing is that he not dissipate the equipment we give him and the capability we give him to the point where he again exposes Formosa to being taken by the Communists.

General, is it not a fact that both General Wedemeyer and General MacArthur, from time to time, had indicated that any equipment that might be turned over to the Republic of China, that we should send a mission, as we did to Greece, when we sent General Van Fleet, to supervise the distribution and training of the Chinese forces?

General BRADLEY. I don't know what they have recommended down through the years.

I have heard General Wedemeyer make a statement once, in a private conversation to me, that in order to insure the delivery of the equipment to the units that needed it, you would have to have a very large number of Americans to supervise it.

Senator KNOWLAND. As a matter of fact, General, hasn't the Republic of China indicated on several occasions that they would be glad to have a mission to supervise such equipment?

General BRADLEY. I think so. I don't know whether they have ever put any limit as to the size of it or not.

PREVIOUS AID GIVEN TO NATIONALIST CHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. Again calling your attention to page 2643, Chairman Connally says:

> Well, your caution about dissipating the supplies and equipment no doubt was suggested by the fact that when he was on the mainland in North China with our equipment, over $2 billion worth of it we gave him, those arms and equipment were dissipated either by voluntarily surrendering them or by capture by the Communists; is that not true?
>
> General BRADLEY. Yes.

And then you go on to say:

> Undoubtedly he did not make very effective use of the equipment we gave him.

Now, General, because I think we want to at least be accurate here, I want to call your attention to the document put out by the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Office of Business Economics, entitled "Foreign Transactions of the United States Government, Basic Data Through December 31, 1950", calling your attention to page A–16, in which it shows that to China for the entire postwar period the total amount of aid, equally both net foreign aid and grants, amounted to $1,683,000,000 for the entire postwar period.

Now, just for comparative purposes——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, did the Senator say 1,000,000——

Senator KNOWLAND. One billion.

Now, for comparative purposes—and then I want to pursue this—it shows that during the same period we gave to our former enemy country, Japan, $1,720,000,000; to Germany, a former enemy country,

$3,089,000,000; to Italy, a former enemy country, $2,046,000,000; and to some of our friends and former allies a good deal more.

Now, are you familiar, General, with the report made by the President of the United States relative to American policy toward China, made on December 18, 1946?

General Bradley. No, sir.

Senator Knowland. Were you familiar with the fact that in that report to the American Congress and to the American people the President said on page 691 of the China white paper the following:

> Assistance took the form of goods and equipment and services. Almost half the total made available to China consisted of services such as those involved in air and water transportation of troops. According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assistance to China up to VJ-day totaled approximately $870,000,000. From VJ-day to the end of February, shortly after General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately $600,000,000, mostly in transportation costs.

Had you been familiar with that statement by the President?

General Bradley. No, sir.

Senator Knowland. Might I call your attention to the following language in the President's statement, and reading from page 692:

> Thereafter the program was reduced to the fulfillment of the outstanding commitments, much of which was later suspended.

Had you been familiar with that?

General Bradley. No, sir; I have told you I was not familiar with that whole report.

Senator Knowland. I just wanted to read some more because I think it is material to the question asked you by Senator Connally. I am reading from page 692 again:

> China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific islands and bases, with certain exceptions. Six months of negotiations preceded the agreements finally signed in August. It was imperative that this matter be concluded in the Pacific as had already been done in Europe, especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the matériel in open storage under tropical conditions and the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people, which it was hoped this transaction would permit.

General, I call your particular attention to the following language:

> Aircraft. All nondemilitarized combat matériel and fixed installations outside of China were excluded; thus no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

So by the statement of the President of the United States himself, these so-called surplus sales, which were included in the over-all figure here, did not include any material which could be used in combat in the Chinese Civil War.

VISITS OF JCS TO FORMOSA

Now, General, I would like to ask, since the matter has been raised, have you ever visited Formosa and personally looked over the troops there yourself to get an estimate of the situation?

General Bradley. I so stated yesterday before this committee—that I had never been to Formosa, I knew of no reason why I should go, because it is not United States territory, and up until recently we had no United States troops there, and now we do have a mission.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you know whether any of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have ever visited Formosa to personally look over the condition and training and morale and equipment of the troops on Formosa?

General BRADLEY. To my knowledge they have not for the same reason.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to merely call your attention to the fact, General, that in the late 1949 I personally communicated with Secretary Johnson and suggested that in view of the fact that we had members of our Joint Chiefs going to Europe, it might be helpful if they could go out to the Far East and look at the troop installations in Formosa and elsewhere to get a balanced picture of the menace we were facing. And then on the 15th of May I addressed a letter to Mr. Secretary Johnson, the first paragraph of which reads as follows:

> As you may recall, I urged at the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in the Far East that they visit the island of Formosa to get first-hand information relative to conditions there. This, as you know, was not done.

To your personal knowledge, General, do you have any information as to whether the Secretary of Defense or anyone in the Defense Establishment sounded out the State Department as to whether it would be advisable to go to Formosa and what kind of a reply they got from the State Department?

General BRADLEY. As I remember it, the matter was discussed with the State Department, and they agreed with us that we should not go.

Senator KNOWLAND. The recommendation of Secretary Johnson was that they should not go?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember what his was. I know my own feeling was that I should not go.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was your feeling even as late as the 15th of May 1950 that you should not even send a mission to look over the status of the troops on the island?

General BRADLEY. No; because the military point of view had always been that we should send a party there to find out what they needed. That was the recommendation in December 1949. But our Government——

Senator KNOWLAND. And that was countermanded by the State Department?

General BRADLEY. Our Government had ruled against that and made a different decision. Therefore, with that decision on the books, on the 15th of May 1950 there was no reason why I should go as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should go.

Senator KNOWLAND. Then, General, you will agree, will you not, that on the 25th of June the picture materially changed when the President ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Strait?

General BRADLEY. Yes. And General MacArthur paid a visit there then as the one responsible, and did pay a visit to Formosa, and he sent a board there, headed by a general officer, who stay there for several weeks, 2 or 3 weeks, anyway, and made a very comprehensive report.

MAC ARTHUR VISIT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON FORMOSA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now the reason I feel this is an essential is because of some of the material that has gotten into the record here.

As I understand it, the Republic of China offered on the 29th of June to supply 33,000 troops. You have testified that the Defense Establishment recommended against the acceptance of the troops. You have indicated and General MacArthur indicated that his first recommendation was against the use of the troops; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yesterday we brought out in the testimony that on the 30th of June the Defense Department, at the suggestion of the State Department, had sent a cable to General MacArthur that if he should get a direct offer of troops from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, that he should turn it down; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. That is correct. I assume the date is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

General BRADLEY. But I know we did inform him that he should not accept it.

Senator KNOWLAND. And that was made at the suggestion of the State Department; I think that was your testimony.

General BRADLEY. In concurrence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, subsequently to that time, General MacArthur in August went down to Formosa on a personal reconnaissance with the full knowledge and approval of the Defense Department, did he not?

General BRADLEY. I think it was the 31st of July he made the trip, and his trip at that particular time was questioned as to whether or not he should not delay it because of certain negotiations that were going on—I don't remember what they were—but he thought he should go at that time, so the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred and said, "Go ahead."

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, after he went down and made his personal reconnaissance, he subsequently recommended that not only 33,000 troops that had already been offered, but he believed that some fifty or sixty thousand troops might be available from Formosa that would help in Korea, did he not

General BRADLEY. He made that recommendation in November.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right.

Now, subsequent to the outbreak of Korean hostilities, have any members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited Formosa to see for themselves the condition of the morale, the training and the equipment of what has been estimated as five hundred thousand non-Communist troops on the Island of Formosa?

General BRADLEY. They have not.

JANUARY 12 JCS STUDY

Senator KNOWLAND. General, calling your attention to the statement of January 12 which has been called a tentative study, and in which four specific recommendations out of sixteen were mentioned by General MacArthur in his remarks to the combined Houses of Congress, and in which he indicated that he believed that his views were substantially the same as those of the Joint Chiefs, that did, as Senator Morse pointed out, provide it might be put into operation in case of two contingencies: Either in the event of evacuation or of stabilization, did it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes; but they were not recommendations, if I may correct your statement.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right. What do you call them, General?

General BRADLEY. Tentative agreements.

Senator KNOWLAND. Tentative agreements. Did you sign those tentative agreements, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you send them to the Secretary of National Defense, Secretary Marshall?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did the Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Marshall, submit those to the National Security Council without comment subsequently?

General BRADLEY. I believe it was without comment. I know he did send them, forward them, on to the National Security Council Staff.

Senator KNOWLAND. He did not disapprove some of them so far as you know?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; they were to be used in connection with the NSC study which was up at that time.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right.

Was General MacArthur ever notified that either the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of National Defense or the National Security Council had taken a contrary view to these studies?

General BRADLEY. Not that I know of. As I have told you heretofore, General Collins discussed this paper with him and I assume told him what it was, but he is better qualified to testify to that than I am.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON JANUARY 12 STUDY

Now, is it a fact that on May 16, 4 months and 4 days later, that the National Security Council took action on these tentative studies?

General BRADLEY. I don't know.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you a member of the National Security Council?

General BRADLEY. Yes; but I don't—I did not attend any Council meeting that day that I know of.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are you normally invited in to attend the meetings of the National Security Council?

General BRADLEY. I am. If my memory serves me right I was before this committee, and have been here pretty much since then, and have not had a chance to look back and see what action was taken.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do you know whether or not on May 16 the National Security Council did take action?

General BRADLEY. I do not know.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you find out so that we might complete the cycle here as to whether action was taken at that time?

General BRADLEY. Yes; I can find out whether or not action was taken. I have no authority and am not at liberty to introduce National Security Council papers.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand that; but I am just at this time trying to run down this sequence of events which has played a very important part in all of the discussions here.

General **Bradley**. I am sure, however, that the National Security Council did not approve a blockade of China or some of these other things or I would have heard about it—in other words, these four points.

Senator **Knowland**. My only point, General, in raising it, is that had the Joint Chiefs themselves reversed their stand and notified the general that might have presented one set of facts.

Had Secretary of Defense Marshall, when he got what you call the tentative study said that in his opinion these particular four points did not meet his approval, and by endorsement or otherwise, disapprove, that would have presented another set of circumstances.

Had the National Security Council, to whom Secretary Marshall sent these recommendations without comment, acted to reject them, it would have presented another set of circumstances; but here we—if it is correct that they did not act until the 16th of May, that was almost—well, it was a little over a month after General MacArthur was recalled—and I think it becomes a very material point in the testimony before our combined committees.

INITIATION OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

I just have one other thing here. Senator Morse, this morning, in asking one of his questions, as I understood it, asked if you and the Joint Chiefs had joined in the recommendation that General MacArthur be removed.

So that I may be perfectly clear in my own mind and that the record may be clear, is it not a fact that the decision to remove the general was made by the President, and that the question which was asked the Joint Chiefs was whether, from a military point of view, there was any reason why the removal could not be consummated?

General **Bradley**. The decision was not made, so far as I know, at least the President did not announce it, until after he had received the statement—these three reasons that I have given here—as to why they thought he should be relieved.

Senator **Knowland**. But the testimony is quite clear, is it not, General, that of their own volition the Joint Chiefs up until the time you had been sent for by the President, had never of their own motion recommended that General MacArthur be removed for military or other reasons, had they?

General **Bradley**. They had not.

Senator **Knowland**. In the situation which faced us on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of June referred to by Senator Morse, when he brought up the point that General MacArthur, having been given a mission, indicated that they would have to send some ground troops in order to carry out that mission, is it your professional military opinion that the Republic of Korea could have been saved from being overwhelmed if ground forces had not been placed in Korea?

General **Bradley**. No; they would have been overrun, and I stated, in answer to that question, that we fully concurred in that recommendation.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Knowland, I am sorry, your time has expired.

Senator **Knowland**. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell**. I want to apologize here to Senator Kefauver. I unwittingly——

Senator **Kefauver**. That is all right, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Russell** (continuing). Bypassed him because of the fact, perhaps, that Senator Knowland called my attention to the fact that he did have some other questions he desired to propound.

I apologize to you, Senator, and I recognize you now.

Senator **Kefauver**. General Bradley, I think I only have about two questions I wish to ask.

BOMBING OF CERTAIN BASES IN MANCHURIA

Did General MacArthur ever state or make any recommendations as to which Manchurian bases he would like to bomb?

General **Bradley**. Not that I know of.

Senator **Kefauver**. In the discussion or in the information that passed back and forth between General MacArthur and you, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did that matter come up as to which bases would be proper—I mean would be most effective to bomb?

General **Bradley**. No. The trend of the messages from General MacArthur was to the effect that he was working under conditions which furnished the enemy a sanctuary, which he was not able to attack; and as far as I know he never did make specific recommendations as to what bases in that sanctuary—that is Manchuria—that he would like to attack.

Senator **Kefauver**. He never got down to the point then of picking out the particular concentration or bases that——

General **Bradley**. If he did, I don't remember, Senator.

Senator **Kefauver**. Well, in connection with the proposal to bomb the bases of Manchuria, did you have any discussion or was anything passed between General MacArthur and you with reference to the military alliance between China, Red China, and the Soviet Union, of February 1950, I believe was the date of it?

General **Bradley**. I don't remember whether we ever included that in a message or called his attention to it or not; I don't remember.

Senator **Kefauver**. The point of these questions is that at the same time that alliance was entered into, there was also an agreement with reference to the Chinese-Russian Railroad, which comes on down to Port Arthur, I believe, and branches of it come down to Korea; and that is under joint control by the Chinese and by the Russians as of the present time, both as to the personnel and as to the investment in the railroad.

Was it contemplated that the railroad would be bombed?

General **Bradley**. I don't believe it was ever mentioned in any of his messages, and the specific thing he mentioned, or forwarded rather from his Air Force commander, was as to the effect on the morale of our pilots of not being able to cross the Yalu whenever they were in a dog fight, and that has been covered in this testimony that we did recommend they be allowed hot pursuit up to 3 minutes or 5 minutes or something of that nature; but I don't believe that there ever has been any message come in in which it was suggested that we bomb this railroad or any other target, any specific target, in Manchuria.

Senator KEFAUVER. To effectively prevent concentrations, the railroads would be the prime objective, would they not, General Bradley?

General BRADLEY. Railroads, air bases, and any other supply installations which would be along the railroads, naturally.

POSSIBLE BENEFITS FROM BOMBING OF MANCHURIA

Senator KEFAUVER. General Bradley, have you testified as to what bombing has taken place on enemy concentrations in North Korea, at the present time, or is that——

General BRADLEY. We have been hitting, almost daily, various supply installations between the present front line and the Manchurian border.

[Deleted.] In addition to that, light bombers were used and fighter bombers used on armed reconnaissance, and those are attacking on every day that the weather permits.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, in view of the fact that the present supply line from Manchuria on down to the fighting line is perhaps more than a hundred miles, which would give an opportunity of bombing at least the line of supply from the Manchurian border down to the present front, would there be any great benefit at the present time in bombing bases in Manchuria?

General BRADLEY. Well, there would probably be some; but we feel that the additional advantage does not offset the danger of the risk you run of spreading the war, and starting a world war III.

Senator KEFAUVER. In considering that risk, I suppose you took into consideration the fact that this railroad was under joint control and branches of it come down into Korea?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. And that would be equivalent to bombing and destroying Russian property?

General BRADLEY. Well, you are bound to get some, if you bomb the main line down to Port Arthur, certainly.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Bradley.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe Senator Stennis is next.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I just have two——

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon me.

Senator Cain is sitting back there.

Senator CAIN. I am not impatient, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sorry, Senator. I have been going around the table, and you caught me off guard, back there.

Senator CAIN. Then, if you wish, sir, I shall proceed.

General Bradley, by way of compliment to you, sir, I respected what you said on Tuesday, in answer to a question by Senator Fulbright, who made clear that he had no knowledge of military matters.

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF BATTLE COMMANDER

He wanted to know if you would have fought the battles of last November differently than General MacArthur did, had you been in command, and your answer was that you could only say that as to deploying the troops, that you would have done it a little differently; but you went on to add that you were in no position to second-guess, or fight a battle thousands of miles away.

I dare say, sir, some of your own superiors said about the same thing concerning you, and the Battle of the Bulge, when you were in command.

That seems like a perfectly normal position for a superior to take, in Washington, D. C., when the battles are only on a map in front of him, but they are realities wherever they ebb and flow.

That is about so, isn't it, sir?

General BRADLEY. That is true. This is a principle that we followed in the last war, and we have tried to follow it during this Korean incident, in that we try to avoid fighting the war from Washington, and leave it to the commander in the field.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Now, General Bradley, it is obvious that many persons, myself among them, are distressed by the method employed to relieve General MacArthur of his commands; and some of us are just distressed that he was relieved.

COMPARISON TO PATTON CASE

I was thinking about that yesterday when my good friend, the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse, said this to you:

> If commander X follows a course of action, be that action by way of issuing public statements that are embarrassing to his Commander in Chief, or any other conduct that embarrasses his Commander in Chief, so as to make it more difficult for his Commander in Chief to carry out the duties, responsibilities, and obligations of Commander in Chief, under these circumstances then does not the Commander in Chief not only have the right to remove the commander who is embarrassing him, but really has the duty to remove him, in the interest of the more efficient carrying out of his duties as Commander in Chief?

And you replied as follows:

> Well, I think that if the Commander in Chief should decide that such actions were interfering with the functioning in his job as Commander in Chief, interfering with his carrying out the duties assigned to him as Commander in Chief, then it would probably be his duty to remove that restriction and that interference.

And I have a question against that, sir:

Was not Gen. George Patton a classic example of a field commander whose conduct was publicly and highly embarrassing, on several occasions, to his superiors; yet those superiors worked hard and found ways to keep General Patton in command because they recognized him to be a great leader of men, whose abilities were sorely needed and required by his Nation, then at war?

General BRADLEY. General Patton was punished in a way for his actions in Sicily, because he was left out of the battle for a considerable length of time.

He was later told that if he opened his mouth once more, in such a way that he embarrassed the supreme command, and the Government, that he would be relieved, and that is what happened.

The next time he did speak up in conflict with our governmental policies, he was relieved by General Eisenhower.

It is true that General Eisenhower, and our Government, showed great patience in handling General Patton. He was not condemned or relieved on the first instance. It was an accumulation that finally caused him to be relieved in Germany.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir; but the point involved, from my point of view, is—there were conferences, consultations, there were steps taken to get General Patton to conform to the attitude of those in higher authority, in order that he could go on as a field commander of great prominence in destroying the enemy.

General BRADLEY. The President never took action, and never had to. I mean, they never came in contact.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate that.

General BRADLEY. The action was taken by General Eisenhower in the field.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate that, sir.

MEMORANDUM ON MILITARY REASONS FOR RELIEF OF MAC ARTHUR

General Bradley, on Monday of this week, May 21, you discussed for the record the JCS memorandum which set forth three reasons which, in the opinion of the JCS, constituted the military considerations of justification for the removal of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, from his Far East command, is that not correct, sir?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember the date.

Senator CAIN. That isn't important, sir.

General BRADLEY. Some time in this testimony I have read the statement which gives the military reasons, the three military reasons, why the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought he should be relieved.

Senator CAIN. By whom was this memorandum dictated, may I ask?

General BRADLEY. As I stated earlier this morning, I believe the reasons were given orally by the Chiefs of Staff to General Marshall.

Senator CAIN. You did, sir.

General BRADLEY. And later on I dictated them and submitted them to the three Chiefs to make sure that I had dictated them the way they had stated them.

Senator CAIN. May I ask what date does that memorandum carry?

General BRADLEY. The first one I dictated, I think, the next day or the day following that; and then I submitted that to them, and the final one that we agreed upon my grammar on, I will say, was finally O. K.'d by them on the 16th of May; and each one of them took a copy of them and agreed that these were the three reasons as they stated.

In the meantime, I had submitted this to them prior to that time, but we just hadn't had time to get together and correct the grammar on the original.

Senator CAIN. I do not know what the custom is, but I should like to ask this question: Was the memorandum read and initialed individually by each of the three service chiefs?

General BRADLEY. It wasn't initialed. They agreed upon it, with the penciled changes I had made on the first draft; I had it typed, and gave each one of them a copy of it, and since then they have not given me any indication that it was typed wrong from the draft we made up together.

Senator CAIN. Does the memorandum bear either your initials or your signatures?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator CAIN. The final date or the date on which that memorandum was actually finished in its final form was May 16?

General **Bradley**. Yes; and if there is any question about these being the reasons, I hope you will ask each of the three Chiefs when they come up here if they have any disagreement with the statements as they were given to this committee.

Senator **Cain**. My only intention is to try to understand exactly the circumstances involved in this case, sir.

General **Bradley**. As I say, they were dictated in the next day or so, and submitted to them, and then prior to any of our coming up here we found time to get together and say now—they had had them in the meantime and each one had marked them up, and we got togther with the three drafts. I was trying to put it in exact words, as they stated it, and the first draft had been rather rough grammar, and that was corrected.

Senator **Cain**. Because of the press of business, I would conclude it took approximately 10 days to put down on paper in final form the reasons which supported the removal of General MacArthur for military reasons, which removal actually took place at least a week ahead of that time.

General **Bradley**. No, sir; I wouldn't say it took 10 days. It happened to be 10 days before we got together and put the four drafts together.

Senator **Cain**. Thank you, sir. General Bradley, I understood you to state some several days ago——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Would the Senator yield for a question?

Senator **Cain**. Only providing it doesn't take my time, which is awfully precious.

Chairman **Russell**. It will have to come out of your time.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I will wait.

General **Bradley**. If there is any question about the time of this thing, I want to make clear this thing was dictated either the Monday following this Sunday afternoon meeting or the Tuesday, I can't remember which. It was done right away. That was about April 10, 9th or 10th, that this was done.

The fact that this final thing happens to have a date on it doesn't mean anything except that was the date this thing was finally typed on the corrected grammar on it.

Senator **Cain**. The record certainly benefits from your views, because we seek to embarrass no one.

FIRST NOTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT'S THINKING ON MAC ARTHUR RELIEF

General Bradley, I understood you to say several days ago that you would check your telephone log to determine if possible who called you to notify you that the President was considering the removal of General MacArthur. Have you had an opportunity to do that?

General **Bradley**. I believe I stated later I had checked it and it does not show. The point was made here then that that probably came over the White House phone, but I should make it clear that a lot of people use the White House phone. It isn't just the White House that uses it.

For example, Admiral Sherman has a White House phone and most of the time I call Admiral Sherman over the White House phone, because it is more secure. I call Mr. Lovett and the Secretary of Defense calls me over that phone.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, General.

General Bradley, I think you told me yesterday why General MacArthur was relieved. At least, I have studied the record carefully and I want to be as certain as I can that my understanding is correct.

On page 2799 I made an observation and asked you a question. I want to put that back in the record so that I may ask you again a question about it. My observation was this:

> Last June the free nations resolved to crush and repel the enemy from Korea. The free nations selected General MacArthur to undertake that assignment. Until the Red Chinese entered the war the free nations and General MacArthur, so far as I am able to determine, were in complete agreement that the mission should be carried out. After the Red Chinese entered the war, General MacArthur continued to believe in the United Nations' mission and asked for authority to carry it out. On the other hand, the United Nations decided to change the mission from repelling the enemy to resisting the enemy. General MacArthur, therefore, had to be removed for he did not believe that the UN change in plan was in the best interests of the United States.
>
> Now, this happens to be my conclusion. Do you consider there is some validity in it, sir, in terms of complete frankness.

General Bradley replies as follows:

> Yes; but I wouldn't completely agree with it, if I may suggest, because I don't agree that General MacArthur was relieved because he disagreed on policy. He was relieved because he carried it to the people and not through the channels to the Commander in Chief.

General Bradley, are you pretty certain, sir, that General MacArthur was relieved for this last stated reason—that it was not that he disagreed with policies but that he carried his argument to the public?

General BRADLEY. That was only one of the reasons which I gave in my statement.

Senator CAIN. Well, but in answer to my question you said in no uncertain fashion he was relieved because he carried it to the people and not through the channels to the Commander in Chief.

General BRADLEY. That related to your question, because your question was confined to the point that he disagreed with policy. The fact that he disagreed with the policy of the Government was not the big thing; it was the thing that he carried that difference to the people instead of through channels.

I did not intend to imply by my answer that was the only one, but it was the answer to the part that was supplied in your question.

ROLE OF POLICY DISAGREEMENT IN JCS REASONS FOR MAC ARTHUR RELIEF

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir, but I just want to press it a bit further because of my great concern with this whole matter which is before us.

I am satisfied that one of the reasons which resulted in General MacArthur's dismissal was that he did discuss Korean policy matters publicly with the general public, but I think a second reason is that the JCS came to the conclusion that they ought to relieve General MacArthur because he disagreed with the JCS policy in the conduct of the war. And again I simply want to be certain that I understand conclusively why General MacArthur was relieved. I shall attempt—it will only take a minute or two—to indicate from the record my present contention that the JCS wished to remove General Mac-

Arthur not fundamentally because he made some public statements which upset the President and the United Nations, but because he disagreed with the JCS on the conduct of the war.

On page 2281 of the record of May 21 General Bradley and Senator Johnson had the following colloquy:

> Senator JOHNSON. General, it would appear to be obvious that a number of important factors would have to be considered before removing a general of the stature and proven ability of General MacArthur from his key post in the Far East. I would think one of those factors would be the consequences of not removing him. In other words, what would happen if, in the light of all the facts that appeared, you left him in the post?
>
> Was that factor taken into consideration before the decision was made to dismiss General MacArthur?

General Bradley replied:

> Yes; that was taken into consideration and his military views, because it is possible that by not trying to confine the conflict to Korea we might find our war enlarged beyond our capability to carry it out successfully.

Senator Johnson then said:

> Was it your estimate of the consequences—good or bad—that would have flowed from leaving General MacArthur in the Far East—what is your estimate—is it good or bad—of what would have happened if he had been left in, in the light of all the facts?

General Bradley's response:

> Well, I expect that it is more or less conjecture as to what would happen in certain instances. We were afraid that we might become too much involved if he did not try to confine the war to Korea.
>
> That was stated in the first reason that the Chiefs were worried about, but whether or not it would happen I don't think anyone knows. There was that danger that it would happen.

And Senator Johnson then said—and this to me is a very important thing, sir:

> At the time you recommended he be relieved it was your opinion that one who entertained the views he had expressed should not be left in command in view of the fact that those views were quite different from the Joint Chiefs' views?

General Bradley replied:

> That is right, and that is, as I stated, from a military point of view. We realized there are other considerations than military, and we confined our statement to the military reasons why we thought he should be relieved.

Senator Johnson then said:

> But from a military point of view it was your personal opinion as well as the opinion of each Chief of Staff that serves on the Joint Chiefs of Staff that General MacArthur should be relieved?

In response General Bradley said:

> That is correct.

General Bradley, the only reason I have labored that point is that I do not wish, if it not be so, that the American public think that Gen. Douglas MacArthur was relieved of his command primarily because of public statements that he made. That record indicates to me conclusively—and I do not quarrel with it, sir; that is a matter of judgment—that in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General MacArthur had outlived his far-eastern usefulness because he disagreed with the JCS and the administration on the conduct of the war.

Senator CAIN. Please, sir.

General BRADLEY. I think the best way to answer that is to again read the three reasons why the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that General MacArthur should be relieved.

Senator CAIN. I will do so, sir.

General BRADLEY. I have them here if you want me to read them.

Senator CAIN. No, sir; that is they are available to me in the record.

General BRADLEY. I think they very largely answer the comments you have just made, because the comments you have just made have to do with the responsibility and who accepts the responsibility if by leaving a commander in command, knowing that he is not in sympathy, he then gets you into a war, in other words, if by not being in sympathy with the directives and limiting the war to Korea he should take occasion to stretch some directive and cause a third world war, we are all in.

Then who is to blame? I would be up there before a different committee possibly but I would be up there being investigated as to why I had any part in letting it happen, so to that extent I am responsible that it doesn't happen. The President is responsible.

That is what I was trying to answer to Senator Johnson's questions.

Senator CAIN. Certainly there is nothing personal in my question, but I think you are throwing an added bit of light on why the general was removed, and you have just concluded placing some emphasis on the military reasons which have nothing to do with his public utterances as to why the general ought to be relieved.

STATUS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM HERE AND ABROAD

General Bradley, I have just several more questions which are rather important to me in a fighting sense. I am among others who do not want to think we are going to become involved in a larger war, but certainly understand the possibility of it. Anything that I now saw that you think is not properly for the record certainly I shall respect your views. May I ask how many combat ready divisions do we in the United States presently have in being?

[Deleted.]

On Saturday, May 12, I asked General Marshall two questions and he has provided the answers to those question today through our chairman, Mr. Russell. The questions were these:

> 1. Do you know to what extent our assistance in Western Europe in the last 10 or 11 months has added to the state of defense preparation of our allies in Western Europe?
>
> 2. General Marshall, have you reason to know that there are today more combat divisions among our allies in Western Europe than there were 10 months ago?

The substance of what General Marshall has said in reply is this, and against this information I wish to ask a question.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL EUROPEAN DIVISIONS FOR KOREA

Now sir, none of us have any idea how long the war is going to continue in Korea. All of us know that after 10 months of war, all of our Western European allies jointly have contributed less than a ground division to the conflict in Korea.

We have troops from Turkey, some from Thailand and some from Greece, but they are not in Western Europe. Is there any real reason why some of those divisions in Europe should not be committed in Korea even if we in the United States sent some divisions to take the place of those European divisions, which might be moved on into Korea? I wonder if there is a possibility of that being done, sir?

General BRADLEY. I think it would be very helpful if they did send additional troops; yes.

Senator CAIN. Is it not true despite the fact everybody hates war, that the best way to learn how to fight a war is in a war, and if that be a sound military doctrine, wouldn't it be very helpful as a possible hedge in the future to have some of those European divisions share in the blood-letting in a very considerable way down in Korea, sir?

General BRADLEY. Yes; combatwise divisions, the troops are always better than those who have not had it. I think I did state once here before that we should remember that France is putting forth quite an effort in Indochina, in fact has a very large part of her regular service committed there.

Senator CAIN. And you likewise indicated, sir, that the Secretary of State knows more about the negotiations which may possibly result in European contributions to Korea than does the JCS?

General BRADLEY. Carried on through him.

STRENGTHENING FREE WORLD DEFENSES BY ADDITION OF GREECE, TURKEY, AN SPAIN TO NATO

Senator CAIN. My last question, if I have time to ask it: In your opening statement, General Bradley, you said this:

> We now have a localized conflict in Korea. Some of the military measures under discussion might well place the United States in a position of responsibility for broadening the war and at the same time losing most if not all of our allies.

You and General Marshall have said that the allies are not prepared for a show-down with a global aggressor. You have indicated that such a show-down, however, might be forced upon the free world. I agree with that, sir.

You have said that because such a show-down might result from bombing Red Chinese bases that our allies as well as ourselves are presently and completely against such a course of action.

You and General Marshall have likewise stated that the rate of military progress in building an adequate defense for Western Europe is quite slow. Against these premises and because, sir, I understand the possibilities of a global conflict, I want to ask what steps are presently being taken and by whom to incorporate within the defense structure of Western Europe the military forces in being, and these include as I understand it probably more than a million men which are presently possessed by Turkey, by Greece, and by Spain.

My question: Would it not largely minimize the fear which is so prevalent among us and among freemen and our allies if these forces in being were a part today of our common defense for Western Europe?

General BRADLEY. From a military point of view we would like to see all three of those forces included.

Senator CAIN. General, do you know how much progress is being made in that direction today, because a good many of us in the Congress have been raising this very legitimate question for the better part of the last 3 or 4 years, and we get no answers to positive progress, sir. Do you know?

General BRADLEY. I only know what we can recommend from the military point of view. The negotiations for the entry of those countries is carried on, of course, by the State Department.

What the exact progress of that at the present time is I wouldn't know and the State Department I think would have to answer the question.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, I bespeak my gratefulness for your frankness. I have benefited from your views.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

EXTENT OF CHINA'S MILITARY COMMITMENT TO KOREA

Senator STENNIS. General Bradley, using hindsight on the question now, do you think that Russia, Red China, and North Korea jointly planned and jointly started the Korean War?

General BRADLEY. I don't know how much China had to do with it. I do think that Russia undoubtedly instigated it through her influence in North Korea. Whether China was consulted on it or not I wouldn't know, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Well, now, as I understood General MacArthur, he said that he thought China was now throwing all the support that she could to a foreign army, and was therefore supporting a Korean War to her full capacity. Do you agree with that conclusion or not?

General BRADLEY. Well, she still has some troops that are not committed to Korea. Now whether or not she is using all of her supply and logistical support for it, I don't know, but I do know that she has not committed all of her forces to it.

Senator STENNIS. You would not venture an opinion then as to the extent or the percentage basis and all. His position was that she was already fully committed, doing all she could as I understood him, to support a foreign army, an army on foreign soil.

General BRADLEY. Well, she has not yet committed her submarines nor her air force, and, as I say, I do know there are still additional troops in China.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I want to thank you again, sir, for all this testimony that I have heard from you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. Senator Fulbright, I understood you to have some questions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have just one or two.

CONCERN OVER COORDINATION BETWEEN TENTH CORPS AND EIGHTH ARMY IN KOREA

General, I did not quite develop the question I asked the other day, and that is about all I wanted to ask you. If you will recall, it was about troops. It occurs on pages 2529 and 2530 of the hearings. I note on top you read a statement that says:

> They—

that is the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

> also requested information concerning the coordination of operations between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army and regarding the positioning of the Tenth Corps, the units of which appeared to be exposed.

General, can you give more precisely the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 21st of November as to the coordination? I mean the way I interpret your answer—at the time I asked you this I did not have full opportunity to digest what you were saying in that statement—is that while you have the principle of not directing your theater commander, that in asking him for the information about coordination, you were showing concern about it. In a sense that was a warning as to the lack of coordination. Is that a correct interpretation of that statement?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think I possibly could better answer that by reading my whole series of notes here on it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, you read it into the record then. I was just trying to sort of elucidate certain points.

General BRADLEY. As a matter of fact I read only two paragraphs of this complete statement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, the particular point I wanted was if you could elucidate the nature of that requested information concerning coordination. Is that not in fact in the nature of a warning to the commander? Do you understand what my point is? I am not sure that I make myself clear to you.

General BRADLEY. Well, in general what we were trying to do in that series of messages was to point out some of the things that we were worried about without at the same time trying to command those forces from Washington.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The point I am really interested in here is after reading what you have said it appears to me that at least on two occasions right there, maybe more, on the 29th and the 30th in effect you were expressing concern which I interpret as sort of a warning with regard to the situation, and in each case he rejected it or did not follow it out.

Because you have a principle of not directing him and ordering him to do something, that this is as far as you felt you could go.

I was trying to really clarify the answer that you gave. That is about all I was seeking to do. In that first instance it looks to me as if you were asking information about the coordination of the operation, that is the part of the question I read about the liaison between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army, and to you they appeared exposed.

Now I would interpret that as a warning to him that "You had better look out. It looks to us at least as if your flanks are exposed." Is that a correct interpretation?

General BRADLEY. That was the purpose of this. It was rather carefully worded so that he would not think that we were trying to direct him how to fight a battle, but just to call his attention to something.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is right, and to you it appeared that it needed correction at that time, didn't it?

General BRADLEY. It appeared to us to be exposed in the light of the situation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So it is fair to say from all your information you were giving him a warning without requiring him to do any specific thing, is that right?

General BRADLEY. I think you can say "Yes," that the purpose of our message was to call his attention to the fact that from here it looked like they were exposed, and again I say without ordering him to do any particular thing or to make any particular movement on the part of his commands.

Senator FULBRIGHT. His reply which follows, the next paragraph which you read the other day on page 2530, he simply did not agree. He thought that there was coordination, and he says:

> It was quite impractical to have a continuous line across the neck.

Well, as a matter of fact since that time you do have a continuous line, don't you?

General BRADLEY. Yes; we do, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So that that in the light of events was not a correct judgment of what is practical, was it?

General BRADLEY. Well, it certainly is practical now. Whether or not it was then, he might have had a different view on it. We had hoped that in sending these messages there would be some attempt made to put the Tenth Corps and the rest of the Eighth Army together, and that is what was done.

It was done by General MacArthur, of course, before he came back.

WISDOM OF A CONTINUOUS LINE ACROSS KOREA

Senator FULBRIGHT. At the bottom of that page you say,

> While geographically his elements seem to be well extended—

I mean this is what MacArthur was saying to you—

> the actual condition of the terrain makes it extremely difficult for an enemy to take any material advantage thereof.

Well, that was proved to be a complete misjudgment because they did take advantage of that situation, did they not?

General BRADLEY. Yes; they did take advantage of it.

LOSSES DURING NOVEMBER RETREAT

Senator FULBRIGHT. The reason I am interested in it is that it was as a result of this misjudgment that we suffered our heaviest casualties of this war, was it not?

General BRADLEY. Well, Senator Fulbright, it is hard to sit back here and say how many of those lost were due to the fact that the right flank was exposed or how many of them were due to the fact that the Chinese hit him harder than he expected.

I think it is a little bit unfair for me to sit here now and try to say just how many of these losses were due to that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, this whole business has an aspect of that. I do not like to ask you any of these questions because, as you said a moment ago, you have had long relations, you are good friends with General MacArthur.

Of course, none of us sought this whole business, and I know it is embarrassing to you, but I still feel so long as we are in it that we have to go through with it in a way that is proper; and the fact is that the period—leaving out the way I characterized it, but the period—of greatest loss was at this period—that is, immediately after these messages were sent to General MacArthur. Was that not the period of greatest loss during this war?

General Bradley. I believe that was the period of greatest loss.

Senator Fulbright. That was testified to the other day, I believe; right after in the beginning, percentagewise there was a high loss—that is the beginning of the war.

Then, the next period in which there was the largest loss numerically was at this period; that is immediately following these messages at the end of November and in the succeeding retreat, and in the battling of the Tenth Corps and so on, was the period of the highest loss; is that not so?

General Bradley. I think so.

Senator Fulbright. It seems to me that if these hearings are to be of value we want to examine just what the causes were, if any.

I must feel constrained to add that with regard to the remark of the Senator from Washington that I think there is some difference in the situation now and what happened in the last war, in that we have here a general who has submitted on his own account a program to the country.

We have to judge the merits of that proposal, and one of the elements in making such a judgment is how infallible the proposer has been in the past.

It seems to me that is always taken into account when we seek to judge anyone's program that is submitted to the country.

Now, I did not ask him to submit it. He submitted it on his own account. I think those things are significant, and this is one situation which seems to me to warrant developing a little even though it may have some elements of embarrassment in it, and there is nothing, as I have said so often, personal about it in any respect. We just want the facts.

INQUIRING INTO PAST JUDGMENT OF MAC ARTHUR

It seems to me fair to say that at least on two occasions, and maybe more, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent what can properly be called a warning to the general as to the disposition of his troops and the coordination of their actions, and in each instance, he did not accept the warning, or at least he did not change his actions in accord with the suggestions or warnings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Is that a fair and correct statement?

General Bradley. I think so; and, as I stated here once before, it is hard to say what you would do this far away, but I think I stated that knowing what I knew at the time I would have done it somewhat differently.

Senator Fulbright. I understand that I am taking the responsibility of making you exercise hindsight; nobody could accuse you of trying to boast about what your hindsight is. I know the record is clear about that. We are just examining into it, and we have to do it by hindsight.

As a matter of fact, the record shows, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time gave this warning, and it was not a matter of hindsight. They did have a view that was different from the general's.

Now, our hindsight, I think, proves that their view was well taken; is that not true?

General Bradley. Well, I think so.

Senator **Fulbright.** Yes. That is, it is perfectly proper, it seems to me, to bring it out because it does bear on the, we will say, judgment of a man who, on his own account, has submitted to this country a program different from that which we are following. I think it is proper to consider that as to whether or not he has, we will say in the majority of cases, been right in these judgments, because if the country is to draw a conclusion, I think it will be influenced by that element.

COORDINATION BETWEEN TENTH CORPS AND EIGHTH ARMY

We heard and saw in the papers, as you know, reports that there was a lack of liaison between General Almond and General Walker. You stated, I believe, that you did not know that the other day of your own knowledge, whether there was proper liaison or not; is that correct?

General **Bradley.** Well, I stated that there was no physical contact across the peninsula. Now, just what communications they had by radio, I don't know. I have been told since that they had radio communication. I believe that was in General MacArthur's statement.

Senator **Fulbright.** Just one or two questions. General Walker was a lieutenant general, was he not?

General **Bradley.** Yes, sir.

Senator **Fulbright.** General Almond was a major general at that time?

General **Bradley.** Yes, sir; at that time.

Senator **Fulbright.** Normally, General Almond would report directly to General Walker, would he not?

General **Bradley.** If they are fighting a coordinated action; yes.

Senator **Fulbright.** If it was a coordinated action.

As a matter of fact, didn't General Almond report directly to Tokyo and not to General Walker during these actions?

General **Bradley.** They were separate commands; each one of them reported back to Tokyo.

Senator **Fulbright.** They each reported back. Do you know whether or not the reports that there was some feeling between these generals are true or not?

General **Bradley.** I don't know anything about that, Senator.

Senator **Fulbright.** Well, I hoped there was not. I mean, I have seen it in the paper.

The requested information about coordination that I referred to and which you first read, could that be interpreted as a suggestion that these two forces be coordinated directly and that General Almond report directly to General Walker?

EXTRACTING THE TENTH CORPS

General **Bradley.** Again on the 30th, in answer to the message you have been reading from General MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed General MacArthur that the elements of the Tenth Corps must be extricated from their exposed positions and suggested that the forces on the two coasts be sufficiently coordinated to prevent large enemy forces from passing between or outflanking them. And finally this message amplified the JCS previous directive to the effect, stated, that the entire region northeast of the waist of Korea should be ignored except for military considerations relating to the security of command.

That was in reply to part of the message you have just read.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That sounds as if it was pretty definite. Almost a directive, was it not?

General BRADLEY. This was a directive to extricate the Tenth Corps.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It was a directive to extricate. What day was that sent?

General BRADLEY. That was sent on the 30th of November in reply to his message of the 30th of November from which you were just reading.

Senator FULBRIGHT. All right. Well, then that shows a very direct difference of view as to what his situation was, does it not?

General BRADLEY. Well, in his message he stated that the Tenth Corps would contract its position as enemy pressure developed into the Hamhung-Wonsan sector, and our directive merely told him to go ahead and do it and to extricate them from the area. His message said he was going to contract them into a beachhead; ours told him to go ahead and evacuate them.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think that is a very substantial difference. As I understand, it said, "As it develops I will do so and so," and you said, "Go ahead and do it," if I understand that directive.

I do not want to continue to draw it out. I wonder if, since you have it before you, you would state in a summary form how many messages you sent to General MacArthur during this period of this nature. Were there two or three or four?

General BRADLEY. According to my notes here, there were two.
difference of view as to what his situation, does it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; it was a very critical period.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Very critical period.

General BRADLEY. Around the end of November.

MAC ARTHUR'S INDEPENDENCE AS A THEATER COMMANDER

Senator FULBRIGHT. Now, General, one other question on this business of why he was relieved and the emphasis upon his not having been directly insubordinate and violated a direct order. I can understand that, but I am just trying to develop this in my own mind now. I have the impression that when you send what you call a suggestion—I mean less than a directive—the normal course of events is your commanders take those very seriously, and if they do not agree, they give you good and persuasive reasons. But is it not a fact that the general had become so remote from the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you felt to an unusual degree he had an independence a theater commander did not ordinarily have, and that is one of the elements in judging whether or not you could trust his judgment if further additional critical periods arose?

General BRADLEY. I don't believe that was stated in so many words by any of the Chiefs. Whether or not it was in the back of their minds, I don't know. I think all of the Chiefs greatly respected General MacArthur's long experience and his ability, and would be inclined to give him more leeway than would normally be the case. For that reason it is rather hard to say that because he probably in this case didn't follow their suggestion right away that they took that into consideration. I do not know. I think they would have to answer that themselves.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I didn't want to pin you down. When one makes a suggestion about an individual personality there are always intangibles involved. I was just seeking to carry one step further the analysis of why it was that finally after an accumulation of instances in which he seemed not to be amenable to suggestions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision to relieve him was made. To me that seems like a logical build-up to that final decision.

It is just a difference in view—on the one side an organization with global responsibilities, on the other side a man of very strong personality who is not accustomed to taking orders.

That is what seems to me to enter into this.

BOMBING OF CLARK FIELD, MANILA AT OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

There is one other question that I have been asked about and reference was made a moment ago to World War II. I have been asked: Was there any element similar to this in connection with the bombing of the airplanes at Manila at the beginning of the war, the last war? In other words, is there an explanation of why there was not an immediate response in the command in Manila after Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941? Can you throw any light on that?

General BRADLEY. I was not in Washington at that time. As I understand it, the bombing at Clark Field—I believe it was—where they caught the planes, was about 10 hours after Pearl Harbor.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes. Do you know whether or not any notice of Pearl Harbor had been received at Manila prior to that bombing?

General BRADLEY. Not of my own knowledge.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't know whether or not they had any notice whatever that Pearl Harbor had been bombed?

General BRADLEY. I would very strongly assume that such notice had been sent, because that is part of all war plans, that you notify all commands of any act which would indicate that a war is imminent or a war is on. I would assume that was sent but I cannot state from my own knowledge.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I wondered whether or not it was this response here that we have just been going over to the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was characteristic of General MacArthur's response to suggestions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff at any other time, that it was rather difficult to get a response to the directives or the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General BRADLEY. I would suggest that the person best qualified to testify as to whether or not General MacArthur got such notice and how much time he had and as to what action he took in connection with it could best be answered by General MacArthur himself.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I expect it would be. Who was head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then, the Chairman?

General BRADLEY. General Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General Marshall was?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I had forgotten. In fact, the question didn't occur to me when either one of them was on the stand.

General BRADLEY. I don't believe General Marshall was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time, but he was Chief of Staff of the Army and Air Corps at that time.

MAC ARTHUR RESPONSE TO JCS SUGGESTION OF NOVEMBER 1950

Senator FULBRIGHT. I overlooked one question that bears on that first question. When this first warning was sent in form which asked General MacArthur about the lack of liaison, as I understood your reply, or MacArthur's reply, it was that such liaison was not necessary. Is that about correct? Due to the terrain.

General BRADLEY. I would have to read over this again here to see whether or not that was covered.

I might just read the whole paraphrase, and I think it will answer your question.

> He informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

this is November 30, 1950—

> That the Tenth Corps geographically threatens the main supply lines of the enemy forces bearing upon the right flank of the Eighth Army. The enemy's penetration southward could not be safely accomplished until this threat of the Tenth Corps is contained and nullified. Any concept of actual physical combination of the forces of the Eighth Army and Tenth Corps in a practically continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea is quite impracticable due to the length of that line, the numerical weakness of our forces, and the logistical problems due to the mountainous divide which splits such a front from north to south. He further went on to state that the Tenth Corps would contract its position as enemy pressure develops, into the Hamhung-Wonsan sector.
>
> The corps commander has been enjoined against any possibility of piecemeal isolation and trapping of his forces. While geographically his elements seem to be well extended, the actual conditions of terrain make it extremely difficult for an enemy to take any material advantage thereof.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is the part I mentioned a moment ago. It proved to be a complete misjudgment of the situation, did it not? The enemy did take advantage——

General BRADLEY. As it turned out, they were able to outflank the Eighth Army, and the Tenth Corps was not able to have any effect on supply lines of the enemy attacking the Eighth Army. That is the way it turned out.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR'S RESPONSE ON JCS REASONS OF DISMISSAL

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, it seems to me, General, that that reaction of General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs' directions, or suggestions, is perhaps a better word—under those circumstances would be reason for great concern on the part of the Joint Chiefs with regard to future suggestions, especially in a matter as delicate as the bombing or interference with Russia or China. That is an important consideration in judging whether or not you were justified in making up your mind to relieve him.

I may be overemphasizing its importance, but trying to put myself in your position, you have a judgment that is considered very delicate and a violation of it could be brought about, as you say, by stretching of a directive. This instance in which he did not follow suggestions of the Joint Chiefs, with disastrous results, would be a consideration of some importance in making up your mind.

Now, I may be giving you the benefit of some consideration you don't deserve; but to me, that is somewhat in justification of the action you took. It is one of the important ones.

I don't know how else we judge mistakes in other activities. In political activities, if somebody makes a mistake, a disastrous mistake, it is more or less generally accepted that you have to pay for it, if you put your foot in it.

Now, if I analyze this situation correctly, the Joint Chiefs gave him fair warning to correct the situation. He doesn't do it. We suffer the greatest casualties of the war.

I don't know why that doesn't bear upon the decision which you finally reached, to relieve him.

Do you think that it doesn't, or that it does?

General BRADLEY. Well, it may have entered into the Chiefs' first reason, as I read it out. As I say, I don't know. I think they are better qualified to state that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am arguing from common sense. It seems to me, if I was judging anybody's past actions—if I was conducting a business, I was owner, and the manager went against my advice and lost half of the capital, I would say it had something to do with my firing him later, if I decided to fire him.

I don't know whether that is a proper analogy or not, but I have to draw analogies, not knowing about the mysterious ways of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; but if they are human at all, it seems to me that kind of reasoning might have entered into the decision, later on, which was to relieve the commander.

You wouldn't want to express an opinion as to whether that is too farfetched or not, would you?

General BRADLEY. I would prefer not to.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You would prefer not to.

I realize, of course, that this business involves an old personal friend. Unfortunately I run into the same thing in conducting an investigation around here, trying to clean up the RFC. Half of the people in and out of Congress are mad at me. I had to go through with it, and I am afraid you may be making some of your fellow officers feel the same about you.

General BRADLEY. Senator, I would like to make it clear I am not holding back anything that would be a positive statement.

I usually speak frankly, and let the chips fall where they may, and sometimes they fall in the wrong place; but in this case it is pretty much a matter of opinion; and as I say, whether or not these Chiefs considered that, I think they might be able to answer, or, whether they can answer, even.

Then, I don't know, these things are always accumulations in your mind over a period of years.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I agree.

General BRADLEY. How much effect this had on any one of the Chiefs, in making up his mind, probably, now, from a military point of view, that he ought to be relieved, I don't know whether they can answer it or not because, as I say, it is one of those things that is an accumulation of things in your mind, and you reach a certain way of thinking, and you don't quite know how you arrived at it, and that is the reason it is very hard to answer that question direct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I have very great sympathy for your position. I don't want to press you too hard, because I know it is difficult, and I know you can't ignore the personal matter. But I think an important element in the matter was the response that was aroused in this country to General MacArthur's appearance; when you had people talking about the deification of this infallible leader, I think that it is perfectly proper to see whether or not he has always been infallible, whether he has always been right in the past, and that has some bearing on whether he is right now.

That was the reason or the motive. I think it was a right good motive.

I have great sympathy for your position. I think it would be difficult for anybody in the profession, and I know yours is much more difficult than mine.

I don't mean to imply that looking into the affairs of the RFC was anything like as difficult or as important as yours, as I do not mean to be other than fair, but whenever you are critical of anybody, there are bound to be repercussions and I hope that I haven't gone too far in this particular instance.

I am, myself, convinced, after reading what you said the other day, that that was a very critical time and a most important mistake in judgment on the part of the general.

I want to just add, General, that I thank you, and I want to compliment you on your patience and the very frank way in which you have answered questions.

I am quite sure I never would have the patience to come in and sit as long as you have and answer as many questions with as good humor as you have exhibited to this commitee.

General BRADLEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, before we adjourn, that I hope we won't get back to December 7 and December 8, and Manila and Pearl Harbor, as to who notified who and under what conditions, because we might continue the investigation for much longer than we would like to continue it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that that question was inspired by the reference of the Senator from Washington to the Battle of the Bulge. I hadn't thought of it before that.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume that concludes the questioning of General Bradley.

I would like to make a statement, that the reporter has indicated that these men, as competent and accurate as they are, cannot do accurate reporting unless they have had a considerable recess in the middle of the day, he indicated an hour and a half; but I will take the liberty of, when we recess, of recessing until 3 o'clock because this afternoon we will settle a number of procedural questions and matters; we have two motions pending here, one by Senator Lodge and one by Senator Hickenlooper; and there are some other matters that will be considered by the committee.

COMPLIMENTS TO THE WITNESS

General Bradley, I want to express to you my appreciation, and that of the committee, for the time and the energy that you have given us in this inquiry.

I think you embodied or described your entire appearance here when you, in answer to a question just a few moments ago, said that you tried to speak frankly and let the chips fall where they may. I think that you have done that in this hearing.

You have given us the benefit not only of your long experience but of the very great study you have given to this entire Korean situation.

I have been tremendously impressed with how closely you have followed every detail, not only Korea but of our troops in every other corner of the globe. Your approach has indeed been global, but underlying all of that has been a splendid patriotism and devotion to our common country, these United States of America.

While we are living in perilous times, critical times, dangerous days, I feel that we have in you, as Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in our Joint Chiefs the very best men that are available to this Nation to undertake to guide us through war if it must come, or put us in such state of preparedness that we will be able to avoid the horrors of world war III.

I thank you, sir.

We will stand in recess until 3 o'clock.

(Whereupon at 2 o'clock, the committee recessed to reconvene at 3 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Brewster, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, and Cain.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, the committee will come to order.

Inasmuch as the examination of General Bradley extended beyond 2 o'clock, why I postponed this meeting until 3. I had hoped that we would have more here at 3 o'clock, but I find that most of those who are here now are those who were in attendance when we recessed shortly after 2.

Senator Hickenlooper introduced a motion this morning which, of course, would affect the order in which the witnesses would appear before the committee. That is wholly within the power of the committee. It is a very proper procedure for the committee to make any change in the order in any way they see fit.

MOTION TO LIMIT THE QUESTIONING

There has been one thing that concerned me. On yesterday, Senator Lodge, as appears on page 2817 of the record, said:

> I have no further questions to ask.

I am quoting from Senator Lodge:

> But I would like to say that at the appropriate time I would like to make a motion that when the next witness is heard, that the time limit on questioning be 15 minutes, but there be no limit on the number of rounds.
>
> Chairman Russell. Senator, I do not think that we should undertake to pass upon that issue now.

I might interpolate that at that time there were only some six or seven members of the committee present and I did not think we should undertake to adopt a new procedure with that small attendance, and I am quoting now from the record:

> I take it that you do not object if we carry it over?
>
> Senator Lodge. I simply bring it up so the members can be thinking about it, sir.

Now, I don't know that is particularly a motion. The Senator did not press it in deference to my request that it not be pressed then. But he did serve notice and say he wished to bring it up at the first appropriate time, and I cut him off before he could say whether he thought it was the appropriate time and got him to carry it over. I do not think it makes much difference, the order in which we consider the two motions, because both of them will be considered. So if Senator Hickenlooper does not object, we will first dispose of the motion of Senator Lodge before we proceed to take action on the motion which was introduced by Senator Hickenlooper this morning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You said if there is no objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was not trying to put you on the spot. The Chair did feel like he had some responsibility.

RELATIONSHIP OF TIME LIMIT TO ORDER OF WITNESSES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sympathetic to the Chair on that. I am not objecting. I merely suggest in all fairness, if we continue with the three Joint Chiefs of Staff, which in my opinion will be substantially a repetition of the testimony of General Bradley—I mean if that is the procedure so far as they are concerned, I would think I would be perfectly willing to vote for Senator Lodge's motion for 15 minutes, which would speed up the time that we could get around. If, on the contrary, we begin to go into policies in accordance with my motion now, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff replying as to their disagreement, then I am not certain that I would vote for a 15-minute limitation in the initial opening up of the subject of policy. I just say that in all frankness, that what our procedure is would influence my vote somewhat on Senator Lodge's motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. I can see the two motions do have a very direct relation to each other. I will then let Senator Lodge state his views.

Senator LODGE. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, first of all, that I think it is advantageous to discuss this whole subject of what our procedure is going to be and I have a good deal of sympathy with the idea of hearing Secretary Acheson before we hear the Joint Chiefs.

IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING REPETITIOUS QUESTIONS

But the argument that my good friend from Iowa makes in favor of his motion is that if we hear the Joint Chiefs, "we will spend a lot of repetitious time"—I am quoting—"and there will be an unwarranted repetition of testimony."

Now, I plan to ask the Joint Chiefs questions that are not repetitious at all and that haven't been asked of anybody yet. I don't want to be foreclosed from having the right to ask some nonrepetitious questions of the Joint Chiefs. I am perfectly willing to agree with the Senator from Iowa to have Secretary Acheson come first.

I am perfectly willing to agree to give the chairman the power to rule a question out of order which is repetitious. I am willing to go that far.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope the Senator from Massachusetts won't undertake to put that responsibility on the Chair.

Senator LODGE. I have confidence in the Chair and think he would do it honestly and fairly, and I don't intend to ask any repetitious questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. I appreciate the Senator's statement, but I don't think we can save a great deal of time by that, because we would immediately fall into an argument as to whether the question was repetitious, and by the time we got through referring to the record, it would be an economy of time to let the Senator go ahead and ask the question and let it be repetitious.

Senator LODGE. That would be an incredibly——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am keeping a table of some of them. I am going to announce it one of these days. One of them is almost identical and has been asked eight times, and several of them seven, but I do not want the responsibility of undertaking to rule on what is repetitious.

Senator LODGE. I agree it would be an incredibly fatiguing procedure if we start arguing the chairman's decisions, but I am mentioning it to show that I am not at all opposed to many of the things that the Senator from Iowa is trying to do.

I would like to cut the time down. I think we could all get our questions much more concise, and I think we could eliminate a lot of time by not being repetitious; and I am willing to go along with him to the extent of hearing Secretary Acheson, first.

But I do not want to be foreclosed from the opportunity to ask a nonrepetitious question of the Joint Chiefs. There is my position in a nutshell.

I should think that we ought to be able to work something out. I do not think you and I are so terribly far apart.

SAVING TIME BY SUBMITTING RECORD TO JCS FOR WRITTEN COMMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if I may again assure the Senator from Massachusetts, and the committee, that I attempted completely to protect against any foreclosure of the examination of any witness in the resolution, by saying that by setting up the calling of Secretary Acheson, as I explained, for the purpose of opening up the policy discussion, after Secretary Acheson, the sequence of witnesses and their personalities, or the personalities of the witnesses, will be entirely up to the discretion of the committee; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of them, not as a group or not in sequence, or in sequence, or as a group, or any way that the committee desires to call them, will be perfectly available for calling at any time.

My whole point is that policy is such a controlling part of the Korean operation, that we can well go into the question of policy at this moment, because we have pretty thoroughly canvassed, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military position of our Government and have the assurance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so far as what he has testified to, are in agreement.

POSSIBLE REPETITIOUSNESS OF JCS TESTIMONY

I submit that there will be many questions, in developing the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that will plow the same ground. I thought that maybe they could point out their differences in the testimony and then narrow down the ground eventually, at a future time, as to what we want to question them on.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I don't see why the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff need be repetitious, unless a Senator wants to ask a repetitious question. I don't see why it has to be repetitious. I don't see why we have to repeat ourselves. That is something I cannot grasp.

I mean to go into the facts with General Vandenberg, and ask him why the Air Force has been so flagrantly inadequate. That is a matter that has not come up before at all. None of the witnesses have been willing to testify on it, and so that is not a repetitious matter.

As I read the Senator's motion, the Joint Chiefs will not come up automatically, but will be called separately, and another proceeding will take place. That is what I cannot follow, as to why we should want to shut them off, as I gather to be the effect of the motion.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would like to be sure that my meaning is clear. I do not intend to shut them out, and when I refer to repetitious testimony, I mean plowing the same ground.

Now if one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comes on this stand, it does not necessarily hold that you should not ask him the same questions that were asked of General Bradley, for instance. You will be plowing the same ground.

He may go over and give protracted answers along the same line of philosophy that General Bradley did. You will end up in most cases after a considerable period of time getting the same answers out of the Chiefs of Staff as you did out of General Bradley, but in examining them individually that ground will have to be explored, and I thought it could expedite the matter by having them indicate their areas of disagreement, if any, with Bradley and then we could examine them at the proper time on that.

Now we have no particular sequence. There will probably be a number of witnesses called here. The action of the committee will have to be taken in these cases to set up a roster of witnesses——

Senator FULBRIGHT. Itinerary.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I presume it would be an itinerary. I don't mean to foreclose anyone from asking questions.

IMPORTANCE OF HEARING THE JCS

Senator LODGE. Well, it says here, Senator:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff be not called before the committee until such time in the future as the committee may see fit to direct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right.

Senator LODGE. That means we have to take new action by new vote, and, if we don't do that, they are going to come up automatically.

You don't just say that "I move that Secretary Acheson be the next witness." You don't do that. You go in and definitely take the Joint Chiefs out of this affair altogether as I read this.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would just as soon modify it so it isn't quite so drastic.

Senator LODGE. Let me just say one more thing. Not only has nobody been questioned about the adequacy of our Air Force—there have been no questions asked about that at all, at least the ones that were asked the witnesses said they would rather have General Vandenberg comment on it—but Admiral Sherman is of course particularly well qualified to respond to very detailed questions on the idea of a naval blockade, and that has not been gone into at all with the clarity that it deserves. In order to settle this question, I think we ought to make some sort of a determination as to how many witnesses we want to hear altogether, whether we want to close this hearing out after hearing the three Chiefs and Secretary Acheson, or whether we want to go on and hear other witnesses, and if so, who, and if so, how many.

I think this is as good a time as any to consider that, and if we can get a meeting of the minds on that, then I think it will facilitate a vote on this amendment.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

LIMITING QUESTIONING EXCEPT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, it seems very apparent to all of us that we are going to have to do something that will hasten the proceeding along and not take quite so much time on each witness, and at the same time preserve the rights of each Senator. I think that Senator Lodge's motion there has so much force in it and so much merit in it and meets the situation so well, I believe he could get unanimous consent to the adoption of what he called the 15-minute rule as we go around the table without a limitation on the number of times you go around.

Perhaps we would have to except from that Mr. Acheson, because there may be some who will want to question him more the first time than 15 minutes, but it seems to me like the Joint Chiefs of Staff certainly we could limit that to 15 minutes and I believe that would be a great incentive to a better attendance and a man can just draw his questions on a little finer bead, why he would cover it to the better satisfaction of himself and his colleagues.

Senator LODGE. In order to modify the amendment to meet the Senator from Iowa's view, it would be 15 minutes on witnesses except for Secretary Acheson, on whom it would be a half an hour, and to provide that Secretary Acheson be called next. How would that affect the Senator from Iowa?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I would support that. The exception on Secretary Acheson is not Acheson personally, as the head of the policy-making department of the administration, next to the President, that is, in the President's Cabinet. I think in order to develop questions to him it may take a little bit longer exploration than 15 minutes would permit. I have supported the 30-minute rule and I am perfectly willing to support this. If the Senator made the exception, I think perhaps I would support his motion subject, of course, to the understanding that anybody could move to change the rule at a later date if they think it is impractical.

Senator LODGE. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. May I say in response to that, if I may, Mr. Chairman, about the amendment now with reference to changing the order of witnesses here, I do not want to be bound by that in saying I support Senator Lodge's motion, because I do not think there is logic in that. But I do think the 15-minute rule can be adopted by unanimous consent if we except the Secretary of State, who many of us would want to question perhaps longer.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator McMahon.

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself to Senator Hickenlooper's motion.

COMMENTS ON SENATOR HICKENLOOPER'S MOTION

Now, Mr. Chairman, General MacArthur came back here and he proposed a military program of very sizable dimensions. General Marshall and General Bradley have been heard in opposition to that military program. It would seem only logical and right that we should finish the consideration of the military matter before we go into the consideration of the diplomatic matters.

I would also like to call attention to the fact that the provision that—

> the Joint Chiefs should examine the testimony of the three witnesses named and indicate in writing to the committee what testimony of each of said witnesses they agree with and what testimony they do not find themselves in agreement with, together with their own views and answers in such cases, and together with such amplification of any answers to questions propounded to the three witnesses as they, each Chief of Staff, desires to give in his own testimony—

that that process would take not less than 3 weeks in my judgment of each of these three men.

As one who has had some experience in appellate work, I venture to say that that job cannot be competently done in less than 3 weeks of working 8 and 9 hours a day—to analyze this record, write your conclusions on it, set out what you agree with and what you disagree with, and amplify the record. So certainly we would be imposing an inhuman burden, and a burden that should not be imposed, on these busy men at this time.

We have exhausted I think—no, I will not say exhausted, but we have certainly explored about every conceivable avenue of examination, pertinent avenue, and some that have not been relevant at all, and I do think that that will reduce the time that will be necessary to examine the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would be certainly disappointed if they took over a day apiece here. But to now interrupt the orderly presentation of that which primarily has brought us together would not seem to me to be in the interests of orderly procedure.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster.

SAVING THE JCS TIME

Senator Brewster. Commenting on what the Senator from Connecticut has said, I would envision exactly the opposite result. I think nothing could be more calculated to conserve the time of the Joint Chiefs than this proposal; as I would assume, from my knowledge of procedures, particularly the military, that one of their very competent assistants on their staff would go through the record and would probably identify with very little hesitation the two or three dozen matters possible he might wish to bring to his chief's attention on which there might be a variance of viewpoint.

I think 80 percent of the record would certainly be very readily accepted and without question.

It would enable them then to dispose of some of those matters and with that procedure, it would certainly be possible to take not more than a day of their time; where on the other basis I am sure the Senator is too optimistic in thinking it would take only a day. I am sure it would take at least a week, and that would be the best we can hope for. It is a matter of opinion.

Senator McMahon. May I make a very brief observation on Senator Brewster's remarks. He contends that some members of the staff of each one of these generals would perform the task. I do not know how they would feel about it, but if I were in Vandenberg's place or Sherman's place or Collins' place and this was the request of the committee, there would be no one that would review that record except myself.

Senator Johnson. Will the Senator yield?

Senator McMahon. Just a second—because this is a record that I predict will be read as long as this country endures. It is one of the most historic investigations that this Congress has ever made; and if I were in their place, I would want McMahon's report, not some subordinate's report in this situation.

I yield to the Senator from Texas.

NEED FOR ORAL TESTIMONY FROM JCS

Senator Johnson. There is considerable difference in calling for the views of a military man in writing and calling upon him to testify and answer questions; and I would like to submit to the Senator it is somewhat new—a somewhat new concept—for a military officer being called to come in here and comment on the views of the military and civilian leaders, by submitting a report wherein they disagree.

Another thing, when we met at our organization meeting, we decided that we would call these witnesses, and we would place them all under oath, and for some reason or other now, we are, after hearing General Bradley for several days, and in repeated answers to my questions saying, "You will have to get these estimates from the Joint Chiefs; I don't have them. I don't know what it would take to carry out the MacArthur program. I do think that it would cripple our commitments in other parts of the world."

Well, there was a considerable difference of opinion between General Bradley and General MacArthur, and I for one, am anxious to have the Joint Chiefs' viewpoint put on this record; I want put on this record their estimates of what are the necessary forces that would be required out there, and I do not see any reason why we should abandon the military at this point when we have agreed on it in our organization meeting, when we publicized to the country that we were going to ask each member of the Joint Chiefs to come here and testify. What has appeared on the horizon that calls for and causes us now to cut our sails and say that we are not going to require any more swearing of witnesses? We will just let them submit their statements in writing and we will postpone hearing them. "We don't want to know what these estimates are; we want to get to somebody else right quick."

I think we should go ahead and try to hear these men, hear them as briefly as possible, and then call on the Secretary of State and any other people who are necessary to the inquiry, but I see no reason for rearranging the entire program and abandoning the course of having witnesses sworn.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George, will you yield for one moment?

Senator MCMAHON. I yielded to Senator Johnson, and I want to close with this observation: That there is no intention here, that I know of, and if it exists, certainly I haven't heard of it, of any member of the committee that does not want Mr. Acheson to have the fullest opportunity, both to be examined and to make such statements as may be appropriate to our investigation.

There is not the slightest desire on my part, certainly, not to have him here. I want him here, and I would vote to have him here; but certainly after we conclude with the men who are experts on the fundamental problem that we are called together to investigate.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the examination of witnesses is one thing; to permit them to review prior testimony of another witness and to elaborate, where they desire, is quite a different thing.

The privilege of cross-examining the witness, though he be a witness of an official character, is not an insignificant privilege; and I think that we ought to proceed with these Joint Chiefs of Staff. Confessedly, their testimony will be very largely cumulative. That is not said in criticism, because if they are telling the truth, they will be obliged to follow General Bradley, if he is telling the truth; if they are not, to the extent that they differ from him, we ought to have the right to cross-examine.

I am perfectly willing, so far as I am concerned, and I think it would be wise to limit the examination to 15 minutes on the these Joint Chiefs, and, indeed, on all witnesses except the Secretary of State.

I do not think you ought to undertake to limit that to 15 minutes, because it would be a pretty difficult thing to do, to ask a lot of questions within 15 minutes, and many of the Senators will want to ask them.

So, it seems to me that we ought to go ahead, and I don't think you will make any time by it, Senator Hickenlooper, because the very moment that General Collins sat down and reviewed the testimony of General Marshall and General MacArthur and General Bradley, our cross-examination of him on why he agreed to this, and if he does agree to it, and what is his interpretation of this question, and so forth, would take us as long as it would to have him here in the first instance; and it seems to me you abandon the somewhat general idea of a hearing when you do not have the witnesses appear before you, with the right to question them, and to cross-question them.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

TIME LIMIT ON QUESTIONING EXCEPT FOR SECRETARY ACHESON

Senator LODGE. In the interest of harmony, and of getting a vote, I modify my motion so that it will read that: Each Senator shall be limited to 15 minutes, for an unlimited number of rounds of questioning on all witnesses except the Secretary of State; and that on the Secretary of State, the limit be 30 minutes on the first round——

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

Senator LODGE. Thirty minutes on each round, on the Secretary of State, and no limit on the number of rounds on the Secretary of State.

Senator WILEY. May I speak on the motion, as I understand it?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Before you speak, are you speaking just to this, or to the combined—are they joined or separate propositions?

Senator WILEY. Speaking on Senator Lodge's alone.

Senator FULBRIGHT. All right.

OTHER POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON QUESTIONING

Senator WILEY. I feel that you have got to give consideration, first, of course, so that each member of this joint committee will have an opportunity to properly produce, by questions, some new matter; so I have no objection to the limitation, except this: I have noticed that when the questioner was trying to get at what he thought was a different answer than the one the witness would make, that the witness would carry on with that answer; whereas, someone who was very adroit would submit a question and the answer would be "yes" or "no."

Now, I have this suggestion, it is not a pearl of wisdom—that if you are going to limit it to 15 minutes, why not make them alternative limitations, that each questioner shall have the right to ask so many questions?

That way the witness himself cannot prejudice the right of the questioner.

Now, another suggestion, I doubt very much whether there is any wisdom in going further, up to date, than the names you have mentioned; but Lodge's resolution is, without our knowing what Acheson is going to say, going to limit all other witnesses along the same line.

Now, there might be somebody that would be brought up in rebuttal, and that wouldn't be exactly fair.

Another, and third suggestion I make is this: If you are going to limit the matter, to the cross-examination of any witness, as to time, why not limit it so that the time could be assigned by the leader of each committee?

Now I personally feel that that could be talked out on our side of the table here and I am sure that if you are going to devote the cross-examination say to Collins not over so many hours on this side, we could agree on the limitation.

I am perfectly willing that, instead of a continuous round around the circle, you try to accomplish something that way. I think it would be eminently unfair, as I have noticed here, that I might ask one or two or three questions and I might have a dozen that I would want to ask, but the witness would consume practically the 15 minutes with the three questions, whereas another Senator might frame 15 questions and get them all answered in the 15 minutes.

I just drop that bit of suggestion.

Senator Lodge. Let me just say to the Senator from Wisconsin that my motion is intended only to apply to the three Chiefs and Secretary Acheson. I am not undertaking to propose anything affecting other witnesses if they are going to be here.

Senator Wiley. I am glad to hear that.

LODGE TIME LIMIT MOTION TO APPLY ONLY TO JCS AND ACHESON

Senator Lodge. If we are going to call Averell Harriman or General Wedemeyer, that would be something else. I am just trying to establish this limitation to the three Chiefs of 15 minutes and for Acheson 30 minutes.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, we can vote on that, but before we vote I should like to point out that it would seem to me it would be rather inconsistent to limit ourselves to 15 minutes on one of the Joint Chiefs, and then to have unlimited time on Mr. Kennedy or some other witnesses, but the committee can handle that when they get to it.

Senator Lodge. I feel that I will be certainly making this motion again, assuming we do call subsequent witnesses, but I am not doing it now, because I think it occasions some misgivings.

Chairman Russell. If I understand the motion made by the Senator from Massachusetts, it now has nothing whatever to do with the motion made by the Senator from Iowa.

He moves that when the Secretary of State is a witness before this committee, that each Senator be limited to 30 minutes' questioning on each round and the procedure will be the same as we have at the present time.

The motion further is that with respect to the three Joint Chiefs of Staff, each Senator be limited to 15 minutes to each round, to be followed in the order that we have heretofore observed.

Is that a fair statement of your motion, Senator?

Senator Lodge. Yes.

Senator Stennis. Second.

Senator McMahon. I want to address myself to that, but I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Senator Sparkman. I am perfectly willing to have you go ahead with whatever you want to say.

TIME LIMIT ON WITNESSES OTHER THAN JCS AND ACHESON

Senator McMahon. Mr. Chairman, I was disappointed to hear the Senator from Massachusetts put the limitation on his motion that he put on it—namely, that it only applies to the Joint Chiefs and to Secretary of State Acheson, and then to add that, of course, we might have Wedemeyer and, I suppose, a number of others to whom the limitation would not apply.

Certainly, if we can limit ourselves to 15 minutes with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we can limit ourselves on any other witness who is to be called here, with the exception of the Secretary of State.

And so I would move an amendment, if that is in order, to the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts, to provide that all witnesses hereafter called shall be treated in exactly the same fashion as the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Knowland. Except for the Secretary of State.

Senator McMahon. Except for the Secretary of State.

Chairman Russell. You have heard the amendment.

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman.

Senator Sparkman. I want to express myself as being in favor of the amendment that Senator McMahon has suggested. I think it is important that we save time, and I think it is perfectly logical that there should be a greater time for questioning the Secretary of State; but I don't see any reason for making any differentiation as among any other witnesses.

Of course, there is this to keep in mind, too, that if after we try out the 15-minute rule, it does not work, we can always revoke it at any time we see fit.

It seems to me that perhaps it might be lowering—deemphasizing, I will put it that way—the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to single them out among all the witnesses that may come before us and say that they, and they alone, shall be examined only 15 minutes at a time.

Then there is another thing, Mr. Chairman. I have not used a great deal of the time of this committee in questioning. As far as I am concerned I would be perfectly willing to see the chairman of the committee, or the fellows at the head of the table, do all of the questioning. They do a very fine job. I never cared to ask a question that is repetitious. However, there is no reason why the whole ground cannot be covered. Fifteen minutes, with 26 members of the committee, after all is 6½ hours of questioning.

Senator Fulbright. Just one round.

Senator Sparkman. Just one round. And it does give the fellows at the foot of the table somewhat of a chance to ask a question that has not been asked before. So it does not seem to me that anybody is going to be hurt by limiting it to 15 minutes.

Chairman Connally. May I ask a question?

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Will the Senator yield to the Senator from Texas?

Senator Sparkman. I yield.

Chairman Connally. Why have so many rounds?

Senator Sparkman. I agree with you on that, and yet I realize that some Senator might think of a question as it goes around, and, as I take it, the chairman does not want to preclude anybody from asking any question he wants to ask.

Chairman Russell. No.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith asked to be recognized first and I will recognize the Senator from New Jersey.

FAVORING TIME LIMITATION BUT NO LIMITATION ON ROUNDS

Senator Smith. I am perfectly willing to go with the last suggestion. I just suggest that in my judgment Mr. Harriman is a very key man in the whole picture. He was the Ambassador to Russia and knows a lot about the Russian picture; he was the one man of the whole group that was at Yalta; he is the one man of the whole group who was at Wake Island. That is the only reason I said a moment ago to

Senator Lodge that possibly we should not foreclose ourselves in the future because I had Ambassador Harriman in mind. I have called him, I think, a very valuable man.

I am perfectly willing to leave it go on the 15-minute rule with that observation.

My own preference would be to determine a few witnesses ahead. We are now with the Secretary of State and the three Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when other names come up and they go on the panel, let the chairman, if he desires to, determine what in his judgment is the length of time we should put in on that round, and have the committee decide at that time.

It is very hard for me to say, not knowing who is coming up, whether we should put this limit on. I certainly think, as I said, in the case of Ambassador Harriman, we might want to develop a whole trend of thinking that might be difficult to do in 15 minutes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly I want to support the McMahon amendment to the Lodge motion, that the 15-minute rule apply to all future witnesses except the Secretary of State; and I think I would very vigorously oppose any limitation of the number of rounds, as the chairman has indicated, but it seems to me whether it——

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not indicate any limit on that.

Senator KNOWLAND. No; as I say, you were not in favor of any limitation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think in that way we could cover, whether it be Mr. Harriman or anybody else, as long as the numbr of rounds is not limited, the subject matter that Senator Smith might have in mind; so I want to support the McMahon amendment to the Lodge motion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. May I ask a question of interpretation? Does that mean as long as two people want to continue to ask questions, it can go on indefinitely? Is that what it means?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is, I think, a rather fair statement, Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It has to simmer down to one in order for the thing to finally finish, is that it?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; and we were almost down to that on Genral Bradley.

YIELDING TIME TO OTHER SENATORS

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, has there been any question raised by anybody whether any junior member might yield his time to any other member?

Chairman RUSSELL. That has not really been decided.

Senator BREWSTER. I could well conceive that it might because I think there are some members here who are following certain lines of questioning who are much more capable of carrying it on and expediting it than a new one would be, who might take up the same line.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If the Senator will yield, if you permit that then that even throws out the limitation down to one, because he can get the limit and go on indefinitely by himself.

Senator BREWSTER. I certainly would not support any such construction. [Laughter.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the question is——

Senator BREWSTER. I think he would have difficulty in getting the time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me that the purpose of an inquiry of this kind is to ascertain the truth, and not to establish rules of limitation on the inquiry.

I am perfectly willing to support a 15-minute limitation but not on the theory that that way we will foreclose questions being answered or being asked, and answered, and with the understanding that the purpose of this committee is to find out the facts, regardless of how long it takes.

Now I think that Senator Brewster made a suggestion that is perfectly sound. If one member on one round has 15 minutes and says, "I will yield my 15 minutes to someone else to pursue a line of questioning and I will pass," it has the same effect as if that member had exercised his right and asked questions for 15 minutes, but he might feel that he could yield them.

I see nothing wrong with that. He could pass the whole round on that round. There would be no undue prolongation that I could see because the time would be consumed anyway, and I think there is considerable merit in what Senator Brewster has suggested, the possibility of one member yielding his time on that round to someone else who is pursuing a particular line of inquiry.

It is utterly impossible when you get into the discussion of policy to pursue with any satisfaction in 15 minutes' time many lines of questioning, and the questioner must break off in the middle of his thought and in the middle of his examination of the witness and pass on. He loses the continuity of the whole inquiry so far as he is concerned at that moment.

Chairman CONNALLY. Will you yield?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Chairman CONNALLY. Wouldn't he get a second round and continue from the point that he quit?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, but if some other member is not disposed to interfere with that questioning and say, "You can have my 15 minutes and I will forego the 15 minutes that I would use," it seems to me it would be perfectly sound. I do not think it would be abused and I think it is a perfectly workable proposition.

Senator MCMAHON. Question.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question before the committee as I understand it from a parliamentary standpoint, is the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a parliamentary inquiry? Why does the Hickenlooper motion——

Chairman RUSSELL. It has no connection with this. It will succeed this if we dispose of this matter.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is an amendment to the Hickenlooper motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh no, this has nothing to do whatever with the Hickenlooper motion. It is the Lodge motion.

NO FINAL LIMITATION ON TIME BUT ARRANGEMENT OF TIME

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, are you now proceeding on the theory that the committee may control the disposition of the members' time? Hitherto I thought you had proceeded on the theory that it did require unanimous consent.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not quite sure I understood the Senator's question.

Senator BREWSTER. I thought when this matter came up some time ago you indicated you thought any limitation would require unanimous consent.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, no.

Senator BREWSTER. You are not taking that position?

Chairman RUSSELL. No; not that I know of. I think that the committee certainly has a right to arrange rules for the questioning of witnesses. My own view is that there should not be any limitation on a Senator who wants to ask questions. I see no objection whatever though to chopping it up into 30-minute periods as we have done heretofore.

Senator BREWSTER. You feel that that fact that there is an open end takes care of the question that——

Chairman RUSSELL. That is my own view; yes. That is the reason I have stated here a half dozen times since these various matters have been discussed that I would oppose any limitation on Senators, it would have to be imposed by unanimous consent but I think as far as arranging the order of the questioning, that is a matter that is wholly within the purview of the committee.

I am not sure that the committee could not do the other, but I would be opposed very much to doing it from my own standpoint.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask a parliamentary question about the motion. Senator McMahon has offered an amendment which is up now. Is it proper to offer an amendment now providing that members under the 15-minute rule may yield their time as they will on each round of questions, or should I wait until action on Senator McMahon's amendment has been taken?

Chairman RUSSELL. You can do it either way. You can amend a motion but you cannot amend an amendment to an amendment and the Senator could either offer it after the disposition of the McMahon amendment or he could offer it to the McMahon amendment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I would like to offer—all right, I will wait.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question then occurs to the McMahon amendment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Please state it.

Chairman RUSSELL. The McMahon amendment is that with the exception of the Secretary of State, that until this committee orders otherwise, that each Senator be limited to 15 minutes of questioning of each individual witness on each round.

Those of you who favor the amendment will say "aye."

(Chorus of ayes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed will say "no."

Senator WILEY. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes appear to have it and the amendment is agreed to.

YIELDING TIME TO OTHER SENATORS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if it is proper I would like to offer an amendment that any member on any particular round of questioning, any member if present—and I think it is only fair to add that the members must be present in order to yield his time, to keep a member from being absent and farming out his time—that any member present on any one round may yield any portion of his 15 minutes or of the time allotted to him to any other member to be added to that member's time of questioning on that round in the discretion of the member so surrendering.

Senator BYRD. Does that just mean one member yielding?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, to make an illustration, suppose Senator Smith is pursuing a line of questioning on his time and I elect to waive my time on that round to him and let him continue to be on the limitation that he would normally have, whatever time I yield him—5 minutes, 10 minutes, or whatever he would want—that would preclude me then, I would be surrendering my time on that round of questions.

Senator BYRD. But a number could yield to one Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; any number could yield to one Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator yield for a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In other words, there is only a certain amount of time allotted to the whole committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think the Senator's suggestion of the member being present is an excellent one. Does he mean by that that if for instance I am present on Tuesday afternoon and my time comes up on Wednesday morning, that I can say to the chairman on Tuesday afternoon that I yield my time on Wednesday morning to the Senator?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the Senator must be present at the time he yields his time to the person who is questioning at that time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think that is right. That is what I wanted to bring out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not yield time by proxy or yield it tomorrow.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I wondered if the Senator would—and I think I support it—limit it to one round. This could not go on indefinitely. I do not mind at all a fellow being given 30 minutes or an hour.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see no reason not to limit it to the first round.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would go along with that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because a 15-minute rule is a drastic rule, and if a person gets into a line of questioning that he is just developing, I think if some other member then wants to yield him his time and says, "You can have my time or a certain portion of it to pursue this," he will surrender it, he ought to be able to do it at least on the first round, and if that is satisfactory I will limit it to the first round.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

Senator HUNT. I would just like to interpolate, Mr. Chairman, that I can't see how anybody would lose any of their own time under that arrangement unless you limit the number of rounds, because I might yield my time once or twice and still demand a third round and a fourth round, and I would still get all of my time aside from yielding previously to whoever requested I yield to them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is no limitation on the number of rounds anyway.

Senator HUNT. My point is, if you are going to allow the motion, you should put a limit on the number of rounds.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't think that follows.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

INTERPRETATION OF MOTION TO YIELD TIME TO OTHER SENATORS

Senator STENNIS. Under the amendment proposed now a man would have to yield all of his 15 minutes?

Senator LODGE. Any part.

Senator STENNIS. I can yield 5 minutes to Senator Hunt and then pick up 10 minutes, if I am recognized, I can take up 10 minutes myself, and next time yield to someone else; is that right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. First round only.

Senator STENNIS. If you limit it that way, that in effect nullifies the 15-minute rule, the operation of it, it seems to me.

The 15-minute rule, as I see it, is to make a man concentrate on what he is saying, and the points he wants to make, and condense it if necessary and hasten the matter along without putting real limitations on anybody.

Senator JOHNSON. Will the Senator yield?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Senator JOHNSON. It seems to me that it puts the man at the bottom of the table at another disadvantage. For instance, suppose it is my time to question and Senator Long and Senator Stennis yield me their time and I take the 45 minutes and then that puts this side of the table way ahead of Senator Brewster and some of them on the other side of the table.

Senator Stennis yields me his 15 minutes, then Senator Long has to wait.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, are you ready for the question?

Senator BREWSTER. Since my name was brought into it, I do not feel greatly aggrieved as I did not ask a question until we had 2,596 pages of testimony.

Senator CAIN. Question.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair wishes to state that he has had difficulty keeping up with this time. I am not taking any position on this, don't care how you vote, but if the Chair happens to make an error on somebody's time of 2 or 3 minutes, I hope the members affected will be tolerant with the Chair.

Senator CAIN. State the motion, please.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question is on the amendment by the Senator from Iowa, Mr. Hickenlooper, that on the first round of questioning any Senator who is present may yield all or such part of his time as he sees fit to any other member for the purpose of asking questions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who is at that time questioning.

Chairman RUSSELL. To the member who is at that time questioning.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for this interpretation? Can a member use part of his time and reserve the balance and then later yield it to somebody else on the first round under this motion or after he——

Chairman RUSSELL. I would not think he could under this motion, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think you are right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those of you who favor the amendment of the Senator from Iowa will say "Aye."

(A chorus of ayes.)

Noes?

(A chorus of noes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The noes appear to have it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May we have a showing of hands?

Chairman RUSSELL. Let's have a roll call.

The CLERK. Mr. George?

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

The CLERK. Mr. Green?

Chairman CONNALLY. No. I have his proxy.

The CLERK. Mr. McMahon?

Senator McMAHON. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Gillette?

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Wiley?

Senator WILEY. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith?

Senator SMITH. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Lodge?

Senator LODGE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Tobey?

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Byrd?

Senator BYRD. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Kefauver?

Senator KEFAUVER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hunt?

Senator HUNT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Long?

Senator LONG. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Saltonstall?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Morse?

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Cain?

Senator CAIN. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Flanders?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have his proxy. I vote "aye."

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. No.

The CLERK. Those recorded in the affirmative—George, Fulbright, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Brewster, Bridges, Saltonstall, Flanders.

Those recorded in the negative—Messrs. Green, McMahon, Lodge, Chairman Connally, Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Knowland, Cain, the chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. On the amendment proposed by the Senator from Iowa the ayes are 10 and the nayes are 13 and the amendment is rejected.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

LIMIT ON NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AS WELL AS TIME

Senator WILEY. I desire to bring to the attention of the committee at this time a suggestion I have for an amendment. After listening to the discussion here, in view of the recent vote, I would like to amend the amendment to provide so that you get 15 minutes or 10 questions—either one or the other. The witness might go into a dissertation which would preclude what you are trying to develop. By the recent vote you have taken it out of the hands of the questioner to pursue his course if one member of his own side wanted him to pursue it. I think in 10 questions each one could write out his questions and you would have many very brief, but he could probably develop with the 10 questions the particular ideas he wants to bring out. Otherwise, it seems to me, you have placed a limitation here in the procedure that is going to operate to prevent a lot of what we are trying to do instead of getting at the truth of the facts. I think that procedure is ineffective.

So, I move that amendment or 10 questions by each member of the committee.

Chairman CONNALLY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, isn't it easily understood that from our experience here that instead of a question, a questioner makes a speech to the witness and he goes on and tells all about so-and-so, and so-and-so, and so-and-so; and if he can do that 10 times, we may be here all afternoon. [Laughter.] So, I am opposed to that amendment.

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that the dispute arises because he is shutting these witnesses off after he has asked a question or two. How about a substitute for that by granting the privilege of telling the witness when he has told him enough?

Senator WILEY. I did not get what the suggestion was.

Senator LONG. How about a substitute for that in having this committee granting Senator Wiley the privilege of telling the witness when he has given the witness the question—told him when it is enough?

Senator WILEY. There may be pertinency to your question, but if you will read what I said, you will see it does not follow what Senator Connally says.

Chairman CONNALLY. You never do. [Laughter.]

Senator WILEY. I have never gone into any dissertation on the subject. I think there is validity to my question, to my statement, because now you are sending out to the public by this record the fact that you are really limiting your investigatory powers here in rather a stringent way.

Now, how long does it take, did you say 15 minutes—how long, how many hours, when you come around to the second round—6 or 8 hours afterward. I think there is merit to my suggestion; and that is the only reason I make it.

Chairman RUSSELL. There is something I would like to say. As one who has been here practically during every moment of these hearings, I wish to pay testimony to the fact that the Senator from Wisconsin is not the worst offender along the lines suggested by the Senator from Texas; but, of course, there is no limit to the time that can be consumed in asking questions, and some Senators have had rather long prefatory statements, and not the Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator WILEY. I have made my point clear that it is only in the public interest that we are here. I feel that there is merit in my position.

I think also, gentlemen, that it would mean that each one of us would give a little study to our questions and get them down very succinctly, and try to develop the point we are trying to bring out.

Chairman CONNALLY. May I say a word, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is recognized.

Chairman CONNALLY. Let me illustrate what I was trying to tell you awhile ago. Here is a question, say, "Now, General Bradley, you testified on the day before yesterday that so-and-so, and so-and-so, the Chiefs of Staff sent messages.

"Now, General Collins was also on the stand and he testified a little differently from you. He testified so-and-so, and so-and-so, and so on; and General Vandenberg came along the following day, and he testified so-and-so, and so-and-so, and so on; and then Admiral Sherman was here and he didn't quite agree, and he testified so-and-so, and so-and-so, and so-and-so. Now, would you care to comment on that?"

That could be done 10 times under this motion. [Laughter.]

MERITS OF MOTION TO LIMIT NUMBER OF QUESTIONS

Senator WILEY. I can agree that in any procedure that those who do not play the game as it should be played can violate rules, possibly; but I think we are here to bring out the facts. The suggestion I made, as I say, has merit; otherwise you are limiting the right of a

Senator to pursue what he thinks is a very important matter; and if you limit it to 15 minutes, anyone who is any good at questioning can certainly get 10 questions in very quickly without all the repetition that you say; and if someone violates it, why, of course, it is up to him, I suppose, to feel whether he is playing the game as we have laid the rules down.

Senator CONNALLY. He can have another round. I can ask you more in 15 minutes than you can answer all day.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. I recognize the Senator from Iowa first.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think there is not only merit but complete justice in the suggestion of the Senator from Wisconsin. It is entirely possible that on rare occasions out of 26 members there may be some abuse of the 10-question idea; as I have watched this committee work, I think almost every member invariably asks more than 10 questions in 15 minutes.

I still say that this is a committee of inquiry to find facts on one of the most important questions that this country has faced for many years, anyway.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And I think we can well take the chance there will not be any widespread abuse of the 10-question idea; and, certainly, I hope we do not go out of here with the idea that we are trying to throttle the inquiry rights of members.

I do not believe any member wants to do that, but I see no reason for not putting the 10-question rule into effect, and then trusting to the members that they will use every discretion to attempt to avoid any abuse of other member's time or of the rule.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I will yield.

HOW TO DETERMINE WHAT IS A QUESTION

Senator FULBRIGHT. There is one thing that bothers me. I am not particularly interested in this strict limitation, but about this criterion, it seems to me unenforceable or practically so because of the difficulty of determining when is a question a question. We have had this on the floor time and time again.

We are going to have the chairman decide what is a question or a statement. If he makes a statement and does not qualify it by asking a question, he is going to be on the hot spot as to whether or not it was a question in the right form, and determine how many were answered. It seems to me an unenforceable rule, and that is the objection I have. I do not care about the amount of time. I believe the chairman would find it very difficult to identify each time each question.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Senator BREWSTER. I am going to make one comment with respect to what the Senator from Texas said. This was a wise observation, which came from a great Democrat, Tom Walsh, who said if a power is to be denied because it may be abused, then Government must cease.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair is ready to submit the question, and before I do so I want to say I do not care how you vote on this, but I do not like to leave the inference in the record that we are throttling this inquiry, because the Chair has consistently, since the moment this inquiry opened, insisted that every member should under any procedure adopted have ample opportunity to ask any question that might be on his mind.

CHOICE TO ASK 10 QUESTIONS OR USE 15 MINUTES

The question now recurs to the motion of the Senator from Wisconsin that each Senator may be entitled to elect whether he will ask 10 questions or whether he will examine for 15 minutes. Did the Chair correctly state the motion?

Senator **Wiley.** My thought was, Mr. Chairman, that one consume—for instance, if in the interrogating for 15 minutes he asked 5 questions, the 15 minutes would be used up. If he asked 10 questions, and did not get the answers, why, he would not be limited to the 15 minutes.

Chairman **Russell.** I understood that. I said he could elect whether he could ask 10 questions without limitation as to time or would abide by the 15-minute rule.

Senator **Wiley.** Yes.

Chairman **Russell.** If that is not a correct statement, I want to get it correct.

Senator **Smith.** He would have to elect before he began questioning, would he not?

Suppose the 15 minutes runs out?

Chairman **Russell.** I certainly thought he did, because I see no reason for having two rules, either a time limit or a question limit.

Senator **Fulbright.** How do you intend to enforce it?

Chairman **Russell.** It would be impossible for the Chair to undertake to proceed until he had knowledge of whether we were to proceed under the 15-minute rule, or——

Senator **Brewster.** I assumed the chairman would have someone numbering the questions, and if he asked 15 questions, the Chair would then——

ENFORCEMENT OF NUMBER AND TIME LIMIT

Chairman **Russell.** Unfortunately the Chair has to assume that responsibility. He has to count those questions, because someone here has to be responsible, because if he did not ask the full number, then he immediately would be allowed another question.

Senator **Brewster.** If there is any question, the record is quite clear, and I assumed that the chairman had not kept the time, didn't you have someone do that for you?

Chairman **Russell.** I have had Dr. Wilcox keeping time, and so do I, and we check with each other from time to time. I check with him in case I have to step out a minute or so, to see what time the Senator started his questioning, and I put that down here; and I had, until the noon hour today, a pile of notes, such as "Brewster, 3:22," or "Brewster, 10 o'clock," which is the time, I believe, that the Senator started. In that way, I have been keeping track of the time of the members.

The Senator from Washington.

Senator **Cain.** May I ask this question:

Regardless of whether the Wiley motion is approved, or fails of passage, isn't it so that every Senator will have an opportunity for as many additional rounds of questioning as he desires?

Chairman RUSSELL. As many questions as he desires.

The only thing that would happen under the rule is that it is distributed about, around the table for a while before he has a chance to do it; but if he is willing to sit here as a dutiful member of the committee, he can ask as many questions as his physical and mental strength will allow him to propound.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes?

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation?

Any other interpretation or ruling except that which you have enunciated would nullify the action we just took.

Chairman RUSSELL. I want the Senator from Wisconsin to state his motion again.

Senator WILEY. Well, my motion was that—to the amendment that was just adopted, there be added to it:

"or 15 questions."

Senator SALTONSTALL. Ten questions.

Senator WILEY. Ten; I beg pardon.

There wasn't anything in there that he would have to elect.

Chairman RUSSELL. How on earth would the Chair know whether he was proceeding under the time limit, or the 10 questions?

Senator WILEY. Well, of course——

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean you want me to keep the time and count his questions, too?

Senator WILEY. He might not use 5 minutes, or he might use 10 minutes.

It might be that if he had his questions all down, that he would not have 15 questions to ask.

Now, my whole thought is that it operates as a restriction on a right—the committee can impose it—upon the Senator inquiring into a very important matter. I don't think anyone is going to abuse it.

I would say that if someone thinks it should be five questions or 15 minutes, it is all right with me, because I think what you are doing is you are making a record here where there is going to be a lot of misinterpretation, to say the least, and that we are agreeing to something that limits a Senator. You have limited it before to a half hour and it worked probably fairly good.

I was right in the midst of a series of questions, if you will remember, a little while before when we precipitated an argument, and I did on the second round catch up what I wanted to pursue before.

If I had had probably 15 minutes additional, I could have closed out and probably had no questions on even the second or third rounds.

Senator LONG. I move we make it five, if the chairman would accept it.

Chairman RUSSELL. That matter has to be clarified before the Chair can undertake to enforce it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I just happen to be reading in the record, and I would like to read a very brief question and let the chairman tell me if this is one question or several questions:

> You say fighting and negotiating. It is perhaps unfair to ask you, but with whom are we to negotiate? Perhaps we ought to ask that of Dean Acheson. Have you any notion of your own with whom we are to negotiate? Is it with some North Korean government? Is it with the Chinese? Or is it with the Russians?

Is that one question or six?

Chairman RUSSELL. If the Chair is to be confronted with a question like that——

Senator SPARKMAN. That is my point.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Supposing the Chair read a long letter and it wasn't a question at all. How would you rule on that? Suppose I read a long letter that took 10 minutes. Would that be a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I am frank to say I am somewhat confused as to the question I am placing before the committee. Those of you who favor Senator Wiley's amendment will say "aye."

(There was a chorus of "ayes.")

Chairman RUSSELL. Opposed, "no."

(There was a chorus of "noes.")

Chairman RUSSELL. The "noes" appear to have it.

Chairman CONNALLY. The "noes" have it.

Chairman RUSSELL. The "noes" have it, and the amendment is lost, and the question reverts to the motion by the Senator from Massachusetts, as amended. Those of you who favor that motion——

Senator SMITH. The Senator from Iowa.

THE LODGE MOTION AS AMENDED

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator from Massachusetts, as amended, Mr. Lodge.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to say for the record that I am now opposed to the motion by the Senator from Massachusetts, as finally it ended up, without the adoption of some of these other amendments, because I think it is a drastic limitation on the right to inquire, and I think it is unwarranted and I shall oppose it.

Senator WILEY. The Senator from Iowa expressed my view very clearly. I think, as I said before, you are making a serious mistake to start out with a half hour and limit us to 15 minutes; so I will vote "no."

Chairman RUSSELL. The clerk will call the roll.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will the Chair please state the question?

Chairman RUSSELL. If I understand the proposition as it now is before the committee, it is that until the committee determines otherwise, with the exception of the examination of the Secretary of State, in which each Senator shall be allowed 30 minutes on each round, that in the examination of all other witnesses the Senators will be limited to 15 minutes on each round, and that there is no limit on the number of rounds that can be taken.

Now, those of you who favor the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts, when your names are called, vote "aye"; those opposed vote "no," and the clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. George.

Senator GEORGE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Green.

Chairman CONNALLY. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. McMahon.

Senator McMAHON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Gillette.

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Wiley.

Senator WILEY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith.

Senator SMITH. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Lodge.

Senator LODGE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Tobey.

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hunt.

Senator HUNT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Long.

Senator LONG. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Morse.

(No response.)

The CLERK. Mr. Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Cain.

Senator CAIN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Flanders.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman Russell.

Chairman RUSSELL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, those in favor are Senators George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Smith, Lodge, Brewster, Chairman Connally, Senators Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, Cain, Flanders, and Russell. Opposed are Senators Wiley and Hickenlooper.

Chairman RUSSELL. According to the vote on the Senator from Massachusetts, the "ayes" are 21, the "nays" are 2; and the motion is therefore agreed to.

HICKENLOOPER MOTION TO EXAMINE ACHESON NEXT

The question now coming up is under Senator Hickenlooper's resolution. We have prepared some copies of it, and if any of you don't have a copy, there is one available for you.

The question is on the resolution. Are you gentlemen ready to vote?

Senator WILEY. May it be restated? That is quite a long instrument..

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper, will you read it?

Chairman CONNALLY. He doesn't need to read it.

Chairman RUSSELL. It reads as follows:

> Mr. Chairman, I move that at the conclusion of the current questioning of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a copy of the testimony of General Bradley, Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall be furnished to Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, to Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and to Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, with the request that they each examine the testimony of the three witnesses named and indicate in writing to the committee what tesimony of each of said witnesses they agree with and what testimony they do not find themselves in agreement with, together with their own views and answers in such cases, and together with such amplification of any answers to questions propounded to the three witnesses as they, each Chief of Staff, desires to give in his own independent testimony; that the said Chiefs of Staff be requested to respond as above outlined at the earliest practicable date, not later, however, than Monday, June 4, 1951; that following the conclusion of the current testimony of General Bradley the next witness to be called be the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, followed by such witnesses as the committee may direct thereafter, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be not called before the committee until such time in the future as the committee may see fit to direct.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the author of the amendment if he is willing to modify the motion so that the testimony, the written summary furnished by the three Chiefs of Staff, will be under oath and make it conform with the other.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I think that is a very proper procedure, to have it put under oath, the same as any other witness. There is no need for accepting their testimony or statements without having them be under oath.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

MODIFICATION OF THE MOTION

Senator LODGE. For reasons I have previously stated I would be opposed to not having the Chiefs appear before this committee, but I would have no objection whatever to calling Secretary Acheson now and if the Senator from Iowa would be willing to modify his amendment so that it simply constitutes a provision to call Secretary Acheson now before we hear the Chiefs, then I could support that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Massachusetts has just suggested that to me 2 minutes ago, and I said that so far as I was concerned, that would completely meet my objectives of being able to go in now to the policy-making field of this matter. I am perfectly willing to modify my motion just to the simple effect that the next witness called be Secretary of State Acheson, and that will eliminate the question of submitting questions in writing in response, and it could be stated, I think, as follows:

That following the conclusion of the current testimony of General Bradley——

Chairman RUSSELL. You needn't worry about that. It is over for this time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then I will just make the motion as follows: That the next witness to be called be the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, followed by such witnesses as the committee may direct therafter—period.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, do you understand the motion?

ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF TESTIMONY

Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to speak briefly to the motion. My impression is that in asking questions of General Bradley many questions were passed over which he said he felt we ought to ask the individual Chiefs.

Now, the result is if we should adopt this motion, that we would be virtually stopping a regular process of developing testimony.

In other words, it is just the same as if we had cut off General Bradley in the middle of his testimony and had brought somebody else in. Yes, it is almost as incomplete as that, because if you go through the record, you will find many, many questions that he asked us to hold until the individual Chiefs came up.

Senator KNOWLAND. Will the Senator yield?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. As a matter of fact, isn't that precisely what we did on the Marshall matter? Now, we didn't get around or at least I never got my second round with General Marshall, although some people did. I have at least 8 or 10 questions that I still wanted to develop, but I thought they left some things unsaid by General Marshall.

He had to go down to this Virginia Military Institute affair, which we all agreed to, so we took him off the second round, and didn't complete that, didn't get into his third round, and brought General Bradley here.

Senator SPARKMAN. There is some element of the same argument in what the Senator says, I admit. However, remember, we did complete one or two rounds of General Marshall. No questions were passed over.

Chairman RUSSELL. As I understand it, there was no limitation at the time General Marshall was here. The 30-minute limitation was imposed later, and the one round covered the field, as far as any Senator desired. Some Senators examined for an hour.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is correct, but in the case of General Bradley we were examining him as one of four, and in other words we were simply considering the four of them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, also as if it were one. And it seems to me that if we left off now, it would be leaving it hanging, and furthermore, Mr. Chairman, a good many of these questions that we passed over at General Bradley's request we probably could have pressed for an answer out of him. He probably could have obtained the information for us, but we passed it on the assumption that the individual Chiefs were coming next. I remember several time he would say, "It is my understanding General Collins will be the next witness on the stand and I would rather you would wait and ask him that directly."

It seems to me that the orderly thing for us to do, the orderly manner in which to develop the testimony in this case would be to continue with the individual Chiefs of Staff.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

MOVING ON TO DIPLOMATIC MATTERS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Might I just say a word. I would be in favor of Senator Hickenlooper's suggestion for just the reasons that Senator Sparkman has given. Now I believe that we have gotten the military testimony from General Marshall, we have gotten it from General Bradley, and the matters that are hanging fire mostly now in my mind are matters that have come from the Department of State and from the diplomatic side, and when we get those matters from the diplomatic side, it seems to me that we will have much more information on which to go at intelligently the remaining technical military matters that we would like to get from the Chiefs' side.

Senator JOHNSON. Will the Senator yield? I have been trying to find out since the first day General MacArthur recommended his program what forces would be required to carry it out, and that is the military program and we would need to put it into execution, and I think the record will show that no one has shown that with any exactness before this committee.

General MacArthur said he thought maybe it would take a couple of extra air groups. General Marshall passed it to the Joint Chiefs. General Bradley passed it down to the Chiefs.

Now we are considering what we are going to do about the MacArthur recommendations, and before we find out how many men, how many ships, how many planes will be required, we abandon the military side of the inquiry and start chasing off in some other direction. I think it is poor procedure.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, in holding a contrary view to that of Mr. Sparkman and Mr. Johnson, I would only like to say this. It is true that General MacArthur, General Marshall, and General Bradley deferred many questions to the Secretary of State, not the least of which is that General Bradley this morning testified that all negotiations concerning additional troop contributions from our allies in western Europe to Korea was in the hands of the State Department, and speaking only for myself, the sooner I get a clarification from the Secretary as to whether we are or are not going to get any more fighting forces in Korea, the better pleased and satisfied I shall be. For that reason I expect to support the motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. We will have a roll call, but I think that the Chair—and I want to state that I do not care anything about the order of witnesses—just to keep you advised as to what has been done, when we had the organization meeting on April 30 the following statement was made in arriving at the agenda:

> General MacArthur will be the first witness. He will be followed by Secretary of Defense Marshall and in the ordinary course of events by the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will, of course, hear Secretary Acheson and other witnesses.

The Chair does not care anything about the order in which the witnesses are called, but I thought I ought to apprise you of what had been done in the committee.

Senator Fulbright?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I just want to observe that these people have other things to do than testify. It seems to me that we ought to dispose of the Chiefs of Staff for no other reason than to let them go about their business.

I am sure this inquiry has already upset the Military Establishment considerably. It is true that this is an important matter, but I think we are at a point where we could dispose of these Joint Chiefs fairly rapidly because of the background we have had on military testimony in the last 2 weeks. And so on the grounds of efficiency particularly I think we ought to go on and get rid of them. Then the committee can take all the time with the Secretary of State it wants to. Otherwise you have got the military sitting around here waiting for us to get to them.

Chairman RUSSELL. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. George.

Senator GEORGE. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Green.

Chairman RUSSELL. This is Senator Hickenlooper's motion to call Secretary Acheson as the next witness.

Mr. DARDEN. Senator Green.

Chairman CONNALLY. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. McMahon.

Senator McMAHON. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Gillette.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Wiley.

Senator WILEY. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Smith.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have Mr. Smith's proxy. "Aye."

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Lodge.

Senator LODGE. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Tobey.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have Mr. Tobey's proxy. "Aye."

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Brewster.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have Mr. Brewster's proxy. "Aye."

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Byrd.

Senator BYRD. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Hunt.

Senator HUNT. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Long.

Senator KEFAUVER. I have his proxy. "No."

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Morse.

This letter was just handed to me, addressed to me—

> If the committee votes on the motion of Senator Hickenlooper to call Secretary Acheson before the Joint Chiefs of Staff are called, please vote me "no."
>
> Sincerely,
>
> WAYNE MORSE.

No.

I have not been handling proxies but this letter is directed to me with the direct directions as to how to vote.

The CLERK. Mr. Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Cain?

Senator CAIN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Flanders?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. No.

The CLERK. The Senators recorded in the affirmative: Messrs. Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Tobey, Brewster, Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, Cain, Flanders.

Senators recorded in the negative: Messrs. George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Chairman Connally, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Kefauver, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Stennis, Mr. Long, Mr. Morse, and Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes are 11 and the noes are 14, and the motion is therefore lost.

ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Now, gentlemen, I want to take the liberty of bringing something to your attention here. I have never seen such attendance at any committee hearings since I have been a Member of the Senate as we had for the first 4 or 5 days. It has fallen off tremendously in the past 2 or 3 days. I do not say that in any critical vein because I know that members have other duties. I might add, incidentally, I have quite a few I would like to be tending to, too.

Some of the members have been very diligent in their attendance here. I will not undertake the invidious by naming them. But I do think that one way we lose time is when Senators are not here when they are called on, and we go all around those who are here, and then the Senator will come in without having known what was asked and undertake to examine the witness.

I do not want to deny any Senator of this committee any right that he has, but it does seem to me that Senators could either be a little more regular in their attendance here or else be willing to forego questioning when they have not heard the questions that have already been propounded.

I am perfectly willing to stay here, but I like the company of other Senators. I like to have a large attendance. I like to enjoy the companionship of all of the members of this committee.

PROPOSAL ON SENATORS MISSING THEIR TURN OF QUESTIONING

I wonder if the Senators would be willing to either get excused from the committee on their first round of questioning—if they have something that will not permit them to be here, get excused in advance, or else whether they would be willing to wait until all other Senators had completed their examination before they propound their questions.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, do we have the authority to lay down a rule in the absence of my colleague from Oregon, Mr. Morse?

Chairman RUSSELL. I regret the Senator's absence. I would he was here. I assume he has reasons he thinks are good ones for not being here.

Senator CAIN. Having a quorum, if we do come to a conclusion, it is binding on all members of both committees?

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry there. I thought if a Senator was not here he missed his time and went to the foot of the round.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, he does. But what I was thinking is to let the other members of the committee who had been here complete their examination here before he gets his time.

Senator BRIDGES. If I am not here, you just pass over me and go completely around and I lose my time, do I not?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. Until the others have their opportunity?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, unless you get unanimous consent that you be excused. A number of Senators have done that.

Senator BRIDGES. How different do you propose that?

Chairman RUSSELL. I propose all the members complete their rounds before that Senator is allowed to examine unless he got excused.

Senator BRIDGES. You mean all the rounds?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, that is right.

Senator BRIDGES. Not just the first round?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. After all the rounds?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He would just get one shot at it then?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator BRIDGES. I would not want to agree with that. I think it is perfectly all right to miss one round.

Chairman RUSSELL. He does not miss any rounds now. He can come in at any time he sees fit.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not believe you understand the import of his question there, or Senator Bridges' either. I understood your answer to be that if he misses his time on the first round then he would not come in until the very last.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right

Senator SPARKMAN. You mean that is all rounds?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

Senator BRIDGES. I do not agree with that. It is perfectly all right for him to go to the foot after the first round, but that would mean he might not be heard for 10 days.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And only once for 15 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is the reason I said you did not catch the significance of their remarks.

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not intend to say that.

Senator SPARKMAN. You mean to lose out on that one round?

Chairman RUSSELL. He does that now.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, with the exception of the chairman, of those who have been in steady attendance here I think among the members I have had at least a fairly good batting average of attendance at the meetings. But I frankly would not want to agree to that because there are some members who do have pressing matters. As you know we do have the Appropriations Committee going, and there are other committees of importance. While I think it is entirely proper that the senior man would lose his place in the round and go to the foot of the table, so to speak, I think it would be working a burden which we should not place upon him if he would have to go to the bottom of two or three rounds, and maybe because of a matter of greater urgency such as the marking up of an appropriation bill.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, if he has got a committee meeting, he can get excused from this committee and would not lose any round at all. I am not going to press it if the members are opposed to it. I might say I also have some other matters I would like to attend to. I happen to be a member of the Appropriations Committee, a member of two committees marking up bills yesterday and today. I also have responsibility for handling the agricultural appropriations bill, and I am very anxious to get on as well with the conference report on the manpower bill. But it is a little discouraging, particularly, to have members come in who have not heard the questions and then proceed to ask almost identically the questions that have just been propounded to the witness. Some of these questions have been asked as many as seven or eight times—the identical questions. At times the witness has read from the same document on as many as five times, and two or three times, as many as four times he has read from identically the same document.

I do not want to impose my views on this committee. That is the farthest thing from my thoughts. But I do think that the members of the committee who attend here regularly are entitled to some consideration.

Senator KNOWLAN. Will the Senator yield?

Chairman RUSSELL. I am through.

Senator KNOWLAND. Might we not at least—and I can see how the Senator had in mind. I did not understand that the member could ask to be excused, and, if excused, that penalty would not apply.

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh, yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am inclined to believe this new 15-minute rule of ours may step up the attendance. Let us try it for a day or so, and then if it does not, the Senator might propound his proposition again.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am perfectly willing to try the 15-minute rule, and I threw that out as a suggestion. But I still think that those who have to stay here all the time are entitled to a little prioriy on this matter of examination.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, if the same question is asked about five times, could not the Chair rule that question has been answered?

Chairman RUSSELL. That would not be satisfactory to the Senators who have not been here, he has not heard the answers, or he has not read the record.

Chairman CONNALLY. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Chairman CONNALLY. The Senators that are here hear these things repetitiously four or five times. They will be examined on the same point. For a Senator to come in that has not been here and go back over that, is that not abuse of the members that are here that are listening? I think it is.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not know about it being abuse, but I know it gets awfully tiresome at times to those that have to stay.

Well, I hope, gentlemen, we will have a little better attendance than we have had in the last day or two.

Is there anything further to come before the committee?

Senator KNOWLAND. When do we meet again?

Chairman RUSSELL. We meet in the morning at 10.

Senator LODGE. Will General Collins be the witness?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes; General Collins will be here as the witness.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do we meet all day tomorrow?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, we intend to meet all day.

The committee will recess until 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon at 4:50 p. m. the hearing was adjourned to reconvene on Friday, May 25, 1951 at 10 a. m.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Kefauver, Stennis, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Knowland, and Cain.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, the committee will come to order.

The committee today has the privilege of having with us as our witness Gen. J. Lawton Collins, who gained the sobriquet of "Lightning Joe" in World War II.

As the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins has the heavy responsibility of directing the world-wide activity of our ground forces. He is the one who bears the responsibility for getting our foot soldiers, our tanks, and our artillery to the points where they are needed, when they are needed.

General Collins is a very important witness before this committee for a number of reasons. In the first place, it is the Army ground forces which have borne the brunt of the fighting in Korea. That is inevitable under the conditions that exist in Korea; and, in addition, as Napoleon said, the infantry is the queen of battle.

Despite the present developments in the use of new techniques, in the field of military science, it is still the old footslogger who has to go up front and take a piece of ground away from the enemy before a battle can be won.

In addition, General Collins has been to the Far East at least once and perhaps more often during the time the war has been in progress in Korea.

General Collins. Four times.

Chairman Russell. Four times, he tells me, since the outbreak of the hostilities there. He has been there when many of the events that we have been discussing have taken place. He can give us a first-hand picture as can few other men.

General Collins, in accordance with the committee rule, I am required to administer the oath to all witnesses. You will therefore stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence which you are about to give this committee upon the matters under inquiry will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General Collins. I do.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, I thought I might suggest that on the committee's time General Collins might take 5 or 10 minutes to bring us up to date on the fighting in Korea. I did not know whether the members of the committee would be interested in that, but I thought he might give us a little briefing such as he sometimes gives the Armed Services Committee on the fighting before he starts answering questions.

Senator Wiley. I would allow him 10.

Chairman Russell. Beg pardon?

Senator Wiley. You say 5 or 10. I would allow him 10.

Chairman Russell. Thank you for your generosity. The general told me he has no prepared statement. I thought we would all be interested in knowing something about current conditions there according to the last reports from the front line.

Will you proceed, General?

TESTIMONY OF GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. MILES REBER, CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, AND LT. COL. MALCOLM F. GILCHRIST, JR., STAFF OFFICER, GENERAL STAFF

CURRENT BATTLE SITUATION

General Collins. It is unfortunate that this covering that we have catches the light. Some of you may not be able to see too well, but I would like quickly to review the situation since the 22d of April when this spring offensive of the Chinese took off.

This green line is the line that was held by the United Nations forces as of that date. This is Seoul right here, and the thirty-eighth parallel is the red line that runs across here. The buildup of the Chinese forces, we had kept tab on it and knew pretty well that their major effort would be made over here in the western part of the front. This area over here is the relatively low flat rice paddy area. From about here on the east it is terribly mountainous and exceedingly difficult country and there are no north and south roads through these mountains.

[Deleted.]

Now, one of the British brigades was thrown in and did a perfectly magnificant job in holding that breach, while General Van Fleet shifted his reserves in order to contain this penetration.

That was successfully done, and the Chinese then were brought to a halt, and with a tremendous number of casualties; so, they had to fall back again.

[Deleted.]

They renewed the attack here, just shortly, again, and they shifted the weight of the Chinese forces from the low ground, where they hadn't made any success, and, for the first time, moving in strength east of this reservoir.

This is the Hwachon Reservoir here, and through our active probing we were able to keep in contract with that. General Van Fleet made a very accurate estimate of where he thought the attack would come.

[Deleted.]

General Van Fleet had properly disposed his reservies so that when that thing broke, he shifted this magnificent Second Division of ours, which has plugged three of these gaps in succession, and each time has done a perfectly wonderful job.

He had to assist them also with elements of our Third Infantry Division. Once again that gap has been plugged, and we have passed again to the counteroffensive, and the Chinese are in pretty complete retreat along the front.

[Deleted.]

So again General Van Fleet has, I think, demonstrated his great skill in this sort of operation, carrying on exactly the same broad plan of operations which General Ridgway had initiated when he took command of the Eighth Army.

EQUIPMENT OF CHINESE REDS

Senator SALTONSTALL. Is their equipment much better this time?

General COLLINS. The Chinese equipment?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Yes.

General COLLINS. They had more artillery this time in the initial attack than we had been subjected to for a long time but they never had had much artillery. They have depended mostly on mortars.

Senator BRIDGES. General, have you captured much of their equipment so that you have knowledge of their various individual pieces of equipment that they are using; where it was manufactured and so forth?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we have.

Senator BRIDGES. Is it pretty nearly all Russian?

General COLLINS. It is mostly Russian; some of it is Japanese stuff which the Russians had taken from the Japanese and then reissued to the Chinese forces. It is a mixture of both.

Senator GEORGE. General, what is their tank strength?

General COLLINS. They are Russian tanks and, of course, in this rough country they cannot operate very many; they cannot operate very many; and whenever they try it over here, we just shoot holes in them; that is all there is to it. We knock them out right and left.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Airplane support?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; with airplane support and also with our own tanks.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I mean, have they.

General COLLINS. No, sir; they have not had any airplane support nor have they had any other——

Senator GILLETTE. Not of any reconnaissance?

ENEMY AIR POWER IN MANCHURIA

General COLLINS. No, sir. Not of any consequence. The Russian air has never come down below this river up here in any strength.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You said Russian air.

General **Collins**. No, sir; Communist air. No, there have been no air——

Senator **Hickenlooper**. You used the word "Russian."

General **Collins**. I am sorry. That was a slip of the tongue, because they have not been in at all. But the Chinese air, some of which we are quite convinced is flown by Russians, is what I am talking about.

Senator **Wiley**. May I ask my question?

General **Collins**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Wiley**. General, there was some testimony the other day or the papers had it that they were building airfields in North Korea, and that a number of airplanes were destroyed on those airfields. Now, where were they located?

General **Collins**. From Pyongyang north—that is a little bit beyond the limits of this map, Senator, Pyongyang is the former capital of the North Koreans, and it is about in here, and they have fields that we have constantly knocked out, and they are constantly rebuilding.

[Deleted.]

They have not done it to any considerable extent in these fields in the south. The other place where we have knocked out their air is Sinuiju, which is near the mouth of the Yalu River, but that is further north.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Here is another thing that has bothered me. I do not mean to take up time on this, but while he has mentioned it, here is a thing which has been bothering me, on why Communist air has not come in; is it possible that the Communist planes, by and large, will have to be operated by Russian personnel rather than Chinese personnel, if they are successful at all, if their tactics and maneuvers are to be successful; and that Russia has been extremely hesitant to have Russian personnel flying over this territory where we could pin the actual participation of Russia in the air in this thing? Is that a reasonable wonder or conjecture?

[Deleted.]

Chairman **Russell**. All right, General. General, do you have any prepared statement or any other statement you desire to make?

General **Collins**. No, sir; I have no prepared statement. I thought that in the interest of expediting our hearing, and rather than take time, I am prepared at once to answer any questions that the committee would like to ask.

CONSULTATION ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Chairman **Russell**. General, were you consulted as to the desirability from a military standpoint to relieve General MacArthur of his several commands in the Pacific?

General **Collins**. Yes, sir, I was.

Chairman **Russell**. Who was the first person to consult with you on that?

General **Collins**. General Bradley notified me on a Sunday that there would be a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his office I think at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. I had not been in the city on the 5th of the month when he had as I understand it from his testimony notified the other Chiefs that they should give some thought to the question as to whether or not General MacArthur should be relieved.

It happened that I had left that morning to go down to the Air War College down at Montgomery and over at Fort Benning for inspection of the Fourth Infantry Division, so I was not present and my participation began on Sunday, I think it was about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Following discussion with General Bradley we then went to General Marshall's office and had a discussion with General Marshall.

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

General COLLINS. I say, following a meeting in General Bradley's office at 2 o'clock, I think it was, we then went to General Marshall's office for a brief conference with him in his office that same day.

Senator WILEY. May we have the day of the month that was?

Chairman RUSSELL. That was Sunday?

General COLLINS. Sunday was the 8th.

Senator WILEY. All right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concur in the opinion that from a military standpoint it was desirable that General MacArthur be relieved of his command?

General COLLINS. I did concur.

REASONS FOR CONCURRING IN MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you state briefly your reasons for that, General?

General COLLINS. Well, there were two principal reasons, Mr. Chairman, in my mind. First of all, it was quite evident to me over a period of time that General MacArthur was not in sympathy with the basic policies that were governing our operations in Korea. I felt that the President, as our Commander in Chief, was entitled to have as a commander in the field a man who was more in sympathy with the basic policies and more responsive to the will of the President as Commander in Chief.

The second major point to my mind was that General MacArthur had failed to comply with instructions that had been issued to him and which directed that he along with all other field commanders clear any public statement that he made which involved matters of policy, or of particularly our foreign policy, and he had failed to comply with those instructions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now you stated first that you thought that General MacArthur lacked sympathy with the plans for carrying on the conflict in Korea. Was that based on communications from General MacArthur in the field or from your conferences with him or both?

General COLLINS. A combination of both, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. You stated, I believe, that you had made four trips to the Far East. That was before the questions started. Does that mean Korea or just to Japan?

General COLLINS. Well, since I have been Chief of Staff I made six trips to the Far East. Four of them involved actual visits to the front in Korea. Two trips were made shortly after I was made Chief of Staff and then the remaining four visits were made subsequent to the outbreak of operations in Korea. Each time I had a full discussion with General MacArthur in Tokyo on arrival there, and then went into the field, and also had another consultation with him on my way out in Tokyo.

Chairman RUSSELL. You, of course, are familiar with the suggestions or recommendations General MacArthur has made and the four points which he outlined in his address to the Congress?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I am.

REASONS FOR SUPPORTING LIMITATIONS ON OPERATIONS IN KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. And you have participated in the adoption of the present program in Korea which limits our bombing operations to the Yalu River and which has not imposed a naval blockade?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And which includes the decision not to use the Chinese Nationalist troops?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you give us, as briefly as possible, your reasons for adhering to those three directives or limitations on the operations against Communist China?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

I think the basic thing at issue, from the Chiefs of Staff's point of view, is our endeavor to limit the conflict in Korea to that specific area.

We have felt, all along, that we went into Korea under the aegis of the United Nations, and that if the conflict were broadened at all, it should be done with the full agreement of the nations participating in the Korean show.

And, furthermore, that if we get into a major war, we would need allies; and if we were to take unilateral action in Korea to broaden the war there, then—not only would there be a possibility of a third world war developing there, but we might very well stand to lose the principal allies whom we certainly would be dependent on in event of a major war.

Now, I feel, with the other Chiefs, that we are not prepared for a major war, as of now; and that the returns that we would get from bombing in Manchuria, risking a naval blockade which, to be eeffctive, we would have to blockade Dairen, for example, would not be worth the increased risk of getting us now into a major war which, from a military point of view, I would certainly not want to see us carry on alone.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, confined strictly to the four recommendations of General MacArthur, then, I understand that political, rather than military considerations caused you to refuse them?

General COLLINS. Not just political reasons; no, sir.

[Deleted.]

So that the return that we would have gotten from bombing into Manchuria, in my opinion, from a military standpoint, did not, or was not worth the gamble that we would be taking.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were there any other military considerations that caused you to conclude that the manner in which we are now conducting the Korean operations are the most desirable from the standpoint of the United States?

EFFECTIVENESS OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE

General COLLINS. Well, as I said a moment ago, I think, to be effective, a naval blockade would have to be participated in by all the United Nations members and it would have to include the port of

Dairen and possibly even the port of Vladivostok.

It happens that I have been into Darien and Port Arthur. I spent 3 years out in the Pacific, back from 1933 to 1936, and had an opportunity to travel fairly extensively, both in China and Japan and, as a matter of fact, down into French Indochina and to Malaya; and I have personally been to both Port Arthur and Dairen.

Dairen is a wholly modern port and can handle a considerable bit of shipping, and is the one nearest to Manchuria, and any naval blockade that did not include the port of Dairen, in my judgment, would not be effective; and when you get into the question of blockading the port of another nation, because, de facto, Dairen is a Russian port today, then that blockade would be a very ticklish thing.

If we were to make it effective, it would be one of those borderline incidents that might well precipitate large-scale war.

Chairman Russell. Has your information as to the air strength available to the Chinese Reds led you to conclude that there would be any danger that attacks from that air force, on our ground troops or forces, would be dangerous, or do we have adequate air there to stop the Chinese air?

[Deleted.]

BACKGROUND OF JCS STUDY OF JANUARY 12

Chairman Russell. General, a great deal of testimony before this committee has centered about a study or a paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated January 12.

I have reviewed the testimony of General MacArthur—on this study it appears on pages 32, 33, and 34 of the hearings, the first day of the hearings. He describes it as a study. For example, he says:

> The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my own so far as I know were practically identical. On January 12 the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a study to the Secretary of Defense embodying these conditions.

He refers to it as a study in his testimony, and in response to questions asked him, he stated that he never had received any directive or that he never was told what disposition was made of the study.

I would like for you to relate your views as to this study and what connection if any you had in discussing it with General MacArthur.

General Collins. I think General Bradley and General Marshall gave the committee a very clear picture of the events leading up to the development of this particular study. The matter was under consideration by the Joint Chiefs as to what additional steps might be taken under varying conditions in Korea for some period of time, and this January 12 study or memorandum—that is what it was—represented the views of the Joint Chiefs of various courses of action that might be taken if it was imperative to take them.

Now when I went out—let me be sure I have got the right trip—I think it was the third trip to Korea and Japan, during the course of our discussions in Tokyo—January 14, I think it was, Senator. I read this memorandum to General MacArthur, and I told him that the various courses of action that were outlined in this study, which included some 15 or 16 various possibilities, were under consideration by authorities in Washington.

Now, I don't remember the exact phrasing, but that is as nearly exact as I have been able to recall it.

Chairman RUSSELL. The time of the Senator from Georgia has expired. Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. I have just one brief question. Can I reserve the balance of my time?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir. You have another round. You can't reserve any of this. You will have another opportunity.

SEPARATION OF TENTH CORPS AND EIGHTH ARMY

Senator CONNALLY. General Collins, I have been puzzled quite a lot about the fact that the armies were separated. The Tenth Corps was over on the east side of Korea and the other forces were on the other side. What was the object in having the armies separated that way?

General COLLINS. Of course, that was a decision taken by General MacArthur, and I don't know definitely what he had in mind. I can give you only what I think he had in mind, Senator. Whether that is of any value to the committee or not, I don't know.

Chairman CONNALLY. I just wondered if in your conversations whether you had ever learned why he thought that was the proper course to pursue.

General COLLINS. Well, in my judgment, it was a proper course to pursue in the initial phases of it because the operation had to be controlled, in my opinion, from General MacArthur's headquarters, because of the fact that the landing at Wonsan was an amphibious operation, and it would have been very difficult for General Walker, who was in command of the Eighth Army at that time—it would have been very difficult for General Walker to have coordinated the action of the naval forces, the air forces and the Tenth Corps in that amphibious landing up in the Wonsan area; so that, I believe, that is why General MacArthur ran the show in the initial phases from Tokyo.

Chairman CONNALLY. Why did it become so critical if it was the wise thing to do in the beginning? It got to the point where it was a very critical situation, did it not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. In the latter phases of this—this was a matter of military judgment, and far be it from me to pose as a critic of General MacArthur's tactics or strategy in this regard.

As I say, the point as to whether he did this thing well or otherwise is not a major issue in this inquiry, and so I——

Chairman CONNALLY. No; it is not a major issue.

General COLLINS (continuing). And I would prefer not to get into a discussion of it; but if the committee feels that you want me to give my personal views, why, I will do so.

Chairman CONNALLY. All right.

INTELLIGENCE AND RED CHINESE INTERVENTION

Now, what is your view as to the intelligence that we have had in Korea? First, is it the function of the Army out there to have its intelligence organization or is it dependent on our intelligence here?

General COLLINS. Prior to the time that our forces went into Korea, General MacArthur had no responsibility for the intelligence on the mainland of Asia.

After he assumed command, he was placed in command of our forces in Korea, he did have the responsibility for the collection and evaluation of all intelligence emanating from the field.

We furnished him from Washington all of the information that we were able to garner in various sources—from various sources—as rapidly as we could do so.

Chairman CONNALLY. Before the Red Chinese intervention, it was pretty well thought that the war was over—those were our reports here, were they not?

General COLLINS. Well, General MacArthur hoped he could clear up the situation in a very short time.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, I know, but I thought the announcement was made that the war was over and the boys would be home by Christmas and so forth, which was predicated on the idea that the Reds would not intervene.

General COLLINS. Well, certainly if they had not intervened, I think the war was practically over. Certainly the North Korean forces had been thoroughly beaten, and without the intervention of the Chinese Communists the war would have been over.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is all for the present.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. General Collins, are we in a war today?

General COLLINS. Well, we are certainly fighting in Korea, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. Would you call it a war?

General COLLINS. I would call it a limited war in Korea; yes.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. General Collins, we have discussed around here the various objectives. What are our objectives in Korea?

General COLLINS. Well, right now I would say that our objectives were to punish the Communist forces to the very maximum, and to hold in Korea as much of Korea as possible for us to hold until some form of settlement can be had of the conflict there.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, you do not agree with the United Nations objectives of driving the Reds out of Korea and having Korea a free country again?

General COLLINS. I do agree with the objectives; yes, sir. It is a question of the practicability of doing it under current conditions. Now, those conditions could well change. In other words, if the Chinese Communists were to withdraw, why, it would be a very simple thing to take over the whole of the country and have the elections which were in the plan.

Senator BRIDGES. What does General Ridgway and what does General Van Fleet understand today? What are they doing? Are they working for the United Nations objectives of freeing all Korea or are they working to stop at the thirty-eighth parallel, or a hundred miles north of it, or just continue fighting indefinitely, killing as many Chinese as possible?

General COLLINS. Well, they are working with the broad objective still, if it is practicable, within certain limitations, that is the broad security of the command in a broad sense, and the security of Japan, to punish the aggressors in Korea to the maximum extent possible with a minimum loss to ourselves.

Senator **Bridges**. You are the channel of communications between Washington and Tokyo or Washington and Korea, are you not?

General **Collins**. Yes.

Senator **Bridges**. And you transmit all the messages that are transmitted?

General **Collins**. All those that go to the commanders out there.

THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED PROCLAMATION

Senator **Bridges**. Now about this so-called famous peace declaration. That is hazy in the minds of some of the committee here at least. Some of the witnesses said they were away and did not remember and so forth. Did you transmit such a plan?

General **Collins**. What peace declaration do you mean— the proposed proclamation by the President?

Senator **Bridges**. What?

General **Collins**. You mean the proposed proclamation by the President?

Senator **Bridges**. The one that General MacArthur was accused of torpedoing and helped bring about his dismissal.

General **Collins**. We transmitted the message, which I think has already been read into the record, advising General MacArthur that the President was considering the issuance of a proclamation outlining in broad terms the possible conditions of peace. I did transmit, that is, the Army did transmit that message to General MacArthur. That did not include the actual draft of a proclamation, but it did advise him that the President was planning to make such a statement.

Senator **Bridges**. You never transmitted the actual plans?

General **Collins**. No, sir.

Senator **Bridges**. If you didn't transmit it, then there was no way for MacArthur to see it, was there?

General **Collins**. It might possibly have been transmitted through State Department channels to the political adviser, but so far as the military side of the picture, I can tell you definitely that, to the best of my knowledge, the proclamation itself was not sent to General MacArthur.

Senator **Bridges**. Now, if it was shown to 13 nations, as I understand the plan was shown to, why wasn't it shown, why wasn't the plan in toto shown to our commander of our theater of operations there, who was our representative in fighting this war?

General **Collins**. I have no knowledge.

Senator **Bridges**. That wasn't your decision?

General **Collins**. No, sir.

Senator **Bridges**. Whose decision was it?

General **Collins**. I don't know, sir. I assume the President's, but I do not know.

Senator **Bridges**. When you transmitted the message to General MacArthur, which wasn't the plan, but contained some of the broad outlines, in the transmittal did you say this was the President's plan which he had approved of, or did you say this is a plan that is being just generally considered?

General **Collins**. I would have to check the record on that, Senator. That has already been read into the record, I believe.

Senator KNOWLAND. It is on page 100, message No. 40.

Senator GEORGE. Of the printed pamphlet, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. No; it is this one.

Senator WILEY. 184.

General COLLINS (reading):

> The proposed statement by the President pointed out that the aggressors in Korea had been driven back to the general vicinity from which the unlawful attack was first launched and that, therefore, the principal objective of repelling North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression against the South Korean Republic had been achieved. It asserted that further United Nations objectives, such as unification and the establishment of a free government in all of Korea, could and should be accomplished without further fighting or bloodshed. The Chinese Communists were, in effect, given an invitation to cease fire and to agree to a settlement of outstanding issues by negotiation. The statement then went on to say that the Korean people were entitled to peace and to assistance from the rest of the world in repairing the ravages of war. A settlement of the Korean situation would greatly reduce international tension and would open the way for the peaceful settlement of other problems as is envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. The statement included a warning, however, that if the Chinese refused to negotiate, the United Nations would be compelled to continue the conflict.

I don't have a copy of the exact statement here.

PROPOSED PROCLAMATION NOT SENT TO TOKYO

Senator BRIDGES. The point is the plan was never transmitted to MacArthur, and there was no way of his seeing it, and therefore he couldn't have torpedoed any peace plan if he never saw the plan.

General COLLINS. I can't answer that question.

Senator BRIDGES. I mean if it had been transmitted to him, you had to transmit it, because it all went between you and MacArthur, did they not?

General COLLINS. It could have been transmitted through State Department channels.

Senator BRIDGES. That is rather unlikely.

General COLLINS. In this field it might well have been transmitted that way, because this was not a military directive. I don't know that it was or was not, but I know we did not transmit it in the military.

Senator BRIDGES. MacArthur got some weird message via some political adviser via the State Department—if he did, it certainly wasn't any directive that he would be disobeying, would it?

General COLLINS. Well, if the purpose of your questioning, Senator, is to get my judgment as to whether or not General MacArthur disobeyed a directive in that, no directive was sent to him with respect to this.

My judgment, however, is that he spoke on a matter which he had been clearly notified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the President intended to speak on very shortly, and in my opinion——

Senator BRIDGES. But if he had the plan——

General COLLINS. I am not through, Senator, with my answer to your question.

In my opinion he thereby as a field commander did something that in my judgment a field commander ought not to do with respect to a proposed statement by his Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, he only had a vague outline from you as to what it was and he had no specific plan. The point is that when it is brought out that he torpedoed the peace plan, he never saw the plan, he couldn't have done that.

He might have spoken up on general issues, but he certainly couldn't torpedo a plan that he never saw and never read and was not familiar with the details of even though 13 nations had seen them, but we did not see fit to give them to the American commander in that area.

LOYALTY TO COUNTRY AND DUTY TO SPEAK OUT

Now General Collins, to whom is your first loyalty? I mean when you raise your hand and take your oath of office, who do you take it to?

General COLLINS. Frankly I never gave any thought to that, Senator. I couldn't tell you right now. I guess it is to the United States, or something in general terms such as that.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, I mean what do you consider is your first loyalty, to your country?

General COLLINS. Certainly.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, that is what I want to bring out, because you take your oath of office to uphold the Constitution of the United States, do you not?

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator BRIDGES. For instance you are a creature of the Constitution and down the line. The President of the United States is a creature of the Constitution.

Somewhere here if your country was in jeopardy or if there were very serious questions involved, you might decide that you had to speak out, mightn't you?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, don't you think General MacArthur might have been in that area?

General COLLINS. I don't know, sir, but my point of view on this is this. Just as you said, I am a creature of the Constitution and so is the President. Therefore in my judgment a military commander in the field must comply with our normal procedures as established by law.

This is a representative democracy and we have certain channels and certain responsibilities along the way. As a military man my Commander in Chief is the President of the United States. My loyalty therefore is to him, my loyalty is to the Secretary of Defense and my loyalty is to the Secretary of the Army.

Senator BRIDGES. But paramount over those is your loyalty to your country, is it not?

General COLLINS. That is right, but in executing that loyalty, in my judgment, as long as I wear this uniform I must comply with the procedures that are established by law and passed upon by this Congress, which makes me subject to the instructions and orders of my commanders in the military field, and one of them is the President of the United States, and if I felt that I could not exercise my duty and my responsibility in uniform as a commander, then I would feel impelled to get out.

Senator BRIDGES. Would you speak out then?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, I probably would.

Senator BRIDGES. But you distinguish that as your line of demarcation?

General COLLINS. I would do it within channels as long as I wore this uniform, and we do that all the time, I can assure you. There is never any hurt about it.

Just yesterday I had a message from General Ridgway with respect to a certain matter, and he gave me his recommendations with respect to it and he said, "This is the unanimous recommendation except for the Assistant Division Commander of one division who doesn't agree."

That is not going to hurt that Assistant Division Commander one iota, I can assure you.

Senator BRIDGES. On the other hand, it has hurt the military careers of certain individuals who have spoken out, has it not?

General COLLINS. Possibly.

Senator BRIDGES. It has ended some of them?

General COLLINS. Possibly, yes; but I think that is a chance that I took when I first put on this uniform, and I think that is a valid chance; in other words, if I cannot do my job within the methods and means stipulated by law, then, all right, I can get out, and that is my responsibility.

WEDEMEYER OFFER

Senator BRIDGES. General Collins, have you offered or has Gen. Albert Wedemeyer been offered the job of Assistant Chief of Staff of the United States Army?

General COLLINS. Here in Washington?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. It has never been offered to him?

General COLLINS. He has been, you see, Assistant Chief of Staff here before.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes; but recently.

General COLLINS. He left here——

Senator BRIDGES. Nothing about that has come up recently?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. Is it unusual, General Collins, for a commander in the field to call upon an enemy to surrender?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I don't believe it is.

NATURE OF THE POLICY DISAGREEMENT

Senator WILEY. General, the President said as his reasons for relieving MacArthur, and I read, "He"—MacArthur—"could not give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his office."

We have testimony here by others that he complied completely with all the military policies.

Do you agree that although he disagreed with them, that he carried them out to the letter and the spirit?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I am sure that he did. There were cases where he had to check up on General MacArthur, but that, I think, is a normal thing. It would go on no matter who was the commander in the field.

Senator WILEY. All right.

Now, when the President referred to policies, can you specifically, from your reading of the record and from your talking with your associates, give us a quick summation of what policies the President had in mind? I assume, from what you said you got into the picture on April 8, and remained there until the 11th, did you not, with all the people who were then setting up the——

General COLLINS. No, sir; the only part that I played in the final action was on Sunday afternoon, the 8th of April, and thereafter I was consulted by no one and participated in no further action; nothing prior to the 8th of April, and nothing subsequent to it.

Senator WILEY. Well, then, you do not feel, from that contact, that you can tell us definitely what policies were brought out on that occasion that MacArthur didn't comply with?

General COLLINS. I was not present. However, Senator, I made the point a while ago that it seems to me perfectly clear from the events that transpired, and furthermore from General MacArthur's statement before the Congress, that he was not in sympathy with the broad policies of the President with respect to the conduct of the war in Korea, particularly on the business of whether we would go it alone in the Far East; and I think that that unquestionably was the fundamental thing from my point of view that was involved.

However, I did not participate in any of those conferences at the White House, so I am not in a position to speak.

MAC ARTHUR CALLS ON ENEMY TO CEASE FIRE

Senator WILEY. Under what circumstances did General MacArthur issue the two calls upon the enemy to cease firing, do you remember? Did you give him instructions?

General COLLINS. The first one was on instructions or at least was with the knowledge and concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't recall exactly, Senator, the conditions. I could look it up probably.

Senator WILEY. You were not present nor did you receive the telephone——

General COLLINS. I was just checking with Colonel Gilchrist; he might be able to tell me more definitely as to the first—Colonel Gilchrist reminds me that the first of these calls occurred after the Inchon landing, and that call for surrender was done with the knowledge and full accord of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator WILEY. In other words, there was no question raised about either one of the previous attempts on the part of MacArthur to bring about an armistice, was there?

General COLLINS. No, sir. In fact, those announcements were made with the knowledge and consent, as I say, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; whereas the last one was not.

Senator WILEY. Where did the call upon the enemy commander to negotiate a cease-fire, as set forth in MacArthur's statement of March 24, 1951, differ from the previous ones? Wherein did it differ?

General COLLINS. Well, I would have to analyze it, Senator, and I have not done that. I could not give you a full answer on it.

One point is, of course, though, that in the first instance North Koreans alone were involved. In the second case the Chinese were the major factor involved; and the conditions under which the Chinese might or might not surrender would involve a great deal of action outside of the Peninsula of Korea; whereas in the first instance, it involved nothing but Korea alone. I think that is probably the fundamental difference between the two.

Senator WILEY. Was General MacArthur notified in any way that his third call required any further previous approval than had the earlier announcements?

General COLLINS. No, sir; except that he had been directed that any public announcement that involved either military policy or foreign policy would have to be cleared, and he did not have that statement cleared.

Senator WILEY. Well, you are talking now, I presume, about the 24th message from the Chiefs of Staff, March 24. "Calling your attention to the order of December 6," you state therein, "in view of the information given you on the 20th of March 1951 any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of the 6th of December."

Is that right?

General COLLINS. That merely reaffirmed the directive that was issued to him on the 6th of December. It was not a new directive; it merely reaffirmed the directive that was given to him on the 6th of December.

Senator WILEY. All right. Now the further part of that—"The President also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions."

General COLLINS. That is right.

Senator WILEY. Do you remember that?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. All right, this was issued on March 24. Why was there a need to say to report to JCS for instructions?

General COLLINS. In order that the political conditions and other conditions that would be involved in an armistice would be passed upon by the authorities here in Washington rather than being fully negotiated in the field.

In the first instances where General MacArthur had been authorized to make a call for surrender, as I recall it, the conditions under which an armistice would be had had already been laid down, and he had been informed of them. Whereas, in this latter case he had not received any detailed instructions as to that, and it was those conditions which the President had intended to announce in his public proclamation and which, as I understand it, we were negotiating with our fellow members of the United Nations at that time.

MAC ARTHUR LETTER TO HENRY HAZLITT

Senator WILEY. Now prior to the 8th of April when you met with the group, had there been any talk by you with the President or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to any alleged failure by MacArthur to carry out his directives?

General COLLINS. There had been no talks that I can recall, Senator, with the President or with anyone else on that.

Senator WILEY. Now if you would refer to the Hazlitt letter, is there any violation of the March 24 order in the MacArthur letter of April 5 to Henry Hazlitt? You will find that on page 186.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Just look at it.

General COLLINS. In that letter General MacArthur said to Mr. Hazlitt:

> The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government, and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General COLLINS. Now to me the implication, the clear implication of this statement is that it was only because of political reasons that the South Koreans were not being armed as had been requested by Syngman Rhee. As a matter of actual fact, General MacArthur had recommended against the issuance of any further arms or the raising of any additional Korean troops.

Senator WILEY. Well, now, General, I of course want to understand you clearly, because, if you will notice the Hazlitt letter on the same page, written to MacArthur—

> Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported New York Times, March 31, dispatch from Taegu? Previous statements President Rhee reported request for such arms.

MacArthur in this letter of April 5 does not discuss the matter; he says why he cannot discuss it.

Now my question to you was—Does that violate the order in your judgment that you issued to him on March 24? That is the issue.

General COLLINS. Well, it seems to me there is an issue a little broader than that, Senator, because clearly to me, reading the letter, reading Hazlitt's request—Why was it that we failed to arm 400,000 South Korean draftees—General MacArthur's answer to it is, if I read his language clearly, that he couldn't do it for basic political reasons, when as a matter of actual fact he had recommended against doing it any more. And I, as a member of the Chiefs of Staff, would certainly concur in his judgment.

Senator WILEY. I don't think you have answered my question.

I want to know which directive, and order, did General MacArthur violate in this letter to Hazlitt. That is the simple question; and if so, be specific and tell me because I am trying to get at what was back of this recall or discharge.

Now, if you can say where he violated the spirit or the letter of any previous order, in this letter, then give it to me.

General COLLINS. Certainly I would say that he violated the spirit of the instructions when he answered in this fashion, the letter that would be published, stating that the reasons that were given, in answer to this question, the basic reason was a political reason; when, aside from any political question whatever, he had recommended against the issuance of any arms to any such numbers of Koreans.

JCS MEETINGS ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. In your meeting that you had, was this conclusion arrived at at the one meeting you attended?

General COLLINS. Which?

Senator WILEY. On the 8th?

General COLLINS. That was one of the instances which we thought clearly demonstrated the fact that General MacArthur was not in sympathy or full support of the President's policy with respect to operations in Korea.

Furthermore, his answer was on the political side, when from our point of view, we had told him that "anything involving politics or anything other than strictly military matters is beyond your field."

Senator WILEY. Whose duty was it, in the General Staff, to bring up all the past records pursuant to the telephone, on April 5?

General COLLINS. I would say that it probably had been Admiral Davis, who is the Director of the Joint Staff, sir.

Senator WILEY. Do you know who it was that telephoned Bradley on April 5, that brought about a telephone to the Chiefs of Staff?

General COLLINS. I have no idea, sir. I was out of the city.

Senator WILEY. Do you know what went on, on April 5, when the Chiefs of Staff gathered?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I was not present. I was down in Montgomery at that time.

Senator WILEY. Do you know what went on?

General COLLINS. I understand, and this is sheer hearsay now——

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General COLLINS. I understand that General Bradley told the Chiefs present the President had under consideration the question of the removal of General MacArthur, and he wished them to give some thought as to whether it should be done or not.

Senator WILEY. To your knowledge——

General COLLINS. That is sheer hearsay. I was not there. That was not transmitted to me because I didn't get back to Washington until the eventing of the 7th, Saturday night.

Senator WILEY. Do you know, whether by hearsay or otherwise, that the President had told the Chiefs of Staff that he ever had that under consideration at all?

General COLLINS. I don't know.

Chairman RUSSELL. Sorry, Senator; your time has expired.

Senator WILEY. No, it has not. I was keeping track, it was 10:55.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was depending on Dr. Wilcox.

Doctor WILCOX. I had 10:51, and it is 11:06 now.

Senator WILEY. Which clock are you taking it by?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have been using that one.

Senator WILEY. At 10:54 Senator Smith took it.

Doctor WILCOX. That is a minute fast.

Senator GEORGE. May I yield him 5 minutes of my time, and then take it up?

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, then, Senator Wiley will proceed for 5 minutes.

Senator WILEY. Now, then, you said that nothing was ever said to you before or that you heard of before about the President having this matter of firing MacArthur before.

Now, do you think it was just a coincidence that on the 5th, which was the day that the letter to Martin was exposed in the Congressional Record, do you think it was just a coincidence that on that date the President called the Chiefs of Staff?

General COLLINS. I have no idea, sir.

Senator WILEY. Well, is it a fact that when the Martin letter from MacArthur went into the Record on April 5—you know that?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I don't.

Senator WILEY. Well, I refer to the Record so that the record will show definitely that the Martin letter for the first time went into the Record, and it was on that date that the President called Bradley.

Now, you say in your opening statement that you felt that MacArthur didn't have any sympathy with the policy of the President or of the Chiefs of Staff.

Would you mind being a little more specific and show just what you meant by "sympathy"?

General COLLINS. Sympathy may not have been a good word, Senator. I would say perhaps instead of sympathy that he was not in accord with the basic policies of the President and of the Joint Chiefs in the conduct of the fighting in Korea.

Senator WILEY. What were the dates of the trips that you took?

COLLINS' TRIPS TO FAR EAST AND REPORTS THEREON

General COLLINS. I can give you that in a moment, sir. The first trip was from July 10 to 15, the second was from August 19 to 25, the third from the 1st to the 8th of December, and the fourth January 12 to 18.

Senator WILEY. That last would be 1951, of course.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Well, now, on all those occasions you saw MacArthur?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; each time.

Senator WILEY. And on all those occasions you reported to the President?

General COLLINS. I am not sure that I reported to the President each time; I think not, as a matter of fact.

Senaor WILEY. Did you report to the Chiefs of Staff?

General COLLINS. Of course, I reported to the Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretary of Defense, and on at least one of them I did report to the President, I think the third trip.

Senator WILEY. Third trip. And at that time did the President say or did you say that MacArthur was out of sympathy and that he ought to be removed or something?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. And as the Chief of Staff did you make a written report of the two times you were there?

General COLLINS. I made written reports to the Secretary of Defense I think on two occasions.

Senator WILEY. In any of those reports do you indicate dissatisfaction with MacArthur or say that in your judgment he should be removed?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Because he wasn't in sympathy with the President?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Or policy?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I regret to advise you that your time has expired.

Senator Byrd? Senator Saltonstall.

MANNER OF MAC ARTHUR'S DISMISSAL

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Collins, there are two points as I see it involved in this inquiry in the first instance anyway. One is the dismissal or relief of General MacArthur, how it was done, whether it was right, whether it was in the best interests of the country, whether it was fair——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator speak up just a little? We can't hear him.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I beg your pardon. The first question involved as I see it is the question of the dismissal of General MacArthur, whether it was right, whether it was in the best interests of our country, and whether it was fairly done and properly done, and the second interest is the question of our policies in the Far East.

Now I would like to ask first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could at any time within their authority have relieved General MacArthur, could they not?

General COLLINS. With the approval of the President; yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. The appointment then of commander in chief of the forces in Korea, forgetting for the moment the Japan side of MacArthur's title, was under the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a military operator, was it not?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And could they not have removed him without the approval of the President?

General COLLINS. No, sir, we could not have.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, now for instance General Stratemeyer's relief that came yesterday or the day before, was the President consulted about that?

General COLLINS. I don't know. That was done by the Chief of Air Force because he was a subordinate commander, you see. He was not a commander directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was a subordinate of General Ridgway.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, now take General Van Fleet, for instance. Could you remove General Van Fleet today as Chief of Staff of the Army?

General COLLINS. I probably could, but I would certainly not do it without getting the approval first of all of my own Secretary, and secondly of the Secretary of Defense.

Each time, for example—when General Walker died, I had received the call from General MacArthur's headquarters. General MacArthur and I had talked about the possibility of losing General Walker. He was always up front.

I made a recommendation of two names to General MacArthur as potential successors to General Walker in the event he should be killed. General MacArthur indicated that he wished to have General Ridgway as General Walker's successor. He was one of the two men that I recommended.

When General Walker was killed, I was called. I immediately called my Secretary and got a clearance from him and we got a clearance from the President on the designation of General Ridgway as his successor.

INITIATION OF DISMISSAL

Senator SALTONSTALL. But in this instance from your statement and earlier questions, you as head or Chief of Staff of the Army had not considered the removal of General MacArthur as commander in chief in Korea?

General COLLINS. Not as a formal matter at all.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, had you considered it mentally? Had you considered it in your own mind?

General COLLINS. Mentally I had; yes, sir; but that was simply as the cumulative differences developed. The question had run through my mind. That was not discussed formally with anyone, but the matter had developed in my mind that ultimately if the situation continued to develop, it might come to a point where some action might have to be taken.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But as a practical matter the first that you were notified was on April 8?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And you were notified then that it was being considered not by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but by the President?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but I was told—I was given the information then in general terms that had been transmitted to the other Chiefs.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Two days before?

General COLLINS. On the 5th.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Two days before?

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But what I am getting at is that the dismissal of General MacArthur really came down to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General COLLINS. That is correct.

Senator SALTONSTALL. From the Commander in Chief, the President.

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that when he made that suggestion that he was considering it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in it?

General COLLINS. That is correct?

Senator SALTONSTALL. But did not recommend it in the first instance?

General COLLINS. That is correct.

POLICY AND OBJECTIVES IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now the other question, the question of our plans in the Far East, referring to this Joint Chiefs of Staff report on the Korean operation, on page 93, paragraph 17, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the Department of State on February 6, 1951. There were five different courses of action considered. I mention just two:

> C was a military stalemate and E was an attempt to settle the Korean question by defeating the Peiping regime.

One sentence more:

> It was observed that if the United States did not obtain a political settlement, our alternative could only be the line of action in C or E above or a combination of the two. There was little to be gained by extending the conflict to other areas at the time.

In other words, on February 6 you thought our best opportunity was either a military stalemate or an attempt to settle the Korean question by defeating the Peiping regime in Korea. That is correct, is it not?

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. But on February 13 when you met with the Department of State representative, it was stated;

> During the course of the discussion it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State would not prefer to express political objectives with respect to Korea until military capabilities there were established.
>
> On the other hand, the consensus of the opinions in the JCS was that a political decision was required before there could be suitable determination of military courses of action.

In other words, as late as February 13, 1951, there was certainly no definite course of action of action with relation to Korea established between the Department of State, the political side of our Government, and the JCS; is that correct?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, there was, because General MacArthur was operating under a definite directive from the Joint Chiefs. There was no change made at that time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. What was his directive at that time?

General COLLINS. His directive at that time was to continue the operations against the Communists, punishing them as severely as possible, but limiting his actions to insure the security of his command and also the security of Japan, and from a military point of view that clearly would prevent him from an all-out effort to try to drive these greatly outnumbered—the large numbers of Chinese Communists—out of Korea as a whole.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And yet so far as an affirmative objective is concerned, as late as March 15, 1951, paragraph 380, page 99:

> The JCS held an informal conference with representatives of the State Department and discussed the Korean situation. It appeared to be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement should be reached on the objectives in Korea.

In other words, as late as March 15 beyond the limited objective which you have just stated of protecting the security of the troops and killing off as many Chinese as you could, there was no affirmative or other objective in agreement between the JCS and the Department of State. That is right, is it not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

NEW DIRECTIVES BEING DRAFTED

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that up to that time and even now as I see it, there is no affirmative course of action recommended or advised or policy lined out by the JCS as to military possibilities in Korea.

General COLLINS. Those are in the course of preparation right now, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, now that is the first we have heard of that.

Now up to the present moment then the policy has been rather a negative policy, has it not, to kill off as many Chinese as you can and to protect our own troops?

General Collins. To a certain extent that is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. And if that policy is pursued, the only way we can get a settlement is to have the action come from the other fellow calling quits, "We have had enough."

General Collins. I believe that is generally correct.

Senator Saltonstall. And if he does not call quits, but stays off, we will say, 25 or 30 miles, and just rests there, we have not got troops enough in Korea to go up affirmatively and thrash him, have we?

[Deleted.]

Senator Saltonstall. Now, you stated that there is a course of action now being planned. I am not going to press that if you feel that you should not tell this committee, even in confidence, at this time what that plan is.

General Collins. I don't feel that I can, Senator, because the final decision on it has not yet been reached.

Senator Saltonstall. But you do say that for the first time then, and you are the first witness who has said so, that there is a course of policy being now studied and planned which we could say was an affirmative policy for ending the war, is that right, in Korea?

General Collins. Well, I don't know whether I could go to that extent. The point that I make is that the instructions under which General Ridgway is operating are now being reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a definite new directive will be issued to him shortly.

[Deleted.]

STRENGTH ENOUGH TO HOLD JAPAN AND PACIFIC DEFENSE LINE

Senator Saltonstall. Now, have we got enough—are the two divisions in Japan sufficient, in your opinion, as from a military point of view, sufficient to hold Japan, having in mind the knowledge that you have of the dispersal of the Russian forces in the Far East?

General Collins. Yes, sir; in my judgment, in conjunction with the Japanese police forces that are being developed, and with our Air and naval forces, I think that it is; that is my personal judgment.

We have an overwhelming naval superiority out there, and I don't believe that any force can invade Japan in an amphibious operation or an airborne operation that would result in the fall of Japan.

Senator Saltonstall. So that from the point of view of the security of the United States we have sufficient forces available now to keep that line, we will say, of Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines?

General Collins. In my judgment.

Senator Saltonstall. In your judgment?

General Collins. That is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. And still do what we have to do in Europe and still be able to leave the present forces in Korea?

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Russell. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, do I have just 10 minutes?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, we could not allot your time to Senator Wiley. The committee took action on that yesterday, and for that reason I asked unanimous consent of the committee that his time be extended 5 minutes.

Senator GEORGE. I overlooked that. I probably will not take even 10 minutes with General Collins.

[Deleted.]

MAC ARTHUR'S STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF TROOPS IN NOVEMBER 1950

Senator GEORGE. So actually—I am getting at General MacArthur's situation in November when the Red Chinese came down en masse. What were his forces available to him in North Korea then?

General COLLINS. He had the same forces that I outlined, Senator, but they were not at full strength.

Senator GEORGE. I see.

General COLLINS. My recollection—and this is not an exact figure now—is that they were roughly at, say, 85 percent strength.

Senator GEORGE. How close was General MacArthur's front lines to the northern Korean boundary? That is, his Eighth Army and his Tenth——

General COLLINS. Well, some of the units had actually gone right up to the frontier, but only a little spearhead, and one of them had been pushed back; a South Korean force had gone up and come back.

The leading elements of the Second Infantry Division were not more than, I think, about 5 miles from the Yalu, 5 to 10 miles, something of that sort; and then one element of the Seventh Infantry Division in the Tenth Corps well over to the east was either right at the frontier or very close to it.

Senator GEORGE. So that he was up close to the North Korean frontier at that time.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; the bulk of his forces were about 2 days' march, straight march, I would say. The distance was—I could check that with the map, but it is something in the neighborhood of 30 miles. Forty-five miles, Colonel Gilchrist informs me.

Senator GEORGE. I want to get at the approximate distance.

General COLLINS. Roughly say 40 to 50 miles.

Senator GEORGE. Our forces have not been that near the North Korean boundary since?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And are not now, of course.

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And now, General MacArthur's request or suggestion or recommendation—I don't know how you military men use terms—for hot pursuit had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General COLLINS. That is correct. That is, by air.

Senator GEORGE. By air?

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator GEORGE. And that had been vetoed?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is my understanding.

Senator GEORGE. But not by the Joint Chiefs?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And General MacArthur had at the time when the mass Chinese attack was made in November, about November 6 or 8——

General COLLINS. The mass attack was on the 24th of November.

Senator GEORGE. 24th of November?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

MAC ARTHUR REQUEST TO BOMB MANCHURIA

Senator GEORGE. Well, in November when the mass attack was made, he had already discussed or had suggested or recommended that he be allowed to bomb build-up depots and concentrations of forces north of the Yalu, north of the border; is that correct?

General COLLINS. I think that is correct.

Senator McMAHON. February 10.

General COLLINS. I am quite certain he did ask for that authority before the 24th of November, but I am not positive.

Senator GEORGE. I have that impression. General, it is, of course, fair in evaluating the actions taken in making up our judgments with respect to General MacArthur's dispositions at that time and his decisions to consider the conditions then existing and then facing him.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator GEORGE. So you didn't offer criticism to the fact that the Eighth Army was on the west and the Tenth Corps was over on the east?

General COLLINS. We did call to General MacArthur's attention in, I think, two different messages the fact that we were concerned about this growing separation between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army.

Senator GEORGE. But the initial decision to separate them and send them up, one east and one west——

General COLLINS. We approved. We not only didn't question, but we approved, because of the fact that at that stage of the game there was nothing but North Koreans, and it was my opinion that it was a wholly reasonable proposition.

Senator GEORGE. At that time.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And I believe you have already said that so far as the North Koreans were concerned, they were pretty badly beaten, a pretty badly beaten army.

General COLLINS. They were thoroughly beaten.

Senator GEORGE. Thoroughly beaten in November?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

FULL UNDERSTANDING OF MAC ARTHUR'S VIEWS

Senator GEORGE. And may I ask this, General: In your talks with General MacArthur, on your visits over there, after the outbreak of this North Korean invasion of South Korea, were you perfectly free and frank in your talks with him?

General COLLINS. Absolutely so.

Senator GEORGE. Was he with you?

General COLLINS. Fully.

Senator GEORGE. You knew his position?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You knew his ideas about Formosa?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There wasn't any question of doubt about what he was thinking himself?

General COLLINS. Absolutely not.

Senator GEORGE. None. Now, when you speak of his inability to give his full accord—I believe you withdrew the word "symapthy"——

General COLLINS. That is right.

Senator GEORGE. Accord to the policies established here by the Joint Chiefs, you mean those policies as the Joint Chiefs coordinated them with the recommendations of the political side—that is, with the President and State?

General COLLINS. That is right.

Senator GEORGE. That is what you mean exactly?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir; because, of course, any military action must be based on what are the political decisions.

Senator GEORGE. I understand, but regardless of the merits or demerits of it, that was the status of the matter in your own mind and as a matter of fact.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT AND THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED DECLARATION

Senator GEORGE. And it is not so much a question in your mind, General, as I take it, whether General MacArthur's pronouncement to the field commander of the Red Chinese about the 24th of March was in accord with the proposed message which the President intended himself to make, but it was because he made it without clearing it here.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; and he made it immediately after having been advised that the President, himself, was going to make an announcement.

Senator GEORGE. Did General MacArthur's statement differ any from the statement that the President proposed to make?

General COLLINS. I really do not know, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. Therefore it wasn't a question of a different position?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. But the fact that he did it after having been advised——

General COLLINS. That was the point exactly.

In other words, here was a field commander making an announcement with many ramifications which affected foreign policy and affected the other United Nations forces——

Senator GEORGE. I understand that.

General COLLINS. That were with us in the field.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that to be your position.

As a matter of fact, you don't recall having seen the proposal which the President intended to make?

General COLLINS. I don't believe I ever saw it, Senator; but it may well be that I did.

Senator GEORGE. I see.

General **Collins**. We had so many conferences that I can't recall now.

Senator **George**. Yes, sir.

General **Collins**. I don't recall definitely whether I ever saw the proposal or not.

I believe, at the moment, I did not.

Senator **George**. I believe it has been requested that that be put into the record; but may I ask the chairman, at this point:

That has not yet been put in?

Chairman **Russell**. Senator, I am sorry, I was not following you, sir.

Senator **George**. The proposed statement——

Chairman **Russell**. You mean the negotiations, armistice, that were under way on March 24?

Senator **George**. Yes.

Chairman **Russell**. That has not.

Senator **George**. That has not reached the committee yet?

Chairman **Russell**. It has not yet been put in the record.

Senator **George**. The request has been made, I thought, to cover that.

Senator **Knowland**. Yes; it has been made.

Chairman **Russell**. The request has been made.

THE LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN MARTIN

Senator **George**. General, will you please, sir, look on page 186 of this printed document?

General **Collins**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George**. It was referred to as the letter from General MacArthur to Congressman Joe Martin——

General **Collins**. Yes, sir.

Senator **George**. Dated March 20, but, I believe, entered in the Congressional Record as of April 5—I am now speaking merely from recollection on that point.

Senator **Wiley**. It so states that on page 185.

Senator **George**. It is stated there; yes.

Now, General, in your opinion does that violate the December 6 directive, political directive, I mean, now, that was transmitted to General MacArthur?

General **Collins**. Yes, sir; in my opinion it does.

Senator **George**. Would you point out, please, if you are able to do so, what——

General **Collins**. Well, in the last paragraph of Mr. Martin's letter to General MacArthur, the last paragraph states:

> I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise.

And, in answering that, it seems to me that the entire, well, the last sentence in the second paragraph of General MacArthur's reply is:

> Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

From there on, practically through the next paragraph, in my judgment, is a violation of the instructions of December 6.

Senator **George.** That was, however, not a military, but—if we may distinguish between a military and a political recommendation?

General **Collins.** Yes, sir; but the directive of December 6 covered political statements, statements involving foreign policy.

Senator **George.** You asked him to clear those before making further statements?

General **Collins.** Yes, sir.

Senator **George.** And you think that was violative, at least of the spirit if not the letter, of your December 6 directive?

General **Collins.** Yes, sir.

Senator **George.** The last paragraph?

General **Collins.** Yes, sir; right.

Senator **George.** I have no further questions, General.

Thank you.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Johnson.

Senator **Johnson.** General Collins, there are two questions that are in my mind about this whole hearing, and I want to go into those two questions with you and tell you in advance what I hope to get your expert opinion on.

One is the justification of the removal of General MacArthur. The second one is the wisdom of the course that we are now following in Korea as compared to the course that General MacArthur recommends that we follow.

Senator **George.** Senator Johnson, would you yield to me before the general answers that question?

Senator **Johnson.** Yes, sir.

Senator **George.** For one matter I overlooked and intended to ask General Collins.

REMOVAL FROM SCAP AS WELL AS THE UN COMMAND

General Collins, on the 8th of April you were asked the opinion of the Joint Chiefs from the military point of view regarding the removal of General MacArthur. That did not apply, did it, to his recall from the position which he occupied with respect to Japan?

General **Collins.** Well, we felt, Senator, that from a purely practical standpoint you really could not separate the two jobs because Japan is actually a base for the operations in Korea. We felt that from a practical standpoint that it would be inadvisable to attempt to have two commanders in Japan at the same time.

Senator **George.** But that was not a military decision that the Joint Chiefs had a right to make.

General **Collins.** Well, sir, we would be involved in it.

Senator **George.** You would be involved in it, but after all that was a decision which the President had to make.

General **Collins.** Yes, sir; but we did consider the question as to whether or not we could separate the two, the job of being supreme commander there with respect to Japan from an occupation standpoint, and also the job of running the operations in the field. We felt that from a military point of view that it would be inadvisable to have two men involved.

Senator **George.** I thank you. I thank you, Senator Johnson.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator JOHNSON. General Collins, how long have you been in the service?

General COLLINS. I have been in the service now since 1913, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you serve overseas in World War I?

General COLLINS. Not until after the show was over. I served over there but not in action. I spent 3 years on the Rhine in the army of occupation immediately after the war.

Senator JOHNSON. We have had much said in certain parts of the country in certain forms about these political generals. Have you ever been a candidate for any political office?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you identified with any political party?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. I want to put in the record again at this point——

General COLLINS. I must say as a citizen I am sorry I have never had an opportunity to vote, and if I were ever to locate permanently, I think that as a citizen I ought to use that right—not only that right but that responsibility. It is a personal regret that I never have.

Senator JOHNSON. Now before I ask some specific questions I have in mind, I want to read at this point a statement made by General Marshall:

> I frankly doubt that this Government will ever be so fortunate as to have such a collection of experience at one time in the Chiefs of Staff.

And in connection with that statement General Marshall had this to say about you:

> General Collins commanded a division which terminated the fighting in Guadalcanal. I believe he got out of a sick bed to redeem the temporary reverse we were suffering in the Russell Islands. He commanded a corps in landing on Utah Beach. He captured Cherbourg in the first large capture after Africa of Germans.
>
> He conducted a classic battle, which received almost no publicity in this country, in destroying large portions of the two armies remaining of the Germans at Mainz in which I think his captures alone were about 23,000, and the destruction was considerably beyond that.
>
> He captured Aachen, he captured Dusseldorf, Cologne, across the Rhine, when he arrived at the Elbe. There is a great deal of experience in that.

General COLLINS. That statement is in error in one point. My corps did not capture Dusseldorf.

COLLINS DISCUSSION OF JCS JANUARY 12 STUDY WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, in the light of this 34 years' experience in the Army, in view of the fact that you are the present Chief of Staff of the Army, I want to ask you if you delivered the January 12 memo which was the study. As I understand it, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the 16 points that were incorporated in that study. Did you deliver that personally to General MacArthur in Tokyo?

General COLLINS. I did not deliver it, but I read it to General MacArthur in Tokyo.

Senator JOHNSON. When you read it to him, did any discussion ensue?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. I made it clear that this memorandum was a matter which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had developed over a period of time, and outlined certain possible courses of action which might be put into effect, if it became necessary to do so, and, as I recall my words, I said to General MacArthur that these measures were under consideration by the authorities in Washington.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you recall the approximate date of that discussion with General MacArthur on this study?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I can give you the exact date of that. That was the—wait a minute, let me see my notes here.

Senator JOHNSON. Was that prior to your visit to the Korean front?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that was before going over. That was on January 15, that is the correct date.

Senator JOHNSON. On January 15?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. That was prior to your visit to the Korean front?

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. At that time you made it abundantly clear that this was a tentative study and had not had the approval of this Government?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. You went to Korea, to the Korean front, and when you came back did you see General MacArthur before you left for the States?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. I had another conference with him on the 19th of January.

Senator JOHNSON. Had your opinion of the situation changed as a result of your visit to the front?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I felt much reassured after having gone over to the front itself, and having talked with General Ridgway.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you inform General MacArthur of that fact?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you indicate to him at that time that it was the conditions that you found at the front which might not make it necessary to abandon Korea, or to put into effect this tentative study?

General COLLINS. I don't recall the details of that, but I feel reasonably certain that we did not discuss in detail whether or not it would be necessary to put all of the 15 or 16 points into operation, on my return. I don't believe that there was any conclusive discussion to that effect.

FIRST THOUGHT OF MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL

Senator JOHNSON. Could you tell me approximately when you first gave thought to the desirability of replacing General MacArthur?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I could not.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you familiar with General MacArthur's message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you remember that he was asked to withdraw that message?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you remember whether at that time it occurred to you that he might not be in accord with the policies of the

Government or might not be in sympathy with the objectives of the Government?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but I am certain that I did not give any thought to any removal of General MacArthur at that stage of the game.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you remember when you gave any thought to it?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I could not pin-point that, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. You recommended he be relieved?

General COLLINS. I concurred in the President's apparent thought of relieving him; yes, sir, I did.

Senator JOHNSON. In the light of what has transpired since he was relieved, would you concur if the decision were before you again today?

General COLLINS. I would.

SUFFICIENCY OF ALASKA DEFENSES AND EUROPE'S DEFENSES

Senator JOHNSON. General, do you consider that we have sufficient defenses of Alaska in the light of present world conditions at this time?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do believe so. I have given considerable thought to the question of the defense of Alaska; I have been there at least twice since I have been Chief of Staff; I have been all over Alaska, and in my judgment, we do have adequate defenses there now.

Senator JOHNSON. In your judgment, do we and our allies have sufficient forces in Western Europe to fight a successful holding action in the event the Soviet moved soon?

General COLLINS. Before I answer that question, Senator, I wonder if I could go back and add something to my answer to the preceding one, because I think this is rather important.

The forces that we have in Alaska now, as a whole, are much fewer than we had in the last war, much fewer; and, in my opinion, it is an example of the carefulness with which the Joint Chiefs have gone into the question of defense of these critical areas. It is always a very simple thing to just run a lot of troops in; but what we have endeavored to do is to analyze the situation, and in order that we don't have too many forces in our active Army we have endeavored to limit ourselves to those that we regard as essential.

Now, turning to the European situation, my answer to your question, if I can recall its exact form, its exact phrasing, would be, no, that the Western Powers do not have sufficient forces as of now to hold Western Europe in the event of an attack by the Russians.

Senator JOHNSON. General, from an over-all standpoint of the disposition of our forces throughout the world, are we sufficiently strong to fight a successful holding action in the event the Soviet Union attacks at an early date?

General COLLINS. Not as of the moment; no sir. That applies particularly to Europe. I think that we have sufficient forces out in the Far East to hold there. I think we have sufficient forces in Alaska to hold there. I do not think we have sufficient forces in Europe.

Senator JOHNSON. When General Bradley was on the stand 2 or 3 days ago, he said that this country would have to strip itself of its other defense requirements to place General MacArthur's recommendations into effect.

Do you have an estimate of the forces that it would take to carry out General MacArthur's program if it were ordered placed into effect tomorrow?

General COLLINS. Well, I have given some thought to the Army forces that would be involved in the clearing of all of Korea, which, I take it, would be a point in General MacArthur's program.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson, your time has expired. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. General, I want first to express now my personal appreciation of the courtesies you have extended to me when I met you in Tokyo in 1949.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now am I correct in my understanding that that was the first visit you gave to that theater after VJ-day? That was in September or October?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. When you were there you very kindly asked me to join you in reviewing the troops.

General COLLINS. I was made Chief of Staff of the Army in August of that year, and it was the first trip I made to the Far East.

Senator SMITH. Then you made one more?

General COLLINS. One more trip, that is correct; yes, sir.

WAS MAC ARTHUR INFORMED AS TO EXACT TERMS OF PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT?

Senator SMITH. Now getting back to this statement of General MacArthur's, would you say General Bradley was misinformed in the testimony he gave us here on page 2329 with regard to these negotiations with the other countries? I will read you his testimony so there will be no misunderstanding about it. General Bradley said:

> Yes, it happened that our Government had consulted certain other governments who had troops in Korea as to certain negotiations which we should try to open for a peaceful settlement.
>
> These various considerations and possible terms were sent to General MacArthur for his comments while they were being discussed with the other governments.
>
> Before we had finished discussing with the other governments, General MacArthur came out with his statement, offering a truce and stating that if they did not accept it, the war would be extended.
>
> As a consequence, we had to drop our negotiations—

and so forth, and then that was made the basis of this criticism that MacArthur had moved in to negotiate.

My question is General Bradley says:

> These various considerations and possible terms were sent to General MacArthur for his comments while they were being discussed with the other governments,

and we have not been able to find out from any of the witnesses, even General Bradley himself, what those terms and negotiations were and whether they actually were sent to General MacArthur.

General COLLINS. I would have to check that for certain, Senator, but I do not believe that the actual terms as such were sent to General MacArthur.

I think that the gist of them was sent, but I don't believe that the actual draft of the proclamation was sent to General MacArthur, at least not by the military.

Senator SMITH. Well, the reason I asked that particularly is because in these documents which are compiled in this little book called Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East, on page 188, General MacArthur sent the following message to Newsweek magazine. Apparently Newsweek magazine had made some statement to the effect that he had been given the opportunity to see these negotiations:

> The statement contained in your issue of April 2 to the effect that prior to the issuance of my statement on March 24 of the military situation in Korea I had been furnished a copy of a policy statement by the President cleared by the governments having military forces in Korea is entirely without basis in fact. I have never seen such a statement and do not know if it even exists. Please publish this in the interest of truth.

That was published April 16, 1951, in Newsweek magazine. Is that an inaccurate statement by General MacArthur?

General COLLINS. I am not in a position to say that it is inaccurate. The question as to whether he knew that such a statement existed or not would be a matter of judgment, but far be it from me to challenge it.

INFORMATION ON GENERAL NATURE OF PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT

The fact is that we did tell him that the President was going to issue, had under consideration the issuance of a proclamation.

Senator SMITH. The only document in that connection we have with our papers here is on page 183 of the same compilation which apparently is to the Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan, dated March 20 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that begins, "State planning Presidential announcement shortly"——

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir. This is the message which I sent.

Senator SMITH. Well, that is the only thing which I have seen in any way complying with this suggestion of General Bradley that General MacArthur knew all about this. Nothing else apparently, and he denied he knew any of the details, so I am wondering whether we have not gone a little bit overboard here in suggesting he knew all the details and that these negotiations were going on.

General COLLINS. I do not know, sir, but this is the message. The one printed on page 183 of this document is the message which I know was sent to General MacArthur.

Senator SMITH. And as far as you know that is the only one that was sent to him in connection with these negotiations?

General COLLINS. The only one that was sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that I know of; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. For the purpose of the record I will just read that whole statement so as to get my argument clear here, this is the only message that General MacArthur got on this point prior to his statement on armistice negotiations, and I quote:

> State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort

> toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of thirty-eighth parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.

I won't pursue that further. That is just for the record.

MEETING OF THE JCS TO CONSIDER MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Now, General, I do want to ask you a little bit more about these meetings which you had with General Bradley at the time apparently it was determined that General MacArthur should be relieved.

If I got your statement correctly this morning, you met on Sunday, April 8, at 2 p. m. with General Bradley and the other Chiefs and then with General Marshall a little later.

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

Senator Smith. That is the only time you ever met with any of them—that is your only connection with this whole incident?

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

Senator Smith. Did you at that time reduce to writing your conclusions or did you just discuss the reasons?

General Collins. We did not reduce it to writing at that time, our conclusions. I know General Bradley made some notes of our conclusions, but, to the best of my recollection, we did not at that time reduce to writing our views.

Senator Smith. You understood at that time that the President was planning to remove General MacArthur?

General Collins. That is correct.

Senator Smith. And you just stated that you concurred. You didn't recommend that yourself, you simply concurred with his decision to do that?

General Collins. Yes, sir. That is standard procedure in the services. A staff can either originate a recommendation or if the commander is considering a course of action, he can frequently—and we do it all the time—ask for the views of his staff. That is the procedure that was followed in this instance.

Senator Smith. Was anybody else besides the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Marshall at that meeting on Sunday afternoon, April 8?

General Collins. I am certain there was not. It may be possible that Mr. Lovett came in, but I believe not. I am quite certain not. I don't think there was anyone else present.

JCS REASONS FOR CONCURRING IN DISMISSAL

Senator Smith. On page 2275 of the transcript General Bradley, at our request, gave us the three reasons in writing why you had concurred in the recommendation for the removal of General MacArthur.

General Collins. Right, sir.

Senator Smith. I will read those separately and ask a brief comment from you on them.

> (1) That by his public statements and by his official communications to us, he had indicated that he was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea. This would make it difficult for him to carry out Joint

Chiefs of Staff directives. Since we had decided to try to confine the conflict to Korea and avoid a third world war, it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington.

Now, that was your first reason reduced to writing.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator SMITH. Am I correct in my understanding that you all read those over and initialed them and approved them before they were turned in to the President as the reason for removal or were they not turned in in writing to the President?

General COLLINS. I do not believe they were turned in in writing, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. You think then probably they were reduced to writing from your joint recollections——

General COLLINS. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. After the President acted?

General COLLINS. I am quite certain that is exactly the case, sir.

Senator SMITH. I note here that you use the word "sympathy" which today you have changed apparently to the word "accord."

General COLLINS. I didn't recall whether that word was there or not.

Senator SMITH. It was used here.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

MAC ARTHUR VIOLATION OF DIRECTIVE ON USE OF UNITED STATES TROOPS ON MANCHURIAN FRONTIER

Senator SMITH. In spite of this statement of yours, all the testimony has said that MacArthur never in any way violated any directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or from the President with regard to action or his carrying out——

General COLLINS. There was one——

Senator SMITH. Military action.

General COLLINS. There was one specific incident that did occur, Senator, which I don't know whether it has been introduced in the testimony or not; but one of the instructions that the Joint Chiefs had issued to General MacArthur was that he would not use anything but Korean troops on the frontier, and he did not comply with that.

He sent American forces directly to the frontier without advising us ahead of time on it, and when we asked him, challenged his doing this, he said that he did it because of military necessity.

The action had already been taken and we did not countermand it, but that was a specific example.

Senator SMITH. Well, when you say the frontier you mean——

General COLLINS. Right to the frontier.

Senator SMITH. Right close up to the Yalu River?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. It was there, and it was not putting our American troops into action in Korea, it wasn't going across the thirty-eighth parallel?

General COLLINS. Into Manchuria, you mean, sir?

Senator SMITH. I mean the frontier of Manchuria, yes.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator SMITH. The Yalu River.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you told him not to send any troops within what distance?

General COLLINS. I do not recall that we specified the distance, but it was a clear-cut directive that he was not to employ troops other than South Koreans close to the frontier.

Senator SMITH. Would it be possible for you to furnish for the appendix of the record the directive on that point?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Because it is the first time I think it has come before this committee at all.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that can be done.

Senator SMITH. I would like to have the date and just what the record was.

General COLLINS. All right, sir.

DIRECTIVE OF DECEMBER 6, 1950, AND THE LETTER TO THE VFW ON FORMOSA

Senator SMITH. Now let me pass to the second reason advanced by the Chiefs. The second reason advanced by the Chiefs was that—

> General MacArthur had failed to comply with the Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public.

I take it that is the directive of December 6?

General COLLINS. That is right.

Senator SMITH (continuing):

> He had also taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice and had made that statement public despite the fact that he knew that the President had such a program under consideration from the Government level.

From all of the evidence that we have had, I gather that the documents which would support this reason advanced by the Chiefs were, first, the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech; second, the March 24 armistice negotiations; and, third, the Martin letter. The President recently stated that the Martin letter was not particularly important, it was just accumulation. The President particularly objected to the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech, and he said from the time that that was issued and got into the press he had planned in his mind probably to remove General MacArthur.

I want to ask this question of you: What was there in the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech not in complete accord with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then with regard to Formosa? For that is all it contained—just the Formosa strategical value. I am wondering in what respect the Joint Chiefs differed with that statement of MacArthur's.

General COLLINS. I do not believe we actually differed at all, Senator, but my recollection of it was that the thing that did disturb us about that was the sort of imputation contained in the letter that we wanted Formosa as a military base.

Senator SMITH. Well, I have read that three or four times.

General COLLINS. That could be read into the letter, into that letter, and that the Joint Chiefs did not support it; but there was nothing, no clear-cut difference between the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those expressed by General MacArthur in this particular paper, or letter.

Senator SMITH. I always understood General MacArthur's position, and I talked to him about that as far back as when I was out there in 1949. He never wanted Formosa as a base for us, he simply didn't want it in hostile hands, because of its threat to our islands groups, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and so forth.

General COLLINS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. That was his position, and all that the VFW letter, it seems to me, says is that if they get that, it would be a base from which they could operate against us; and he never—it seems to me but I may be mistaken—he never suggested that we should take Formosa as a base to operate against the Chinese mainland.

General COLLINS. I don't believe he did, in any formal fashion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith, your time has expired.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much General, for the courtesy you extended me today, and that other day, too.

General COLLINS. It was a pleasure to have had you with me that day.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. General Collins, do you agree with the manner in which the war is now being carried on in the Far East, in Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do.

WISDOM OF PRESENT GLOBAL POLICY

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you feel that the course we are now pursuing in the Far East, and in Europe, is the one best calculated to prevent the commencement of another all-out world war?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator KEFAUVER. In making that statement, have you considered fully the military situation in the Far East and in Europe and in the other danger spots of the world where we have commitments?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we have. I have personally, and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator KEFAUVER. So, the present conduct of the war is not one that has been handed down to the Chiefs of Staff as a course to follow, but represents the combined judgment of you military men in the formulation of policy, is that correct?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

POSSIBLE DANGERS IN MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, from a military point of view, do you think our chances for peace would be seriously jeopardized if we accepted General MacArthur's suggestions for extending or enlarging a war in the Far East?

General COLLINS. Well, it might well bring the conflict to a conclusion, out there, sooner than the present course of action. However, the danger that it might well bring on a great world war, when we are not fully prepared to wage such a war, overrides the first consideration, in my judgment.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, will you outline very briefly, as succinctly as you can, why you think this program might involve us or run us into a larger risk of being involved in an immediate war with Russia?

General COLLINS. Well, for one thing, to make it effective would require, among other things, a blockade, naval blockade which I think, to be effective, would have to be a United Nations blockade, not one merely put into effect by the United States.

As I said earlier, to make such a blockade effective, it is my judgment that you would have to blockade Dairen and Port Arthur which are, for all practical purposes, Russian ports.

[Deleted.]

Now, any such extension of a blockade would be fraught with material dangers of involving us in another war.

The other point is that in order to carry out such a full-scale war, out in that area, we would have to commit considerably more troops than we have got there now, to insure a successful conclusion: and frankly, as a military man, I don't know of anything that would delight the Kremlin more than if we were to just get involved with a large military force out in that area of the world.

The other point is that we know, while we don't know the details, we are quite confident that there is a definite treaty between China and Russia which calls for Russia coming to the aid of China if China is attacked by anyone, any nation allied with Japan; and while we have no alliance with Japan, the fact of the matter is that we would be operating out of Japan and certainly if the Russians wished to have a legal basis for coming to China's aid, they might well seize upon that as a reason for doing it.

Senator KEFAUVER. Has not the Peiping radio already indicated that they feel that our operations in connection with Japan are meeting the terms of the Russian-Chinese Communist Treaty, and that they may be preparing to call on their ally, Russia, to come in on the basis of what has already happened?

General COLLINS. I have not personally seen that statement, but I have read of it in the press.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you think we could accept MacArthur's suggestions and still keep our allies in Korea?

General COLLINS. I didn't hear one word toward the last of your question, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you think we would lose any of our allies in Korea, and maybe in other places, if we carried out his suggestions?

General COLLINS. There is every indication that we would lose some of our allies.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, from a military point of view, how serious would that be, General Collins?

General COLLINS. I think it would be very serious indeed, because certainly with respect to the world situation as a whole, not even this country can go it alone, as strong as we are, industrially, and as we are getting to be, militarily; and in my judgment it would be a serious mistake if we were to embark on a full-fledged war out in the Far East, and thereby lose our allies, or potential allies.

WISDOM OF THE MANNER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL

Senator KEFAUVER. General Collins, I have had the feeling that if General MacArthur was going to be removed, that he should not have been so summarily removed, but should have had some time to clean things up, and carry out orders and transfer his command in Korea.

What was your feeling about that?

General COLLINS. If we had not had as able a man as General Ridgway right available on the spot, I think that the condition, that the timing of the relief should have been different.

I think that General Bradley has already indicated to this committee that the original plan for the relief was not carried out—for reasons that I do not know about.

I think, myself, it was unfortunate that the original plans were not carried out.

But, actually, with General Ridgway immediately available there, and General Van Fleet had already been forewarned that if anything happened to General Ridgway, he would go at once to Korea to take command of the Eighth Army, I don't believe that it had any actual bad effect.

Senator KEFAUVER. You feel then, as I get it, that you agree with me that it was a rather harsh treatment and it would have been much better to have been handled as it was originally planned; but you do not feel that it has had any adverse military repercussions, is that right?

General COLLINS. That question involves several things, Senator.

I would not go, perhaps, to the same extent of saying that it is harsh treatment. When a man is going to be relieved, he is going to be relieved, and however it was done, needless to say, it would have been a shock to General MacArthur.

I am personally sorry that it was apparently not feasible to handle it in the way that it was originally planned.

SOVIET CAPACITY FOR WAR IN FAR EAST

Senator KEFAUVER. General MacArthur stated, General Collins, that he didn't feel that Soviet Russia had very great capacity for carrying out a major war in the Far East.

You undoubtedly read his testimony in that regard.

Do you agree with that?

General COLLINS. I do not agree with it fully. Of course, he used some relative terms, and you could always have a discussion as to how well prepared they are or how far their aid would be able to go; but to the best of my knowledge and belief, Russia does have sufficient forces and sufficient supplies out there in the Far East to carry on operations for some period of time.

[Deleted.]

NATURE OF JCS JANUARY 12 STUDY

Senator KEFAUVER. General Collins, was it made clear to General MacArthur that this 16-point program—of course he brought us a four-point program. I think the other points have been effectuated. Was it made clear that this 16-point program was just something that you were talking about and discussing, and that it all depended upon the timing of matters and the happening of events, or could he have gotten the impression that that was something that was to be effectuated immediately?

General COLLINS. I don't believe—I will rephrase that. Certainly I did my best to make that clear. The very fact that General Mac-

Arthur referred to this memo as a study would seem to indicate that I did make it clear.

Senator KEFAUVER. It was not your intention then to convey the impression to him that you agreed that these four points should be put into effect immediately, but that you were being overridden by somebody else?

General COLLINS. No, sir; there was no question, no discussion of anyone being overridden. I did say—this part by chance I happen to remember—very close to my words were that these proposed courses of action were under consideration by the authorities in Washington. Or words to that effect.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, I got the impression from his testimony that you agreed with him on the four points, and that——

General COLLINS. I do agree that those four points and a number of the others should be carried out under certain conditions.

Now it happened that the situation materially improved shortly after the formulation of the January 12 memo.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, has the——

General COLLINS. A good many of those points have been carried into effect; others have not been.

Senator KEFAUVER. Does the timing of the carrying out of the four points, does that meet with your best judgment? I mean, what has happened in connection with the carrying out of the four points, does that meet with your military judgment?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; except that we on the Joint Chiefs and I personally felt that the economic blockade or the economic restrictions as distinct from a naval blockade should have been tighter all along, and we so recommended.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL FROM JAPAN

Senator KEFAUVER. Much has been said here of the bad effect of General MacArthur's removal on our position in Japan, and I think certainly we all agree that he did a masterful job as military commander of Japan. At least that has been my definite impression.

General COLLINS. He did a magnificent job there.

Senator KEFAUVER. What has been the actual effect in Japan of his removal as military commander?

General COLLINS. I have not been over there since, but we have had a number of our senior people there, and while unquestionably his removal was a shock to the Japanese people, it is my personal judgment that the progress that had been made in the development of a peace treaty, the establishment of an operating Japanese Government, the relaxation of our controls over that Government—have progressed to the point where an able man such as General Ridgway, with the assistance of Mr. Dulles, who has been, of course, very active and also very helpful in the development of the Japanese peace treaty projected terms, that I believe General Ridgway can carry out the job that General MacArthur had so magnificently started.

VALUE OF SOUTH KOREAN FORCES

Senator KEFAUVER. General Collins, will you give your estimate of the value of the South Korean forces? We have had a good deal of testimony, pro and con, as to their fighting ability and whether they were worth equipping to fight.

[Deleted.]

General Collins. We are exceedingly fortunate in having General Van Fleet as our commander there. That is one of the reasons why we nominated him to go out because he had experience in Greece under quite comparable conditions and did a perfectly marvelous job in Greece—not only in putting fight into the Greek Army but in rebuilding the Greek Army, which General Van Fleet did practically from the ground up. He did a magnificent job there, and there is no doubt in my opinion that he, more than anyone else, deserves credit for the fact that the Greeks did not collapse to communism.

I think that, given time, he can do a similar job in Korea.

[Deleted.]

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Kefauver. Thank you, General Collins.

Chairman Russell. Senator Green?

Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator Hickenlooper. General Collins, I take it you have read the testimony, or at least you have been well briefed on it, that General MacArthur has given here?

General Collins. I think I have read all of General MacArthur's testimony.

EXTENT OF MAC ARTHUR'DISAGREEMENT WITH JCS

Senator Hickenlooper. You are aware that he testified repeatedly in his statement to this committee that he had had the most complete cooperation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military, within their limitations, that is?

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. In other words, I got the impression that he said that under no circumstances could he criticize the cooperation that he had been given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all arms of the services.

As I got it, he did indicate that it was the limitations under which he thought our military program was operating that he was critical of.

General Collins. I believe that is the case, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. And that you had furnished him everything within reason you could possibly furnish him, under his request?

General Collins. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. And when he could not get things he understood or indicated, at least as I understood it, that you could simply not from a practical standpoint furnish him those things?

General Collins. That is correct. Each time I made a visit over there——

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

General Collins (continuing). We had the most cordial relations with General MacArthur.

Senator Hickenlooper. So that—I just want to hurry—as I understand it, and I want to see if you have the same understanding, disagreements have not been with the military restrictions from a military standpoint that have been put on him, but from the circumvention which has been put on the military in this country in the operation over there.

General COLLINS. I don't think that is absolutely correct, Senator, because I think General MacArthur did know that we did not support his recommendation that we bomb into Manchuria, for example, and that was decided not just on political grounds, but, as I have indicated earlier, from a military point of view as well.

I think a similar condition exists with respect to his recommendation of a naval blockade.

Similarly we disagreed with him, although he had originally recommended against the introduction of Chinese Nationalist forces into Korea—we disagreed with him on that. But I think, except for those three things, possibly, there was no serious disagreement with the military people.

DECISION ON CHINESE NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not want to pursue this point too long, because of time but I was given to understand from the testimony that the use of Chinese forces in one way or another has been a political or a diplomatic decision, in the main?

General COLLINS. Not wholly; not wholly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is possible that the military might have taken a different view about equipping those troops and using them if it were not for the political situation and the situation of the hour?

General COLLINS. It is rather difficult to separate it.

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right. Are you familiar with the fact that in 1947 General Marshall reported—and this was in an executive meeting, so I don't know what will be done about releasing the statement—that Chiang's troops at that time were forced to go north to fight the Communists, Chinese Communists, with only two rounds of rifle ammunition per soldier?

General COLLINS. No, sir, I am not; I am not familiar with it. I don't know whether that is the case or not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That testimony is extant. I mean it can be produced. I just read it the other day.

General COLLINS. But I do know that we fully equipped 10 Chinese divisions with American equipment and all of it was lost.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General COLLINS. And in my opinion it was not properly fought.

INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS ON MILITARY DECISIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now you said a moment ago that if we adopted the plan of bombing the bases across the Yalu and perhaps going into certain blockades, other actions, that we stood a chance of losing our principal allies.

Then later in answer to I believe a question of Senator Kefauver, you used these words; that there is every indication that we would lose allies if we adopted that policy.

Now that is quite a positive statement and I wonder what the indications are, the specific indications are, that we would lose allies if we went into that situation. Have we been notified to your knowledge by some of our so-called allies that they would pull out of this show if we adopted that policy?

General Collins. No, sir. Perhaps in reflecting on it maybe my statement was too strong, that there is every indication, but there were clear indications that certain of our allies would not go along with the blockade.

Senator Hickenlooper. What are those indications? I mean have you seen dispatches, messages? Have you been told by the State Department? What is the source of your information about the clear indications?

General Collins. Primarily in our discussions with the State Department which we have had that their contacts with the other United Nations members indicated clearly that they did not intend to support certain of these projected moves, at least at the time that this discussion came up.

Senator Hickenlooper. And that indicated refusal of our allies to go along with certain moves which we might otherwise advance, I take it, from a military standpoint?

General Collins. Yes; but once again, Senator, I have to separate certain parts of your question. When you said, "which we would otherwise have done," I am not at all sure that we would have otherwise done these things even if all of our allies said, "We will go along with you."

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, then let me put it this way. Leaving all political considerations out of it, leaving out, the possibility of Russia coming in and starting a third world war just suppose we were in fighting this thing as a military action with the Red Chinese pouring over the Manchurian border and would not good military tactics indicate that we should go over and bomb their bases as far as we could conveniently reach to disrupt their supplies and communications as far back of the actual fighting front as possible?

General Collins. Yes, sir, but of course you cannot separate the military reasoning from your political background. It is impossible to do it. The two are interwoven so thoroughly that I couldn't possibly consider here military factors, you might say, in a vacuum.

Senator Hickenlooper. I understand, but the point I am trying to bring out is this: That it is in the last analysis political considerations of our allies and certain possibilities of international disruption that are actually controlling and constricting what otherwise and in the absence of those political and international complications would be considered a desirable or a perfectly sound tactical and strategic military operation.

General Collins. Not wholly, Senator. Let me see if I can't make clear my point.

I said earlier that we know that there are sufficient aircraft in that part of the world to have seriously hurt us, particularly during the time when the Tenth Corps was off by itself.

Political considerations to the contrary, which is rather difficult for me to visualize now, I believe it would have led me to have opposed the use of airpower at that stage of the game.

Similarly, I would be opposed to the commitment of the necessary forces to wage an all-out war against China in the Far East at this time from a sheer military reasoning, now—political reasons to the contrary.

Senator Hickenlooper. I agree with you on the all-out war business, and I don't know anybody who is advocating a complete invasion of China.

General COLLINS. I don't mean a complete invasion of China. I am talking about committing sufficient air forces to carry this thing through and sufficient land and naval forces to carry it through.

ENDING AGGRESSION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, should it be our purpose, or is it our purpose in Korea to put down aggression or to merely punish aggression?

Now, there is a difference between bringing aggression to a stop, which means a successful conclusion of this matter, and just continuing the punishment of aggression by destroying the aggressor's repeated attacks and his equipment, and so on.

Now, what should our purpose be, in your opinion, to put it down or to punish?

General COLLINS. Both, in my judgment, Senator. Put it down within the capabilities—within the capacity of the forces we are willing to commit for the purpose.

If that is not sufficient, then at least to punish so severely these aggressors and to make clear to them that they cannot get away with it without very severe punishment.

COLLABORATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

I happen to believe in collective security, and I happen to believe in the efforts of the United Nations to stop wars. I have seen too much of these damnable wars, and I think we ought to do everything in our power, that is within reason, to support the efforts of the United Nations; just as I originally thought as a young man we should have done the same thing with respect to the League of Nations.

If we don't back up the United Nations, then we definitely in my opinion lose one of the agencies that we have so far been able to create. At least, it is in the right direction.

It may not be effective, but, by God, until it is proven completely ineffective, I think we ought to do everything in our power to make it work.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with you that we should back up the United Nations. Is there any question but what we are backing up the United Nations?

General COLLINS. The only thing is, though——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aren't we backing them up in Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but much of the action that has been recommended would have been unilateral action, from all my judgment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was a sequel to that question. Do you think we are receiving the same commensurate support from others of the United Nations as we are putting into the principles and objectives of the United Nations in Korea?

We are backing up the United Nations. Are they doing what they could, even by means of consent and approval of certain actions?

General COLLINS. Not as fully as in my judgment they should be doing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree. I have that same feeling.

Pardon me for rushing, but they have a 15-minute limit on this thing, and I want to get as far as can.

WHAT IS OUR POLICY ON ENDING WAR IN KOREA?

Don't you believe that we should, if possible, have a program, an objective, as to how we are going to end this thing?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. That may not be any simple—there may be no simple solution to it. I know of none.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Bradley said yesterday and I believe you said that the matter is under study at the moment. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as I recall the testimony—and I don't want to misquote him, and if I I am wrong, I will stand corrected—had asked State and the administration for a definition of policy, a delineation of policy. What are we going to do? Where are we going?

You agree with that, do you not?

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, we have not had such a policy laid down clearly and concisely up to now, as I understand it.

General COLLINS. We have had a policy, Senator. It may not have brought the results that were anticipated, because of the intervention of the Chinese. You can't get any military man to say he has had no political guidance in this campaign.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To free South Korea of the Chinese. The Chinese came in. But so far as I know, we have not developed any concrete policy as to where we are going and where the end objective is in the matter.

I take it that is desirable.

General COLLINS. Yes, it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, I don't mean this to be a "Have you stopped beating your wife?" question; but, therefore, in view of the fact that we have not had a policy laid down so far as any concrete deliniation, so far as the Chinese are concerned, and you believe there should be, you yourself find yourself in disagreement then with the present policy of no policy which is in existence.

General COLLINS. No, sir; I do not agree that we have no policy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not advocating that you be fired for that.

General COLLINS. I do not agree that we have no policy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have been inquiring ever since these witnesses came on here: What is our policy other than just to fight back and forth?

I conceive it entirely possible that the Red Chinese might very well get tired of fighting here, temporarily go back across the Yalu, lick their wounds, get some more arms and equipment, and fight another day in a short time; and that we may defeat them then on the aggression, and that they can go back and regroup.

They have endless manpower—truly, not well trained.

General COLLINS. They don't have endless trained manpower or endless equipped manpower.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Over a period of months or years they can renew their training, there is no question about that in my mind. So long as this constant, uninterrupted flow of supplies and their ability to regroup in a sanctuary continues, how are we ever going to pull our troops out? How are we ever going to pull the force out of Korea unless we can hurt them to the point where it will postpone for a great period of time their ability to reattack periodically?

General COLLINS. That is what we are hoping to do, Senator. In other words, as you have stated essentially and as I have stated what the program is right now, you clearly indicated there is no simple solution to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. General Collins, with reference to the January 12 tentative study of the Joint Chiefs, was that transmitted to General MacArthur by cable or by mail?

General COLLINS. I do not recall. Let me ask Colonel Gilchrist He has been running down these various points.

Both, Colonel Gilchrist tells me.

COLLINS' DISCUSSION WITH MAC ARTHUR OF JANUARY 15, 1950

Senator KNOWLAND. When you were in Tokyo on the 14th of January, you discussed it with him personally as well?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; and I think that is the first time that General MacArthur knew of the existence of that memorandum.

You see, it had been just prepared as I left Washington, and I brought a copy with me in order to let General MacArthur know what we were thinking about here at home.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do I understand your testimony this morning that you did not leave the copy with him?

General COLLINS. I did not, to the best of my recollection.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you tell me at the time you were discussing that with the general who else was present?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. General Vandenberg was present, and General MacArthur and his principal staff officers.

Senator KNOWLAND. Senior staff officers there?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; and I think we probably had one or two of our assistants with us also. In fact, I am sure we did.

Senator KNOWLAND. In addition to the so-called tentative study, did you at that meeting also discuss the January 12 directive? Which is the military directive part of the letter which the President sent, I think, by mail subsequently.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. That letter from the President or message from the President had arrived just before our arrival in Tokyo. We did discuss it; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. You did discuss it. Was it your impression at that time that the January 12 directive called for the permanent holding of our position in Korea or a tentative holding of our position in Korea?

General COLLINS. I will have to review the terms very carefully, because it so happened that we sent a directive on the 12th and on the same day by sheer coincidence, so far as days are concerned——

Senator KNOWLAND. I am now speaking about the directive.

General COLLINS. The directive was that we were to stay in Korea if in General MacArthur's judgment he could do so without having severe losses and without a genuine threat toward Japan. Because, of course, at that stage of the game the Chinese operation was still on, it had not been finally checked, and there was a serious question evidently in General MacArthur's mind as to what the ultimate outcome would be.

Now it happens that just about the time that we arrived things began to look up in the field, and I was convinced after talking with our commanders in the field—I visited a great many of them, pretty nearly all ranks—that we could stay in Korea without any serious jeopardy to either Japan or to the Eighth Army itself.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am trying to get the sequence of events. You went over there—I understand you left about the 12th?

General COLLINS. We did leave on the 12th.

Senator KNOWLAND. Which would be the 13th Tokyo time?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Did you arrive in Tokyo the 13th Tokyo time or the 14th Tokyo time?

General COLLINS. I will have to check that. I think we arrived on the 14th Tokyo time, Senator, because our first conference was on the 15th. We may have arrived even on the 15th.

Apparently we arrived on the 15th Tokyo time because my notes show that we had a conference with General MacArthur and his principal staff officers at once and that was my standing procedure, as a matter of fact, each time I went out.

Senator KNOWLAND. So on the 15th you discussed this tentative staff study; you also discussed the directive of the 12th, which by coincidence had the same date as the staff study——

General COLLINS. Correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. And the President's letter——

General COLLINS. That is right.

Senator KNOWLAND. Which was already there, dated the 13th. Now that was prior to the time that you took your air trip to Korea, I take it?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. At the meeting on the 15th, which was your first meeting there, was it your judgment at that time that we would be able to maintain our position in Korea?

General COLLINS. I wasn't certain of it, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was it General Vandenberg's opinion that it could be maintained?

General COLLINS. I can't speak for him, but I am quite certain that he had the same——

Senator KNOWLAND. He participated in the discussion, did he not?

General COLLINS. But we did not know for certain. Although conditions had improved then over—you see that was really 3 days later, and conditions were not as bad then in my judgment as they were, we will say, 3 days earlier.

Senator KNOWLAND. What was General MacArthur's opinion as expressed on the 15th? Was it that he could maintain his position in Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that was his judgment at that time.

DIRECTIVES TO MAC ARTHUR ON APPROACHING MANCHURIAN BORDER

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, the previous testimony before this committee has been very clear from Mr. Secretary Marshall and from General Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that General MacArthur had never at any time to the best of their knowledge violated a military directive, nor had he been insubordinate. For the first time, today, you indicated to this committee, at least my interpretation of what you indicated was, that he had violated a military directive, and because of the importance of this testimony, I think immediately I am going to abandon some other questions I have and take them up on the second or third round.

But I want to call your attention to page 64 of the booklet furnished to the members of this committee entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations." Reading from item 60, there is the following:

> On November 24, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised commander in chief, Far East, of the growing concern of other members of the United Nations over the posibility of bringing on a general conflict if the United Nations forces advanced and seized the entire North Korean area at the boundary between Korea and Manchuria and the U. S. S. R. The consensus of political and military opinion in Washington was that there should be no change in CINCFE's mission; rather, a course of action should be formulated which would permit establishment of a unified Korea and at the same time reduce the risk of general involvement. On the assumption that the United Nations attack would be successful, exploratory discussions were held to discover what military measures and political actions might be taken to reduce the tension with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union and to maintain a solid United Nations front. The following measures were considered:
>
> (*a*) After advancing to or near the Yalu, CINCFE might hold his forces in terrain dominating the approches to the valley of the Yalu. These forces should be principally ROK troops. Other United Nations forces should be grouped in positions in readiness;
>
> (*b*) United Nations forces would continue to make every effort to spare the hydroelectric installations in North Korea;
>
> (*c*) The United Nations Unification and Rehabilitation Commission would, at a propitious time, enter into negotiations with appropriate representatives of the Chinese Communist Government in order to insure equitable distribution of hydroelectric power;
>
> (*d*) In the event the Chinese forces did not again attack in force across the Yalu, elections in Korea could proceed in accordance with the action by the United Nations; and
>
> (*e*) The ultimate handling of the extremely sensitive northeast province would await United Nations procedures.

Then, items 61:

> In CINCFE's reply on November 25, 1950—

and I would like to ask parenthetically at this point if it is not true that the dateline of November 24 American time, Washington time, would not be the 25th of November Tokyo time?

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator KNOWLAND. Presumably, he reported or replied on the same day because I assume he put Tokyo time on his message.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; well, he always replied very promptly, within a matter of a few hours.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right. Let me read item 61:

> In CINCFE's reply on November 25, 1950, to the above message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff he indicated that the suggested approaches would, in all probability, not only fail to achieve the desired result but would be provocative of the very consequence that we were seeking to avoid. CINCFE felt that it would be utterly impossible for the United Nations forces to stop on the commanding terrain south of the Yalu, as suggested. He also felt that it was necessary to destroy all enemy forces within North Korea if unity and peace in all Korea were to be restored. He also felt that the matter of the hydroelectric power would not be a major factor either to the Chinese Communists or to the Soviets. CINCFE stated that his plan was to consolidate positions along the Yalu River as soon as he was able and then to replace, as far as possible, Ameri-

can forces with those of the Republic of Korea. He would then announce his plans which would include:

(*a*) The return of the American forces to Japan.

(*b*) The parole of all prisoners of war to their homes; and

(*c*) Leaving the matter of the unification of Korea and of the restoration of the civil processes of government to the people, with the advice and assistance of United Nations authorities.

He felt that as soon as United Nations military objectives had been reached prompt implementation of his plan would effectively appeal to the reason in the Chinese mind.

WAS A DIRECTIVE VIOLATED?

Now, General, in the light of those messages, can you indicate any place in your record where General MacArthur violated a directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he must not use American troops in going to the Yalu?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. I did not intend to indicate when I cited that as an example—I was asked specifically were there any instances which did——

Senator KNOWLAND. I understood that.

General COLLINS. Cause us to view his action with alarm, and I gave you a correct answer. On the 27th of September a directive had been sent to General MacArthur. I think this can be paraphrased, to this effect:

> Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or U. S. S. R. borders of Korea, and as a matter of policy—

not a flat directive but as a matter of policy—

> no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

Senator KNOWLAND. Oh, now, General, just let's be fair, as I know you want to be on this situation. There were a long series of directives from the 26th day of June on.

The first directives said that he must not fly his planes north of the thirty-eighth parallel, as you remember. They said the United States Navy must not go north of the thirty-eighth parallel. You are now reading from a directive that was about the time of the Inchon landings.

A great many directives had taken place. He wasn't even up near the Yalu River at that time. When he got close to it, there was his communication from the Joint Chiefs to which I have referred which did not prohibit him from having American troops on the Yalu, but the clear statement in your own paraphrase is that they hoped that a majority of the troops would be ROK, but no clear directive that he must not have any American troops.

He promptly responded on the very same day and outlined the situation to you what in his military judgment would be the situation, and I am now asking you in view of the statement that is in the record and possibly out to the press before this time, where can you show in your record that he violated a directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to having spearheads on the Yalu?

General COLLINS. I would say that it was not a flat directive, Senator, but the point is that we had clearly indicated to him that we felt that he should not put troops other than South Korean forces up into the northeast area toward Vladivostok or along the Yalu.

Senator KNOWLAND. But your directive doesn't say that, General. I want you to cite the directive. I have read from the only directive you furnished us, and this is supposed to be a complete record so that we may have the facts, and your own directive says no such thing. Now it may be that——

General COLLINS. This comes in on the proposition as to the readiness of General MacArthur and his response to the basic policies under which he was operating. I did not state it was a disobedience or an insubordination.

I cited it as an example of the fact that General MacArthur did take action contrary to this matter of policy without advising us first—he could readily have advised us first on the matter.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, he did advise you on the very same day as to what his military estimate of the situation was, and I am asking if in view of your message that you sent him on the 24th and his reply, presumably on the 25th, which was Tokyo time, giving his position, whether the Joint Chiefs thereafter said in effect, "General, do not put any American troops on the Yalu."

General COLLINS. I will have to check the record on that.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I wish you would, and be prepared this afternoon to go on with the examination.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

SESSION ON MEMORIAL DAY

Gentlemen, I would not want to interrupt any Senator after just 3 or 4 minutes of questioning. I would like to discuss with the committee briefly as to the pleasure of the committee as to having a session on Wednesday, which is Memorial Day.

Personally, I hope that we can proceed with these hearings, but if a considerable number of the members of the committee do not think we should have a session on Wednesday——

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I certainly hope that we will not have a session on Memorial Day. It is a national holiday and several Senators—did the Senator from Texas make a statement?

Chairman CONNALLY. No; I did not. I spoke a little loud. I was talking to Senator George. I did not mean to interrupt.

Senator LODGE. It is a national holiday and quite a number of Senators I think have to be away on that occasion.

The Senate is not going to be in session on that day and I certainly hope there will be no session of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, of course, Senator Lodge, you realize that the Senate does not recognize all legal holidays by any manner or means. We always meet on George Washington's Birthday, which is a rather important holiday, and the Senate when it does not have any business to transact does recognize national holidays, but if I am not mistaken, either last summer or the summer before last we met on the Fourth Day of July.

Senator LODGE. May I say to the Senator from Georgia I asked the Senator from Arizona, the majority leader, as to what the plan was going to be this year on Memorial Day. He informed me that the Senate was going to take a recess on Memorial Day.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I have no doubt of that because we all know as a practical matter there is nothing of any great importance on the legislative calendar that would require us to meet, but it seems to me that is all the more reason for us to meet. The Senate is not in session. We can put in a full day of hearings.

Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to do whatever a majority of the committee desires, but my personal preference is for meeting on Wednesday, Memorial Day, and every other day that we can.

Memorial Day rather recognizes the sacrifice of the dead, and I take it that it is our great ambition in these hearings to have fewer dead in the future, so I just want to say, whatever the committee wishes, I am for it, sir.

Senator LODGE. Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of fewer dead, too, and I think it is possible for this committee to sit on Wednesday and still for us to do everything we can patriotically to prevent more Americans being killed. I do not think that issue is at stake.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is my own view that we should push along with these hearings, and I would like to meet on Wednesday unless the majority of the committee feel to the contrary.

Chairman CONNALLY. I feel like we ought to meet on Wednesday.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am prepared to meet on Wednesday.

Senator GEORGE. I am prepared to meet on Wednesday.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, we will have a session on Wednesday then. The committee stands in recess uutil 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., the same afternoon.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Chairman Russell, Chairman Connally, Senators Johnson, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Long, Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Lodge.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator McMahon?

Senator McMAHON. General, I had thought until we heard some of the questions this morning, that there were two issues in connection with General MacArthur's recall that were pretty well settled.

On the first there does not seem to be any question about and that is the President's constitutional right as Commander in Chief to remove any military officer without giving any reason whatsoever, and the second thing that I thought was settled, but apparently is not, is why the President decided to remove or rather recall General MacArthur.

MAC ARTHUR'S DISAGREEMENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY

The general has made it plain since he has returned to this country that he is in strong disagreement with the policies of this Government, is that not correct?

General COLLINS. That would be my judgment.

Senator McMAHON. General, I think it is so obvious in his speech to Congress and in his testimony before this committee that he was advocating a course which was divergent from the course that is being pursued by this Government as not to admit of any doubt on that subject.

CHANGES IN FAR EAST COMMAND

Senator WILEY. Why did General Weyland replace General Stratemeyer in the Far East?

General COLLINS. My understanding, General Stratemeyer had a very severe heart attack, and I checked on it recently. Of course he is not under my command, but General Stratemeyer had a very serious heart attack and somebody had to take his place.

Senator WILEY. Are the changes in general in the Far East now taking place due to their difference with the General Staff or the courageous comments on the inhibitions under which they are forced to carry on their operations in Korea?

General COLLINS. To my best knowledge and belief—although, Senator, this is not in my field actually—their statements and actions had nothing whatsoever to do with their relief. General Stratemeyer actually had a heart attack—and is very seriously ill.

Senator WILEY. This question that I am asking now does not whatsoever reflect upon your courage, upon your judgment or integrity, but supposing you had not concurred in the President's position——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He had not what?

Senator WILEY. Concurred. [Continuing.] Do you think something might have happened to you?

General COLLINS. I don't believe so; no, sir.

JCS MEMORANDUM ON REASONS FOR CONCURRENCE IN DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. In these conversations where you were present, did they go into at that time the particular items that you have set up in—what date?—page 2276 in volume 14 that I think Senator Smith read this morning?

General COLLINS. Is that May 16?

Senator SMITH. May 21.

General COLLINS. Is that the same one where General Bradley——

Senator WILEY. General Bradley's testimony; yes.

General COLLINS. We discussed all of the factors there, and, as I say, in formulating that paper I can distinctly recall that General Bradley made the point that he wanted to add no new considerations, that he was merely reducing to writing the essence of the discussions that happened on the eighth of the month in his office and in General Marshall's office. And I know General Bradley, I have known him for many, many years. I can assure you that he is the soul of integrity, and he made it very clear to each of us that we were going to add nothing that had not been discussed at that particular time.

Senator WILEY. You said that after the decision. Did you mean the decision on April 8?

General COLLINS. Did I say decision?

Senator WILEY. I use your phrase—"after the decision General Marshall met with Bradley to formulate."

General COLLINS. After the decision had been made by the President, which was made—I am giving you hearsay now, of course—about the 10th or 12th somewhere along there. Then the question came as to the instructions that would be sent out to General MacArthur and to General Ridgway, and I did participate in the preparation of those instructions. But that was after the decision that was made by the President.

Senator WILEY. Now for the purpose of expedition, I might ask parenthetically, you have read Bradley's testimony, have you?

General COLLINS. I have not had time, Senator, to read all of it. I have read all of the summaries in the press, but I just have not had the time. I have read all of General MacArthur's testimony and all of General Marshall's, but I just haven't had the time to read all of General Bradley's.

Senator WILEY. From a purely military standpoint would you be willing to state that General MacArthur's conduct of the Korean War was compatible with the outstanding record he has compiled in his conduct of the war in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945?

General COLLINS. That is a difficult question to answer, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Do you want to answer it?

General COLLINS. If you insist, I will answer it. I prefer not to.

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES IN NEAR EAST

Senator WILEY. All right. Turning now to the present world situation, because I think there is one statement you made today to the effect that MacArthur looked at the matter simply from the standpoint of the Far East and not from the scope of the world. I wonder if you would tell us whether—compatible with military security—the United States has any military forces it could utilize in the Near East, for example, in Iran, in the event trouble were to break out there.

General COLLINS. We have forces. The question as to whether we should use them there or not is a different story.

FORCES NEEDED IN KOREA AFTER THE COMPLETION OF CONFLICT

Senator WILEY. Assuming the Korean conflict were to be settled tomorrow, is it not a fact that a tremendous garrison of American troops would have to stay in that land in order to make sure the same vacuum was not created such as existed prior to June 25, 1950, when the North Koreans marched down because there was no strong military force to prevent them?

General COLLINS. It would be necessary in my judgment to leave forces in Korea until we could complete the training of a South Korean force that would be capable to resist aggression.

Senator WILEY. Do you think the South Korean forces are fighting as well as the North Korean forces?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I believe they are. In fact, they fought much better in many instances.

Senator WILEY. General Bradley stated that the quicker we liquidate the Korean conflict the better able we will be to meet a situation elsewhere. Is it not a fact, however, that even if we liquidate the Korean War we simply would not have the trained Reserves available for use in other theaters because we would have to keep probably as many as 150,000 men there until you could be assured that the threat would not repeat what has happened?

General COLLINS. General MacArthur did indicate that upon the completion of the Korean conflict that he could release two Infantry divisions in his judgment.

Senator WILEY. That was on the assumption that he liquidate the North Koreans and the Chinese would not come in, was it not?

General COLLINS. I don't recall exactly, Senator, whether that was conditional in that way or not.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE ARMIES

Senator WILEY. General Collins, the Army has predicated the whole basis for hope for a Chinese peace settlement on the basis of the fact that we might kill so many Chinese they would have to sue for peace. Is it not a fact, however, that the whole history of the Chinese long march from south of Shanghai to northwestern China, when Chiang Kai-shek was battling the Reds, shows that the Chinese Army can practically melt away, but then can reform simply by recruiting peasantry and by giving them a minimum of training?

General COLLINS. Well, it all depends on whom they are fighting how effective such a force would be. They have got plenty of manpower; the point is they do not have the trained and equipped manpower to an unlimited degree.

Senator WILEY. The point I am making is that in a modern trained army, if you crack the trained backbone of that army, you may very well destroy it, but in a peasant army you can destroy it completely only to have it revive again and again, with a handful of trained officers starting the process each time. Is it not a fact, therefore, despite the terrific casualties they have suffered, the Red Chinese can carry on the Korean conflict almost indefinitely if the Russians will keep on furnishing them with the material?

General COLLINS. They can continue it for a long period of time. It is a question whether they would or not. I think even the Chinese would finally come to life and realize that the thing is getting them nowhere and draining off the very best trained men they have.

EQUIPMENT OF KOREAN AND UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. Is it not a fact that the weapons which General MacArthur had to use in the outset of the Korean War were strictly hand-me-downs from the Second World War?

General COLLINS. No, sir; not all of it. General MacArthur had the same weapons that are being used there now except the first forces that went in. The things that our troops lacked initially were medium tanks and the new bazooka, which was not yet in production.

Senator WILEY. The North Koreans had tanks at the start, did they not?

General COLLINS. They had no medium tanks. In fact, the South Koreans had no tanks. They had a few armored cars and that was all.

Senator WILEY. The North Koreans.

General COLLINS. The North Koreans did; but the South Koreans did not.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley, your time is exhausted.

Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Collins, may I ask you just four questions on subjects that are not related to each other, but which are interesting at least to me. If you testified to any of them when I was not in the room, please say so and I will not proceed.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

KNOWLEDGE OF CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator SALTONSTALL. Did General MacArthur have all the intelligence out there that you had here? In other words, did you transmit to him all the intelligence?

General COLLINS. To the best of my knowledge; yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now it was current around here, certainly, that the English and the Indians had intimated that the Chinese would come down if we came too near the Manchurian border. Was there any actual intelligence on that?

General COLLINS. We were furnished that information by the Far Eastern Command.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That came from——

General COLLINS. Came from the Far Eastern Command here.

Senator SALTONSTALL. To you?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. That is one source, and then we got it also from India direct. But we had a message to that effect from FECOM.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that rumor, if not better than a rumor, was current then?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. At least everybody knew that might happen?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

KOREAN SITUATION IN JANUARY 1951

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now you came back here after January 12 and, as I remember it, you came in here, into this room, and you told us you were very much encouraged by the conditions that you found things in in Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You specified, one, the morale of the troops; and, two, the terrain; and, three, the climate at that time. Is that not correct?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that you reviewed and changed really your point of view after that visit and were much more optimistic?

General COLLINS. That is right—as to the feasibility of our troops staying in Korea without having very heavy losses.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And as to the possibilities of our troops staying in Korea more from a defensive point of view or, at that time, from an offensive point of view?

General COLLINS. Primarily from a defensive point of view, because, you see, we had a message from General MacArthur that indicated that he was concerned about the morale of our troops and how long we would stand up under these attacks that were obtaining at the time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that even as far back as January 12 you realized from your point of view here that we had to adopt more of a defensive attitude over there against aggression rather than our ability to really become aggressive?

General COLLINS. That is right, and instructions compatible with that concept were sent to General MacArthur.

IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now another question on another subject. Today the problem of our going it alone over there has been raised. If we go it alone over there, we raise the question of our cooperation with the English and the French in other parts of the world. Now, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view, and from the infantry point of view how important is it from the point of view of bases in Europe and everything else, how important is the active cooperation of the English and the French?

General COLLINS. I would say it would be vital, Senator Saltonstall, from the over-all world picture from a military point of view.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that we have got to give some consideration to their points of view in the Far East if we want their cooperation in Europe, even though their point of view may be completely different from ours?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I think that is the case.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, to sum up—you have stated, I believe, that it is your opinion that more troops than we now have available of a trained character would be necessary to accomplish—to take the chance of, I will put it that way, going into a war outside of the limits of Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do believe that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that is your opinion as chief of staff of the infantry?

General COLLINS. Of the Army.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Of the Army, and your experience as a soldier?

General COLLINS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think that is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. General, I will continue the discussion of the three reasons of the Joint Chiefs to concur for military reasons that General MacArthur should be removed.

The first reason, which we discussed briefly, was that he was out of accord or sympathy in limiting the conflict.

The second was the criticism primarily for his armistice attempt, which they felt was improper. The third, I want to read, now, and then ask you the reasons for and behind this. I quote from page 2276 of the testimony of General Bradley who was here yesterday.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

> The third reason advanced by the Chiefs was that "they, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country." They have always adhered to this principle and they felt that General MacArthur's actions were continuing to jeopardize the civilian control over the military authorities.

Now, we asked General MacArthur his attitude on civilian control and he was outspoken on the idea of civilian control, so I would like to ask you what actions of his would jeopardize civilian control? What was the basis of this particular reason?

General COLLINS. Well, I would say that it overlaps into the first reason, perhaps, Senator Smith, in that General MacArthur spoke on foreign policy, which directly affects military policy in a fashion that we thought was improper; and, incidentally, the second reason, I didn't see that particular testimony of General Bradley's, but I would say that the second major reason was not merely his effort at a peace proposition, but was the successive failure to clear his statements after the December 6 message was given, Senator, to him.

Senator SMITH. Well, I think we limited those cases, if I am correct, to the Veterans of Foreign Wars' speech; the letter to Congressman Martin, and the armistice proposal of March 24.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but, you see, in your statement now you mention only the armistice business.

Senator SMITH. Well, am I correct then? I was just sort of summing up what the testimony was this morning.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; right.

Senator SMITH. I was just summing up what the statement was so we do not get confused on this.

CLEARANCE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON POLICY

The second reason advanced by this testimony was that General MacArthur failed to comply with a Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That was the directive of December 6.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator SMITH. And, as I pointed out this morning, the three things that seem to have been the cause of complaint was the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter stating the strategic position of Formosa; the Congressman Martin letter, and this armistice negotiation of March 24. I do not know of any others than those that we have put much stress on in these discussions.

General COLLINS. No, sir; except that the reply to Mr. Hazlitt was publicized, and we didn't agree with that either.

Senator SMITH. You mean you did not agree that that was a political consideration?

HAZLITT LETTER AND ARMING OF SOUTH KOREANS

General COLLINS. No, sir. But the point was that the clear implication to us was that the answer given to Mr. Hazlitt was that the only reason we didn't arm these 400,000 South Korean draftees was political. That was not the case.

Senator SMITH. Might I just point this out, if I might as I did to General Bradley when he testified to the same matter, that when General MacArthur gave his first opinion on the arming of the South Koreans, it was in January at the time when you were considering evacuation. He was thinking of the defense of Japan, and he thought it would be better to put that armament into the Japanese police force being set up than to risk it with the Koreans whom it would take time to train.

When the Hazlitt inquiry came, it was March 31, after the scene had changed, after we had decided not to evacuate, and the question then was a forward push in Korea, and that involved the problem of complying with President Rhee's request which was way after the January decision; so, it seems to me, if we take the two dates and consider the exact situation when the two different inquiries about Korean troops were made, they are perfectly consistent, and there is nothing wrong in the second communication that they were political decisions.

I am confused about your answer to that because, it seems to me, there are two different situations there entirely.

General COLLINS. I don't believe that the situations were so different, Senator.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH. Well, your only——

General COLLINS. From a military point of view.

Senator SMITH. But your only complaint there was that was another reason why we didn't feel it would be wise to give further equipment to untrained men.

General COLLINS. In my judgment that would have been a complete answer.

Senator SMITH. If he had said that.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Then, your complaint is that it leaves an implication that the fault was here rather than there?

General COLLINS That is correct, sir.

Senator SMITH. And that, of course, is a question of what really was in General MacArthur's mind at the time. He was asked a specific question why do they "fail to refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported New York Times," and so forth, and the reference to President Rhee's requests, and his answer was that that was a question which was political.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. You may be right. I just want to point out that distinction because it seems to me, as a layman, there was a distinction there: One, while contemplating evacuation he would be obviously thinking of the defense of Japan, and taking care of that problem; and the other indicates that he was thinking of a forward movement and wanted troops from somewhere, and Syngman Rhee asked for the rearming of his Korean Army. I think there is a reasonable distinction there between the two, but I don't want to press the point.

JUSTIFICATION OF MAC ARTHUR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

Now then, I cannot quite see, in the light of the evidence that has come out, and what you have testified to so far, how we can justify the abrupt dismissal of the general.

You have testified that there was a plan to have Secretary Pace take this message; but, frankly, that does not satisfy me. Here we have a man who was the commander in chief in our Japanese war; he had been made the SCAP, which was the supreme commander of the Allied forces in Japan.

You would not question what he has done in Japan in the way of a rehabilitation of the country, in building up the new democracy, in selling to the Japanese people our western tradition, and in turning them from the feeling that they were a conquered people to wanting to join with us in the western group.

You were aware that peace negotiations were pending; in fact, I think prior to the dismissal, Mr. Dulles had been out there and had started negotiations with General MacArthur.

Now, I cannot quite see why either General MacArthur was not invited to come here and discuss the differences that might exist on this strategy in Korea or why you or one of the Joint Chiefs or General Bradley, did not go to Japan, and just say, "We disagree on the policy here in limiting the war to Korea and we request you to turn your command over to Ridgway."

Now, I asked him distinctly if he had been asked to do that what would he have done? Why, he said, "I would have turned it over immediately."

He said, "I would have been delighted to have gone into conference with my superiors, and if I had been asked to I would have turned it over immediately," and I am asking you whether that course was considered at all.

The abrupt dismissal is what is concerning the people in this country, with a man of this reputation and standing.

General COLLINS. I have given you what I know of the situation, Senator, the complete statement of my personal knowledge of what was done and how it transpired.

Senator SMITH. Well, I am just assuming that you and, I do not think, any of the Joint Chiefs had anything to do with the method that was applied. You may have discussed the wisdom or unwisdom, but including the dismissal from the SCAP job, you did not have anything to do with the sudden midnight message which did not give him a chance to see his troops or anything of that sort.

General COLLINS. No, sir; I had nothing to do with it.

Senator SMITH. There was a falling down there. I still have to leave it in the record that I cannot possibly justify the way this thing was done even assuming there was a difference over which the President had the last ward. General MacArthur should have been requested, if he couldn't cooperate with you, to turn over the command.

WHEN DIFFERENCES WITH MAC ARTHUR BEGAN

Now, what I would like to know is this: Whether prior to this particular difference on strategy with General MacArthur, there were any other differences with him or any differences of feeling among the Chiefs of Staff with regard to MacArthur's over-all policy?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I would say not. I think that they have all been very thoroughly outlined and discussed.

Senator SMITH. Well, prior to the Korean outbreak—let us go back to the time you went out, when I was there, and saw you there——

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator SMITH (continuing). Was there any difference at all with MacArthur? Did you have any complaint with regard to the handling of the Japanese situation?

General COLLINS. None whatsoever.

Senator SMITH. Was there any question of a difference?

General COLLINS. None whatsoever.

Senator SMITH. Wouldn't you agree with me that it was an amazing job done in Japan there?

General COLLINS. Perfectly marvelous job.

Senator SMITH. That is what troubles me, to find out the point at which the lack of faith or confidence in him began.

The President implies it really began back with the VFW letter, the letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars; at that point he began to feel that he would have to think in terms of a change.

General COLLINS. I can only speak for myself, Senator, and I can assure you that the difficulties began after the Korean outbreak and not before; that is, after the Korean fighting began, and not before.

EXTENT OF DIFFERENCES WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator SMITH. Well now, on this whole question of strategy, and I am a layman, so I am not going to discuss the pros and cons of it, let me ask you this question: If the Joint Chiefs were not apprehensive that Russia—not the Chinese Communists, but that Russia—would come in, wouldn't you have said that the program that General MacArthur had talked over with you in Japan January 12, the program that you fellows yourselves thought might wind up this thing, would have been a wise program to pursue? Was it not simply the fear that Russia might come in that was the difference between you and General MacArthur?

General COLLINS. No, sir; that was not all of it. The other points had to do with the fact as to whether or not we would have to go it alone without the support of our allies. That was definitely a military consideration on our part; plus the fact that, as I indicated earlier here this afternoon, that once embarked upon bombing into an area like Manchuria, there is no telling where you would have to stop, and the thought of our taking an all-out fight with the Chinese, who, frankly, have been our traditional friends, and in whom I am confident personally that the average Chinaman does not want to have any war with us any more than we want to have a war with them, that if we once embark on it, there just would be no stopping.

Senator SMITH. Let me just make a suggestion. You speak about the allies, and I am wondering whether the allies would not have followed us if we had given them a course to pursue; we were carrying 90 percent of the load; we were taking nearly all the casualties. England was the only country among the allies that seemed to have much voice in this, except India's attitude.

Now, England was alarmed, of course, for fear of Hong Kong; England was alarmed, because she had a $2 billion dollar investment in trade with China, and she wanted to keep that up. I am sympathetic with her feeling. She did not want to cut off her trade in China.

However, all MacArthur was asking for was a diversion of some sort to take the pressure off his troops in North Korea. One thing was air reconnaisance to determine where the enemy was in the China front.

Another was the economic blockade, and another was a naval blockade, and they all appear in your study.

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. And another was taking the wraps off the Nationalist troops so that at least the Chinese Commies would be scared enough to bring some of the divisions down there to defend against them.

CHANCES OF AN ALL-OUT WAR

But what I am getting at is I cannot see the logic of the position that that would precipitate an all-out war. General MacArthur simply wanted to take the pressure off the present troops until the Chinese saw that they had to quit. As I visualize it, here was defiance of the United Nations. I commend you for the splendid statement you made this morning about the Untied Nations; I share it. Let us back them up to the limit; but how can the UN tolerate a defiance in Korea and not say we are going to use the resources we have got until the Chinese cease that aggression? They get out, and the United Nations take over, and that is the end.

It seems to me that is the picture that General MacArthur tried to portray rather than the picture that he wanted an all-out war with China.

Now, is that unsound, that analysis?

General Collins. Well, Senator, it was too long for me to give an out-and-out answer of concurrence to your statement, and I am afraid that I am not in a position to say that I agree with everything that you have stated. I don't know all the facts involved, actually, as to what the views of the various nations were, because I was not a party to whatever inquiries were made.

Senator Smith. Well, I understand, and I will take that up with the Secretary of State.

General Collins. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith, your time has expired.

Senator Johnson?

ADDITIONAL FORCES NEEDED FOR MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATION

Senator Johnson. General, this morning you indicated that General MacArthur's program, if it were placed into effect, would require several more divisions than we now have in Korea.

I want to bring to your attention General MacArthur's testimony on that specific point.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I apologize, but would he speak just a little louder?

Senator Johnson (reading):

> Senator Johnson. But you recommend a specific program in the Far East. Will that program, in your judgment, require additional manpower and if so, what is your estimate of how much would be required?
>
> General MacArthur. It does not require a great ground force in the Far East. It does require a certain amount of Navy and Air. It does require garrisons such as we would have in the various places of Japan, Philippines, and Okinawa. It would be a small fraction indeed of the total forces of the United States. I think the forces we have out there now, including the Korean forces, represent something less than 10 percent of our forces. I am sure that that would not have to be raised to any material strength to accomplish the purpose of defense that I spoke of.

[Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSON. And you are in disagreement with General MacArthur on that specific question?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I am.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, we have before us legislation now pending in conference committee, and I want to read to you provisions of that legislation and get your comments and your opinions, and particularly do I want to know what effect you think this would have on your forces in Korea and the build-up to full strength that we expect of our Armed Forces, under the 3,462,000 ceiling, and I am quoting now from page 39 of a comparative draft of the House and Senate bill, and this is from the House bill:

> DISCHARGE OF INACTIVE RESERVISTS AFTER 1 YEAR DUTY
>
> Any member of the inactive or volunteer reserve who served on active duty for a period of ninety days or more in any branch of the Armed Forces between the period December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, inclusive, of for a period of twelve months or more in any branch of the Armed Forces between the period September 16, 1940, and June 24, 1948, inclusive, who is now or may hereafter be ordered to active duty pursuant to this section, shall upon the completion of twelve or more months of active duty since June 25, 1950, if he makes application therefor to the Secretary of the branch of service in which he is serving, be released from active duty and shall not thereafter be ordered to active duty for periods in excess of thirty days without his consent except in time of war or national emergency hereafter declared by the Congress.

If that should be a part of the law of the land and you should be required to discharge any members of the Inactive or Volunteer Reserve after service of 12 months, what effect would that have on your divisions now in Korea and on your forces in other parts of the world?

General COLLINS. Well I presume, Senator, that it is all right for me to answer this. Normally I have understood that when a bill is in conference, that normally the hearings on it are finished, but if you wish me to give you that view on it, and if that is an appropriate thing for me to do——

Senator JOHNSON. Maybe I can get at it a little better. Do you favor such a provision?

General COLLINS. If the chairman of the committee says it is proper for me to answer it, I will be happy to answer it.

Senator JOHNSON. I do not know any reason why it would be improper for you to give your views on such a provision. You do it every day.

General COLLINS. We normally don't after a bill goes to conference. At least that has been the general procedure within the Department of the Army.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you expressed yourself on this provision before?

General COLLINS. Not since it has gone to conference.

Senator JOHNSON. At any time?

General COLLINS. I think I have; yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you tell us this? Would you tell us what effect it would have if you discharge every member of the Inactive Volunteer Reserve who had served 12 months or more?

General COLLINS. It would have a very seriously adverse effect—no question about that.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you have any idea how many men would be discharged?

General COLLINS. No sir; I don't. I think that the Army is in a little better shape than perhaps the other services are now. In other words, we are in course now of initiating the relief of our reservists, and I believe we will be in a little bit better shape, we will be able to relieve them a little sooner than certainly the Navy will be ready to do; and I think also sooner than the Air Force.

Senator JOHNSON. But you think any requirement that you discharge them in 12 months would result in a serious situation for your forces?

General COLLINS. Yes; it would have a very adverse effect if we had to do that literally.

Senator JOHNSON. When General MacArthur was before the committee I read to him a statement made by Secretary Pace at the Wake Island Conference, which appears on page 3 of the Substance of Statements at the Wake Island Conference:

MAC ARTHUR'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF COOPERATION FROM WASHINGTON

> Secretary PACE. Is there anything in the terms of ECA and Army cooperation that we might do to help you?
>
> General MACARTHUR. No commander in the history of war has ever had more complete and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than I have.

I asked him if that was a correct statement, and he said it was up until that time.

Now, could you tell me—could you enlighten us any on what has happened since that time that would indicate he didn't receive coöperation?

General COLLINS. I don't believe—of course, again now I am just estimating—I don't believe that General MacArthur had in mind that he didn't receive cooperation. He did not receive all of the troops that he said he would like to have.

For example, he asked originally for four additional divisions for the security of Japan. However, in my visit out there, either the December visit or the January visit, he did agree that it would be satisfactory from his point of view if we sent out two divisions to Japan instead of four.

We did send two divisions. But his original request was four divisions.

Senator JOHNSON. You think that is what he had in mind when he said in answer to that question:

> I am very glad to have the opportunity to reaffirm that statement. Up to that time it was certainly so.

General COLLINS. I believe so; but, of course, I don't know.

AGREEMENT OF COMMANDERS IN KOREA ON MAC ARTHUR PROGRAM

Senator JOHNSON. When General MacArthur appeared before the committee, I asked him this question:

> Did I understand you to say that the foreign commanders in Korea shared your views about the kind of program that should be put in effect there?
>
> General MACARTHUR. Every officer that I have talked with there is in general agreement.

Did you find that to be true in your various visits out there?

General COLLINS. I did not inquire from any of the other commanders with respect to the views of General MacArthur.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you learn from any of them that they did share his views that we should undertake that four-point program that he recommended?

General COLLINS. Was he speaking of foreign commanders, or American commanders?

Senator JOHNSON. He was speaking of both.

General COLLINS. Both?

I have had one communication from General Ridgway, the date of which I do not recall now, in which he told me that from his point of view, of being a commander in the field, and he made that clear, that he felt that he should support that proposal of General MacArthur's, which involved the release of any restrictions on Chinese Nationalist forces operating on the mainland of China.

Senator JOHNSON. And he limited it to that one?

General COLLINS. That one particular point.

Senator JOHNSON. In the four-point program?

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. That may have been what General MacArthur had in mind when I asked him about General Ridgway's feelings:

> And by that statement, of course, you include General Ridgway?
>
> General MACARTHUR. General who?
>
> Senator JOHNSON. Ridgway.
>
> General MACARTHUR. I would, of course, prefer to let General Ridgway speak for himself; but I will say "Yes."
>
> Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General.
>
> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
>
> General MACARTHUR. I think you will find, if you will go into the reports that he made, that he is quite in agreement.

Now, do you know of any report, other than the one you mentioned, that General Ridgway has made, to the effect that he agrees with the program recommended by General MacArthur?

General COLLINS. I do not know of any, Senator; no, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WILEY. That doesn't mean that there aren't any.

Senator JOHNSON. Wait a minute. I have another question here to ask, which I asked General Bradley yesterday

NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE CASUALTIES

General Collins, do you have an estimate of the total number of casualties that have been suffered by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists, from the beginning of the war?

General COLLINS. I believe I have such an estimate. Let me check here and see whether I have it with me here.

Yes, sir.

The estimate that I have, which includes killed, wounded, nonbattle, and prisoners of war, both Chinese Communists and North Koreans, is 1,025,000.

Senator WILEY. What date?

General COLLINS. As of now.

Senator JOHNSON. Does that include battle and nonbattle casualties?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. What are the estimates? How do you divide those?

General COLLINS. I don't have a breakdown of that, except for 1 week. The week from the 17th to the 23d of May, our estimates are that they suffered almost 90,000 casualties in that 1 week. That includes only killed in action, wounded in action, and those taken prisoners of war.

Senator JOHNSON. Battle and nonbattle, it is your estimate there are more than a million casualties?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, in your estimation, to what extent do those casualties cut down the military potential of the Chinese Communists?

General COLLINS. I think they reduce the military potential of the Chinese materially, because, as I said earlier, the forces that they have sent in have been the very best troops that they have; and I have word from one of our officers recently returned, just yesterday, that so far as the North Koreans are concerned, particularly the prisoners that we have been taking recently, they have been much older men than the younger, more vigorous men that we took originally.

ALLIED CASUALTIES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES

Senator JOHNSON. Do you have an estimate on the allied casualties, other than ours?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

I believe that the ROK, Republic of Korea, battle casualties total something over 167,000, actually 167,254.

Other United Nations forces, total battle casualties, 4,823.

Senator JOHNSON. That is both battle and nonbattle?

General COLLINS. No, sir; that is just battle casualties.

Now, including the nonbattle casualties, and frankly that is a very poor term——

Senator JOHNSON. That is the next thing I want to go into.

General COLLINS. "Sick and injured" would be a far more accurate term than "casualties."

If they had occurred at home, in a home station in the United States, nobody would ever think of calling them nonbattle casualties; they would be listed on the sick book and called "sick."

Because of the fact that they are in a theater of war, you get into this military lingo which, in more cases than one, is terrible; and if you get such a term as "nonbattle casualty," actually, it means sick and injured.

The sick and injured casualties in the Republic of Korea forces totaled 30,202; and in the other United Nations forces, just under 5,000, actually, 4,962; so that the total battle casualties and sick and injured, Republic of Korea Army, total now 197,456; for the other United Nations forces, 9,785.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

General COLLINS. I wonder if I can add a word further to the question, or is the Senator's time up?

Chairman RUSSELL. He has 1 minute.

General COLLINS. I would like to add the point with respect to this so-called nonbattle casualties that, to the best of my knowledge, I am not positive of this, now, that the sick rate in Korea is, if anything, less than the garrison rate in the United States.

That has usually been the case. Our troops in the field usually have a lower sick rate than the people living right in the garrisons.

I think that has held in Korea, as it has in all our wars.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, I want to ask you a few questions about soldiers.

General COLLINS. About what, sir?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. About soldiers.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will say this with utter sincerity and complete conviction, that I consider you one of our great, brilliant generals.

I think your record bears that out, and I am sincere about that, and I want to take you out of the category, with that personal observation.

MAC ARTHUR'S RECORD AS A SOLDIER

Hasn't it been true, in our history, that periodically some of our great military leaders have been firm in their convictions, and have had rather outstanding disagreements with their superiors on policy in times past, in our history?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I think that there are occasions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I won't canvass the list, but I think there is a well-known list. They have been people of strong conviction, and there have been a number of instances where they have been great leaders.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now there have been some slightly, perhaps not even slightly concealed questions asked repeatedly here, the purpose of which seems to be to draw from you or some other witness the idea that General MacArthur is either a bungler, a fool, or a stupid military leader, and that he may have made some inexcusable blunders from time to time.

Because of my respect for your opinion, and my sincere admiration for your record and proven ability, I shall ask your opinion on this. Taking General MacArthur's record as a soldier, as a strategist, as a field captain, in the broadest term, field general, and without asking you to classify or to A B C in degree of ability or of brilliance, what would you say about General MacArthur's over-all standing in brilliance and leeadership, and in what general category—top, middle, or lower—would you place General MacArthur in the history of our great military men in the United States?

General COLLINS. I think he is one of the most brilliant military leaders that this country has produced.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir. Now has his record been replete with any substantial military blunders from the standpoint of strategy or tactics or has he demonstrated generally in his military career a successful line of strategy and a successful line of tactical operations in matters for which he has been responsible throughout his career?

General COLLINS. Throughout his career he has been brilliantly successful.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir.

DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES IN NOVEMBER 1950

Now with regard to this situation in December and January when the Reds came over in force and split the Tenth Corps away from the Eighth Army, isn't it a fact that their positions at the time when they were farthest north and perhaps the farthest split apart, that the front, which our entire forces were to hold, was much broader in length, much longer than down in the waist of Korea near the thirty-eighth parallel?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it a fact that because of the terrain and the hogback of mountains which went up there, that direct and continuous liaison between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army way in the north of Korea was far more difficult than it is down in the waist part of Korea, that is, by waist I mean the center part of Korea; isn't that correct, General?

General COLLINS. It would have been more difficult; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General MacArthur testified, I believe that that push to the north was a known and designed reconnaissance in force which if lightly resisted would push on north, and which if heavily resisted would have to withdraw. It did encounter superior force, and according to the preconceived plan of such a reconnaissance in force, a withdrawal was put into effect, and, as I recall his testimony, he said that the casualties were surprisingly small in this orderly withdrawal.

It was a tough one. I don't mean to minimize it, but considering the forces against us that were pouring in, that the withdrawal was accomplished according to plan and with what might be considered a reasonable minimum of casualties under all the circumstances. Would you say that that is a fair statement? Do you agree with that generally?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do agree.

CONSULTATION OF PACE ON DISMISSAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. Now, General Collins to your knowledge was Secretary Pace consulted about the relief of General MacArthur in April in those meetings?

General COLLINS. No, sir. Mr. Pace was outside of the country at the time. He had already left the country, to the best of my recollection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To your knowledge was his advice sought by anyone by cable, wireless, message or otherwise?

General COLLINS. Not that I know of, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mentioned Mr. Pace, of course, because he is Secretary of the Army and the civilian head at least over you in your capacity as Chief of Staff of the Army.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There may be some question about your membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to where the line of command comes.

General COLLINS. There is no doubt that he is my Chief in the Army.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH OF OFFICERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now I want to read to you your own statement about the freedom of speech of officers. I am reading from the record of interrogation of General Marshall on May 11 and I am reading from page 1322.

I had previously read from the hearings on the troops-to-Europe issue. Senator Lodge had asked you when you appeared as a witness there whether or not there was any truth to the statement that wraps had been ordered on military officers to prevent them from testifying as to their opinion or giving committees of Congress their personal views, and Senator Lodge said—he had asked you the question and you said, "Definitely not." Then Senator Lodge:

> In other words, an officer is free to respond to an invitation by any committee of Congress to come up and say what he thinks?
>
> General COLLINS. Completely so. So far as the Army is concerned, I can say without any reservation whatever that here in essence are the instructions that we have complied with for years. An officer called before a committee of the Congress must present the considered view of the Department of the Army or the War Department. I think that is a logical thing.

And then you go on to discuss that, which I agree with. I think he is obligated to support or to present the view. Then you continue:

> However, an officer is permitted to answer to queries complete and utterly unfettered personal views so long as he says "this is my personal view."
>
> Senator LODGE. So that is a protection to the public and to the Member of Congress involved is it not, so that he will know that the officer is expressing a personal view and not a view of the Department.

I am fully aware, General, that that refers to coming before committees of Congress. That is a public declaration of personal views which I take it would not be in major premise different from expressing a personal view to the Member of Congress such as Congressman Martin.

Now I would like to read you—I am hurrying along because I will ask your composite comment—are you familiar with a book called The Armed Forces Officer which I believe is just coming off the press? It is put out by the Department of Defense by General Marshall, that is he has promulgated it here?

General COLLINS. I am not familiar with it personally, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I will assure you it is an official publication of the Government Printing Office, and it has a statement by General Marshall as Secretary of Defense on page 8 this language for the guidance of officers, saying about the officer:

> The service officer is charged only to take a lively interest in all such discussions—

That is about public and military affairs.

> He has no more right to condemn the service unfairly than has any other American. On the other hand he is not expected to be an intellectual eunuch, oblivious to all of the faults in the institution to which he gives his loyalty. To the contrary, the nature of that loyalty requires that he will use his force toward the righting of those things which reason convinces him are going wrong, though making certain that his action will not do more damage than repair.

And continuing the second paragraph:

> His ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country, and not to his service or his superior. He owes it to his country to speak the truth as he sees

it. This implies a steadying judgment as to when it should be spoken, and to whom it should be addressed. A truth need not only be well-rounded, but the utterance of it should be cognizant of the stresses and objectives of the hour. Truth becomes falsehood unless it has the strength of perspective. The presentation of facts is self-justifying only when the facts are developed in their true proportion.

And may I read just one more passage and then I will be glad to have your views. This is from page 18 of this manual:

DUTIES OF OFFICERS

But to get back to those simpler virtues which provide a firm foundation for patriotism and may become the fount of courage, at least these few things would have to be put among the fundamentals:

1. A man has honor if he hold himself to a course of conduct, because of a conviction that it is in the general interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation, or grave physical risk.
2. He has veracity if, having studied a question to the limit of his ability, he says and believes what he thinks to be true, even though it would be the path of least resistance to deceive others and himself.
3. He has justice if he acknowledges the interests of all concerned in any particular transaction rather than serving his own apparent interest.
4. He has graciousness if he acts and speaks forthrightly, agrees warmly, disagrees fairly and respectfully, participates enthusiastically, refrains from harboring grudges, takes his reverses in stride, and does not complain or ask for help in the face of trifling calamities.
5. He has integrity if his interest in the good of the service is at all times greater than his personal pride, and when he holds himself to the same line of duty when unobserved as he would follow if all of his superiors were present.

Those are the five categories. Now, has my time expired?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have nearly 2 minutes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry.

Chairman RUSSELL. I say you have 2 minutes left. You have almost 2 minutes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought I had run over 2 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. No.

MAC ARTHUR'S DUTIES AS AN OFFICER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I read those, General Collins, because it seems here that the policy of the Army itself is clearly stated that an officer's duty is to his country and his prime duty, his overriding duty, is to his country and not to the service or to his superiors.

I am wondering, in the light of that fact and the fact that General MacArthur was not only a field commander in the Orient—that he was in the nature of a proconsul of this country, with policy-making powers over a conquered country—he was beyond the strict military man, subject to military discipline, because he had the power in at least one capacity to exercise judgment, to make policy, and he was in some measure outside of the strict military routine disciplinary field.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator's time has expired. If General Collins wishes to answer, he may.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would be unfair to General Collins not to let him answer it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have consistently marked the timing of the Senators speaking and not the witness. The witness speaks on the committee's time in this case.

General Collins. I would like to answer the question posed to me.

Needless to say, it is a very long and involved question.

Senator Hickenlooper. I read the philosophy and it is a comment I want rather than a "yes" or "no" specific answer.

General Collins. If I could address myself to the latter part of your question as to whether or not there was a difference of the status of General MacArthur, that he was in a sense a proconsul, I would say he was a proconsul with respect to the occupation in Japan, and there he was involved in the formulation of policy.

With respect to the conduct of the operations in Korea, I do not agree that he was in a privileged position. There he was in the same position that, we will say, General Pershing was when he went into Mexico; he was in the same position that General Eisenhower was in when he went into Europe.

There, in my judgment, he was bound with respect to over-all diplomatic policy, you might say, international relations, and that sort of thing to be guided by instructions of the President of the United States.

In my personal judgment—and this is my conviction—he stepped out of his proper sphere, particularly after having been instructed by the President that he was not to speak in these matters without first having gotten clearance from appropriate authorities.

Now, with respect to the other part of your question, it impinges in my judgment on the same sort of thing Senator Bridges asked me earlier today. I don't know the context from which you quoted in this particular book, but I feel certain that that had to do with the manner in which an officer conducts himself in his broad life in the Army, that he should——

Senator Hickenlooper. It is the manual.

General Collins. Yes, sir. I think that is the purpose of the manual and I subscribe. I think, if I might say, it is a little bit long-winded, but I subscribe to the philosophy behind it. I have lived with that philosophy and certainly it has not hurt me in my career, and I have seen a great many other outspoken officers who say their piece.

I say that the difference in this case is that it was not, the matter was not handled in the normal channels, and as put up to me by Senator Bridges, if I disagree, as I have disagreed at times with policies, I have stated my disagreement in the appropriate channels, and I personally think that under the circumstances, under our form of government, where the responsibilities of the military are fixed by law, and we do establish a chain of command, that that chain of command must be honored, must be followed.

If you arrive at the point where you feel you still can not do it, then you have the option of stepping out of the uniform, and there you free yourself then from the restrictions which our people have traditionally placed on their military men as long as they hold a military post.

That is my judgment, sir.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, I think it is quite evident we can't conclude here this afternoon; so if there is no objection, we will take a recess now until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:23 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m. Saturday, May 26, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

SATURDAY, MAY 26, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Johnson of Texas, Long, Bridges, Knowland, and Cain.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

I believe when the committee recessed on yesterday afternoon that Senator Hickenlooper had just concluded his examination.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. MILES REBER, CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON; AND LT. COL. MALCOLM F. GILCHRIST, JR., STAFF OFFICER, GENERAL STAFF—Resumed

General Collins. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a question at this point, sir.

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir.

General Collins. There were two items that were left a little bit hanging in the air yesterday, and I promised the committee that I would get some information on them, and I have that information if you wish me to give it now.

Senator Cain. Will the gentleman yield to me just one minute? Might I suggest—and there is some selfishness in it—that the Chair might recognize the next Senator to do the questioning and then have General Collins provide that information. I think that will result in a more orderly procedure.

Chairman Russell. It would not do to take that out of Senator Knowland's time.

Senator Cain. No, sir.

Chairman Russell. Well, is there any objection? The Chair hears none. Senator Knowland is recognized. His time will begin to run when General Collins concludes the evidence which he now has before him.

NONBATTLE CASUALTIES

General **Collins**. Yesterday the matter of nonbattle casualities was discussed as it was in earlier testimony. I stated yesterday that usually nonbattle casualties are lower and men are generally healthier in combat than in normal garrison areas where men are not exposed to combat. I have today some current figures that are applicable and that illustrate my statement on this subject.

Among the United States troops in Japan, including the occupation forces and those passing through Japan en route to Korea, the so-called nonbattle casualties rate from the 1st of July 1950, that is, shortly after the initial North Korean attack in Korea, to the 31st of March of this year amounted to 20 percent of the total strength for this period. During the same period, 1st of July 1950 to the 31st of March 1951, among the United States troops in Korea, the so-called nonbattle casualties amounted to only 12 percent of the total United States strength for the period, or 8 percent less than the nonbattle casualty rate in Japan.

Here is another interesting figure for the same period. Of all the nonbattle casualties, so-called, in the Far East command, including both Japan and Korea, 90.4 percent have been returned to duty in the Far East.

Chairman **Russell**. What is that percentage?

General **Collins**. Ninety and four-tenths percent have been returned to duty in the Far East itself—4.9 percent were evacuated to the United States for treatment, and only three-tenths of 1 percent died after admission to the hospital.

Actually, if we military, particularly our medicos, could get away from our military lingo and talk plain English a bit more, we would name these so-called nonbattle casualties what they really are—that is sick and injured.

Senator **Wiley**. What is your percentage on the battle casualties of return?

General **Collins**. I think it is 85 percent, but I am not positive of that. Let me check that. I think Colonel Gilchrist may have that information.

Our medical people have done a perfectly marvelous job—perfectly marvelous. I know—at least, sometime ago I was told—that our deaths in ratio to the number of wounded is about a third less in this conflict in Korea than it was even in the last war. And in the last war I thought they did a wonderful job.

Those reported as wounded in action or injured in action, 75 percent—at one date I do remember 85 percent were reported as having returned to action. The figures now—and these were up to date as of the 13th of April, and this runs all the way from the period of the 1st of July 1950 to the 13th of April of this year—of those reported as wounded in action or injured in action, 70.2 percent have been returned to duty, of which 57.3 percent returned to duty in the Far East and 12.9 percent returned to duty in the United States.

Senator **Knowland**. General, under the unanimous-consent agreement, not out of my time, but merely to clarify the situation—could you, for the benefit of the record and the Senators present, give your definition of either these nonbattle casualties or, as you say, the sick and injured?

In other words, there is some misconception that if a person goes, for instance, to ask for an aspirin tablet, that he is included as a nonbattle casualty.

General COLLINS. That is right . Every time a man reports for sick duty, sick report out there, he is tabulated as being a nonbattle casualty.

Senator KNOWLAND. He is on that list?

General COLLIINS. He is, in my understanding, he is on that list, that is correct.

Colonel GILCHRIST. He gets on sick call.

General COLLINS. If he gets on sick call for any reason whatever, he is termed a nonbattle casualty.

Frankly, it is sheer doggerel, in my opinion.

As I said yesterday, at home in the United States, we don't list such things as nonbattle casualties. We just list them as being sick and injured. That is the term we normally used—at least that was the term we used when I was a company commander. I haven't had anything intimately to do with this for years.

That is what they actually are, they are sick and injured.

DEATHS RESULTING FROM WAR

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, seeing that this is a free-for-all, I would like to ask a couple of questions to clear that up.

I think what you say, is very important General. I think first we should have those that are dead as a result of this war.

General COLLINS. They have been reported regularly.

Senator WILEY. The number?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. And those that are incapacitated because of the war; for instance, amputations, or whatever it is.

General COLLINS. What was that word?

Senator WILEY. Amputations, such as an amputated arm or a leg.

Now, you have those two, and it seems to me that that is all there is to it.

General COLLINS. No, sir; there is one other category.

Senator WILEY. Missing?

General COLLINS. Missing in action, and actually we do not record the number incapacitated as such. I don't doubt that over a period of time we could find out that.

What we report regularly, and I can assure you that they have been reported fully and completely to the press, as rapidly as they have been processed, and their families notified, we have reported killed in action, battle casualties, even very slight wounds such as a scratch on the hand, that is a battle casualty, if caused by a shell.

They have all been reported; and the third category is missing in action.

I will guarantee there has been no concealment, no attempt to fool the American public—we are not that silly.

We have reported those things as they have occurred, and as we have checked them and notified the families of the persons involved.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, the over-all casualties that have been put out in prior wars, in those cases, for instance, where we used for World War I, 333,734 casualties, or for World War II, 994,893, do they include so-called battle casualties——

General COLLINS. That is all they are.

Senator KNOWLAND. And nonbattle casualties?

General COLLINS. That is all they are, to my best knowledge, only battle, true battle casualties.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would you check that point, because I think one of the things in which the Congress would have some interest is the comparative situation with this war and prior wars.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in prior wars, they have included both the battle and nonbattle casualties—if they have—then that should be included here. If they have not been, in order to get fair comparisons, why then, perhaps they should not be here; but I wish you would do so, so that there will be no doubt in anyone's mind, if you could present the list of casualties in prior wars, and as to whether those lists were just battle casualties alone.

General COLLINS. I will ask General Reber to inquire right now.

Senator KNOWLAND. And supply it for the record so that we may have some official comparative figures.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have made inquiry for World War II figures, I did not ask for World War I, of all men who were killed or wounded or missing in action.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

I have one other brief statement to make, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

SECURITY OF RECORD

General COLLINS. If I may make another statement, I would like to refer to the question asked of me yesterday concerning General MacArthur's request to bomb targets in China, including Manchuria; that was one of the questions that you asked me to check on specifically.

Actually, it appears that there was no specific request from General MacArthur for authority to bomb targets in China or Manchuria. However, he raised the question of doing so as early as November 7, when he stated that restrictions placed upon the United Nations operations in Korea provided a sanctuary for hostile forces.

At that time he requested instructions for dealing with this new and threatening development.

However, in another message of the same day, and I might interpolate here that I certainly hope, Senator, that the censor of this will cut out any of these sequential dates, and as much of detail as possible, and the reason I say this is that one of the means—I couldn't say this completely off the record without notes being taken, could I? It is a matter of genuine security, I assure you. Can we do it without——

Chairman RUSSELL. It can only be done by unanimous consent, General.

Senator WILEY. I so move.

General COLLINS. I can assure you, Senator, that has not a thing to do——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I am perfectly willing to have it off the record, and then have the committee decide whether it goes on the secret record or not, but I cannot agree in advance to that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, the general will proceed and then the committee will determine as to whether or not it goes on the secret record.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, to make myself clear, I am perfectly willing from my standpoint to hear the general completely off any written record and then have the committee decide whether it goes on the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand. Now, Mr. Reporter, you won't take this for the time being.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator WILEY. I understood, Mr. Chairman, and it came to me very clearly that it was simply a question of opening up for those who were trying to get information of importance to their cause, a way of getting that information.

General COLLINS. That has nothing to do with this at all.

Senator WILEY. That is why I suggested it.

Senator MORSE. I think proceduralwise the record should show that following Senator Hickenlooper's suggestion that we hear General Collins on this point completely off the record and then decide whether or not it should go on the record. General Collins then said that under those circumstances he would not discuss the point that he had in mind, and he gave assurance to Senator Hickenlooper that his decision to follow that course was not any intransigence on his part at all, but that he just considered the matter so important from a standpoint of security that he did not feel that he should make the comment that he was about to make because it had nothing to do with this inquiry anyway, but I think that ought to be shown on the record. Otherwise there will be a break in the record difficult to understand.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you are going to make that statement, I think it should be completed by stating that it related only to security procedures and not to any issues involved here.

Senator MORSE. I said he said it had nothing to do with this inquiry but only to procedures.

General COLLINS. The recorder did take down what Senator Morse just said. From my point of view that clears the thing completely.

I did not intend not to give you the information on this sheet. It was an extraneous statement that I intended to make, and frankly I think that I will just go ahead, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind.

Chairman RUSSELL. Go ahead.

NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS TO EXTEND BOMBING

General COLLINS. This may be slightly repetitive. I have forgotten where I left off.

However, in another message about the same time General MacArthur indicated that inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia had been a cardinal obligation of his command from the beginning of hostilities.

A short time later in another message he stated that his air power operating within Korea—I will have to reread that again.

A short time later still another message stated that with his air power operating within Korea he could prevent reinforcements from coming across the Yalu. A short time later, however, he reported the terrain aided the enemy, and together with the limitation in the international boundary reduced the normal benefit that would accrue to our superior air power.

Later on the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked him to comment on a possible plan to evacuate Korea should enemy activities force an evacuation. In his reply to the JCS request for his comments, he stated that our naval and air power were only being partially utilized, and suggested that we could destroy China's industrial capacity to wage war through bombardment.

Still later General MacArthur gave an estimate that the enemy had lost his chance for decisive action in Korea, but still retained a potential as long as enemy bases in Manchuria remained immune to air attack.

There were other similar references to the enemy sanctuary. Thus the subject was one that was frequently referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General MacArthur. It is possible that General MacArthur considered those references to the subject to be requests, but we cannot find in the record any specific requests as such.

Nevertheless, because the subject had been raised, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave it their consideration.

Chairman Russell. When?

General Collins. Specifically, for example, in November and in January.

Chairman Russell. The Joint Chiefs then didn't consider it until November? It hadn't been presented in such form that you thought it was important for you to consider it until November?

General Collins. We had considered, but directed against it, but we carefully reviewed the thing after a message from General MacArthur dated the 7th of November. We then again reviewed it in early January.

They also referred the matter to the Secretary of Defense, but it remained their opinion that targets in China and Manchuria should not be attacked under the conditions that then existed for the reasons that I yesterday spread on the record and other witnesses have testified.

Now, this paragraph which I am going to read to the committee I would strongly urge be omitted from the printed published record.

[Deleted.]

Gentlemen, I hope this information clarifies the answers given to the question of "requests"—"requests" in quotes—to bomb targets in Manchuria and China.

Chairman Russell. So far as I have been concerned, I have been anxious to find out just when General MacArthur first recommended that he be given authority—that is, that his directives be changed, that he be given authority to bomb in Manchuria.

I was particularly anxious to find out whether it was before or after the Chinese ground forces had appeared in large numbers in North Korea.

General Collins. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, so far as we have been able to locate, he made no such specific recommendation, but, in all frankness and honesty, in my judgment, he clearly indicated that he thought it ought to be done, although he didn't make a specific recommendation that it be done.

Senator GEORGE. That was early in November?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; from November 7 on; there were several references from that time forward.

Chairman RUSSELL. But the Chinese did not really attack our people in force?

General COLLINS. Not until the 24th of November.

Chairman RUSSELL. Until the 24th of November?

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know whose time it is, but everybody has been asking questions here, Mr. Chairman.

General COLLINS. The first contact with the Chinese was on the 26th of October, but that was not an all-out attack. The 26th of October was the first real brush with them.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper, did you have some question you wish to ask on the committee's time? If so, go ahead; others have used it.

FIELD COMMANDER'S SCOPE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just going to suggest that on that theory, if a field commander in the tactics and strategy of the use of his troops to win an objective, if he has to wire to the Joint Chiefs of Staff every time he wants to load a cannon or, say, put five rounds in a rifle, isn't that cutting him down pretty thin? Doesn't your field commander say, "I want the limits of the objective and then I operate tactically as the situation demands"?

It seems to narrow that down pretty much to have to wire the Joint Chiefs of Staff every time you put a cartridge in a gun.

Chairman RUSSELL. Since I am the man who has been asking these questions, let me make this observation.

I see absolutely no relationship between asking permission to load a cannon and asking permission to bomb forces outside of Korea that had not yet demonstrated that they were attacking our Armed Forces.

Of course, no one would be more strongly in favor of absolute leeway for the conduct of operations in the field by a field commander than I would be, even with my limited knowledge of military matters.

It would seem to be quite a difference in that and in deciding to attack neutral forces that were within their own country and had not yet intervened in the war.

That was the reason I had asked these questions. I asked them of General MacArthur, and he said he couldn't recall when he requested specifically this information. I asked him if he would have recommended it before the Chinese came into the war, and he stated, as I read into the record on yesterday, that he would have issued an ultimatum to them when they moved those armies up there, that if they did intervene, he would bomb China.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

CLEARANCE OF JCS DIRECTIVES

Senator WILEY. On the subject that has been discussed I would like to ask the general something.

I think you have cleared up the matter from the various communiqués between MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff. There was a clear indication that because of the movement of the troops north and because of the discovery of them being north of the Yalu, and so forth, there was a clear indication that MacArthur was seeking to be able to meet any eventuality; and on March 7, I think, you stated definitely that you told him he could not bomb north of the Yalu.

Now, this is my question:

Was that the result of the Chiefs of Staff's own judgment, or was it the result of the State Department's judgment, or both?

General COLLINS. It was probably both, Senator.

I thought I pretty thoroughly covered that, discussed that yesterday.

It was not wholly a political decision by any manner of means. As I stated yesterday, to me there were good, valid reasons for not wishing to, which I believe I thoroughly discussed in the record yesterday.

Senator WILEY. The point I was getting at was—who really made the decision, you people or the State Department?

General COLLINS. It would depend upon—it was not the State Department, I can assure you; but after some date which I really do not recall, we were required to clear all JCS directives, specifically to clear them with the Secretary of Defense, and that didn't mean that we didn't have to clear them with State; we cleared them in the normal chain of command.

CENSORSHIP PROCEDURE

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, there are two procedural matters which I think might be taken up before we get into the questioning.

One of them as Admiral Davis mentioned to me this morning—I suppose he mentioned it to me because I am one of the members of the subcommittee and Senator McMahon at the moment is not here, and I think the point is very well taken.

[Deleted.]

Now I merely want to call it to the attention of the committee again, as I know the chairman will do, that the censor has been, I think, leaning over backward to try and make everything available that can properly be made available. There may be some cases in which the committee will differ from the censor, but it is a very dangerous thing for any releases to be given from the committee until the copy has been cleared.

Then if any committee member—and I am merely taking this time to reemphasize as a member of the subcommittee—questions the necessity of eliminating a particular piece of testimony, if he will take it up with Senator McMahon or myself, we will discuss it together and then discuss it with Admiral Davis. We may be able to clear it with him.

If it still cannot be cleared, our procedure is that he will contact the Defense Establishment, give us a report, we will then come in here and if we are still in disagreement, we will submit it to the full committee.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish to thank the Senator from California for those observations. [Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

[Deleted.]

Chairman Russell. As Senator Knowland pointed out, and as I have undertaken to point out time and again, we have a procedure here that enables this committee, in the last analysis, to pass on all of those matters, and if Senators could just restrain themselves from giving information of that nature to the press, and take it up with either Senator Knowland or Senator McMahon, we have a procedure which will enable the committee to pass upon it to determine whether or not we think that it ought to be released.

Admiral Davis' decisions, while they are very persuasive with me, because I think he has been very liberal in releasing this matter—in some instances, perhaps, too liberal—but if we disagree with his ruling we have a procedure that enables the whole committee to pass on it.

[Deleted.]

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. May I make a statement?

Senator Wiley. What was the slip you say?

Chairman Russell. I prefer not to give it on the record.

Senator Wiley. If the chairman will talk toward the reporter——

Chairman Russell. This is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse.

Senator Morse. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from California, and the chairman of the committee.

[Deleted.]

We certainly ought to follow the procedure that has been set up through Admiral Davis, Senator Knowland, and Senator McMahon on these matters of top-secret information presented to this committee.

Chairman Russell. Well, I was reluctant to say anything else about it, because I know the members of the committee are tired of hearing me talk about security; but, gentlemen, I cannot help but feel that unless we at least exercise reasonable care in these matters that American men will die as a result of the unrestrained desire of Senators to discuss matters here that should not properly be known to our enemies.

CORRECTING COMMITTEE REPORT

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, the second procedural matter which I wanted to call to the attention of the committee is on page 92 of our Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East, which is the report of General MacArthur, the twelfth report, dated February 23, 1951, to the United Nations, and which includes communiqué No. 15.

On page 92, the second paragraph down, beginning with the sentence reading "events subsequently have"——

Chairman Russell. Where is that now?

Senator Knowland. That is page 92, the second paragraph.

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Knowland. Beginning "events subsequently have." In checking it with the New York Times communiqué, it appears that there has been a line left out, and it should read—

> events subsequently have—

and these are the words that belong in there—

> disclosed that neither political or military reassurances could have—

and then it picks up and reads—

> had the slightest influence upon the momentous decision underlying Red China's commitment of her forces to war.

There has apparently been a line left out, and I think it does throw a little different light on that sentence.

Chairman RUSSELL. The staff will make note of that, and in the event there is another printing of this compilation it will be corrected. It is too late to do anything about it now, of course.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. I mention it merely for the benefit of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland, I had already recognized you before we digressed.

ANALYZING VFW LETTER

Senator KNOWLAND. General, directing your attention to the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter of October 26, have you had a chance to review that letter recently?

Geenral COLLINS. I reread it recently, Senator Knowland; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you indicate wherein by that letter the general was disagreeing with the military judgment of the Joint Chiefs, or, for that matter, the policy of the Government of the United States at that time?

I have read and reread the letter on several occasions, and frankly I have not been able to see in the light of the testimony of Secretary Marshall that Formosa should not be allowed to get into Communist hands, and the testimony of General Bradley that the Joint Chiefs have consistently felt that the island had strategic value and that it was important to our interests that it not get into unfriendly hands—I have not been able to find out on what basis the objection could be raised to that letter.

General COLLINS. Well, of course, I don't know the basis, Senator, because as a member of the Chiefs I was not consulted as to the basis of the objection to the letter, and frankly I am not qualified to determine what particular part, if any, of this letter should have been objected to, we will say.

Senator KNOWLAND. As a matter of fact, it seemed to me in reading it, in the light of the President's action of June 26 and 27 of putting the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa strait, that the general might very well have felt that he was upholding the President's hand entirely, because he ends his letter to the VFW by saying:

> The decision of President Truman on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

We have had ample testimony that not only in this country but elsewhere many of our people in Government and throughout the country have taken very great objections to some of our other UN members and others who have shipped war supplies to the Chinese Communists while they were combating United Nations forces.

And it seems that the general had every reason to believe that he was wholly supporting the policy of this Government.

I merely wondered if you have any contrary viewpoint?

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield just a moment?

JCS VISITS TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator KNOWLAND. I would prefer not to, on my time, because of the 15-minute limitation.

Have you visited Formosa to make a personal reconnaissance to gain information as to the number, the condition, the morale or equipment of the Republic of China's estimated 500,000 non-Communist troops?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I have not.

We depended upon, in our judgment of that, upon the Fox group report, and also from what General MacArthur has said after he personally had gone down there.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, you have, however, visited—which I think is entirely proper and very sound—some of our European allies, members of the UN, and members of the North Atlantic Alliance, to look over their troops and armament and general condition and morale, have you not?

General COLLINS. I have visited in Italy only.

Time has been the partial reason for that, of course.

Senator KNOWLAND. But other members of the Joint Chiefs have visited various countries?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Have they not?

General COLLINS. Right.

JCS APPROVED INCHON LANDINGS

Senator KNOWLAND. Directing your attention to the Inchon landings of last summer, were the Joint Chiefs in complete agreement with the plans for the Inchon landings?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we approved the plans; and as I said, and as I think is reported here, Admiral Sherman and I went out to find out just exactly what these plans were.

Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark, and as it was a matter of great concern, we went out to discuss it with General MacArthur.

We suggested certain alternative possibilities and places and everything of that sort, which General MacArthur looked into, and then he finally gave us the recommendations, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan.

Senator KNOWLAND. Between the times that the plans were made available to the Joint Chiefs and the time the landing took place, did the Joint Chiefs reverse their position in any regard as to the desirability of making the landing at Inchon?

General COLLINS. They did not.

MDAP SHIPMENTS TO FAR EAST

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask, General, with further reference to the situation on Formosa, as you know, the first arms implementation bill was passed in 1949, the second was passed in 1950.

Both of them included funds to be used in the general area of China which could include both the Republic of China and those areas that are adjacent thereto. Do you now know of your own knowledge, and if not could you supply to the committee, the actual shipments of arms or munitions that have been made to the Republic of China under either of those arms implementation bills or other legislation since June of 1950?

General Collins. I will have to check with Colonel Gilchrist to see whether we have that information available here now, Senator. I do not know of my own knowledge. However, if we do not have it, I can get it for you.

Senator Knowland. Could you also supply, and I imagine this will have to be a part of our classified secret record, but can you also supply for the same period from say June of 1949 to date the shipments that have taken place under the arms implementation program to Indo-China and the Philippines so that we will have Indo-China the Philippines, and the Republic of China on Formosa.

General Collins. Yes, sir; we can supply that.

Senator Knowland. My recollection is when I left Formosa in the latter part of November last year, 1950, that under that program there had only been one ship that had arrived with mostly small-arms ammunition, perhaps some other equipment of approximately the 1st of December of last year.

General Collins. Yes, sir; I think that is correct, but since then we have shipped in just under $10 million worth—but I do know, and I said yesterday, that in our plans for the 1951 budget, MDAP, that if the money is appropriated there or provided, then we will have supplied, we will be in course of supplying, approximately 70 percent of what the Fox survey group recommended.

Senator Knowland. I am familiar with your testimony of yesterday. However, I would like to get down so there will be no doubt about it, just actually what has been shipped and not what is in prospect.

One of the great shortages that I have found in my visit both in 1949 and 1950 out there was inadequate supply for training.

Now, General, Sun-Li-Jen, who is a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, told me that was one of the great problems in adequately training his troops, and I may be in error and I think our military attachés could perhaps have given the same report to this Government, but I think his statement was that they had about 25 rounds for training purposes. Now I think you——

General Collins. Twenty-five rounds per man, I take it.

Senator Knowland. Per man for training purposes.

General Collins. Right.

Senator Knowland. Now my information is—and I would like to ask you what do we consider a proper number of rounds for training purposes in our own Army? I have some figures here. I would like to read them to you.

They may be in error, but my administrative assistant got them from the Department of Defense and I would like to read them and then if they are not correct, you can make a notation later in the record.

General Collins. All right, sir.

Senator Knowland. 325 rounds carbine or M–1; 200 rounds for pistol and submachine gun; 1,380 rounds caliber .30 machine guns; and 2,300 rounds caliber .50 machine guns.

CHANGES IN FAR EAST COMMAND

Senator Wiley. Why did General Weyland replace General Stratemeyer in the Far East?

General Collins. My understanding, General Stratemeyer had a very severe heart attack, and I checked on it recently. Of course he is not under my command, but General Stratemeyer had a very serious heart attack and somebody had to take his place.

Senator Wiley. Are the changes in general in the Far East now taking place due to their difference with the General Staff or the courageous comments on the inhibitions under which they are forced to carry on their operations in Korea?

General Collins. To my best knowledge and belief—although, Senator, this is not in my field actually—their statements and actions had nothing whatsoever to do with their relief. General Stratemeyer actually had a heart attack—and is very seriously ill.

Senator Wiley. This question that I am asking now does not whatsoever reflect upon your courage, upon your judgment or integrity, but supposing you had not concurred in the President's position——

Senator Hickenlooper. He had not what?

Senator Wiley. Concurred. [Continuing.] Do you think something might have happened to you?

General Collins. I don't believe so; no, sir.

JCS MEMORANDUM ON REASONS FOR CONCURRENCE IN DISMISSAL

Senator Wiley. In these conversations where you were present, did they go into at that time the particular items that you have set up in—what date?—page 2276 in volume 14 that I think Senator Smith read this morning?

General Collins. Is that May 16?

Senator Smith. May 21.

General Collins. Is that the same one where General Bradley——

Senator Wiley. General Bradley's testimony; yes.

General Collins. We discussed all of the factors there, and, as I say, in formulating that paper I can distinctly recall that General Bradley made the point that he wanted to add no new considerations, that he was merely reducing to writing the essence of the discussions that happened on the eighth of the month in his office and in General Marshall's office. And I know General Bradley, I have known him for many, many years. I can assure you that he is the soul of integrity, and he made it very clear to each of us that we were going to add nothing that had not been discussed at that particular time.

Senator Wiley. You said that after the decision. Did you mean the decision on April 8?

General Collins. Did I say decision?

Senator Wiley. I use your phrase—"after the decision General Marshall met with Bradley to formulate."

General Collins. After the decision had been made by the President, which was made—I am giving you hearsay now, of course—about the 10th or 12th somewhere along there. Then the question came as to the instructions that would be sent out to General MacArthur and to General Ridgway, and I did participate in the preparation of those instructions. But that was after the decision that was made by the President.

Senator WILEY. Now for the purpose of expedition, I might ask parenthetically, you have read Bradley's testimony, have you?

General COLLINS. I have not had time, Senator, to read all of it. I have read all of the summaries in the press, but I just have not had the time. I have read all of General MacArthur's testimony and all of General Marshall's, but I just haven't had the time to read all of General Bradley's.

Senator WILEY. From a purely military standpoint would you be willing to state that General MacArthur's conduct of the Korean War was compatible with the outstanding record he has compiled in his conduct of the war in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945?

General COLLINS. That is a difficult question to answer, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Do you want to answer it?

General COLLINS. If you insist, I will answer it. I prefer not to.

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES IN NEAR EAST

Senator WILEY. All right. Turning now to the present world situation, because I think there is one statement you made today to the effect that MacArthur looked at the matter simply from the standpoint of the Far East and not from the scope of the world. I wonder if you would tell us whether—compatible with military security—the United States has any military forces it could utilize in the Near East, for example, in Iran, in the event trouble were to break out there.

General COLLINS. We have forces. The question as to whether we should use them there or not is a different story.

FORCES NEEDED IN KOREA AFTER THE COMPLETION OF CONFLICT

Senator WILEY. Assuming the Korean conflict were to be settled tomorrow, is it not a fact that a tremendous garrison of American troops would have to stay in that land in order to make sure the same vacuum was not created such as existed prior to June 25, 1950, when the North Koreans marched down because there was no strong military force to prevent them?

General COLLINS. It would be necessary in my judgment to leave forces in Korea until we could complete the training of a South Korean force that would be capable to resist aggression.

Senator WILEY. Do you think the South Korean forces are fighting as well as the North Korean forces?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I believe they are. In fact, they fought much better in many instances.

Senator WILEY. General Bradley stated that the quicker we liquidate the Korean conflict the better able we will be to meet a situation elsewhere. Is it not a fact, however, that even if we liquidate the Korean War we simply would not have the trained Reserves available for use in other theaters because we would have to keep probably as many as 150,000 men there until you could be assured that the threat would not repeat what has happened?

General COLLINS. General MacArthur did indicate that upon the completion of the Korean conflict that he could release two Infantry divisions in his judgment.

Senator WILEY. That was on the assumption that he liquidate the North Koreans and the Chinese would not come in, was it not?

General COLLINS. I don't recall exactly, Senator, whether that was conditional in that way or not.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE ARMIES

Senator WILEY. General Collins, the Army has predicated the whole basis for hope for a Chinese peace settlement on the basis of the fact that we might kill so many Chinese they would have to sue for peace. Is it not a fact, however, that the whole history of the Chinese long march from south of Shanghai to northwestern China, when Chiang Kai-shek was battling the Reds, shows that the Chinese Army can practically melt away, but then can reform simply by recruiting peasantry and by giving them a minimum of training?

General COLLINS. Well, it all depends on whom they are fighting how effective such a force would be. They have got plenty of manpower; the point is they do not have the trained and equipped manpower to an unlimited degree.

Senator WILEY. The point I am making is that in a modern trained army, if you crack the trained backbone of that army, you may very well destroy it, but in a peasant army you can destroy it completely only to have it revive again and again, with a handful of trained officers starting the process each time. Is it not a fact, therefore, despite the terrific casualties they have suffered, the Red Chinese can carry on the Korean conflict almost indefinitely if the Russians will keep on furnishing them with the material?

General COLLINS. They can continue it for a long period of time. It is a question whether they would or not. I think even the Chinese would finally come to life and realize that the thing is getting them nowhere and draining off the very best trained men they have.

EQUIPMENT OF KOREAN AND UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA

Senator WILEY. Is it not a fact that the weapons which General MacArthur had to use in the outset of the Korean War were strictly hand-me-downs from the Second World War?

General COLLINS. No, sir; not all of it. General MacArthur had the same weapons that are being used there now except the first forces that went in. The things that our troops lacked initially were medium tanks and the new bazooka, which was not yet in production.

Senator WILEY. The North Koreans had tanks at the start, did they not?

General COLLINS. They had no medium tanks. In fact, the South Koreans had no tanks. They had a few armored cars and that was all.

Senator WILEY. The North Koreans.

General COLLINS. The North Koreans did; but the South Koreans did not.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley, your time is exhausted.

Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. General Collins, may I ask you just four questions on subjects that are not related to each other, but which are interesting at least to me. If you testified to any of them when I was not in the room, please say so and I will not proceed.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

KNOWLEDGE OF CHINESE INTERVENTION

Senator SALTONSTALL. Did General MacArthur have all the intelligence out there that you had here? In other words, did you transmit to him all the intelligence?

General COLLINS. To the best of my knowledge; yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now it was current around here, certainly, that the English and the Indians had intimated that the Chinese would come down if we came too near the Manchurian border. Was there any actual intelligence on that?

General COLLINS. We were furnished that information by the Far Eastern Command.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That came from——

General COLLINS. Came from the Far Eastern Command here.

Senator SALTONSTALL. To you?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. That is one source, and then we got it also from India direct. But we had a message to that effect from FECOM.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that rumor, if not better than a rumor, was current then?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. At least everybody knew that might happen?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

KOREAN SITUATION IN JANUARY 1951

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now you came back here after January 12 and, as I remember it, you came in here, into this room, and you told us you were very much encouraged by the conditions that you found things in in Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You specified, one, the morale of the troops; and, two, the terrain; and, three, the climate at that time. Is that not correct?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that you reviewed and changed really your point of view after that visit and were much more optimistic?

General COLLINS. That is right—as to the feasibility of our troops staying in Korea without having very heavy losses.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And as to the possibilities of our troops staying in Korea more from a defensive point of view or, at that time, from an offensive point of view?

General COLLINS. Primarily from a defensive point of view, because, you see, we had a message from General MacArthur that indicated that he was concerned about the morale of our troops and how long we would stand up under these attacks that were obtaining at the time.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that even as far back as January 12 you realized from your point of view here that we had to adopt more of a defensive attitude over there against aggression rather than our ability to really become aggressive?

General COLLINS. That is right, and instructions compatible with that concept were sent to General MacArthur.

IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now another question on another subject. Today the problem of our going it alone over there has been raised. If we go it alone over there, we raise the question of our cooperation with the English and the French in other parts of the world. Now, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view, and from the infantry point of view how important is it from the point of view of bases in Europe and everything else, how important is the active cooperation of the English and the French?

General COLLINS. I would say it would be vital, Senator Saltonstall, from the over-all world picture from a military point of view.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that we have got to give some consideration to their points of view in the Far East if we want their cooperation in Europe, even though their point of view may be completely different from ours?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I think that is the case.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, to sum up—you have stated, I believe, that it is your opinion that more troops than we now have available of a trained character would be necessary to accomplish—to take the chance of, I will put it that way, going into a war outside of the limits of Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do believe that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that is your opinion as chief of staff of the infantry?

General COLLINS. Of the Army.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Of the Army, and your experience as a soldier?

General COLLINS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I think that is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. General, I will continue the discussion of the three reasons of the Joint Chiefs to concur for military reasons that General MacArthur should be removed.

The first reason, which we discussed briefly, was that he was out of accord or sympathy in limiting the conflict.

The second was the criticism primarily for his armistice attempt, which they felt was improper. The third, I want to read, now, and then ask you the reasons for and behind this. I quote from page 2276 of the testimony of General Bradley who was here yesterday.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

> The third reason advanced by the Chiefs was that "they, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country." They have always adhered to this principle and they felt that General MacArthur's actions were continuing to jeopardize the civilian control over the military authorities.

Now, we asked General MacArthur his attitude on civilian control and he was outspoken on the idea of civilian control, so I would like to ask you what actions of his would jeopardize civilian control? What was the basis of this particular reason?

General Collins. Well, I would say that it overlaps into the first reason, perhaps, Senator Smith, in that General MacArthur spoke on foreign policy, which directly affects military policy in a fashion that we thought was improper; and, incidentally, the second reason, I didn't see that particular testimony of General Bradley's, but I would say that the second major reason was not merely his effort at a peace proposition, but was the successive failure to clear his statements after the December 6 message was given, Senator, to him.

Senator Smith. Well, I think we limited those cases, if I am correct, to the Veterans of Foreign Wars' speech; the letter to Congressman Martin, and the armistice proposal of March 24.

General Collins. Yes, sir; but, you see, in your statement now you mention only the armistice business.

Senator Smith. Well, am I correct then? I was just sort of summing up what the testimony was this morning.

General Collins. Yes, sir; right.

Senator Smith. I was just summing up what the statement was so we do not get confused on this.

CLEARANCE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON POLICY

The second reason advanced by this testimony was that General MacArthur failed to comply with a Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public.

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. That was the directive of December 6.

General Collins. That is right, sir.

Senator Smith. And, as I pointed out this morning, the three things that seem to have been the cause of complaint was the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter stating the strategic position of Formosa; the Congressman Martin letter, and this armistice negotiation of March 24. I do not know of any others than those that we have put much stress on in these discussions.

General Collins. No, sir; except that the reply to Mr. Hazlitt was publicized, and we didn't agree with that either.

Senator Smith. You mean you did not agree that that was a political consideration?

HAZLITT LETTER AND ARMING OF SOUTH KOREANS

General Collins. No, sir. But the point was that the clear implication to us was that the answer given to Mr. Hazlitt was that the only reason we didn't arm these 400,000 South Korean draftees was political. That was not the case.

Senator Smith. Might I just point this out, if I might as I did to General Bradley when he testified to the same matter, that when General MacArthur gave his first opinion on the arming of the South Koreans, it was in January at the time when you were considering evacuation. He was thinking of the defense of Japan, and he thought it would be better to put that armament into the Japanese police force being set up than to risk it with the Koreans whom it would take time to train.

When the Hazlitt inquiry came, it was March 31, after the scene had changed, after we had decided not to evacuate, and the question then was a forward push in Korea, and that involved the problem of complying with President Rhee's request which was way after the January decision; so, it seems to me, if we take the two dates and consider the exact situation when the two different inquiries about Korean troops were made, they are perfectly consistent, and there is nothing wrong in the second communication that they were political decisions.

I am confused about your answer to that because, it seems to me, there are two different situations there entirely.

General COLLINS. I don't believe that the situations were so different, Senator.

[Deleted.]

Senator SMITH. Well, your only——

General COLLINS. From a military point of view.

Senator SMITH. But your only complaint there was that was another reason why we didn't feel it would be wise to give further equipment to untrained men.

General COLLINS. In my judgment that would have been a complete answer.

Senator SMITH. If he had said that.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Then, your complaint is that it leaves an implication that the fault was here rather than there?

General COLLINS That is correct, sir.

Senator SMITH. And that, of course, is a question of what really was in General MacArthur's mind at the time. He was asked a specific question why do they "fail to refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported New York Times," and so forth, and the reference to President Rhee's requests, and his answer was that that was a question which was political.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. You may be right. I just want to point out that distinction because it seems to me, as a layman, there was a distinction there: One, while contemplating evacuation he would be obviously thinking of the defense of Japan, and taking care of that problem; and the other indicates that he was thinking of a forward movement and wanted troops from somewhere, and Syngman Rhee asked for the rearming of his Korean Army. I think there is a reasonable distinction there between the two, but I don't want to press the point.

JUSTIFICATION OF MAC ARTHUR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

Now then, I cannot quite see, in the light of the evidence that has come out, and what you have testified to so far, how we can justify the abrupt dismissal of the general.

You have testified that there was a plan to have Secretary Pace take this message; but, frankly, that does not satisfy me. Here we have a man who was the commander in chief in our Japanese war; he had been made the SCAP, which was the supreme commander of the Allied forces in Japan.

You would not question what he has done in Japan in the way of a rehabilitation of the country, in building up the new democracy, in selling to the Japanese people our western tradition, and in turning them from the feeling that they were a conquered people to wanting to join with us in the western group.

You were aware that peace negotiations were pending; in fact, I think prior to the dismissal, Mr. Dulles had been out there and had started negotiations with General MacArthur.

Now, I cannot quite see why either General MacArthur was not invited to come here and discuss the differences that might exist on this strategy in Korea or why you or one of the Joint Chiefs or General Bradley, did not go to Japan, and just say, "We disagree on the policy here in limiting the war to Korea and we request you to turn your command over to Ridgway."

Now, I asked him distinctly if he had been asked to do that what would he have done? Why, he said, "I would have turned it over immediately."

He said, "I would have been delighted to have gone into conference with my superiors, and if I had been asked to I would have turned it over immediately," and I am asking you whether that course was considered at all.

The abrupt dismissal is what is concerning the people in this country, with a man of this reputation and standing.

General COLLINS. I have given you what I know of the situation, Senator, the complete statement of my personal knowledge of what was done and how it transpired.

Senator SMITH. Well, I am just assuming that you and, I do not think, any of the Joint Chiefs had anything to do with the method that was applied. You may have discussed the wisdom or unwisdom, but including the dismissal from the SCAP job, you did not have anything to do with the sudden midnight message which did not give him a chance to see his troops or anything of that sort.

General COLLINS. No, sir; I had nothing to do with it.

Senator SMITH. There was a falling down there. I still have to leave it in the record that I cannot possibly justify the way this thing was done even assuming there was a difference over which the President had the last ward. General MacArthur should have been requested, if he couldn't cooperate with you, to turn over the command.

WHEN DIFFERENCES WITH MAC ARTHUR BEGAN

Now, what I would like to know is this: Whether prior to this particular difference on strategy with General MacArthur, there were any other differences with him or any differences of feeling among the Chiefs of Staff with regard to MacArthur's over-all policy?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I would say not. I think that they have all been very thoroughly outlined and discussed.

Senator SMITH. Well, prior to the Korean outbreak—let us go back to the time you went out, when I was there, and saw you there——

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator SMITH (continuing). Was there any difference at all with MacArthur? Did you have any complaint with regard to the handling of the Japanese situation?

General COLLINS. None whatsoever.

Senator SMITH. Was there any question of a difference?

General COLLINS. None whatsoever.

Senator SMITH. Wouldn't you agree with me that it was an amazing job done in Japan there?

General COLLINS. Perfectly marvelous job.

Senator SMITH. That is what troubles me, to find out the point at which the lack of faith or confidence in him began.

The President implies it really began back with the VFW letter, the letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars; at that point he began to feel that he would have to think in terms of a change.

General COLLINS. I can only speak for myself, Senator, and I can assure you that the difficulties began after the Korean outbreak and not before; that is, after the Korean fighting began, and not before.

EXTENT OF DIFFERENCES WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator SMITH. Well now, on this whole question of strategy, and I am a layman, so I am not going to discuss the pros and cons of it, let me ask you this question: If the Joint Chiefs were not apprehensive that Russia—not the Chinese Communists, but that Russia—would come in, wouldn't you have said that the program that General MacArthur had talked over with you in Japan January 12, the program that you fellows yourselves thought might wind up this thing, would have been a wise program to pursue? Was it not simply the fear that Russia might come in that was the difference between you and General MacArthur?

General COLLINS. No, sir; that was not all of it. The other points had to do with the fact as to whether or not we would have to go it alone without the support of our allies. That was definitely a military consideration on our part; plus the fact that, as I indicated earlier here this afternoon, that once embarked upon bombing into an area like Manchuria, there is no telling where you would have to stop, and the thought of our taking an all-out fight with the Chinese, who, frankly, have been our traditional friends, and in whom I am confident personally that the average Chinaman does not want to have any war with us any more than we want to have a war with them, that if we once embark on it, there just would be no stopping.

Senator SMITH. Let me just make a suggestion. You speak about the allies, and I am wondering whether the allies would not have followed us if we had given them a course to pursue; we were carrying 90 percent of the load; we were taking nearly all the casualties. England was the only country among the allies that seemed to have much voice in this, except India's attitude.

Now, England was alarmed, of course, for fear of Hong Kong; England was alarmed, because she had a $2 billion dollar investment in trade with China, and she wanted to keep that up. I am sympathetic with her feeling. She did not want to cut off her trade in China.

However, all MacArthur was asking for was a diversion of some sort to take the pressure off his troops in North Korea. One thing was air reconnaisance to determine where the enemy was in the China front.

Another was the economic blockade, and another was a naval blockade, and they all appear in your study.

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. And another was taking the wraps off the Nationalist troops so that at least the Chinese Commies would be scared enough to bring some of the divisions down there to defend against them.

CHANCES OF AN ALL-OUT WAR

But what I am getting at is I cannot see the logic of the position that that would precipitate an all-out war. General MacArthur simply wanted to take the pressure off the present troops until the Chinese saw that they had to quit. As I visualize it, here was defiance of the United Nations. I commend you for the splendid statement you made this morning about the Untied Nations; I share it. Let us back them up to the limit; but how can the UN tolerate a defiance in Korea and not say we are going to use the resources we have got until the Chinese cease that aggression? They get out, and the United Nations take over, and that is the end.

It seems to me that is the picture that General MacArthur tried to portray rather than the picture that he wanted an all-out war with China.

Now, is that unsound, that analysis?

General Collins. Well, Senator, it was too long for me to give an out-and-out answer of concurrence to your statement, and I am afraid that I am not in a position to say that I agree with everything that you have stated. I don't know all the facts involved, actually, as to what the views of the various nations were, because I was not a party to whatever inquiries were made.

Senator Smith. Well, I understand, and I will take that up with the Secretary of State.

General Collins. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith, your time has expired.

Senator Johnson?

ADDITIONAL FORCES NEEDED FOR MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATION

Senator Johnson. General, this morning you indicated that General MacArthur's program, if it were placed into effect, would require several more divisions than we now have in Korea.

I want to bring to your attention General MacArthur's testimony on that specific point.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I apologize, but would he speak just a little louder?

Senator Johnson (reading):

> Senator Johnson. But you recommend a specific program in the Far East. Will that program, in your judgment, require additional manpower and if so, what is your estimate of how much would be required?
>
> General MacArthur. It does not require a great ground force in the Far East. It does require a certain amount of Navy and Air. It does require garrisons such as we would have in the various places of Japan, Philippines, and Okinawa. It would be a small fraction indeed of the total forces of the United States. I think the forces we have out there now, including the Korean forces, represent something less than 10 percent of our forces. I am sure that that would not have to be raised to any material strength to accomplish the purpose of defense that I spoke of.

[Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSON. And you are in disagreement with General MacArthur on that specific question?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I am.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, we have before us legislation now pending in conference committee, and I want to read to you provisions of that legislation and get your comments and your opinions, and particularly do I want to know what effect you think this would have on your forces in Korea and the build-up to full strength that we expect of our Armed Forces, under the 3,462,000 ceiling, and I am quoting now from page 39 of a comparative draft of the House and Senate bill, and this is from the House bill:

> DISCHARGE OF INACTIVE RESERVISTS AFTER 1 YEAR DUTY
>
> Any member of the inactive or volunteer reserve who served on active duty for a period of ninety days or more in any branch of the Armed Forces between the period December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, inclusive, of for a period of twelve months or more in any branch of the Armed Forces between the period September 16, 1940, and June 24, 1948, inclusive, who is now or may hereafter be ordered to active duty pursuant to this section, shall upon the completion of twelve or more months of active duty since June 25, 1950, if he makes application therefor to the Secretary of the branch of service in which he is serving, be released from active duty and shall not thereafter be ordered to active duty for periods in excess of thirty days without his consent except in time of war or national emergency hereafter declared by the Congress.

If that should be a part of the law of the land and you should be required to discharge any members of the Inactive or Volunteer Reserve after service of 12 months, what effect would that have on your divisions now in Korea and on your forces in other parts of the world?

General COLLINS. Well I presume, Senator, that it is all right for me to answer this. Normally I have understood that when a bill is in conference, that normally the hearings on it are finished, but if you wish me to give you that view on it, and if that is an appropriate thing for me to do——

Senator JOHNSON. Maybe I can get at it a little better. Do you favor such a provision?

General COLLINS. If the chairman of the committee says it is proper for me to answer it, I will be happy to answer it.

Senator JOHNSON. I do not know any reason why it would be improper for you to give your views on such a provision. You do it every day.

General COLLINS. We normally don't after a bill goes to conference. At least that has been the general procedure within the Department of the Army.

Senator JOHNSON. Have you expressed yourself on this provision before?

General COLLINS. Not since it has gone to conference.

Senator JOHNSON. At any time?

General COLLINS. I think I have; yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you tell us this? Would you tell us what effect it would have if you discharge every member of the Inactive Volunteer Reserve who had served 12 months or more?

General COLLINS. It would have a very seriously adverse effect—no question about that.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you have any idea how many men would be discharged?

General Collins. No sir; I don't. I think that the Army is in a little better shape than perhaps the other services are now. In other words, we are in course now of initiating the relief of our reservists, and I believe we will be in a little bit better shape, we will be able to relieve them a little sooner than certainly the Navy will be ready to do; and I think also sooner than the Air Force.

Senator Johnson. But you think any requirement that you discharge them in 12 months would result in a serious situation for your forces?

General Collins. Yes; it would have a very adverse effect if we had to do that literally.

Senator Johnson. When General MacArthur was before the committee I read to him a statement made by Secretary Pace at the Wake Island Conference, which appears on page 3 of the Substance of Statements at the Wake Island Conference:

MAC ARTHUR'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF COOPERATION FROM WASHINGTON

> Secretary Pace. Is there anything in the terms of ECA and Army cooperation that we might do to help you?
>
> General MacArthur. No commander in the history of war has ever had more complete and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than I have.

I asked him if that was a correct statement, and he said it was up until that time.

Now, could you tell me—could you enlighten us any on what has happened since that time that would indicate he didn't receive cooperation?

General Collins. I don't believe—of course, again now I am just estimating—I don't believe that General MacArthur had in mind that he didn't receive cooperation. He did not receive all of the troops that he said he would like to have.

For example, he asked originally for four additional divisions for the security of Japan. However, in my visit out there, either the December visit or the January visit, he did agree that it would be satisfactory from his point of view if we sent out two divisions to Japan instead of four.

We did send two divisions. But his original request was four divisions.

Senator Johnson. You think that is what he had in mind when he said in answer to that question:

> I am very glad to have the opportunity to reaffirm that statement. Up to that time it was certainly so.

General Collins. I believe so; but, of course, I don't know.

AGREEMENT OF COMMANDERS IN KOREA ON MAC ARTHUR PROGRAM

Senator Johnson. When General MacArthur appeared before the committee, I asked him this question:

> Did I understand you to say that the foreign commanders in Korea shared your views about the kind of program that should be put in effect there?
>
> General MacArthur. Every officer that I have talked with there is in general agreement.

Did you find that to be true in your various visits out there?

General Collins. I did not inquire from any of the other commanders with respect to the views of General MacArthur.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you learn from any of them that they did share his views that we should undertake that four-point program that he recommended?

General COLLINS. Was he speaking of foreign commanders, or American commanders?

Senator JOHNSON. He was speaking of both.

General COLLINS. Both?

I have had one communication from General Ridgway, the date of which I do not recall now, in which he told me that from his point of view, of being a commander in the field, and he made that clear, that he felt that he should support that proposal of General MacArthur's, which involved the release of any restrictions on Chinese Nationalist forces operating on the mainland of China.

Senator JOHNSON. And he limited it to that one?

General COLLINS. That one particular point.

Senator JOHNSON. In the four-point program?

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. That may have been what General MacArthur had in mind when I asked him about General Ridgway's feelings:

> And by that statement, of course, you include General Ridgway?
>
> General MACARTHUR. General who?
>
> Senator JOHNSON. Ridgway.
>
> General MACARTHUR. I would, of course, prefer to let General Ridgway speak for himself; but I will say "Yes."
>
> Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, General.
>
> Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
>
> General MACARTHUR. I think you will find, if you will go into the reports that he made, that he is quite in agreement.

Now, do you know of any report, other than the one you mentioned, that General Ridgway has made, to the effect that he agrees with the program recommended by General MacArthur?

General COLLINS. I do not know of any, Senator; no, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WILEY. That doesn't mean that there aren't any.

Senator JOHNSON. Wait a minute. I have another question here to ask, which I asked General Bradley yesterday

NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE CASUALTIES

General Collins, do you have an estimate of the total number of casualties that have been suffered by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists, from the beginning of the war?

General COLLINS. I believe I have such an estimate. Let me check here and see whether I have it with me here.

Yes, sir.

The estimate that I have, which includes killed, wounded, nonbattle, and prisoners of war, both Chinese Communists and North Koreans, is 1,025,000.

Senator WILEY. What date?

General COLLINS. As of now.

Senator JOHNSON. Does that include battle and nonbattle casualties?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. What are the estimates? How do you divide those?

General COLLINS. I don't have a breakdown of that, except for 1 week. The week from the 17th to the 23d of May, our estimates are that they suffered almost 90,000 casualties in that 1 week. That includes only killed in action, wounded in action, and those taken prisoners of war.

Senator JOHNSON. Battle and nonbattle, it is your estimate there are more than a million casualties?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, General, in your estimation, to what extent do those casualties cut down the military potential of the Chinese Communists?

General COLLINS. I think they reduce the military potential of the Chinese materially, because, as I said earlier, the forces that they have sent in have been the very best troops that they have; and I have word from one of our officers recently returned, just yesterday, that so far as the North Koreans are concerned, particularly the prisoners that we have been taking recently, they have been much older men than the younger, more vigorous men that we took originally.

ALLIED CASUALTIES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES

Senator JOHNSON. Do you have an estimate on the allied casualties, other than ours?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

I believe that the ROK, Republic of Korea, battle casualties total something over 167,000, actually 167,254.

Other United Nations forces, total battle casualties, 4,823.

Senator JOHNSON. That is both battle and nonbattle?

General COLLINS. No, sir; that is just battle casualties.

Now, including the nonbattle casualties, and frankly that is a very poor term——

Senator JOHNSON. That is the next thing I want to go into.

General COLLINS. "Sick and injured" would be a far more accurate term than "casualties."

If they had occurred at home, in a home station in the United States, nobody would ever think of calling them nonbattle casualties; they would be listed on the sick book and called "sick."

Because of the fact that they are in a theater of war, you get into this military lingo which, in more cases than one, is terrible; and if you get such a term as "nonbattle casualty," actually, it means sick and injured.

The sick and injured casualties in the Republic of Korea forces totaled 30,202; and in the other United Nations forces, just under 5,000, actually, 4,962; so that the total battle casualties and sick and injured, Republic of Korea Army, total now 197,456; for the other United Nations forces, 9,785.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

General COLLINS. I wonder if I can add a word further to the question, or is the Senator's time up?

Chairman RUSSELL. He has 1 minute.

General COLLINS. I would like to add the point with respect to this so-called nonbattle casualties that, to the best of my knowledge, I am not positive of this, now, that the sick rate in Korea is, if anything, less than the garrison rate in the United States.

That has usually been the case. Our troops in the field usually have a lower sick rate than the people living right in the garrisons.

I think that has held in Korea, as it has in all our wars.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, I want to ask you a few questions about soldiers.

General COLLINS. About what, sir?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. About soldiers.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will say this with utter sincerity and complete conviction, that I consider you one of our great, brilliant generals.

I think your record bears that out, and I am sincere about that, and I want to take you out of the category, with that personal observation.

MAC ARTHUR'S RECORD AS A SOLDIER

Hasn't it been true, in our history, that periodically some of our great military leaders have been firm in their convictions, and have had rather outstanding disagreements with their superiors on policy in times past, in our history?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I think that there are occasions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I won't canvass the list, but I think there is a well-known list. They have been people of strong conviction, and there have been a number of instances where they have been great leaders.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now there have been some slightly, perhaps not even slightly concealed questions asked repeatedly here, the purpose of which seems to be to draw from you or some other witness the idea that General MacArthur is either a bungler, a fool, or a stupid military leader, and that he may have made some inexcusable blunders from time to time.

Because of my respect for your opinion, and my sincere admiration for your record and proven ability, I shall ask your opinion on this. Taking General MacArthur's record as a soldier, as a strategist, as a field captain, in the broadest term, field general, and without asking you to classify or to A B C in degree of ability or of brilliance, what would you say about General MacArthur's over-all standing in brilliance and leeadership, and in what general category—top, middle, or lower—would you place General MacArthur in the history of our great military men in the United States?

General COLLINS. I think he is one of the most brilliant military leaders that this country has produced.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir. Now has his record been replete with any substantial military blunders from the standpoint of strategy or tactics or has he demonstrated generally in his military career a successful line of strategy and a successful line of tactical operations in matters for which he has been responsible throughout his career?

General COLLINS. Throughout his career he has been brilliantly successful.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, sir.

DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES IN NOVEMBER 1950

Now with regard to this situation in December and January when the Reds came over in force and split the Tenth Corps away from the Eighth Army, isn't it a fact that their positions at the time when they were farthest north and perhaps the farthest split apart, that the front, which our entire forces were to hold, was much broader in length, much longer than down in the waist of Korea near the thirty-eighth parallel?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Isn't it a fact that because of the terrain and the hogback of mountains which went up there, that direct and continuous liaison between the Tenth Corps and the Eighth Army way in the north of Korea was far more difficult than it is down in the waist part of Korea, that is, by waist I mean the center part of Korea; isn't that correct, General?

General COLLINS. It would have been more difficult; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General MacArthur testified, I believe that that push to the north was a known and designed reconnaissance in force which if lightly resisted would push on north, and which if heavily resisted would have to withdraw. It did encounter superior force, and according to the preconceived plan of such a reconnaissance in force, a withdrawal was put into effect, and, as I recall his testimony, he said that the casualties were surprisingly small in this orderly withdrawal.

It was a tough one. I don't mean to minimize it, but considering the forces against us that were pouring in, that the withdrawal was accomplished according to plan and with what might be considered a reasonable minimum of casualties under all the circumstances. Would you say that that is a fair statement? Do you agree with that generally?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do agree.

CONSULTATION OF PACE ON DISMISSAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. Now, General Collins to your knowledge was Secretary Pace consulted about the relief of General MacArthur in April in those meetings?

General COLLINS. No, sir. Mr. Pace was outside of the country at the time. He had already left the country, to the best of my recollection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To your knowledge was his advice sought by anyone by cable, wireless, message or otherwise?

General COLLINS. Not that I know of, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mentioned Mr. Pace, of course, because he is Secretary of the Army and the civilian head at least over you in your capacity as Chief of Staff of the Army.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There may be some question about your membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to where the line of command comes.

General COLLINS. There is no doubt that he is my Chief in the Army.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH OF OFFICERS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now I want to read to you your own statement about the freedom of speech of officers. I am reading from the record of interrogation of General Marshall on May 11 and I am reading from page 1322.

I had previously read from the hearings on the troops-to-Europe issue. Senator Lodge had asked you when you appeared as a witness there whether or not there was any truth to the statement that wraps had been ordered on military officers to prevent them from testifying as to their opinion or giving committees of Congress their personal views, and Senator Lodge said—he had asked you the question and you said, "Definitely not." Then Senator Lodge:

> In other words, an officer is free to respond to an invitation by any committee of Congress to come up and say what he thinks?
>
> General COLLINS. Completely so. So far as the Army is concerned, I can say without any reservation whatever that here in essence are the instructions that we have complied with for years. An officer called before a committee of the Congress must present the considered view of the Department of the Army or the War Department. I think that is a logical thing.

And then you go on to discuss that, which I agree with. I think he is obligated to support or to present the view. Then you continue:

> However, an officer is permitted to answer to queries complete and utterly unfettered personal views so long as he says "this is my personal view."
>
> Senator LODGE. So that is a protection to the public and to the Member of Congress involved is it not, so that he will know that the officer is expressing a personal view and not a view of the Department.

I am fully aware, General, that that refers to coming before committees of Congress. That is a public declaration of personal views which I take it would not be in major premise different from expressing a personal view to the Member of Congress such as Congressman Martin.

Now I would like to read you—I am hurrying along because I will ask your composite comment—are you familiar with a book called The Armed Forces Officer which I believe is just coming off the press? It is put out by the Department of Defense by General Marshall, that is he has promulgated it here?

General COLLINS. I am not familiar with it personally, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I will assure you it is an official publication of the Government Printing Office, and it has a statement by General Marshall as Secretary of Defense on page 8 this language for the guidance of officers, saying about the officer:

> The service officer is charged only to take a lively interest in all such discussions—

That is about public and military affairs.

> He has no more right to condemn the service unfairly than has any other American. On the other hand he is not expected to be an intellectual eunuch, oblivious to all of the faults in the institution to which he gives his loyalty. To the contrary, the nature of that loyalty requires that he will use his force toward the righting of those things which reason convinces him are going wrong, though making certain that his action will not do more damage than repair.

And continuing the second paragraph:

> His ultimate commanding loyalty at all times is to his country, and not to his service or his superior. He owes it to his country to speak the truth as he sees

it. This implies a steadying judgment as to when it should be spoken, and to whom it should be addressed. A truth need not only be well-rounded, but the utterance of it should be cognizant of the stresses and objectives of the hour. Truth becomes falsehood unless it has the strength of perspective. The presentation of facts is self-justifying only when the facts are developed in their true proportion.

And may I read just one more passage and then I will be glad to have your views. This is from page 18 of this manual:

DUTIES OF OFFICERS

But to get back to those simpler virtues which provide a firm foundation for patriotism and may become the fount of courage, at least these few things would have to be put among the fundamentals:

1. A man has honor if he hold himself to a course of conduct, because of a conviction that it is in the general interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation, or grave physical risk.
2. He has veracity if, having studied a question to the limit of his ability, he says and believes what he thinks to be true, even though it would be the path of least resistance to deceive others and himself.
3. He has justice if he acknowledges the interests of all concerned in any particular transaction rather than serving his own apparent interest.
4. He has graciousness if he acts and speaks forthrightly, agrees warmly, disagrees fairly and respectfully, participates enthusiastically, refrains from harboring grudges, takes his reverses in stride, and does not complain or ask for help in the face of trifling calamities.
5. He has integrity if his interest in the good of the service is at all times greater than his personal pride, and when he holds himself to the same line of duty when unobserved as he would follow if all of his superiors were present.

Those are the five categories. Now, has my time expired?

Chairman Russell. You have nearly 2 minutes.

Senator Hickenlooper. I am sorry.

Chairman Russell. I say you have 2 minutes left. You have almost 2 minutes.

Senator Hickenlooper. I thought I had run over 2 minutes.

Chairman Russell. No.

MAC ARTHUR'S DUTIES AS AN OFFICER

Senator Hickenlooper. I read those, General Collins, because it seems here that the policy of the Army itself is clearly stated that an officer's duty is to his country and his prime duty, his overriding duty, is to his country and not to the service or to his superiors.

I am wondering, in the light of that fact and the fact that General MacArthur was not only a field commander in the Orient—that he was in the nature of a proconsul of this country, with policy-making powers over a conquered country—he was beyond the strict military man, subject to military discipline, because he had the power in at least one capacity to exercise judgment, to make policy, and he was in some measure outside of the strict military routine disciplinary field.

Chairman Russell. The Senator's time has expired. If General Collins wishes to answer, he may.

Senator Hickenlooper. It would be unfair to General Collins not to let him answer it.

Chairman Russell. I have consistently marked the timing of the Senators speaking and not the witness. The witness speaks on the committee's time in this case.

General Collins. I would like to answer the question posed to me.

Needless to say, it is a very long and involved question.

Senator Hickenlooper. I read the philosophy and it is a comment I want rather than a "yes" or "no" specific answer.

General Collins. If I could address myself to the latter part of your question as to whether or not there was a difference of the status of General MacArthur, that he was in a sense a proconsul, I would say he was a proconsul with respect to the occupation in Japan, and there he was involved in the formulation of policy.

With respect to the conduct of the operations in Korea, I do not agree that he was in a privileged position. There he was in the same position that, we will say, General Pershing was when he went into Mexico; he was in the same position that General Eisenhower was in when he went into Europe.

There, in my judgment, he was bound with respect to over-all diplomatic policy, you might say, international relations, and that sort of thing to be guided by instructions of the President of the United States.

In my personal judgment—and this is my conviction—he stepped out of his proper sphere, particularly after having been instructed by the President that he was not to speak in these matters without first having gotten clearance from appropriate authorities.

Now, with respect to the other part of your question, it impinges in my judgment on the same sort of thing Senator Bridges asked me earlier today. I don't know the context from which you quoted in this particular book, but I feel certain that that had to do with the manner in which an officer conducts himself in his broad life in the Army, that he should——

Senator Hickenlooper. It is the manual.

General Collins. Yes, sir. I think that is the purpose of the manual and I subscribe. I think, if I might say, it is a little bit long-winded, but I subscribe to the philosophy behind it. I have lived with that philosophy and certainly it has not hurt me in my career, and I have seen a great many other outspoken officers who say their piece.

I say that the difference in this case is that it was not, the matter was not handled in the normal channels, and as put up to me by Senator Bridges, if I disagree, as I have disagreed at times with policies, I have stated my disagreement in the appropriate channels, and I personally think that under the circumstances, under our form of government, where the responsibilities of the military are fixed by law, and we do establish a chain of command, that that chain of command must be honored, must be followed.

If you arrive at the point where you feel you still can not do it, then you have the option of stepping out of the uniform, and there you free yourself then from the restrictions which our people have traditionally placed on their military men as long as they hold a military post.

That is my judgment, sir.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, I think it is quite evident we can't conclude here this afternoon; so if there is no objection, we will take a recess now until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:23 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m. Saturday, May 26, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

SATURDAY, MAY 26, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell, Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Sparkman, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Johnson of Texas, Long, Bridges, Knowland, and Cain.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

I believe when the committee recessed on yesterday afternoon that Senator Hickenlooper had just concluded his examination.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. MILES REBER, CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON; AND LT. COL. MALCOLM F. GILCHRIST, JR., STAFF OFFICER, GENERAL STAFF—Resumed

General Collins. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a question at this point, sir.

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir.

General Collins. There were two items that were left a little bit hanging in the air yesterday, and I promised the committee that I would get some information on them, and I have that information if you wish me to give it now.

Senator Cain. Will the gentleman yield to me just one minute? Might I suggest—and there is some selfishness in it—that the Chair might recognize the next Senator to do the questioning and then have General Collins provide that information. I think that will result in a more orderly procedure.

Chairman Russell. It would not do to take that out of Senator Knowland's time.

Senator Cain. No, sir.

Chairman Russell. Well, is there any objection? The Chair hears none. Senator Knowland is recognized. His time will begin to run when General Collins concludes the evidence which he now has before him.

NONBATTLE CASUALTIES

General Collins. Yesterday the matter of nonbattle casualities was discussed as it was in earlier testimony. I stated yesterday that usually nonbattle casualties are lower and men are generally healthier in combat than in normal garrison areas where men are not exposed to combat. I have today some current figures that are applicable and that illustrate my statement on this subject.

Among the United States troops in Japan, including the occupation forces and those passing through Japan en route to Korea, the so-called nonbattle casualties rate from the 1st of July 1950, that is, shortly after the initial North Korean attack in Korea, to the 31st of March of this year amounted to 20 percent of the total strength for this period. During the same period, 1st of July 1950 to the 31st of March 1951, among the United States troops in Korea, the so-called nonbattle casualties amounted to only 12 percent of the total United States strength for the period, or 8 percent less than the nonbattle casualty rate in Japan.

Here is another interesting figure for the same period. Of all the nonbattle casualties, so-called, in the Far East command, including both Japan and Korea, 90.4 percent have been returned to duty in the Far East.

Chairman Russell. What is that percentage?

General Collins. Ninety and four-tenths percent have been returned to duty in the Far East itself—4.9 percent were evacuated to the United States for treatment, and only three-tenths of 1 percent died after admission to the hospital.

Actually, if we military, particularly our medicos, could get away from our military lingo and talk plain English a bit more, we would name these so-called nonbattle casualties what they really are—that is sick and injured.

Senator Wiley. What is your percentage on the battle casualties of return?

General Collins. I think it is 85 percent, but I am not positive of that. Let me check that. I think Colonel Gilchrist may have that information.

Our medical people have done a perfectly marvelous job—perfectly marvelous. I know—at least, sometime ago I was told—that our deaths in ratio to the number of wounded is about a third less in this conflict in Korea than it was even in the last war. And in the last war I thought they did a wonderful job.

Those reported as wounded in action or injured in action, 75 percent—at one date I do remember 85 percent were reported as having returned to action. The figures now—and these were up to date as of the 13th of April, and this runs all the way from the period of the 1st of July 1950 to the 13th of April of this year—of those reported as wounded in action or injured in action, 70.2 percent have been returned to duty, of which 57.3 percent returned to duty in the Far East and 12.9 percent returned to duty in the United States.

Senator Knowland. General, under the unanimous-consent agreement, not out of my time, but merely to clarify the situation—could you, for the benefit of the record and the Senators present, give your definition of either these nonbattle casualties or, as you say, the sick and injured?

In other words, there is some misconception that if a person goes, for instance, to ask for an aspirin tablet, that he is included as a nonbattle casualty.

General COLLINS. That is right. Every time a man reports for sick duty, sick report out there, he is tabulated as being a nonbattle casualty.

Senator KNOWLAND. He is on that list?

General COLLIINS. He is, in my understanding, he is on that list, that is correct.

Colonel GILCHRIST. He gets on sick call.

General COLLINS. If he gets on sick call for any reason whatever, he is termed a nonbattle casualty.

Frankly, it is sheer doggerel, in my opinion.

As I said yesterday, at home in the United States, we don't list such things as nonbattle casualties. We just list them as being sick and injured. That is the term we normally used—at least that was the term we used when I was a company commander. I haven't had anything intimately to do with this for years.

That is what they actually are, they are sick and injured.

DEATHS RESULTING FROM WAR

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, seeing that this is a free-for-all, I would like to ask a couple of questions to clear that up.

I think what you say, is very important General. I think first we should have those that are dead as a result of this war.

General COLLINS. They have been reported regularly.

Senator WILEY. The number?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. And those that are incapacitated because of the war; for instance, amputations, or whatever it is.

General COLLINS. What was that word?

Senator WILEY. Amputations, such as an amputated arm or a leg.

Now, you have those two, and it seems to me that that is all there is to it.

General COLLINS. No, sir; there is one other category.

Senator WILEY. Missing?

General COLLINS. Missing in action, and actually we do not record the number incapacitated as such. I don't doubt that over a period of time we could find out that.

What we report regularly, and I can assure you that they have been reported fully and completely to the press, as rapidly as they have been processed, and their families notified, we have reported killed in action, battle casualties, even very slight wounds such as a scratch on the hand, that is a battle casualty, if caused by a shell.

They have all been reported; and the third category is missing in action.

I will guarantee there has been no concealment, no attempt to fool the American public—we are not that silly.

We have reported those things as they have occurred, and as we have checked them and notified the families of the persons involved.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, the over-all casualties that have been put out in prior wars, in those cases, for instance, where we used for World War I, 333,734 casualties, or for World War II, 994,893, do they include so-called battle casualties——

General COLLINS. That is all they are.

Senator KNOWLAND. And nonbattle casualties?

General COLLINS. That is all they are, to my best knowledge, only battle, true battle casualties.

Senator KNOWLAND. Would you check that point, because I think one of the things in which the Congress would have some interest is the comparative situation with this war and prior wars.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in prior wars, they have included both the battle and nonbattle casualties—if they have—then that should be included here. If they have not been, in order to get fair comparisons, why then, perhaps they should not be here; but I wish you would do so, so that there will be no doubt in anyone's mind, if you could present the list of casualties in prior wars, and as to whether those lists were just battle casualties alone.

General COLLINS. I will ask General Reber to inquire right now.

Senator KNOWLAND. And supply it for the record so that we may have some official comparative figures.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have made inquiry for World War II figures, I did not ask for World War I, of all men who were killed or wounded or missing in action.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

I have one other brief statement to make, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

SECURITY OF RECORD

General COLLINS. If I may make another statement, I would like to refer to the question asked of me yesterday concerning General MacArthur's request to bomb targets in China, including Manchuria; that was one of the questions that you asked me to check on specifically.

Actually, it appears that there was no specific request from General MacArthur for authority to bomb targets in China or Manchuria. However, he raised the question of doing so as early as November 7, when he stated that restrictions placed upon the United Nations operations in Korea provided a sanctuary for hostile forces.

At that time he requested instructions for dealing with this new and threatening development.

However, in another message of the same day, and I might interpolate here that I certainly hope, Senator, that the censor of this will cut out any of these sequential dates, and as much of detail as possible, and the reason I say this is that one of the means—I couldn't say this completely off the record without notes being taken, could I? It is a matter of genuine security, I assure you. Can we do it without——

Chairman RUSSELL. It can only be done by unanimous consent, General.

Senator WILEY. I so move.

General Collins. I can assure you, Senator, that has not a thing to do——

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I am perfectly willing to have it off the record, and then have the committee decide whether it goes on the secret record or not, but I cannot agree in advance to that.

Chairman Russell. Without objection, the general will proceed and then the committee will determine as to whether or not it goes on the secret record.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, to make myself clear, I am perfectly willing from my standpoint to hear the general completely off any written record and then have the committee decide whether it goes on the record.

Chairman Russell. I understand. Now, Mr. Reporter, you won't take this for the time being.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Wiley. I understood, Mr. Chairman, and it came to me very clearly that it was simply a question of opening up for those who were trying to get information of importance to their cause, a way of getting that information.

General Collins. That has nothing to do with this at all.

Senator Wiley. That is why I suggested it.

Senator Morse. I think proceduralwise the record should show that following Senator Hickenlooper's suggestion that we hear General Collins on this point completely off the record and then decide whether or not it should go on the record. General Collins then said that under those circumstances he would not discuss the point that he had in mind, and he gave assurance to Senator Hickenlooper that his decision to follow that course was not any intransigence on his part at all, but that he just considered the matter so important from a standpoint of security that he did not feel that he should make the comment that he was about to make because it had nothing to do with this inquiry anyway, but I think that ought to be shown on the record. Otherwise there will be a break in the record difficult to understand.

Chairman Russell. If you are going to make that statement, I think it should be completed by stating that it related only to security procedures and not to any issues involved here.

Senator Morse. I said he said it had nothing to do with this inquiry but only to procedures.

General Collins. The recorder did take down what Senator Morse just said. From my point of view that clears the thing completely.

I did not intend not to give you the information on this sheet. It was an extraneous statement that I intended to make, and frankly I think that I will just go ahead, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind.

Chairman Russell. Go ahead.

NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS TO EXTEND BOMBING

General Collins. This may be slightly repetitive. I have forgotten where I left off.

However, in another message about the same time General MacArthur indicated that inviolability of Manchuria and Siberia had been a cardinal obligation of his command from the beginning of hostilities.

A short time later in another message he stated that his air power operating within Korea—I will have to reread that again.

A short time later still another message stated that with his air power operating within Korea he could prevent reinforcements from coming across the Yalu. A short time later, however, he reported the terrain aided the enemy, and together with the limitation in the international boundary reduced the normal benefit that would accrue to our superior air power.

Later on the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked him to comment on a possible plan to evacuate Korea should enemy activities force an evacuation. In his reply to the JCS request for his comments, he stated that our naval and air power were only being partially utilized, and suggested that we could destroy China's industrial capacity to wage war through bombardment.

Still later General MacArthur gave an estimate that the enemy had lost his chance for decisive action in Korea, but still retained a potential as long as enemy bases in Manchuria remained immune to air attack.

There were other similar references to the enemy sanctuary. Thus the subject was one that was frequently referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General MacArthur. It is possible that General MacArthur considered those references to the subject to be requests, but we cannot find in the record any specific requests as such.

Nevertheless, because the subject had been raised, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave it their consideration.

Chairman Russell. When?

General Collins. Specifically, for example, in November and in January.

Chairman Russell. The Joint Chiefs then didn't consider it until November? It hadn't been presented in such form that you thought it was important for you to consider it until November?

General Collins. We had considered, but directed against it, but we carefully reviewed the thing after a message from General MacArthur dated the 7th of November. We then again reviewed it in early January.

They also referred the matter to the Secretary of Defense, but it remained their opinion that targets in China and Manchuria should not be attacked under the conditions that then existed for the reasons that I yesterday spread on the record and other witnesses have testified.

Now, this paragraph which I am going to read to the committee I would strongly urge be omitted from the printed published record.

[Deleted.]

Gentlemen, I hope this information clarifies the answers given to the question of "requests"—"requests" in quotes—to bomb targets in Manchuria and China.

Chairman Russell. So far as I have been concerned, I have been anxious to find out just when General MacArthur first recommended that he be given authority—that is, that his directives be changed, that he be given authority to bomb in Manchuria.

I was particularly anxious to find out whether it was before or after the Chinese ground forces had appeared in large numbers in North Korea.

General Collins. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, so far as we have been able to locate, he made no such specific recommendation, but, in all frankness and honesty, in my judgment, he clearly indicated that he thought it ought to be done, although he didn't make a specific recommendation that it be done.

Senator GEORGE. That was early in November?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; from November 7 on; there were several references from that time forward.

Chairman RUSSELL. But the Chinese did not really attack our people in force?

General COLLINS. Not until the 24th of November.

Chairman RUSSELL. Until the 24th of November?

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know whose time it is, but everybody has been asking questions here, Mr. Chairman.

General COLLINS. The first contact with the Chinese was on the 26th of October, but that was not an all-out attack. The 26th of October was the first real brush with them.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper, did you have some question you wish to ask on the committee's time? If so, go ahead; others have used it.

FIELD COMMANDER'S SCOPE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was just going to suggest that on that theory, if a field commander in the tactics and strategy of the use of his troops to win an objective, if he has to wire to the Joint Chiefs of Staff every time he wants to load a cannon or, say, put five rounds in a rifle, isn't that cutting him down pretty thin? Doesn't your field commander say, "I want the limits of the objective and then I operate tactically as the situation demands"?

It seems to narrow that down pretty much to have to wire the Joint Chiefs of Staff every time you put a cartridge in a gun.

Chairman RUSSELL. Since I am the man who has been asking these questions, let me make this observation.

I see absolutely no relationship between asking permission to load a cannon and asking permission to bomb forces outside of Korea that had not yet demonstrated that they were attacking our Armed Forces.

Of course, no one would be more strongly in favor of absolute leeway for the conduct of operations in the field by a field commander than I would be, even with my limited knowledge of military matters.

It would seem to be quite a difference in that and in deciding to attack neutral forces that were within their own country and had not yet intervened in the war.

That was the reason I had asked these questions. I asked them of General MacArthur, and he said he couldn't recall when he requested specifically this information. I asked him if he would have recommended it before the Chinese came into the war, and he stated, as I read into the record on yesterday, that he would have issued an ultimatum to them when they moved those armies up there, that if they did intervene, he would bomb China.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

CLEARANCE OF JCS DIRECTIVES

Senator WILEY. On the subject that has been discussed I would like to ask the general something.

I think you have cleared up the matter from the various communiqués between MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff. There was a clear indication that because of the movement of the troops north and because of the discovery of them being north of the Yalu, and so forth, there was a clear indication that MacArthur was seeking to be able to meet any eventuality; and on March 7, I think, you stated definitely that you told him he could not bomb north of the Yalu.

Now, this is my question:

Was that the result of the Chiefs of Staff's own judgment, or was it the result of the State Department's judgment, or both?

General COLLINS. It was probably both, Senator.

I thought I pretty thoroughly covered that, discussed that yesterday.

It was not wholly a political decision by any manner of means. As I stated yesterday, to me there were good, valid reasons for not wishing to, which I believe I thoroughly discussed in the record yesterday.

Senator WILEY. The point I was getting at was—who really made the decision, you people or the State Department?

General COLLINS. It would depend upon—it was not the State Department, I can assure you; but after some date which I really do not recall, we were required to clear all JCS directives, specifically to clear them with the Secretary of Defense, and that didn't mean that we didn't have to clear them with State; we cleared them in the normal chain of command.

CENSORSHIP PROCEDURE

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, there are two procedural matters which I think might be taken up before we get into the questioning.

One of them as Admiral Davis mentioned to me this morning—I suppose he mentioned it to me because I am one of the members of the subcommittee and Senator McMahon at the moment is not here, and I think the point is very well taken.

[Deleted.]

Now I merely want to call it to the attention of the committee again, as I know the chairman will do, that the censor has been, I think, leaning over backward to try and make everything available that can properly be made available. There may be some cases in which the committee will differ from the censor, but it is a very dangerous thing for any releases to be given from the committee until the copy has been cleared.

Then if any committee member—and I am merely taking this time to reemphasize as a member of the subcommittee—questions the necessity of eliminating a particular piece of testimony, if he will take it up with Senator McMahon or myself, we will discuss it together and then discuss it with Admiral Davis. We may be able to clear it with him.

If it still cannot be cleared, our procedure is that he will contact the Defense Establishment, give us a report, we will then come in here and if we are still in disagreement, we will submit it to the full committee.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish to thank the Senator from California for those observations. [Deleted.]

Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. As Senator Knowland pointed out, and as I have undertaken to point out time and again, we have a procedure here that enables this committee, in the last analysis, to pass on all of those matters, and if Senators could just restrain themselves from giving information of that nature to the press, and take it up with either Senator Knowland or Senator McMahon, we have a procedure which will enable the committee to pass upon it to determine whether or not we think that it ought to be released.

Admiral Davis' decisions, while they are very persuasive with me, because I think he has been very liberal in releasing this matter—in some instances, perhaps, too liberal—but if we disagree with his ruling we have a procedure that enables the whole committee to pass on it.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. May I make a statement?

Senator WILEY. What was the slip you say?

Chairman RUSSELL. I prefer not to give it on the record.

Senator WILEY. If the chairman will talk toward the reporter——

Chairman RUSSELL. This is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from California, and the chairman of the committee.

[Deleted.]

We certainly ought to follow the procedure that has been set up through Admiral Davis, Senator Knowland, and Senator McMahon on these matters of top-secret information presented to this committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I was reluctant to say anything else about it, because I know the members of the committee are tired of hearing me talk about security; but, gentlemen, I cannot help but feel that unless we at least exercise reasonable care in these matters that American men will die as a result of the unrestrained desire of Senators to discuss matters here that should not properly be known to our enemies.

CORRECTING COMMITTEE REPORT

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, the second procedural matter which I wanted to call to the attention of the committee is on page 92 of our Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East, which is the report of General MacArthur, the twelfth report, dated February 23, 1951, to the United Nations, and which includes communiqué No. 15.

On page 92, the second paragraph down, beginning with the sentence reading "events subsequently have"——

Chairman RUSSELL. Where is that now?

Senator KNOWLAND. That is page 92, the second paragraph.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator KNOWLAND. Beginning "events subsequently have." In checking it with the New York Times communiqué, it appears that there has been a line left out, and it should read—

> events subsequently have—

and these are the words that belong in there—

> disclosed that neither political or military reassurances could have—

and then it picks up and reads—

> had the slightest influence upon the momentous decision underlying Red China's commitment of her forces to war.

There has apparently been a line left out, and I think it does throw a little different light on that sentence.

Chairman RUSSELL. The staff will make note of that, and in the event there is another printing of this compilation it will be corrected. It is too late to do anything about it now, of course.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. I mention it merely for the benefit of the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland, I had already recognized you before we digressed.

ANALYZING VFW LETTER

Senator KNOWLAND. General, directing your attention to the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter of October 26, have you had a chance to review that letter recently?

Geenral COLLINS. I reread it recently, Senator Knowland; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you indicate wherein by that letter the general was disagreeing with the military judgment of the Joint Chiefs, or, for that matter, the policy of the Government of the United States at that time?

I have read and reread the letter on several occasions, and frankly I have not been able to see in the light of the testimony of Secretary Marshall that Formosa should not be allowed to get into Communist hands, and the testimony of General Bradley that the Joint Chiefs have consistently felt that the island had strategic value and that it was important to our interests that it not get into unfriendly hands—I have not been able to find out on what basis the objection could be raised to that letter.

General COLLINS. Well, of course, I don't know the basis, Senator, because as a member of the Chiefs I was not consulted as to the basis of the objection to the letter, and frankly I am not qualified to determine what particular part, if any, of this letter should have been objected to, we will say.

Senator KNOWLAND. As a matter of fact, it seemed to me in reading it, in the light of the President's action of June 26 and 27 of putting the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa strait, that the general might very well have felt that he was upholding the President's hand entirely, because he ends his letter to the VFW by saying:

> The decision of President Truman on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

We have had ample testimony that not only in this country but elsewhere many of our people in Government and throughout the country have taken very great objections to some of our other UN members and others who have shipped war supplies to the Chinese Communists while they were combating United Nations forces.

And it seems that the general had every reason to believe that he was wholly supporting the policy of this Government.

I merely wondered if you have any contrary viewpoint?

Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield just a moment?

JCS VISITS TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator KNOWLAND. I would prefer not to, on my time, because of the 15-minute limitation.

Have you visited Formosa to make a personal reconnaissance to gain information as to the number, the condition, the morale or equipment of the Republic of China's estimated 500,000 non-Communist troops?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I have not.

We depended upon, in our judgment of that, upon the Fox group report, and also from what General MacArthur has said after he personally had gone down there.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, you have, however, visited—which I think is entirely proper and very sound—some of our European allies, members of the UN, and members of the North Atlantic Alliance, to look over their troops and armament and general condition and morale, have you not?

General COLLINS. I have visited in Italy only.

Time has been the partial reason for that, of course.

Senator KNOWLAND. But other members of the Joint Chiefs have visited various countries?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Have they not?

General COLLINS. Right.

JCS APPROVED INCHON LANDINGS

Senator KNOWLAND. Directing your attention to the Inchon landings of last summer, were the Joint Chiefs in complete agreement with the plans for the Inchon landings?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we approved the plans; and as I said, and as I think is reported here, Admiral Sherman and I went out to find out just exactly what these plans were.

Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark, and as it was a matter of great concern, we went out to discuss it with General MacArthur.

We suggested certain alternative possibilities and places and everything of that sort, which General MacArthur looked into, and then he finally gave us the recommendations, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan.

Senator KNOWLAND. Between the times that the plans were made available to the Joint Chiefs and the time the landing took place, did the Joint Chiefs reverse their position in any regard as to the desirability of making the landing at Inchon?

General COLLINS. They did not.

MDAP SHIPMENTS TO FAR EAST

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask, General, with further reference to the situation on Formosa, as you know, the first arms implementation bill was passed in 1949, the second was passed in 1950.

Both of them included funds to be used in the general area of China which could include both the Republic of China and those areas that are adjacent thereto. Do you now know of your own knowledge, and if not could you supply to the committee, the actual shipments of arms or munitions that have been made to the Republic of China under either of those arms implementation bills or other legislation since June of 1950?

General COLLINS. I will have to check with Colonel Gilchrist to see whether we have that information available here now, Senator. I do not know of my own knowledge. However, if we do not have it, I can get it for you.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you also supply, and I imagine this will have to be a part of our classified secret record, but can you also supply for the same period from say June of 1949 to date the shipments that have taken place under the arms implementation program to Indo-China and the Philippines so that we will have Indo-China the Philippines, and the Republic of China on Formosa.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we can supply that.

Senator KNOWLAND. My recollection is when I left Formosa in the latter part of November last year, 1950, that under that program there had only been one ship that had arrived with mostly small-arms ammunition, perhaps some other equipment of approximately the 1st of December of last year.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I think that is correct, but since then we have shipped in just under $10 million worth—but I do know, and I said yesterday, that in our plans for the 1951 budget, MDAP, that if the money is appropriated there or provided, then we will have supplied, we will be in course of supplying, approximately 70 percent of what the Fox survey group recommended.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am familiar with your testimony of yesterday. However, I would like to get down so there will be no doubt about it, just actually what has been shipped and not what is in prospect.

One of the great shortages that I have found in my visit both in 1949 and 1950 out there was inadequate supply for training.

Now, General, Sun-Li-Jen, who is a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, told me that was one of the great problems in adequately training his troops, and I may be in error and I think our military attachés could perhaps have given the same report to this Government, but I think his statement was that they had about 25 rounds for training purposes. Now I think you——

General COLLINS. Twenty-five rounds per man, I take it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Per man for training purposes.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now my information is—and I would like to ask you what do we consider a proper number of rounds for training purposes in our own Army? I have some figures here. I would like to read them to you.

They may be in error, but my administrative assistant got them from the Department of Defense and I would like to read them and then if they are not correct, you can make a notation later in the record.

General COLLINS. All right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. 325 rounds carbine or M–1; 200 rounds for pistol and submachine gun; 1,380 rounds caliber .30 machine guns; and 2,300 rounds caliber .50 machine guns.

During the course of the training cycle of American troops that is what they used, so that we can see that these forces on Formosa, if my information was correct, are working under very terrific handicaps in order to properly be trained to do the job which some people complain that they are not able to do.

General COLLINS. Well, Colonel Gilchrist tells me—and he has checked this—that in November of last year, we did furnish almost $10 million worth of ammunition for this purpose; that is November of last year.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is that one shipment that came in November.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to find out what other shipments, if any, have been made.

General COLLINS. All right, sir.

ORGANIZING CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN NORTH KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. General, you agree that in any army or in a country involved in warfare that morale is a very important factor, do you not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Were you familiar with the fact that our forces in Korea were given a directive that when they got north of the thirty-eighth parallel into Communist Korea, that they were not to use any of the officials of the Republic of Korea in setting up civil government north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

General COLLINS. There was some such directive as that, I know, Senator. The details of it I do not recall at the moment.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I call your attention to the information which was furnished us, and for the benefit of the censor, I am now reading from page 3 of the State Department's letter of May 22 addressed to Mr. Secretary Marshall, which was forwarded by Mr. Lovett, the Under Secretary, under date of May 22, in which they say the following:

> On October 12, 1950, the Interim Committee of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea established in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of November 7, 1950, passed a resolution advising the unified command to take over temporarily all responsibilities for the Government and civil administration of those parts of Korea which had not been recognized by the United Nations as being under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Korea at the outbreak of hostilities—

and so forth.

Then, attached to this communication is a photostat of a message which does not on its face appear to be a classified document now, although I couldn't be sure of that, because we only have the photostat, which is message to CINCFE for CINCUNC, and this radio was in two parts; and in reading it it indicates rather clearly that the forces of SCAP and the forces of our United Nations command in the Far East should not use any of the officials of the recognized Government of the Republic of Korea north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

My question to you now is, Did this, in your judgment, originate in the Defense Establishment or did it originate in the United Nations, and merely pass through the Defense Establishment on its way out to the Far East?

General COLLINS. I am sorry, Senator, but I don't know.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you check into that? I think from the letter of Mr. Secretary Acheson it indicates that the document was prepared in this UN committee, but I wanted to be sure that that information coincides with the information which you have.

General COLLINS. We would have to check that with State, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right. Now, assuming, for the moment, that that information which we have been furnished is correct, do you or do you not believe that that might have an adverse effect upon the morale of the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea if they knew that they had been prohibited from using their own public officials in what they at least considered part of their own country north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

General COLLINS. Well, Senator, you are getting me in a little bit out of my field now. I can give you what I believe was behind that order.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right.

General COLLINS. But, frankly, this I am not certain of.

I do know that it was—that when the government of Syngman Rhee was set up in Korea, reset up, I think it was a hundred vacancies had been left in the Diet for the areas north of the thirty-eighth parallel. It had not been possible to hold such an election to fill those vacancies because of the fact that the Russians, the Communists, would not permit the elections to be held, and I recall something of this, and in my recollection of it, it was that the idea behind this was to, if anything, lean over backward to be sure that we could not be accused of thrusting a government down the throats of the North Korean people, or officials down their throats, without their having had a chance to select them themselves.

Now, I am quite certain that is what was behind that move. Now, whether that had an adverse effect on the morale of the Koreans or not, I don't know; but frankly, based on the conditions there, as I observed them, I would say, no, because one of the things that really impressed me very greatly is the way the Korean people themselves have handled the areas, police action and all such things as that.

We have had really no difficulties with these South Koreans. To me it has been an amazing thing that the normal municipal governments and the police forces have operated as efficiently as they have right in the middle of the turmoil of war.

Senator KNOWLAND. But, General——

General COLLINS. And I saw no lack of general control of the civilian populace north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In fact, the North Koreans were fleeing from the Communists and trying to get inside of our lines when we fell back.

FORCES EMPLOYED AT MANCHURIAN FRONTIER

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, your time has expired.

Senator McMahon? Senator Lodge? Senator Fulbright? Senator Tobey? Senator Sparkman? Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster? Senator Hunt? Senator Cain?

Senator Cain. General Collins, in World War II, I was privileged on occasion to serve in units which were on your right or left flank.

General Collins. On our left flank, sir.

Senator Cain. That experience taught me to grow to understand your fairness, your courage, and your intelligence. In a word, sir, I hold you in very high regard, and I mention that because I know you will take no exception, or I hope you will not, to several questions I would like to pose to you now.

General Collins, this inquiry deals with two questions, one of which, in part, is the splendid reputation of an American, which has been the pride of our Nation for many years. I want to do everything I can to see that this reputation is neither tarnished nor doubted nor criticized in any single respect without complete justification.

From what you said yesterday, I know that you believe that Gen. Douglas MacArthur has been and remains among the foremost military leaders in our American history.

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

Senator Cain. I am convinced, General Collins, that you seek, intentionally, to do him no harm.

General Collins. Definitely.

Senator Cain. On yesterday, General Collins, I think you unintentionally, and I emphasize that word, unintentionally did a first-rate hatchet job on General MacArthur; and certainly you led the Nation to believe that General MacArthur violated a field directive, a field order, when, in my opinion, he did no such thing.

In an effort to find out who is right, I want to ask you several more questions about your statement of yesterday, that General MacArthur had disobeyed one of the JCS instructions, that General MacArthur should not employ anything but Korean troops on the frontier.

My first question, General Collins: I wonder if you intended to say anything yesterday, or thought you said it, which justified this headline in last night's Evening Star: "Collins says push to Yalu broke orders."

And, in the first paragraph of that story, I want to quote it:

> General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, said today General MacArthur disregarded a specific Joint Chiefs of Staff directive last fall by sending American troops near the Manchurian frontier.

Did you intend, yesterday, General Collins, to support those two contentions made in this medium of public opinion, sir?

General Collins. Certainly not the headlines, Senator.

Needless to say, I don't write headlines, and I was not seeking headlines.

I thought I had clarified it, and in one or two comments that I listened to over the radio last night, it seemed to me that they were a fair evaluation of what I said; and it is true that in answering the first question, I indicated that it was a violation of a directive, or words to that effect.

I promptly corrected that, and made the point that what, in my opinion, and I still have this opinion, General MacArthur did, was to not follow a matter of policy which had been clearly delineated to him in a directive of the 27th of September, if I remember the date correctly.

Now, of course, in the field, we endeavor to give our field commanders as much leeway as possible, and certainly we gave General MacArthur lots of leeway.

The point I was making, and I think I clarified it in the testimony, was that that condition being true, in other words, that being our normal procedure, to give our field commanders plenty of leeway, then we felt that it was incumbent upon them to follow our broad policies and that when they felt impelled to vary from them, to consult with us.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OPINIONS OF COLLINS AND MAC ARTHUR

General MacArthur did not consult with us, when he issued his directive, I think it was the 24th of October, in which he took the wraps off of his field commanders and when we called him on it, he came back and said he did it as a matter of military necessity.

That is a matter of judgment, and as I indicated yesterday, I refused to get involved in the discussion where judgment of that character is involved, because we are a long ways away.

The only point now in my raising this question, and you will recall that I did not volunteer this—I made this point in answer to a question before this committee.

The point that I endeavored to make, and which I hope now to make abundantly clear, is that this did represent an instance where a policy clearly enunciated by the Chiefs was not followed, and was not followed without consulting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my judgment there was plenty of time during which the Chiefs could have been consulted prior to the issuance of this directive.

I said that to me the fundamental, one of the two fundamental points in this whole inquiry, is whether or not the President has the—whether we owe it to the President to give to him a field commander who is in consonance or in general accord with the basic policies under which we are operating. I think this was one indication among many others, which certainly have been clear, that General MacArthur was not in consonance with the basic policies that led us gradually to fear that just as he violated a policy in this case without consulting us, perhaps the thing might be done in some other instance of a more serious nature.

Now we again followed this up. This particular point we again followed up in November when we suggested, we did not direct but we suggested, that General MacArthur should stop his forces short of the Yalu.

Now, since you raised the question, Senator, I feel now compelled to tell you that I don't agree and did not agree with General MacArthur's reply that it would not be possible to stop on the high ground overlooking the Yalu.

I would not have made this statement except that you have pressed me now for an explanation of why I raised the question yesterday.

Senator Cain. Out of fairness, General Collins, I have to press you, sir.

General Collins. I don't object to it.

Senator Cain. Your answer speaks exactly for itself.

General Collins. I do not object to it. My only point is that I regret that I am forced to go into a discussion of this. I have the utmost respect for General MacArthur. I think his campaign from Australia to the Philippines was sheer brilliance, one of the most brilliant campaigns that I know of in military history. I think in this instance I disagree with him. That doesn't mean I am right and that he is wrong, but I disagree.

Senator CAIN. General Collins, will you permit me to say this, sir. My military experience is very limited, but I certainly know the difference between an order and a policy.

General COLLINS. I did not say that he violated an order.

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN INSTRUCTION, ORDER, AND POLICY

Senator CAIN. Sir, let me ask you a few more questions. My recollection of yesterday is this: The Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, said:

> General Collins, both General Bradley and General Marshall have testified in no uncertain terms that in no single instance did Gen. Douglas MacArthur ever violate or disobey a directive or an order.

I think my memory is fairly clear, and in part helped by the record, that General Collins said, "But I will give you an instance in which he did disobey"—and these are the words that you used, and we seek to clear it up out of fairness to you and out of fairness to a man who has been to this American a hero all his life——

General COLLINS. And he has been to me.

Senator CAIN. And you say, sir:

> One of the instructions that the JCS had issued to General MacArthur was that he would not use anything but Korean troops on the frontier, and he did not comply with that.

I have a question to this point, sir. Will you tell me what a JCS instruction is? I ask you that against your words, because I have not understood what an instruction is. Is it an order or is it a suggestion?

Senator SMITH. Will the Senator yield at that point just for further corroboration of the point he is making? On page 3200 General Collins said in answer to a question of mine when I said:

> And you told him not to send any troops within that distance?
>
> General COLLINS. I do not recall that we specified the distance, but it was a clear-cut directive that he was not to employ troops other than South Koreans close to the frontier.

General COLLINS. And that was later corrected, Senator, when it was brought to my attention, the wording. Frankly, I had forgotten the exact wording of that, and I did correct it for the record yesterday afternoon, not this morning, yesterday afternoon as soon as it was brought to my attention.

Now the point I am driving at, Senator Cain, I did not intend, and I think that again was clearly indicated in the testimony yesterday, to accuse General MacArthur of insubordination of anything of that sort.

DIRECTIVE AGAINST USING UNITED STATES TROOPS AT BORDER

I still make the point that the directive that was issued to him clearly indicated that as a matter of policy we didn't want him to send American troops close to the front. He did send them close to the front without consulting us when he could readily have consulted us, and then the decision would have been made here, and if we said "No," we would have accepted the responsibility for it.

That would have cleared him as a field commander completely. We would have had the responsibility then.

Senator CAIN. Right. That is not my concern at the minute because the first order and directive which you imposed upon General MacArthur was to protect and preserve the security of his command as in his judgment military necessity required. Now I have one question on this, sir.

General COLLINS. Well, you see now you force me to say, Senator Cain, that in my opinion to secure his command did not necessarily require the use of American troops for such probing actions because actually not only did he send American troops but he also sent a Korean column, and if the Korean column was competent to do the job, other Korean columns could have done the job.

Senator CAIN. Exactly, sir, but he is 7,000 miles away or was that distance away. He wanted to protect the integrity of his command as his judgment best dictated.

He used both American troops and South Korean troops, and

[Deleted.]

I could only conclude that General MacArthur's judgment must be within his own province, but here is my last question on this subject so that everybody knows, General, and you and I and everybody else understand this problem.

MILITARY NECESSITY IN DEPLOYING FORCES

Was there any mandatory provision of any kind, character, or description in the instruction in question which prevented General MacArthur from deploying his forces as military necessity dictated?

General COLLINS. There was not. There shouldn't have been. I would not have supported such a flat mandatory order.

Senator CAIN. I appreciate your answer, and I think that clears that matter away for all time.

Let me ask this, General Collins, please. General Marshall, General Bradley, and yourself have testified repeatedly that it has been your policy here at home to delegate complete discretion to your field commander as to how he was to deploy his forces in Korea.

Would you tell me if it was your military judgment as the Army Chief of Staff and as a member of the JCS, that the field commander should do what he thought possible, for no order was imposed upon him as you have just said, to use South Korean forces rather than American forces on the northern border, or was that the judgment of the State Department and merely passed through you by the State Department to the commander in the field?

General COLLINS. I do not recall the details of that, Senator, but I do believe that political considerations did have a good deal to do with those instructions which we sent to General MacArthur.

Senator CAIN. That is to say, sir, and I can understand it, that was not purely a military judgment then on the part of the JCS?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, General Collins.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Cain.

Senator Stennis? Senator Flanders? Senator Long?

STOPPING POINTS NORTH OF THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator Long. General Collins, in this compilation of materials on the military situation in the Far East, I notice some correspondence between Mr. Arthur Krock and Gen. Douglas MacArthur where Mr. Krock referred to certain rumors or criticisms—that is on page 137, the bottom of the page.

At that point Mr. Arthur Krock referred to representations apparently being made by allies of the United States to the effect that they desired that action by this Government either be stopped at the thirty-eighth parallel or on a line parallel to Pyongyang or at some other point south of the Yalu and south of the Manchurian border, it apparently being their theory that to proceed all the way to the Manchurian border would greatly increase the risk that the Chinese Communists would come in.

Do you know anything about any such representations having been made?

General Collins. I heard of them, Senator, but of my own knowledge I don't know.

Senator Long. Do you know whether or not it was General MacArthur's point of view that there could be no stopping point south of the Yalu or the Manchurian border?

General Collins. I couldn't pin point an answer to that, but that is my clear recollection, that it was General MacArthur's view that he should go all the way, and that he shouldn't stop anywhere short. In fact, when we suggested that he stop his troops, as I indicated awhile ago, on the high ground commanding the Yalu, he replied that that was not feasible.

Senator Long. Now, in Mr. Arthur Krock's article he stated that it was his understanding that General MacArthur had replied to such representations that he would not accept the responsibility for the security of his troops if a decision was made to stop on any one of these suggested lines. Do you know whether any such indication as that was given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General MacArthur?

General Collins. No, sir; I believe not. I don't believe any such—in fact, I am quite positive that General MacArthur didn't make any flat statement of that character—not that I recall, sir.

Senator Long. However, it did seem to be his point of view, do I understand correctly, that there could be no logical stopping point south of the Manchurian border?

General Collins. Yes; that is my recollection.

Senator Long. Were you consulted or advised when the original decision was made to proceed north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

General Collins. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted; yes, sir.

Senator Long. What was your view on that question?

General Collins. We felt that they should move north of the thirty-eighth parallel. The thirty-eighth parallel has absolutely no military significance of any kind whatever.

Senator Long. If you had known—looking at it from hindsight, and of course it is always an unfair question to ask—but if you had known that the Chinese Communists would have come in if you had proceeded north of the thirty-eighth parallel, might that have altered your decision?

General COLLINS. We might possibly—but again this is a hypothetical question, you understand, Senator—we might possibly have given some limiting line to the north, but certainly we could cross the thirty-eighth parallel because the thirty-eighth parallel, if anything, is a very poor place to stop from a military point of view. There are just no natural barriers whatever on the thirty-eighth parallel.

Senator LONG. It is still possible, is it not, that an ultimate solution to the Chinese war might be worked out upon the basis of the thirty-eighth parallel?

General COLLINS. Something approximating it, it is always possible.

UNIFICATION OF KOREA

Senator LONG. It is your feeling that a solution to the entire Korean problem really requires a unification of Korea under one government elected by the people; is that correct?

General COLLINS. Well, it certainly should, if possible.

There are two general alternatives as I see. Again now you are getting me a bit out of my field here. One would be the entire unification of the country. As I see it today, under the current circumstances, from a military point of view that is unlikely.

The other possibility would be to arrive at a solution based on factual conditions somewhere certainly not south of the thirty-eighth parallel. That would at least restore the conditions that existed prior to the Communist aggression. Because, of course, we were trying to proceed on some peaceful solution of the unification of Korea and not using any military means whatever in the first place. We have repelled the aggresors from South Korea. While that second solution would not be as good a solution, in my judgment, as the first, nevertheless you are back where you started from, at any rate back in the field of arriving at some sort of a political solution without further war.

Senator LONG. In the beginning this country definitely committed itself to meet and repel the aggressor. That certainly entailed pushing the enemy back to the thirty-eighth parallel, did it not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. It did not necessarily entail carrying out a unification of Korea by military means?

General COLLINS. It did not.

Senator LONG. This country had been seeking, and the United Nations had been seeking, to unify Korea by peaceful means prior to the time the aggression broke out?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator LONG. I take it that faced with the choice, if it had to be, you would prefer to seek it by peaceful means and negotiations rather than an attempt to accomplish it by military means, if it meant a major military effort to do it?

General COLLINS. By all means.

Senator LONG. That is all for this time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman passes. Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. I pass.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

COMBINED POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC DECISION

Senator WILEY. If you will take this pamphlet again, refer to page 183. I ask you to refer to the message of March 20 to General MacArthur you said several times the President was planning.

Now, read carefully. You will note it says State is planning. It doesn't say the President is planning. Do you see any difference?

General COLLINS. Not of any consequence, because the State Department is the political adviser of the President, just as the Joint Chiefs are in the military sense.

Senator WILEY. You know what that refers to anyway.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Is there any evidence anywhere that you know of that the President issued such an announcement or that the President accepted State's planning in this case?

General COLLINS. Not of my own knowledge; no, sir.

Senator WILEY. Do you know of your own knowledge whether the President consented to said planning mentioned in this message, which the record shows went to 13 nations, but didn't go to MacArthur?

General COLLINS. I don't know, sir.

Senator WILEY. When you issued the directive that South Korean troops—it wasn't a directive, it was a suggestion—instead of American troops should be used when close to the border, was that the result of consultation with the State Department?

General COLLINS. That is as I recall it, sir.

Senator WILEY. You think that we largely the action of the State Department or do you think it was largely the action of the Chiefs of Staff?

General COLLINS. I think it was largely the action of the, you might say, the whole political-diplomatic field. How much the President personally got into that I don't know. But, of course, we were operating there under the aegis of the United Nations; and while I didn't participate in the discussions, I am sure that it was the thought of the other members of the United Nations that we ought to use South Koreans close to the frontier.

RECONSIDERING VFW LETTER

Senator WILEY. Now, following Senator Knowland's suggestion this morning in relation to this letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, do you know of any directive that it violated? Do you remember that? That letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, as I recall it—I made a note here last night—is way back, is it not?

Senator KNOWLAND. August 26.

General COLLINS. There was no specific directive. However, we have standing regulations, Army regulations, which involve the clearance of such statements of this character, which do prescribe that normally such statements for publication should be cleared through the normal channels.

Senator WILEY. Well, Senator Knowland asked you to specify anything violative of regulations, and I guess you didn't specify. Now, do you want to change that and specify anything?

General COLLINS. I thought that Senator Knowland's question was what specific points in this letter were violations, as I recall it.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General COLLINS. I wouldn't make a great point of it, Senator, but the letter as a whole normally under Army regulations would be cleared through normal channels.

However, the normal channel is with the theater commander, and it may well be that General MacArthur, a theater commander, felt that he was entitled to clear it himself. I don't know what his thinking is, you understand; I am only giving you a possible answer.

Senator WILEY. Now, if you will refer to page 122, you will notice there is the message from the President after this speech to the veterans. You will notice that in that message, dated August 29, you find nothing there where the President criticizes the message, do you?

General COLLINS. The message of the President to General MacArthur?

Senator WILEY. Yes, the bottom of 122, August 29.

General COLLINS. Of course, I notice he says:

> You will understand why my action of the 26th in directing the withdrawal of your message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was necessary.

Senator WILEY. Yes. Now, you will notice also that it says:

> General Collins and Admiral Sherman gave me a comprehensive report of their conversations with you and of their visit to the United Nations forces now fighting under your command in Korea. Their reports were most satisfactory and highly gratifying to me.

That is correct, is it not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. At that time, when you talked with the President, did he criticize the letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars?

General COLLINS. I do not recall, Senator. I don't believe that the question came up.

Senator WILEY. When you reported to the President?

General COLLINS. I reported to the President on our visit.

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General COLLINS. But the question of the letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was not pertinent to my visit to Korea or to our report. We limited ourselves to the report on the conditions as we found them, when we were in Korea, and I don't recall—I don't believe—in fact, I am quite sure no mention was made of this letter, but it is possible.

Senator WILEY. Well, you noticed on August 26 that the President—Johnson did send a message directing that the VFW letter be withdrawn—

> because various features with respect to Formosa—

said, in that message, Johnson—

> are in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations.

That was under date of August 26; but the message of the President to MacArthur was August 29; and meanwhile you had reported that he had not mentioned anything about the message that you recall; is that correct?

General COLLINS. Not that I can recall, sir.

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS AFTER WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE

Senator WILEY. Now, if you will refer to page 124, the message from the President to General MacArthur, under date of the 29th, he says, among other things:

> The unification of our arms established by you and by them has set a shining example. My thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to your gallant forces—soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen—from the United States and other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all and say to all of you from all of us at home, "Well and nobly done."

You see that, do you?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now I ask you, after the President's visit of October 15, to Wake Island—127—did you talk with the President?

General COLLINS. After he came back from Wake Island?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General COLLINS. No, sir; not that I recall.

Senator WILEY. Did you have any conference with him at all?

General COLLINS. Not that I can recall at the moment, no, sir.

However, if I had, I would have to say, just as General Bradley did the other day, that I couldn't tell you what he said.

Senator WILEY. I call your attention to the President's statement, on page 127:

> On all of these matters, I have found our talks most helpful and I am very glad to have had this chance to talk them over with one of America's great soldier-statesmen, who is also now serving the unique position of the first commander in chief of United Nations peace forces.

You say, at that time, you have no recollection of having any talks with the President, or, if you had, that he was criticizing MacArthur for the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech, is that right?

General COLLINS. I don't recall my ever being present at a meeting with the President where this matter was discussed.

As I said, if I had been present, I would have to say that I would not comment with respect to what the President said.

Senator WILEY. You consider that as a personal privilege of your own?

General COLLINS. No, sir; but it was a conference with the President, and if I had been there—this is a hypothetical question—my recollection is, I wasn't there.

Senator WILEY. Now, if you will refer to page 138, that is under date of November 30, that is to the New York Times, was there any criticism by the Chiefs of Staff, to the President, that you know of—withdraw that.

Is there any criticism of his reply, MacArthur's reply to Arthur Krock's letter of November 30, as violative of any directive, and if so, where?

General COLLINS. Well, once again, this would be—if there were any violations, it would be—this was issued prior to the December 6, and this is not in my province, Senator. Nobody asked me if I objected to the New York Times statement, that is, no one in an official capacity did it; and frankly, I am not in a position to tell you whether I agreed, or did not agree with this thing.

Senator Wiley. What I am getting at—did the Chiefs of Staff, or the President, to your knowledge, at any time, consider MacArthur's communicaiton of November 28 as violative, then?

General Collins. The communication of November 28?

Senator Wiley. Page 137.

General Collins. It never came to my attention.

Senator Wiley. Well then, in the discussions that you had with the Chiefs of Staff, this communication was not a matter of consideration or of criticism, as I understand your statement?

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

FIRST MENTION OF DISMISSING MAC ARTHUR

Senator Wiley. Now, if you will turn to page 156—did the President consult with the Chiefs of Staff in relation to the declaration of national emergency that was issued on December 16?

General Collins. Yes, sir; he certainly consulted with us prior to the decision to declare a national emergency.

Senator Wiley. During that time and previous thereto was there any talk or anything said in relation to MacArthur for his previous communications or was there any talk about firing MacArthur?

General Collins. There was no talk about firing MacArthur that I ever heard in any formal discussion at any stage of the game until, as I said yesterday, on the 8th of April, I guess it was.

Senator Wiley. If you will refer to page 72—I think you have answered that by your last statement—but there you request, you will notice, under the date of January 4, MacArthur's comment and recommendations under the proposed arming of additional South Korean troops. Do you have that in mind?

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Was that arrived at in consultation with anybody or was it just the Chiefs of Staff own get-up?

General Collins. I don't recall the details of what immediately preceded this, but we were examining all possibilities with respect to getting additional forces over there, and what assistance could be had to support our people, and I suspect we just simply did this on our own, but I don't recall the details of that, Senator.

Senator Wiley. All right. Anyway, by the answer to the last question, there was no criticism at that time when you were getting that up in relation to anything MacArthur had said or done?

General Collins. No, sir; not at this time that I remember.

Senator Wiley. Now, if you will refer to pages 178, 81, 82, and 83, where MacArthur issued various communiqués, was there any criticism of those communiqués?

General Collins. We had a discussion with General MacArthur on one communiqué, following the issuance of the December 6 directive, in which we stated that in our judgment this communiqué did not comply with the President's directive of December 6, and General MacArthur did not issue the communiqué.

Senator Wiley. All right, now you did not quite answer that question because my question relates to communiqués of December 26, February 13, March 7, and March 24 referred to in the pages that I have called to your attention.

General Collins. No, sir, as I recall there was not.

ACTION IF COMMUNISTS REQUESTED ARMISTICE

Senator WILEY. There was not. As I understand your position, the message from the JCS of March 24, that is on page 184, does not limit MacArthur from pursuing the former directives to seek surrender or armistice, but it did limit him to report the fact if an armistice was in process or had been obtained, for instructions?

General COLLINS. The statement there reads:

> The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field—

that is if the initiative is taken by the Chinese Communists—

> then you will report that fact to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for instructions.

Senator WILEY. Yes, but my question is now whether or not any of that language limited him as a commander in the field to go ahead pursuant to former directives to negotiate an armistice or a surrender and only said in substance if that takes place, report to JCS for instructions. Now I want to know if you read into that formal limitation of the power of a commander?

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Wiley, but of course the witness will answer the question.

General COLLINS. In answering the question, I would say that the difference here is that the President directed that if the Chinese Communists requested an armistice, he would go ahead with the initiation of the consultation, but would promptly report back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order that the President would tell General MacArthur what were to be the conditions that would be acceptable to the Government of the United States, and the United Nations, since our Government was acting as the agent, you might say, for the United Nations.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I do not think that that answers my question.

Chairman RUSSELL. You will have an opportunity to propound it again, Senator.

Senator Bridges? Senator Byrd? Senator Saltonstall? Senator Johnson?

SIZE OF UNITED STATES ARMY

Senator JOHNSON. General Collins, what was the size of the Army in Korea at the time we went into Korea?

General COLLINS. The size of the Army in Korea?

Senator JOHNSON. No; at the time what was the total strength?

General COLLINS. Oh, our total strength then—I just happen to remember this figure, I have had to use it so many times—592,000.

Senator JOHNSON. What is the strength today?

General COLLINS. I have got a note on that.

Senator JOHNSON. It can be approximate, if you want to.

General COLLINS. Yes; it is approximately 1,550,000 or 1,600,000 in round numbers.

Senator JOHNSON. So you have already tripled the size of the Army in 11 months.

ARMY PREPARATION PLANS

General, is the build-up of a well-trained and effective Army being delayed any by the delivery of materials and equipment or the availability of installations?

General COLLINS. I don't believe that they are at the moment, Senator. Your question is as to the failure of deliveries. There has been no failure on the part of industry to deliver in accordance with schedule.

The just sheer weight of time is such that it does take time between the time you put in an order before any concern can get the raw materials, get the labor force collected, and finally produce the item.

Senator JOHNSON. Are we going far enough——

General COLLINS. We will not get these deliveries in quantity for a few months yet to come, but in my judgment industry has done a splendid job.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you satisfied that we are going far enough and fast enough with our Army preparedness plans?

General COLLINS. At the moment I believe that it is a sound program, as I said yesterday, considering all other elements that are involved.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you see any necessity for increasing the size of the Army over and above what you now have projected as a ceiling?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, a slight increase, but not very great.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

General COLLINS. That is for peacetime, now.

Senator JOHNSON. I mean in the light of present world conditions.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. We will require a slight increase if the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve my recommendation we call up certain additional troops, and if the President approves it.

Senator JOHNSON. That would require revision then of the present ceiling of 3,462,000 on the total of the Armed Forces?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but it would be well within the limits that have been projected in the bills that are still under consideration.

Senator JOHNSON. You are speaking of the 4 million?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

FIRST DISCUSSION TO EXTEND BOMBING

Senator GEORGE. I have just one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.

General, as I understood you awhile ago in the preliminary statement, not on anybody's time, you said there was evidence that the Red Chinese were coming across the Yalu and participating in the fighting about October 26?

General COLLINS. October 24 was the first time we captured Chinese prisoners.

Senator GEORGE. And that General MacArthur did raise the question early in November, say, the 6th or 7th, that he should be permitted to bomb installations north of the Yalu in Manchuria?

General COLLINS. He raised the question.

Senator GEORGE. He raised the question.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. He did not ask for specific authority to do it?

General COLLINS. No, sir; but he clearly raised the question.

Senator GEORGE. He clearly raised the question, and he might have thought, or considered in his opinion it was a request.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I can well imagine that he might have considered that as a request. Certainly we gave it consideration.

Senator GEORGE. I understand.

General COLLINS. Just as we would have, practically just as we would have had it been a request.

Senator GEORGE. And then the mass Red Chinese attack was later in November?

General COLLINS. November 24.

Senator GEORGE. November 24, following that.

At that time our troops were close up to the northern boundary of North Korea?

General COLLINS. Well, we were roughly 45 to 50 miles away at that time, Senator?

Senator GEORGE. At that time?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. At the time of the——

General COLLINS. Mass attack.

Senator GEORGE (continuing). Mass attack.

General COLLINS. It happens that the country in that region is very woody, very broken, and it was within the capabilities of the Chinese by marching at night and hiding in the daytime to get down from the Yalu to the position where they struck the Third ROK Corps by night movements.

Senator GEORGE. From strictly a military point of view, if there was to be any bombing of the bases in Manchuria, in your judgment that would have been the time to do it, would it not, General?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Purely from a military standpoint?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, of course, when we are down near the thirty-eighth parallel with some 200 miles intervening, why, there is plenty of opportunity to bomb supply lines and to interrupt their communications and so forth?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is being done, of course.

[Deleted.]

Senator GEORGE. I thank you, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I have quite a few questions, so I think the Chair ought to be notified procedurally I will not be able to finish my first round of questions but may have to go into an afternoon session, because I think it is going to take me about three periods of 15 minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed.

Senator SMITH. May I ask the Senator to speak a little louder. I could not hear that point. Did you ask for extra time?

Senator MORSE. Oh, no; I never ask for extra time.

General COLLINS. The question was whether you estimated your time, sir.

Senator MORSE. I think it will take me about three 15-minute periods. I think the chairman ought to know that procedurally.

Senator WILEY. How long?

DRIVE TO THE YALU

Senator MORSE. At least three 15-minute periods.

General, I want to ask you a few questions about MacArthur's proceeding up to the Yalu. I understood your testimony in answer to Senator Cain's question this morning to be to the effect that you hold to the opinion that General MacArthur could have stopped some distance on high terrain this side of the Yalu without pressing forward to the river in order to protect his troops. Am I correct in that understanding?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator MORSE. General, have you been in that territory yourself personally?

General COLLINS. Not in that immediate territory, but I have been in North Korea.

Senator MORSE. And you have been rather far north in North Korea?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator MORSE. Is it true, General, that with the aid of terrain maps, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in a very good position to pass judgment upon military tactics, at least in respect to where troops could be stopped along a good line of defense?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but, of course, as I said yesterday, that is a matter of judgment.

Senator MORSE. I understand.

General COLLINS. You will get a difference of opinion on such things.

Senator MORSE. I understand it is a matter of judgment, but I want to pin down here that there is no question about what your judgment is, that on the basis of your knowledge of North Korea, on the basis of your study of terrain maps which set out, as I have seen those maps, the topographical problems of the area, you believe that General MacArthur could have stopped some distance this side of the Yalu and adequately protected his troops?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. But, in fairness to General MacArthur now, I should say that he would have had to have gone farther than he was at the time the Chinese made their mass attack on the 24th of November.

Senator MORSE. I understand that.

General COLLINS. You see, part of our troops were across the Chongjin River; other troops were not yet across the river, and they were still roughly, we will say, 45 miles from the frontier.

STOPPING SHORT OF YALU

Senator MORSE. What was the reason why the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought he should stop somewhat short of the Yalu River?

General COLLINS. Well, we felt that the Chinese Communists, not knowing what our intentions are or were, although we had clearly enunciated them—but they, never enunciating really the truth themselves, possibly felt that we were doing some propaganda, perhaps, and that we would cross the Yalu—if we got up there—so, therefore, if we got down beyond the point where we could control the crossings with artillery fire, and that is what we were after, that if we went beyond that to the river itself, that they might feel that, from their on security standpoint, that they would have to come across and see that we did not get those heights—because before you make a crossing of a river you always secure the heights overlooking the river—and that is the point. It is dominant ground. You don't have to be on the river line. If you are on the dominant ground commanding the low ground, then you secure the crossings, and all you have to have out in front are just patrols; that is our normal river-line defense, for example.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, General Collins, that before General MacArthur conducted this offensive with the aim of going to the Yalu River that you came back from Korea and appeared before an executive session of the Armed Services Committee and, in the course of your explanation to the Armed Services Committee of the situation as you found it in Korea, you explained to the Armed Services Committee that if we went further north there was a line somewhat this side of the Yalu River, which would give us command of the river so as to prevent the crossings by the Chinese, but would keep us some distance this side of the river so that we would avoid the danger of Communist propaganda that we had territorial designs on the other side of the Yalu River? Do you remember any such conversation with the Armed Services Committee?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator WILEY. The date?

Senator MORSE. I cannot tell the date.

General COLLINS. It was either after my third visit or the fourth. It was either in December or in January, one or the other.

Senator MORSE. I simply want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I remember it distinctly because I cross-examined General Collins at that time on this very matter; and I think the record should show that this is not a matter of hindsight with the Joint Chiefs of Staff; this is a matter of foresight with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because that conversation that we had in the committee with General Collins at that time was in advance of this advance of MacArthur's, and——

Senator WILEY. No.

Senator KNOWLAND. No.

General COLLINS. No, sir; I don't believe that it was in advance of his move up across the Chongjin River, but I am not positive of that.

Senator MORSE. If I may be allowed to complete my statement without interruption, which is my right, and I am going to insist on it.

I want to repeat my statement, that it is my recollection that the report of General Collins was in advance of the defeat that we suffered as a result of the advance of General MacArthur beyond the point where the Chiefs of Staff had previously advised he should not go; and I will let the record speak for itself; and that is a matter of rebuttal in a lawsuit, and we will let the record speak for itself.

JCS-MAC ARTHUR RELATIONSHIP

Now, General Collins, Senator Cain in his examination this morning wanted to know if there was any mandatory order given to General MacArthur not to advance with American troops as far north in North Korea as he advanced, and you replied that there was no mandatory order.

Am I correct, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in communications with General MacArthur had made clear that it was their desire as a matter of policy that he not advance as far north with American troops?

General COLLINS. That is correct, it was a matter of policy.

Senator MORSE. Now, that leads me to make this comment, and I want your observation on the comment.

As I listened to the witnesses in this case, and as I study the documents in this case, I somehow get the feeling that the human relationships, the man-to-man relationships, between MacArthur and his group, on the one hand, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and apparently the President, on the other hand, were relationships that properly would be described, as I described them in a comment or in a colloquy with General Marshall when he was on the stand, as a dealing at arm's length, as showing a lack of what I would describe as a complete teamwork relationship, where there seemed to be the maximum degree of mutual confidence and trust, a feeling that I developed that General MacArthur was somewhat of a strict constructionist, a literalist, and questions in the committee constantly indicating, well, did you give him a mandatory order? Did you specifically say that? Did you specifically direct General MacArthur to do this or that?

The answer is to the effect that we didn't specifically, literally direct it, but a feeling that he ought to have understood what our policy was.

Had there been that mutuality of confidence and trust between the Government on this side and MacArthur's group on the other, a lot of these misunderstandings would not have occurred.

Now that is the impression I am forming from this record. One might think, it seems to me from some parts of this record, that there developed over the months not only a dealing at arm's length with MacArthur, but a feeling apparently on the part of some in our Government that you had to be exceptionally careful in your communications with MacArthur.

One might almost think that he was looked upon as a military prima donna in the relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur.

It seems to me that to whatever degree that feeling developed, it must necessarily have created administration difficulty. If the feeling existed, and I say it looks to me as though it did, that you had a field commander in Asia somewhat out of sympathy with the Government's policy who seemed to be constantly pressing to go further than the policy he had been advised about would permit him to go.

His communications in this secret document here that we have in the exchanges between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur I think indicate in many respects that he is protesting restrictions, that he wanted to carry this war more energetically far up into North Korea and then on to the mainland of China.

But as a result of that feeling, you came to a final situation where the President of the United States and apparently the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt they had had enough of this dealing at arm's length and that they had to replace him with a new commander from whom they felt at least they could have wholehearted cooperation in carrying out what they were satisfied they made clear to that commander was national policy.

Now I have made these comments, General Collins, because we are going to have to come to the point where we will have to form final impressions as to what this record shows.

I think it is only fair to you to tell you what my tentative impression is about what this record shows. My present impression is that this record is building up to the conclusion that although there was a very high regard for MacArthur's military genius and his great contribution to the military history of this country, nevertheless it reached the point where in regard to this particular operation he was sufficiently out of sympathy with the policy of his Government that you were not getting from him that open-handed full cooperation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to expect from a member of the team.

Now I would like to have your comment on my feeling about it.

General COLLINS. Senator, I am sorry that you did not hear my testimony yesterday, and if I should be so bold as to make the suggestion, I would suggest that you read it.

Senator MORSE. I will before Monday.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; because as a general proposition I agree with your conclusion; as a general proposition.

Senator WILEY. Which conclusion?

General COLLINS. His conclusion that there gradually developed over the months as a succession of events took place, and as I indicated in a specific case where a matter of policy was not followed without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that I as an individual now at any rate, as I indicated yesterday, had given some thought that the time might arise when it would be necessary to make a change in commanders, and I supported, concurred in the President's proposal which was referred down to us in accordance with normal military procedures in the relief of General MacArthur, largely because I was convinced that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States was entitled to have a field commander who was more fully consonant or in accord with the basic policies under which that field commander was operating.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse, your time on this round has expired.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, might I raise a procedural question, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. I think prior to your coming in this morning, General Collins suggested to the Senator from California and myself and whoever else was present, that it was his hope that he might be able to leave for overseas this afternoon, and against that expression I would raise the question as to what the committee's plans are with reference to the rest of the day.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, I do not know that we could arrive definitely at it now. I thought that after we had perhaps seen where we were going on this round, that we might take it up and decide whether we desired to have an afternoon session this afternoon or perhaps run on through for a while to see if we could conclude with General Collins.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, on the same procedural matter, I would say that if it would be of any help to General Collins, that I would be glad to delay the lunch hour if it looked as though we might by moving along be able to complete.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we will just run along here and see where we go.

Senator Smith?

MAC ARTHUR'S ARMISTICE STATEMENT OF MARCH 24

Senator SMITH. I only have one or two more questions, General Collins. Before I put them, I want to say for the record that the hypothetical impressions that the Senator from Oregon just expressed as to this proceeding up to date are not the same as my own.

I think I have attended more sessions in full detail than the Senator from Oregon, and at the appropriate time I hope to express my impressions as to what these hearings are showing.

Now, General Collins, I think we agreed yesterday that with regard to the now famous armistice statement of General MacArthur of March 24, that as far as the record shows and as far as we know, the only indication to General MacArthur of what the feeling was in Washington on the subject was contained in the message which went from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated March 20 and appears on page 183 of the compilation. I think I am correct in that statement.

The suggestion had been made earlier by General Bradley, and I think by yourself, that General MacArthur was familiar with the fact that some negotiations were going on, but as far as we have been able to locate, the only message that was sent to him on this subject was the message that I have just referred to; is that correct?

UN PLANS OF ARMISTICE

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I believe that is correct. The record would have to be checked to see whether or not prior to the sending of this message of March 20, whether or not there had been some interchange between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur outlining the possible conditions of an armistice.

I know that they were much earlier in the game transmitted to General MacArthur. I am doubtful that anything close to this date was transmitted to him, but I will ask Colonel Gilchrist to check that to be sure.

Senator SMITH. I think that is becoming important as the testimony develops. As I read this statement of March 20, the emphasis was on this point:

> Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

In other words, they did not want MacArthur as commander in chief to make any further major advance north of the parallel if anything along this line was going on.

That is what I get to be the point of this message, because then it goes on to ask him for his recommendations as to the limitations on his activity and so on, and so we get back to the vital words here communicating with General MacArthur on this matter, simply these, and I quote from the statement:

> State—

State Department, that means—

> planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea.

I can't read in that that the President was doing anything. It simply says that the State Department is making a plan for the President to announce that the United Nations is prepared to discuss conditions of settlement, so the testimony that has been given that MacArthur knew of the details, that he had the plan before him and all those things as I got from the record yesterday and before, I can't find here.

The only reason I am stressing this is because MacArthur is accused of knowing all about some negotiations that were going on when he made this statement of March 24 suggesting the possibility of settlement with the enemy.

The only reference to settlement with the enemy of course comes in the last paragraph of his statement which is:

> Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer.

PREROGATIVE OF FIELD COMMANDERS

I have always thought, unless I am wrong—I am a layman only in these matters—that a commander in the field could indicate to his opposite number that he is in a position at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy's forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea to which no nation may justly take exceptions might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

Is there anything unreasonable in a commander in the field making a statement like that? He was not opposing armistice terms. He makes a recital in the beginning of the war situation and pointing out that the enemy might well consider going into negotiations, and it seems to me if he got any hint at all that negotiations were going on in the statement of march 20, that he was simply indicating that he stood ready as commander in the field to confer. He doesn't lay down terms.

TERMS OF MAC ARTHUR'S ARMISTICE

General COLLINS. Well, there are paragraphs on that page 184, the paragraph beginning:

> These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

Senator SMITH. What is wrong with that? Was there any question in anybody's mind that those things were going to be excluded from the armistice negotiations? I would like to know it right now, if there was.

General **Collins**. No, sir; once again, Senator, I didn't pass judgment——

Senator **Smith**. I realize that.

General **Collins**. You are directing the question at me, and if you wish me to answer, all I can give you is my impression that as a field commander, the inclusion of that paragraph is extraneous to the immediate situation of military terms and, in my personal judgment, and this is just my judgment, certainly in my judgment General MacArthur got over, again, into the field of national and public policy; and he had been advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the President very shortly was going to speak on this subject, and that, as a military man, my judgment is that he got way out beyond what would have been necessary if he had discussed simply the military terms of the particular question at hand.

That is my judgment. Maybe I am wrong.

ACCUMULATION OF INCIDENTS LEADING TO MAC ARTHUR'S RECALL

Senator **Smith**. Well, this is very important because the Joint Chiefs apparently made this particular action by General MacArthur as practically the principal reason, under this second of the military reasons for his dismissal.

General **Collins**. That was just one.

Senator **Smith**. One of the most important——

General **Collins**. That was just one, Senator.

As I answered Senator Morse a little while ago, my answer there is the fundamental one, that it is not in any individual message, in any individual line of these documents, but merely an accumulation of, and a growing conviction that General MacArthur was not in sympathy with the basic policies under which he was operating; and that the President of the United States, as the Commander in Chief, was entitled to a field commander who was in consonance with the basic policies of his Government.

Senator **Smith**. I can——

General **Collins**. I refuse, very frankly, Senator, to be pinned down to say the reason I supported his relief was because in such-and-such a letter, and on such-and-such a line, he said so-and-so.

Senator **Smith**. Well, there has been a good deal of discussion about an accumulation of incidents, and I am trying to locate those incidents and accumulate those incidents, and see just exactly what it was.

It may have been just a general feeling that you were out of accord.

General **Collins**. This was one of the accumulating incidents.

PROCEDURE IN RELIEVING MAC ARTHUR

Senator **Smith**. I would say that it was a general feeling that you were out of accord, in the light of General MacArthur's past performance and accomplishments and service to his country, and the least that could have been done would have been to invite him to come to a conference, or to have sent one of the Joint Chiefs to a conference.

I have the highest regard for Secretary Pace, but Secretary Pace has only been in a short time and was previously experienced in the Budget Department, and wasn't a military man, and it didn't seem quite adequate for him to discuss with General MacArthur, or convey to him, the notice that he was fired, without first an opportunity to discuss the issues.

General COLLINS. Senator, I thought the question we were discussing was the reasons, not the procedures.

I said yesterday that I personally regretted the procedure that was followed. I also said yesterday that I would again support the action that I took, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I reiterate that to you.

Senator SMITH. General MacArthur has told me privately, in private conversation, and told us when he testified here, that he had been asking for directives, he thought he had gotten some directives, he thought that the statement of January 12 indicated that the line he had taken was in line with the same position of the Joint Chiefs.

These were such serious matters, that, after all the work that he had done, all the services that he had rendered, it still doesn't look to me, I don't see how you can possibly take the things that have been presented to us as the reasons, as a sound basis for the Joint Chiefs frankly to have taken the position against a man who has been working with them and which we all give such great credit to, on such a short notice of action, and abruptly dismiss him.

I think that is one of the great, big, important things in this.

I can be sympathetic if there was friction, but I say if there was friction in a matter of importance, the friction ought to be explored and General MacArthur should have been given a chance to withdraw.

He said, in answer to a question here, that on request he would have turned his command over immediately to General Ridgway.

It would have been a perfectly simple matter to deal with on that basis, but the way this was done, it is hard for me to understand, and I think the people of the country are very much concerned, and the division of feeling that it precipitated, by what seems to me to be an inadequate justification for the way the action was taken.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

JET FIGHTING IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. General Collins, with reference to the situation in North Korea with the MIG fighters coming over the Yalu and then when they are engaged, moving back across the Yalu, is it your judgment as a military man that whoever has been flying those fighting planes has been getting a tremendous amount of valuable experience in how to deal with our jet fighters and how to deal with our bombers of various types?

General COLLINS. They are getting valuable experience. Of course, we are getting valuable experience also in dealing with them.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct, but they are getting valuable experience?

General COLLINS. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Without themselves being involved where we are involved.

General COLLINS. Well, of course, they are involved this side of the river at any rate.

Senator KNOWLAND. Except I understood, and I think it is generally common knowledge, that no one is quite sure who is flying those planes, that few, if any, of them have been shot down behind our lines—they keep them up into an area which is behind the North Korean line.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, that is correct.

CLEARINGHOUSE FOR COMMUNIQUÉS WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask this question, General: On the communiqués which are sent by General MacArthur to the UN, does that follow the same chain of command, so to speak, coming to the UN as UN directives follow in going out to General MacArthur? In other words, are you the clearinghouse?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Both ways?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Calling your attention to the communiqué No. 15, which appears in the United Nations Report No. 12, appearing on page 91 of the booklet we have put out, I want to read you this language and then ask, Mr. Chairman, that the entire twelfth report be published in the appendix of the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. That will be done.

Senator KNOWLAND. Because I think there is very significant information in it. I would ask when it is published as part of the appendix that the correction I noted earlier in the day be included in the appendix report. I read this paragraph——

Chairman RUSSELL. If you do not mind, Senator, are you going to read that, otherwise the reporter would not know where the correction is?

Senator KNOWLAND. I will show it to him or leave it with the clerk because of the time element involved here. [Reading:]

> This amphibious movement of the Tenth Corps from the Hungnam sector to a juncture with the Eighth Army has been successfully completed with but light casualties and no matériel loss. This operation has been conducted with great skill and coordination by Army, Navy, and Air commanders concerned and exemplary courage and marked efficiency have characterized the conduct of all personnel. It has completed the readjustment of our positions made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war. The real test of the United Nations command was when it was suddenly and without the customary notice of belligerency confronted by this new power in overwhelming force and yet survived without marked diminution of its strength and resources or loss of its fluidity of movement and maneuver. This it has done and has come through well.

There is still more of the communique.

Do you agree substantially with that statement?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I do. Of course——

Senator KNOWLAND. You saw the statement when it came through on its way to the UN, did you?

General COLLINS. I did not personally see it; no, sir; but I do think that all said there is correct.

[Deleted.]

INDICATIONS OF MAC ARTHUR'S DISSONANCE WITH UNITED STATES POLICY

Senator KNOWLAND. Did I understand your testimony earlier in the morning to indicate that with the exception of the message that was sent out about March 20 advising General MacArthur that the

State Department was planning a Presidential message that so far as you personally know he received no other specific information regarding that message?

General COLLINS. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, will you tell the committee when and where it was that General MacArthur was first informed that he was not in step with the administration's program? In any of your personal interviews, in any of the messages that were sent out there, could you indicate specifically when he was—when was the first indication to him that he was so out of step that it might be contemplated that he be removed?

General COLLINS. Now, when you add that last statement, Senator, the answer is there was none.

Senator KNOWLAND. There was none?

General COLLINS. There was none.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right. Well, let us go back.

General COLLINS. It will take a little time, unfortunately, for me now to find the exact spot, but I can create the approximate situation.

It was in either November or December—I think it was possibly after that November 7 communication of his, in which he indicated that he felt that while he didn't recommend specifically, he indicated that the wraps ought to be taken off. He ought to be permitted to operate with Air north of the Yalu.

We replied to him that that was not in consonance with the policy; that there was no evidence or no indication that that would be changed, or words to that effect, which are clearly indicated in the message that we sent to him; and if my memory serves me right, that was either in November or December.

FIRST PRESIDENTIAL INDICATION TO RELIEVE MAC ARTHUR

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in the statement that the President made at his press conference, and as modified by his Secretary, Mr. Short, he indicated that he first came to the opinion that he was going to get rid of General MacArthur about a year ago, and then he pinned it down to the period of the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter.

To your knowledge, and that is all I am asking you at the moment——

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). Was there any indication by the President of the United States to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body, to you as an individual member of the Joint Chiefs, prior to April 5 or 6, when it came to your attention through General Bradley's calling the Joint Chiefs of Staff together, that the President had any such contemplation in mind, that is, the removal of the general?

CONSIDERING JANUARY 12 MEMO

General COLLINS. No, sir; none that I can recall.

Senator KNOWLAND. In regard to the January 12 Joint Chiefs of Staff study, I think I raised this question before, but I want to be very clear in my own mind and in the record: Was General MacArthur ever informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had changed their opinions, as had been expressed in the January 12 memo?

General COLLINS. No, sir. Mind you, however now, I have to take a little time to answer that for you—those opinions and conditions that were listed, the 15 or 16 of them were all contingent upon the condition that existed at the time they were formulated, which was a very dire situation in Korea, as pictured by General MacArthur himself, and at that stage of the game it looked wholly possible that we might have to get out of Korea entirely; and if we were to do it, then there were a whole series of things that we recommended would be done, and not only including the four particular points that General MacArthur had, but a great many others, many of which had been done.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes. But the study itself was based on either evacuation or stabilization of the situation, was it not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but, again I have to qualify my answer now. It was not necessary to take those emergency measures, in order to stabilize the situation. The troops stabilized the situation on their own, and under the current directives, and did it wonderfully well, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. All I am trying to find out is since this had been first shown to him by you, and later, I think he was either cabled or sent by mail——

General COLLINS. He was sent a copy of it; yes, sir.

NO CHANGE IN JCS VIEWS

Senator KNOWLAND. A copy—whether or not, subsequent to your own knowledge, he was ever informed that the Joint Chiefs had changed their views relative to this study; and I understood you to add, sir, that so far as you know he was not sent any information that they had chanced their views relative to the study.

General COLLINS. No, sir; and the JCS has not changed their views. In other words, under certain conditions we would probably go ahead with every one of the 16 things we have listed, don't you see? I have found the particular message, Senator, that I was looking for, in answer to an earlier question, and it was a question that you asked me, had we ever indicated that there wouldn't be much chance of a change in policy.

I don't know whether this message has ever gone into the record or not, and I would again suggest that your committee and Admiral Davis review whether it should or should not be printed in the record.

INFORMING MAC ARTHUR OF POLICY

This is the message of the 9th of January 1951. It refers to two different messages from General MacArthur the numbers of which I am not going to give:

> Retaliatory measures you suggest have been and continue to be given careful consideration here. There is also full appreciation of the contribution to the general situation made by current absorption of Chinese Communist forces in Korea. Based on over-all considerations, however, the following must be accepted:
>
> 1. There is little possibility of policy change or other external eventuality justifying strengthening our effort in Korea.
>
> 2. Blockade of China coast if undertaken must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hong Kong. It is considered necessary to obtain UN concurrence.

And so on.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, General, you have testified so far as you know, the Joint Chiefs had not notified the General that there had been any change in their thinking in regard to this matter.

I want to ask you, do you have, to your own knowledge, any information that any higher echelon, namely, the Secretary of National Defense or the National Security Council had informed General MacArthur that as far as they were concerned they did not approve this tentative study?

General COLLINS. That they did not approve it?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

General COLLINS. Well, we have——

Senator KNOWLAND. Or they objected to it.

General COLLINS. We have either confirmed or sent additional directives to him subsequent to January 12 which did not include these—all of these—proposals of his, so to that extent he was given an answer with respect to the study of January 12.

Senator KNOWLAND. Specifically, will you furnish that information for the record as to whether or not and when they were sent, and, secondly, did any of them say that relative to the January 12 study it has been decided by the Secretary of Defense or the National Security Council that items 6, 7, and 12, for example, are not approved?

General COLLINS. Well, I can answer you that now, Senator, that no such message, with specific reference to any of those particular items, was sent, to the best of my knowledge.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland, your time has expired.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, this happens to be my birthday, and I promised my office force that I would be there.

Chairman RUSSELL. Many happy returns.

Senator SMITH. Many happy returns.

Senator WILEY. What I want to say is if I am back here at 1 o'clock can I reserve my right to ask questions?

Chairman RUSSELL. If you return before this hearing concludes, Senator, you do not have to reserve any right. You have it ab initio.

Senator WILEY. Well, there is only one questioner, and then you start on your next round. That is all that I am getting at.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I do not know; what time did you think you would be back here?

Senator WILEY. I will be back at 1 o'clock.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am quite sure you will be amply protected if you are back here by 1 o'clock.

Senator WILEY. Thank you.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, so that he can leave with a most happy frame of mind, I will assure him that I will ask 30 minutes of questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is amply protected.

Senator MORSE. I offer him the compliments of the day.

Senator WILEY. Are you going to adjourn?

Chairman RUSSELL. We will go on for a while.

Senator Green? Senator Hickenlooper?

UNITED STATES MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, we now have about [delete] American ground troops in Korea, do we not, roughly?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; roughly I think that is the number.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have a lot of Navy?

General COLLINS. Let me check that for you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not care for the exact figures.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just so that figure is approximate.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have an immense amount of American equipment over there, do we not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; a good deal. The total United States Army strength in Korea—that is your specific question now—is [delete], sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

We have a great many elements of our Navy there, do we not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In Korean waters and that vicinity?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have additional troops that have been sent to Japan?

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is correct?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you say that we, therefore, have a large military force in that area?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we do.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And that they are tied down there now with the Korean situation?

General COLLINS. Correct, sir.

KREMLIN REACTION TO KOREAN WAR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I call your attention to your testimony of yesterday, I believe it was, in which you said, and I am quoting from page 3206:

> And frankly, as a military man, I don't know of anything that would delight the Kremlin more than if we were to just get involved with a large military force out there in that area of the world.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now I expect we have shown, and I agree, that it is a large military force, we are involved, and therefore, I take it that the Kremlin is highly pleased with our continued commitment of this large military force in that part of the world.

General COLLINS. I suspect so. However, the connotation from which that statement came involved the extension of the conflict into a broad-scale war. That is the connotation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; I think there was a discussion along that line.

General COLLINS. That was definitely my connotation, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the fact is that we are tied down now with actually a large military force there.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. But again let me say that the connotation at the time I made that statement had to do with the broadening of the war in the Far East to a full-scale war out there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then do you not think, General, in any event, that it is not displeasing to the Kremlin to see us tied down in Korea with an indeterminate action for the longest possible period of time and dissipate our resources to that extent and our manpower?

General COLLINS. I would agree that the situation out there probably is wholly to the liking of the Kremlin.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General Collins, we have heard a great deal of testimony——

General COLLINS. I would like to qualify that statement I made. Not wholly to the liking because I don't think they like to see their Chinese Communist friends get beaten like they are. I don't think the loss of considerable forces out there is to their liking.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think the Kremlin is particularly concerned about how many Chinese get killed?

General COLLINS. I don't know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just as a humanitarian thing?

General COLLINS. Not just as a humanitarian thing, but I think from a military point of view they are beginning to get concerned about it. At least I hope so.

KREMLIN'S CAPABILITIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, we heard quite a little testimony about the intentions of the Kremlin, that is, whether they will come into the war, whether they will not come into the war. I would like for you to tell me what we believe about the capabilities of the Kremlin.

In other words, the theory of this question is this: While it is most desirable, I admit, if we can find out the intentions of a potential enemy, nevertheless it is at least equally vital and perhaps in most instances more vital to know his capabilities.

General COLLINS. That is correct.

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. From a military standpoint, then, would you say—and I understand there are often eventualities—but from a military standpoint, are you satisfied and do you tell this committee today that you are satisfied with our security in Korea and in Japan?

General COLLINS. As a matter of security, yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, getting back to the point of the intention of Soviet Russia, it has been testified, I believe you mentioned it, I believe General Marshall mentioned it, I believe General Bradley mentioned it—he said it is difficult for us to know the intentions because only 14 men in the Kremlin can determine that.

Now, is that because of that theory that power is lodged in the 14 men of the Kremlin or that they assume it and exercise it?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

RUMORS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I call your attention, General, to the fact that one man put us into this Korean War, in the United States, under our so-called system of representative government. That decision was made by 1 man and not by 14 men. He may have had advice. I think it is quite significant.

Let me ask you this. Do you have any information of any kind that there is being now formed in Manchuria or in that area—I wouldn't limit it to a particular geographical state line—that there is being formed in that area on behalf of either the Red Chinese or the Kremlin or any of the opposing forces to us, an international brigade, consisting of substantial numbers, at least in part if not in whole, of European soldiers of fortune or other soldiers from, let's say, Poland or Czechoslovakia or other such countries of that kind, with an indication that they may be formed for use against our forces, either in Korea or in that area?

General COLLINS. I know of no information that would substantiate such rumors.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you say there have not been such rumors and——

General COLLINS. I believe there have been——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Information, regardless of the complete reliability of the information, but information, so far as being told, that there are such rumors extant?

General COLLINS. I believe I have seen something to the effect that there were rumors to that effect, but we get rumors, Senator, about all sorts of things that never pan out.

[Deleted.]

WOULD GUERRILLA WARFARE ON MAINLAND WEAKEN COMMUNIST KOREAN ATTACKS?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, is there any question in your mind as a military man that if Chiang Kai-shek's forces, either those on Formosa or a part of those on Formosa together with whatever he could rally on the mainland, by way of sporadic action, let's say, not perhaps great marching armies, but by way of sporadic or guerrilla action, if turned loose on the mainland with some reasonable equipment, is there any question but what that action would probably pull pressure off of the attacks in North Korea?

General COLLINS. With all of your "ifs" added, yes; but the question of getting such a force on the mainland, permitting them to stay there, and supporting them logistically, I can assure you it would take a great effort, which I as a military man would not support from the United States point of view.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Even substantial and spottedly organized strong guerilla movements, with equipment, on the mainland would probably lessen that pressure and draw Communist troops down to cope with it.

General COLLINS. Not necessarily. The Chinese have enough forces down in that area to cope with guerrilla operations, in my judgment, and it would not necessarily follow that they would have to pull anything out from Manchuria to cope with that type of guerrilla warfare.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the fact is they did move those armies from the mainland of China opposite Formosa, they did move them north mostly after we established the blockade to prevent——

General COLLINS. Perhaps that prevented the invasion of Formosa.

NAVAL BLOCKADE WITH REGARD TO HONG KONG TRADE

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, referring to this Joint Chiefs of Staff report for the Senate committees—I don't know whether you would like to have the pages referred to——

General Collins. If you don't mind.

Senator Hickenlooper. Page 81. You will notice a report of December 30, 1950, in which CINCFE had responded to a request for views and there were four categories set out there:

> Blockade the coast of China;
>
> Destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war;
>
> Secure appropriate reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa; and
>
> Release existing restrictions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action, possibly leading to counterinvasion, against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.

I shall not read the rest of that. Turning to page 83, on the 9th of January there was a message you referred to awhile ago, and which I shall not reread, except this. It says—the first sentence is significant, in which it says the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the President, said as follows, and the significant statement I want to call to your attention at this time is in subdivision b of that, the sentence where it says:

> However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hong Kong.

General Collins. Were you going to read the next sentence, too?

Senator Hickenlooper (reading):

> It is considered necessary to obtain United Nations concurrence.

You read that entire thing into the record.

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. I didn't want to be too repetitious. The point I want to make is this: that seems to me to be the first and the clearest concrete evidence that British commercial trade through Hong Kong is hampering what might otherwise be a normal, vigorous operation in this Korean venture and that actually British trade through Hong Kong is in at least some great measure a controlling factor either in our action or in securing United Nations approval.

I think it there is said "and with the approval of the President" and I want to say that rather significant——

General Collins. The directive was sent with the approval of the President. The reply, rather, was sent with the approval of the President.

Chairman Russell. Senator Hickenlooper, your time has expired. Senator Hunt.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Cain.

Senator Cain. General Collins, on the assumption, sir——

General Collins. I wonder if before you ask your question on committee time I could answer a question from Senator Knowland which I now have prepared to give you, because I would like to wind up these things as we go along. Is that all right, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir.

PROHIBITING USE OF ROK OFFICIALS IN NORTH KOREAN CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

General Collins. Senator Knowland requested the origin of the prohibition on the use of ROK, that is Republic of Korea officials in North Korea. I have been informed from the Department now that this is a proper answer.

The directive for occupation of North Korea sent to General MacArthur soon after the Inchon landing was prepared by the State Department in consultation with the Department of Defense. The prohibition on use of ROK officials was in the State Department version of the directive.

This prohibition actually applied only to their use under Syngman Rhee, and was so clarified to General MacArthur. In other words—and this comes back to my mind now—that General MacArthur could use any ROK official under our military civil government people, don't you see, but he was not to permit Syngman Rhee to go up there and establish any form of government at that time using ROK officials, and I clearly remember that now.

Senator Knowland. Might we clarify that at this point? As I read both that directive and the subsequent amendment to which you have referred, it permitted him to use South Korean citizens, but not South Koreans who were members of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

Now you speak of Syngman Rhee. Of course, he is the constitutional president of the Republic of Korea. He is not there as an individual, and is my interpretation of that correct, that he was told he could use South Korean citizens in his work up there, but not South Korean governmental officials?

I think that is very important to be cleared up.

General Collins. Well, my understanding is that he could use South Korean officials but not as such. In other words, use them as citizens.

Senator Knowland. Well, that is what I am saying. I just wanted to clarify that.

General Collins. The main objective of the thing was frankly—and I am positive of this now because this has now come back to me and I was consulted on this, because it happens that the Army is responsible for civil government.

That is one of the functions among many that the Army has incidentally that none of the other services have to worry about. That the idea was that we would give General MacArthur every bit of assistance in setting up a going civil government.

We did not want ahead of time to commit ourselves necessarily to these officials of Syngman Rhee since they were not elected in North Korea.

In other words, we wanted to keep the decks clear so that a free and valid election could be had so that the people of North Korea could pick their own mayors and their own district representatives.

Senator Knowland. I do not want to take up any more time now, but I hope before the general gives a blanket endorsement to this, he permits me on my time to question him about some specific provisions which I rather question he wants to give a blanket endorsement to.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think we had better defer this now.

Senator Cain?

ARMY ROTATION PLAN

Senator CAIN. General Collins, on my assumption that you may be excused today to go to Europe before you have completed your testimony, it is my intention to ask you but two questions against my hope that I may reserve other questions against your return.

The other day we were advised, I think it was by General Bradley, that it was his understanding that the Marine Corps was developing a rotation program which would provide that a marine who had twice been wounded would be returned to the United States for reassignment or other duty.

I asked General Bradley what did the Army have in mind concerning a rotation system. He deferred that question to you, and I should like you to take several minutes if you would be so kind as to give us the best thinking that the Army has on that question at the moment.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

We did not set up any criteria from Washington. We directed the theater commander to establish the system, and we gave him data as to the manner in which we could support him.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General COLLINS. But the specific criteria were not fixed from here. We suggested the following—

No; this is from him, excuse me; this is in reply.

We told him to set up his criteria, and here is the message that we had back from him:

[Deleted.]

Then, there are some other details, but those are the most pertinent.

Senator CAIN. General Collins, has that plan been agreed to by the War Department?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Or the Department of the Army?

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator CAIN. Is that plan presently in operation, sir, to any considerable degree?

General COLLINS. Excuse me, Senator?

Senator CAIN. Is the plan presently in operation, to any considerable degree?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we are rotating about 20,000 men a month.

Senator CAIN. That means that you are constantly sending replacements?

General COLLINS. That is correct.

Senator CAIN. Which then become available and make possible the program as outlined in this cable?

General COLLINS. That is right; yes, sir.

However, I am not sure that this cable has been published to the troops, and I would suggest that—this is not a matter of national security, but it is a matter of good, sound internal administration, because very frankly if we publish this whole thing, just as is, every soldier on the line is going to start figuring out when he gets home, and that is going to have an effect on the fighting efficiency of this force.

Furthermore, the question of the rotation of key specialists is a very difficult one.

Senator CAIN. I understand that.

General COLLINS. These are general criteria, and a man will not be released, particularly a keyman, unless we get a man in place of him. We just cannot wreck the fighting efficiency of the Eighth Army.

On the other hand, the bulk of the men that really do take the pounding are going to be rotated, and we are doing it now, at the rate of 20,000 a month.

Senator CAIN. I think you can appreciate, General Collins, why I asked that question.

The substance that you have given us, in response, will be exceedingly helpful to a Senator, all Senators, for example, in answering their mail——

General COLLINS. For goodness sake, don't answer it specifically.

Senator CAIN. If we use discretion in the way in which we answer it, we can certainly look into particular cases deserving of preference against that general outline.

General COLLINS. Frankly, I would ask you not to do it, please do not do it.

We have got field commanders 8,000 miles away from here; and just like I say, in a broad way we depend upon the discretion of the field commanders on combat operations, when you get into anything as specific as this, you have to trust the honesty and integrity of the men on the spot; and I really ask you not to interject for special cases.

Colonel Gilchrist has told me that he has been informed by some men who have come back, that the question of wounds is considered by the theater commander, although it is not written down in black and white.

Senator CAIN. But you have helped us tremendously in permitting us to know, at this time, what the attitude of mind of the field commander in Korea is, and I individually, am most grateful to you.

General COLLINS. Thank you, sir.

ANALYZING RACIN SITUATION

Senator CAIN. My other question, General Collins, is this: General MacArthur spent a reasonable amount of time in describing to us the supply potential and actuality of Racin.

General COLLINS. Racin? The town of Racin?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir, in northeast Korea.

It has been indicated in subsequent testimony that Racin as a supply and lines of communication center was bombed on one or more occasions as a matter of military necessity. It was then related that the State Department had contrary views and indicated to the military side that perhaps further bombings were not in order.

Against my assumption that General MacArthur was merely relating a fact, that from Racin many, many of the enemy were kept and maintained in the field, may I ask you, sir, what consideration is presently being given to doing away with Racin in a complete and total sense?

General COLLINS. There was—at the moment I can't give you a definite, clear-cut answer to the latter part of your question. But when the question of bombing of Racin came up, there was a difference of opinion in the Chiefs as to whether it was profitable to bomb it, whether it was worth while taking the chance of provocation, whether it was also worth taking the chance of a bomber getting lost. And we have had instances, which have been publicized, and we have apologized to appropriate people, when these men get lost.

Frankly, you do not gain very much by bombing Racin. It is just over the frontier, and it is just a question, once again, if you just push them back to Vladivostok. The stuff comes out of Vladivostok, in that vicinity, and the distance between Racin and Vladivostok is not very great.

[Deleted.]

Racin, frankly, is of no great consequence.

Senator CAIN. But is it a fact, sir, that Racin is a supply source from which large segments of the enemy are maintained in the field?

General COLLINS. It is what you might call a transition point, Senator. It is a place where stuff from Vladivostok can be moved over and stored there temporarily, and then as the road, path opens up, it can be moved out. But, frankly, it could be done almost as well from Vladivostok as it can from Racin. That is the essence of it.

Senator CAIN. Would you call Racin a combination of a military and political problem?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, probably. Of course, these depots, as I indicated yesterday, they are in town, some of them are on the water front, but they are mixed in. It is very difficult to bomb them without hitting a good portion of the rest of the town.

Senator CAIN. If Racin were solely a military consideration, would it not follow that it would be the concept of the Joint Chiefs and of the field commander to destroy in a total way any facility that was helping to maintain our enemies in the field—if it was a purely military consideration?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. But, of course, as I said yesterday, I don't think you can ever in modern war divorce purely military considerations from political or over-all considerations. I don't believe it can be done.

Senator CAIN. General Collins, we are working awfully hard at really trying to understand the great question which is before us. I do thank you, sir.

General COLLINS. I don't object to your question in any sense. I merely point out frankly I don't see how you can possibly separate military questions from political questions, particularly when the objective in that particular instance is very close to an international frontier.

Senator CAIN. General Collins, I am grateful for your answers and I shall hope to and anticipate asking you further questions on later rounds.

Chairman RUSSELL. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?
(No response)
Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman.

DISPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TROOPS ON MANCHURIAN BORDER

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, General Collins, you have testified here with respect to the position of our troops at the time of the Chinese attack in our subsequent retreat from North Korea, that we were some 40 or 50 miles from the Yalu River.

I think you testified that twice, but I had understood that some of our people had actually reached the Yalu River. Is that understanding wholly incorrect?

General COLLINS. They had reached it earlier and then had pulled back. One of the columns that pulled back had been actually trapped by Chinese forces, one of the two columns, and we had pulled back. When I said "about 45 miles," I was speaking primarily of the area where the Chinese mass struck.

On the left flank we were closer to the river than that. My guess would be it might have been as close as 20 miles.

Is that about right, General Reber?

General REBER. Yes, sir. It is up here I think the chairman is referring to.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. But the main attack came, you see [using the map], came down against the right flank of the Eighth Army.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am speaking about last November before we were driven from North Korea.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did or did not our forces reach the Yalu River?

General COLLINS. They did up to the northeast. Yes, sir, they did up to the northeast. My mind was focused on the area where the main attack took place, which was way down here [indicating]. Right through here. Let me show you on this map, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Let's use this one. You furnished us this.

General COLLINS. Right.

Now the main attack took place right in there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not talking about the main attack——

General COLLINS. Chinese attack.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not speaking about the main Chinese attack; I am speaking about the advance of our forces. Did they or did they not actually reach the Yalu River?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; the did.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did they reach the boundary with Manchuria at more than one point?

General COLLINS. American troops, I think, only at one point. That is the left point that sticks up that is marked "26 of October" on this phase IV chart. My recollection is those are South Koreans. The one that is marked "21 of November 1950" were American troops.

Chairman RUSSELL. How long did they stay up on the Yalu—until after the Chinese attack en mass at other points along the line?

General COLLINS. The South Koreans were pulled back much earlier. That is the column indicated on the phase IV chart marked "26 of October." They pulled back quite rapidly. The Seventh Infantry Regiment which was farther up remained there for several days before they were withdrawn.

Chairman RUSSELL. The reason I ask the question—I recall reading the newspaper accounts of all the confusion that ensued after that attack, which stated that while the Marines and one infantry regiment—I thought it was the Seventh Regiment——

General COLLINS. It was a regiment of the Seventh Division.

Chairman RUSSELL. One regiment of the Seventh Division were along the reservoir and were being driven back in there, while there was still one of our patrols up on the border.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, that is correct; and the remainder of the Seventh Infantry Division with the regiment of Marines were up on the frontier at a town that begins with an "H."

Chairman RUSSELL. Right on the frontier?

General COLLINS. Right on the south border, the south side of the Yalu River.

Chairman RUSSELL. So your statement about being 45 or 50 miles back was rather a general average than to place the general line that far from the Manchurian border?

General COLLINS. Yes sir, that specifically dealt with the location of the bulk of the Eighth Army, and this force of which we have just been speaking, these elements of the Seventh Infantry Division, were part of the Tenth Corps.

ANALYZING MARCH 20 MESSAGE

Chairman RUSSELL. Now I have one question with respect to this message to General MacArthur of March 20, which has been discussed perhaps more than any other single document in the study. But I have heard it read a number of times, and I have read it myself. As a layman I would get the idea from that message that General MacArthur was being asked to mark time where he was at that time—it is on page 183 of the compilation—that that was more or less a directive that he was to mark time where he was, not make any very determined movements forward in the portion above the thirty-eighth parallel, and the recognition that the line had no military significance; that he was asked what authority he should have to provide security and maintain contact with the enemy.

My reading of the whole context of that message is that it was more or less a notification that negotiations were in progress, without advising him of the specific terms, but telling him that they were in progress and that he should conduct himself with great caution in his military movements.

Is that a fair assumption of the civilian construction of that?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is the intent of it because we said:

> Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop.

For that reason then we stated, "Major advance should not be made," or words to that effect.

DEMAND FOR SURRENDER STATEMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, in General MacArthur's statement, the one that has been called "Demand for surrender statement" appears on page 184. There is a paragraph which says:

> These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

That statement there has caused me some little confusion with respect to this whole thing. It seems to me that that is the field commander going into the details of a settlement. Even if that was the position of the Joint Chiefs, would not that be considered as members of the United Nations, or if Formosa was not to be permitted to fall into their hands, that that was nevertheless a diplomatic announcement by the field commander. What was your feeling on that?

General COLLINS. I said that in answer to an earlier question this morning, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course knowing how General MacArthur was concerned and vitally concerned about Formosa and the recognition of Red China, I can understand why he might see fit to bring that in. I assume he did not completely trust the State Department with respect to that.

I do not believe I have any more questions right now. Senator Connally? Senator Wiley? Senator George? I think it is evident it is unnecessary to continue to call the roll of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. Senator Wiley has just come in. What is your pleasure, gentlemen?

Senator MORSE. My pleasure is always to yield to my friend from Wisconsin.

Senator WILEY. What are all these pleasantries about? I hear my name mentioned back and forth. You mean that I have a turn now, a fling?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, we had passed you, but Senator Morse said that he was willing to defer to you.

Senator MORSE. Without losing my rights to be next called upon.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, if Senator Johnson will defer——

Senator JOHNSON. I yielded to Morse and Morse yielded to you, I guess.

Chairman RUSSELL. What is your wish on that, gentlemen?

Senator KNOWLAND. I have no objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection——

Senator WILEY. I wish some of you husky men would raise your voices so we can hear you. You are big men. There is no reason why you should purr around like kittens.

Senator JOHNSON. I ask unanimous consent that after Senator Wiley finishes, Senator Morse be permitted to question the witness.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley is recognized.

Senator WILEY. I have to get this time down. I have 1:10. Let me read, General—I refer to page 184 again—is there anything wrong?

Chairman RUSSELL. I think I should state the Chair has 1:08.

Senator JOHNSON. That is what the clock says.

REALM OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Senator WILEY. All right, I will accept my own time. I refer to page 184, and the last paragraph. In the question of Senator Smith I think you said there was no objection to that last paragraph, but you made exception to the third paragraph from the bottom, did you not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. You objected to that because you felt that was beyond the province of what?

General COLLINS. It was speaking in the realm of international politics and diplomacy which in my judgment were in conflict with the instructions of the President contained in his directive of the 6th of December.

Senator WILEY. Now the phrase has been used by you and others "theater commander" time and time again. Don't you think General MacArthur was something more; wasn't he, as the President said, the first commander in chief of UN peace forces?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; but he is still a field commander, and furthermore the specific directive had been sent to him at any rate, whatever his position was, he had been sent a directive from the President of the United States.

Senator WILEY. Well, was your answer "Yes" or "No" to the question that he was something more than simply a theater commander? That was my question.

General COLLINS. No, sir; I don't think he was anything more than a theater commander because in his theater he was commanding United Nations troops, but his job was that of a theater commander, in my judgment.

MARTIN LETTER RELATIVE TO DECEMBER 6 DIRECTIVE

Senator WILEY. All right, refer to page 185. Is your reaction that the Martin letter violated the December 6 directive?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; in my judgment.

Senator WILEY. What part of it?

General COLLINS. It appeared to me that Mr. Martin gave General MacArthur the option of either answering his letter on a confidential basis or otherwise, and General MacArthur chose to put no restrictions on Mr. Martin, and therefore in my judgment Mr. Martin rightly felt that he could publish his answer.

Senator WILEY. Refer to page 178. What part of the directive is violated?

General COLLINS. On page 186 in General MacArthur's reply I personally feel—and this is only my personal judgment—that beginning with the last sentence of the next to the last paragraph, which reads, "Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition," and from there on including the next paragraph in my judgment is a violation of the President's directive.

Senator WILEY. No; you did not understand my question. My question was: Refer to page 178 and tell me what part of that directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what part of that directive this letter that you have now designated a portion of, violates?

General COLLINS. The last paragraph, subparagraph of paragraph 2 of that directive reads as follows:

> Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States.

Senator WILEY. Do you consider Congressmen a publicity media?

General COLLINS. No, sir, not that part. The first part of the sentence says:

> Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments.

Senator WILEY. All right, was the directive meant to curtail the right to write a congressman?

General COLLINS. No, sir, it was not.

Senator WILEY. Now it says,

> To refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States.

Now you have said the Congressman wasn't a publicity medium. I know some that might be classified by some folks as such, but he is not a newspaperman, he is not a magazine.

General COLLINS. No, sir, but clearly as I indicated a moment ago, Mr. Martin gave General MacArthur the option of answering in a confidential manner or otherwise, and General MacArthur is a smart man, he is alive to the facts of life, and in my judgment when he didn't reply to Congressman Martin—what I am saying now is on a confidential basis—therefore he must have anticipated that that would have been released to the press.

Senator WILEY. Well, I think we have your viewpoint. Of course I cannot agree with that. I am bound to take the other position because my judgment is otherwise, but I respect your judgment, sir.

JCS ACQUAINTANCE WITH KOREAN TERRAIN

Have General Vandenberg, General Bradley, or Admiral Sherman ever been stationed in Korea?

General COLLINS. Stationed in Korea?

Senator WILEY. Yes.

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. And I think the evidence is that they had not been over there until after the fighting started; is that right?

General Collins. There was no reason for them having gone over there prior to the fighting starting, Senator. The only troops that we had in Korea just prior to the fighting was a small military mission, an Army mission. I don't believe that there was any air mission, but I am not positive of that. There was none, Colonel Gilchrist tells me.

Senator Wiley. All right, let me ask a question. I think you can answer it without arguing with me.

General Collins. I apologize, Senator, if I have appeared to argue with you.

Senator Wiley. Frankly I am trying to make the point, and I think it is clear, that you fellows have been advising about a terrain, as "General" Morse I should say tried to get you into, that you had not been over there before the fighting started.

General Collins. I don't believe General MacArthur had been over there before the fighting had started either, but I am not certain of that. He had been over once, I am told, but to clarify the point, Senator, I believe that I know the terrain of Korea pretty thoroughly and I have made four visits to Korea. I have studied it intimately.

It so happens that in my military career I put a tremendous amount of importance on the analysis of the terrain. It is one of the things that we have emphasized in our schools, and in my judgment General Vandenberg, Admiral Sherman, and I are thoroughly alive to the effect that the terrain in Korea will have on military operations there.

Senator Wiley. I haven't any questions about it. My first question, sir, was to find out when before we got into the battle you people had been acquainted with the terrain, and I think the answer is "No," none of the Chiefs of Staff had been over there or acquainted with it.

General Collins. I was acquainted with it from a map analysis only, but that is worth a great deal.

REASONS COLLINS SUPPORTED MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator Wiley. Now you have repeatedly told, and I think made it clear, that there were some irritations existing, and you made it clear also that being 8,000 miles away, you did not feel in some differences that you had, but what the judgment should be lodged in the commander who is on the ground commanding the forces. Am I correct about that?

General Collins. All except the question of irritations. I do not believe I ever used the term "that there had been any irritations existing."

Senator Wiley. Between the Chiefs and MacArthur?

General Collins. That is right, sir.

Senator Wiley. Do you mean to say then these differences that you mentioned in reply to Senator Morse's question, did not irritate?

General Collins. I wouldn't have used that term. The main point again that I am driving at, if I can presume to try to find the basis of your question, is that General MacArthur's relief was not caused by any irritation between the Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur.

Senator WILEY. It was caused as outlined in the four reasons set forth some time after he was fired by the Chiefs of Staff in which you all concurred.

General COLLINS. Senator, I have said I believe twice, and I am going to ask you to let me state it again now, that in my judgment—and I am the only man that is testifying right now—that the fundamental reason for my supporting the President's proposal that General MacArthur be relieved was my growing conviction as the Korean conflict developed, that General MacArthur was not in consonance with the policies under which he was operating, and that I as one of the President's principal military advisors felt that he, the President of the United States, as our Commander in Chief was entitled to a field commander who was more in consonance with the basic policies under which that field commander was operating.

Now irrespective—I do not know whether you were present or not, Senator—of what you can point out to me or anyone else can with respect to a certain line or a certain place in any certain document, that is still going to be my answer, and I still stick by it and I said this morning I would do it again.

DANGER OF PROVOKING WORLD WAR III

Senator WILEY. Well, I think the examination so far has developed a certain bill of particulars which are the instances apparently on which you base that conclusion. The trouble with "conclusion" testimony is the same trouble we have when Senator Morse goes into 15 minutes and gives his convictions.

That is not testimony though it is argumentative on the floor, any more than if I were to go in and maybe I shall before we close this afternoon, make a statement for the record as to my position, how I felt about General MacArthur. Frankly, this is not in any way critical of what I conceive to be your human judgment, but the purpose of these hearings as I see it is whether or not before the bar of public opinion the President was justified, not whether he had the legal right. Everyone so far has apparently more or less made up his mind on the evidence so far.

So far as I am concerned, if there is any more evidence developed other than mere conclusion, the facts shall have my earnest consideration.

Is our policy in the Korean campaign dictated by any fear? Was there ever a successful military campaign in history which was based on fear?

General COLLINS. I did not understand that question, Senator. I am sorry, sir.

Senator WILEY. Well, what I mean is are we fearful that if certain things that MacArthur suggested were done, certain results might follow? Are we fearful of those results?

General COLLINS. Well, we are fearful to the extent that we don't believe that the United States is ready for a great world war.

We are concerned that if we were to put into effect all of the recommendations that General MacArthur has made, that there would be a serious danger of a broadening of this conflict either into an all-out war with China which we would not feel would be warranted, or else into an all-out world war, which we would certainly hope to avoid.

Senator WILEY. Did North Korea have a mutual assistance pact with Russia much like the Chinese Treaty, the China-Soviet Treaty of which so much fear has been expressed?

General COLLINS. Not that I know of, Senator.

Senator WILEY. You haven't any knowledge on that?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. How much time have I got?

Chairman RUSSELL. About 2 minutes, Senator.

SEPARATING EIGHTH ARMY AND TENTH CORPS

Senator WILEY. In the paper today there is reported from Whitney a statement in relation to the disposition of troops that:

> On the right of the Eighth Army constituting its right wing were our South Korean forces. The Chinese armies split because of the presence of the Tenth Corps on their flank and hit the Eighth Army at the junction between the American and South Korean troops, routing the South Koreans and causing the withdrawal of the entire line.
>
> There was no gap in the sense reportedly described by General Bradley, and none of the Chinese forces outflanked our Eighth Army positions as he is reported to have stated.
>
> The withdrawal operations following the Chinese attack were among the most skillful ever executed and received the highest commendation from Washington. Losses were relatively light—less, for instance, than in the month of September during our victorious actions at Inchon and the Pusan perimeter as General MacArthur has previously pointed out.

Do you think that is a fair statement?

General COLLINS. I think that is essentially correct. The collapse of the third ROK Corps did result in an outflanking or an effort on the part of the Chinese Communists to outflank the remainder of the Eighth Army, and I do believe that one of the Chinese columns did hit outside of the right flank of the Third Corps.

Senator WILEY. Just one question, and I quote:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff were fully and daily informed of the tactical operations and the basic plans, movements, and dispositions and I know of no objection they sent to Tokyo concerning the same.

Is that correct?

General COLLINS. We did caution General MacArthur that in our judgment we were greatly concerned over the separation of the Tenth Corps from the remainder of the Eighth Army.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to take about a minute to make a comment concerning certain remarks that my good friend from Wisconsin, Mr. Wiley, made with reference to me as "General" Morse in the course of his comments. His remarks might be misinterpreted in the record by those not in the hearing room as some sarcastic reference, since it will not show that he had a smile on his face when the remarks were made.

Of course, I sit here in no military capacity at all, because I have no military expertness, I sit here just as a juror in a case, and——

Senator WILEY. Not prejudiced.

HUMAN RELATIONS FACTORS

Senator MORSE. I have been given the job of examining some of these witnesses. I made certain observations this morning in my examination of General Collins as to my impression, which has been formed to date in this case, as a basis for what I consider, as far as my judgment is concerned, a fundamental question, that goes to the human relations factor that developed between MacArthur, on the one hand, and the Government, on the other.

I put that impression to General Collins, and he verified that my general conclusion was correct, namely that these tensions and misunderstandings, had developed to the point that in his opinion, the President of the United States was justified in having a commander in the field with whom he found himself in greater consonance than he found himself with General MacArthur. I think that is pretty fundamental to this inquiry.

General Collins. I wonder if I might—if you might permit me to make a statement.

Senator Morse. I will always permit you to make any statement you wish.

General Collins. I will make it brief. I think in justification of myself—I don't feel any great need of justification, but I do want to point out that I did not answer your question or statement with a "yes" or "no." I gave you my answer irrespective of what you had said. I gave you my answer.

Senator Morse. That is right, and for the record, I want to say that I consider that General Collins' answer fortifies my impression that these human relations factors had developed to the degree that the President had lost confidence to a point in his commander in the field in Asia that justified him removing him in order to get one with whom he found himself in greater consonance.

Now, also, may I say, and good-naturedly, to my good friend from Wisconsin, that it certainly will be news to many people that he has not to date expressed his views or opinion on this matter, because unless he has been completely misquoted in the press, for some days past I have been reading about the Senator's views. I am glad to say I do not share his views, on the issues in this case, including that one press report that I read that at least purported to say that he said serious consideration probably ought to be given to General MacArthur as a possible Presidential candidate.

Senator Wiley. Do you believe all you read?

Senator Morse. I am reporting what I read.

I would say though—and good-naturedly to my friend—that a lot of the comments I have heard him make on the MacArthur question would raise considerable doubt in my mind that when he imputes prejudice to others that there is no beam in his own eye.

ROTATION SYSTEM IN KOREA

Now, I hope the general won't object to my joshing him a bit about a little difference he and I have had in the past. I was delighted to hear his testimony this morning in regard to the rotation system. I have felt right along that a rotation system in Korea could be worked out under the existing size of our military manpower.

The general will recall that when the manpower bill was before the Senate, he sent up a letter in the closing hours of that debate, read by my good friend across the table, the Senator from Texas, Mr. Johnson, in which he said that in the short range the Army would be adversely affected as to combat effectiveness and morale for want of authority to go overstrength from time to time under conditions which cannot be accurately predicted; and with the fluctuations in current international tensions our present plans for rotation of personnel in Korea might be completely upset.

I am happy to discover they have not been completely upset yet.

General COLLINS. I don't remember the date of that, Senator Morse; but we have only been able to initiate——

Senator MORSE. March 7.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; we have only been able to initiate this rotation on any scale in the month of May. Up until that time we were not prepared to initiate rotation, and if we did not get the authority, frankly, to get a little overstrength over that which we had originally been granted, we could not have made it effective.

Senator MORSE. I want to say I will not go on with this issue, and I make this comment half kiddingly, General——

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator MORSE (continuing). But I would point out that the rotation system we are working under is within a total manpower membership now quite below the 4 million mark that the junior Senator from Oregon was trying to set up by statute that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed. I am still of the opinion that we can have a rotation system and have a reasonable statutory limit.

BRITISH-COMMUNIST TRADE

However, let us return to the line of questioning I want to ask the general. I want to go back to the secret document, this exhibit we have before us, page 83, and this message of January 9 about which you have been examined.

Referring to the blockade, point "b," blockade of the China coast:

> if undertaken must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or evacuation from Korea. However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hong Kong. It is considered necessary to obtain United Nations concurrence.

Now, the fact that that was in the message of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur in no way indicates, does it, General, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, for that matter, other officials in our Government approved of the economic trade by the British with the Chinese Communists?

General COLLINS. No, sir; certainly the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not.

Senator MORSE. To the contrary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were on record, and have been on record, as opposed to this economic trade.

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. But is it not true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout this war have been confronted with the reality that it is a United Nations operation?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. And being a United Nations operation, the United States is not in a position of being able to dictate the terms of operations, but we have to reach agreement through negotiations as to what those terms of operations shall be; is that not true?

General Collins. That is correct, sir. If I might offer a suggestion, sir, Admiral Sherman is prepared fully to discuss all of the intricacies of blockade. Frankly, I am not; but Admiral Sherman will be prepared to discuss with all of you the complete implications of a naval blockade.

Senator Morse. I want to ask you this one further question, then, on blockade, and then I will reserve other questions for Admiral Sherman.

REQUIREMENTS OF A TRUE BLOCKADE

As the Chief of Staff for the Army, one of your primary responsibilities is to try to develop those strategies and policies that are best suited to protect our troops; is that not true?

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. It is true, is it not, that if we had followed General MacArthur's recommendations as to a blockade we would have had to enforce that blockade by sinking ships, if necessary?

General Collins. Yes, sir; that is one of the legal requirements that I understand of a blockade; it is a curious thing, but it has been a long time since I have studied this aspect of law, but one of the provisions is that to be legal it must be effective; to be effective it might require actual sinkings.

Senator Morse. That is, to be legal you must do everything you can within your power as a blockading nation to make it effective, including the sinking of ships, if necessary.

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM BLOCKADE

Senator Morse. In view of the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the State Department, were aware of British ships going into Hong Kong, you took note of the international difficulties that would be created by sinking a British ship, did you not?

General Collins. Yes, sir; not only British ships, but possibly Russian ships going into Dairen.

Senator Morse. That was my next question, General, and the same would be true of Dairen, including the sinking of Russian ships?

[Deleted.]

Senator Morse. Is it not difficult for you to believe that if we blockade Dairen and sunk Russian ships that there would be a demand on the part of the Russian people to retaliate in view of their historic record of always going to war when their own territory is attacked?

General Collins. Well, of course, once again whether they would or would not have done it is conjectural, but certainly it was a definite possibility.

Senator Morse. And increase the danger to such a point that you, as Chairman of the Army Staff——

General Collins. As Army Chief of Staff.

Senator Morse (continuing). Were opposed to the blockade?

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

[Deleted.]

JCS—MAC ARTHUR DIFFERENCES REGARDING TIMING

Senator Morse. That leads me to ask a question that I asked of General Bradley. General Collins, as we study the MacArthur proposals, it is necessary to study them in point of time for their application, is it not?

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. Is it not true that one of the differences over policy that developed between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur was this difference as to timing?

General Collins. Yes, sir; that was a very vital factor.

Senator Morse. Is it not true that the memorandum of January 12 has to be studied in terms of the element of timing?

General Collins. Yes, sir; I made that point, sir.

Senator Morse. Is it not true that you have not changed your opinion in regard to the memorandum of January 12 if conditions develop so that you have to resort to those proposals in order to best protect our troops in Korea?

General Collins. That is correct, sir.

Senator Morse. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not shared General MacArthur's viewpoint in regard to his recommendations for blockading and for bombing because, in the light of our military potential in Asia, up to the present time, it has been their view that we would suffer more from the application of his recommendations if Russia came in than would be the case if we did not put his recommendations into effect?

General Collins. Yes, sir; generaly, that is correct, sir.

Senator Morse. Am I correct in my assumption that that has been not only the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but of the other officials of this Government, in the line, or in the channels of authority, in connection with the operation of the Korean War—they, too, have felt that we would lose more than we would gain, if Russia came into the war?

General Collins. So far as I know, that is correct, sir.

JOINT MILITARY-POLITICAL DECISIONS

Senator Morse. Now, there have been many questions asked, not you, but other witnesses, to this effect: "General, was this a military decision, or was it a State Department decision?"

Or, the point has been brought out that we want to know whether or not military officials recommended it, or Dean Acheson recommended it.

General Collins. Speaking of the relief of General MacArthur?

Senator Morse. No; of various decisions that have been made.

General Collins. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. In regard to the operation of the Korean War.

Now, General Collins, am I correct in my understanding that you would emphasize that because of the United Nations aspects of this war, it has to be conducted by the United States, as far as our participation in its is concerned, by joint conference and agreement and negotiations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department?

General Collins. Yes, sir; I believe that is the case.

DETERMINING A RECESS TIME

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Gentleman, I think we ought to make a little survey here.

It is now 20 minutes to 2. If we are going on at some length this afternoon, I should think we might take a brief recess and step around to the cafeteria and get a bite to eat.

Senator MORSE. Procedurally, I might announce, if it would be helpful in working out an arrangement for excusing General Collins at a very early hour, I will forego the other questions I was going to ask him, and ask them of Admiral Sherman.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I only have three or four questions, and I shall be glad, then, to conclude so that General Collins can get away on his trip.

He has been very patient. I realize that my approach is a little different, but I want him to know that I only have the highest regard for him as a man, especially as a military man.

I am sure he will rank high in the estimation of our people.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not undertaking to cut anybody off. I am trying to arrange the best time for these questions to be asked.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, procedurally, I am willing to do whatever the committee wants.

I think I can complete, in another 15-minute round, what I have to follow up on; and I think there are some loose ends left.

I am perfectly willing to either continue on here, or to recess for a short time to get a cup of coffee and a sandwich, and come back.

I want to accommodate the general, and what his plans are.

General COLLINS. I can leave much later. It is no part of mine, to inject myself, but if we had a short recess to get a cup of coffee, and then come back——

Senator KNOWLAND. It would be a little easier on the censors out there. I think they have been following through with a pretty heavy program themselves, and the reporters, it might give them a little break.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For my part I think I shall take the 15 minutes on my next round. I earnestly hope to be able to conclude the line of questioning that I was asking General Collins at that time, together with one other very short line of questioning, I hope. I mean it won't be a long one, and I hope I can conclude in 15 minutes. It might take 20, another 5, but I will do everything I can to conclude in the next 15-minute period.

I would like to merely pursue to some conclusions the line of questioning I was in when my time expired the last round.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. I have no questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long.

Senator LONG. I might want to ask one or two more, but it won't take more than a few minutes more.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, I personally have a number of questions, but permit me to say this, if you will, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Under the circumstances, I had been perfectly willing to waive all of those questions in hope that I could direct some of them at General Collins' counterparts among the other service chiefs. I should like to think, however, that there may be an opportunity at a later time for General Collins to return.

General COLLINS. Let me make it clear I will stay until just as long as you say. This trip of mine to Europe is important, but not as important, in my judgment, as this inquiry.

It is true that the trip has been planned for some time and if I don't get away today, I may have to delay it, because I have got a deadline at the far end of the trip also that I must make. But I can stay here just as long this afternoon as you wish to stay.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think it is quite evident from what has been said here now that we can conclude within an hour all told of the questions that will apparently be asked, and to give these reporters and the censors a little breathing spell and permit the Senators to get a sandwich and a cup of coffee, suppose we recess until 20 minutes past 2. That is 37 minutes.

We will stand in recess until 2:20.

(Whereupon, at 1:43 p. m., the committees recessed, to reconvene at 2:20 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Johnson, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Morse, Knowland, and Cain.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will be in order.

General COLLINS. I have a couple of answers now to earlier questions if you wish me to read them into the record.

Senator KNOWLAND. Why not let him read them now.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may read them, General.

ARMY EQUIPMENT SENT TO INDOCHINA AND PHILIPPINES

General COLLINS. In answer to Senator Knowland's question on equipment sent to the Philippines and Indochina, the following applies to Army only. Navy and Air Force should answer for supplies sent by their services, if they sent any. My answer is Army alone. In the time available we could only run down our own.

Since June 1949, $3 million worth of Army supplies have been shipped to the Philippines.

I might add that, of course, we had left behind in the Philippines a great quantity of equipment and ammunition.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask, General, $3 million according to what yardstick—according to original purchase cost or according to the depreciated surplus cost?

General COLLINS. Colonel Gilchrist informs me this is new equipment, new current equipment at current prices. But we had left behind, of course, in the Philippines great quantities of World War II equipment worth many millions more than this equipment.

Since June 1949—

Colonel Gilchrist says MDAP price, so it still might be at a reduced price. So apparently my answer, Senator, is not exactly correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We often get confused as to whether it is original cost, new cost, or whether it is a depreciated surplus cost.

General COLLINS. Which is it, Colonel, do you know?

Colonel GILCHRIST. I recall the Philippine program, sir, and in the most part the Philippines got entirely new equipment or equipment taken right off our shelves. So it would be the current replacement price.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

General COLLINS. Since June 1949, $54 million worth of Army supplies had been shipped to Indochina. That is $54 million of Army supplies to Indochina. That also, Colonel Gilchrist informs me, applies to current prices. In addition there are $2 million worth of Army supplies previously planned that are now being prepared for shipment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So far as Indochina is concerned, that does not include airplanes to Indochina?

General COLLINS. This is all Army stuff.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No Air Corps, no Navy, or Navy Air equipment?

General COLLINS. This is solely Army equipment. Army supplies, shipped to Formosa since the 9.7 million last November, now totals 2 million of the 50 million, Army. That is, approved for current delivery; 800,000 worth of that is en route now—800,000 additional——

Senator KNOWLAND. Do I understand by that you said 9.7 million was the shipment last November?

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Two million in addition to that?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. And a total of 11.7 million.

General COLLINS. Plus 800,000 now en route.

"TERMS OF SURRENDER" SENT MAC ARTHUR

Now, with reference to General MacArthur's proposal for surrender on the 24th of March, the question was asked, When were the "terms of surrender" sent to General MacArthur?

The "terms of surrender" for North Korea were sent to General MacArthur shortly after the Inchon landing, as I indicated this morning I thought they were.

General MacArthur prepared a broadcast to the North Korean officials. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the broadcast and it was made by General MacArthur on the 9th of October.

The "terms of surrender" for North Korea are not applicable to the Chinese Communists. New terms of surrender that would apply to the Chinese have not been sent to CINCFE.

That answers the questions, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

JCS-MAC ARTHUR CONCURRENCE ON JANUARY 12 STUDY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, if you will turn to the document, the Joint Chiefs of Staff report for Senate committees, that I was talking about in my last round of questions, I want to call your attention to page 88.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, without requoting or rehashing the terms of this Joint Chiefs of Staff study that has been referred to, as of January 12——

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to call your attention to the language of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's own report there as follows:

> Generals Vandenberg and Collins held conferences in Tokyo with General MacArthur and his principal staff officers during the period January 15–18, 1951.

That is the trip you testified to as having made?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And—

> General Collins read a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on the courses of action relative to Communist China and Korea, dated January 12, 1951.

That is the study, is it not?

General COLLINS. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That we have referred to as containing the outline——

General COLLINS. Correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And this statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff starts off:

> General MacArthur indicated his concurrence with the proposals contained therein.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to that document, in their own report here, as "proposals," as I read it; the word "proposals" is used.

Also, it is conceded that on January 12, 1951, in connection with those proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur were in concurrence?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; in the background of time and condition.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand; but this proposal was read, according to this report, to General MacArthur, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff say that General MacArthur concurred, so that there was concurrence, as far as we know from this report, complete concurrence in all details with this report, or this proposal of January 12, between—concurrence between—General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was General MacArthur ever notified at any time after January 12, up until his relief, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were withdrawing any of those proposals?

General COLLINS. We withdrew none of these proposals, Senator; we haven't withdrawn them right now.

CONDITIONS AND TIMING RELATIVE TO JANUARY 12 STUDY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. All right, then; when General MacArthur, in his speech to Congress, referred to these four points that he referred to, which were contained in this proposal of January 12, he stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with these proposals.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And therefore I take it that his statement is not in error?

General COLLINS. It is in error, to this extent only, Senator, that the context was not stated, the background of the proposals was not stated, and no condition was outlined in this public statement of General MacArthur's, as to the conditions under which these proposals were developed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think that is very true, that that has not appeared in the evidence; but I call your attention to the fact that there is no evidence whatsoever that at the time these proposals were read to General MacArthur, in Tokyo, on the 15th or 18th of January, there is no evidence that any hedging conditions or conditions precedent or subsequent, necessarily, other than that which was in the proposal, this document, were called to his attention.

General COLLINS. Oh, yes there is. I told you that at the time I told General MacArthur that these various proposals were under consideration by the authorities in Washington, and I also indicated in the record that apparently I had made clear to General MacArthur that these were not directives, they were not firm commands, because General MacArthur, himself, referred to this as a study.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

General COLLINS. And I did my best, in all honesty, to make it clear that these were matters that were being considered.

It may well be that someday we will put every one of them into effect. It is a question of timing, and the conditions under which they would be put into effect.

I also, for the record, made clear that shortly after, in fact just about the time I arrived in Tokyo, and then in Korea, that the conditions under which this study was developed had quite markedly changed, and I, for one, was convinced that we could stay in Korea as long as we wished to stay in Korea.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And General MacArthur, at that time, was in agreement that the conditions had changed and that our position was tenable in Korea?

General COLLINS. That is right, sir; and I so stated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

REACHING DECISION TO RECALL MAC ARTHUR

Now, General Collins, prior to the 6th of April, last, did you ever recommend to the President or the Secretary of Defense that General MacArthur be recalled?

General COLLINS. I did not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever have a meeting with a view to recommending that General MacArthur be recalled?

General COLLINS. No, sir; we did not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it has been pretty well established, through the statement of the President, and the evidence here, that when the President called for the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he apparently had already made up his mind it was advisable to relieve General MacArthur. His own news release, which is all we have to go on, indicates that he had made up his mind sometime before this to relieve General MacArthur.

Were you told, when you went to that conference, that is the one which you attended, that the President had come to the conclusion that he would have to relieve General MacArthur, and he wanted to know what your attitude was, from a military standpoint?

General COLLINS. No, sir; we were not. I indicated that yesterday; and we were not told that the President had made up his mind, and I do not know whether he had made up his mind or not. But we were definitely not told that the President had already arrived at a decision. I tried yesterday to clearly indicate the condition under which we met, and I stated that in accordance with procedures that we follow constantly that my view of it, and my understanding clearly was that the President had under consideration the relief of General MacArthur, and he turned to his military advisers and he asked us what we thought about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, what actions of General MacArthur between the 5th day—including the 5th day—of April, when the first meeting with General Bradley was had with the President and the Secretary of Defense—let us say the 5th day of April, and the 8th or 9th day of April, when the decision was finally made apparently to relieve General MacArthur—what actions of his between those dates did he perform which would warrant his removal? I am limiting it——

General COLLINS. No specific actions between those dates, Senator. You again force me now to go back and reiterate my statement. My reason—and I am the witness——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand.

General COLLINS. My reason is—do you wish to hear my statement or not, sir?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I was going to ask you the question about whether or not the reasons had been cumulative prior to that date, prior to the date of April 5.

General COLLINS. They had been cumulative.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That was the point. I understand your reason, and I do not mean to shut you off, but you have already testified in the record.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, General, the point I am making is this: If those reasons from a military standpoint, from the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were cumulative and existed prior to the April 5, 1951, date, why did not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and why did not you, as Chief of Staff of the Army, recommend his removal prior to that date, when you were called for a conference with the President?

General COLLINS. Because I did not know that the Commander in Chief had apparently reached the point where he was fed up, and the question was referred to us as a body, and we were asked—we were told that the President was considering the relief of General MacArthur; we were asked for our judgment from a military point of view as to whether we concurred in that, and we said, Yes, we would.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, as Chief of Staff in a responsible position, if you come to the conclusion today that—I hate to mention any general by name, becaues I do not insinuate that any of them should be recalled—but that General X in the field should be relieved, is it your duty and responsibility to wait until you see whether the President makes up his mind, or is it your duty under your responsibility and in the responsible position as Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to affirmatively recommend it to the President at the time you come to such conclusion?

General COLLINS. Part of that conclusion, Senator, is inevitably involved in the view of the commander, because the staff officer has no immediate responsibility for what goes on in the field.

I told you that I had personally thought that the time might well come when it might be necesasry for us to recommend the approval of the removal of General MacArthur. That time had not yet developed.

However, when our Commander in Chief indicated to us that he was very seriously concerned with whether or not this commander in the field could any longer carry on in accordance with the basic policies under which he was operating, we then sat down and discussed the thing in detail and we came to the conclusion that the time had arrived when he should be relieved.

REASONS TO RECALL MAC ARTHUR EXISTED PRIOR TO APRIL 5

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Now, General, in other words, prior to April 5 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not concluded that General MacArthur should be relieved, they had not concluded to the point of making any recommendations, but after the President's desires were made known, is it a fair assumption to say that then the Joint Chiefs of Staff got together to justify from he military sandpoint the action, the preconceived action of the President?

General COLLINS. Not to justify; no, sir. I have told you several times that we were called upon for our opinion by our Commander. We gave him our honest opinion, and that is all I can say, Senator.

You can ask me it in 10 different ways and I am going to give you the same general answer. In all honesty, now, I am going to give you the same answer.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not question your honesty, General Collins. If I did, I would take a different viewpoint. The point I am trying to bring out is this. As I understand the testimony, you were asked for your conclusions.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Your "concurrence" I believe is the term.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am trying to make is this: That there were no conclusions drawn by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the 5th day of April.

That whatever reasons in the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff existed prior to the 5th of April; that nothing new after the

5th day of April occurred which would warrant the removal of General MacArthur from his standpoint.

That therefore the reasons for the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff existed prior to the 5th day of April and the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to affirmatively take a position and make recommendation upon which they later said justified the removal or the recall of General MacArthur.

Frankly I am merely suggesting this. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet the responsibility of our trained and responsible military leaders to recommend if, as, and when a situation arises where they think the military commander should be relieved? Did they meet that responsibility when the occasion arose, or did they wait until sometime later and justify it as of sort of an ex post facto act?

General COLLINS. In my judgment we did meet our responsibilities.

VAN FLEET STATEMENT ON THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now in yesterday's paper, General Collins, it is reported General Ridgway had issued a statement that the thirty-eighth parallel meant nothing to him, and that he had indicated his disregard for that by crossing the thirty-eighth parallel himself.

Chairman CONNALLY. Van Fleet you mean, do you not?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Van Fleet, I guess it was. Excuse me. Thank you, Senator.

Did he submit that statement to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for clearance?

General COLLINS. No, sir; but I am certain he was talking from a military point of view that it meant nothing to us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, was not General MacArthur——

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

General COLLINS. There is no question in my mind whatever that is what he was talking about.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was not General MacArthur talking from a military point of view when he talked about taking military action?

General COLLINS. Not alone, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

COLLINS' FORMER TESTIMONY

Senator KNOWLAND. General Collins, I will try to move along just as rapidly as possible here.

Earlier this morning Senator Morse had asked about several appearances you had made before this committee and certain lines of questioning.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am told by the clerks of the committee that your appearances at that time were on September 14, 1950, which, I might say parenthetically, happened to be the same day Korean time as the Inchon landing, which I understand was done on the 15th Korean time.

Then you appeared on January 9 and 19. Both of those dates were long subsequent to the mass Chinese attack on the forces in northeast Korea, and I think were probably considerably after the Hamhung evacuation, although on that I am not quite certain as to the dates.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. But it was after the November-December massive attacks in northeast Korea.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator KNOWLAND. Just to get the record straight.

General COLLINS. Well, it may well have been, Senator, that in September I may have discussed—but I do not know now whether it is the case or not—I may well have discussed in my appearance in September the possible contingencies that might well have developed. I do not know, however, whether I did or not.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am merely stating the dates and general strategic situation at that time. The September meeting was on or about the time of the Inchon landings, when we were well south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The other dates were long subsequent to the massive attacks having taken place in North Korea.

General COLLINS. Yes. The only connection would be, though, that we did issue the instructions to General MacArthur with respect to proposed limitations on the operations of other than South Korean forces on September 27. I did appear before this committee just a few days before, and I may well have given you what we were thinking about at that time. However, I do not know that is the case.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think our record is rather clear as to what you sent to General MacArthur and what General MacArthur sent to you, and I do not want to repeat that here today.

General COLLINS. Right.

PENTAGON PRESS RELEASE

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, on or about April 12 there was a press release, presumably from the Pentagon, because it quoted an unknown Pentagon spokesman, that said that the action of the removal of General MacArthur, which had taken place a day or so prior to that, had had the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I understand your testimony today, it was a concurrence of the Joint Chiefs, because you have testified that of their own motion the Joint Chiefs made no such recommendation.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Now I would like to call your attention——

Senator WILEY. What was the answer?

Chairman RUSSELL. He said, "Yes, sir."

Senator KNOWLAND (continuing). To where you stated that General MacArthur's recommendations relating to these four points would not in your opinion have been decisive and might cause the Soviet Union to intervene in Korea. Is that substantially correct?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

I wonder if I could go back in answering your preceding question.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

General COLLINS. I want to make it very clear, certainly I, and I don't believe any other members of the Chiefs themselves, to the best of my knowledge, saw that press release. Commotion is such, we have got a terribly complicated business we conduct, and to my recollection I never saw the press release prior to the time it was released. I don't know who it was that released it. It may have been by those who issue what comes out of the Secretary of Defense office, the civilian in charge of that, and the exact technical connotation of recommendation may never have occurred to him. I don't know.

Senator KNOWLAND. At any rate you were not the Pentagon spokesman who gave the release?

General COLLINS. No, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. And you do not know that any of the Chiefs were directly involved?

General COLLINS. I am quite sure that none of us saw it; I am not positive.

POSSIBLE RESULTS OF JCS RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Relative to your statement relative to the fact that General MacArthur's recommendations would not be decisive in bringing the war to a close and might cause the Soviet to intervene in Korea, is it not correct that as far as the Joint Chiefs' study, which we have in the testimony was tentative, if carried out, would have had the same effect?

General COLLINS. It is possible, yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. It is substantially the same recommendation, and I would think if it applies to one it would apply to the other.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, but the conditions, you see, were different. In other words, we would be much more willing to run the risk of spreading the war if it were essential to do so in order to save our troops and get them out of Korea.

If, as did develop, we could still stay there without any very heavy increase in casualties, then the conditions under which we would have taken action no longer existed.

LANGUAGE OF DISMISSAL DIRECTIVE

Senator KNOWLAND. I haven't been able to get an answer on it yet, General—and I don't say that in any way to mean that any of the witnesses have avoided it, because I think it may be that they don't have the answer that I have been seeking—but as I have said on many occasions, I do not question, and I know of no person who questions, the legal or constitutional right of the President to make whatever decision he made as to the removal of General MacArthur or any other commander.

But the normal processes, as I have always understood them, in a relief is to at least give sufficient time to turn over the command. In view of the fact that the General was not being relieved in disgrace, as a man might be under certain circumstances where consideration should not be shown to his feelings, I am trying to find out who it was that suggested the summary dismissal.

Now, prior testimony has shown in the record—and I don't want to repeat it except to give this background—that they originally had intended to have Secretary Pace deliver the orders relieving him.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. But that still doesn't answer the summary dismissal end of it, because Secretary Pace might have delivered it and it still would have been a summary dismissal, without the successor taking over or the General being allowed to say goodbye to his troops or turn over the occupation of Japan or see the high Japanese officials.

I would like some light, if you can give it, and if not, I shall pursue it with other witnesses, as to who suggested the language which called for the summary, forthwith dismissal of the General as soon as he read his orders.

General COLLINS. I can add no light whatever to that, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. Then we won't pursue that at this time.

RETREATING ENEMY MIGHT NEGOTIATE TO GAIN TIME

General, is it not true that an enemy in retreat or on the verge of defeat might offer to negotiate or to enter into a parley to gain time?

General COLLINS. That is within the bounds of possibility, yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. If an army was being hard pressed and had been badly chewed up, as the testimony is here that the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have been chewed up in the last several weeks, don't you think, as a military man, looking at it from the Chinese Communist commander's point of view, that if he could gain a few weeks in discussion, it would be to his advantage to do so, and if he could get the UN forces to mark time while that was going on?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Is it not generally considered good doctrine that if you have the enemy on the run, to press your advantage and let him do his negotiating while he is being pressed, rather than to give him a breather? I am speaking of a general situation.

[Deleted.]

DIRECTIVE REGARDING NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to read to you from this directive relative to government in North Korea, wherein it was stated that the officials of the Republic of Korea were not to be included in the governing of the area north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and I quote from subsection—it looks like 7—yes, subsection 7:

> Rights of individuals: The mere fact that an individual is or was a member of the armed forces of the North Korean Government, an official of that Government, or any local government, or a member of any political party, will not subject him to prosecution or reprisal, and will not, by that reason alone, bar him from office or employment.

Now, it looks to me that as that directive read at the time it was issued—and there may be later directives that will throw more light on the subject—that we were saying to our commander in Korea, "You use some of these former Communist government officials in the operation of the government, military government, in North Korea, but you are prohibited from using any of the public officials of the constitutional government of the Republic of Korea," and I merely am trying to inquire now, and I will pursue it with other witnesses later, whether this was an initial recommendation of the Defense Establishment or whether this came either directly from the State Department or from their UN committee, which may have passed it on.

General COLLINS. I do not know the answer to that, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, Senator Morse had made an observation a little earlier, and I may have one if time will permit.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have 1 minute, Senator.

LETTER FROM FATHER OF A KOREAN CASUALTY

Senator KNOWLAND. I just want to read you this, which came to me yesterday. It was brought in in person by a retired Army captain, and it reads as follows:

> I have just buried my son at Arlington, a boy who in dying earned the award next in rank to the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross. * * *
>
> My son was killed by a piece of metal; a piece of metal shipped to the enemy in all likelihood by our so-called allies whose continuing recognition and support of our enemy will long live in infamy. He was killed by a piece of metal brought down over supply lines we were forbidden to bomb, and made into ammunition by power from Korean dams we were forbidden to destroy; a piece of metal whose transportation was protected by Red planes we were forbidden to pursue and shoot down.
>
> The name for the reason this and other bits of metal were transported and protected until they could kill this boy and other thousands of American boys is a justly hated and dishonorable one—it is appeasement. Our leaders prefer to call it by another name, and they excuse it on the grounds of expediency. It has, they say, given us more time—which is but a paraphrase of, "Peace in our time." It has, they say, kept us out of a big war. Those excuses are but echoes of the words of the man with the umbrella at Munich. This boy, these boys, fought and died without hope or chance for victory. When before in our history has America ever committed such a crime against its fighting sons? Appeasement tied one of their hands; the Reds tied the other; and so shackled they died.
>
> The reasons for paying blackmail are always compelling, and the alternative to paying it is always horrible. Pay or have your house burned down; pay or have your child murdered. The reasons today are no less compelling—pay or have world war III, pay or have Washington atomic-bombed. * * *
>
> Nevertheless appeasement or paying blackmail is wrong and does not work. The child held for ransom has already been killed; the decision to burn your house down has been made no matter how much blackmail you pay. Today the Russian decision as to whether and when to attack will not be altered by our hand-tying appeasement. We are paying with beloved human lives to buy time that we might have for nothing. Our blackmail payments in American blood purchase neither time nor security.

This is by a retired captain who has just buried his son in Arlington.

Chairman RUSSELL. I let you read it. Your time is up. If the general wants to comment on it, you may do so.

General COLLINS. I have no comment, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon? Senator Lodge?

Senator KNOWLAND. As a procedural matter, Mr. Chairman, I forgot to mention the captain's name, and since I have quoted him, could I just add that?

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think it is procedural, but if you call his name it will appear in the record.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Eugene R. Guild, captain, United States Infantry retired, from Colorado, and he was sent to my office by Senator Millikin.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Cain?

Senator Cain. General Collins, is it a reasonable assumption that prior to the time that Red China entered the Korean War, there was a minimum amount of friction between General MacArthur, the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the President and all others in authority?

General Collins. Yes, sir; I believe that is a fair statement.

PRESENTING QUESTION OF MAC ARTHUR RECALL TO JCS

Senator Cain. General Collins, despite the colloquy you have had several minutes ago with Senator Hickenlooper—and I followed it as carefully as I could—I still wish to impose upon your time and help concerning the circumstances surrounding the removal of General MacArthur.

It happens that I continue to be uncertain about the steps which were followed and the methods which were employed in removing General MacArthur from his far eastern command.

Please permit me, sir, to state why I remain in doubt, and then perhaps you can provide me, as I know you will, with the complete facts as you understand them to be.

General Collins, it will take me several minutes to lay the foundation for my question and your answer. I beg your indulgence, sir.

General Bradley has testified that the President requested the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS and Mr. Harriman to visit with him on Friday, the 6th day of April. At this meeting General Bradley has testified to us that the question of removing General MacArthur was discussed.

General Bradley likewise has testified that this was the first time he had ever heard the question of removing General MacArthur either raised or discussed. In this meeting the President encouraged his four visitors to confer among themselves after they left the President's office, about the question.

The four men in question conferred that Friday afternoon. No decision, so General Bradley testified, was reached in the morning meeting or at the afternoon meeting during Friday, the 6th day of April.

The four men returned to the White House on Saturday morning, April 7, to meet again with the President. They suggested that the President make no decision until the President had studied the question over the weekend and other people had been given a chance to study the question. The President said that he would discuss the question with other unnamed administration leaders.

At this Saturday meeting the President directed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS to secure an opinion on the removal question from the JCS. General Bradley testified that he arranged a meeting with the JCS for the next day, Sunday afternoon.

As the Army Chief of Staff and as a member of the JCS, you have testified that you never heard of the question before Sunday, April 8. The record tells me, sir, that the three service Chiefs met with General Bradley in the latter's office about 2 o'clock Sunday afternoon. At this meeting the matter of General MacArthur's removal was discussed.

At 4 o'clock on the same Sunday afternoon the JCS and its Chairman met with General Marshall in the office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss the General MacArthur removal question.

This meeting lasted, so General Marshall testified, until about 6 o'clock. At this meeting in General Marshall's office the Secretary of Defense apparently said nothing. On May 12 General Marshall testified before us as follows:

> After the Chiefs of Staff had had a meeting on Sunday afternoon of several hours, they came to my office with General Bradley and they each stated respectively their views and the common view of the three. I did not discuss the matter with them. I heard what they had to say.

Now General Collins, I fully understand that the President has never discussed the MacArthur question with you or General Vandenberg or Admiral Sherman. Apparently General Marshall had no conversations with any of the three service Chiefs on the question.

The only information then that you received as a member of the JCS and as the Army Chief of Staff about the several meetings in the White House obviously came to you from General Bradley. I wish that you would advise this committee of the nature of the question which General Bradley posed to you. You may perhaps remember the form of that question.

I wonder whether you were asked to study and state both sides of the removal question, or were you simply requested to state reasons in support of a pending removal? I hope you will merely tell this committee as much as you can remember about the meeting of the JCS with General Bradley, and then about the meeting of the JCS with General Marshall, and I know that my great curiosity in this question will then be satisfied.

General COLLINS. I hope it will be satisfied, Senator. I can't guarantee that it will be because unfortunately I cannot remember the exact form in which General Bradley presented the problem to us. I wish that I could, but I simply can't.

Senator CAIN. Was it by telephone, General Collins?

General COLLINS. Oh, no, sir; we met in his office.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir?

General COLLINS. We sat around his desk and chatted back and forth.

Senator CAIN. You did not, sir, know the reason why he was calling you into session?

General COLLINS. To the best of my knowledge, Senator, but again I am not really positive of this, I did not know what the purpose of the meeting was until I came into the office. You see, it happened that I had been out of the city, as I have testified.

I got back into the city late on Saturday evening, and I don't remember now whether it was that night or the next morning, Sunday morning. I think it was Sunday morning that I was advised that there would be a meeting; the term "emergency" wasn't used, but the very fact we were meeting on Sunday morning wasn't a usual thing, although we meet at all hours, and my best recollection is I did not know what the subject was until I arrived.

JCS DISCUSSION PRECEDING RECOMMENDATION

I do not recall the exact form in which General Bradley posed the question to us. I do know that we discussed the thing back and forth con as well as pro for some little time.

Senator CAIN. Do you mind if I interrupt just occasionally?

General COLLINS. All right.

Senator CAIN. One of the reasons I raised the question is that the recommendations or the three points had only one side, and that seemed a little bit strange to me because this was a tremendous problem and I should have assumed that there were things to be said in opposition to the general being removed.

General COLLINS. Well, yes; that is correct, but the form in which that paper was prepared, it is my understanding what were the reasons why they thought that from a military point of view only General MacArthur should be relieved. It doesn't state that there were any reasons, there weren't some reasons why he shouldn't have been perhaps, don't you see, so this is a statement——

Senator CAIN. That is the result of the meeting?

General COLLINS. That is the result of the meeting; yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. The three reasons.

General COLLINS. But as I indicated we did discuss, I can well remember specifically the question of whether or not General MacArthur's job in Japan as SCAP could be separated from his job of the theater commander in control of troops.

We finally decided from a practical point of view you could not separate it or certainly it would be inadvisable to attempt it.

So, therefore, when we got through with our conclusions we then went upstairs, at approximately 3:30 to 4, somewhere about that hour—I think the thing was set up at 4, and I believe actually we got through ahead of time, and General Marshall was there, and we talked to him.

Senator CAIN. Permit me one interruption here. You understand that I really want to get the facts in this business.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator CAIN. What you have said up to date is that in having had no prior notice of this meeting that you and the other service chiefs met at approximately 2 o'clock, spent approximately an hour and a half to 2 hours in studying this question, which had not previously ever been submitted to you, and you came out at the end of 2 hours with a determination to recommend and to state the three reasons supporting the possible removal of General MacArthur, and from General Bradley's office you went upstairs to General Marshall's.

General COLLINS. That is true only of me, Senator. General Bradley and the other two chiefs had known that the matter was under discussion, as has been testified to, you see. In other words, the other three of the four of us had been advised earlier. The date of that I don't know but I think the evidence showed it was on the 5th. I just happened to have left town, don't you see.

FORM OF JCS-MARSHALL MEETING

Senator CAIN. Well, would you now, please, sir, recite to the best of your recollection the form of the meeting in the Secretary of Defense's office, and how the question was resolved there?

General COLLINS. I will try to do it very quickly and briefly. We, each of the Chiefs—General Marshall called on each of us to give what our views were. We each gave them. At the conclusion—he said, "Well, what is the conclusion?" General Bradley, I think, stated our general conclusion, and then there was some little discussion, and General Marshall said, "Well, General Bradley, you will express the reasons or the concurrence or the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff"—I think "views" was the term used but I am not positive—"to the President whenever we meet with the President."

Senator CAIN. Is it quite normal, may I ask, General Collins, for the JCS to offer their views on an important question to the Secretary of Defense, and merely have the Secretary of Defense accept those views, without comment, one way or another on his part?

MARSHALL'S APPROACH TO A PROBLEM

General COLLINS. General Marshall—it has been my experience—I have known General MacArthur and admired him greatly for many years——

Senator MORSE. General Marshall.

General COLLINS. General Marshall; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Yes.

General COLLINS. It is characteristic of him that in any discussion of this character, he sits back and lets you do the talking. I am personally of the belief that he does that because he doesn't want you to be affected—he wants you to be untrammeled by his views, and that was it.

Now, frankly, I don't recall whether General Marshall said, "I agree" or "I don't agree." If General Marshall said he didn't, I take his word for it.

Senator CAIN. No, the General merely stated that he himself, General——

General COLLINS. That is a detail that, frankly, I don't recall. Had you asked me, I would have said that he indicated concurrence; but in the light of his statement that he did not participate, then I won't make that statement, because I kept no notes at the moment, and this is quite a little time ago.

Senator CAIN. In a professional capacity you have served General Marshall in one way or another for quite a number of years, have you not, sir?

General COLLINS. Off and on; yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Yes. And in his capacity as your superior military officer, it has been your custom to state whatever the question was, as requested by him, and his custom to merely have you state it, and he accepts it—takes action on it at a later time, often not in your presence, and that is the end of the matter?

General COLLINS. That is right. Frequently, he does not indicate whether he is going to accept my views or not.

As a matter of fact, just 2 days ago I had a discussion with General Marshall on a wholly different matter, and I don't know now whether he is going to take action along the general lines I suggested or not. In other words, he has reserved judgment, which he is entitled to do.

Senator CAIN. Certainly. And that is a custom which, as a military man, you know that he has followed over a number of years?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator CAIN. My last question in this connection: The testimony appears to be rather conclusive that at that Sunday meeting with the Defense Secretary, General Marshall, no consideration or discussion was had about the method of relieving General MacArthur of his far-eastern commands. The entire discussion was and revolved around the question, are there reasons sufficient to support his removal?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I am quite certain that is correct.

Senator CAIN. General Collins, I do not know—and this is personal between us—to what extent I agree with the method pursued, but I want to say to you, sir, that I think for the first time I have a conclusive appreciation of every step insofar as the JCS, the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the JCS are concerned that led to the removal of General MacArthur; and I thank you for your help.

General COLLINS. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman? The chairman passes.

Senator Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. Pass. I hope it is unanimous.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I simply wish to say that I will reserve my further questions that I expected to ask General Collins, and ask them of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. I just have a very few——

Senator WILEY. Don't I get another shot?

Chairman RUSSELL. I have been switching from committee to committee, Senator.

I called on Senator Connally, and he passed, and I will get to somebody on that committee, and then return to you.

I am going to treat you fairly, if I know what "fairly" is.

MAC ARTHUR'S MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. General Collins, directing your attention to page 42 of the book furnished to us, and dealing with the date of September 27, 1950, relative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to General MacArthur as of that date, calling your attention to the last sentence:

> His military objective was the destruction of the North Korean armed forces.

May I ask your judgment as to whether or not General MacArthur could have carried out that part of his directive without proceeding north of the thirty-eighth parallel?

General COLLINS. No, sir; I do not believe he could have.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, I call your attention——

General COLLINS. You will notice, Senator, if I may add——

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

General COLLINS. That in the third line of that same paragraph from which you quoted, the sentence begins:

> The major portions of this directive established General MacArthur's authority to conduct military operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

Senator KNOWLAND. The reason I raised that question, because of the time element, I didn't want to read the whole message, so I was sure it was not taking anything out of context.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. The reason was that among some uninformed people there is the impression that when General MacArthur went north of the thitry-eighth parallel, he was going north in violation of some directives.

I don't think any member of this committee is under any such misconception; but from time to time, in the press and otherwise, you see that people question whether he had gone off on his own.

General COLLINS. That was definitely not the case.

Senator KNOWLAND. I merely wanted to show that that was his directive, and clear directive; and I also submitted for that purpose the military government directives to him, which clearly indicate that they even expected the setting up of a military government, other than under the Republic of Korea, north of the thirty-eighth parallel; so that that, plus his directive of October 7, which came from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to me at least, and I think to any fair-minded person, would clearly indicate what his directives had been, to pursue and destroy the enemy.

General COLLINS. No question about it, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. At all times keeping from crossing the international frontier, the Yalu, and the Soviet Union?

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

RESTRICTIONS ON GENERAL MAC ARTHUR

Senator KNOWLAND. General, I have been somewhat concerned that, in going through this document, and I believe I am correct, I haven't kept a score, nor have I gone completely through, to keep a tabulation, but I have found what I believe to be some 20 or more instances in which it was indicated to the general that because of the possibility of some changes taking place at Lake Success, or some political decision on that level, which had not yet been brought into being, that he should slow down, or hesitate, perhaps, in carrying out his strategy in the war.

Is that an unfair impression that I have, as you have read this document?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I believe it is unfair, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like for you to clear it up, because I am seeking information.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir, I believe it is. It is true that once the Chinese Communists got into the fight, there were restrictions placed on General MacArthur with respect to bombing and a lot of other things like that, don't you see, and he was cautioned not to use other than North Korean troops close to the frontier—South Koreans—close to the frontier, and a few things like that.

Senator Knowland. General, the Chinese Communists as such—this is my recollection from being over there last November and from what I have read since—the Chinese Communists were not identified as being over in organized units until some time in October—I think the testimony indicates today that perhaps October 24 or some such date.

When I was there in mid-November, I personally interviewed up at Hamhung and Hungnam and other places some Chinese Communist prisoners that had been captured, and they were among the first that had been captured.

I call your attention to page 44 of the record of September 29, which was another directive. It reads as follows:

> After clearance on the highest governmental level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved CINCFE's plan on September 29, 1950. On the same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff also advised CINCFE that, because of the serious—

again the word—"political implications"—and I underscore the words "political implications"—

> involved, he should not authorize an all-out bombing attack or attacks against Pyongyang—

which is the North Korean Communist capital—

> or similar targets until he had first cleared the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That is the type of situation to which I referred, which by the date of it, of course, occurred before the injection of the Chinese Communists into the war.

General Collins. I was going to correct my statement that actually restrictions of this character did exist prior to the time that the Chinese Communists came in. I was about to interrupt you when you turned and I did not want to seem to anticipate your question.

Senator Knowland. As a matter of fact, General——

General Collins. May I take time to give you the reason behind this, the thinking that was behind it?

Senator Knowland. Yes.

COMPARING UKRAINIAN AND KOREAN SITUATION

General Collins. We were genuinely concerned—and this again is a combination of both political and military, which I say cannot be wholly separated—we were concerned about the condition that might exist in North Korea with respect to the reaction of the North Korean people toward a quick and early cessation of fighting if we were to just bomb their cities.

What we had in mind was what actually transpired in the Ukraine. When the Germans went into the Ukraine, there is no question but what if they had used their heads, they might well have gotten a great deal of support from the Ukrainan people in their fighting against the Russians.

We had that exactly in mind here. That until it became quite apparent that it was essential to bomb Pyongyang, we wanted to reserve that judgment back here in Washington and again there would have been plenty of time, we thought, for General MacArthur to have asked for authority when he located a specific target there.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, if I may be pardoned, I think your example of the Ukraine situation is an unfortunate one. In the first place, of course, whenever you are engaged in a war you have this problem. We had it in Germany—what the effect on the German people was of the bombing of Düsseldorf, Coblenz, Berlin, and so forth, but you can't escape some of that if you are striking at military targets—and Pyongyang was an important communication center, all the troops that got down south had to funnel through there, a large part of them had to.

The fact of the matter historically, as I have always understood it on the Ukraine, it was not that there was some war damage, because, as a matter of fact, the German forces were met with the traditional welcome of bread and salt; but it was the harsh occupation directives which the Germans later carried out against the Russians and treating them as racial inferiors and not part of the master race, and so forth, as I understand it, that finally turned the Ukrainians away from the Germans and back on the side of the Soviet Union.

General COLLINS. I didn't intend to say that there is an exact parallel. Actually it was a combination of what you have just said, plus some genuine destruction, plus the ravaging of the countryside.

My point was—and I didn't intend it to be an exact parallel—I don't know that formerly we mentioned this point, but certainly it was in my judgment a valid consideration that we desired here, for both high political and high military considerations to say to General MacArthur go easy on this business of bombing North Korean cities.

CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN BOMBING CITIES

In the first place, we are going to have to rebuild them, we are going to have to give them civil aid like we always do, and therefore go easy on that until the situation develops and you think it must be done; then call on us for clearance and we will weigh it here. That is all that was intended.

Senator KNOWLAND. I quite agree, General, on any directive that might have been given to him that there should not be a mass bombing of cities in general on the situation, and even in the war with Germany we deliberately did not bomb Heidelberg because it was not an important industrial center or communications center, and there were reasons why it should not be done.

General COLLINS. That is right.

Senator KNOWLAND. But this was the Communist capital, it was the seat of the government that was the aggressor, it was a major communication center. I have been into it myself and have seen the railroad yards and the supply depots, and so forth the Communists have had there.

I merely cite this as another example of these political decisions which were somewhat restraining on the commander, and there may be an honest difference of opinion, but I think a little too restrictive.

Now turning your attention to page 43 of that same directive we have previously referred to, of September 27, reading on, it says:

> Political questions such as the formal extension of the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea over North Korea should await action by the United Nations.

I do not want to press this point, but I merely wanted to put that as a background to a statement I now care to make.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS IN RESTRICTING FIELD COMMANDERS

No one knows what the future is going to hold in store for us, whether the men in the Kremlin will precipitate the world into a third world war. We are in somewhat of a trial period with the United Nations. I have always supported it since I have been in the Senate and the system of collective security under the North Atlantic Pact and the arms implementation bill.

The only thing that concerns me as a United States Senator and a member of the Armed Services Committee who is interested in our Armed Forces, the turn of the wheel might some day make you a theater commander in some area of the world, and I am concerned that if our commanders in the field who, after the diplomats have failed and war has broken out and they have been given the job to win the war, whether they on a magnified scale are going to be encumbered with many of these political indecisions and vacillations which may make most difficult the carrying out of a theater commander's mission.

We all know that one of the great difficulties during the Civil War was the interference by congressional committees in the operation of the field commanders. That is bad enough when it is within one country where they have a common background and language and the rest of it. But it seems to me, as one observer, and if this record is clear in any regard, it seems to me it is clear in this, you have that situation multiplied 10 times over in the United Nations today; and unless we learn from what I think are some of the mistakes, I am afraid that our field commanders, when we are putting in such a large body of troops and all the rest of the UN members together are only putting in 10 percent of what we are putting in, that if they can hog-tie us and obstruct the carrying out of the mission, we might lose our freedom in the process.

I sincerely hope that our high command and our Joint Chiefs of Staff are going to examine this situation very closely so that if we are involved in Europe or Asia or the Middle East, we can eliminate as many of these difficulties as is possible to do.

Could you make an observation on that phase of it?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

I am afraid that commanders since the very early times of history have been relatively speaking restricted by some such political considerations as you have outlined.

I happened just the other day to see a story that came, I think, from the Romans. Unfortunately I cannot remember the exact time and place. But a field commander spoke of the restrictions that were placed upon him by his home government.

I think that we military men have got to recognize the fact that there will always be some political considerations which must be reserved for the government at home.

Now, as a military man, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recognize the fact that those restrictions should be kept to the utter minimum. I can assure you that my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs feel the same way. And where we thought that those restrictions, if any, should be broadened, we have discussed those matters and brought them to the attention of the appropriate authorities. Specifically, for example, on the question of hot pursuit, we brought that to the attention of the authorities.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; but on the question of hot pursuit, of course, the action was vetoed, and what I am concerned with—we are developing new weapons all the time. The new weapons might be the difference between victory and defeat. Will the same type of a veto be used on our responsible commanders in regard to the use of such weapons?

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired.

General COLLINS. I don't know, of course, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley.

NATURE OF BRADLEY MEETING

Senator WILEY. This morning, General, and together with what you said this afternoon, I think you have pretty well clarified the situation in my mind as to this particular angle of the controversy. It was not until the 8th that you were called in, and in the meanwhile MacArthur's letter published in the Congressional Record on the 5th caused the President, or someone on his behalf, to call Bradley, and Bradley called the Chiefs of Staff. I think he mentioned you, but you say you were not there.

Now I am getting to this Bradley meeting. Had the Chiefs of Staff looked up all this back matter and produced the records? Did you discuss them in this meeting with Bradley?

General COLLINS. We discussed a number of these specific incidents, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Who brought the information to the meeting? In what form was it? Is it like this book that was gotten out here?

General COLLINS. No, sir, it was not. I remember—I think it was that meeting but I am not positive—one of the members did refer specifically to certain of these various incidents. Which ones, frankly, my memory is such now that I cannot tell you. I say that in all honesty.

Senator WILEY. I thought you only attended one meeting.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir. But subsequent to the meeting, don't you see, and before the formulation of this book, for example, needless to say we reviewed the situation. We directed our staff to get together all of these documents.

Incidentally, I can assure you that the Chiefs and the Staff leaned over backward to be sure that we included everything in this pamphlet that we had any specific part in.

Senator WILEY. Well, was the meeting with Marshall or with Bradley the same day—was the question whether you should concur then with the President?

General COLLINS. Exactly the form, as I said earlier, Senator, in which General Bradley posed the question to us I cannot recall, unfortunately. But it was clear to me that the President had under very serious consideration the question of whether he should remove General MacArthur from office, and we were asked to give our judgment on this from a military point of view.

COLLINS' PERSONAL THOUGHT

Senator WILEY. This morning—I cannot repeat the exact words, but in reply to a certain question you let it be known that you had not discussed with anyone the removal of MacArthur before this meeting of the 8th, but that you had had in your mind a personal thought about the matter. Am I right about that?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator WILEY. Now, did you in your various meetings with MacArthur say anything to him about what you had in your mind?

General COLLINS. No, sir. However, in my discussions with General MacArthur I made it perfectly clear each time what the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, what the policies were. I don't think that I left any doubt in General MacArthur's mind as to what the views of the Chiefs were or what the policy was that we were following.

PURSUAL OF PEACE

Senator WILEY. Do you know whether or not in relation to the release of March 24 that MacArthur made—I think it relates to dealing with the enemy—whether that very situation had been, as MacArthur said, in the mill for some time?

General COLLINS. Whether the proposition of having, proposing terms of an armistice, Senator?

Senator WILEY. Yes. Or that he had been "pamphleteering" up to the tune of over a million pamphlets?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; had been taken along those general lines; that is right.

Senator WILEY. This is a question that I wish you would listen to very carefully because to me it is important. There has been so much testimony that no human mind can grasp it all.

Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff at any time object to any tactical operations, basic plans, military movements, or disposition of troops made by General MacArthur?

General COLLINS. We twice called to General MacArthur's attention our concern over the separation of the Tenth Corps from the remainder of the Eighth Army subsequent to the landing in the Wonsan area.

Senator WILEY. Is that your answer to my question?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Then, the answer is that you did not object to any tactical operations, basic plans, military movements, or disposition of troops, but you were concerned about this one operation? And I think you said this morning that was a matter of military judgment which, if you had been on the ground, you don't know whether you would have pursued or not?

General COLLINS. Well, the last part I didn't say, Senator.

Senator WILEY. Well——

General COLLINS. The latter part of it I don't believe is quite what I said.

Senator WILEY. What did you say?

General COLLINS. I said that from Washington, 8,000 miles away, that I didn't want to pass judgment on what General MacArthur did. I did not say that I if I had been in his shoes, might or might not have done differently.

Senator WILEY. No; in other words, you don't know what you would have done?

General COLLINS. I have a pretty strong conviction as to what I would have done, but that is beside the point because I wasn't there and it wasn't my responsibility.

NEWSPAPER INTERPRETATION OF MAC ARTHUR STRATEGY

Senator WILEY. The press, General, have interpreted the testimony that the gap in the lines last December was due to faulty MacArthur strategy. In view of the facts that Senator George developed as they existed then, is that your view?

General COLLINS. Well, I would prefer not to discuss that question in detail, Senator, unless you should insist that I do so.

Senator WILEY. No; I won't insist on it.

General COLLINS. It is a pretty complicated question, Senator, and again I will tell you that it is a matter of judgment. I don't believe that you can say that this is a fact in this field; it is a matter of judgment, and certainly General MacArthur had great, vast experience upon which to base his judgment.

Senator WILEY. Thank you for that, but I thought that would be your answer and the press, I think, has misstated it.

Have you in your previous testimony given us the specific directives and the specific violations, if any, of such directives that you claim exist?

General COLLINS. I can add nothing, Senator, that I can think of to the statement that I have already made on this point.

Senator WILEY. I have had, I might say, one of the rare experiences in my 12 years in Congress in this whole so-called MacArthur matter from the time he spoke to the time he appeared before our committee, and also the experience I have had here with you, General.

And I feel very humble about the matter, but I want to say that from your evaluation of MacArthur, there is as someone said, a little bit of a doubt in my mind in your evaluation of him, as to whether first there could be anything personal between you. I take it there never has been.

General COLLINS. No, sir, not from my point certainly, and I don't know of anything from General MacArthur's point of view.

Senator WILEY. Well, you remember how he spoke of you people.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. What wonderful terms and the way he felt that he had never violated any directives and carried on.

Well, now here is my question. You agree that he is a man of great faith and great conviction, don't you?

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Senator WILEY. And one thing that impresses me was that throughout the whole proceeding I know that I could not have done what he did after the deal he had gotten. He never uttered an ugly or mean thing about anyone.

MAC ARTHUR'S CHARACTER

I felt that this man was concerned with a basic job and in doing his duty as he saw it. I never had a similar experience. I never knew General MacArthur until I met him in the Senate when I helped escort him to the rostrum. He is a Wisconsin man. His family reaches back into Wisconsin, but I never had the personal experience of meeting him, and I am sure you agree that he is an American through and through.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator WILEY. And a man who loves our institutions.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Senator WILEY. And a man who has a reverence for the truth.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

Senator WILEY. And a man with tremendous spirituality. Do you agree on that last sentence?

General COLLINS. I don't know General MacArthur personally enough to pass judgment on that. It does not indicate that I disagree with you, sir. I simply do not know him in a personal way to give you an answer with respect to that.

It does not mean that I disagree with you. Certainly in my answer why I don't want to even imply that I think that General MacArthur lacks spirituality. I don't know him well enough in a personal way to evaluate that very intimate personal characteristic, and I hope that is not regarded or interpreted by anybody in a derogatory sense.

Senator WILEY. Not at all, sir. I feel that as a matter of fact you have not—with your contacts with him, and through the years, have not ascertained that fact, and that is for you to say.

General COLLINS. I have not had too many contacts through the years with General MacArthur. I served under him as a young officer at West Point when he was Superintendent of Cadets, but I am sure he didn't know that I existed even, and our contacts—I had no contact with him practically.

Senator WILEY. I would like to ask more or less of a personal question that involves Army men in general. For 3 days I saw that man go through that grind. At the end of 3 days he was just as fresh as when he started. His appearance here was not just in the morning and then a recess in the afternoon. It was from morning to night.

Only once did he show any emotion, and that was when he told that he had ordered General Dean and his troops into the breach, and I can still see him trying to catch himself.

I want to know how you fellows go through the hell that you do, and send men into battle, and then do as even you have done here?

General COLLINS. That is why so many of us have gray hair.

Senator WILEY. Well, that was the only time that he showed emotion, as I say. There were tears in his eyes and emotion in his face, but he caught himself, and came back.

Now, that this act has been performed—I suppose it cannot be undone.

Senator Morse this morning said that I had said something about politics. I want to get that straightened out. I was in my State, and I said apparently that a man who has demonstrated in the hearts of America by simply coming and telling his story the way he has, and received as no other man in history—in the history of America has been received—you cannot discount his possibilities.

General MacArthur says he is not a political candidate. I do not know; I have not talked to him since he left the committee, but I just want to say that I am grateful to you for the contribution you have made to my understanding of these facts; and I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain passes.

Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Collins, just in closing I would like to get utterly clear answers to certain things that have been on my mind that I touched on yesterday, I believe, with regard to the advance.

If you will turn to the report, phase 4 of the map, beginning of phase 4, now, my impression——

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; I have it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Turning to the map of phase 4, September 28 to November 29, 1950, I cannot help but gain the impression that there have been indications or there have been questions asked, soliciting, or attempting to solicit answers that there were some substantial shortcomings in that particular action between September 28 and the 29th of November.

For the continuity here, I would like to ask if this is not true: Was, as General MacArthur testified, the advance north of the parallel toward the border calculated as a reconnaissance in force toward the border?

He testified that it was planned as a reconnaissance in force with the idea that if they met insurmountable odds, meaning if the Red Chinese came through, that they could retreat, and it was planned on the basis of a strong reconnaissance, which possibly might be successful, and occupy in the end; is that correct?

General COLLINS. Well, I will take General MacArthur's word for that. I don't believe that in the initial phase it was considered as a reconnaissance in force at all, because General MacArthur was bent upon the destruction of the North Korean forces.

Now, after the Chinese came in, I testified the other day that one way to get information in the field is to attack, to make a reconnaissance in force, and that is a perfectly legitimate military operation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I understood his testimony, at least in the latter phases leading up to the latter part of November as they were going toward the border, that effort was designed as a reconnaissance in force. It involved all of our troops in order to see what resistance they would meet all along that border, and whether or not the Chinese were coming in. If they found an insurmountable force coming in against them, if the Red Chinese did come in, which was anticipated——

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, they had already planned for an orderly withdrawal, if that force was greater than they could meet.

General COLLINS. With respect to the latter point, I am not factually informed; that is, only the point with respect to whether they planned a withdrawal, that point I am not factually informed on.

A 300-MILE FRONTIER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you if this is not true: I have attempted to measure the distance on the map we have on the wall, of the north border, that is, including the Yalu, and then on east, over to the Sea of Japan, up near Vladivostok. That border is roughly 300 miles long, and the forces at General MacArthur's disposal had to be disbursed along a 300-mile frontier, if they were approaching the border. That is correct; is it not?

General COLLINS. Not necessarily, sir.

Actually, what General MacArthur was talking about was not the 300-mile border; I think, if you will check—I may be mistaken—he was talking about only the Eighth Army. That is all he was talking about when he said that he had orders, what he had ordered was a reconnaissance in force, according to my understanding. That is all he was talking about, that is the Eighth Army, which was over in the western part of the peninsula——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the point I am getting at——

General COLLINS. Leading to the Yalu, leading up to the point indicated on the map by the date October 26, 1950. He may have had in mind the whole thing. I don't believe he did.

FORCES USED IN ORGANIZATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I guess we cannot probe his mind here today, because he is not here. The point I am trying to make is that that frontier is in a straight line, according to the map, at least 300 miles long, or approximately 300 miles long. It appears longer, as some fronts do because of the convolutions of the mountains. The total forces at General MacArthur's disposal then were, I believe you testified yesterday, somewhere around 80 to 85 percent filled up in organization.

General COLLINS. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the organizations he had were of short strength.

General COLLINS. Right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Since that time, the organizations have been built to full strength.

General COLLINS. Correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are now operating in the vicinity of the thirty-eighth parallel, and have been for some time.

I call your attention to the fact that a measurement on the map shows that just below the thirty-eighth parallel the distance across

Korea is roughly 140 miles, which is slightly less than half of the front line to be maintained, as compared to the line along the northern frontier. That contact between the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps is maintained now, but it has half the distance, so far as the front is concerned, to maintain. Its organizations are brought up to strength.

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At least there are more people to maintain. At the present moment it means half the front, as was the case in late November 1950.

Now, the only point I am trying to make, which I hope is obvious, is that as the front lengthened, your front lines are bound to be thinner, so far as personnel is concerned.

General COLLINS. If I decide to lengthen them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General COLLINS. That was a decision that was up to General MacArthur.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was it feasible to go up one side of these mountains and leave the other practically unprotected?

General COLLINS. Senator, let me give you the reason now; and again, you have asked the question, I have not volunteered this:

The reason for our concern, why were the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerned, and why did we twice call it to the attention of General MacArthur?

[Deleted.]

FACTORS OF EVACUATION AND STABILIZATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just one more question that I would like to again reemphasize, in connection with the memorandum or proposal or suggestion——

General COLLINS. I would like to suggest that, if practicable, the latter part of that be left out of the printed record, because it may happen that we will be up in that general area again some day, nobody can tell, and the possibilities are something we certainly ought not to tell the enemy, as to what these developments might be.

I would appreciate having that left out of the record, for strict security reasons, aside from any of the psychological ones.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am sure that Admiral Davis will take notice of what you have said, and he will be bound by that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One other thing, and that is with respect to the proposals or studies which are referred to as those of January 12.

It has been emphasized and reemphasized in the testimony that evacuation was the big thing.

I want to call attention to the fact that we emphasized that these proposals suggested that when the conditions became stabilized, or we were forced to evacuate. In all of the discussion the stabilization phase has been minimized so much, and the evacuation phase emphasized so much, that I want to call attention to the fact that General Bradley stated in his testimony that shortly after the 12th of January last, the situation in Korea did become stabilized. Thus one of the "either-ors" was then, according to his testimony, fully met. In other words, the situation became stabilized, which was one of the alternative conditions under which these proposals should be considered.

I merely want to emphasize the fact that I think evacuation has been drawn on a great deal as one of the conditions, but the fact also was that stabilization of the situation was an equal condition, and yet has not received sufficient emphasis.

General Collins. Well, I don't want to belabor the point, Senator. It would be somewhat a matter of semantics, the exact phrasing of that; but my general understanding of it was, at the time, without specific reference to the words—it was more an idea, if it was necessary, to take all of these steps in order to prevent our evacuation and stabilize the situation, that if it was necessary for us to do so, we would be willing to do it.

That may not be literally what it was, but I can assure you that it indicates my mental processes, at any rate.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I don't care to take up any more time, Mr. Chairman. I think the record and the statements and the document will have to speak for themselves together with the testimony, but I merely wanted to again reemphasize that stabilization was one of the two elements either when the condition became stabilized or when and if we were forced to evacuate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Johnson.

Senator Johnson. I pass.

Chairman Russell. Senator Knowland.

USING CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES

Senator Knowland. It won't take me 3 minutes. General, while I had known it before, I purposely had not questioned you on it with reference to your testimony appearing on page 3353 of the record of yesterday in which in answer to Senator Johnson you said, speaking of General Ridgway:

> I have had one communication from General Ridgway, the date of which I do not recall now, in which he told me that from his point of view, of being a commander in the field, and he made that clear, that he felt that he should support that proposal of General MacArthur's, which involved the release of any restrictions on Chinese Nationalist forces operating on the mainland of China.

That is in the public record of yesterday. I don't want to question you on the communication for reasons that are obvious. I think that was some time in late December, but I don't want to specify the date. I have the date, I might say, but again for security reasons the only question I would like to ask you so we can tie down the loose end, was an acknowledgment or an answer sent to the general to that communication which he sent you?

General Collins. I did not.

Senator Knowland. That is all. I don't want to press the point.

Now, some comment has been made in prior testimony by other witnesses as well as by yourself on the reasons for the nonuse of the estimated 500,000 non-Communist troops of the Republic of China now on Formosa, because of their in some instances not being properly trained or not having sufficient equipment.

I would like to ask this question: Has it not been necessary for the United States to furnish to our other 14 allies in Korea a substantial part of their equipment?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask just this additional question. A little earlier this afternoon or this morning I understood you to say that you would, at the moment at least, be opposed to these Republic of China troops on Formosa being used, either on the mainland of China or in Korea.

I have a very high regard for your opinion. Having been to Formosa on two occasions—and I do not pretend to have military experience in any sense of the word, and was in a very low echelon, though I did go through the Infantry School at Fort Benning—I hope that now that our policy has been to send ammunition there, that if you go out to the Far East again, you will personally have a chance to go there and see for yourself the job that is being done.

I was tremendously impressed with what General Sun is doing and is trying to do with the terrific limitations of ammunition for training, and so forth, he has had.

I would have a great deal of confidence in your personal reconnaissance of looking over the situation for yourself.

I hope that you may be able to take a few days to go down there and I would be a great deal more satisfied if I knew that you yourself had looked at the situation that exists on Formosa.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Any further questions?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. General Collins, I want to thank you for your helpfulness to this committee in carrying on this inquiry.

In the response you have made to the numerous questions that have been propounded you have been the very embodiment of frankness and forthrightness.

In the great wars in which this Nation has been engaged, in World War II, and in today's troubled world, you have made a great contribution to the defense of your Nation and the preservation of its institutions.

Much of the future safety of this Nation depends on your wise decisions. For my part, I have great confidence that that part of the responsibility for our defenses is in awfully good hands.

I hope you have a pleasant trip to France and a profitable one for our Nation. I wish you Godspeed, sir.

General COLLINS. Thank you, sir.

I wonder if I might make a very brief statement to the effect that, first of all, I have appreciated the treatment that I have received from this committee during the long hours from individual members.

I would also like to state that while I have been forced to make comments with respect to General MacArthur's movements and operations, the statements that I made were made with the utmost respect for General MacArthur and that I hope no one will interpret them as being anything of a personal nature, but on matters of judgment in which you, as members of this committee, are entitled to know, and which I, as your witness, was bound to answer.

Chairman RUSSELL. We stand in recess until 10 o'clock Monday next.

(Whereupon, at 4:05 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10:05 a. m., Monday, May 28, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

MONDAY, MAY 28, 1951

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Johnson of Texas, Hunt, Long, Bridges, Saltonstall, Morse, Knowland, Cain.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge, of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Gentlemen, our witness today is Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, and therefore the miiltary head of our Nation's Air Force.

General Vandenberg is in command of that branch of our armed services whose mission it is to keep control of the air and deal devastating counterblows on the very day that any aggressor may attack the United States. It is his responsibility to see to it that the Air Force is ready at all times to carry out that important mission.

The Air Force under his command is playing a major role in the Korean War. It has protected our ground troops, bases, and installations throughout the fighting and bears a considerable share of the credit for the large number of casualties inflicted upon the enemy.

Like our last witness, General Collins, General Vandenberg has been on thes cene in the Far East. He can bring us a first-hand account not only of the evets that we are studying but of the war itself and the lessons that we are learning from that war.

General Vandenberg, the committee has instructed me to administer the oath to all witnesses. Will you please arise to be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the evidence which you will give to this committee on matters under inquiry shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General VANDENBERG. I do.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. IMMANUEL J. KLETTE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Chairman RUSSELL. General, do you have any prepared statement that you desire to present to the committee?

General VANDENBERG. No, Mr. Chairman; I do not.

VANDENBERG'S CAREER

Chairman RUSSELL. Suppose you give us on the committee's time a brief statement of your career, General, for the benefit of the record.

General VANDENBERG. From the beginning, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General VANDENBERG. I was appointed to the United States Military Academy, graduated in 1923 as a second lieutenant, in the Air Service, United States Army.

I commanded as a second lieutenant the Third Attack, a squadron in the Third Attack Group which was one of the three combat groups in the United States Air Service at that time.

I became a flying instructor at Brooks Field and at March Field, commanded a fighter squadron in Hawaii. I attended the usual staff and command schools, Air War College, was an instructor in fighter tactics at the Air Attack School.

I was General Arnold's Chief of Operations shortly after the outbreak of war. Went to England, helped prepare plans for the invasion of north Africa, landed in north Africa on D-day, became deputy commander of the Northwest Strategic Air Forces in Africa.

I went to Russia as air adviser to Mr. Harriman in the winter of 1943, came back to Washington as Deputy Chief of Staff, was sent back to England as the Deputy Air Commander in Chief of the Allied Air Forces in Europe.

I was given command of the Ninth Tactical Air Force shortly after the invasion of Europe. Came back to the United States at the end of the war, became one of General Arnold's principal deputies; then became G–2 in the War Dejartment under General Eisenhower; then became the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, became Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force and then Chief of Staff.

EVALUATING RUSSIAN JETS

Chairman RUSSELL. How many times have you been to the Far East during the course of the hostilities now in existence there?

General VANDENBERG. Two times.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you remember about when those two visits were?

General VANDENBERG. One was shortly after the engagement started in July, and the other was in January.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is when you went with General Collins in January?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have been in Korea with the Air Forces and other forces there?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; both times.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, we hear quite a bit about the jets that are flying from Manchurian bases, and which sometimes have come in contact with our own jet fighters.

Some of the news accounts that I have read state that those jets, which are Russian, and I believe they call them MIG's, are faster than our jets, and are superior planes. I would like to have you comment on that.

General VANDENBERG. The indication is, Mr. Chairman, that they have a jet engine in the MIG 15 that is superior to any jet engine that we have today. Our training is superior and our gunnery control in the aircraft is superior, which gives us an advantage, even though they have the advantage of speed and climb and operations at altitude.

[Deleted.]

IMPROVING UNITED STATES JETS

Chairman Russell. What steps are being taken to improve our own jet engines to where they will be as fast, or faster than these Russian jet engines?

General Vandenberg. We have given all the information that we have been able to obtain, on the improvements that the Russians have put into their jet engines; we are collaborating with the British who have been making good jet engines, and through our research and development program, we are doing everything possible to procure the best jet engines that American manufacturers can make.

BRITISH INFLUENCE ON SOVIET JETS

Chairman Russell. Do we have any knowledge as to whether or not the Russians built this engine that is in these MIG's, or do we think it is an improvement of the British jet engine?

General Vandenberg. It is a very marked improvement of the almost obsolescent jet engine that was sold to the Russians several years ago.

It was made and developed in Russia, possibly with the help of German technicians; but any thought that we might have that it is due solely to those German technicians is fallacious. The quantities in which they are now appearing on the front, both in Western Europe and in the Far East, would indicate that mass production methods of very excellent aircraft are now a capability of the Russians.

Chairman Russell. When you speak about the engines sold to the Russians, do you mean the Rolls-Royce jet British engines that were the subject of some controversy when they were sold to Russia some time ago?

General Vandenberg. Yes; I believe it was the NENE.

Chairman Russell. Rather than the Rolls-Royce?

General Vandenberg. I think it was probably manufactured——

Chairman Russell. [Deleted.]

According to newspaper accounts, every time our jets encounter Russian jets we shoot down from one to four or five and we report no losses.

Are the newspaper accounts on that reasonably accurate?

General Vandenberg. Yes, sir, they are.

SUPERIOR UNITED STATES TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT

Chairman Russell. How do you account, then, for the fact [deleted] that our people go practically unscathed while they shoot down these Russian planes?

General Vandenberg. Our pilots are at the present time much superior in tactics and technique of air fighting, in my opinion. They are better trained and their armament is superior. I think those are the two factors.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean the machineguns——

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And the 40 millimeter or whatever we equip our jets with?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir, and the sights.

Chairman RUSSELL. How far have these jets come into Korea? Have they come down below the parallel, the Russian jets?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; that is about the extreme limit of their range, and they wouldn't be able to do much fighting when they got down there under the present configuration of the MIG–15.

COMPARING THE RANGE OF JETS

Chairman RUSSELL. How does the range of our jet compare with the Russian jets?

General VANDENBERG. That is difficult to answer in an all-inclusive answer, Mr. Chairman, because it depends upon what type of our jets we are talking about. If we are talking about the F–86 Sabre, which is most nearly comparable to the MIG–15, I would say we had some slight advantage in range.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have our air forces encountered any bombers coming out of Manchuria or is it exclusively the fighter planes?

General VANDENBERG. There have been a few reports of single aircraft operating at night that indicate that some of those might be bombers.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have there been any attacks made upon our troops and installations and bases in Korea by these planes?

General VANDENBERG. Bombs have been dropped upon occasions. To my knowledge, they have caused no casualties as yet.

JCS RESTRICTIONS ON BOMBING

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you participate in any meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when restrictions were placed upon the bombing of the Chinese installations and bases and troop concentrations north of the Yalu River in Manchuria?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you approve of these orders which prohibited the Air Force in the Far East from attacking north of the Yalu?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

AIR POWER NORTH OF THE YALU

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, you are the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General, and of course one of the stanchest champions of air power as a weapon of war. Why did you conclude that it should not be used north of the Yalu River?

General VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, the application of air power is not very well understood in this country by people in general, in my opinion. While I was and am today against bombing across the Yalu, it does not mean by any stretch of the imagination that I might not be for it tomorrow, a month from now, or 6 months from now.

Air power, and especially the application of strategic air power, should go to the heart of the industrial centers to become reasonably efficient. Now, the source of the matériel that is coming to the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans is from Russia. Therefore, hitting across the Yalu, we could destroy or lay waste to all of Manchuria and the principal cities of China if we utilized the full power of the United States Air Force. However, in doing that——

Senator MORSE. Did you say we could or could not?

General VANDENBERG (continuing). We could. In doing that, however, we are bound to get attrition. If we utilize less than the full power of the United States Air Force, in my opinion it might not and probably would not be conclusive.

And even if we utilized it and laid waste to it there is a possibility that it would not be conclusive. But the effect on the United States Air Force, with our start from approximately 40 groups, would fix it so that, should we have to operate in any other area with full power of the United States Air Force, we would not be able to.

"SHOESTRING AIR FORCE"

The fact is that the United States is operating a shoestring air force in view of its global responsibilities.

Starting from a forty-odd-group Air Force, the aircraft industry is unable until almost 1953 to do much of a job oward supplying the airplanes that we would lose in war against any major opposition.

In my opinion, the United States Air Force is the single potential that has kept the balance of power in our favor. It is the one thing that has, up to date, kept the Russians from deciding to go to war.

In my opinion, we cannot afford to, what I would like to call, peck at the periphery as long as we have a shoestring Air Force.

While we can lay the industrial potential of Russia today waste, in my opinion, or we can lay the Manchurian countryside waste, as well as the principal cities of China, we cannot do both, again because we have got a shoestring Air Force. We are trying to operate a $20 million business with about $20,000.

AIR FORCE POTENTIAL TO KEEP PEACE

Chairman RUSSELL. You base it then on purely military grounds rather than political considerations that it might bring Russia into the war or is that a military consideration?

General VANDENBERG. From my point of view, Mr. Chairman, I am looking at it from the point of view of the United States Air Force and the potential that it has that has kept the peace so far. If I may go on just a minute to enlarge a little bit——

Chairman RUSSELL. I did not intend to interrupt you, General. I did not know whether you were through or not.

General VANDENBERG. Today the United States is relatively safe from air attack. Tomorrow in my opinion we will not be. Because we are relatively safe from air attack today, an air force of a certain size can protect the United States and keep the balance of power in our favor.

Today we only have one job that we would have to do if we got into a major war with Russia, and that is to lay waste the industrial potential of that country. Tomorrow when they have developed their long-range air force and they have more atomic weapons, we have two jobs.

V aw

We would have to put into first place the job of destroying the Russian air potential that could utilize atomic bombs against the United States, and lay waste the industrial potential. Today the air defenses of this country are about adequate. Tomorrow they will not be nearly adequate enough.

I believe that finishes my statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. My time is about up.

I have one question I want to ask you, going back to the operations in Korea——

Senator FULBRIGHT. I will yield the chairman 5 minutes of my time, if that is in order.

BOMBERS AS TACTICAL SUPPORT

Chairman RUSSELL. That cannot be done. They voted against it. I appreciate that, though, Senator.

We have been using our B–29's and B–50's, our large bombers in a way never contemplated, I understand, in tactical support of the troops, is that right?

General VANDENBERG. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Has that been effective? Can you use those large planes tactically?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

I have some figures that might be interesting.

[Deleted.]

Some weeks ago, near Hamhung, a ground force pushed forward after a night attack by a single B–29, and found 600 casualties.

Chairman RUSSELL. One plane?

General VANDENBERG. One plane.

In another action near Inje, a B–29 provided another instance of effectiveness, for when the South Koreans recaptured the hill, they found 800 enemy dead.

More recently, following the enemy's May 17 renewal of their attack, close support missions on two successive nights accounted for one enemy regiment and one enemy battalion, nearly 4,000 enemy troops. That was verified by an actual count.

Our reports from prisoners of war tell of an increasing feeling of helplessness and futility among the enemy units, moving at night and in bad weather, and going into concealment during the day.

[Deleted.]

BOMB LOADS

Chairman RUSSELL. I suppose the bomb load of the B–29 is not a classified matter, is it?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir. It is approximately as effective as 20 fighter-bombers.

Chairman RUSSELL. How many pounds? Do you know about how many tons or pounds of bombs? I do not know how much the fighter-bombers take.

General VANDENBERG. Of course, Mr. Chairman, that varies with the distance from which the B–29 took off. If you get close, I would gather around 20,000 pounds.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is something new we have learned out of this Korean War—this use of these large bombers to attack ground troops?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir. We did it during World War II in great numbers, but our control over positioning the bombers so as to provide safety for our ground forces has been improved greatly.

Chairman RUSSELL. You did not use the B–29 in World War II, did you?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; we used the B-17's and B-24's. The B–29 is simply a larger brother of theirs.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally.

MAINTAINING AN ATOMIC LEAD

Chairman CONNALLY. General, I never have been associated with you very closely but I think Senator Vandenberg was your uncle, was he not?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. We were very closely associated in our work, and I have for him a high regard and admiration. I regret very much he had to go.

A while ago you testified that at the moment, at the present time, the conditions of the United States with regard to keeping the peace and being free from threats of war were good, is that correct?

General VANDENBERG. In my opinion they have been up to today; yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Now does the atomic bomb figure prominently in that estimate, or is it other factors?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir, the atomic bomb figures in it.

Chairman CONNALLY. Do you feel as time goes along that the importance would probably increase somewhat, with development by Russia?

General VANDENBERG. I don't believe, Senator, that its importance will decrease, but our lead will be more difficult to maintain.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I mean.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I do mean it is not still effective, but you mean that our ability to cope with other powers will be less.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Is that right?

General VANDENBERG. It would be more difficult.

Chairman CONNALLY. More difficult.

EVALUATING UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA

Now, Senator Russell has been asking you some questions about operations in Korea. My I ask you somewhat of a general question: How have the operations of the Air Force in Korea impressed you? Have they been satisfactory or have they proven inadequate or inefficient? What is your general feeling about the Air Force in the Korean War?

The reason I ask you that question is that I read in the paper the other day that in this last drive by the Red Chinese and the North Koreans, the Air Force sent out 600 sorties, and as a result there were 500 casualties.

Now, I am just a layman; I am strong for the Air Force, I will tell you that, and I am not critical. I have always been a strong supporter of the Air Force, but it seems to me that to send out 600 sorties and only kill or disable 500 soldiers is not very effective work. That may have been an error, I do not know. I just read that in the paper.

General Vandenberg. Senator, to answer the first part of your question first, in my opinion, the gaining and maintaining of air superiortiy almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea was done most efficiently.

Since that time we have had reports from all of the ground commanders. General Michaelis, who was given a battlefield promotion from colonel to brigadier general, stated that, in his opinion, the support furnished by the Air was more complete and more efficient than had ever been provided before in the history of ground warfare.

Those are not his exact words, but that is the impression I got out of his statement. I can furnish the exact statement, if necessary.

Chairman Connally. That is not necessary.

General Vandenberg. About the airplanes getting about one soldier per airplane, there will be many cases where aircraft will be called for by the Army and either the targets will disappear or they will fire at well dug-in troops and perhaps not get any casualties on the part of the enemy.

On the other hand, I call your attention to the fact that one airplane got 800, another airplane got 600, and another airplane got nearly 4,000—verified by actual count.

In my opinion, the rpoper way to use air power is initially to stop the flow of supplies and ammunition, guns, equipment of all types, at its source.

The next most efficient way is to knock it out along the road before it reaches the front line.

The least efficient way is after it gets dug in at the front line.

Nevertheless, there are requirements constantly where the utilization of air power in close support is necessary.

But in doing that job very often I think you will find that the number of soldiers that are killed by an airplane is liable to be from very great to zero.

Chairman Connally. Well, in those instances of 600, 800, and one of 4,000, what sort of conditions were they? Were they formations of troops and solid masses that were killed by the air attacks?

General Vandenberg. One of the groups was a group of North Koreans or Chinese that had just captured a hilltop, and therefore I would presume that they were dispersed in battle formation. The others I have no information on.

Chairman Connally. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Bridges.

THE AIR AGE

Senator Bridges. General, before the twentieth century, Great Britain dominated the world by dominating the seas. For instance, she defeated the Spanish Armada and crushed the power of Spain without landing a single British soldier on Spanish soil.

Now that we are in an air age, do you believe it would be possible for the nation that dominates the air to dominate the world?

General Vandenberg. Yes, sir.

BALANCE OF FORCE

Senator Bridges. Do you believe in the balanced force concept, that we must build up all three services at the same rate?

General Vandenberg. Senator Bridges, I would like to explain my concept of balance of force. Way back in February of 1949 in Dallas, and on the 1st of May in 1949 in Indianapolis I made two talks on the balance of forces, and I stated at that time that the balance of force in my opinion, the use of that name was misleading.

I said that what we have to balance our forces toward is the threat, not against each other. We must balance our forces against the enemy and his forces and his potential.

It should be designed in proportion to evade an enemy's strength and to exploit his weakness. I still have that opinion, sir.

HASTENING CHINESE NEGOTIATION THROUGH AIR FORCE

Senator Bridges. Do you agree with General MacArthur that air and sea power could force the Chinese to negotiate, the Chinese Communists to negotiate?

General Vandenberg. Used alone?

Senator Bridges. Well, the full use of air and sea power together with what we are doing with land forces in Korea if we made full use of air and sea power.

General Vandenberg. Senator, I don't want to try to apparently avoid the answer to that, but I would like to point out that anything in war where we make a categorical statement is liable to be proven erroneous. In answer to your question, I would say that if we were able to utilize the full power of the United States Air Force with all that it implies, that there would be a good chance of forcing them to negotiate.

On the other hand, as I said before there are many factors in war that cannot be added up and come out to a solution that is mathematically correct.

Senator Johnson. Will you yield there a moment?

Senator Bridges. Certainly.

Senator Johnson. Do you mean the power of the forces we have out there or the power of all of our forces or our potential power?

General Vandenberg. Senator Johnston, I stated I believe before you came in that when I was talking about the ability to do this job in Korea and China, that I stated the entire United States Air Force's power.

Senator Bridges. Do other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff share your confidence in the decisiveness of air power?

General Vandenberg. Senator, I am not sure where you got from what I said that I believe that air power was decisive. I said as I recall, in answer to one of your questions, that it could be the balance of power similar to the British fleet.

I think it is the greatest single factor in keeping the peace today.

JCS DECISIONS

Senator Bridges. Have you ever disagreed with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy?

General Vandenberg. The present Joint Chiefs?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes; and then go further in the next question as to others.

General VANDENBERG. The present Joint Chiefs and I, as far as I can recall, Senator, have agreed quite generally in our concepts. I have to put it that way—quite generally—because obviously three individuals representing three services are going to have differences of opinion that, if they are going to be of any value to the Government, must be expressed very vigorously.

On the other hand, in general, I can say that the present Chiefs are in usual accord in the broad outlines of strategy.

Senator BRIDGES. General Vandenberg, if your views on military strategy are overruled by other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would you be obliged to support the majority decision before Congress and the President?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

JCS-PRESIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP

Senator BRIDGES. You are free to come to the Congress and tell your own views or go to the President and tell your own views?

General VANDENBERG. More than that, Senator, I have an obligation under the Defense Act, as I understand it, to go directly to the President.

Senator BRIDGES. In other words, I am told that there is a New York Times article this morning—I have not seen it—that is rumored that the Joint Chiefs are having difficulty in going to the top, to the President, on matters of this kind. Are you familiar with that article?

General VANDENBERG. I read rather hastily the article in my office before I cam over here, Senator. I did not gather that from the statement in the New York Times.

Senator BRIDGES. I did not see the article, I was just told about it.

General VANDENBERG. I gathered that what they were talking about was that very often there are shades of opinion expressed by the Joint Chiefs in their deliberations, that it is very difficult for one man, after listening to all of the permutations and combinations that go into making up a decision, to represent all those finer points in giving the final decision, and in the course of discussion as to how that decision would be implemented, to either the Secretary of Defense or to the President.

On the other hand, in that article there was no indication that there was any block ever put on any of the Chiefs from going to see the President.

I have the utmost confidence that at any time any of the Chiefs desire to see the President on a military matter they could make an appointment with him.

Senator BRIDGES. Have you ever allowed yourself to be used to gain support for administration programs which you did not believe were wise?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

VANDENBERG'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Senator BRIDGES. Have you ever made any public statements which did not completely endorse or coincide with the position of the Secretary of Defense?

General VANDENBERG. Would you state that again, sir?

Senator BRIDGES. Have you ever made any public statements which did not completely endorse or coincide with the Secretary of Defense?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Did you publicly support ex-Secretary Johnson and General Bradley in their endorsement of the military budget cuts last spring?

General VANDENBERG. On the 19th of May 1950 in Detroit, in a speech, I publicly disagreed with Secretary of Defense Johnson's contention that our military forces today are sufficient on the need of the hour, and opposed from a military standpoint the military budget cuts which were supported by other leaders, and I warned against depending on preparation for war after absorbing a large-scale attack.

Again on the 16th of June 1950 at Maxwell Field, in a public address, I again disagreed from a military standpoint with the administration's policy of limiting and reducing the strength of the Air Force, while at the same time recognizing the Air Force need for doing the best job.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE IN KOREA

Senator BRIDGES. Do you believe we can win in Korea without using our full air power against the enemy bases and supply line?

Now, look, you said earlier here that one of the most efficient uses of the Air Force was to hit at the source of supplies.

The second most important use of the Air Force—efficient use of the Air Force—was to hit at the lines of supply; and the third most efficient was what we are doing there now. Now, with that background, will you answer my question?

General VANDENBERG. Could I have that repeated?

Senator BRIDGES. Do you believe we can win in Korea without using our air power against enemy bases and supply lines?

General VANDENBERG. In Manchuria?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, what do we mean by "win"? A complete defeat of the Chinese Communist nation and the North Koreans?

Senator BRIDGES. No. I have been trying to find out from some of your colleagues just what we meant by winning our objective, and I haven't found out yet; but for purposes of my question, let's say drive the Chinese Communists out of North Korea, out of all Korea.

General VANDENBERG. I wasn't aware that that was our objective.

Senator BRIDGES. I am not either, but I haven't been able to find out what our objective is.

General VANDENBERG. I believe our objective is to kill as many Chinese Communists as is possible without enlarging the war at the present time in Korea.

I believe that there are reasonable chances of success in achieving a negotiated peace without endangering that one potential that we have, which has kept the peace so far, which is the United States Air Force; which, if utilized in a manner to do what you are suggesting, would, because of attrition and because the size of the Air Force is such and the size of the aircraft industry is such that we couldn't still be that deterrent to war which we are today.

PRESENT GOAL OF AIR FORCE

Senator BRIDGES. Do you think we could win in Europe without the air power to knock out Russian bases?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Are we building enough air power to do that job?

General VANDERBERG. By that Senator, do I understand you to ask: Are we started to build that air power?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes. Do we have projected——

General VANDENBERG. As far as the budgets that have been approved by Congress, we are engaged on that program; yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. This, I assume, will be classified, but when will we attain that?

General VANDENBERG. Well, that poses a different question, Senator. I stated that we had started. It depends upon the appropriations in fiscal '52, and the appropriations in fiscal '53, as to whether or not that objective is reached.

What I wanted to say was that the money that had been appropriated in fiscal '51 is, in the opinion of our experts, as much as could be efficiently spent toward the goal to which the Air Force is driving; that in fiscal '52 we should continue, we must continue that progression upward; and whether we do that or not depends upon fiscal '52 and fiscal '53 appropriations for the Air Force.

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN AIR BASES

Senator BRIDGES. Are air bases in Europe, including Spain and England, as well as in North Africa, essential to any successful striking of the Russian bases?

General VANDENBERG. No, Senator, they are not essential; they are certainly desirable.

The United States Air Force is getting itself into a position, as rapidly as possible, into a position so that it can be free from the requirement to have overseas bases.

However, it is not an effiicent way to fight a war, if we are forced to fight one.

Obviously, the closer you can get to the enemy, the less gasoline you have to carry, and the more bombs you can carry. Obviously, if you have to refuel two or three times in the air, you get two or three missions per month out of your airplane, instead of 15 or 20. Therefore, your Air Force, in order to do that efficiently, would have to be five or six times the size it would be if we had bases that were more nearly appropriate.

Additionally, it would take longer to have the full import of the air war upon whoever we fought.

Therefore, the answer to your question is that they are not absolutely essential, but they certainly are highly desirable.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

AIR FORCE STRENGTH, NOVEMBER 1950

Senator GEORGE. General, what was the strength of our Air Force in October, last—October 1950—in Korea?

What was your Air Force, say, in October and November 1950?

General VANDENBERG. I know generally, Senator. I will have to look it up, to be exact.

Senator GEORGE. Well, generally?

General VANDENBERG. At the outbreak of the war?

I presume they will——

Senator GEORGE. They will be classified.

[Deleted.]

CHINESE ENTRANCE IN KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator GEORGE. Do you recall, General, when you first knew that the Chinese Reds were coming over en masse out of Manchuria?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, that is difficult to answer because there were indications that gradually mounted until General MacArthur's message when he said that the Chinese Reds had now entered the conflict in great number, and that was an attack at that time.

I felt along with Admiral Sherman that in October, about the 20th to the 21st of October, we had both noted the movement of Chinese reported north. At the Joint Chiefs' meeting on Friday, I recall the date approximately the 30th of October, I asked Admiral Sherman if he could make available some aircraft carriers to take more groups to the Far East.

At that time there were some MIG–15's reported as being north of the Yalu, and I wanted to send out some of our F–86's to insure that we would have adequate protection if they came across, and some F–84's, which was our best fighter bomber, to assist our Army in case the Chinese attacked. Does that answer your question, sir?

CHINESE AIR STRENGTH, NOVEMBER 1950

Senator GEORGE. Yes, I think so, General; in a general way, at least.

What was your estimate of the Chinese Air Force in October and November?

General VANDENBERG. Well——

Senator GEORGE. I mean by that, of course, what did they have available? It would be very difficult to say where they were getting it all from, I assume.

General VANDENBERG. The Chinese at that time we knew had some obsolescent American aircraft which they had captured, I presume, from the Chinese Nationalists; they had obsolescent or World War II Russian aircraft, called the Yak; and I believe there was a report that they had a few World War II Japanese aircraft, but not to any extent.

Senator GEORGE. And what was your estimate of their general striking power in November or in October?

General VANDENBERG. Our estimate of the Chinese Communist striking power, considering only the use of Chinese Communist crews, was very low.

[Deleted.]

Senator GEORGE. Well, in your opinion, could the possible threat from the Chinese air forces themselves have lasted long?

General VANDENBERG. Could not, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That is what I was getting at. That remains true unless they are drawing air power from other sources?

General VANDENBERG. That is right, sir.

VALUE OF HOT PURSUIT

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Now, General, if you had been called upon, and had been directed to have interfered with the movement of Chines troops across the Yalu, out in Manchuria down into Korea in late October and early November, could you have effectively accomplished that mission without going back to the source, but hitting their supply lines and their movement of troops?

General VANDENBERG. With the forces that we had over there only?

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. In my opinion, it would have assisted somewhat our Armed Forces, but would not have been in any way decisive.

Senator GEORGE. You could have interrupted——

General VANDENBERG. Somewhat.

Senator GEORGE (continuing). Disrupted somewhat, at least?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. We never went across the Yalu, though; you were not permitted to go across; you were not directed to go across the Yalu.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. Not even in hot pursuit.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. The hot pursuit, after all, was not such a significant course, was it? You did not have much opportunity to pursue planes across——

General VANDENBERG. Hot pursuit, in my opinion, would have been of morale value to our Air Force.

Senator GEORGE. Morale value; but its actual decisiveness would not have been substantial or material at that point?

General VANDENBERG. Would not have been decisive, in my opinion.

Senator GEORGE. Decisive.

[Deleted.]

General VANDENBERG. I would answer that, Senator, that it depended upon a whole lot of varying components to the situation. Whenever you decide to utilize your air force in an all-out effort, all of the air force, and you recognize that what is left from that can't be replaced to any material point before the spring of 1953, I maintain that you have to utilize that air force, which is in my opinion the sole deterrent to war with the Russians today, that you have to utilize that air force very carefully.

Before I would agree, I would want to look at it very carefully and weigh all of the pros and cons before I could agree that it should be utilized.

Senator GEORGE. You have been restrained by that conviction——

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Throughout——

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

BOMBING POWER RESERVOIRS

Senator GEORGE. This Korean fighting. I take that from what you have previously said.

Were you ever called upon to bomb the reservoirs, the power reservoirs, in North Korea?

General VANDENBERG. Called upon? No, sir; not that I recall.

Senator GEORGE. Was it discussed?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; we discussed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as I recall, almost all the targets that were capable of being hit by air power.

Senator GEORGE. The decision was against the bombing of the reservoirs?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Just what controlled that decision, General, if you are able to answer it?

General VANDENBERG. Well, from a purely Air Force point of view, I can't see that bombing the reservoirs in North Korea is going to affect the tide of battle, particularly, one way or the other.

Senator GEORGE. Were the Red Chinese getting any power from these installations?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; both in Manchuria and Russia.

Senator GEORGE. That is what I meant, in Manchuria.

General VANDENBERG. In my opinion, you could affect somewhat, if you destroyed the entire power potential of Manchuria, you could affect through the lack of their ability to mine their coal to run their railroads, you could affect the Manchurian area.

In my opinion, however, dependent upon how determined Russia is to keep the Chinese supplied, it could be done regardless of what you have done to the power dams.

Senator GEORGE. It would have interfered, interrupted, but would not have been decisive. Is that right?

General VANDENBERG. That is right, sir. If you want to do a job in Manchuria, then you have to utilize the full strength of your United States Air Force, and then you have to go in there and really do a job.

Now whether or not that would be decisive depends upon many factors. I think that it would certainly give us an opportunity, a chance at least to have the Chinese Communists sue for peace.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. At this point in the record I wish to call attention to the fact that through error on the part of the staff, the Senators listed as present during the afternoon session on May 26, last Saturday, is incomplete.

The names of Senator Bridges and Senator Saltonstall do not appear on page 3533 of the record which lists the Senators present. I regret this error happened and I hope the corrected list adding these two names is complete.

Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBLE MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, this inquiry as I get it is specifically concerned perhaps with three general points. First, the dismissal of General MacArthur, second our plans in the Far East and our policies out there, and third perhaps the general policies with relation to our security as a whole.

Now, we have listened to General Bradley and General Collins and General Marshall describe the part that the Joint Chiefs of Staff played with relation to the dismissal of General MacArthur on either April 8 or April 9. Have you read their testimony?

General Vandenberg. I have read portions of it; but I haven't completely read it.

Senator Saltonstall. Well, do you agree with General Collins that as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff you heard nothing about the removal of General MacArthur until April 8?

General Vandenberg. I would rather put it in my own words, Senator, and tell you the events leading up to it as I recall.

Senator Saltonstall. I would appreciate it if you would do that.

General Vandenberg. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in writing directives for General MacArthur over a period of time, and then the answer that we would get back from the directive had discussed over a period of time some of the difficulties in the way we were operating.

On Thursday, the 5th, as I recall it, at the end of a meeting that we had—and this is a recollection—General Bradley asked to see the Chiefs, and we let the operations deputies go. It might be that he called us to his office, I don't recall, and asked us to think over the military implications should we be asked on the relief of General MacArthur.

Senator Saltonstall. May I interrupt to say, was that the first time the matter was brought up to you?

General Vandenberg. That was the first time I had ever heard it.

Senator Saltonstall. Excuse me for interrupting again, but in other words it was never discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff among themselves prior to that time?

General Vandenberg. I don't believe his actual relief was ever discussed prior to that time. It is my recollection that some of the difficulties in having a commander who did not see eye to eye with the policy had been discussed in the course of formulating some of the directives.

That is only a recollection. I believe that that is correct. But the point that he was to be relieved, actually, had not been brought up, as far as I know, before the 5th. And that was only to think about it in its military implications.

Senator George. That is the 5th of April, General? Pardon me, Senator.

Senator Saltonstall. Yes. That was the 5th of April?

General Vandenberg. Yes.

Senator Saltonstall. Do you care to go on from there or does that answer my question?

General Vandenberg. The next I heard about it was a meeting that we had Sunday—correct that. At the Friday Joint Chiefs' meeting we had a discussion as to when the best time would be to get the military implications of this discussed among the Chiefs. As I recall, we decided that 2 o'clock Sunday would give us the most time to think it over and be the most convenient time to meet. And somewhere along in there we were told that the Secretary of Defense wanted our military views about 4 o'clock on Sunday. So we planned to meet 2 hours ahead. In the meantime, we, with the exception of General Collins who, I believe, was out of town, had had from Thursday afternoon to think the matter over.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Sunday, the 8th, you met. Did you meet with General Marshall at 4 o'clock?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You gave him your views at that time?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. As I recall, it was slightly before 4.

JCS VIEWS REGARDING MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator SALTONSTALL. Could you repeat in your own words the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that were given to General Marshall?

General VANDENBERG. I can give you the consensus.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Would you please give the consensus of the JCS as you were there that day, in which, I assume, you concurred?

General VANDENBERG. The consensus was that it was difficult from a military point of view to have a commander who had publicly indicated that the policy of the Government was not the policy that he thought was correct.

At that time a number of his public statements, and his armistice offer to the leader of the Chinese Communists was discussed, and the implications of that, from a military point of view, were discussed, and the consensus was, in answer to a question as to whether or not from a military point of view he should be relieved, that we concurred.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Did he in any way, so far as you know, not carry out any of the military directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so far as operations were concerned?

General VANDENBERG. I would like to put it this way, Senator, if I may, that that is a question that we can get into many legalities of intent and a whole ramification that had nothing to do with my recommendation or my concurrence.

I would like to put it on the ground that he didn't see eye to eye; it was difficult. You had broad policies that you had to give to a commander, and in those broad policies, he had to have considerable latitude; in the use of that latitude, if he felt strongly in opposition to the policy that the Chiefs had felt necessary, there was a danger.

JCS PROCEDURE LEADING TO MAC ARTHUR'S RECALL

Senator SALTONSTALL. You didn't personally request his removal?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And did the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a vote amongst themselves, or was it just a general concurrence?

General VANDENBERG. There was no formal vote, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And no disapproval among them?

General VANDENBERG. No disapproval.

Senator SALTONSTALL. After the 8th, did you hear of this matter again?

General VANDENBERG. Not directly. I was awakened one morning at 5:30—the last I heard was, after we gave our views and left the office of the Secretary of Defense—to my mind, I do not recall even discussing it with anyone until the morning of the afternoon that General Van Fleet left for Korea.

At 5:30 that morning, as nearly as I can recall it, General Collins called me and asked me if an airplane could be made available that night, and requested a Constellation, in order for General Van Fleet to get to Japan as rapidly as possible; and at that time I asked, as I recall it, "Has a change been decided on?", and the answer was "Yes."

DISCUSSING MANCHURIAN BOMBING WITH MAC ARTHUR

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, may I ask you one other question, as my time is running out.

General, one of the points of difference in policy was General MacArthur's desire to bomb Manchuria. You have discussed that with other Senators.

When you talked with MacArthur those two times you were out there with him, did you discuss the question of bombing Manchuria?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; we did, because, as I recall, General Collins took out the January 12 study and discussed it with General MacArthur, so I know we must have.

Senator SALTONSTALL. If you can remember, did you discuss with him, at that time, your thoughts on the use of the Air Force? Did you discuss the fact that it would take all our Air Force to do a proper job, and your lack of desire to use it for that purpose?

[Deleted.]

Senator SALTONSTALL. So he did understand, did he not, or at least you did make an effort, did you not, to have him understand your point of view with relation to the use of the Air Force in bombing Manchuria, in those conversations?

General VANDENBERG. I couldn't say, Senator, whether or not he understood my point of view.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief announcement? I have to move the admission of a lawyer friend at the Supreme Court, and I will leave at this time, but I expect to be back in plenty of time to examine General Vandenberg.

If the event should arise that in my absence all questions of him have been finished, I would like to reserve the right to have him recalled, so that I may question him.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't think there is any possibility of finishing with General Vandenberg this morning, and while I am making that statement I should apprise the members of the committee of the fact that we will not have a meeting of this committee this afternoon, due to the fact that five members of the Armed Services Committee must be in conference with the House of Representatives on the very important military manpower bill, which is the real base of our defense system.

Senator GEORGE. Three members of the Finance Committee should also finish up a conference on a very important bill in the House.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am glad to know someone else will help us bear the responsibility of not having a meeting this afternoon. Senator Smith?

AIR FORCE DETERRENT VALUE

Senator SMITH. General, it seems to me you have given us something this morning that certainly, to me at least, is a new thought, namely, that your objection to using the Air Force to bomb Manchurian bases was not the same objection as heard before. Your objection is not the fear of bringing in Russia, so much as the fear it might impair our over-all global air strength and might put us in a position of jeopardy in case there were outbreaks somewhere else in the world or in case we had to protect ourselves here.

Is that the conclusion I can draw from your statement this morning?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; if I may make one correction in what I was attempting to say.

In connection with your statement that it should be saved for outbreaks in some other section of the world, I would like to go back to my pecking at the periphery and say in my opinion the shoestring United States Air Force that we are operating today, in view of our global commitments, must not be utilized until it is larger for anything except holding it intact as nearly as possible against a major threat, against a major power, because in my opinion again it is the sole deterrent to war up to this time; and if we emasculate it, that sole deterrent will be gone.

SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF HEARINGS

Senator SMITH. That is very interesting, and I assume that ought to be off the record, because it seems to me that we do not want to tell our Russian friends, unless they know already, that we are unprepared for the big event if it comes.

General VANDENBERG. Well, sir, I feel a little differently about that. I have heard a great deal in reading the testimony about the fact that we are telling the Russians everything, and there is a great danger of exposing our weakness. On the other hand, here is something that is definite and we do possess it, and our determination to hold it, I think, is going to increase the feeling that there is that determination. I don't feel strongly about that. I think that perhaps it can well go in.

Senator SMITH. I am glad to hear you say that because there has been some suggestion here that too much information is getting out.

General VANDENBERG. I believe that is correct, sir, but about this one thing—here is a positive factor in my mind that we can afford to talk about.

CLARIFYING "A SHOESTRING AIR FORCE"

Senator SMITH. I was interested in your expression "a shoestring air force" and the little illustration you gave of what you had in mind. You said an analogy was trying to run a $20,000,000 business with $20,000. That would be one-tenth of 1 percent, unless my mathematics are wrong. You do not mean to imply that our Air Force is only one-tenth of 1 percent that of the strength we need for our global protection?

General VANDENBERG. Those figures had nothing to do with the actual size of the Air Force except insofar as in my opinion it is greatly understrength in view of our global commitments.

Senator SMITH. What you meant was——

General VANDENBERG. Understrength.

Senator SMITH. A dramatic presentation of what the understrength was, and we ought to be giving serious thought to that weakness we appear to be in at the present time?

General VANDENBERG. It was an attempt to explain the word "shoestring."

Senator SMITH. I thank you. I thought I would make that clear because the record shows $20,000,000 for 20,000, and the conclusion might be drawn by some writers you said our force was only one-tenth of 1 percent. I did not think you meant quite as bad as that.

General VANDENBERG. I did not. Thank you, Senator.

VANDENBERG'S POSITION ON BOMBING MANCHURIA

Senator SMITH. Now, you used the expression "today and tomorrow." You said today we might be all right and tomorrow we might be all right. I think I understand what you meant by that. But when you said today you agreed with the proposition of not bombing beyond the Yalu, and tomorrow or a month hence, or 6 months hence you might be for it, what conditions did you visualize within that area of time that we might be justified in bombing beyond the Yalu?

General VANDENBERG. There are none that I can foresee at this time that I would advocate that. There are no conditions that I can foresee at this time.

On the other hand, I want to make it plain to the committee that there are possibilities that would make me change my mind, but at the present time in view of the world situation, in view of the strength of our strategic air force, in view of the difficulties we have in Korea, in view of the world global situation, I do not recommend it.

I do not say, however, or do not want it understood that my mind is completely fixed and could not be shifted in case there is a change in the world situation. What that change could be I can't visualize at this time, but I do visualize that there is a possibility that it would change.

That was all I meant, sir.

[Deleted.]

PRESENTING JCS STUDY TO MAC ARTHUR

Senator SMITH. Now as I recall it, you went out to see General MacArthur in Japan, and you took with you the so-called study of the Joint Chiefs which has been the subject of some discussion here because it was pointed out that the studies of the Joint Chiefs and certain recommendations, especially the four particular recommendations, were in line with the position that General MacArthur took in his speech before the joint session of the Congress. As I recall, you took that study out with you and discussed those points with General MacArthur.

I haven't been quite clear from the testimony heretofore just what you did discuss with him with regard to the four points of the Joint Chiefs which have been brought before the committee. If you are not familiar with the points, I can read them.

General VANDENBERG. I am familiar with the points, Senator.

In the first place, it was General Collins who took the study out to discuss with General MacArthur, because he is the executive agent. I was present during the conference.

Senator SMITH. That is what I meant. I understood you were present.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. As I recall, it was presented to General MacArthur as a study. It was based upon the situation as reported in his last cable to us; that it was based upon considerations should the situation over there be as desperate as it appeared to us before we got out there; that at the time we got out there, there had been a change while we were flying out; and that, therefore, the question as to whether all of those should be implemented was discussed.

Since it was only a study and since it had no approval, I don't think there was any determination made; it was simply a discussion.

Senator SMITH. I am reading at the moment from the compilation of documents, Joint Chiefs of Staff report to Senate Committee on Korean operations, on page 88, paragraph 7; the heading is "Visit to the Far East by Generals Vandenberg and Collins." The paragraph reads as follows:

> Generals Vandenberg and Collins held conferences in Tokyo with General MacArthur and his principal staff officers during the period January 15 to 18, 1951. General Collins read a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on a course of action relative to Communist China and Korea, dated January 12, 1951. General MacArthur indicated his concurrence with the proposals contained thereon.

Then, it goes on to say:

> General Collins then stated he would report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his conclusions that from a strictly military viewpoint it appeared feasible unless Russia actively intervened to continue operations in Korea for so long as it was to our over-all national interest to do so without seriously endangering the Eighth Army.

Now, that seems to be in reply to the query as to whether we should evacuate. As I recall it, in General MacArthur's memorandum or inquiry to the Joint Chiefs which I think was the 10th or 11th of January or a little bit earlier, the question had been raised of evacuation. That is why this question came up in your discussions there, in which you decided that you would not need to evacuate. It has been provided since that time, that because you did not need to evacuate, it would not be necessary to apply these four principles that were discussed.

If that is true, I do not think it was the impression General MacArthur had at the time because he gave us the impression, or at least he gave me the impression, that he thought he was in accord with your study, and with the advisability of exploring these different avenues of action.

General VANDENBERG. I think I concur with General MacArthur's view that these actions should be explored, because while the situation at that time was getting better, still in a staff action unless we have on tap all the possible courses of action, both of the enemy and ours, I feel that the military has fallen down on the job.

It was, however, from the point of view purely of examining all the course of action open to us that the study was prepared, and the thought of its possible implementation was due to a large extent to the message from General MacArthur that indicated that there was some question as to his ability to stay in Korea.

I think that you will notice the context here, right after that sentence where he indicated his concurrence with the proposals of the study, it then immediately goes on to say that General Collins would report that we could continue operations in Korea for as long as it was to our over-all national interest.

As I recall the context, it was that because of that there was not the same pressure on the January 12 study as there had been prior to the time we had arrived there.

MAC ARTHUR'S REPRESENTATION OF JCS'S VIEWS

Senator SMITH. What interests me is this question. General MacArthur has been criticized for the statement he made in his address to the Congress that what he was recommending, which is almost verbatim with your four points there, was virtually in line with the decisions of the Joint Chiefs, and he was accused of having misrepresented his being in accord with the Joint Chiefs.

It seems to me, from reading the two different documents, which are summed up together here by Mr. David Lawrence, that the Joint Chiefs' four points of January 12 were almost verbatim, word for word, with the statement that General MacArthur made in his statement to the joint Houses of Congress.

General VANDENBERG. I think the only difference, Senator, lies in the fact that the Joint Chiefs prepared these as a study of possible contingencies, and General MacArthur wanted them implemented without delay.

Senator SMITH. He wanted them implemented, as I understood it, when it was decided you would not evacuate, and that you would stay there. He felt, as I understood it, that we were going to stay there, and it would be necessary for us to take some of these steps to strengthen his position and draw off the pressure of the increasing hordes of Chinese Communists that might come over the border.

General VANDENBERG. The question between General MacArthur and the Chiefs of Staff, as I feel it, has to do with the timing. The timing of the Joint Chiefs was a study of something in the future. General MacArthur could see a desire to put these into effect in the very near future.

Senator SMITH. Well, I refer to your four statements in paragraph 2, as I have them,

> 2. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place into effect as soon as our position in Korea stabilizes or when we have evacuated Korea,

and so forth. In other words, from these alternatives, and I understood from General MacArthur's testimony that the stabilization was synonymous with staying there in Korea, as opposed to the other course of evacuation, he could draw the conclusion that with the stabilization these proposed measures became effective so far as the agreement, and the meeting of the minds was concerned, of the Joint Chiefs themselves.

All I am trying to get at, General, is whether or not you feel that General MacArthur has misrepresented his statement that he felt, at least he was in accord with the thinking of the Joint Chiefs.

General VANDENBERG. I think General MacArthur is too fine a man to have any such indication. I do believe that he must have misunderstood.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up—go ahead, General.

General VANDENBERG. All I wanted to make plain, Senator, was that from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it was clear to us, and we had hoped that it was clear to General MacArthur, that this was a study, a study that took into consideration a lot of possible contingencies depending upon a situation that has not yet occurred.

On the other hand, General MacArthur, I believe, took the view that these, especially four of them, should be put into effect in the near future. I believe that that is the difference.

Senator SMITH. Has my time expired?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, your time has expired.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson.

AIR FORCE STRENGTH

Senator JOHNSON. General Vandenberg, what was the strength of our Air Forces at the peak of World War II?

General VANDENBERG. I can get that figure for you, Senator. My impression is that it was around 2,000,000, 2,500,000.

Senator JOHNSON. How many groups?

General VANDENBERG. It was close to 200, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. What is the strength today?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, would you qualify that? You know we are in a period of expansion right now. We have groups with five or six people in them, we have groups that are combat ready, we have groups that are half combat ready. Which figure do you wish?

Senator JOHNSON. What is your goal?

General VANDENBERG. Our goal today is 95 groups.

Senator JOHNSON. What was your strength when you became Chief of Staff?

General VANDENBERG. As I recall, it was in the neighborhood of 53 or 54. Theoretically it was around 55 groups, but we weren't quite at that strength. I will have to check that if I may.

[Deleted.]

AIR POWER NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT MAC ARTHUR PLAN

Senator JOHNSON. General, these hearings have been taking a lot of time. Senators and many important military men have spent hours here. I believe the time spent has been justified, certainly from two standpoints.

I think we have made abundantly clear from the record that is being made that this Nation is not an aggressor nation. I think as the head of our Department of Defense and the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have testified, they have made clear to the public opinion of the world that we are not aggressors.

I think it is good that we have made that clear, but I am hopeful that this morning will produce something else, too. I hope that it will make clear to the people of this country that we are not prepared for any eventuality. In my opinion, we are not going far enough fast enough.

Now, I hope that you will be prepared before you finish your questioning to put in the record of this committee the recommendations that have been made by every Chief of Staff since World War II—that includes the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Air Force—on the minimum number of air groups or the minimum amount of air power that those men felt would be necessary to protect this country in peacetime.

I should also like to have from you your estimate as to whether you think that the Air Force, the Budget, the Executive Department, the Congress are proceeding as fast as we should to increase our air strength in the light of the world conditions that we face.

Now, General Vandenberg, when General MacArthur testified before this committee and eloquently advocated his program in the Far East, he was questioned about the requirements, the forces that would be necessary to put that program into effect.

I want to ask your opinion, as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on this question: How much additional air power would be required to carry out General MacArthur's recommendations, so far as air is concerned, in the Far East?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, that is a difficult question, to tie it to the Far East; because I have attempted to explain the potential of the United States Air Force—to do a job is one thing, today; tomorrow, that job is another thing.

Senator JOHNSON. Assuming you undertook today the recommendations that General MacArthur has made to this committee, what increased forces would you need to do that?

General VANDENBERG. If I had them in being at this minute?

Senator JOHNSON. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. I would say, roughly, double the strategic air power that the United States Air Force has today.

Senator JOHNSON. That air power, of course, is not available now?

General VANDENBERG. It is not.

AIR REARMAMENT PROGRAM

Senator JOHNSON. General, do we have the air power to give American cities a reasonable defense against atomic attack, in event of a war with the Soviet Union today?

General VANDENBERG. Today, yes, sir; but not tomorrow.

Senator JOHNSON. Do we have a sufficient air power available to carry out our commitments to Europe?

General VANDENBERG. Today—no, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you think we will have, under the program that has been projected.

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator Johnson, the program, as projected, is a build-up program, provided that all of the countries that are going to contribute tactical air power, including the United States, all lift their sights from 50 percent to perhaps 33⅓ percent—that we will meet the tactical air power part of it.

The strategic effort is O. K. today. Later it will not, nor cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be made adequate until sometime later in the future regardless of how much money we might have put into it in fiscal year 1951.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you satisfied with the rate of progress of our air-rearmament program?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you think we have set our sights high enough in the light of current international tension?

General VANDENBERG. To answer that, Senator Johnson, I must say that the Air Force sights consider that the 95-group program is simply a stepping stone toward the force that we believe is necessary. We are proceeding to the 95-group program as rapidly as is possible under, as someone has put it, the present 30 percent guns, 70 percent butter.

AIR FORCE NEEDED FOR PRESENT COMMITMENTS

Senator JOHNSON. General, how many air groups do you think the Air Force would need to carry out its present commitments, including the defense of our far eastern bases, the defense of Western Europe, as well as the defense of the United States, and the strategic air offensive?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, what we are talking about is something that will take, regardless of how much money you put into it, 2½ to 3 years to accomplish—regardless of how much money you put into it today.

Therefore that comes up in the goal that we are going to attempt to achieve in the '52 budget and the '53 budget, and in the '52 supplemental. Since that is a job that ought to be done, let me say, neatly, I would like to ask your indulgence to have it properly prepared through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Establishment and the Bureau of the Budget so that this will not be used apparently by me as a sounding board for an appeal for more air power than I have even discussed yet within the Defense Establishment.

Senator JOHNSON. Of this, though, you are sure—that the 95-group figure is entirely inadequate in the light of our commitments and our responsibilities?

General VANDENBERG. The 95-group program is the interim program only.

[Deleted.]

VANDENBERG DECISIONS IN LIGHT OF HEARINGS

Senator JOHNSON. General, is it correct to say that you believe that if we attack installations across the Yalu in Manchuria that we would risk the security of our own bases in the Far East with our present air strength?

General VANDENBERG. I would like to put it this way, Senator Johnson, if I might: As I stated before, the use of the United States Air Force, if used as a whole, can lay waste to Manchuria and principal cities of China, but that the attrition that would inevitably be brought upon us would leave us, in my opinion, as a Nation, naked for several years to come, and therefore I did not advocate it.

Senator JOHNSON. And you think it would be very unwise to advocate that?

General VANDENBERG. I do, sir.

Senator Johnson. General Vandenberg, there are two principal questions that have concerned this committee, and I want to get your present views on those questions.

One of them is the relief of General MacArthur, and the other is the substitution of the program that he recommends for the program now in operation.

You concurred in the move made to relieve General MacArthur. Do you think, in the light of what has transpired since then, that you have any reason to change your recommendation today?

General Vandenberg. I do not.

Senator Johnson. Do you think, in the light of the evidence adduced and what has transpired since his return to this country, that there is any reason for embracing his program and abandoning the one we are now carrying on in Korea?

General Vandenberg. No, sir.

ESTIMATING SOVIET AIR POWER

Senator Johnson. Could you give us the best estimate you have on the first-line planes that the Soviets have at this time?

General Vandenberg. By that I understand, Senator Johnson, you mean combat-worthy aircraft?

Senator Johnson. That is right. I would like to know how many you think they have for their own defense and the tactical aircraft which would support the Red Army in its military operations. How many combat-worthy planes do you have to use for those purposes as of today, according to your best estimates?

[Deleted.]

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator Johnson. Senator Green?

ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN KOREA

Senator Green. General, I would like to ask a few questions, if I may, supplementing those that Senator George asked you. What, in your estimation, is the maximum air strength of the enemy today in the neighborhood of Korea?

General Vandenberg. Are you asking of the Chinese Communist forces, Senator?

Senator Green. Yes, or North Korean forces, anything that is included among the enemy forces that are fighting us.

[Deleted.]

Senator Green. Well, now are all those aircraft either American or Russian make?

General Vandenberg. Well, they are mainly Russian makes. The transport type, C–46 and C–47 are mainly those of American types. Most all of the combat aircraft are Russian.

Senator Green. Now, those American types I assume were surrendered by the Nationalist forces or captured from the Nationalist forces.

General Vandenberg. I presume so, sir. They got them some way.

Senator Green. What percentage of the planes that we furnished Nationalist China are represented by those now in the enemy forces in Korea?

General VANDENBERG. I would have to get that for you, Senator, and I think, if I get what you are after in the answer, it would have to be supposition, because we would have to presume, unless I have information to the contrary, that they got a certain number from the Nationalist Government, probably by overrunning some airdromes. It is possible that they got some other types through purchase, through various devious channels.

Senator GREEN. Assuming they got them from the Nationalist Government, and the Nationalist Government got them from our Government, I was wondering how many had been destroyed in action and how many had been either surrendered or captured—roughly.

General VANDENBERG. I can get you a rough figure of the number that are presently in the Nationalist hands of American aircraft and the number that was made available to the Chinese Nationalists, showing you what is left.

However, I would like to point out——

Senator GREEN. There was another category, namely, those that might have been destroyed in action.

General VANDENBERG. It would be very difficult to figure out whether they were crashed because of pilot error, whether they were destroyed by gunfire in the taking of an airdrome. It would be almost impossible, I would think, to get that figure.

Senator GREEN. Well, my point is: Were there large quantities of them surrendered without being destroyed when they might have been destroyed?

CHINESE NATIONALIST AIR STRENGTH

General VANDENBERG. I don't think there are large quantities. There are no indications that there were large quantities.

Senator GREEN. How many do the Nationalist forces have on Formosa? I presume all they have are on Formosa.

General VANDENBERG. Yes.

Senator GREEN. How many are there?

General VANDENBERG. The Chinese Nationalists—I presume this, too, will be restricted data.

Senator GREEN. What?

General VANDENBERG. I assume this will be restricted data, because any nation's capacity to fight, that we gave out here, I would think would be unethical.

[Deleted.]

SUPPLEMENTS NEEDED FOR MAC ARTHUR PLAN

Senator GREEN. In case of the projected attack on China and the mainland by the Nationalist forces, aided by us according to General MacArthur's plan, would we have to supplement than considerably?

General VANDENBERG. We would have to considerably supplement it, both in the air, and with sea power and with, in my opinion, logistic supplies, spare parts, ammunition and so forth.

Senator GREEN. But no ground forces were included in his plan, as I remember?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. Then, is it——

General Vandenberg. The logistic supplies I speak of would be engines, spare parts, gasoline and oil, ammunition, and so forth.

Senator Green. Well, as I understood you to say, earlier this morning, it would take the whole of our Air Force to carry out that plan successfully.

General Vandenberg. I don't believe, Senator, that I said "to carry it out successfully."

I still reserve the fact, in my own mind, that since the majority of this equipment could be supplied by Russia, which is very close to the Manchurian border, where the fighting is taking place, that even though we devastated completely Manchuria, which is our capacity to do, in my opinion, and knocked out the principal Chinese cities in which they were manufacturing some articles of war, that should the Russians so desire, there is a possibility that they could keep the fighting going over there by supplying all the essentials that were required.

Senator Green. Then, your answer is even stronger than suggested by my question?

General Vandenberg. I believe so.

Senator Green. It would take the whole of our Air Force to be successful, but even with the whole of our Air Force, it might be unsuccessful, is that right?

General Vandenberg. Yes, Senator; but I want to be very careful to get the point I am trying to make across:

That it is the position of another power, of a very strong power, that is in juxtaposition to Manchuria, which we left untouched in the consideration that you have mentioned, where the supplies flow from, and that therefore it is not because the United States Air Force couldn't devastate and lay waste to the industrial potention of the countries we are talking about, but that industrial potential is in another country bordering this country, and from which the main source of supply comes, anyway.

Senator Green. Yes. Well, that was brought out in previous testimony, by the others, and that it meant war, and that under the treaty which China has with Russia, that means Russia in the war, and that would mean a third world war.

That is the deduction that was drawn in other testimony; and do you agree with that?

General Vandenberg. Well, that is a pretty broad statement. I would have to examine it pretty carefully, Senator, to give my unqualified agreement to everything that you have said.

Senator Green. Would you go so far as to say there was danger of that?

General Vandenberg. I think there is always danger when nations are fighting on the border of another country, and one country is supplying the equipment.

Senator Green. Isn't there somewhere between this last statement and the other one that you chose to answer?

General Vandenberg. I would try, Senator, if you would query me on one point that you want to make.

Senator Green. Well, it is this:

Assuming the MacArthur plan was carried out, and that we established a naval blockade of the China coast, and that——

General Vandenberg. May I interrupt, Senator?

Senator Green. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. Are you talking of the United Nations blockade, or us?

Senator GREEN. Alone—General MacArthur emphasized doing it alone.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

INCREASING DANGER OF WAR

Senator GREEN. And that we limited our actions to bombing the coastal cities and stations, and furnished what you have already stated, and no ground troops—that would be, as it was stated by General Bradley and others, war. You can't establish a naval blockade, and bomb the coastal cities and stations and things like that, and according to the treaty, assuming that Russia lived up to the treaty between herself and China, the mutual defense treaty, that would mean war against both?

General VANDENBERG. I would have to answer that, Senator, that that would depend entirely upon the decision of the people in Russia—that in my opinion it would not necessarily mean war because it depends on whether or not they feel that the greatest advantage would be gained from having war at that time.

Senator GREEN. Surely.

General VANDENBERG. On the other hand, I must also agree that it would increase the danger.

Senator GREEN. And even if you argue that Russia would not feel obliged morally to live up to its treaty of mutual defense with China, yet would not the fact that her prestige in the whole of Asia be lost if she went back on such a definite treaty be a moving force in determining her to wage war, to some extent, at least?

General VANDENBERG. Well, again, all I can say, Senator, is that is a possibility.

Senator GREEN. Yes. Well, to get back to the question, there would be at least a chance of having to call upon us to use our whole Air Force there, and even then it would not assure us success, if I understood you, is that correct?

General VANDENBERG. That is correct; with the additional explanation I made in the previous part of my testimony.

Senator GREEN. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. Yes.

Senator GREEN. That brings home to us the wisdom of choosing the Government's plan, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and rejecting the MacArthur plan, that is the point I wanted to bring out. Thank you; that is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

VANDENBERG'S CONCURRENCE REGARDING MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator MORSE. General, I am correct, am I not, in my understanding that you concurred with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the wisdom of removing General MacArthur from command?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you agree with me, General, that under our democratic system, under our program of military organization, it is necessary, from the standpoint of military efficiency and proper military discipline, for the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to have under him military leaders in whom he has complete confidence for carrying out the military and foreign policy of the United States?

General VANDENBERG. I think it is advisable; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it your opinion that when one of those military comanders on an echelon lower than that of the President of the United States and other higher military officials that have the direct responsibility of administering our military policy, cannot agree with our national policy, they most certainly have the right to carry the issue to the American people as citizens; but they are under an obligation in such circumstances to first resign their position before they speak contrary to national policy?

General VANDENBERG. In my opinion, that is a proper way to do it.

Senator MORSE. In regard to the instant case that is before us, namely, the removal of General MacArthur, it is not true that for many months prior to the removal, every courtesy, every possible cooperation was extended at all times to General MacArthur on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in trying to work out a teamwork relation with the commander in the Far East?

General VANDENBERG. There was.

Senator MORSE. You know of no personal differences in those months that developed between the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur?

General VANDENBERG. None.

Senator MORSE. Your conversations and consultations with him when you were in the Far East were most amiable as far as personal relationships are concerned?

General VANDENBERG. Mine were; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. You have never had any personal feeling and do not now have any personal feeling against General MacArthur, do you?

General VANDENBERG. I have a great admiration for him, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that when you came to the point of making up your mind as to whether or not the developments between MacArthur's command in the Far East and the Government here had reached such a point that he should be removed, that you reached that conclusion most reluctantly and regretfully?

General VANDENBERG. I did.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that in reaching that decision, however, you felt that in keeping faith with your military obligations to your Government, that you had to reach your decision completely impersonally?

General VANDENBERG. I did.

Senator MORSE. And on the basis of an impersonal evaluation of the situation, is it true that you had come to the conclusion that developments had become such that from the standpoint of the world it appeared that we had two voices speaking on Asiatic policy, MacArthur as one and the President of the United States as the other?

General VANDENBERG. I did.

Senator MORSE. And in view of that conclusion, you decided that in the interests of adequately protecting a basic American principle under our Constitution of civilian control of the military, that General MacArthur should be removed?

General Vandenberg. Yes, Senator, but I want to make sure that you understand my position in this.

Senator Morse. I want you to take whatever time you want to answer my question.

General Vandenberg. There were many considerations other than purely military that affected this. Many of the questions that you have directed to me, and which I have answered generally in the affirmative, have to do, or could be interpreted to have to do, with other than purely military considerations. That was why in my opinion the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred rather than initiated or made a recommendation.

With that explanation, I stand by my answer.

Senator Morse. I am very glad to have the explanation, because I think it is not only a proper one but an exceedingly fair one.

[Deleted.]

A MATTER OF TIMING

Senator Morse. I have asked other witnesses this question, General. I ask it of you particularly because of the very clear statement that you made this morning, that you want the committee to understand your position in opposition to MacArthur's program up to this date was not a fixed and final position. I think your language was to the effect that maybe tomorrow or next week or next month or some time in the future you would change your position, depending upon world developments, which I think is a common-sense position to take, and I would expect you to take it, because of my confidence in the leadership you have given this country of ours.

The question I have asked the others that I ask you is this one: Is it not true that up to date one of the major differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur in respect to the MacArthur program has been the difference over the matter of timing?

General Vandenberg. I think that is correct, Senator, with a little explanation, that the timing that I feel enters into the difference of opinion has to do with the timing that is required either to build the forces that you need on the ground to do part of the job that General MacArthur has advocated in Korea, to build the air forces before I would be willing to risk the result caused by the attrition.

SPEEDING UP AIR CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Senator Morse. That leads me to the next subject of my inquiry. Is it your opinion that we in this country on the home front need to proceed with our military mobilization program, including an all-out aircraft construction program, at a much faster rate than we have done so to date?

General Vandenberg. In answer to that I would like to say that anything that can be done to speed up the build-up of the United States Air Force toward the 95 group level and later on beyond that should be accomplished with as much dispatch as possible.

At this time I would like to put in a plea for rapid action on the Hill when such things as public works comes up, because I think we are all prone to look at the building of an air force as consisting of the increased production from aircraft factories, the fact that we have strips, landing and take-off strips, in the United States, available but in most instances too short, but nothing adequate to receive the men in greater quantities, to train them, and then after they become composite units, to house them with proper recreational facilities.

In other words, in my opinion, we must not bring the people into the United States Air Force or any other branch of the service and cause them for a period of time to live in an atmosphere of such lowered standards that the entire standard of living of the United States is going to be affected by it.

Senator MORSE. General, may I say that for my money I do not think I could have asked you a more important question or received a finer answer than I have just received to the question that I put, because I completely agree, and although I joined with the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Lodge, the other day on the floor in a plea for greater speed in our whole airplane mobilization program, as you say, you have got to have more than just the building of ships.

I think it would be a fair conclusion for me to draw from the statement you have just made that there is a need also for Congress to mobilize itself for defense, so far as its contribution for the defense program is concerned, by hastening action on important pending proposals for strengthening the military defense, such as the manpower bill, public works bill.

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I would not presume to answer that, but I thank you for the implication.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. I think we should work together.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think it is appropriate to state that inasmuch as we have a conference at 2 o'clock, that the committee take a recess at this juncture in order that we may gird our loins and meet the House conferees and make an earnest effort to reach agreement. We will stand in recess until tomorrow morning.

Senator McMAHON. Am I first?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir. Senator Hickenlooper precedes you. I talked with Senator Hickenlooper, and I told him we would recess at 12:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10:03 a. m., Tuesday, May 29, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

TUESDAY, MAY 29, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:03 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Bridges, Byrd, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, and Long.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. All right, gentlemen.

Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, while we are waiting might I raise a procedural matter?

Some time ago I called the attention of the chairman and Senator McMahon, who is not here yet, to the State Department's letter of December 23, 1949. This letter has been made available to the committee and is part of our confidential or secret records, but they submitted it on the basis that it would not be made a part of our public record.

I raised the question at that time that so far as I could see, it in no sense violated the security of our forces now engaged in Korea. It did not violate any crytographic code, and I did not feel that it violated any other security of the Nation.

I have discussed the matter with Senator McMahon, who indicated he would speak to the State Department about it, but I want to serve notice now that I expect to move when we have a full committee and at some proper time as the chairman might determine, that the State Department letter of December 23, 1949, be made a part of the public record.

Chairman Russell. Has a request been made to the State Department to downgrade the classification of it?

Senator Knowland. I believe Senator McMahon was to do that.

Chairman Russell. I think under our procedure that should be done first, before the committee passes on it.

Senator Knowland. Yes.

Chairman Russell. It would save a little time.

Are you prepared now, Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. I lost the book I had marked.

UNDERSTANDING JANUARY 12 MEMO

General Vandenberg, at the outset I would like to attempt to clear up my understanding of this memorandum proposal of the 12th of January which was read to General MacArthur by General Collins in Tokyo when you were present.

Secretary Marshall in his testimony on the 7th of May—I am reading from page 829—reads from that document, and this is reading from the document which was read to General MacArthur:

> "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively agreed upon the following objectives—
>
> These are the action to be taken in connection with those objectives—

And then there is a series of actions according to General Marshall's testimony to be taken in connection with those objectives. Those include the famous four points which we have been discussing. I shan't increase the verbiage by reading them.

Then on the Joint Chiefs of Staff report to this committee, page 88, there is this statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

> General Collins read a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on the "courses of action relative to Communist China and Korea dated January 12, 1951"; General MacArthur indicated his concurrence with the proposals contained therein.

Now so far as I know in this record, the record is silent from then on. There is positive testimony, as I understand it, in the record from General Bradley and from General Collins and others that thereafter at no time was General MacArthur ever told that these tentative proposals and the actions proposed to be taken were ever withdrawn, changed, or altered.

Now the only point I am making is this: The Joint Chiefs of Staff made these tentative proposals for action, some of which were to be taken when the conditions were stabilized in Korea or evacuation was to be undertaken. No notice of change of these proposals for the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated in them was ever given to General MacArthur so far as this record is concerned that I can find, and I believe it has been affirmatively testified that no changes were given to him. Therefore, I assume that General MacArthur was perfectly justified when he said that so far as he knew he was in agreement on these matters with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or they were in agreement with him, because no alteration had ever been listed or ever been sent to him.

Now, do you know of any notification that General MacArthur ever had that these tentative proposals and the actions to be taken in connection with them had ever been withdrawn to General MacArthur?

TESTIMONY OF GEN. HOYT S. VANDENBERG, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. IMMANUEL J. KLETTE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE—Resumed

General VANDENBERG. No, Senator Hickenlooper. I am of the opinion that we explained to General MacArthur when we were discussing that they were tentative and were drawn up based upon conditions as reported in his message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As I recall, it was made clear that they were based upon conditions which at the time General Collins and I arrived there appeared to have dissipated to some extent.

The point was brought up by General MacArthur, in discussing the January 12 study, the directive that had been sent to General MacArthur a day or two previously from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President's letter, which contained political background for the use of General MacArthur—that all of these combined were discussed and the application of one to the other was talked about.

I believe that it was abundantly clear, at that time, that the fact was—at least we attempted to make it known to General MacArthur—that the directive that had been given to him a day or two previous to the time that he read this January 12 document, was the document, in effect—that the 12th was a study based upon conditions as we might find them some day, or which looked as though they might be approaching, from the last message that we had before we left the United States.

Taken altogether with the President's letter of political implications, we went over the three documents in question.

At one time General MacArthur indicated that everything was now clear to him, that the President's message had, as he described it—the President's directive now made it abundantly clear to him his position, that is, General MacArthur's position.

General Collins immediately said:

> No, General MacArthur; that is not a directive, that is for background. The directive is the directive that was given to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I believe the date on that was January 11, and the January 12 study was based upon contingencies that might occur, and that at the time we left, we thought were approaching.

DEFINING "STABILIZATION"

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The contingencies—at least two of them—were either the evacuation of Korea, or the stabilization of our position there.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And General Bradley testifies, in just these words, that the position stabilized shortly after January 12; so, one of the alternatives was met.

General VANDENBERG. I don't want to take issue with General Bradley, but my understanding of stabilization is somewhat different from that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, he used the word, and said the situation became stabilized. It was the exact word used in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, and I assume that he was using it in the same terminology the Joint Chiefs of Staff used it.

General VANDENBERG. If I might interrupt, Senator——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. It is my impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff meant by "stabilization" a line in Korea in which there was relatively little fighting, that both sides had withdrawn somewhat; they had outposts in contact, and that for some period of time there was relative inaction.

That is what I would mean by "stabilization," and it is my opinion that that was probably what was meant by other Chiefs.

APPROVING HOT PURSUIT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Vandenberg, you approved the proposal for hot pursuit of Red Chinese planes across the Yalu, did you not?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it, as I understand it.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And our Government approved it—that is, it became an official proposition which our Government put forward.

General VANDENBERG. I understand so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have had that testimony heretofore. That meant pursuing for an unknown or perhaps speculative distance, pursuing Red planes across the Yalu, and shooting them down, if they could; is that right?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the difference between shooting down Red planes in the air across the Yalu and attacking Red planes on the ground across the Yalu? What is the moral principle? What is the difference in that situation?

If our Government believed and the Chiefs of Staff believed that we should be permitted to pursue those planes across the Yalu and shoot them down there, what is the difference between shooting them down in the air and shooting them on the ground across the Yalu?

General VANDENBERG. There is a difference in my mind, Senator. When a few aircraft are engaged in aerial combat in the element of the air and they are at some altitude, perhaps thirty or forty thousand feet, a line that is drawn on the ground is very difficult to extend.

The theory and the thought, as I understand it, behind the hot pursuit was that they could go over for 6 or 8 miles, while they were engaged in a dogfight to continue the dogfight; that distance in the air at six or seven hundred miles an hour is a matter of seconds.

The difference between that and a determined attack pressed forward on the ground where a great many individuals come under fire is a different proposition, I think, in the reaction of the people that are being attacked.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is a political proposition, is it not, and not a military one? The military situation would demand that you pursue them and shoot them down if you get after them.

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, that gets into the question again of how you utilize your Air Force in Korea and in Manchuria, and how far, from what I understand your suggestion is, how far you will go to destroy the enemy air base, how much beyond that you are going to go; what forces you are going to utilize to accomplish that; how many of them, how deep you are going to go, whether you are after the entire air effort in that area.

That leads you then to those things that lend toward establishing that air base, the oil, the fuel, the ammunition, the bombs, and that comes on to the communications system that supplies it.

It comes then to another proposition that when you attack an airdrome that is heavily defended by antiaircraft artillery, you have to do it efficiently and to save lives—you should have your fighters down on the deck strafing your antiaircraft artillery to silence them while the bombers go in to destroy the field; you have to have top cover to provide protection for your bombers, and you get into a large potential of your force.

When you do that you have to expect to have attrition. Now, by going into the enemy's nest where his airdromes are you can do it either by going in with a real good wallop and do a first-class job with it, or you can go in in a half-hearted manner and do a fairly good job.

When you go in and do a real job, you are going to have to continue that because airdromes can be repaired and other aircraft brought in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you finished?

General VANDENBERG. Just this one thought, sir; that it is a proposition whereby your Air Force then is exposed, especially your bombardment component, to much greater attrition than you would have in your normal operations.

VANDENBERG STATEMENT TO AIR FORCE MAGAZINE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, you are familiar with the magazine Air Force, are you not?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. While I realize that is not published by the Government—is my time up?

Chairman RUSSELL. I want you to finish this question. Your time is up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to point out that in the March 1951 special issue of Air Force in discussing the use of air in Korea, this magazine which is published by a number of eminently experienced men in air power, quotes you as saying:

> Isolating the battlefield from reinforcements is the prime function of tactical air. Air power was rendered practically inoperative when the United Nations in an effort to avoid a diplomatic rupture with the Chinese Communists halted offensive action at the Yalu River.

Then they go ahead and explain what they think that means. Now General Vandenberg, that statement of yours I think is just as critical of UN policy, and I will have some other statements at a later date, as anything that General MacArthur ever said.

Now let me ask you this, because you recommended or concurred in his withdrawal. Shouldn't you resign your commission or get out of the service or be recalled for criticizing UN policy?

And I am not advocating that, General, bear in mind, but I am saying that you concurred in General MacArthur's recall on the basis that there was a cumulative disagreement with policy.

Now what about your own situation, and I think there are some other statements we can bring up where you have been in disagreement with policy. Now I think it gets down to a question of morals and perhaps the philosophy of this thing.

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I don't think that I disagreed with any policy. I was explaining a result from military action. I was not advocating it.

I made a statement, and as I believe it today, that statement is factual when you consider the point of time to which I was talking.

At that time the United Nations forces were up close to the Yalu. There was very little distance between the Yalu and the front line where air power could operate against them, and I was simply making a factual statement that when that condition occurs, your air power is relatively ineffective.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have a line of questions along that point but I cannot conclude now.

Chairman RUSSELL. You will have to wait your next round, Senator. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

COMPARING UNITED STATES AND RED AIR LOSSES IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. General Vandenberg, are you familiar with the article which appeared on or about May 13 which quoted Lt. Gen. Otto P. Weyland to the effect that we had lost 212 Allied planes in Korea while the Red losses were placed at 149 aircraft?

General VANDENBERG. I am not familiar with the article but I am somewhat familiar with the figures.

Senator KNOWLAND. Are those figures substantially correct as of that time?

General VANDENBERG. I would have to check that for complete verification. It is my impression that something in that neighborhood is probably correct. If General Weyland gave it, he would be in a position to know.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you indicate for the benefit of the committee as to why in your judgment you believe that our losses were substantially heavier than the Communist losses in the air?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; that is very easy. The Communist air forces are operating generally between 5 and 10 miles south of the Yalu and have no connection with our ground forces. Our air power is assisting the front line troops, going into the face of very heavy ground fire, ground flak, small-arms fire. They are operating at practically tree-top level where almost a hand grenade can bring them down, and the losses that we get in addition to that are the losses when we deliverately go up along the Yalu River and are exposed to attach along the river.

Also, I would guess some 500 percent factor or greater, our sorties are by that factor greater than the number that the Communist air force participate in. I guess it would be infinitely greater than that.

Those two are the main reasons, I would believe.

GENERAL SPAATZ' ARTICLE IN NEWSWEEK

Senator KNOWLAND. General, are you familiar with the article which appeared in Newsweek magazine on May 14 by Gen. Carl Spaatz dealing with the air situation in Korea?

General VANDENBERG. I don't believe I am, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. General Spaatz was former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was he not?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. He had an excellent background in World War II as an American commander?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to read you a few paragraphs from General Spaatz' article. I quote:

> Attacks such as the recent one immediately south of the Yalu, resulting in the loss of several of our B–29's, are only made successfully by thoroughly trained pilots. The B–29 gunners are all experts, and the operation in question was covered by our own fighters. The enemy attack in this action was too well coordinated to be the work of airmen of the Chinese Communist-North Korean caliber.

[Deleted.]

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to read a little further on. He said:

> Yet these skilled air fighters have not ventured deep into Korea, where they might do much damage. This indicates that the Russians are not willing to have their own pilots shot down over territory held by the UN. But we can be assured that airplanes manned by Chinese Communists and North Koreans will attack our ground forces and installations when their fliers, aircraft, and bases are ready.
>
> Stalin may have decided that air operations from a sanctuary across the Yalu are definitely to his advantage. The present type of operation in Korea is providing him with the knowledge he needs: how to use air power effectively.
>
> I believe Stalin will not start a third world war unless he is convinced that his military power is adequate to give him a reasonable assurance of victory. What we do in Asia or Europe will not force him prematurely into such action.
>
> In the meantime, we are presenting him with an ideal set-up for developing his air knowledge and technique. This is an aspect of the policy of containment in Korea which demands immediate and serious consideration by the United Nations. This raises the question whether bombing Chinese Communist bases and lines of communication in Manchuria would spark another world war. Personally, I do not believe it would. It is possible that other actions—re-creation of German military might, for example—would be just as provocative or even more so.
>
> Our basic policy and that of our allies is to prevent another world war and, if unsuccessful in that goal, to win the war if started by an aggressor nation. To achieve either objective requires that we have as our allies all of the free nations of the world.
>
> But in a world challenged by the dynamic force of communism, the present restrictive policy in Korea is extremely dangerous. The Russian Communists may gain thereby the know-how to defeat us in the air. And meanwhile, the United Nations ground forces must continue to meet full-scale attack by greatly superior numbers of solders who move freely and safely to the Yalu River.

With that background, General, I would like to ask you, from your professional military opinion, whether you believe that whoever are flying these planes, these Russian MIG fighters, are gaining valuable experience against our bombers and fighters in Korea?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; I think that any time anybody engages in combat with an enemy with more know-how, and they can afford to take the losses, those people who live are bound to learn.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would just like to clear up several points, General.

General VANDENBERG. I would like to add one thought, Senator, if I might.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. Of course, that is a two-way street, too, because we also are gaining battle experience.

Senator KNOWLAND. But not against whatever latest bombers the Soviet may have.

General VANDENBERG. No; but the difficulty of shooting down a jet airplane at high speed—with relatively the same or greater speed and maneuverability, is very essential.

DIFFERENTIATING DIRECTIVE AND PRESIDENT'S BACKGROUND MESSAGE

Senator KNOWLAND. When you were over in Tokyo in approximately January, I think the testimony was, around the 15th of January, which was immediately subsequent to the January 12 directive of the Joint Chiefs, also the study of the 12th, which, of course, was a different document, and the President's letter of the 13th, I understand that that matter was discussed with General MacArthur in Tokyo; am I correct?

General VANDENBERG. The matter of hot pursuit, Senator?

Senator KNOWLAND. No; the matter of those two directives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive and the President's letter.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir?

Senator KNOWLAND. Was there any discussion, and any difference of opinion at that time, as to just what the implications of the directive were, namely, was there any difference as to whether it meant that General MacArthur should only hold on temporarily, and then to withdraw, or that it meant that he should hold on permanently to at least a beachhead in Korea?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. There was quite a discussion as to which was the directive.

General MacArthur, as I stated earlier, indicated that, at one time during the conversation, that he thought, or he took it that the President's letter of political background was the directive.

That was very clearly pointed out by General Collins, by pointing out that it said at the top that it was not a directive, it was simply for background information.

Then General Collins made it clear, to me, at least, in the conversation, at least I understood very clearly that the directive that was in force was the directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; that the President's letter was simply background.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, how did you interpret the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive that we should permanently hold on in Korea?

General VANDENBERG. Well, I helped write it, Senator, and it was very clear to me that the meaning expressed in it is exactly what it says in the directive; but, I will refresh my memory, if you like.

Senator KNOWLAND. I wish you would, because I want to explore this situation a little bit.

General VANDENBERG. Will I go through it paragraph by paragraph, Senator, and explain?

Senator KNOWLAND. If you have read it, could you indicate to me whether your interpretation of the directive was that the forces should permanently hold in Korea or that they should make some token or other resistance and then withdraw?

General VANDENBERG. The way I interpreted the directive was that General MacArthur was a long way away from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and therefore the directive as given to him—he was told that if the position in Korea could be stabilized with the forces that he had, in other words, that he was not forced out—that he should stay there; but that the Joint Chiefs, being that far away, could not tell him whether he would be forced out or wouldn't be forced out. That was left to his judgment.

The political part then of the explanation in the President's message further amplified the reasons behind it. General MacArthur was given the picture, both from a military point of view in the directive, and the considerations, world wide, which underlie part of that directive. The two of them formed, in my opinion, a fairly clear picture of what General MacArthur was to do.

He was to delay in successive positions, if he was forced into successive positions. He was not to leave Korea if he could still maintain the safety of his force.

In other words, it would not be cut to pieces, annihilated—if he could still stay there, he should stay there. If he could not stay there, that had to be his decision, based upon his primary mission of defending Japan and to stay in Korea as long as possible.

Senator KNOWLAND. Was that the interpretation of General Collins at that meeting also?

General VANDENBERG. My understanding is it was; yes, sir.

VANDENBERG VISITS PRESIDENT

Senator KNOWLAND. Calling attention to your testimony on page 3644 that if you were in disagreement with the views of the Defense Establishment, that you would have not only the right but the obligation to go directly to the President—is that correct?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. When in the face of the Finletter report the President and the Secretary of Defense cut the minimum of 70 groups down to 40 groups, did you exercise your right to go to the President of the United States at that time?

General VANDENBERG. The exact timing I cannot be sure of, but shortly thereafter the then Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Finletter and myself with several staff officers went to the President and made a presentation.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Finletter or Mr. Symington?

General VANDENBERG. Mr. Symington and myself.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I will pursue this next round.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

UN OBJECTIVE IN KOREAN WAR

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman and General Vandenberg, I have stated at these hearings before, and I repeat that the question of the recall, the advisability, wisdom or nonwisdom of recall of General MacArthur is determined in my own mind and I do not need any additional testimony on that. However, there is this other issue that has been continually before us, and I do not know when I have been more disturbed than I was yesterday in the colloquy between the Senator from New Hampshire and you as to the objective of this war. Millions of American people are tremendously concerned over our objective in Korea, and I read from this colloquy of yesterday:

> Senator BRIDGES. Do you believe we can win in Korea without using our airpower against enemy bases and supply lines?
>
> General VANDENBERG. In Manchuria?
>
> Senator BRIDGES. Yes.
>
> General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, what do we mean by "win"? A complete defeat of the Chinese Communist nation and the North Koreans?
>
> Senator BRIDGES. No. I have been trying to find out from some of your colleagues just what we meant by winning our objective, and I haven't found out yet; but for purposes of my question, let's say drive the Chinese Communists out of North Korea, out of all Korea.
>
> General VANDENBERG. I wasn't aware that that was our objective.
>
> Senator BRIDGES. I am not either, but I haven't been able to find out what our objective is.
>
> General VANDENBERG. I believe our objective is to kill as many Chinese Communists as is possible without enlarging the war at the present time in Korea.

Do you stand by that statement?

General VANDENBERG. I should have added to that, Senator, and I appreciate your calling it to my attention, that the objective, of course, is—the minimum objective is—to establish the status quo, where at least the South Koreans have an opportunity to reestablish themselves and push the aggressors north.

Senator GILLETTE. By the status quo, you mean the status quo ante?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; that would be the minimum objective, in my opinion.

TWO MEANINGS OF VICTORY

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I quote from General MacArthur's address to the Congress:

> Once war is forced upon us there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there can be no substitute for victory.

Do you agree with that?

General VANDENBERG. Generally, yes, Senator, I think I can agree with that. To make a definitive answer to that in its entirely gets into national policy objectives that are a little over my head, but I would like to discuss for a minute some of the possible implications.

For a long time Great Britain held the balance of power, and thereby kept peace in a world that was, let us say, in an explosive condition over a period of a great number of years. They have had a great deal of experience in this balance-of-power business, and they—incidentally, I often used to hear Secretary Forrestal talk about this theory, and I am an advocate of what he believed—that there are two ways of going about establishing peace in the world.

One, in which you completely bring to the knees a nation so that its power of resistance is gone for many years, and that shifts the balance of power.

Another method is to have a victory that does not require unconditional surrender, but that leaves a force still in the world that can be applied against the balance of power so that by playing the balance of power, if it is done carefully, peace can be preserved over a great many years under explosive situations.

Now, I am not sure in my own mind and, as I say, this is a little over my head, because it has to do with other than strictly military matters, but I would like to give an opinion, that the term "victory" there can be applied, in one sense, and I think is in the minds of a lot of people, that that is that complete victory, which completely wipes out the potential of a country to engage in war for perhaps many years.

There is another complete victory that is a combination of a military victory and the diplomatic victory, whereby there is again a balance of power in the world in which the people that we are interested in and believe have the right idea, have that balance without completely knocking out, emasculating, ruining, killing off all of your enemies.

With that explanation, I would agree with the statement that there is nothing that is a substitute for victory.

Senator GILLETTE. That is very logical.

Now, going back to the colloquy with Senator Bridges, as I stated, I was tremendously perturbed when a great Senator, the senior on the minority side of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be questioning one another as to what the objective was in this Korean conflict. Both of them were professing that they did not know what was meant by winning, and what was the objective.

Now, if there is that uncertainty in the mind of a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a great United States Senator, what can we expect from the general public that is committing their resources and their sons to this conflict?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I was not, I hope, leaving the impression that I didn't know the objective. I was trying to find out from Senator Bridges what he meant by the question.

Senator GILLETTE. You don't mean to repeat that in your mind the objective was to kill as many Communists as possible, that that was our objective?

General VANDENBERG. Part of the objective, Senator. I believe that after that I went on and said that the minimum objective would be to reestablish the freedom of the South Koreans and to push the aggressor back.

Senator GILLETTE. When we entered into the Korean conflict under the aegis of the United Nations, they noted in their third resolution that the purpose was to defend South Korea against armed attack and restore international peace and security in that area.

That has not been achieved yet?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir. I think there is a prospect of achieving it.

Senator GILLETTE. Has it been changed? Has the objective been changed?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, that is getting a little bit into the State Department business, because the military objective obviously is to push the forces back and to kill as many as possible. I would say that that statement that you read put into much better language what I was attempting to say to you was my understanding of it. However, that, I think, could be much better answered by the State Department.

MAC ARTHUR'S BASIC OBJECTIVE: DEFENSE OF JAPAN

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I assure you that I am going to ask the State Department representative when he comes here.

Now, just one other question: In his testimony here General MacArthur stated in referring to the policies to be followed in the Korean conflict, that he was to take certain steps consonant with his basic objective of the defense of Japan.

Do you understand that that was his basic objective, or was, when he was in command?

General VANDERBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GILLETTE. Now, this question that I am asking you—if one of the basic objectives is the defense of Japan, we unquestionably have a great moral responsibility for the safety and protection of the people of Japan. We have heard much testimony on the possibility of open Russian intervention if the war in Korea was extended, as probably would be the case if we bomb Manchuria. This intervention might mean the use of Russian air power against our troops in Korea, but might it also well mean air attack on Japanese cities and Japanese industry, which are almost wholly dependent for their safety on American defense forces?

General VANDENBERG. If Russia entered the war, I think that the chance of having Japanese cities attacked would be quite probable.

Senator GILLETTE. And they would have no defense except such as we could bring to bear?

General VANDENBERG. Well, I would say that the main defense certainly would be the forces of the United States.

[Deleted.]

POSSIBLE AIR ATTACK ON JAPAN

Senator GILLETTE. Just one other question:

Under the same premise of retaliation for our bombing in Manchuria, is there not the great possibility of Chinese Communist air attack on Japan, as distinct from my question relative to the Soviet Union air attack?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, by that do you mean airplanes manufactured by the Chinese and flown by the Chinese, or are you talking of an international air force?

Senator GILLETTE. I am talking about air forces under the control of the Chinese Communists, as distinct from Russian, Soviet active intervention.

General VANDENBERG. Well, unless they established a very large international brigade, and also unless they had far more aircraft, and of a different type than we have seen to date in the Chinese Communist hands, the air forces that are available there, in my opinion, would render quite safe the Japanese home islands from any attack by the Chinese Communists.

Senator GILLETTE. And Japan has no substantial defense excepting such as could be afforded with our assistance?

General VANDENBERG. That is true.

Our United States Navy is a very strong deterrent to any hostile force attempting to make a landing.

Our Army forces are substantial deterrent; and our Air Force.

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, General.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have a fine capacity for running out just about on your time, Senator Gillette. You only had about a half-minute left.

Senator Hunt.

Senator HUNT. General Vandenberg, do you happen to know whether or not it was suggested to General MacArthur, immediately before the Wake Island conference, that General MacArthur should return to the United States for conferences?

General VANDENBERG. I could not answer that from my own memory, Senator.

It is not my recollection that the Joint Chiefs of Staff made that, but I could be mistaken.

Senator HUNT. Do you know, General, from your own knowledge has there been any let-down in the morale of the Japanese people since the general's removal from his command? Has there been any evidence of resentment, to speak of, on the part of the Japanese people because of the President's action?

General VANDENBERG. None that has come to my attention, Senator.

Senator HUNT. I do not suppose you would care to comment on a question as to whether it would have been more advisable for the President to suggest MacArthur come to Washington for conferences than for the President to go to Wake Island?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; I think that is completely out of my field.

CONFIDENCE IN KOREAN COMMAND

Senator HUNT. General, do you have more confidence now in the performance of your command of your air force in Korea since the removal of the general? Were you somewhat worried? Did you have some misgivings with reference to what might possibly take place if General MacArthur continued in the method and means he was following before his dismissal?

General VANDENBERG. Well, since it is a unified command and under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may I express it more from the point of view as a member of that body rather than the employment of the Air Force, Senator? And from that point of view, I would say that, as I said yesterday, in essence, the latitude that necessarily must be given to a theater commander in the exercise of various judgments, and the therefore necessarily rather broad directives of course can be interpreted with varying degrees toward or away from Government policy. Knowing that General MacArthur was an ardent advocate of a different policy from a military point of view, it seemed sounder to have someone, with those rather broad directives, who was more nearly in consonance with Government policy.

Does that answer you question, Senator?

Senator HUNT. Yes; I think that answers it very clearly.

Now, General, in your discussions in reaching your conclusions for dismissing General MacArthur, was there ever discussed in your presence the ways and means of doing it?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Senator HUNT. While I have come to the conclusion that the action taken was the proper action, I don't mind saying I think considerable better finesse could have been used in the way it was done.

In other words, I do think the President or his advisers could have used a good deal more tact in handling the dismissal than the way it was accomplished.

FULL AND COMPLETE KOREAN VICTORY

Now I want to ask you one more question, General. What do you consider a full and complete victory in Korea? Let me change that to in the Korean War.

General VANDENBERG. Not the possibilities but just the words "complete victory," Senator?

Senator HUNT. Yes; taking into consideration all the ramifications, the possibility of having to take China, having to defeat Russia and all of the complications that might follow, what would you consider a complete victory?

General VANDENBERG. Complete victory to me would be the unification of North and South Korea under a democratic form of government with a treaty of some sort with the Chinese, between the Chinese and the Korean Government would in my opinion be a complete victory.

Senator HUNT. That would only be a negotiated peace, would it not?

General VANDENBERG. As to the method of arriving at that, Senator?

Senator HUNT. What I am trying to develop, General, is that a full and complete victory in the Korean situation it seems to me to mean the utter defeat of both China and Russia.

That is what I would consider a complete victory, but what I want to develop is that following that if we should be involved in a third world war and we should defeat those two, my question is would you consider that a victory or a tremendous liability to the United States?

General VANDENBERG. Well, I think that whenever a nation is brought completely to her knees such as Germany was, such as Japan was, there is always a terrific drain on the economy of the rest of the world to reestablish those people into the family of nations.

As I indicated a little before, I am an advocate of the balance of power, and often it seems to me there are opportunities for something less than the complete annihilation or destruction of a nation.

Senator HUNT. Don't you think this country would be incapable of reorganizing and restoring and rehabilitating those two great countries if we were successful in complete victory?

General VANDENBERG. I would think it would be difficult, Senator. I think that is a little out of my field. My personal opinion is it would be difficult, but it is a problem, I believe, other than military.

Senator HUNT. I agree with you, General, it is out of your field; but there have been so many, many questions directed at the technicalities of warfare that in my thinking we should start to look at the broader aspect of the results and what might happen in the event of the complete victory I speak of.

That is all the questions I have.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

JCS CONFERENCE CONCERNING MAC ARTHUR RECALL

Senator Cain. General Vandenberg, I need your assistance, sir, in determining the exact and complete relationship and participation of the JCS in the removal of General MacArthur from his far eastern command.

On May 15 General Bradley testified as follows:

> My first information that there was some concern being shown by the President over this was late the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th of April, when I received the information—I don't remember where from—but I think I received it from a telephone from someone; at which time I called the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for about 30 minutes, from 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon, and told them that the President was concerned about some statements that had been made by General MacArthur, and that they should begin studying the military aspects of it. There was nothing more than that said about it.

This statement by General Bradley appears on page 1935 of the record.

On page 1988 of the record of May 15, the same day, General Bradley said to Senator Wiley:

> I called the 3 Chiefs and asked them if they could come by my office at 5 o'clock.

Senator Wiley said:

> Name them, please.

General Bradley responded:

> General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman.

General Vandenberg, were you in attendance at this meeting on Thursday, the 5th of April, to which General Bradley made reference?

General Vandenberg. I was.

Senator Cain. Will you give me the names, sir, of every other person who was in attendance at this meeting?

General Vandenberg. I can give it to you to the best of my recollection.

Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.

General Vandenberg. I cannot vouch for its complete authenticity.

Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.

General Vandenberg. I would think, as I recall it, Admiral Sherman was there, General Bradley was there, Admiral Davis, I think, was there, and I know that General Collins was out of town and, therefore, I would suspect, but I do not remember, that probably General Haislip was there.

Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.

On page 1937 of the record of May 15, Chairman Russell asked this question of General Bradley:

> Did you subsequently call another conference of the Joint Chiefs?

General Bradley replied:

> Yes, sir. There were subsequent meetings with the same four people—I believe General Marshall has explained that to you—and then on Saturday we were told that the President would like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>
> Chairman Russell. What day of the month would that be?
>
> General Bradley. That was Saturday, April 7. We were told they would like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and we should give them to General Marshall at 4 o'clock, Sunday afternoon. That would have been Sunday, the 8th of April.

> So I called the Chiefs together at 2 p. m. Sunday, the 8th of April, in my office, at which time we discussed—I presented to them the concern of the President and what he had in mind, and two or three other subjects were discussed—

and so on.

Were you, General Vandenberg, in attendance at this Sunday meeting in General Bradley's office?

General VANDENBERG. I was.

Senator CAIN. Were the other two service Chiefs present?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Were any other persons present, to the best of your recollection?

General VANDENBERG. I have rather an indistinct memory that Admiral Davis was also present, Senator.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

At page 3119 of the record of May 25, Chairman Russell addressed this question to General Collins, Army Chief of Staff:

> General, were you consulted as to the desirability from a military standpoint to relieve General MacArthur of his several commands in the Pacific?
>
> General COLLINS. Yes, sir, I was.
>
> Chairman RUSSELL. Who was the first person to consult with you on that?
>
> General COLLINS. General Bradley notified me on Sunday that there would be a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his office I think at 2 in the afternoon. I had not been in the city on the 5th of the month when he had, as I understand it from his testimony, notified the other Chiefs that they should give some thought to the question as to whether or not General MacArthur should be relieved.
>
> It happened that I had left that morning to go down to the Air War College down at Montgomery and over at Fort Benning for inspection of the Fourth Infantry Division, so I was not present and my participation began on Sunday, I think it was about 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

REPRESENTING ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

Against this colloquy in the record, General Vandenberg, I would like to say this: The record makes it appear that the Army Chief of Staff, the officer who was most directly responsible for General MacArthur's activity in Korea was not present on Thursday, April 5, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said in the record that he was present, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy and Air Force members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff first met and discussed the possibility of relieving General MacArthur of his commands.

I would assume that no meeting on such an important question would have been proper or desirable without the Army Chief of Staff's being present.

I should merely like to ask your view about my feeling in the matter, sir.

General VANDENBERG. That is a question that I would prefer General Bradley and General Collins answer, but I would like to make the observation that from the point of view of the way the Air Force is run, there are many occasions at which the Chief cannot attend the Joint Chiefs' meetings.

There must be someone who is completely in the confidence of the Chief of Staff, who understands his policies, and who can confer with the other Chiefs with the complete backing of his own Chief when he is not there.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General Vandenberg, General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, has testified that General Bradley did not notify him of the Sunday, April meeting at 2 o'clock until Sunday morning. General Collins related that he did not return to Washington until Saturday evening, April 7. Can you tell me, sir, how it happened either the Chief of the JCS or the other members of the JCS did not advise General Collins of the nature of the meeting which was to be held at 2 o'clock Sunday afternoon?

I ask that question for I think it reasonable because the JCS consists of four members, three of whom, on the basis of the record, were fully aware of what was to be discussed Sunday afternoon and the Army Chief of Staff was not. It seems to me a bit strange, and I would like to ask your view about that, sir.

General VANDENBERG. I can speak only for myself on that, Senator. Again my impression is that the Chief of Staff of the Army was represented. And I would presume that in the normal course of events the Chief of Staff of the Army's representative would inform him about as important a discussion as that. It would never enter my mind that that would not be done.

LOG OF JCS MEETINGS

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

I would assume, General Vandenberg, that the JCS must keep some sort of a diary or log which indicates the place of any JCS meeting, the time of any JCS meeting, and those who are in attendance at any JCS meeting. If there is such a diary or log, would you please tell me who is responsible for keeping that diary or log and where it is physically maintained.

General VANDENBERG. I presume now, Senator, you are speaking of formal Joint Chiefs' meetings.

Senator CAIN. Well, I am just asking the question as to whether or not you have in writing anything that from hindsight you can go to to determine what conduct and under what circumstances the JCS met at some former time.

General VANDENBERG. Admiral Davis could answer that question for you, sir.

Senator CAIN. Because of something, General Vandenberg, you said just a minute ago, I should like to recite four lines of colloquy which took place between Senator Wiley and General Bradley on May 15, and it is to be found on page 1990 of the record of that date, and follows the colloquy in which General Bradley testified that he notified and invited to his office General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman.

On the occasion of this testimony, as I recall, General Bradley was seated where you are now seated and had on his left a staff assistant, a colonel whose name I do not know. Senator Wiley said this:

> Was this young man sitting next to you in the presence of these four?

referring to the three members of the JCS and General Bradley, who met in General Bradley's office on the afternoon, at 5 o'clock, of April 5.

General Bradley said:

> No, sir, just us four.

Senator Wiley said:

> Just the four of you?
> General BRADLEY. That is right.

Mr. Chairman, I have mentioned that. I have no desire to unnecessarily labor a point or embarrass anybody because the contradictions in the testimony of General Bradley and General Vandenberg and of General Collins is to me totally confusing, and as of this minute unexplainable, because under oath with reference to perhaps the greatest question that has ever happened in the military history of America, the Chairman of the JCS said that he called together not two of the three members of the JCS but all three of those members on the afternoon of Thursday, April 5, to discuss the possibility of a recommendation covering Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has in no uncertain terms said that he knew nothing of the question to be discussed on Sunday because, No. 1, he had been out of the city, and No. 2, he did not return until Sunday morning at which time sometime during the morning General Bradley presumably called and asked him to come to his office, and I would suggest in all seriousness, Mr. Chairman, that General Bradley and General Collins be recalled at the convenience of this committee to straighten up what is to me up to date the largest discrepancy there is to be found in the record.

That is all the questions I have at the moment, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman.

NATIONAL DEFENSE TODAY AND TOMORROW

General Vandenberg, you used the expression several times on yesterday, we could do something today but not tomorrow, protect the cities of America today, for example, and not tomorrow, other things that we could do today but not tomorrow.

Of course I realize that tomorrow is not intended literally. You meant at some time in the future, but just what were you talking about when you said we could accomplish the purposes that are essential to the national defense today but not tomorrow?

General VANDENBERG. Tomorrow was used purposely, Mr. Chairman, because the date of that tomorrow is unknown. It is an attempt to state that as the power of the Russian air force mounts, at a date it will become a distinct threat to the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, that was what concerned me about your statement, and that was the inference that I drew from it.

Do I understand that despite our rearmament program, very considerable, that the disparity between our air and Russian air is increasing rather than the gap being narrowed by our efforts?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir. I believe that the gap is in process of being decreased; but the difficulty in this problem is somewhat as I state, like this:

They have the initiative. They can, when they decide, or if they decide, to move, they can pick a date which is advantageous to them, and a place or places.

The United States, on the other hand, has to be equally ready at all places, and from now on out.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, what I am driving at is that I desire to better, rather than to worsen, our position with Russia, as far as our Air Force is concerned.

What steps can you take to avoid this calamity of tomorrow?

Do you think that we are taking all the steps that we can, or should, at the present time; or what else is necessary?

I certainly don't want to have this tomorrow come when our Air Force will be deficient.

General VANDENBERG. May I divide that into two parts?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

"WALK SOFTLY, BUT CARRY A BIG STICK"

General VANDENBERG. In the first place, I think that the American people have the greatest opportunity since the days of President Theodore Roosevelt, where I believe he said, "Walk softly, but carry a big stick."

Today, the United States has the opportunity of carrying a big stick, and can walk softly; but people will realize that that big stick is the offensive strength of the United States Air Force.

To date, instead of a big stick, it is a fairly large club; but tomorrow, it is liable to be a willow wand.

As the power of the Russian air force increases, and their stockpile of atomic weapons increases, the job of the United States Air Force becomes roughly doubled.

Whereas today it is a deterrent to war, because of its ability to devastate the industrial potential of any great nation on the globe; tomorrow, if the Russian air force has the atomic bombs and the ability to deliver them, we have to have an Air Force that can take the attrition that would be necessary to destroy that air force, and destroy it promptly; and after that, have a sufficient Air Force left to destroy the manufacturing potential of Russia, and to do what we call policing action after that, to insure that it was not rebuilt.

Therefore, while today we have a fairly large club, in the United States Air Force, that tomorrow, which is the date at which they will have sufficient atomic bombs, and aircraft to deliver them, we will not have, in my opinion, a sufficient Air Force.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, why won't we have? Is your statement to be construed as a warning to the American people that we cannot in any wise relax in our providing the Air Force with the essential weapons of war and the men to man them, or is it a prediction of gloom for the future that this contest is set up in such a way that we cannot hope to win it?

General VANDENBERG. Thank you for bringing that point to my attention, Senator Russell. I didn't indicate that we wouldn't have it or that we couldn't have it.

I meant to indicate that we must have it, but that it is going to require a greater Air Force than we have planned today.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is exactly what I want to get.

We are planning a greater Air Force?

General VANDENBERG. The planned Air Force, as I believe I indicated yesterday, goes as far as the fiscal 1951 and supplementary budgets. That is all that I can speak firmly about. That is built upon the premise that the goal that we are after is 95 groups sometime in 1952 or the spring of 1953.

In my opinion, that goal of 95 groups is a way station toward the Air Force that I was speaking of that we must have at the time they have the atomic capabilities that I have just spoken of.

Chairman RUSSELL. You further stated that you thought, I believe—I don't want to put words in your mouth—that it was your opinion we were doing about all we could just now, at this present time. So far as actual construction is concerned, that is.

General VANDENBERG. From the base at which we started, Mr. Chairman, the fiscal 1951 appropriations were about as much as the industry and the facilities that could be provided within that length of time—it was the amount of money that we could spend logically and efficiently.

In 1952 the problem becomes different. We can, because of the base from which we are now starting, because of the fiscal 1951 funds, we can now spend in 1952 a great deal more money.

Therefore, you can enlarge more rapidly and more quickly the Air Force over the 95 groups, but not within the length of time that the 1951 funds were appropriated for.

In other words, nothing you can do today in the way of money can assist in getting any more groups before about December of 1952. But money spent in fiscal 1952 can get you more air power in 1953.

Chairman RUSSELL. The point I want to make is that if the American people put their hands to this task, there is no reason why our strength as compared to Russia's should not grow progressively greater rather than less; is there?

General VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, that is my opinion; it should.

RUSSIAN AIR FORCE POTENTIAL

Chairman RUSSELL. That is fine. Now, you discussed here—I assume some of it was stricken by Admiral Davis—the number of Russian planes. The great bulk of those are considered obsolete or obsolescent by today's standards, aren't they, General Vandenberg, or are they? And our own planes, for that matter, whether they are all obsolescent.

General VANDENBERG. Senator, it is very difficult to have at any one time an Air Force that is completely modern in the view that they all are equipped with the very latest types.

[Deleted.]

They are building a long-range air force.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, we, of course, are emphasizing the latest developments in the planes we are building today, so that we know all of our planes will never be the last word, because we hope that every one that comes off will be a little better than the one before, figuratively speaking.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir.

[Deleted.]

TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

General Vandenberg. Mr. Chairman, there has been an awful lot of foolish material written and expressed about tactical air support. If you or any member of the committee is interested, I have letters from practically all the division commanders, the regimental commanders, the commanding general of the Eighth Army from General Ridgway, all of which I think might be enlightening if there is still any question in anyone's mind about tactical support over there.

Chairman Russell. There is no question in my mind that the tactical support has been one of the material factors that keeps us from being driven out of there, General.

[Deleted.]

WHAT IS AN AIR GROUP?

Chairman Russell. I have one question I want to ask you. My time is just now ending.

So many people speak glibly of air groups, General, this number of air groups and that number, and while I endeavor to keep up with it, I myself cannot always tell just what constitutes an air group, but I am sure that hundreds of people do not that I have asked.

They say they want 70 air groups. I say, "What is an air group?" and they don't know. I think for the benefit of the record you might explain here what is an air group as applied to all the different types.

General Vandenberg. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is very similar to the concept of divisions. Divisions have different strength and have different equipment.

Roughly, without going into too much detail, the fighters, fighter-bombers, and interceptors, which are the single-engine, and in some cases two-place, mostly single-place, single-engined aircraft, in a so-called group, although we now call them "wing"—in a group is approximately 75 airplanes.

In the light bomber type, which is also used for close support, interdiction, and shorter-range missions, they run just short of 50 airplanes.

In the medium bombers and heavy bombers—the medium bombers run roughly about 36 airplanes to a group, and the heavy bombers around 30.

Now that includes in some cases in the medium, tankers, and at the present time in the very long-range or very heavy groups; we have about 18 airplanes because production at this time and the indoctrination of personnel into new equipment gives us a broader base on which to work. Eventually there will be about 30.

Chairman Russell. That is the B-36's?

General Vandenberg. Yes.

Chairman Russell. Senator Connally?

UNITED STATES KEEPING PACE WITH AIR IMPROVEMENTS

Chairman Connally. General Vandenberg, naturally as time goes on, airplanes are going to be improved, are they not?

General Vandenberg. Yes; we hope so.

Chairman Connally. Well, they have been in the past, have they not?

General Vandenberg. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And it is presumed that we in the United States will keep pace with these improvements and gradually increase our air strength, is it not, if we still keep in the mind that we are in now?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

JET ENGINE PRINCIPLE

Chairman CONNALLY. Although I do not want to belabor the question, would you mind explaining briefly the principle of the jet engine? How does that differ from the ordinary engine?

General VANDENBERG. Well, the ordinary engine, Senator, is built on the principle of turning an air screw, which either pulls or pushes it through the air, the air screw being called the propeller.

A jet airplane puts air under great pressure and forces it out the rear and it reacts upon the air behind and pushes the airplane forward.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, now, what generates the force or the power that pushes that back? You say you put the air in under great pressure. Where does that come from.

General VANDENBERG. It comes in the nose and is built up in a centrifugal apparatus with vanes on it that compresses the air, heats it, expands it, and throws it out the rear?

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, is there an engine up there somewhere to do that?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; it is a jet engine. The difference, though, is that the air pushes the airplane, whereas in a propeller a screw pulls or pushes.

Chairman CONNALLY. Of course, I am familiar with the principle of the ordinary jet that shoots the air out the back and forces the thing forward. As to airplanes, I am not very familiar with them. I have never done anything with them except ride in a few.

[Deleted.]

GREATEST ADVOCATE OF PEACE

General VANDENBERG. Well, when you do that, when you consider that, you have to consider the type of airplane, the use to which it is going to be put, and the training; and it is very difficult to answer that categorically.

Today, I think that, as I said before, our Strategic Air Force, its composition, is the main deterrent to a warlike move.

It is the greatest advocate of peace we have.

Chairman RUSSELL. Excuse me a minute, Senator Connally.

You didn't include the naval air arm, did you, General, in your figures?

General VANDENBERG. I will have to check on that, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

General VANDENBERG. You mean the Soviet naval air, or ours?

Chairman RUSSELL. Both. I understood, from the figures——

General VANDENBERG. That included the Russian naval aviation; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. But did not include ours?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. To those figures, as to ours, would be added the naval aviation?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Which is considerable, I suppose, I don't know; but still, you feel that our aircraft organization, our planes and so on, constitute the strongest deterrent to Russia breaking out into war; is that right?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir—today.

Chairman CONNALLY. Today?

LEARNING MORE ABOUT RUSSIAN PLANS

Well, is that based on the supposition, which is no doubt well-founded, that Russia knows how many planes we have and all about it?

General VANDENBERG. I feel sure they do, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Just as we know about theirs?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. We don't?

General VANDENBERG. No. They know much better than we do.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, it seems to me that is a problem for our Government—either keep them more ignorant about our affairs or find out more about theirs.

It is a pretty hard poker game when one fellow is sitting there with a hand you can see, and another one with a hand you can't see.

That looks to me like that is our trouble. Instead of spending so much on the Voice of America, we might spend a little on the Voice of Russia and find out what they are up to.

I believe that is all the questions at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

THEATER PRIORITIES FOR EQUIPMENT

Senator BRIDGES. General Vandenberg, you testified that you had many requests for new, modern-type planes in the Korean War, to replace the older planes of more obsolescent type.

Now, did you honor those requests and send them?

General VANDENBERG. We are in the process of doing it as rapidly as possible, Senator Bridges.

The difficulty is one of starting from a 40-group, or less, level, in the aircraft industry, and expecting to get out, at the end of the pipeline, enough airplanes, quickly enough to do this job; and the airplanes that are coming out, those that we can make available, we are sending over there; but it is a rather slow process, to build up the aviation industry.

Senator BRIDGES. Now during this period when you had requests, General Vandenberg, for new planes, newer-type planes to replace the older or more obsolete type which you were not able to fill or are now in the process of filling, were newer-type planes given by us or transferred by us to any other nation?

General VANDENBERG. I would have to check that, Senator, but I am under the impression that some aircraft of the F-84 type, for example, have been sent to some of the NATO countries.

Senator BRIDGES. By those countries, what countries do you mean?

General VANDENBERG. NATO countries, North Atlantic treaty.

Senator BRIDGES. In other words, what I am getting at is while we needed very vitally in the war which we are fighting and Americans were dying over there, while we needed and you had requests for modern airplanes, we refused them in Korea, yet we sent them to these foreign other countries.

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, I couldn't go along with the implication there that there were many casualties in the Air Force because they were using this more or less obsolescent type of airplane. They were in proportion to the casualties in the other airplanes greater, but they are really very, very minute compared to the over-all casualties.

Senator BRIDGES. Now who made that decision to send these modern planes to other countries when we were having demands from our own forces in the active war for these modern planes? Was it your decision or was it a political decision?

General VANDENBERG. I believe it is both, Senator Bridges. It is a combination of recommendation from the Chiefs of Staff to build up certain of the defensive capabilities of NATO countries, and weighing that against the requirements of the Korean War. I would like to make plain that the Korean War requirements have first priority.

Even when one theater has priority over the other, one has first priority and another one has second priority, it is not always advisable to send every last bit of equipment to the theater having first priority.

Senator BRIDGES. But we were in an active war, shooting war, in Korea, and we were not in the other location, to which the more modern planes were sent; is that not true?

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir. They were sent in quantities, as I recall, of less than a group.

There is always the problem when you are reequipping as we are doing in Korea, of reequipping them as a whole unit so that you do not have your supply problem of having several kinds of spare parts that you have to provide, put in the pipeline, that your mechanics are trained for only one type, your pilots are adequately trained on one type; and the small quantities of aircraft going to other countries would not affect the over-all proposition of equipping units unit by unit to any great extent.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR A 70-GROUP AIR FORCE

Senator BRIDGES. General Vandenberg, when I was chairman of the Appropriations Committee in 1948, and I think General Spaatz was Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Congress initiated action toward the 70-group Air Force, and Congress acted. What happened to the 70-group Air Force on the way that we did not get it?

General VANDENBERG. The main reason it wasn't produced, Senator, was that we didn't have the money appropriated to get it.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, why did we not have the money appropriated? Congress certainly acted and fulfilled all the requests, formal requests; did we not?

General VANDENBERG. I will have to check the record on that.

I am sure to get the entire picture absolutely straight, Senator Bridges, that we would have to go through it item by item and year by year to explain what has happened.

But I have a few notes here and I noticed this in one of them:

> During the hearings before the Congress on the President's budget request, the Air Force was asked to state the procurement authorization needed to enable it to implement the recommendations of the Brewster board and of the Fin-

letter commission with respect to the 70-group program. The Air Force testified that an authorization of $2,037 million would permit it to start the 70-group program with an initial purchase of 2,911 airplanes. The difference between this amount and the sum contained in the President's amended budget request was $822 million.

By subsequent action in the House $100 million was cut off this amount and the Air Force was granted the total obligation authority for aircraft procurement of a billion nine sixty-two.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, is it not true, and I quote from Senator Thomas of Oklahoma, who was discussing this on the floor, that—

> Secretary Johnson did not ask for an increase in the House figure in the Senate, neither did Mr. Symington, but asked only for the budget estimate, and this bill carries the budget estimate—

Is that correct?

General VANDENBERG. I would have to check that, Senator Bridges.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DECISIONS PERTAINING TO AIR FORCE SIZE

Senator BRIDGES. Now, isn't it a fact that the final bill when enacted did contain substantially more than the budget requested and isn't it true that the executive branch of the Government, the President of the United States, impounded that money so that it was not utilized for the purpose for which it was appropriated?

General VANDENBERG. Speaking purely from memory, which can be very faulty, it is my impression that the events you have stated are about correct.

However, the Air Force in requesting the money, I recall at the time, stated that the desired 70-group Air Force was from a military point of view deemed the minimum that we should have, but that we recognized at that time that there were many other influencing factors, and I believe Secretary Symington made the statement that those factors were beyond the purview of the military, and therefore, all he could do, as I recall it, was to talk from a purely military point of view, recognizing these other factors.

Senator BRIDGES. In other words, what I am getting at here is that the reason we didn't have a larger Air Force to start with when this crisis developed was as a result of political decisions from the President which overweighed the military and which reacted first by forcing Secretary Johnson or bringing about the point so that Secretary Johnson and Secretary Symington presented the budget figures; and then, secondly, when this additional money was added, that under the direction of the President the money was impounded so that it wasn't used, and that was not your decision, General Spaatz's decision, and the military decision—it was a political decision.

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I think I am getting a little out of my field in commenting on what type of decision it was that resulted in the Air Force not having the 70-group program, but I would guess—still saying that it is a little out of my field—that, rather than a political decision, it was an economic decision, and it had to do with the world situation in general, the estimate of what was best for the country from an economic standpoint, and in consideration with our request for an additional force.

Senator BRIDGES. Even though you say it was in part an economic decision, that economic decision was not made by the Air Force, it was made by the other divisions of the Government—the administration, including the President of the United States—is that not true?

General VANDENBERG. It was not made by the Air Force, Senator, because the Air Force in its recommendation is solely able to present what it believes to be correct from a military point of view, recognizing that there are other factors that must be taken into consideration.

Those factors are beyond the purview of the Department of the Air Force and belong to some higher echelon than ours.

Senator BRIDGES. Is my time up?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have 1 more minute?

Senator BRIDGES. General Vandenberg, when I concluded my questions to you yesterday I had just reached a certain point and I want to ask you further this:

VALUE OF AIR BASES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

If by chance European nations decided to remain neutral in case of an all-out conflict between the United States and Russia, is it your understanding that bombers could operate from bases on their neutral territory?

General VANDENBERG. No; it would not be my understanding, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. Are you making plans, are you taking that into consideration in any preparations you are making in case of an all-out conflict with Russia, if these foreign bases should not be available to us?

General VANDENBERG. We are doing everything possible within the Air Force to enable us to operate without bases.

However, I would like to reemphasize what I said yesterday, that it is a very, very difficult operation where you stand off as far as we would have to without even Canadian bases, and operate over long distances.

The casualties would be unquestionably much greater, the attrition would be much greater, the length of time to do a job would be much longer, and the eventual success of it in comparison with bases properly located would be somewhat questionable.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges, your time has expired.

Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

AIRCRAFT BUILDING OF OTHER NATIONS

Senator GEORGE. General, I have just a few questions. Are any other countries building modern military aircraft now?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; England is; France is.

Senator GEORGE. Have they any considerable production in England, General?

General VANDENBERG. England and Canada——

Senator GEORGE. I do not ask for specific figures.

General VANDENBERG. Have considerable production; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. England and Canada. Is Australia building?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; but it is not——

Senator GEORGE. Not a modern aircraft?

General VANDENBERG. It is modern, but their capacity is strictly limited.

Senator GEORGE. Do you say that France is doing some building?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. I believe they are building under patents from the United States, and they are taking our——

Senator GEORGE. Are the Russian satellites building, so far as you know?

General VANDENBERG. They may have a few Russian factories in the satellites, but the general trend of the location of aircraft factories and their war-making potential is to get as far inside of Russia as possible for protection from air attack, I presume.

Senator GEORGE. Presumably it is all Russian-controlled, is it?

General VANDENBERG. I believe so.

AIR FORCE INTERIM GOAL

Senator GEORGE. You think that would be your judgment about it.

General, do you say we are building toward your goal of 95 groups?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. I would like to express that that is what I consider to be an interim goal, and I hope it will prove to be, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I understand, sir, an interim goal. That means, General, in so many plain words that we are embarked upon the greatest military race in human history, does it not, from the standpoint, at least, of the air, which is an important arm now?

General VANDENBERG. Well, I would like to call your attention, respectfully, Senator, to the 243 groups that we had at the end of World War II, and——

Senator GEORGE. Well, we were in actual war then.

General VANDENBERG. I would say that if you can call this peace, sir, that——

Senator GEORGE. It is sort of a peace; it is a very uneasy peace, but it is kind of a peace, except in Korea.

General VANDENBERG. This goal of 95 groups is about as great as we have had in time of peace, other than when we were building the aircraft industry prior to World War II in order to supply our allies; and I believe that the total aircraft goals then were much higher than the goal set under the 95-group program.

LEADING TO AN ARMAMENT RACE

Senator GEORGE. The thing that is disturbing to me is, General, the picture you give us. I do not suggest that it is overdrawn any, but it leads to an armament race, which is bound to lead to a war. Yet in Korea, we are taking all sorts of chances to prevent the spread of a war, to limit and restrict it. I do not quite enter into the philosophy of the whole thing, but I want to ask you just one question.

You said yesterday and you gave us yesterday your very impressive reasons, why we could not or why you could not and do not believe it wise to accede to the viewpoint of General MacArthur in bombing the bases, build-ups, and troop concentrations across the Yalu in Manchuria. You stated specifically that in your opinion, in your judgment, and I presume in that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur, that while we could have gone all-out, we would have had to use all of our Air Force, which would have left us naked for a good many years, as you expressed it, possibly. Was that correct? Was that at least one of the very strong reasons why you thought that General MacArthur's recommendations were not wise?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. That is correct?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. General, did you know that when we went into Korea? Was that your view when we went into the fighting in Korea?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. It has always been my view that the United States Air Force, in the size which——

Senator GEORGE. Which we have.

General VANDENBERG (continuing). We have——

Senator GEORGE. That is right.

General VANDENBERG (continuing). Must be saved for a major enemy.

Senator GEORGE. Then, General, we could not have gone into an all-out war in Korea unless it was forced upon us at that time.

DECISION TO SEND TROOPS INTO KOREA

Let me ask you, did you participate in the decision to send our troops into Korea? I want to find out if the general did; he may have.

General VANDENBERG. I participated in some of them, Senator. The sending of the first troops, our first Army troops over there, I believe that I knew of it after the fact. I would have to check the record as to that, if I may.

Senator GEORGE. Well, when we did send troops into Korea, were you aware of it? Were you aware of the fact that we were sending troops into Korea?

General VANDENBERG. I think so.

Senator GEORGE. And when we were sending Air Force into that area?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you knew then that unless your fighting was limited, that you would be jeopardizing, as you expressed yesterday, our air power, our complete air power, our full air power, which, as you forcibly presented to us, was the main hope of preventing Russia from making some other move at this time, possible move.

General VANDENBERG. That is right.

NECESSITY OF LIMITED ACTION

Senator GEORGE. I wanted to get that very clear, General.

Now, as I understand it, when we commenced fighting in Korea we knew very well, did we not, that we had to fight a limited action there so far as our air power was concerned, or else run the terrific risks which you have detailed to us?

General VANDENBERG. May I take your first part, answer that, and come back to this, sir?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir. I think it important from my viewpoint, General.

General VANDENBERG. The statement that you made about the armament race and the inevitability of war, when talking about air power, I must respectfully disagree with you about.

In my opinion the United States Air Force and the build-up of the United States Air Force, with its capacity to inflict destruction upon people who will break the peace, is the greatest single factor that the United States can possibly have in the foreseeable future to preserve the peace of the world.

By that I mean to prevent a conflict of the size and magnitude that we generally envisage when we talk about world war III; that without this deterrent people who are bent upon aggression and who desire to communize the entire world, will have nothing in their way as a deterrent force, because they have overwhelming land power. Their objectives are mainly upon land, connected land masses, and the sole deterrent to this today has been, and I venture to say that the build-up of the United States Air Force to the proper proportions will continue to be in the forseeable future, the greatest deterrent to the war and the greatest force for peace that the United States has ever had in its possession since the days when we operated a fleet for the same purpose.

The days when the fleet can do that to the extent that an air force can do it today, in my opinion, are gone. Those days and the days when Britain kept the peace of the world with her fleet have passed. When the peace of the world is kept in my opinion, today, it must be kept by air power, and today we have the opportunity, the American people have the opportunity of having an instrument to preserve the peace of the world and to prevent the conflict of world war III if you have a sufficient air force.

Now, turning that over into terms of Korea, Senator—had we had an air force of the proper size, instead of a shoestring air force, when we entered the Korean conflict, in my opinion there is a very great possibility that the Chinese Communists would not have dared come in. Up to this time, in my opinion, the possession of that United States Air Force has prevented the enlargement of that Korean conflict into world war III.

ARMAMENT RACE OF WAR PREVENTATIVE

Senator GEORGE. I get your point, and viewpoint, General. I am not quarreling with it, but I am trying to get my own views straight.

As I take it, our Air Force there was preventative. Or, if we had had this strong force that you visualize, which was moving, would it have kept the Red Chinese from building up, coming in, and bringing their forces in?

General VANDENBERG. In my opinion, there would have been an excellent chance for it.

Senator GEORGE. And if they did come, it might have been decisive?

General VANDENBERG. If they did come, the opportunity to utilize it as General MacArthur requested, could have been done without, as I said before, leaving us naked in a world that is dominated by a desire for aggression.

Senator GEORGE. I understand, General, and I don't want to argue the matter with you at all; but I have inferred, or deduced from all of your statements to us, that the Russians were likewise very rapidly building an air force.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Therefore, you have got an air race, and it is not that either one of you are going to have a completely dominant position in the air, is it, until you collide?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, if we do not build it, in my opinion, and Russia does do it, and we have no control over what she is doing, and she is going to build anyway—the indications are that she is well on her way.

Senator GEORGE. Yes?

General VANDENBERG. Well then, we are in a position of having no opposition to the threat of her world conquest, and therefore her satellites' operations throughout the world cannot be countered, nor could we counter Russia herself.

On the other hand, if we, with weapons of mass destruction, and Russia, with weapons of mass destruction, are able at any time to meet them, and to do it better and more quickly than they are able to do it. the thought of the terrible consequences of that type of war, in my opinion, would even cause the masters of the Kremlin to pause and consider; and therefore I believe it to be the greatest power for peace that the United States can possibly have.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I hope you are correct about it, General, but what I am saying is——

General VANDENBERG. Senator, there seems to be no alternative.

Senator GEORGE. Maybe there is no alternative, but what I am saying is that we are building and Russia is building, and if the history of mankind means anything up to now, it means ultimately a collision.

General VANDENBERG. Well, sir, I would hope that that will not come about.

Senator GEORGE. I would too.

General VANDENBERG. If it does come about, in the one case we have an opportunity to exist not under the heel of slavery but pretty badly torn. The other alternative is——

Senator GEORGE. I agree with you, General, and I am not arguing with you against building a strong air power. I believe in it, but I do think I comprehend faintly at least the inevitable result of an armament race on a gigantic scale, and I just hope that your fondest hopes about that thing or your brightest hopes about it all will prove to be correct.

General VANDENBERG. May I go to history, sir?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

General VANDENBERG. The British Navy, which was superior at one time to all the combined navies of the world, kept the peace for a long period of time. It kept the United States safe, as a matter of fact, for a long period of time.

Senator GEORGE. I agree with you.

General VANDENBERG. My only hope is that the United States Air Force can be built to a point where it can do a similar job for the free nations of the world.

Senator GEORGE. Well, then we have got an awful lot of building to do, General. I think you will agree to that, especially when you say that Russia is herself building, and building very rapidly.

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; the goals that I set in terms of equipment, money, or people are not in my opinion as great as would be indicated in your statement.

Chairman Russell. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator George. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must go to the floor. They have this 75 resolution, concerning Arizona water, but I will probably bring up the conference report on the Trade Agreements Act.

Chairman Russell. The report will not be highly controversial, will it?

Senator George. I don't think it will be controversial at all.

Chairman Russell. Senator Byrd.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Saltonstall.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Johnson.

STEPS TAKEN TO PROVIDE 70-GROUP AIR FORCE

Senator Johnson. General Vandenberg, do you believe that the course that you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now pursuing in Korea is the best available course for us to pursue and is the course that is most likely to give us victory, our objectives, with the least loss of material and lives?

General Vandenberg. At the present moment, yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. Now, that course that we are now pursuing might be an entirely different course if developments of the past had been different. I don't want to spend a lot of time in this hearing crying over spilt milk, but if we can cry a little bit over it in the record and not make the same mistake again, it may be worth our while.

Now, you just stated in response to an exchange with Senator George that the shoestring Air Force that we have now, if we had had a larger Air Force in the first place, the Chinese Communists might not have come in, and in the second place, if they had come in, we might have been able to follow out a different policy.

Now, it is my memory that General Eisenhower, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, in his annual report stated that in his judgment the minimum Air Force strength in time of peace should be 70 groups.

I recall that following that report, sometime following it, Congress set up a joint congressional aviation policy group, and they held extensive hearings and made detailed recommendations to the Congress.

The President also set up an Air Policy Commission, which at that time was headed by the present Secretary of Air, who was then a distinguished lawyer.

Now, in early 1948, upon the recommendations of certain people responsible for maintaining minimum air strength, those recommendations were all considered by the committees of Congress.

In response to a question of Senator Bridges a while ago you said that the reason we did not get started on building a 70-group Air Force was because appropriations were not made. Now, I wonder if that is an exactly accurate statement or if it wouldn't be more accurate to say that all the appropriations that were made were not made available to the Air Force.

General Vandenberg. I would say, Senator Johnson, that it was a combination of the two. At that time the national goal was not for 70 groups in the money that was made available to the Air Force.

Senator Johnson. Not in one appropriation, but the goal was 70 groups and the money that was appropriated was to build toward the 70 groups. Isn't that correct?

General Vandenberg. To build toward it, but at no time did we ever get the money on a continuing basis that could build a 70-group Air Force, so that at a date we would have it.

Senator Johnson. That is correct.

General Vandenberg. There were ups and downs.

ACCORDION-TYPE OPERATION IN ATTAINING LARGER AIR FORCE

Senator Johnson. That is correct. If I might say at this point, we have been told about these ups and downs in the committee in the war we are fighting in Korea. They say it is an accordion-type operation.

Isn't it fair to say that so far as attaining the minimum opjective of 70 groups that you had an accordion-type operation so far as both the Executive and the Congress is concerned?

General Vandenberg. That is certainly true, Senator, and I would like to point out that every time you go up or down instead of at a steady progression—either up or down—it is going to cost a great deal more money than it would if it could be stabilized.

Senator Johnson. And I gathered yesterday when you were talking about today and tomorrow, that Senator Russell referred to this morning, that at least you were implying that you were hopeful that the program for tomorrow, that we would not be confronted with another accordion-type operation, and then we could, when we reached our present interim goal, continue without going back down the hill again.

General Vandenberg. That is my fond hope, Senator Johnson.

Senator Johnson. Now, the limitations that we are operating under in Korea are the actual result of the mistakes that we made in 1948, 1949, and 1950, whoever made those mistakes, is that not true?

General Vandenberg. From the Air Force point of view that certainly is true.

AIR REARMAMENT PROGRAM

Senator Johnson. That is what I am talking about.

General Vandenberg, yesterday I asked you the question if you were satisfied with our progress in air rearmament and you said you were not. Would you care to tell us in what details you are not satisfied?

General Vandenberg. To get into a technical discussion of difficulties that we find, Senator Johnson, I would——

Senator Johnson. Could you tell us what you think we ought to be doing that we are not doing, that would bring us nearer to today, when we would have protection that you think it is important that we have?

General Vandenberg. When I do that I would like to make clear that I am speaking purely now from the military point of view, and I realize again that even in this period there are other points that come into the problem that must be adequately considered by people who have other responsibilities than those that I have.

However, speaking purely from the military point of view, the control of raw materials, the availability, the speed with which we can assemble, the cost, all have important bearings on our ability to operate as rapidly as I think we should be doing.

Senator JOHNSON. Well, you do not think that we are operating as rapidly as we should. What do you think we can and should do about it?

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean the Congress?

General VANDENBERG. The first hope I would have, Senator, in connection with what you said previously, was that if things begin to look a little bit more rosy in Korea that we would not immediately start demobilizing or lowering our sights.

The world situation, whether Korea looks better or looks worse, is, in my opinion, going to remain for some period of time approximately as explosive as it is today; and any slight advance in any particular area of the world, rather than looking at the whole problem from the global threat that exists today to the United States and the other nations allied in its hope for a free world, must, in my opinion, make us realize that an unremitting effort, or let me say, a steady progress toward whatever goal Congress decides is adequate, must be obtained.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you getting the men for your Air Force? As I understand it, you are building up something over 500,000 to something over a million. Are you getting those men in as fast as you can take care of them economically and efficiently?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; there have been some delays due to public works moneys that had the Air Force obtained them earlier, greater numbers could have been taken care of and greater numbers could have been trained.

On the whole the public works requirement, as I said yesterday, goes hand in hand with the procurement of airplanes and people.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you getting the planes as fast as you want them?

General VANDENBERG. No; there is a slippage in aircraft production, some of which is probably normal, but others of which are caused by difficulty of getting raw materials and getting parts.

Senator JOHNSON. Yesterday you said something about the program of 30 percent guns and 70 percent butter. Do you think that that percentage should be changed?

General VANDENBERG. Well again, Senator Johnson, I would have to qualify my reply by again stating that there are many considerations other than the military that I recognize, but from a military point of view, I would certainly advocate changing it.

Senator JOHNSON. Are the aircraft production people operating as efficiently and as hurriedly as you think they should, or do you think we should intensify our efforts to step up our plane production over and above what we are now doing?

General VANDENBERG. I believe that everything is being done that is within the capabilities and limitations of the aircraft production people's hands to speed up the production of aircraft. I believe they are having difficulty in obtaining materials.

"BUYING TIME" IN KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. Now we have been talking a lot in these hearings about the time we are buying out there. We do not have enough divisions to start on the MacArthur program; that if we decided it was the wisest course, we would have to double our strategic air strength to inaugurate the air recommendations, and we would probably have to increase our fleet in order to carry out the naval recommendations.

Now this final question or observation that I would like to comment on: If we are buying time, it is important that we use that time and we use it advantageously. Are we doing that, in your judgment?

General Vandenberg. I would say in reply to that, Senator, that we are not going all-out by a long shot.

Senator Johnson. Now, actually is this time working in our favor or is it working in Russia's favor? We know that she is several years ahead of our estimate with the atomic bomb, we believe that our stockpile is considerably superior. But what comment do you have to make on this: I am sitting in my living room and I may have 100 45's around me, but if my enemy come up and shoots me through the window with only two 38's, it may do enough to knock me out and make my 100 45's useless.

Now I assume that this time we are buying, Russia is using to increase her stockpile of atomic bombs. We have been told that she is hurrying up her program of heavy bombers, and actually it may be that this time we are buying is going against us instead of aiding us. I would like to have your views on it and your observations on it.

General Vandenberg. Well, if war were a science instead of an art, Senator Johnson, I would answer unequivocally that time is not in our favor. On the other hand, there are diplomatic and military considerations that cannot be neatly added up, and, therefore, to express an opinion with any degree of assurance on a question which, if I might put it that way, is a little "iffy," would be in my opinion very difficult to do. I would say that the general indications would be that it is questionable whether time is on our side.

Chairman Russell. Your time is up, Senator.

Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Russell. Senator Smith.

MAC ARTHUR'S RECORD

Senator Smith. General, could I ask you when you first visited the Far East?

General Vandenberg. I believe the date was July 13, 1950.

Senator Smith. You had not been there prior to that or made any special study of the Far East?

General Vandenberg. No, sir.

Senator Smith. Would you agree that probably General MacArthur, with an experience of 15 to 20 years living in the Far East, was qualified to have a judgment as to far eastern politics and conditions out there?

General Vandenberg. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. I think you testified yesterday of your high regard for the wonderful job he did in the conquest of Japan and in the time leading up to VJ-day. You would also agree, would you not, that since VJ-day in Japan itself he did an outstanding job in the postwar period in bringing about the reconciliation of the Japanese people and probably bringing them into the group of western powers as opposed to the Communist influence?

General Vandenberg. I didn't say that, Senator, but I am very happy to say I agree with everything you say.

Senator SMITH. I just mentioned that as a background for my next question.

COLLINS' REASON FOR MAC ARTHUR RECALL

If my notes are correct, and I think we can check it from the testimony, General Collins made this statement, which rather surprised me: "General MacArthur was relieved not because of differences in strategy ideas, but because he carried his views to the people of the United States, not through the Commander in Chief."

In other words he was not relieved because he differed on strategy but he was relieved because he apparently talked out of turn, according to the views of those who were deciding his case. Is that your view?

General VANDENBERG. I think all of the chiefs had varying views as to their particular reasons.

Mine, I believe I expressed, Senator. I would be happy to do it again, if you desire.

Senator SMITH. I want, in my limited time, just to give you the high lights or high spots of the views I understand the chiefs had, for military reasons. I say military reasons, now, for relieving General MacArthur, because you weren't asked to go outside of the sphere of military reason, as I understand it.

General VANDENBERG. May I make the point, though, that the chiefs being three individuals, with varying reasons weighing upon them, do not come to the same conclusion for the same reason.

Obviously, they have varying factors that each of them weighs.

My particular concurrence in the action was due to the points that I have mentioned.

General Collins undoubtedly had different ones.

General Bradley, I believe, has expressed some other views; and I wouldn't be surprised but what Admiral Sherman might express some other ones.

VANDENBERG'S REASON FOR MAC ARTHUR RELIEF

Senator SMITH. I think it would be helpful, to me at least, and probably to the committee, as we have so much testimony here from the different people that we are not quite clear; if you could give us just a quick summary for your particular reasons for thinking that General MacArthur ought to be relieved.

General VANDENBERG. I concurred in the relief of General MacArthur because it was my opinion that because of the broad directives that must necessarily be given to a theater commander, in which the interpretation could approach either one end or the other of that broad interpretation, knowing the views that he held so strongly, which were not in consonance with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the President, that it was better to have a man in the position of interpreting the broad directives who thought more nearly in consonance with the objectives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President.

Senator SMITH. Well, could you give me, very briefly, the fundamental difference in point of view between Geenral MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on policy?

General VANDENBERG. Well, sir——

Senator SMITH. Was it a question of limiting the war to Korea, was it the bombing that you have been discussing; was it his general attitude, or what?

I can't make it out.

General VANDENBERG. I think they are tied together, Senator, in the point of view that as I understand it General MacArthur had—of not necessarily limiting the war to Korea, or willing to go it alone without allies, if the allies did not come in with us, and to impose a blockade, to bomb across the Yalu, to possibly enlarge the war, although, as I said before, my reason for recommending against bombing across the Yalu was a purely military one, and had nothing to do with the views that I believe had been presented here before.

Senator SMITH. Well, when can it be said that you first discovered there was a fundamental difference of view between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Washington?

You said your first trip there was in January 1950. Was that the time when you discovered the difference?

Chairman CONNALLY. Not January——

Senator SMITH. July, whatever it was; I am trying to locate the time when this developed.

General VANDENBERG. I think that would be very difficult, Senator, for this reason: That there is no particular point in my position with regard to General MacArthur where there was a definite time when the change occurred.

I believe it was an accumulation over a long period of time, and, as I said yesterday, I believe the removal of General MacArthur had to do with many factors other than those purely military; that from the military point of view, the point or points that I have made were the ones that determined me in my concurrence in his removal.

Senator SMITH. Well, you don't agree entirely then with General Collins' statement that I read a moment ago, that General MacArthur was relieved not because of differences in strategy ideas, but because he carried it to the people of the United States and not to the Commander in Chief?

General VANDENBERG. Oh, I would say, Senator, in answer to that—that that had some slight impact, undoubtedly, on my decision, but was not the determining factor by a long shot.

JCS WRITTEN REASONS FOR MAC ARTHUR'S DISMISSAL

Senator SMITH. Well, I refer to the three reasons given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which appear on pages 2275 and 2276 of the testimony, the reasons given in writing, which I understood were drawn up substantially after the dismissal of General MacArthur, as sort of recollection of the Joint Chiefs as to why they had made the recommendations they did. The first one was that he was out of accord or sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea. That made it difficult for him to carry out the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives.

Now, the testimony we have had has been right straight through, with the exception of one incident which I think was cleared up finally, that in every single instance he carried out absolutely any military directive that he received, and that there was no complaint whatever about his not carrying out military directives.

Therefore, I am wondering what the point is of saying it is difficult for him to. If he was a good soldier and did carry them out, it seems to me it is difficult to make that a real reason to abruptly dismiss him. That is the first point. I am very much troubled about that.

Have you any feeling yourself about whether or not General MacArthur ever failed to carry out a military directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General VANDENBERG. Well, as I said yesterday, Senator, that gets into the question of legal arguments as to whether or not you state that he did or did not. It gets into a lot of "iffy" questions, and since it had no bearing on my concurrence, I would rather leave that problem, because surely that, from my point of view, had nothing to do with my concurrence.

Senator SMITH. Then that first reason was not one of your reasons really.

General VANDENBERG. The first reason was, sir, with the addition which I have stated here, that it would be difficult for him to carry out the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives.

Then if you take that in connection with what I said before that the broad directives that must necessarily be given and the interpretation of those broad directives can swing from one end of the pendulum clear to the other one, and that therefore when you have in Washington one point of view, very clearly defined, and someone who has a broad directive, which many times he has to interpret, if he cannot always interpret it in the light of the people back home, it becomes difficult for him, because he holds very strong views to the contrary; it becomes difficult, therefore, to carry out the spirit and intent.

Therefore, I thought that it was more advantageous to have someone more in consonance with it.

MAC ARTHUR-WASHINGTON SPIRIT OF RELATIONSHIP

Senator SMITH. Now, General, let me pass to the second reason because my time is limited: The second reason advanced was that General MacArthur had failed to comply with the President's directive of December 6. He did not say that, but that is what he means, that is to clear the statements on policy before making the statement public. Then he was criticized for taking independent action and for negotiating directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice, in spite of the fact that he knew that the President had such consideration at top Government level. In that connection the three things that were mentioned were the Martin letter, which the President himself later said was a contributing cause but not conclusive, the Veterans of Foreign Wars statement with regard to the strategic importance of Formosa, and the March 24 armistice negotiations statement.

I am now just trying to get clear in my mind whether you thought that those three things were a violation of the spirit of the relationship between General MacArthur and Washington.

General VANDENBERG. Well, I would say, Senator, that my impression was formed in connection, again, with the first paragraph, in which it was more of the reasons that I have just explained, that under my concurrence, my comment on the second paragraph would be that I felt that it would certainly have been more in keeping with the spirit of what was desired in Washington if the message that was sent to him about the President preparing to make a statement—if he had waited or sent his proposed statement back here before he had announced it. That is the sole part of that particular paragraph that would have any bearing on my point of view.

MAC ARTHUR'S NEWSWEEK STATEMENT

Senator SMITH. In that connection for the record, I want to say that I have been trying to check that particular matter up because some issue was taken with the statement that General MacArthur sent to Newsweek magazine under date of April 16, which was published under date of April 16, where he said, as we read into the record yesterday or the day before:

> The statement contained in your issue of April 2 to the effect that prior to the issuance of my statement on March 24 of the military situation in Korea I had been furnished a copy of a policy statement by the President cleared by the governments having military forces in Korea is entirely without basis in fact. I have never seen such a statement and do not know if it even exists. Please publish this in the interest of truth.

Newsweek published that statement by General MacArthur. I thought it had clarified the situation, but the suggestion was made here by other witnesses that they felt that MacArthur did know that these negotiations were going on. So, I have made an inquiry myself from people who are reliable, and I can quote them, if necessary, but I prefer not to because they prefer not to be mixed up with this, and I prepared this statement which I want to go into the record now on this point.

I said that last Friday, May 25, I inserted into the record of these hearings the text of a telegram which I have just read, which General MacArthur sent to Newsweek magazine on March 31, denying he had ever received the text of the proposed Presidential statement or United Nations aims in Korea.

This telegram was occasioned by a story in the then current issue of Newsweek, which reported that this text had been sent to General MacArthur in Tokyo.

I think the record will show that General Bradley said that that text had been sent to General MacArthur in Tokyo.

The telegram of retraction by MacArthur here, or that he had not seen it, was published in the April 16 issue of Newsweek.

Speaking for myself, I have checked into this matter carefully and have obtained corroborating information from a completely reliable source.

My information is that for some weeks after General MacArthur issued his statement of March 24, there was an assumption in the minds of top officials in Washington that the text of the proposed Presidential statement had in fact been sent to General MacArthur and that he had used that text as a partial basis for his own statement.

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

However, it is now definitely established that the proposed Presidential statement never was sent to Tokyo, that the only intimation to General MacArthur that such a statement might be made was the message of March 20 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which began as follows, as we know:

> State Department planning Presidential announcement shortly——

Chairman Russell. Senator, I have let you run over your time, but inasmuch as that is the record, I do not think we would be justified——

Senator Morse. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Smith be allowed to finish reading his statement.

Chairman Russell. Without objection.

Senator Smith. I just quoted the first part of this March 20 statement:

> State Department planning Presidential announcement shortly that with the clearing of the bulk of South Korean aggression United Nations now prepared to discuss settlement conditions in Korea.

In light of these facts, we can dismiss once and for all any discussion that General MacArthur made improper use of a confidential draft in Washington of framing his own appeal to the enemy commander in Korea. The fact is the draft had never been sent to him and he did not even know that it existed.

I wanted to get that in the record because if there is any question about it, we can certainly have testimony from either the Joint Chiefs or somebody else as this particular matter has apparently done a great harm to General MacArthur's reputation, and I want to have it clarified, if I may.

I do not know whether I have any more time, but I would like to know if you have any comment on that or whether you are not familiar with that altercation?

General Vandenberg. As to whether or not General Bradley's text had been sent to General MacArthur, I can't testify of my own knowledge. I believe that the record would clear that.

Senator Smith. I might say this in defense of General Bradley; he did say that, and then it was corrected—that it had not been sent exactly as a text. He thought the gist of it had been sent.

General Vandenberg. However, from my own point of view, whether the text had been sent or not would have made very little difference to me. The only point that I would have in formulating an opinion either to concur or not to concur with removing General MacArthur would be solely upon the basis as to whether or not a message had been received by him that the President was considering a statement in reference to some method of approach to the forces fighting over there in opposition to ours, and that from my point of view it would have been more advisable to have either cleared his armistice statement or to have waited for more information.

Senator Smith. Has my time expired, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Smith. I will want to pursue it a little further.

Chairman Russell. Senator Morse.

JCS TESTIMONY

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, in proceeding I want to make these brief comments:

The excellent testimony of General Vandenberg has completely satisfied me that, No. 1, he concurred in the recall of General Mac-

Arthur for military reasons and because, as I understand him, he felt the Government was entitled to one voice and not to two, speaking on foreign military policy in Asia.

Secondly, he has completely satisfied me that at no time did he, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agree with General MacArthur's program for extending the war in Asia.

And, lastly, Mr. Chairman, the testimony that he just gave in response to Senator Smith carries great weight with me because it is verified by the record, the secret exhibit that we have before us that sets out the paraphrases of the various communications that were sent to General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from General MacArthur. General MacArthur was clearly advised that the President of the United States was in the process of trying to negotiate some terms with our allies, or agreement among our allies, for a settlement of the war in Korea by way of at least proffering an armistice to the enemy.

I am certainly of the opinion that on the basis of that message, which General Vandenberg and the other witnesses we have heard verify was sent to General MacArthur, a spirit of teamwork with the Commander in Chief, I think, placed General MacArthur under clear obligation to check with his commander in advance to make certain as to whether or not the ultimatum that he issued to the enemy leaders in any way was inconflict with what the President was trying to work out, or would in any way embarrass the President, instead of using his voice independently of the voice of the President.

I would make no point of the fact that the text was not sent to him. I see no reason why the text should have been sent to him when it was still in the process of negotiation.

I think that General Vandenberg has performed a great public service in his testimony before this committee, and Iwould that every American could read it. As far as I am concerned, it makes clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not followed a course of action, for which they have been criticized by some segments of the American press, of acting as rubber stamps or stooges of proponents of a policy with which they were not in fact in agreement.

Here we have had the testimony now of three of them under oath, which leaves me satisfied that they have lived up to the highest tradition of American military officers in advising their superiors of their point of view; and they came to the conclusion, and so notified their Commander in Chief, that they did not agree with the MacArthur program—for application at the time that he recommended its application, at least.

Therefore, in light of that testimony, Mr. Chairman, I will be inclined to say, as a lawyer, at this point in the trial that I would rest, and I have no further questions to ask the general.

General VANDENBERG. Mr. Chairman, may I put a note that I have just received from Admiral Davis into the hearings so that I can clarify a statement I made and correct it?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General VANDENBERG. This is from Admiral Davis:

> General Vandenberg said a while ago that he thought I was present at the meeting of the Chiefs in General Bradley's office at 5 p. m. on Thursday, April 5. I wasn't there and did not know of the meeting.

I thought that should be put in in clarification. If the chairman will recall, I stated that I had a somewhat hazy recollection that he might have been there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I recall you stated you were not definite in your statement.

Chairman CONNALLY. Are you talking about Admiral Davis?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green.

INCREASED AIR FORCE

Senator GREEN. General Vandenberg, you made a very clear and cogent argument for an increased Air Force. I congratulate you on it.

There is one point, however, in that connection it seems to me might be emphasized more than it has been, and that is this: The difference between preparation for a possible third world war and the preparation which was made and was possible to be made in connection with other wars in all past history of the world.

In other wars it has always been felt preparation could be made when war had been declared or war had broken out. Time was bought—sometimes very expensively in life and money, but it was bought. But in the next war, if it comes, is it not likely there will be no time to be bought even at an extravagant price? We will have to fight with what we have at the time; is that not so?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, Senator. I am a firm believer in that, especially in connection with air forces. Air power must be in being, in my opinion, to be of any value in the next war, because of the swiftness with which it can operate.

I would like to add to what you have said, that the Air Force that I am advocating being built in connection with questions asked me at this hearing is, in my opinion, to prevent world war III rather than to get ready for it. I would just like to make that slight distinction, sir.

Senator GREEN. Well, it would perhaps act as a deterrent but if war broke out, it would also serve as a defense.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. It would serve both purposes, would it not?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. Well, it is also true that we have advance information now, which we really seldom had in the past, as to the coming of war, in view of the fact that one of the world's great powers has not only declared—its representative has declared—the desire to conquer the world, but it has entered upon a policy of armed aggression which has been recognized by all the nations, the 52 nations of the United Nations, which the majority of them have taken part in repelling.

Now, with such evidence of intention, isn't it an additional reason why we should prepare to the extent we can and do it promptly?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. You agree with that?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator GREEN. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

AIRCRAFTS SENT TO NATO COUNTRIES

Senator CAIN. General Vandenberg, against your response to some of the questions of Senator Bridges this morning and because of my assumption that the Russians in a pretty good way know what we are doing in Western Europe, may I ask how many planes of the types requested by your air commanders in Korea have we sent to France and our other allies in NATO during recent months? And if that answer is not immediately available, General, and should you think it proper, I would merely appreciate your providing us with that answer in due time.

General VANDENBERG. I will try and provide that, Senator.

FIRST JCS MEETING

Senator CAIN. Thank you, General.

Permit me to go back for one minute, if you will, to that first JCS meeting which took place on Thursday, April 5. General Bradley testified that he called the meeting because sometime earlier in the day some person, whose name he simply could not recall—and I think he meant exactly that—had called to advise him that the President was concerned with some recent public utterances of General MacArthur.

I wonder if during the course of that first meeting General Bradley advised the other service chiefs as to where that call or from whom did that call come.

General VANDENBERG. To my knowledge, it was not discussed, Senator.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

BECOMING INVOLVED IN KOREAN WAR

General Vandenberg, we haven't gotten very much testimony on how we became involved in this war in Korea. I would deeply appreciate it if you would recollect your memory as best you can concerning those meetings, if any, at which you were in attendance at Blair House when the subject of committing American forces to Korea was discussed.

General VANDENBERG. In order to get the dates, Senator, and to get generally the timing on that, may I have until this afternoon to see if I can assemble that in some sort of orderly fashion for you?

Senator CAIN. Not only I, but I think the record would appreciate and benefit from a recitation. What I am getting at is this, General Vandenberg: We are talking these days and very seriously, too, about the hazards and the risks involved in Korea should any considerable portion of General MacArthur's recommendations be agreed to and carried out.

Therefore, I am anxious to know, within reason anyway, what consideration of those risks was given last June. It appears to me from hindsight, admittedly, that much of what worries us today ought to have been recognizable and should have worried us last June; and I think of you in your official capacity as a member of the JCS, and after you have had an opportunity to refresh your memory, perhaps you will tell us what, if anything, you were called upon to recommend and other details concerning those meetings, if you will, please, sir.

POLITICAL MISSION IN KOREA

General Vandenberg, on yesterday, the first day you testified, I understood you to say that you did not understand our Korean mission to be that of driving the Red Chinese out of Korea. This morning, in response to one or another of the Senators, you said why you did not think that was our objective.

I want to be certain that I have understood your position. During the earlier days in our hearings every witness, I think, has testified—and, so far as I know, all members of the committee are in agreement—that our political mission in Korea is this:

We seek to make of Korea a unified, free, and self-controlled nation; or, as I think it was General Bradley who stated it, we seek to make Korea united, independent, and democratic.

My question is this: Are we pursuing a course of military action in Korea which insofar as the allied nations are concerned is designed or has any chance of fulfilling this political mission, which undeniably was what got us into Korea in the first place?

General VANDENBERG. I would say, in answer to the last part of that, that in my opinion there is a chance, Senator——

Senator CAIN. Would you press that yourself a bit further, General, as to how you think our limited operation can carry out our full-scale military mission?

General VANDENBERG. There is a chance, I believe, that the Chinese can get so completely knocked about and their trained forces can be so decimated and the people back home can raise enough opposition that even in that type of government it would be very difficult to carry on the war that far from Chinese territory. I say there is a chance.

The operations from the military point of view that are being carried on there at the present time, I would say, have a more limited objective of restoring, at least initially, to South Korea the threat of aggression that came down into her territory and of freeing the territory below the thirty-eighth parallel from that aggression.

Senator CAIN. Let us assume, General Vandenberg, that some of what I might characterize as being your intangibles and your imponderables, come true in our favor, and that the Chinese Reds actually get out of Korea, more on a decision to be made by them than by virtue of any decision by us imposed upon them. Would it be your view that simply because the North Koreans and the Red Chinese had stopped fighting that our political mission would have been carried out, which to restate it is to make Korea unified, free, and self-controlled?

General VANDENBERG. In answer to the first part, Senator, I am not sure that I can agree that it would be entirely voluntary on their part.

If we are successful in decimating the hard core of the trained Chinese Communist forces, I feel that a decision that they might take that the war over there is costing more than what they could possibly get out of it would be imposed upon them at least to some extent by us.

Now as to the second part of the question——

Senator CAIN. As to whether or not our political mission would have been accomplished by the mere withdrawing of the Chinese Reds.

General VANDENBERG. I would say that any time an armistice or a cessation of hostilities has occurred prior to the complete defeat, unconditional surrender of the aggressor is always a question that has to be hedged by diplomatic provisions, and the threat in my opinion exists to some degree after those diplomatic conditions have been met.

I believe that if the defeat that is handed to the Chinese Communists is sufficient to cause them to withdraw, knowing the loss of face that would entail, that the chances of their resuming it again in the near future would be relatively slight, knowing that the United States as we prepare, as we increase our Armed Forces on the course which we have set for ourselves would next time call down upon their head greater difficulties than had caused them orginally to cease hostilities, and therefore while there is always that danger inherent in anything except unconditional surrender, I believe that the chances are favorable.

ASSUMING RED CHINESE WITHDRAWAL

Senator CAIN. General Vandenberg, thank you, sir.

In a very sincere effort to determine what our present policy actually is in Korea, we make many an assumption.

I try, for example, to put myself in the enemy's position.

Were I that enemy, I would give serious consideration, particularly when the weather gets bad, to withdrawing my forces north of the Yalu River, for purposes of regrouping; for purposes of training; for purposes of relaxation; and for other, I think, sound reasons.

Now, let's assume, for I take it, it must be one of the items involved in our conjectures, that the Red Chinese did withdraw.

If that happened, it seemed to me that we neither would have carried out our political mission nor would we be in a position for an indeterminable period of time to return our American forces and allied forces to their home countries.

The result would be a period of stagnation during which allied forces in considerable numbers were tied down in an area of the world where they least want to be.

What would we do if the Red Chinese decided to get out without having deliberated with us at a council or armistice table?

General VANDENBERG. I would think, Senator, that there are two possibilities: One is that through the application of diplomatic means we might secure a better type of peace than that which you have described; and the other is, in my opinion, a more perhaps plausible method of arranging that this be more complete than the situation which you have described, which would be to continue building up the United States Air Force, with the "big stick" policy that you have talked about, talk softly and carry a big stick.

And that I do not believe would be such an interminable length of time, because I believe if we bend our energies within the next year and a half, that we could achieve something like the effect that might be necessary to convince them that to step again across that border would be most difficult for them as a nation.

Senator CAIN. Well, your views have importance to our studies, sir. If I have time, I have one more question.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have a half minute, Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. I would prefer then, sir, to reserve the other questions I have in mind for a later time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, the committee will now stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1:13 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 3:30 p. m. the same afternoon.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Smith, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette, Bridges, Johnson, Morse, Knowland, Cain, and Long.

Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order.

Senator Hickenlooper, you seem to be the lead-off man on this team.

UTILITY OF AIR FORCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Vandenberg, I would like to pursue for just a few minutes the theory of the utility of our Air Force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I did not understand you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The theory of the utility of our Air Force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Oh, I thought you said "futility."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I understand it, the generally accepted theory of Air Force operations falls roughly into three categories. One is strategic, which is considerably ahead of the immediate battle area designed to disrupt sources of supply and so on in general.

Another is tactical operations somewhat out in front generally of the immediate battle area but still in support of the ground and other operations in the immediate battle area, and a third is what they call close support on occasions of the ground troops in immediate and specific objectives on the ground.

Now, so far as the Air Force itself, our strategic concept of the Air Force is concerned, will you give me a definition of the generally accepted and perhaps restricted interpretation of the term "freedom of maneuver" of the Air Force, strategic and otherwise.

I have been told repeatedly that the Air Force uses the term "freedom of maneuver" in a rather restrictive but quite definitive way.

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I don't recall ever having heard the expression used that way. It seems to me that that generally has been applied to land forces more than it has to air forces.

AIR FORCE DEPENDENCE ON BASES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, if you have not heard it applied, may I suggest what my understanding of at least the field that I am getting into may be.

In order to operate the Air Force, the Air Force must depend upon bases, they must operate from a base some place. The mere fact that an airplane can fly around in the air does not mean that it can flit from here to there at will. It is more or less tied down to operating from specific bases where it can be resupplied, where it can be repaired, if necessary, either temporary or further back for major repairs. Is that not true? The Air Force is not necessarily a free agent like the birds that can fly from here to there and settle down most any place and replenish themselves. You are tied pretty much to rigid bases from which you operate.

General VANDENBERG. Well, I would say that that is not true, Senator, except in the sense that after having gone halfway around the world or around the world and coming back to your base, that same day you have got to sit down for repairs and rest, and probably put a new crew aboard.

A modern airplane, I believe we demonstrated, can fly around the world nonstop through the method of refueling in the air, which does not require a base to be provided for the airplane that is refueling except the base that it starts from and the base that someday it is going to come down on. Obviously there is a limit.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Your refueling plane has to have a base, does it not?

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir. Obviously there is a place where you start and a place where you end, but the only point I wanted to make was that in no sense can we say that under a thought that they are tied to a base restricts the operation to any great extent in the air.

Of course, anything on this globe has to stop and start somewhere here on it, except with free gas, or something.

FREEDOM OF MANEUVER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is very true. I don't mean to say any one plane is tied to a specific base, because it is like a homing pigeon, but any airplane that takes to the air, and continuously operates, not 24 hours a day, but keeping in operation, must depend upon a base some place, maybe not the one it took off from, but some other base. It has got to have a base to come to.

General VANDENBERG. That is right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, if those bases are successful, depending upon whether they are temporary bases or permanent bases, are they actually quite rigid? That is, you cannot simply pick up a base and move it over to some place else. That base has to stay there doesn't it?

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I refer to the base from which one plane is supposed to take off, when it goes to another; those are rigid bases, and those have to be known and are a part of the operations. Isn't it correct that a large part of the operations depend upon a series of permanent, that is, some so-called rigid installations?

General VANDENBERG. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I refer to whether we were to take off from a base in the United States, and use a base in Europe after a few days, for that same plane, or whether we use one in the Orient, or some place else.

Now, I would like to ask this question of you, which I think goes to the heart of our air power program of operations:

Are we in any way restricted or curtailed through commitments for installations, or through agreements, either here or abroad, so that the complete freedom of maneuver of the Air Force of the United States is hampered or restricted?

In other words, if I can make it a little clearer, are we so tied up in any way, so that we are not completely free agents as to when, how, and how much of the American Air Force we can use at any time in our sole discretion?

I may go a step further, because I want this perfectly clear. Have we hedged ourselves about with agreements, so far as you know, for the use of American airpower and equipment so that we are in any measure subservient in the last analysis or controlled in the last analysis in the unlimited and uninhibited use of this airpower and air strength ourselves?

General VANDENBERG. Well, I would say, Senator, that as far as United States bases are concerned, the answer to your question is "no."

On the other hand, I know of no agreements other than those that are inherent in a grouping of nations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where nations will be used, the power of the various nations will be used to prevent aggression against one of the member nations, I know of no agreement in the sense that I believe you are asking about that inhibits it.

On the other hand, to be perfectly clear, I would feel that I must bring to your attention the fact that a base in a foreign nation is there at the will of that government, of course.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand, but if I may further clarify a little bit, are we committed to maintain bases in certain other places, which carries with it the requirement that we keep any specified or any comparable—by whatever yardstick you want to measure it—number of planes in that vicinity which would under agreement prevent us from taking those planes away at any time to use them in some other part of the world, if we in our own opinion saw fit to do it?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; none that I know of.

RESTRICTING AIR POWER

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask you to leave out the political implications in this matter, and consider the ground and military operation, in all of its phases in Korea including an enemy that is attacking from across the border of the Yalu. In your opinion, has air power been allowed to satisfactorily operate so far as the military operations are concerned, or has it been restricted in certain of its fields of normal potential of air power?

General VANDENBERG. Well, obviously, Senator, from what is well known the army that is facing us in Korea is supplied by matériel from Russia and in a normal operation where you would utilize your air power, that air power would be directed against the industrial source which supplies those arms, in that sense surely air power has been restricted in the Korean operation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that the so-called long-range strategic operation of air power, which is to hit deep in the enemy's territory, as deeply as practicable and destroy his potential for resupplying his troops or for regrouping or things of that kind, that has not been, in fact, used in this Korean operation?

General VANDENBERG. No, Senator, for the reason that I have just mentioned.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

ARSENALS EXISTING IN MANCHURIA

Do you know how many, what you might call, major arsenals or arsenals of any size, exist in Manchuria? Isn't there one at Mukden?

General VANDENBERG. By arsenals——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we can always get around technical descriptions; I could not tell you how many lathes they had in it or anything of that kind, but is it not pretty well known that there are arsenal facilities for the repairing of military equipment and for production of certain types of at least small arms ammunition and the repair of small arms and trucks and things of that kind at Mukden?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; it is generally accepted.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about a half minute, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And also isn't there an installation of that type—I don't know the size of it—considered to be located at Harbin?

General VANDENBERG. I am informed that there is a small one, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. Well, I did not know about the size. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

AIR FORCE EFFICIENCY RELATIVE TO BASES

Senator McMAHON. General, I am going to be very short indeed, I think. I understand, General—I have had to be away on some other committee's business—that you have been examined somewhat about our allies, and I do not wish to repeat, but I am interested in developing somewhat your estimate of the importance of our allies in relation to the efficiency of the United States Air Force. Can I ask one question off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

General VANDENBERG. I have generally by stating that the efficiency of the Air Force—let me put it this way. In order to operate efficiently, the closer your bases are, the more efficient is your operation. The farther the bases, the less efficient is your operation, the more air power you need to do the job, and the length of time to do the job increases.

Senator McMAHON. I remember your saying that, General, but what I want to do is to particularize a little more with the globe in mind.

I wanted you to stake out portions of the globe that you regard as critical for air force operations of today and today's equipment which are held by our allies.

General VANDENBERG. By our so-called United Nations Organization, by the NATO Organization, or by the people who are fighting at our side in Korea?

I believe there is a difference in the three.

Senator McMAHON. I was thinking about geography. I was thinking in terms of geography.

General VANDENBERG. I was thinking in terms of allies.

[Deleted.]

Senator McMAHON. By what percentage would you state that our efficiency of our Air Force is increased by the possession of those bases and the right to use them?

General VANDENBERG. That's a rather difficult question to put in percentages, Senator. I would say roughly that the possession of adequate bases in the proper places, compared to operating solely from the territory in the Western Hemisphere that the United States owns itself, excluding, of course, Canada, but including Alaska, with the possession of only those bases, I believe I made a rough estimate yesterday that it would take a much longer time to accomplish our objective, it would take a much larger air force. I believe I guessed, and it was rather an off-the-cuff guess, that it was perhaps five or six times as large a force.

Now that would be generally talking about the strategic air force. It is very difficult to arrive at a much greater percentage than that. You might relate to when you have to operate with two or three refuelings, your time under fire is greater, you have to more or less come out in the same direction that you went in, the number of missions that you can get is greatly reduced, the amount of destructive material that you can carry is reduced because part of the load would have to be gasoline rather than bombs, which you could change to bombs if you were closer, and factors like that.

Senator McMAHON. All of that adds up to this, then, does it not, General?—that the policy of going it alone is not too attractive a one at the present time.

General VANDENBERG. My personal opinion of that, Senator, would be that is one of the factors which operate against the advisability of going it alone. I don't believe it is the sole factor.

Senator McMAHON. But certainly in weighing any prospective military course, is not one of the prime factors that must be taken into consideration, the maintenance of the solidarity of our alliances?

General VANDENBERG. I agree that that is a most desirable objective.

Senator McMAHON. Thank you, General, very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

AIR FORCE DECISIVE IN RESTRAINING RUSSIA

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, I have been very interested in your testimony of yesterday and today. If I understand correctly, you believe that the existence of our Air Force is now the decisive element in restraining Russia from attacking Western Europe and the free world; is that correct?

Geenral VANDENBERG. I believe I made the statement, Senator; it has been up to this time in my opinion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is the decisive element, I believe you said, in the balance of power in our favor. Something to the effect that it is the restraining element. Is that correct?

General VANDENBERG. In my opinion, yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You feel that to use up our Air Force on China and Manchuria would expose us to attack without our having adequate Air Force in defense; is that correct? Is that what you meant by attrition and using it up?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; I would not expect that the entire Air Force would be used up, but that portion of it would be used up, which, in my opinion, would be dangerous, since we are now operating on what I termed the other day a shoestring Air Force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, is it fair to say that if we lose many of the planes before 1953, when, as I understand it, you expect adequate replacements to begin to appear, that we will have destroyed the main force which is today preventing an all-out third world war?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; it would seriously impair it, in my opinion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then, isn't it fair to say that not only would the use of our Air Force in Manchuria tend to precipitate a world war, but if war then should break it out, we would be without an adequate defense?

General VANDENBERG. The latter would be the primary consideration from my point of view, although I agree that there is a factor in the first part of the statement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Now, General MacArthur in his testimony, if I recall correctly, said something to this effect: That major increase in the power of Russia relative to the United States power would tend to enhance the likelihood of an attack by Russia—any major increase in their power relative to ours—it would throw the balance more strongly in her favor.

We were talking about it in another connection, but I think it is consistent with your view that if we used up a large part of our Air Force, particularly our strategic long-range Air Force, in Manchuria, that that would have a tendency, assuming Russia intends to attack us some time, to precipitate such an attack. It would be a relative weakening of ourselves. Is that correct logic, and do you subscribe to it?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, the answer to that would be, from my point of view, is that it would appear to me to be logical.

What the Soviet would do or not do is to me a very iffy question based upon that——

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General VANDENBERG (continuing). But certainly the point I tried to make this morning is that any tendency to diminish our ability to react aggressively with the one potential that we have, in my mind has been a deterrent to war at this time, and it——

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General VANDENBERG (continuing). And if removed, would certainly make it easier for a decision to engage in war with the United States if that was their purpose.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Sure. Well, it seems to me that follows. If it is a deterrent up to this point, and you remove the deterrent, then you would say that would tend to cause that effect which its existence deterred. That is what seems to me to be the proper logic.

General VANDENBERG. I believe that is correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Granted, of course, if we do not know what their purposes are. There is a difference of opinion about that ultimate purpose.

IS WAR INEVITABLE?

I asked, I think, each of the witnesses whether they considered war with Russia as being inevitable. Would you care to express your opinion about that?

General VANDENBERG. Well, there are so many if's and so many unknowns in there, Senator, that it would be, at best, a guess on my part.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General VANDENBERG. I would certainly say that we were defeatists in our mind if we thought that there was no possibility for peace, and that war was inevitable. If I believed that, I am sure that I would advocate full mobilization and all the other necessities that go along with preparing for that inevitable war, and I do not believe that that, in fact, is true, although I must confess that my hope for a peaceful world situation is rather limited.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, it is a rather gloomy picture, at the moment?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think I agree with that. My own feeling is that it isn't hopeless, but that it has a very gloomy look.

General VANDENBERG. I concur with that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is pretty bad.

PRINCIPLE OF UNITED NATIONS

Do you feel that the United Nations is a proper approach to this problem?

I mean I realize its weaknesses, and I don't want to get you too far astray. It is just your own private opinion I want.

Assuming that something can be done in this field, that human nature isn't completely without hope, is that a reasonably well-designed machinery, in your opinion?

I realize that perhaps it is a little out of your regular training, but it would be interesting to know what your views are on it.

General VANDENBERG. As you say, Senator, it is a little out of my sphere.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Sure.

General VANDENBERG. However, commenting on it, I would say that the idea and objective behind the United Nations is most laudable; that we should do what we can to give it a chance to succeed.

On the other hand, some such organization of states which are interested in very similar activities, in a similar way of life, and in a similar approach to freedom, let us say, or dignity of the indivdual, and rights of the individual, are more likely to make a cohesive instrument forcibly maintaining peace, perhaps, than the United Nations; but surely by nothing that I have said do I want to indicate—I do not want to in any way indicate that I am not wholeheartedly behind the principle of the United Nations.

I think it is a wonderful effort and we must, in my opinion, support it with everything we have, and hope that it is going to work.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If we can reach a tolerable or acceptable, I should say, settlement of the Korean matter which you do not consider appeasement, but if we repulse the aggression of the Chinese and the North Koreans, if we do reach such an agreement, wouldn't that have a very great strengthening effect on the United Nations and the respect in which it is regarded by the world? Wouldn't you say that?

General VANDENBERG. I believe it would. I think that this present endeavor is the first opportunity we have had to really breathe some life into the principles for which it stands.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, a few good victories, we will say, or successes for the United Nations in bringing about a cooperative action would be the best thing in the world to strengthen it and make people have respect for it in the future and make it a success to prevent war, would it not?

General VANDENBERG. I believe it would.

AIR POWER IN THE PHILIPPINES, DECEMBER 7, 1941

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, do you know how many planes we had in the Philippines on December 7, 1941?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; I do not. I will try and find that figure for you.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was an investigation ever made by the Air Force with regard to the situation and the loss of our planes on December 7, 1941?

General VANDENBERG. I am not familiar with it. When that investigation was made, if it was made, I was not in Washington. I will endeavor to find that out and supply it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You can find that out and supply it for us?

General VANDENBERG. I will endeavor to, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know of any reason why an investigation was not made of that incident similar to the investigation that was made at Pearl Harbor?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I am afraid you have caught me a little bit here. I am not very aware of the situation of which you are talking.

I was engaged at the time, I believe, in other matters, and I believe about the time that the investigation would have been made, if it was, I was probably in England preparing the plans for the invasion of Africa.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am sure you were plenty busy. I thought maybe you had heard since you have been in your position what went on. It is a matter that has been raised several times, and so on, and a lot of talk is going on about it.

I thought maybe it was a good time for us to clear up some of the uncertainties surrounding it, for the good of all concerned, including the principal reasons for this whole study, namely, General MacArthur.

I have received letters, and of course you have seen it written about in the press. I think it would be a good thing if you could supply to the committee a few of those basic facts.

Number one, how many planes did we have and how many were lost on December 7 in the Japanese raid. How many were on the ground and lost on the ground, and how many in the air? You had some bombers. You had a fair air force, didn't you. Didn't you have some bombers and fighters and so on?

General VANDENBERG. There was a very small force in the Philippine Islands of the Air Force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would that be very difficult for you to secure for the committee?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I can't answer that. I can assure you that if we have it and it can be made available, I will certainly dig it out.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would assume that it was just common sense to say that if the planes had not been destroyed at Clark Field on that afternoon, that we might have been able to put up a more effective resistance to the Japanese. That follows necessarily, doesn't it?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir, again depending on the force that was available in the Philippines with which I am not very conversant at the moment.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I wonder if you would have your staff also ascertain exactly at what time on December 7 the Japanese struck Clark Field in the Philippines.

General VANDENBERG. We will endeavor to do that, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would be interested in any messages or any information in your files that you can find with regard to the question of the dispersal of the planes, whether or not any of the Joint Chiefs of Staff——

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Had made any recommendations, if there had been any discussion whatever of the question of disposal of the planes, and so on.

I think that whole matter should be cleared up in the committees, and I know of no better place to do it than in these hearings.

I noticed in one of the columnists—or the report of some magazine laterly, something regarding a Gen. Louis Brereton. Is there such a general still in the Army or in the Air Corps?

General VANDENBERG. General Brereton retired about a year ago.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was he is the Air Force?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was he at Manila?

General VANDENBERG. I believe he was.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It was alleged that he had urged the dispersal of planes and that there had been some controversy over that. If you can ascertain that, that would help.

General VANDENBERG. Correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General I believe that is all the questions, except I wanted to say that I think your testimony has been extremely helpful, certainly to me, and I think to the committee, on this whole question.

General VANDENBERG. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey.
(No response.)
Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman.
(No response.)
Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette.
(No response.)
Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster.
(No response.)
Chairman Russell. Chairman Russell. I pass. Senator Connally.
Chairman Connally. I pass.
Chairman Russell. Senator Connally passes. Senator Wiley.
(No response.)
Chairman Russell. Senator George.
(No response.)
Chairman Russell. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Is this the third round, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Russell. I beg your pardon?
Senator Smith. Do I understand this is the third round?
Chairman Russell. Yes, sir.

EXTERNAL POWERS INVOLVED IN CHINA

Senator Smith. I have only one or two questions to ask the general.

General Vandenberg, do you believe that what has happened in China is a conquest of that country by Soviet Russia and that there is consequently a control of China today by an external power, namely, Russia.

General Vandenberg. Not exactly, Senator. I believe that it was the conquest of China by Chinese who were aided and abetted by Russia, and because of that aid and because of the position of Russia, which makes China dependent upon her for military supplies and other supplies, because of the training of the top Chinese Communists in Russia, I believe that the Soviets have a considerable measure of control over the actions and reactions of China.

OPPOSING UN ADMISSION TO COMMUNIST CHINA

Senator Smith. Well, would that answer imply that the admission of Communist China to the UN would mean recognition by the UN of the control of China today by an external power; that we just accept that as a fait accompli, and that we admit it in the UN?

General Vandenberg. Senator, that is more a diplomatic——

Senator Smith. I realize that; but I did ask this of General Marshall and others, and I am interested in the attitude of the military people toward that question.

General Vandenberg. May I put it this way: That I am definitely opposed to the admission of the Communist Chinese to the United Nations under any circumstances.

Senator Smith. Well, I am very glad to hear that because I share your view a hundred percent.

I guess your saying that means that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to the Chinese entrance because I know General Bradley seemed to feel that way.

General VANDENBERG. I would not like to speak for them, sir. I believe I am on safe ground when I state that I have never heard anyone advocate it, and I am of the opinion that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other than myself, are definitely opposed to that.

Senator SMITH. Do you think the Joint Chiefs—or speaking for yourself now rather than for them—would be willing to consider the admission of Communist China to the UN as a bargaining point in settling the Korean issue?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. I am glad to hear that also.

General VANDENBERG. Under no circumstances.

Senator SMITH. Would you feel that you would oppose the turning over to Communist China the island of Formosa?

General VANDENBERG. I would personally.

Senator SMITH. As a bargaining point?

General VANDENBERG. I would oppose it under any circumstances.

Senator SMITH. Do you share the views of the other Joint Chiefs which they apparently held, from what General Bradley told us, that Formosa has a distinct strategic value for the United States on this point, that it should not be in the hands of the hostile power?

General VANDENBERG. I agree with that, sir.

Senator SMITH. A distinction was made here between our acquiring Formosa as a base for ourselves, although nobody has advocated that, and that we should oppose its getting into the hands of a hostile power, particularly Russia, as a threat to our life line in the Pacific. Would you give your opinion on that?

General VANDENBERG. I would think that that would be very undesirable.

GLOBAL ASPECT OF AIR FORCE

Senator SMITH. Now to turn to another question. You impressed me very much with your whole discussion of this global air force. It seems to me your position is very soundly taken, namely, that it is one of our main deterrents to the possibility of Russia starting something. If our Air Force was destroyed or badly impaired, Russia might well feel in a much stronger position. She might be happy if we had engaged our Air Force in the Far East or had it impaired and partly destroyed. I take it that is your position.

My question is this: Do you think that General MacArthur in his suggestion that we ought to use air more than we have been using air in one way or another was aware of all those factors as to the size of our Air Force and the global situation, or do you think he was thinking in terms only of his theater command?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, it is difficult for me to judge what was in General MacArthur's mind. As I have said before, my opinion is that he is a brilliant soldier. On the other hand, I must point out that General MacArthur's responsibilities were for that area and that, therefore, I would suppose that he was thinking mainly of the impact on that area; whereas, I am sure you recognize that I have great global responsibilities for the employment and the security of the United States Air Force.

Therefore, when I recommend its use or its nonuse, I have to do it in view of those global responsibilities.

I believe that General MacArthur stated something to the effect, when he was testifying, about some additional responsibilities outside of the theater, that that was beyond his purview. Therefore, I would presume that General MacArthur, and rightly so, was thinking of his particular area.

Senator SMITH. And not necessarily with relation to the whole global picture?

General VANDENBERG. I would presume so.

DEFINING AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Senator SMITH. Now can you clear up in my mind what you mean by the expression "air reconnaissance" as distinguished from "air bombing"? Is there a distinction? I am referring now to the famous statement or study of January 12 of the Joint Chiefs where one of their points was:

> remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

That was under certain conditions that did come to pass later. And MacArthur in his address to the joint session used the same expression——

> Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Does that mean just exploration journeys to see what is going on, or does it mean air reconnaissance from the sense of dropping a bomb here and there?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; that means surveillance of bases and coastal cities both by means of visual observation and by photographs of areas in Manchuria and along the coast of China. It means keeping tab on possible build-ups, changes in composition of forces in the areas to the extent that it is practicable to get them from the air.

Senator SMITH. Well, wouldn't that be a great help for any man in the field, in determining the masses that might have been coming down from Manchuria through the Yalu?

General VANDENBERG. Yes; it would have been of considerable assistance.

In the area north of the Yalu, there has been, from time to time, and especially in the early days, reports of North Koreans who had once been in North Korea, who had gone into Manchuria and who had been recruited and were being trained in Manchuria for operations against the South Koreans.

Those people were coming across the Yalu at intervals, and in varying degrees of force, almost from the initiation of hostilities.

When the Chinese appeared, from the air it would have been difficult to distinguish, in a photograph, for example, or by visual observation, at relatively high speed and at relatively high altitude, whether or not they were Chinese Communists or more North Koreans.

On the other hand, it would have been helpful in getting estimates of numbers which would verify or throw out the intelligence that was obtained from other sources about their location and numbers. It is an additional factor of assistance to the commander.

Senator SMITH. Would you tell me why we didn't use air just before the big Chinese Communist push when we were moving up into the North Korean area, initially, back there just before Christmas when we thought they might "get the boys home before Christmas"?

THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Why weren't we using air to tell whether the masses were liable to come across and attack? What was the real difficulty with our intelligence?

We have heard testimony that the intelligence of the commander in the field fell down, and it was also said that we had information in Washington that, if it could have been supplied, might have helped.

I am wondering just what was the reason for that fall-down in intelligence?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, intelligence is largely, in that instance, one of the Army forces. The Air Force gets into it as an adjunct to the normal intelligence activities.

I would say that whatever testimony General Bradley or General Collins would care to give on the subject, would probably be more knowing than mine, about that particular point.

Senator SMITH. What troubled me was this:

I understood, of course, when we were told that our ground forces were not allowed across the Yalu. We understood that.

Was there any reason why our airplanes should not have gone across the Yalu to determine the enemy concentrations, even though we were limited and were not allowed to drop bombs? Why shouldn't the planes have gone over and at least given us the benefit of their knowledge of enemy concentrations?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, we now get into another complicated area of how far do we go, and what good do we get out of it.

Reconnaissance aircraft are generally, usually, unarmed, high altitude, fast-moving aircraft——

Senator SMITH. That is what I understood.

General VANDENBERG. Who take pictures, penetrate into hostile territory, and attempt to get back.

From very early on, we had indications that the air warning system north of the Yalu and extending down fairly well about to Pyongyang, was being operated quite efficiently.

We found out that our aircraft going up toward the Yalu were always met by hostile fighters. To operate successfully your reconnaissance airplanes over a period of time you have to more or less gain either air superiority in an area or have a feint to draw off that hostile opposition.

You can get through flights from time to time with the information. In order to be of any value, to really spot these people, take photographs on successive days, find out how far they have moved, find out what the build-up is, you have to do it over a considerable period of time; and, while I think it would have been helpful undoubtedly to General MacArthur, I do not believe that with the other sources of intelligence that he had available to him, that air intelligence alone would have been decisive.

For example, there were indications early on from other than air intelligence that the Chinese Communists were moving up the coast from southern China. We knew right along that there were masses along the Yalu River; but the big problem was what their intent was.

I doubt if you could have gotten the intent by aerial reconnaissance. That was a combination of political intelligence, diplomatic intelligence, and military intelligence behind, as someone has described it, a bamboo curtain instead of an iron curtain.

I believe that is all I can add to it, sir. I think it would have been helpful to some degree, but whether it would have furnished General MacArthur with all the intelligence that he would have desired is questionable.

Senator SMITH. I thank you very much. The chairman is motioning to me that my time has expired. Thanks very much for your testimony. It has been very helpful to the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

Senator JOHNSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. General Vandenberg, if you do not have it available here, would you supply for the committee the amount of Air Force equipment which has been furnished since June 30, 1949, to the Philippine Republic, to Indochina, and to the Republic of China on Formosa?

We have the figures for the Army furnished by General Collins.

General VANDENBERG. I may have them, Senator, if the colonel can be looking them up, and when I have them I will see that they are supplied; if not, I will get them and furnish them to the committee.

POSSIBILITY OF EVACUATION

Senator KNOWLAND. General, calling your attention to the document furnished us, entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations," I call your attention to page 80, pragraph 37, reading as follows:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 29 December 1950, pointed out to CINCFE that effective resistance at some position in Korea and the deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interests if this could be accomplished without incurring serious losses. Further, the basic directive of CINCFE was modified in that he was to defend, in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces. His operations, however, were always subject to the primary consideration of the safety of his troops. Further, maximum Korean contribution to sustained resistance should be mobilized. Comments by CINCFE were requested as to conditions which might determine a decision to evacuate Korea. It was stated that upon the receipt of his comments, CINCFE would be provided a definite directive.

Now, I may be mistaken, but, as I have read through here, that is the first suggestion that I have seen as to the possibility of evacuation; so that the subsequent message of CINCFE was apparently in answer to the prior message from the Joint Chiefs. Is that as you understand it?

General VANDENBERG. I would appreciate it, Senator, if you would let me know exactly which message you are talking of with regard to General MacArthur.

JCS-MAC ARTHUR COMMUNICATION

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I am speaking now of paragraph 37 on page 80.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; but I mean it was my understanding that you said that General MacArthur's message was in answer to which message?

Senator KNOWLAND. I think there was a message on January 10, as I recall the situation. I think he had a message on January 10, if I can find it here, which was in relation to it, and apparently also on the 30th of December, paragraph 39 reads that:

> On 30 December 1950, CINCFE made a comprehensive reply to the request for his comments on the evacuation of United Nations armed forces from Korea. He pointed out that United States naval and air potential was being only partly utilized and that the potential of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and guerrilla action on the mainland were being ignored.
>
> Further, were the Government to make a political determination to recognize the state of war forced upon the United States by China and to take appropriate retaliatory measures, the United States could—

and then he mentions these four points:

> (*a*) Blockade the coast of China;
>
> (*b*) Destroy through naval gun fire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war;
>
> (*c*) Secure appropriate reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa; and
>
> (*d*) Release existing restrictions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action (possibly leading to counterinvasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.

Now these messages so far as I can recall have not come into the hearings heretofore, and they seem to be a forerunner to the January 12 study of the Joint Chiefs in which they tentatively agreed to some of these proposals; did they not?

General VANDENBERG. Senator, to answer the first part of your question, the 10th of January message of CINCFE—and I have to be a little inconclusive here because I haven't the actual messages with me—it is my impression that the 10th of January message from CINCFE was in answer to a directive on the 9th of January where he was given the directive that is spoken of as going to come on page 80, paragraph 37.

In relation to the other part of your statement, I would say that yes, those did have, were considered in drawing up the 12th of January study, as were a long line of communications back and forth between CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as conversations we had with him, with various members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their visits out there.

Senator KNOWLAND. The reason I raise the issue, my recollection is that in General Collins' testimony, I believe, the indication was that this first discussion on possible evacuation had developed as a result of what I think he termed or some member of the committee termed the gloomy message of General MacArthur of January 10, but apparently the first suggestion that it might be necessary to evacuate that I can find in these records was the Joint Chiefs' message to General MacArthur of December 29.

Now if you can find and make available to us where prior to that time General MacArthur had suggested evacuation, I think merely for the clarity of the record that should be pointed out to us.

It gets around to this questioning I did this morning as to whether, when you arrived in Japan on the 15th of January, the immediacy of evacuation was the subject of discussion and whether General MacArthur felt that it was going to be necessary to evacuate or whether to the contrary he felt that it was not necessary or desirable to evacuate, and whether your views coincided with General MacArthur at that point and whether General Collins' views coincided with General MacArthur's at that point.

You will recall I raised the question during the morning hour.

General VANDENBERG. In relation to the views of General MacArthur, General Collins, and myself, I would recall, if my memory serves me right, that conditions had so changed that by the time we had discussed this with General MacArthur upon our arrival there, both General MacArthur, General Collins, and myself felt that from the indications we could get before going to the front we believed that it was not necessary to have a forced evacuation.

Senator KNOWLAND. And that was the unanimous opinion of all three of you at the time prior to your going to Korea?

General VANDENBERG. It wasn't quite as definite as that, Senator. I would say that we had that impression from the communiqués, the press reports, from talking to some of the staff. But our purpose was to go over there and find out first-hand what the conditions actually were. I would say that when we returned from that trip and had a conference with General MacArthur that General Collins and I were of the unanimous opinion that a forced evacuation was not in the offing.

Senator KNOWLAND. Thank you. That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

BATTLE OF THE BULGE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Vandenberg, Senator Fulbright was quite solicitous a moment ago about the situation of this small air force on the Philippines at the time of the Japanese attack. I think it would be interesting perhaps if we knew also whether or not there has been any sound investigation of the reason for the catastrophe of the Bulge in the last war.

While at this time I will not ask you to devote a great deal of time to that investigation, yet I think there was a great deal of talk about the Battle of the Bulge situation and where the responsibility lay for the serious miscalculations that were involved in that situation. So I presume if we are going to investigate battles, that ought to be one of the important ones where we might have eventually all of the answers as to responsibility.

Now, General——

General VANDENBERG. May I comment on that, Senator? The Battle of the Bulge——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wasn't asking you for an explanation at the moment.

General VANDENBERG. I believe I can give one off the cuff, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Very good, sir.

General VANDENBERG. I was there. The Battle of the Bulge was written up at home as a catastrophe. On the field of battle I have the impression that I had something to do with the naming of the Battle of the Bulge.

I was briefing a group of correspondents in my office and pointed out the bulge in the line, and at that time, having just come back from a morning briefing with General Bradley, at which we had both agreed that if the Germans pushed through, it was probably their last gasp and they could be cut off, and offered us an opportunity to deal them a very telling blow.

Now, it is true that it was coming from an unexpected direction, but the eventual result in my opinion, talking with General Bradley, was never very much in doubt over there. I believe it was represented so over here in the press.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, there are a number of interesting facets to it that I just suggest if we are investigating and looking into all those things, some of them would probably be interesting. I have a statement of an officer who was in the chart room in London 3 days before the strike came, and his views on what was known there and to some of our officers and what happened later would be an interesting field of examination.

EMPLOYING GERMAN SCIENTISTS

But, General, I do want to come back to one thing, where I believe you put your finger on a most important situation. On pages 3624 and 3625 you testified with respect to the jet engine, the MIG–15, calling it a superior jet engine, and stating it had been developed. You commented that the Russians had taken German scientists to Russia, and that it is a very excellent engine.

I think you went so far as to say it is superior to anything we have in that field.

Now, General, were you assistant to General Eisenhower or a member of, or were you G–2 in late '45 and '46?

General VANDENBERG. It was around that time, Senator. I would have to recall exactly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, do you recall a program which I recall very distinctly, because I had just come to Congress at that time in '45 proposing to bring over a substantial number of trained German scientists, under certain inspected conditions, to work in the rocket programs and jet propulsion and synthetic products and matters of that kind, because we had discovered that in certain fields they were way ahead of us at the close of the war? Do you remember that proposal?

General VANDENBERG. I recall the general subject; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would suggest this, and I may be wrong about it, according to your recollection: That the Armed Forces—that is, the Army and Navy at that time—were very anxious to bring over as many as a thousand of those well-trained and provenly successful German scientists to give us the benefit of their advanced learning in certain fields, which would have been very important to our jet developments and to our synthetic processes and other things in the field of national defense.

Am I wrong about that? The number of a thousand may not be exactly right, but I recall it, and whatever evidence I have here indicates that a thousand was approximately the number.

General VANDENBERG. The gist of your remarks from my recollection is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My own recollection, aided by a memorandum which I have here of somewhat near that time, is that the military forces of this country were very zealous to do this. I thoroughly approved at the time, although I wasn't directly in connection with it, but I knew something about it and I thoroughly approved, and I think a great many people on the Hill approved at that time.

Is it fair to say, according to your memory, General Vandenberg, that one man in the State Department put such blocks and hindrances in the way of bringing those German scientists over here that we never got any appreciable number of them? We did get a few at first, but most of them had to go back, and the program was stopped because of one man's activities in the State Department.

I am not talking about a Secretary of State; I am talking about one individual in the State Department.

General VANDENBERG. Senator, that is beyond my cognizance; I really don't know.

I do recall the services, armed services, desiring them. I know that in some few fields, it is my impression that we got some, about that time. Whether the total number was stopped or how many we got or who did it was on a level far above me, sir, and I had no knowledge of it whatsoever.

PREVENTING THE EMPLOYMENT OF GERMAN SCIENTISTS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Were you a member or did you work on the organization called the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, called the JIOA?

General VANDENBERG. At that date, I would suspect not, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I was thinking of your being assistant to General Eisenhower, and then being G–2 put you in proximity with that group.

General VANDENBERG. I was General Eisenhower's intelligence officer for about 4 or 5 months, I would guess. I will have to check that time. Then I went to the Central Intelligence Agency. My recollection would be that I did not have, while I was General Eisenhower's G–2, any joint meetings, but I will have to check that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By any chance, did you happen to be a member of the group of military officials who visited Assistant Secretary of State John Hildring in the fall of 1946 on this proposition of attempting to take out the roadblock which had been apparently thrown in the way of bringing these German scientists over here to teach us things that they had learned and which we did not yet know?

General VANDENBERG. I recall meeting with General Hildring; the exact dates, sir, I doubt if I could even check, because I don't believe

I have any record of them. But during the time that I was either in G–2 or in the Central Intelligence Agency, I recall meetings with General Hildring and I would not be surprised but what that subject might have come up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now, General, I am in thorough accord with that; I was in thorough accord with that program. I am not critical of the Armed Forces. I think they did everything they could to make arrangements whereby this vast lore of scientific knowledge could be made available for our own defense advancement, so I am thoroughly in accord with that.

I have a memorandum here that was made a short time after that period. This memorandum indicates that Assistant Secretary of State Hildring stated that he was unable to cope with the various preventive measures that were thrown in the way of bringing the German scientists here.

Now, the significance of that is that the Russians, as I think we all know, did take a great many German scientists from Germany over to Russia, who have since been, according to whatever information we have been able to get, working in their scientific activity there. That is quite generally understood; is it not?

General VANDENBERG. That seems to be the general impression, and from what meager information I could get, I would believe that is correct, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Now, I raise that question, General—I raise that question indicating that at least the military, at that time, realized the tremendous value which they might get, to this country, but according to my information, the completion of that program had a lot to promise for us, but was blocked in the State Department; and I just wondered——

Senator SMITH. When was that?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was blocked in 1946 and 1947, and according to my information, permanently blocked thereafter.

Chairman CONNALLY. Who blocked them?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. My information is it was blocked by one individual in the State Department. I don't mean the Secretary of State.

Chairman CONNALLY. What man?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I didn't name the man. I don't know about censorship, and I don't know all the facts, and I don't think it would be fair to name his name. I have it here on this memorandum, but I shall not make his name available for the record at this moment.

Chairman CONNALLY. He must have been an awfully powerful man to override the Secretary of State and everybody else in the Department.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He was just powerful enough to block this thing, I am sure.

DECISIVENESS OF AIR POWER

Now, General, we have talked a great deal about not using air power in Manchuria. We have heard considerable testimony from various witnesses that it would not be necessarily decisive to use air power.

Regarding our ground troops now in Korea, have they been decisive yet in winning the war?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Our tactical air power in support of troops has not been decisive in winning the war; has it?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir; there has been no decision there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Navy has not been decisive in a successful conclusion of this Korean War; has it?

General VANDENBERG. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have all been helpful; have they not?

General VANDENBERG. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have all contributed to whatever successes we have had and to the prevention of our being driven out of Korea; is that not true?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it essential, then, that the extended use of air be decisive in this war, or is it good tactics to use it if it will contribute a substantial share to eventual termination of this war and the successful conclusion? In other words, does air alone, strategic air at long range, does it have to be decisive before we decide to use it?

General VANDENBERG. No, Senator. As I recall my comments on that particular phase, the fact as to whether or not it would be decisive was more or less beside the point. The point I was trying to make was the effect on the deterrent value of that force if it were emasculated by attrition.

I agree with you that it would not necessarily have to be decisive if it were to be used to be of value.

OBJECTIVE OF KOREAN WAR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There has been running through this testimony—not yours alone, General, but through practically all of the testimony of the last three witnesses, anyway, or maybe two—this question regarding killing Chinese.

I noticed on yesterday, on page 3648, Senator Bridges said:

> I am not either, but I haven't been able to find out what our objective is.
>
> General VANDENBERG. I believe our objective is to kill as many Chinese Communists as is possible without enlarging the war at the present time in Korea.

I have been under the impression, General, our objective is to terminate that war and save American lives, and to win the victory against aggression, and to say to the aggressors that "you cannot become aggressors with immunity under the philosophy that obtains among nations in the United Nations Charter," and that our objective is not primarily, as an objective, to kill as many Chinamen as we can. But that we have an objective which is the termination. If killing is incidental to it, then we cannot help that; we have to. But we have had a number of times in our testimony that our objective is to kill Chinese.

Now, I have been told, General, and this I don't know, as I haven't seen the propaganda, but I have been told that the Communists are beginning to use that as propaganda and quoting statements that the purpose of the United States is to kill Chinamen.

I have been informed by newspapermen that that has been reported as a part of the present Communist propaganda, and it is really quite an awful thing.

We have recently negotiated a genocide treaty in which we abhor and condemn the killings of portions of populations as such. It has not finally been approved but the treaty has been signed.

I earnestly hope that we have some concrete and ascertainable objective, and I hope it is to put down agression and to destroy as much as we can the possibility of future aggression and the denial of the power of would-be aggressors to commit aggression against the law of nations as set out in the United Nations Charter.

General VANDENBERG. I believe I stated this morning, Senator, in my testimony that upon that rather uncompleted statement of mine in my opinion it was much better put in the United Nations expression of objectives, and that killing of the Chinese is incidental, but a part of winning the war and stopping aggression.

In my opinion none of the testimony that has been given heretofore by either the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman or General Collins, if they did, mentioned as I did the killing of Chinese, did it have any relation to genocide. It is an unhappy fact that when troops are in combat on the field, one of the methods of victory is killing or wounding of the opposition, and it was only in that connection that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If I may, Mr. Chairman, on this particular point——

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection Senator Hickenlooper may propound another question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that death and destruction is an unavoidable part of warfare. There is no question about that, but I emphasize it because whenever we have had testimony here, at least so far as I know, the only concrete objective that has come out repeatedly is the killing of Chinese.

I hope that we can develop a concrete objective as to what our objects and purposes are, and when we reach them we will have obtained those purposes, and that may not be entirely military.

I think perhaps there are many political decisions that go into that, but a definition of objectives is something that I think we are entitled to have and everybody is entitled to have. That is all, unless General Vandenberg has a comment.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; I would like to comment.

In the first place, Senator, may I refer to my concurrence this morning in referring back to the particular part in order to save time where it had the United Nations objective in there as a part of what I had intended to say the other day.

As to there being a political part of this final objective, I concur, and I would like to read from page 94 of the book that was supplied, paragraph 23:

> On February 13, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with representatives of the Department of State and informally discussed the Korean situation. During the course of the discussion it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State would prefer not to express political objectives with respect to Korea until military capabilities there were established. On the other hand, the consensus of the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that a political decision was required before there could be suitable determination of a military course of action.

I concur in general with that. I also concur——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I might say that I concur with that.

General VANDENBERG. And the objective prior to getting the two objectives together it seems to me has got to be first the reestablishment of the status quo, and then from there go on to see what more can be gained.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And may I suggest this, and I apologize for intruding. May I suggest that one of the major premises of General MacArthur's position is that military operations and success cannot be determined until the politicians—that I mean in the broadest sense of the word—define what the objectives are, and those objectives have not been clearly defined as yet.

I realize that the military can't go out and fix political policy. They fight wars to win them, but they can only operate within the framework of broad political decisions when they are made.

General VANDENBERG. I concur with that, Senator, but I also would like to make the point that sometimes the atmosphere for making political, as you say, diplomatic decisions, the atmosphere is greatly more favorable for those depending upon certain military situations, and that sometimes, as in this instance, there are times when the atmosphere is more ripe for that sort of thing and there are times when the military situation makes it less advantageous, so both conditions I think have to be taken into it.

It cannot be stated flatly that one must come first or the other must come first. It depends upon, it seems to me, conditions at the time, both the military and the diplomatic atmosphere.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I apologize.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

PRESIDENTIAL GUIDANCE MESSAGE

Senator CAIN. General Vandenberg, earlier in the afternoon you were talking with Senator Knowland about the January Tokyo meeting at which General MacArthur and General Collins and yourself discussed the President's political guidance message of January 13. I understood you to so relate, sir.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. May I ask if General MacArthur's senior staff officers were in attendance at that meeting?

General VANDENBERG. My recollection is that there were a number of General MacArthur's staff officers present.

Senator CAIN. Was the meeting to which we presently address ourselves held prior to the time that you and General Collins went out to the Korean front to see for yourselves or after your return from Korea?

General VANDENBERG. My recollection is that it was prior thereto.

Senator CAIN. May I ask if you and General MacArthur and General Collins were in agreement that the President's message meant that our forces were to remain for an indefinite period in Korea?

As I understand it, General Vandenberg, that message was sent to supplement a military directive which had been sent to the supreme commander some several days before.

General VANDENBERG. If I may express it this way, Senator——

Senator CAIN. Please, sir.

General VANDENBERG. The military directive was more or less in the nature of a concrete order within the generally broad latitude that has to be given to a theater commander of the scope that General MacArthur had.

The political message—and now again I am getting a little out of my field, but my interpretation of the reason for the message of the President, was to explain further the underlying objectives which, in a purely military message, said in effect, "You will do this and you will do that," without very much reason for it.

Now, the message explaining the underlying reasons definitely could not be a directive because some of the desires expressed from the diplomatic point of view obviously depended upon the military situation, and if you were to tell a commander that these desires and these end objectives are what we seek, it might be well that in endeavoring to seek those objectives, without attention to other details, his force might be sacrificed in attempting to carry them out.

Therefore, the military message explained or attempted to explain the limits of the authority of General MacArthur in making his decisions.

The other message contained reasons, just broadly, but which could not be utilized as in any sense a directive.

Senator CAIN. If I understand the situation, then, it is about like this: The military directive imposed certain military guidance and restrictions insofar as the military campaign upon the supreme commander.

The political guidance message which outlined the objectives which we sought to achieve in Korea would necessarily say to anyone who read that message that, "within certain military limits you are to exercise every possible force and ingenuity to remain in Korea against a deep-seated hope that in due time we will be able to carry out our political objective, which is to make a Korea free, unified and self-controlling nation"; is that a reasonable evaluation of that situation, General?

General VANDENBERG. If I might differ slightly, Senator, I believe that that message taken by itself would lend some strength to that supposition.

On the other hand, the directive—and it was pointed out by General Collins—definitely stated that the restrictions imposed on doing some of these things were such that there was not that latitude.

The point was stated by General Collins, as I recall it, that the military directive was the governing factor, the letter from the President was information.

Senator CAIN. May I ask the question just once more, though I seek not to burden you, sir.

Was the interpretation of General MacArthur, General Collins, and General Vandenberg of the President's letter that it was the desire of all concerned—those in authority—to remain in Korea if militaily that was possible?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

EVACUATING KOREA

General Vandenberg, have you ever heard anything said or have you ever seen any message which said that General MacArthur proposed to evacuate Korea, except under conditions which might prevent him from using his maximum power to repel the enemy?

General VANDENBERG. I don't recall, Senator, that in any message that I can recall General MacArthur ever proposed, as you say, evacuating Korea.

I believe that there were indications that at one time he might be forced out, but——

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General VANDENBERG. There was no proposal, as I understand it, from General MacArthur that he pull out.

Senator CAIN. I ask that question for the following reasons and because, General Vandenberg, we hope to be fair to every single person called in this inquiry. It seems to me that an impression has been conveyed during these hearings that General MacArthur wanted to evacuate Korea, but that when you and General Collins went out there and looked the situation over, you were able to prevail upon him to change his mind. To my way of thinking, sir, that is an inaccurate impression of what took place, and because I felt it was an unfair or an unreasonable impression, I asked you the question just several minutes ago.

General VANDENBERG. If anyone has the impression that General MacArthur was advocating pulling out, I believe that that is entirely fallacious.

I think, on the other hand, that he pointed out that necessity, at one time, looked as though it would require him to.

Senator CAIN. I respect your answer just given, General Vandenberg, very much; and to my way of thinking, it does conclusively clear what I think has been a growing and erroneous impression.

AIRCRAFT DELIVERED TO NATO NATIONS

General Vandenberg, you were going, during the recess, if it suited your convenience, to determine how many airplanes of the types desired by our Korean air commanders, that we have sent to France and our NATO allies recently.

If you have that information available now, I would appreciate it.

General VANDENBERG. I have the numbers of aircraft delivered to NATO nations as of May 28, 1951.

I presume that you would not be interested in the report for such things as training aircraft, and so forth.

Senator CAIN. No, sir.

General VANDENBERG. Therefore, I will simply give you the jet aircraft that we were discussing when this came up.

Senator CAIN. Please do.

General VANDENBERG. Belgium, 4 F–84's; France, 17 F–84's; and Netherlands, 4 F–84's.

That is the total, sir.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, General.

General Vandenberg, have you ever known General MacArthur to recommend the employment of American Ground Forces on the mainland of China?

General VANDENBERG. Would you state that again?

Senator CAIN. Have you ever known General MacArthur to recommend the employment of American Ground Forces on the mainland of China?

General VANDENBERG. I cannot recollect such a recommendation.

JCS BASIC FUNCTION

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

General Vandenberg, what is the basic function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

What is your prime statutory requirement?

General VANDENBERG. If I may quote from the National Security Act, for the record, I would think that they could be much more correctly placed in the record, than my attempting from memory to get them exactly correct.

Senator CAIN. Well, I can save your time, sir, if you and I are in agreement on this: As I understand it, the primary function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to act as the chief military advisers to the Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council, and to the President of the United States. If we are in agreement on that, sir, why, there would be no further need for putting anything in the record.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir.

BLAIR HOUSE CONFERENCES COMMITTING TROOPS TO KOREA

Senator CAIN. General Vandenberg, you were going to look over your notes during the recess and tell us as much as you can recollect of the Blair House conferences which resulted in committing our forces to Korean last June. I would very much appreciate your taking whatever time you think is proper to tell us of what went on in order that we might better judge the future.

General VANDENBERG. On the 25th of June there was a conference at the Blair House. At that meeting, as I recall it, the problems of Formosa, Indochina, and Korea were discussed, and Korea with special attention to action by naval units and air units south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

It was at that meeting, as I recall, that the President approved the naval and air action south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

On the 26th of June there was another conference. There were conversations pro and con as to the desirability of lifting the restrictions on the naval and air action to permit operations north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

At the same meeting, it is my impression that the Seventh Fleet was then told or the order was given to prevent an attack on Formosa and to prevent its being used as a base of operations against the mainland of China.

There was some discussion as to who was to have the authority for this, and as I recall it, the consensus and the agreement was that this operational control of the Seventh Fleet would be assigned to General MacArthur. At the same time the idea of speeding up aid to Indochina was in conference and was generally agreed.

On the 27th of June there was a meeting, as I recall it, in the Cabinet room where some congressional leaders were brought up to date.

In the afternoon of the 27th the Joint Chiefs and the three Secretaries met to discuss various possible courses of action that might have been taken by the Russians and perhaps the Chinese Communists.

Senator CAIN. The date of that meeting, General, is on the 28th?

General VANDENBERG. The 27th.

Senator CAIN. The 27th. I thank you, sir.

General VANDENBERG. On the 30th of June, sometime quite early in the morning, General Collins called me and said, as I recall it, that General MacArthur had—and this is in very general terms, my recollection—told me that General MacArthur had asked for permission to send a regimental combat team to the Korean front, and it had been cleared very early that morning by General Bradley and Mr. Pace and the President, with General Collins participating.

I believe that takes care of the immediate——

CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN BLAIR HOUSE CONFERENCES

Senator SMITH. Will the Senator yield for just one question?

Senator CAIN. I am sorry but——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has no time; I am sorry, Senator. By unanimous consent you can have time.

Senator SMITH. Just to clear up one point that I had in mind on the conferences.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, you are allowed one minute.

Senator SMITH. General, I am interested in the meeting of the 27th, at which you state certain congressional Members were present; I think that is the meeting at which I was present. Do you recall whether the question of ground troops was raised at that meeting, or whether they were just discussing Air and Navy support for two reasons; one, to help support the South Korean Army, and the other, to help get our nationals out of Korea?

I mention that because I think on the 30th, when we had the next meeting, it was announced that some ground forces would be moved in to maintain a beachhead, if a beachhead had to be maintained.

I am trying to get in my mind which meeting first raised the question of ground troops.

General VANDENBERG. I would presume that the question as to whether or not they might have to be eventually used might have been raised there. I am sure that from my recollection of it—It was so long ago that all I would be doing would be guessing—I believe that on a subsequent meeting, I am rather clearer that they were informed of ground forces.

The meeting, as I recall it, the two meetings, in the initial stages, were to bring the congressional leaders up to date and, as I recall it, at that time no ground forces had been committed. Therefore, in guessing, Senator, in answer to your question, which is the best I can do, I would guess it probably was not.

Senator SMITH. I am just wondering were any minutes kept of those meetings because I have a vague recollection that the question of whether or not we were going to commit ground troops at that first meeting was raised, and they were sure they were not, and the second meeting changed that with the possibility of the Pusan beachhead which would be needed which would need ground troops for protection.

That is my vague recollection. But I am wondering if that is your recollection.

General VANDENBERG. I have no recollection as to——

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chair seems to recall that there was some testimony to the effect that certain notes that were kept on behalf of the Joint Chiefs were kept by Admiral Sherman.

I seem to recall some witness testifying to that effect. We hope to have Admiral Sherman here tomorrow.

Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

DEFINING THE TERM "CASUALTY"

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to take any of General Vandenberg's time. I have not been able to be here all the time, although I have been able to be here part of the time, and I have had some chance to read the testimony.

I think he has made a very fine presentation.

Mr. Chairman, I do want to ask this: When General Bradley was on the stand, I asked him if he would obtain for us a short memorandum describing just what was meant by "casualty."

Now, I realize that has been gone over several times in several different places, but I am not sure that anywhere yet we have had anything that would describe what was meant by the term "casualty," and I just wonder if that memorandum had been submitted?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think that any memorandum has been submitted, but General Collins testified at some length on that.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know he did. I was here during most of his testimony and I also read it. It may be that it is entirely satisfactory as he stated it. I am not sure, but if the memorandum had been submitted, I wanted to see it. I will not press it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not believe any such memorandum has been received.

Senator SPARKMAN. It may be that General Collins' testimony has been sufficient.

I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

WARFARE NECESSITATES KILLING

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman? I have one matter I want to ask you about, General. I have a great deal of sympathy with Senator Hickenlooper's viewpoint that we should have a clearer objective in

Korea, although I can realize that our objective might change according to conditions.

The objective would be one thing when we had a patrol on the Yalu River, and it might be another when we were trying to keep Taegu from being captured, for example.

However, I am a little at a loss to understand how, under any planned objective, the basic requirement would not be that our forces kill as many Chinamen as possible. Do you know any plan or program that you could adopt in Korea that would not have as its basic element the killing of as many there as possible?

General VANDENBERG. No, Mr. Chairman, that was the point I was attempting to make previously, that unfortunately settling it by force of arms, that is one of the objectives in any act of armed aggression. In order to settle it, you have to kill a lot of people.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assume that the Chinese objective, whatever it may be in driving us out of Korea, otherwise conquering all of Korea, is predicated upon killing as many Americans and as many United Nations forces as they possibly can.

General VANDENBERG. I believe that is so, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chinese can avoid being killed if they retire back to the Yalu River. That part of our objective would cease if they did retreat beyond the Yalu.

General VANDENBERG. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

BALANCE OR PREPONDERANCE OF POWER

Senator SMITH. I think I just have one more question I would like to ask the general.

I understood you this morning to say that you believed in the balance of power. The reason I ask this question is this: Does that really mean the balance of power or does it mean, as Justice Roberts stated before one of our committees when he was advocating the Atlantic Union, that he was not interested in the balance of power but he was interested in the preponderance of power?

Do you distinguish between the preponderance of power on the side of the western allies, let us say, the anti-Communist people, or do you really believe in a balance of power to preserve the peace? If so, how do you reconcile that with the Charter of the United Nations?

It is apparently aimed to get away from a balance of power and aims at a collective security program.

General VANDENBERG. My idea of the balance of power, Senator, is that it be so regulated within the capacity, capability of the United States to be able to throw its weight to one side or another in order to preserve the peace.

I think that would be true either in the United Nations, in NATO, or in the global situation itself. I think that is inherent, however, in the United States having sufficient power so that where it throws its weight, it then becomes the balance of power.

UNITED STATES POWER POSITION

Senator SMITH. Well, you probably couldn't contemplate that the United States could be in a sort of stand-offish position with the world divided into two balances of power, with us throwing our weight one way or the other. Is it your thought that there would be three positions like that or do we have to be one of the balances?

General VANDENBERG. We have to be one of the balances in my concept of it, Senator, but at the same time, to always be on one side regardless of whether that is better for the world or not would be a power position regardless of what your objectives were for a free world, rights of the individual, and so forth.

I am simply suggesting that knowing the ideals and the aspirations of the people of the United States—at least, I think I do—that they should be in a position to throw their weight in discussions about food, economy, power, on to the side that we believe is correct, in order that the world can go on in the way in which the people of the United States believe human rights and human dignity should be permitted to go.

There are many times, in my opinion, when perhaps the NATO nations might advocate something that the people of the United States, as it is possible, might not agree with, that would not have to be, in my view, war or total war or even the beginning of it, but if by throwing the balance of power of the United States one way or another, if it were so fixed that the balance would carry it, it would be to our advantage, it seems to me, to be able to assume that position.

Senator SMITH. Then wouldn't you be willing to accept the objective of what I thought was the United Nations purpose of disarmament with simply a United Nations police force to preserve the peace?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; I think that is the ultimate objective, but before the United Nations becomes an effective instrument, it would appear to me that the balance of power project is much nearer at hand in being able to become effective.

I believe that the ideal of the United Nations is an excellent one. I believe that it is going to require time to get it into operation where it is, throughout the world, believed in so that it becomes a potent force for good.

Senator SMITH. Do you think until that happens we have got to keep a sufficient strength to take care of our own interests and the interests of the rest of the world as well?

General VANDENBERG. I do, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you carry that to the extent of making that even more important than the so-called regional pacts like the Atlantic Pact, the Rio Pact, and if possible, the Pacific Pact, and so on?

General VANDENBERG. Well, the exact method of working that out, Senator, is more in the field of national policy than it is purely military.

The principle that I advocate is one that I believe in, from a military point of view.

How it is to be worked out is on a level beyond me.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much.

That is all.

I just wanted to get your thought on that, because it is a matter I have frequently heard discussed and people have different views.

One's view is a preponderance of power, another has a view toward a balance of power, another favors complete disarmament with an international police force under the United Nations. I think we are groping somewhere in between there, and I gather from your statement, that until we can get to the millenium, we had better look out for our own selves, and try to take care of contingencies.

General VANDENBERG. That is right, sir.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

CHAIN OF ISLAND BASES

Senator BRIDGES. General, just a few more questions.

Do you support the General MacArthur concept of holding a chain of island bases from Alaska, through Japan and Formosa and the Philippines?

General VANDENBERG. Would you just start the first part?

Senator BRIDGES. Do you support, or agree with the General MacArthur concept of holding a chain of island bases from Alaska, through Japan and Formosa and the Philippines?

General VANDENBERG. Well, I would support the theory that those islands should be in hands that are friendly to the United States; and that those are bases which are within the jurisdiction of the United States, such as Guam and, I would hope, Okinawa, those places where we have base rights such as the Philippines and, I hope, in Japan; and we certainly should be in a position to deny them to any hostile power.

Senator BRIDGES. My next question is, and I assume this will be classified:

Do we have sufficient air strength now to hold this chain, if Russia should strike, or this develop into an all-out war with Russia?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, and I am not trying to sidestep the question, but again I would like to emphasize that war being an art, and not a science, no exact formula or answer for adequate security can, in my opinion, be evolved.

On the basis of the statements by General MacArthur, and of General Collins, I would believe on that basis that they who have had some measure of the responsibility for the security of the Japanese islands, and it is my understanding that they have agreed that they are secure, relatively speaking, again within the limit of which I spoke, that they would be better able to give a qualified opinion than I would—I would be inclined to go along with their expert testimony.

I would like to point out that whenever we say that anything is safe, from a military point of view, I would desire a great deal more force than perhaps some people might desire.

[Deleted.]

ADVOCATING ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO EUROPE

Senator BRIDGES. In endorsing the proposal, General Vandenberg, for sending the four additional divisions to Europe and the program of our added American concentration of troops in Europe, what was the chief basis of your concurrence or approval of that?

Was it as a war deterrent or was it as a morale factor to the other European countries, or was it for the very definite basis of securing air bases for ourselves?

General VANDENBERG. It was a combination of all with varying emphasis upon different ones, Senator. If I may take them up one by one, the principal reason in my mind at the time was the necessity to raise the spirit of the people of Western Europe to where they thought that they had a chance against the Russian military machine.

In raising that feeling of freedom from that threat which they felt was hanging over their head went the freedom of allowing themselves, may I say, the luxury of giving us air bases without fear of retaliation which they might have had, had we not indicated our complete willingness to go along with them in the defense of Western Europe, and very partly as a beginning toward a ground defense of Western Europe which in my opinion I have always held should be provided mainly by the Western European nations.

[Deleted.]

AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING FACILITIES OF NATO NATIONS

Senator BRIDGES. You spoke of this morning, I think, in answer to a question—I think it was from Senator Smith—about what are the facilities in these countries for manufacturing their own modern planes. Do any of them, outside of Great Britain, have those facilities?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. There are some very good facilities in Italy, both for engines and aircraft. There are several facilities in France that could be utilized. They have trained mechanics and trained artisans to do that job. They are competent in motor manufacture, and it would be my opinion that in order to get on with it, in time that the best method of forming that industry over there would be to take either American or British designs and manufacture them in their facilities for several reasons.

In the first place, it will provide us with less diversified types on the front and therefore the spare parts situation will be easier, and secondly, it is more or less a proven type of aircraft and many of the bugs of the engineering category have been worked out, and therefore it would be a less difficult job than starting from scratch, also a more rapid job could be done.

Senator BRIDGES. Outside of Great Britain, are any of those countries actually producing planes today for the tactical air force?

General VANDENBERG. The French are started. I don't believe—in fact, I am sure the first airplane has not come out, but they are building aircraft of American design for the tactical air forces. They are also building airplanes of British type.

The treaty with Italy precludes a top, it has a top, as I understand it, in the number of aircraft that they can possess.

On the other hand, there is no reason why many of the component parts could not be made by many of these countries. The components roughly occupy 50 percent of the total in time and cost and materials. If those facilities in those various countries could be turned toward even making components in great numbers, it would assist the overall effort.

Senator Bridges. My time is up.

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir. Senator Green.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Hickenlooper.

EXPLAINING SUPERIORITY OF RUSSIAN JETS

Senator Hickenlooper. General Vandenberg, getting back to the question of our deficiencies so far as quality is concerned in the performance of jet engines, which I have been curious about for a long time, why is it that we don't have jets that are equivalent in performance of the Russians?

General Vandenberg. Well, I can only give you a partial answer to that, and I am afraid not too authentic a one, Senator. I would guess that part of the reason is that we were the major manufacturer during World War II of aircraft to fight the war on both the western front and in the Far East, and that all of our time and effort, our engineering capacity, was taken up with winning the war.

While Germany was ahead of us in jet aircraft and in certain designs of rockets and other weapons, we must, I believe, take into consideration the fact that that very reason was one of the contributing causes that caused her downfall. It is a peculiar sort of set of circumstances, but when General Goering, Air Marshal Goering, was first captured, I went down to interview him, and I asked him to what he laid the defeat of the German Air Force.

He told me at that time, as I recall it, that it was because they were fooling with so many gadgets that might win the war rather than concentrating on a bombardment force to knock out initially England and afterward to knock out the air bases from which the United States Air Force operated.

He said that they were engaged at that time in developing jet airplanes that could go more rapidly to altitude, and were therefore building a defensive force; that the rockets, if they had put half or even a third, as I recall his telling me, of the effort that they had put into development of the V–1 and V–2 into their aircraft program, that in his opinion the war might have had a very different ending.

Senator Hickenlooper. They changed models in the middle of the operation and in the hiatus they got caught; is that it?

General Vandenberg. They were engaged, Senator, in a research and development program in the middle of a war.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

General Vandenberg. Now we did not do that. Therefore, in winning the war we have had to pay a penalty of starting our research and development from a position further back.

Senator Hickenlooper. Except that we had the advantage of a substantial amount of their research and development when they capitulated, did we not? That is, we got hold of their jets, their rockets, their cold-steel extrusion methods, and a number of things of that kind.

General Vandenberg. Yes, sir, that is true. But in any situation where we have a finished article without the brains and the thinking that developed it behind it, and all of the faults that they have overcome in that process—to get back to your point of the scientists——

Senator Hickenlooper. That is right.

General VANDENBERG. The cold article laid in front of a group of our people, we cannot possibly begin to discover all of the difficulties and what they have had to overcome and, therefore, the know-how in order to develop a better article from that one. In effect, we are starting from the cold article just as they are starting in a newer edition of that in their mind as they built this one.

UNITED STATES SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. However, General, we started in 1945, knowing that they had some very intriguing advances in scientific machinery and various gadgets of various kinds; I checked up the figures and I find that including fiscal 1945 we spent $179,197,000,000 on our Armed Forces through fiscal 1950.

Now I suggest you take off fiscal 1945, which is $84½ billion—and I think, in all fairness, that there was a lot of clean-up work in that, perhaps. But take that off and we have still spent from fiscal 1946 through fiscal 1950 $84,628,000,000 on our Armed Forces. That does not include the $20,994,000,000 of fiscal 1951, nor the $41,421,000,000 of fiscal 1952.

Now I am concerned—and I think it is a perfectly valid question—with the fact that we have spent $84½ plus billions through fiscal 1950 from 1946 on. We have tremendous volumes in the mill now. I am concerned as to why, unless we admit inferior techniques and things of that kind, we have not got at least as good a jet engine as the Russians, when we have realized, I think, for a long time that jets or propulsion of that general type is probably the coming thing.

I also want to ask you whether or not we are sufficiently along in design and experiment at this time in your opinion, regarding jets or rocket combinations or whatever type of propulsion of that sort may be deemed best. Do we have at the present time engines which we have a reasonable right to say are at least as good, if not better than, anything the Russians have that you know of?

I am not talking about having them in actual operation in the air from a combat standpoint, but I am talking about where we are in our production or in our development program.

General VANDENBERG. Well, your question as I see it, Senator, boils down into two general areas. The first one is why have we got, as you say, so little for what we spent so much for.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is not only the Air Corps.

General VANDENBERG. I realize that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Air Corps has got its share of it.

General VANDENBERG. I am talking of the armed services now, if I may venture an opinion on all three.

The most wasteful method of financing the armed services is to give them a program one year, let them lay the groundwork for that sized program, compress it the next year and waste all the money for that portion of the program that is not appropriated for the next year, the year following that enlarge it again and go back and rehabilitate a great amount of equipment, of public works and so forth, and the next year cut it again.

And as Senator Johnson described it, a squeezebox operation. It is an accordion operation, and that is partly the reason.

Another reason is because the cost of living and the cost of production in the United States is higher than it is any place, which you know much better than I do, Senator, and the prices that we pay our soldiers, which is roughly 50 percent I believe of the cost of the armed services is an additional factor. Our workmen get a much higher wage.

Therefore it costs more to produce the raw material and so on and so on, which you are more familiar with than I am, and I shouldn't attempt to explain that.

The second part of your question as to whether or not today we are in that position, and if not why not have at least parity on the drawing board with the Russians, I can only venture a guess.

My guess would be that the aircraft industry of the United States had been starved during the years—I am talking now of research and development money—during the war years and until approximately 48–49.

Therefore the drawing board or bread board models that we have of jet engines which at that time were more or less a gleam in somebody's eye are now beginning to come out with some hope of getting really advanced aircraft engines and armament.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, General, let me ask you whose primary responsibility from a professional and technical standpoint is it to get better engines for our airplanes?

General VANDENBERG. That is my responsibility.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the responsibility of the Air Corps, is it not?

General VANDENBERG. That is right, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is so far as the Air Force planes are concerned. I understand the Navy has a program of its own.

AIR REPRESENTATION IN NATO

Now I want to jump over to Europe for just a moment. There are several questions I have not asked heretofore.

Are you satisfied with the military staff set-up so far as the Air Corps or the Air Force is concerned and air operations are concerned of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations? Are you satisfied with the Air Corps or Air Force representation and authority and voice on that air set-up in the NATO organizations?

General VANDENBERG. I presume by that you are talking about General Eisenhower's headquarters. I am concerned as an Air Force officer.

My former deputy for operations is the allied commander in chief of the Air Forces under General Eisenhower. I am certain that his voice is heard in the councils of all of General Eisenhower's deliberations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no thought on it one way or the other, except does he have an air superior over him under General Eisenhower or is he directly under General Eisenhower in NATO?

General VANDENBERG. There is a staff officer on General Eisenhower's staff. He is called the deputy, I believe, for Air; but General Norstad has complete access to General Eisenhower.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One other question. You have said that you are satisfied with it, which answers my question. One other question: As an airman of vast experience and probably as much experience and otherwise as any airman we have, and perhaps more—and you do not need to put this on the record if you do not want to, since I am asking this for my own information—and if it is not proper and it should be censored, why that is all right with me——

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper, your time is up.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. No further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

FINLETTER REPORT

Senator KNOWLAND. General, I have a very few questions. I had to cut mine short on the last round to go back on the Senate Floor.

Calling your attention to the President's Air Policy Commission Report, the so-called Finletter report, on page 24, I will read you the following:

> From evidence received from the Secretary of the Air Force, its Chief of Staff, and many of its ranking generals, as well as informed authorities outside of the Military Establishment, we conclude that the 55 group force, if engaged in action in its present phase I, could not carry out the missions assigned to it because it is lacking in the essential air units for effective combat action. It would be even less capable of carrying out the missions which would face it in phase II conditions.
>
> Even more alarming is the statement by the Air Force that the funds presently available will not permit the maintenance of the present inadequate Air Force, and that if appropriations are not increased the establishment may be cut back to approximately 40 groups with reductions established in July 1948.
>
> None of this must be permitted. There is a minimum force in being below which we must not go if we are to protect our country in its vital interests.
>
> We have concluded that the minimum force necessary at the present time is an Air Force composed of 12,400 modern planes, organized into 70 combat groups and 22 special squadrons, supplemented by 27 National Guard groups and 34 groups of Air Reserve. All of these forces, with the exception of the Air Reserve, must be equipped, trained, and ready for immediate action in the event of war. We should build to this force as rapidly as possible, and once it is achieved, never permit it to drop below this level nor should we permit it to become impotent and ineffective, because of a failure to keep it modernized with the very best planes and equipment available.

That is the end of the quotation. You are familiar with the Finletter report, are you not?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. That report was made to the President in approximately the early part of January, about January 1, 1948, was it not?

Colonel KLETTE. That is right.

General VANDENBERG. Around that time, sir.

FIRST ALARM OF POSSIBLE SOVIET AGGRESSION

Senator KNOWLAND. General, as a man who has been greatly experienced in World War II, when did you first become concerned with the threat of Soviet aggression in the world subsequent to VJ-day?

General VANDENBERG. I believe it was the time General Bradley and I met with General Zukov at the meeting of the two armies, when I believe the Red Army opposite our people asked whether we were digging in or not, and later at this meeting I am speaking of, the attitude of the Russian general in showing me his jet aircraft—his fighter aircraft—that came over to pay us ostensibly a salute, as we were leaving.

The aircraft that we saw—there were not too many of them—impressed me very much from their desiegn and their speed and the way they were handled. As I recall it, I spoke about it to General Bradley as we were going out in the airplane after we had driven through the Russian zone.

I remember talking to him about my concern over the apparent feeling in this country that the Russians had no technical capabilities, that they had masses of manpower and no brains.

That is putting it rather bluntly, but still I believe that is the general impression, that we have invented everything in the world since the world began and can produce it faster and better than anyone else.

I remember talking to him about a Stormovik, which combined armor plate and wood at the critical bending moment, something that our people up to that time had said could not be successfully done.

I remember talking with the young engineers in the factories around Moscow when I was there with Mr. Harriman as his air adviser in the winter of 1943. All of these people in order to get better food, get better living accommodations, and greater freedom, were feverishly working after their work in the daytime, feverishly working at the technical schools and institutions of Russia.

About the only way I could see from their conversations that they could raise their standard of living and obtain their freedom from being constantly watched was to get their technical competence to such a state that the Soviet Union depended on them. Therefore they were working under that duress in a way which few university students in the United States or our technical people could be expected to operate.

I believe that is the beginning when I began to view with slight alarm.

Senator KNOWLAND. That was really before VJ-day and after VE-day, or approximately in that period.

General VANDENBERG. Right, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, subsequent to that time the Nation and the President became concerned with the threat of Communist aggression in Greece and Turkey to the extent that we had the so-called Greek-Turkish doctrine enunciated.

We also were subject to Soviet blackmail in the Berlin blockade, were we not?

General VANDENBERG. I would say that was true, sir.

ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR AIR FORCE, AUGUST, 1949

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, in August of 1949—Senator Bridges has mentioned this before, but I want to explore it a little more—the Congress was acting on an appropriation bill dealing with the Air Force, among other things, and I happen to have been one of those who felt that the administration and the Congress were cutting the amount beyond the point where it should be cut.

On August 26, on page 12,302, this one paragraph of my statement, because I was opposing the committee amendment which would have had the effect of decreasing the amount of funds for airpower, I said:

> If the danger of overt Communist aggression is so great as our National Government has felt it would be, so that this Nation was justified in embarking for the first time in its history upon a North Atlantic Pact; if it is so great as to justify the expenditure of a billion four hundred million for the implementation of arms to the signatories to the pact, and to other free peoples of the world in order to maintain a free world of free men, then I say, Mr. President, with all the sincerity that I possess, that this is no time for the Congress of the United States to clip the wings of the eagle, to dull his beak, or to cut off his talons.

Now, the answer generally that was given to that at the time was that given by Mr. Thomas, who was handling the bill on the floor. Mr. Thomas of Oklahoma in several places throughout his statement, but more succinctly at this particular place, had this to say:

> The House added money for a 58-group Air Force and this is a reduction recommended by the Senate committee. It is a reduction in harmony with the request of the military authorities. Secretary Johnson did not ask for an increase to the House figure. Neither did Mr. Symington. They asked only for the budget estimate and this bill carries the budget estimate.

Now, in the light, General, of your statement yesterday—which unfortunately I did not have the opportunity to hear, but which I have seen read—in which you say—and I read from page 3630 of yesterday's record—

> The fact is that the United States is operating a shoestring air force in view of its global responsibilities.
>
> Starting from a 40-odd group Air Force, the aircraft industry is unable until almost 1953 to do much of a job toward supplying the airplanes that we would lose in war against any major opposition—

it is a little difficult for me to understand how, in view of the Finletter Commission Report, which I understood generally the Air Force people subscribed to, your own statements here of yesterday, as to the serious difficulties that we face, the fact that testimony before our committee is that we can't take certain action, which under normal times we would be expected to take in Korea, because we find ourselves understrength, so to speak, why it was that the Department of the Air Force did not speak out if they felt the country was endangered and ask for additional funds at that time?

Would you like to comment on it?

LIMITING AIR FORCE BUDGET

General VANDENBERG. Yes, Senator, I would.

The Department of the Air Force, in the Defense Establishment, is sometimes a participant in a limited budget figure.

By that, I mean that of a certain amount of money that is made available to the Defense Establishment, the Air Force must participate in the dividing up of that money in as equitable manner for the defense of the United States as is practicable.

Now, as I see it, the military position is to state what they believe to be correct.

There are other governmental agencies above the Air Force that can either show that there are other circumstances that alter the military situation, that have a bearing on it, that in the evaluation of all the factors, will approve it or disapprove it, from the purely military point of view.

After that opinion has been given from the best military authority that we can have in the Air Force, which should be, I believe, the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, then the resultant action by the Secretary of Defense and/or the Congress and/or the President, in the person of the Bureau of the Budget, is a problem of higher Government operation which has many other factors to consider, other than the purely military.

From the point of view that I have, it seems to me that when I have pointed out, and the Secretary, who, in this instance was operating under a ceiling budget and previous to that time had indicated, as has all the testimony in response to questions from the Congress, as to the minimum force they believed adequate for a peacetime air force, since 1945 or 1946, I believe, had been, until recently, a 70-group Air Force.

That military opinion has been given many times in answer to every question.

Now beyond that, the other factors that come into the running of the Government are to be considered. Somebody has to make that decision.

I feel that it would be, with the information that is available to the Air Force or even the Defense Establishment, to attempt to undertake that responsibility which is clearly someone else's province and in which they do not have either the staff or the information to assess its value, that the Air Force has completed its job, and I think the Defense Establishment—but I will speak particularly of the Air Force—has completed its job when in answer to questions and in proposing what the minimum force is to the proper authorities, then I think it has completed not only its obligation but as far as it should go under our form of government.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I am sorry. Do you have just one more question?

Senator KNOWLAND. Just one.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection.

SUBMITTING MILITARY BUDGET

Senator KNOWLAND. I only wanted to make this brief observation, General. Both as a member of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee I don't quite agree with that theory that you just enunciated, and it seems to me that one of the reasons we are in the very serious problem we are in today where our hands are tied to keep from doing some things which sound military strategy might dictate that we do is that we find ourselves without adequate facilities and wherewithal to do it.

Now it seems to me that the function of the Joint Chiefs in their professional capacity is to tell the administration, to tell the Congress, because they are not creatures of the administration, they are creatures of the Government which is different from the administration, to tell them what in their best judgment is needed as being essential to the defense of the Nation.

Then if the civilian superiors of the Joint Chiefs feel that there are certain budget limitations that they have to deal with, that is their responsibility.

If after having all the facts and the best judgment of the Joint Chiefs that we need so much air power or naval power or ground power to properly defend this country, if the Congress wants to take the responsibility, then having those facts, why that is a policy matter, but I do submit that it has been in many instances—now I am not speaking in a personal sense now but in many instances—it has been like drawing eye teeth for the Congress to get the information because once the upper echelon in the executive branch of the Government has determined that the Joint Chiefs have to operate within a certain budget limitation, whether or not that actually is essential for the defenses of this Nation, then everybody clams up down the line, and it is most difficult for even those of us who are trying to help the Air Force or help the Navy or the Army to make our voices felt and our actions felt in the committees and on the floor of the Congress.

General VANDENBERG. Senator, I would have to disagree somewhat with what you have just said. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on several occasions that I am familiar with have submitted the budget that they thought was essential.

At one time running around the town there were the allegations of warmongering, and the fact that we were financially incapable, that we had fantastic ideas, and that we had no sense of what the economy of the Government could stand because we submitted, as I recall, something in the neighborhood of a $30 billion budget; then, if that was not acceptable, a $26 billion budget; and finally a $15 billion budget. Then, I believe, we were given a $13 billion budget.

But the fact is the Joint Chiefs of Staff have on many occasions, and I think upon almost every occasion, informed the proper authorities as to what we believe was the minimum budget. But that is purely from a military point of view.

Now the pulling of the eye teeth to get the information, Senator, I think that a résumé of the testimony before the various Appropriations Committees since 1946, either at that time Assistant Secretary of the Army or Air, and the commander of the Army Air Force, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, every time in answer to a question their response has been, I am confident, that from the military point of view 70 groups, until recently when that was insufficient, has been the answer to every question directed as to the adequacy of the Air Force.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you through?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Lodge?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Cain?

CONSIDERING ENTRANCE IN KOREAN CONFLICT

Senator Cain. General Vandenberg, we seem to agree conclusively that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the chief military advisers to the President. I am conscious that most of our military authorities have long stated that Korea possessed strategic and tactical opportunities that were very undesirable.

You told us this morning that four meetings to discuss the Korean conflict were held on the following dates: June 25, 26, 27, and 30.

My question is this: Did the President, who is the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, ever request an estimate of the Korean situation with both its liabilities and possibilities from the JCS, or did the JCS ever provide the President with such an estimate during any of these meetings?

General Vandenberg. If you mean a formally prepared paper in those days, the answer is "No," Senator. If you mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the pros and cons, the dangers, the advantages, and the difficulties, the answer is "Yes."

Senator Cain. I am glad to hear that, sir. That is all I am trying to get at.

In your opinion was a very thorough presentation made of both the liabilities and the virtues likely to be encountered in the Korean episode or conflict presented to the Commander in Chief?

General Vandenberg. I think they were fairly comprehensive, as I recall them, Senator, because among the various conversations that I recall at the time was the possibility of Russian intervention, the possibility of Chinese intervention, the possibility of an attack on Formosa, the position of the Japanese Islands in relation to this, the position of the Philippines, the potentials one way or another. As I recall it, the decision was made that some place along this line that satellites were pushing the free world back on their heels every time, somebody had to make a stand somewhere, and the decision was that that was the place to do it.

Senator Cain. Well it seems reasonable then, General Vandenberg, to assume as a result of what you have just stated that those in executive authority knew what they were getting into when the decision was made last June to commit American forces to Korea.

General VANDENBERG. I would say, Senator, in answer to that, that the possibilities of the situation were fairly well gone over. I think at that time it was considered very doubtful that, (a) the Russians would come in, (b) the Chinese would come in.

Those considerations were talked over and discussed. But as to whether or not there was a great opportunity or chance of their coming in, I believe the consensus at that time was that there was a chance but it was relatively small.

Senator CAIN. But, General Vandenberg, as of now the Red Chinese are in the war, and we do not exactly know what to do about it, as I see the situation.

General VANDENBERG. I can't agree with that quite, Senator. I think that we are doing a first-rate job of destroying the know-how of the Chinese Army, which is not as extensive, the hard core is not as extensive as we got from the figures of the mass population of China.

Senator CAIN. Well, thank you, sir. The fact remains from my point of view that the Allied forces are not fighting the Red Chinese in the same unlimited or full-scale fashion that the Red Chinese are presently committed against us.

But from what you have said it is now obvious, and I have not been clear on this before, that in those June meetings the possibility of Red China coming into the war was actually discussed.

KOREAN WAR ENTRANCE AND STRATEGY

May I ask what conclusion was reached as to what the Allied forces would do if the possibility of Red China entering the Korean conflict become a fact?

General VANDENBERG. May I take the first part of your question, first?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

General VANDENBERG. The point that you made, I believe, that——

Senator CAIN. You had said at these meetings the possibility of Red China's coming in was discussed, so the rest of my question is an obvious one. What was your conclusion?

[Deleted.]

The second part of your question, as to what would happen if the Chinese Communists came in, or if the Russians came in, the normal way of operating in such a case is that after the discussion and the decision is made, and the general proposition is weighed, without getting into too much detail, to go back and draw up contingent plans, war plans, and so forth——

Senator CAIN. Certainly, sir.

General VANDENBERG (continuing). Upon various contingencies.

The imminence of one or the other generally brings those to fruition. After they are drawn up, they are sent back, generally, by the Chiefs for additional information, and over a period of time, maybe a year, a year and a half, they gradually jell, depending upon the exigencies of the situation.

Senator CAIN. Is that to say that at those meetings in June the possibility of Red China's entering the war was discussed, but no conclusive determination was made as to what the Allies would attempt to do if that possibility became a fact?

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir. That would depend upon a very careful analysis of many pros and cons in the situation in order to get the sort of answer that would make sense.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

PROPER USE OF AIR POWER

Yesterday, General Vandenberg, you said there were three ways to employ air power properly. The first was to strike at enemy supply depots and originating end of his lines of communication; the second was to strike at his lines of communications as they led to the battle area; and the third was to strike at the enemy after he had become entrenched.

It is so, is it not, that we are not; for reasons that you and others have explained, employing the preferred way, the No. 1 and most effective way, to employ air power?

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, for the reason that they are coming from Russia, and we are trying to avoid a global war.

[Deleted.]

Senator MORSE. The Senator from Washington won't object to my saying, on committee time, I certainly think that answer ought to be off the record.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think there is any doubt but what Admiral Davis is very careful to read the record and will eliminate that.

Senator CAIN. I notice that Admiral Davis is very careful to read the record. I got a note this morning saying, with reference to the use of his name, that he was not present at a particular meeting.

I think the admiral overlooks nothing, which is very good for the record, and all of us.

MILITARY PARADOX OF KOREAN SITUATION

This is the question, sir:

Does it not follow that under the prevailing prohibitions against bombing in Manchuria, we are certain to decrease the presently limited effectiveness of our air power in Korea if, as we all hope, our Ground Forces find it possible to move farther and farther north of the thirty-eighth parallel, in the direction of the Yalu River?

That seems to me, in terms of military doctrine, to be a paradox—that as you are successful with one branch of your services, you become less effective with another branch of your services.

General VANDENBERG. I think that last statement that you have made, Senator, is correct.

As the distance between the Yalu River and our troops decreases, the effectiveness of our tactical air force decreases in direct proportion.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

ADDITIONS NEEDED TO CARRY OUT MAC ARTHUR PLAN

General Vandenberg, yesterday you said this, and I would like to ask your view of exactly what you mean, please, sir, in answer to a question from Senator Johnson concerning how much more we would need to carry out General MacArthur's bombing recommendations—you said:

> I would say roughly double the strategic air power that the United States Air Force has today.

Does that imply that, in your opinion, General MacArthur was recommending leveling Manchuria, and leveling all of the large and medium-sized cities in China?

General VANDENBERG. No, sir.

I doubt if that is what was in General MacArthur's mind.

However, in my opinion, in my position, I believe that to be effective in the use of air power against, let us call it, secondary targets, a small, relatively small-range effort is productive of but small-range results.

To use air power which has destructive capabilities that almost stagger the imagination, if properly used, you have to recognize the fact that to utilize it, you have to employ it on the basis of destruction.

Therefore, blowing up a depot here and there, over a long period of time, will assist your army forces quite measurably, as they are doing now in Korea; but to become effective, to really do a job, to really turn the tide of battle so that it is practically impossible to move anything from the border to the North Korean border, which I might point out is very close, you would have to almost lay waste all of those facilities which would lend themselves toward hiding or storing or stockpiling equipment. That, in a small measure, is what is being done today by the B-29's, in going through the area and blowing up buildings in which troops are housed; in blowing up haystacks under which tanks are hidden; and therefore to do a job, assume you are going to—then you are going to have to level those methods of communication, those facilities for hiding the material, and the facilities that are there, in existence, today, which form some measure of ability of manufacture toward the war effort, both in China proper and in Manchuria.

But, I would like to point out, in explanation of what I said yesterday, in connection with the possibility of whether it would be decisive or not—is the fact that if you look at the map and you see where Russia comes right down to the border of North Korea, that again this business about moving between daylight and dark any reinforcements and supplies in order to hide them before the next day, that that can be easily done from the eastern sector and therefore if there is a determination on the part of the Chinese, and on the part of the Russians, to continue this, regardless of the casualties and losses and desolation, I say there is a possibility that they could continue.

Senator CAIN. In your considered view it woulld take approximately twice the strategic air strength you now have to carry out that job conclusively?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. General, I thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, I had hoped to conclude with General Vandenberg this afternoon. I am not pressing anyone on their questioning. They can ask all the questions they feel disposed to, but it would assist us in knowing whether it was possible to do so without running into the night.

If the Senators would indicate about how much more time they would desire, if there is any considerable amount of it, why we will go over until tomorrow with General Vandenberg. I had hoped to start with Admiral Sherman, but that is not essential, of course.

Senator KNOWLAND. I have no further questions at this time.

Senator CAIN. I think I would like to ask about two.

Senator LONG. I can get through in about 7 minutes. I have just a very few questions myself, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

Senator CAIN. Not to exceed two, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I will withhold mine for Admiral Sherman. I do not need to ask the general any more.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have a very few questions, Mr. Chairman. I think I can finish very shortly.

Senator KNOWLAND. I do have a procedural matter that I would like to bring up before any more members of the committee get away, if possible.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

PROCEDURE ON STATE DEPARTMENT MEMO

Senator KNOWLAND. There are two points. I have discussed earlier today with the chairman of the committee this matter of the December 23, 1949, State Department memo to the effect that Formosa had no strategic value. I have since had the opportunity of discussing it with Senator McMahon who talked with the State Department on it.

I understood from him that they apparently still feel the document should not be made part of the public record. He suggested that they wait, that the committee wait on that decision until Secretary Acheson gets here the latter part of this week.

I would prefer not to wait until that time because frankly I would like to examine Admiral Sherman on the matter, and there is going to be so much cut out of the record if that is not going to be made available that would be needlessly cut out, so I was going to suggest to the chairman if it is agreeable to him that the State Department be requested tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock to have someone who could present their point of view to the committee present here.

I do not think it will take a matter of more than 5 or 10 minutes to merely present the issues to see whether that document could not be made available as part of the public record.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator McMahon spoke to me briefly about it. He came by here and said that in his opinion we ought to have the testimony of the Secretary of State on it. Is that about what he told you?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes; that is what he suggested; that we wait for Secretary Acheson to be here.

I told him I fully agreed that the State Department should have its point of view presented before the committee took action but I did not want to wait until Secretary Acheson himself was a witness before getting that matter solved.

The document, I want to merely repeat for the benefit of the committee, was a mimeographed document and cryptographic security is not involved. It was December 23, 1949, so it is old hat to that extent.

The security of our forces in Korea is not even remotely involved in the situation, and we have had documents which at that time—for instance, the Wake Island document—was once classified a top secret document here and then was properly declassified and made available.

Now this one only has a security classification of confidential, and for the life of me I have read it on several occasions and I can see no justification for withholding that from the public record and this committee.

I would like to let the State Department present its point of view here and have the committee act on it before Admiral Sherman and Secretary Acheson appear, because otherwise I think our questioning will be severely limited.

Chairman **Russell**. It is very evident that we cannot take any action on it this afternoon.

Senator **Knowland**. I am not pressing for that.

Chairman **Russell**. I understand. I just make that statement for the benefit of the record.

General Mudge, would you advise Mr. Fisher or someone at the State Department to have someone stand by in the morning and then I will submit to the committee as to whether or not we will proceed with it in the morning, as Senator Knowland suggests, or defer it until Mr. Acheson comes in at the end of the week.

I might also request that you try to get that word to Senator McMahon.

Very well. Senator Stennis?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Long?

DISPERSAL OF RUSSIAN WAR PLANTS

Senator **Long**. General Vandenberg, I found a statement by you in the record earlier in your testimony that you believed that we had sufficient air power and sufficient atomic power to pretty well knock out Russian industry in the event we had to fight them in a third world war, something to that effect at least.

General **Vandenberg**. Today; yes, sir.

Senator **Long**. It would be my guess Russia would be dispersing her war plants insofar as she possibly could, knowing that we have a great number of atomic weapons. Do you believe, do you have any information to indicate that she is doing that sort of thing?

General **Vandenberg**. The information I have is that they are fairly well dispersed; yes, sir.

Senator **Long**. Do you believe that notwithstanding that, you could accomplish your task, your mission of knocking out most of their war potential?

General **Vandenberg**. I believe it could be done today.

Senator **Long**. There is some question in my mind how well we are taking advantage of the time that we have had.

UTILIZING TIME ADVANTAGE

Now there has been some discussion here about the $500,000,000 roughly that Congress appropriated that was impounded after the Eighty-first Congress had appropriated that money. I recall as one of the Senators at that time that at the time only nine Senators voted for that on the Senate side; we did not know that Russia had the atomic bomb.

When the President announced that she did have the atomic bomb, it came back on a voice vote and I can't recall that a single Senator voted against that extra $500,000,000 for the Air Force, but the Secretary of Defense and the President felt that in the interests of the economy they should impound those funds, but it certainly put us on notice that we were in danger of atomic attack from Russia at a much earlier date than we had anticipated.

Now subsequent to that when the Korean War broke out, of course we knew then that we were in danger of world war III almost at any time, at least some of us feel that way today. We completely expect that it could happen. Do you believe that we are taking advantage of the time that we have had the way we should have since, let us say, the Korean War broke out?

General VANDENBERG. I answered that——

Senator LONG. I had particularly in mind for building weapons rather than recruiting the men.

General VANDENBERG. I answered that at some length this morning to Senator Johnson and I would like to repeat as nearly as I can remember what I said then.

LOCATION OF UNITED STATES INDUSTRY

Senator LONG. I won't go into Senator Johnson's question because I would rather develop one point I especially had in mind. Is it not true that our industires that could produce the essential materials for war are very concentrated in certain localities?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir; I believe that is true, Senator.

Senator LONG. Do you know the estimate of civilian defense based on what they believe the Russians probably have and how they think the Russians could be expected to use the atomic weapons they have available?

General VANDENBERG. I don't know the particular study you have reference to.

Senator LONG. I am sure you have had called to your attention at least what, in the opinion of the Air Force, would happen to American industry in the early stages of an atomic war?

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator LONG. Do you believe that there is a danger of this Nation's being crippled industrially for some time to come as a result of an early attack?

General VANDENBERG. I believe, as I said previously, Senator, that we are relatively safe today. Tomorrow, I think that we are in great danger.

DISPERSING AMERICAN PLANTS

Senator LONG. Do you believe there is a need for further dispersion of American plants to produce various essential materials for war purposes?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, that gets into an awful lot of ramifications so that it is very difficult to give a one-paragraph answer to it. I might highlight some of them without giving you a definite answer, to show you what the thinking in the Air Force has been on that to date.

If you concentrate your industrial area, and you adequately defend it, and it is inward far enough from your advanced warning station, it is obviously going to require fewer aircraft to defend it, and your air-warning net can be more heavily made. It can reach further, and there will be fewer holes in it.

On the other hand, if you disperse it, you have got to furnish through the length and breadth of the United States that same defense, and you ought to have it in the same thickness that you have it in the area where you have it concentrated.

Therefore, it becomes a question of cost, efficiency, and similar problems.

Additionally, when you disperse your industry that makes certain inefficiencies between some of the components. Now, the Germans dispersed and camouflaged their industry while the war was in process, and did a remarkably excellent job.

However, the Air Force found out that it also worked to the disadvantage of the Germans, because you made a component over in the northeast, let us say, and it needed another component over in the northwest, so you put the railroads and the locks and canals and the roads and the bridges out of commission, and they can't get components built in the northeast to a component built in the northwest, so in that instance there is another factor that has to be considered; perhaps it is better to concentrate.

Senator Long. Of course, in considering the factor, you have to keep in mind that it would be a very difficult task for an enemy at long range to bomb out our railroads, as we did from a short-range bombing of German railroads.

General Vandenberg. I believe I am correct when I say that the German road and rail system was built for war, and it had switchbacks and cut-offs, and alternate routes that had been very carefully thought out for that purpose, and I doubt if we in this country are very much better off than they were with their roads and rail communication systems. All of their roads practically were military roads.

Senator Long. You then would hesitate to recommend further dispersion of various industries?

General Vandenberg. I would not be prepared to recommend either for or against it at this moment, Senator, because of the very many varying factors that must be taken into consideration.

I would think that it would be a study based upon, jointly, perhaps, the advantages and disadvantages, both from the industrial point of view and the military; and in that I would also include the ground defense, the defense against sabotage, and the antiaircraft artillery, as well as the air defense.

FIGHTING WAR FROM PRODUCTION LINE

Senator Long. What do you think of the theory that we should fight a war from the production line? Do you believe that we can depend on the materials being produced while the war is being fought or do you think that it might be better to try to have a large starting force in the beginning, particularly in terms of equipment?

General VANDENBERG. As far as air power is concerned, Senator, I very much doubt, after weapons of mass destruction are available and means to deliver them, if you will have any opportunity to do much building if you do not have your defensive air force in being at the date on which you will need it.

Senator LONG. So far our experience has been that we have had almost a year's notice from the time the Korean War broke out and we still have a tremendous way to go in overcoming Russian air advantage, do we not, at least in some phases of it?

General VANDENBERG. I believe that I could say that we have a way to go in some phases. In other phases we are ahead and in some phases we are behind.

In the over-all we are starting from a position in rear that only the advantage of our having a stockpile of A-bombs and the means to deliver them today is the overcoming factor which makes it in our favor.

UNITED STATES MARGIN OF SECURITY

Senator LONG. We are told by Mr. Wilson that we can expect about 1953 at the rate we are going to have a reasonable margin of security. I take it you are in agreement with that.

General VANDENBERG. Not exactly, Senator. My feeling is that the danger period begins from today until about 1954 and in my opinion in 1953 we will be beginning to have an adequate military posture.

I would not say that in 1953 everything would be lovely by a long shot.

APPROPRIATIONS RELATIVE TO AIR FORCE BUILD-UP

Senator LONG. You think that appropriations are in any major degree the problem of the Air Force, as far as giving us adequate preparation is concerned, or do you find that at the present time the money seems to be no particular object as far as getting the job done?

General VANDENBERG. I would like to state it this way, if I may, Senator:

That the basic appropriation of fiscal year 1951 and the various supplementals in 1951, the Air Force was given enough money which in my opinion it could efficiently spend for the purpose.

I would like to make the point, though, that the time that money was made available to the Air Force was such that greater efficiency and much greater progress could have been made had we had it earlier.

Senator LONG. I just wanted to get some idea as to how much you think it might help if you simply had no strings at all as far as money is concerned.

General VANDENBERG. Well, up to this time I would say, starting from a 40-group Air Force and saying that nothing could have been done previous to that time, that it would have made a difference mainly in our public-works program. It would have made the planning for following fiscal years much easier. It would have insured the industries that are required for rearmament to have steady, firm programs that they knew for several years ahead would be implemented.

It would enable the Defense Establishment to more surely and confidently start from a base which is larger and which, in my opinion, there is today always the feeling that if we extend there and it is cut off, somebody has built a monument and who is responsible? Which tends to limit the efficient going about of this program.

But those are, I would say, more or less minor restrictions. The principal one, I think, is in the difficulty of getting raw materials and in utilizing the civilian economy for certain of the components that we need for the armed services.

Senator LONG. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith, I believe you said you did not have any more questions.

Senator SMITH. No, I will pass. I want to thank the general for his courtesy.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

STRATEGIC AIR IN MANCHURIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General Vandenberg, in answer to some questions by Senator Cain when he last questioned you, I understood you to say, in effect, that one justification for not using strategic air in Manchuria, was that unless you went all-out and destroyed the whole potential over in that area and in China, that it was hardly worth it. That is, to destroy a part of it would not be desirable in your opinion.

Is that a reasonably correct understanding? I said that is one of the reasons. I do not mean to go into your third world war reason.

General VANDENBERG. I would say that that is reasonably correct for one of the contributing factors toward not using it; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, General, just in all seriousness, it seems to me that that argument is open to the same type of criticism as would be the argument that because we cannot kill all the Red Chinese attacking our forces in Korea in one shot or in one battle that we should not attempt to defeat them piecemeal. In other words, within certain limitations, I think we have to hit the enemy where and when we can in order to contribute to that final capitulation or victory.

I say that in all seriousness, that one could turn that argument and say because we cannot devastate the army in Korea in one battle or by one sortie, or one limited campaign of a few days, that we had not ought to do it at all.

General VANDENBERG. I didn't intend to convey quite that impression, Senator. Any military operation to be successful, you have to figure out what you are going to gain and what you are going to lose, in my opinion.

What you are going to gain in this is only—now operating on your theory of utilizing only a portion and not going about this thing all-out—what you are going to gain in my opinion is relatively ineffective contribution to the army which is fighting over there.

On the other hand, what you are going to lose by going into the hornets' nest of the MIG's and not going on a concentrated effort against the airdrome, in other words, you are going to go in there and you are going to peck away at this thing without really first eliminating the hostile air force, without gaining air superiority, you are sending your air crews in there to be picked on at will almost by the enemy.

WAY TO FIGHT AN AIR WAR

Now in connection with the way to fight an air war, in my opinion, besides the considerations that we have to use about hitting at the source, and the next best, and then the tactical air force, and air defense and so forth, there is one very important point that is very often overlooked, and that is that no successful operations on the surface can be conducted until you get air superiority. And when you go against a hostile air force in order to gain that air superiority, you must first destroy the enemy air force at the place where he is most vulnerable, which is on the ground and in his nest. To do that you have to do two things. You have to make his airdromes untenable, and you have to knock out his gasoline, oil, lubricants, and his runways, and his aircraft.

To do other than that when you go into an area, you expose your crews, which are going in for a purpose of pecking at this thing, to the combined efforts and onslaughts of all of the aircraft that are available within a large radius that can be brought into this area and be relatively safe. Because in the formations that you would be utilizing for this you have to use the relatively slow aircraft which you ought to utilize first in knocking out the hostile air. If you don't do that, your attrition mounts in arithmetical progression.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had not meant to suggest that we go in there in just pecking operations. My thought was we either do or do not have enough to go in there and give him a pasting and maybe give him a repeated pasting on his airdromes and planes on the ground.

Certainly I agree with you that you would not want to send an isolated squadron in there and get into a hornet's nest, unless you send him in with a good wallop, and perhaps be able to follow that up in certain places, such as known airdromes and known supply marshaling centers, and so on, within a reasonable radius of Manchuria's border. Certainly if we are not planning to do quite a thorough job in a reasonably short time, you might have a lot of trouble. I understand that.

General VANDENBERG. That was my point, Senator, when I said in going in there to knock out these installations that would assist the Army, that it would require what seemed on the face of it, I am sure when I first said it, to be a rather ridiculous statement, of what you need for the Air Force in the sense of the strategic Air Force which we have today. Because you would have to do that within a reasonable period of time to assist the Ground Forces. You would have to knock out the air bases in that vicinity as well as in North Korea.

You would probably have to approach pretty close to the borders of Russia to do that. In addition to that many of the nests that they have are around such places as Harbin and Mukden.

In addition to that, you are going to get, as you move into this operation with this greater force which you have to have first in order to eliminate the supply dumps and the rail lines, and the roads and the bridges, a considerable force, and that force, in my opinion, is going to get attrition.

[Deleted.]

My point is that the aircraft industry today, because of the small number of orders that have been given to it heretofore, and which they are now just beginning to get under way, cannot supply that attrition, and the force gradually becomes whittled down so that we are not capable of having that deterrent force.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course on that theory, if they are that strong, and if they elect to come in in force, we will take a pasting, too.

General VANDENBERG. That is correct, sir. Therefore, at that time I believe we have to make a decision, and that is why I said at the present time I am not in favor of it, but that does not mean I would not be tomorrow or the next day.

DISAGREEMENT WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There is one thing I would like to correct as far as you are concerned and as far as the committee is concerned before I forget it. I saw on the ticker today it said I suggested you resign your commission. I did not mean to do anything of the sort.

General VANDENBERG. That was very clear to me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was making a comparison of reasons. If disagreement with higher authority was in and of itself sufficient reason to recall, then I suggested that you yourself had disagreed with higher authority on occasion. I think I said at that time but that I was not suggesting, that I was merely posing a comparative situation for the sake of argument.

General VANDENBERG. You said it very clearly, Senator, and I had no misunderstanding.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say this because I saw it on the ticker that I had suggested or demanded your resignation or something of that kind, and I simply wanted to clear that up because I didn't think I had done that. I had no intention of making an affirmative suggestion of future conduct.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope that is not the first time, Senator, the press boys picked out what you said and distorted the whole meaning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wanted to clear it up in the hope I could make it clear.

VANDENBERG'S SATURDAY EVENING POST ARTICLE

Now I think perhaps I can shorten this with just a statement, because I have been reading here your article in the Saturday Evening Post of February 17, last, in which I think you referred to something quite specifically, at least in my conclusion. I would be happy to have the whole article go into the appendix, if necessary, to clear it up. I do not like to bring out one portion and not the whole.

But what you called very effectively to the attention of the public is that the power of air is to reach really far back. Anything short of that is not using its full power. For instance, you say:

> The same bomb that knocks out one mortar on the batlefield can knock out a convoy of 10 mortars 50 miles behind the front. Five hundred miles farther back that same bomb can blow up a railroad engine or a bridge, preventing the arrival of 100 mortars in the battle area.

I take it there is no dispute on that philosophy, that more than anything else you are putting your attitude on not using this air in Manchuria on matters other than a straight theoretical strategic use of air and all three components of the use of air, that is, strategic, tactical and in close support; I take it that you are putting the failure to use it in Manchuria on slightly different grounds than the accepted complete all-out utility of an air force.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. I think that my explanation of why I am not advocating the use of air power in Manchuria has been explained here so that it is very clear.

I would like to take this opportunity to point out that the article I wrote in the Saturday Evening Post was trying to put in a short article and in very few and simple words a subject which is very complex and very difficult to explain, and which, in my opinion, the people of the United States must be informed of.

In doing that I have had to make more or less dogmatic assertions, which are true in their over-all contention, but there are many variants that must, of course, be applied to them.

In no sense does my recommendation for or against bombing Manchuria have anything to do with an accepted dogma or doctrine.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask you just this one question? I think my time is up, is it not?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is almost, Senator. You said you would be through in a few minutes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then this one question: Did you have this article cleared with the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Air Corps?

General VANDENBERG. All up and down the line, including the State Department, sir. I have had all my speeches cleared since I started making them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see. Very good.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you through?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. No further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

DEFINING POLICE ACTION

Senator CAIN. I have just three questions, General Vandenberg.

At what meeting, if at any meeting, was it agreed that the Korean police action had gotten out of hand and that we had a real war on our hands?

I seek to establish just for my own satisfaction when did we as a matter of national policy know that this was a large-scale undertaking.

General VANDENBERG. Well, I would like to answer that this way, Senator, that it is not an all-out war in my opinion yet; it is still a police action because of the attempt to restrict it to the area, the restricted area of Korea.

It became evident, I believe, to the—may I say that it became the accepted viewpoint that it was a great deal more precarious situation for our forces over there at the time when the Chinese Communists launched their first attack which, I believe, was about on or around the 24th of November.

Prior to that time, the concern of at least two of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sherman and myself, that caused us, between us, to gather up three groups of additional aircraft of more modern types, and Admiral Sherman procured the shipping in order to meet the possibility of this threat.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

You are the first witness who has given us some sort of a definition for a police action. If I understood you correctly, apparently your definition of a police action is a war which is maintained within the geographical confines of a single country.

General VANDENBERG. No, Senator, I can't quite agree with that.

I would say that police action is in regard to a small state which has generally a limited area, and on which there are restrictions imposed by that police action which would not be ordinarily imposed in an all-out war.

Senator CAIN. I think that answers——

General VANDENBERG. That is a very poor definition, but that right at the moment is the very best I can do, so——

Senator CAIN. I think that definition will be studied with interest by the historians, sir.

EFFORT REQUIRED TO SATISFY MAC ARTHUR'S BOMBING RECOMMENDATIONS

General Vandenberg, you have said that in your opinion it would take about double the strategic air power that the Air Force now possesses to satisfy General MacArthur's bombing recommendations.

General VANDENBERG. I believe those words were somewhat put in my mouth, Senator.

Senator CAIN. I have no intention of doing that. I have a question, and I am interested in this.

General VANDENBERG. I didn't mean to suggest that you have done it, sir.

It seems to be now accepted fact that there is some indication I said that General MacArthur's intentions in that regard would have required that. I would like to make that clear.

General MacArthur envisaged a smaller-scale operation than I envisage, but because I have, as I said before, the global responsibility for the United States Air Force, I have to see how that smaller-scale operation would affect my Air Force in total; and, as I have just talked with Senator Hickenlooper about the subject, the problem of doing it in a smaller fashion from the point of view of the replacements that are available to the Air Force, it not one that I could recommend.

There is no intention on my part to say or to impute that what General MacArthur has advocated is something that couldn't be done with the force that he advocated, but my responsibility is in what happens to that force and how it affects the global force; and, therefore, there is—and I use this in the proper sense, I hope—a rather limited viewpoint; because of his responsibility in a limited area, he was not as concerned as I am for the global responsibility.

Therefore, having to take that global viewpoint and being responsible for the entire United States Air Force and its capacity and ability to fight, I could not go along with the proposition; solely that. There is no other indication, Senator.

AIR PREPAREDNESS IN JUNE 1950

Secretary CAIN. I understand that, General Vandenberg, and I appreciate the fullness and frankness of your answer.

In my effort to understand this question in its entirety, I am trying, I think, to get at this:

Against everything that you have said, it would seem to follow, to me, that last June, when the possibility of Red China entering the war was discussed, that, as Chief of Staff of the American Air Force, you must have given, as your recommendation at that time, last June, that if the Red Chinese entered the war, that your total limitation of aircraft being what it was, you would be in no position to carry the war, by air, to the Red Chinese.

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator——

Senator CAIN. I don't want to maintain that assumption, General Vandenberg, if it is incorrect, in whole or in part, so I state it to you and ask your view.

General VANDENBERG. I believe it is not exactly in accordance with the way I recall the conversation.

In the first place, in my analysis of the situation over there, before, without the view of it, as we say, by Sunday-morning quarterbacking, the threat that was the most logical at that time appeared to be from Russia rather than from China.

Therefore, the main attention of the meeting, I would recall, I believe, was based more upon a consideration of that problem than upon the Chinese.

In the first place the Chinese were engaged in a war, and at that time they were having difficulties in their country. As to whether or not they could amass an army like that and bring it up as rapidly as they did was conjectural; also, their control by Russia, whether or not at that time if they came in, it might have to be a consideration from a national point of view as to whether the finger would be pointed at Russia, and tell them to stop.

Many considerations, pro and con, up and down, backward and forward, had to be taken into consideration.

But, with those views and recognizing the very evident risks, we all believed and concurred that somewhere, sometime, we had to stop being pushed around, and to afford some hope to those people who lined themselves up with us, that they could expect some assistance from the United States.

General MacArthur concurred in that. That is my understanding.

USING JETS IN 50-MILE RADIUS

Senator CAIN. General Vandenberg, this last question. I am completely satisfied that our joint and greatest hope is that we might somehow be able to drive the aggressor out of Korea and get him to stop his aggression against the free nations employed against him in Korea.

Let us assume that we are going to be successful in moving north until we are about 50 miles from the Yalu River. It seems to me that under prevailing restrictions on the Air Force, that the last 50 miles of that war will certainly be the toughest because it will be waged almost entirely about ground forces on both sides with very little opportunity for our air to be employed. Is that a reasonably valid assumption, General Vandenberg?

General VANDENBERG. Well, Senator, if you have your primary assumption that we will be operating 50 miles from the border and that at the time we are operating there that the Chinese Army has not been really badly beaten, I would say the consideration of the effective air support that you can get with the present restrictions would be limited.

I do not, however, agree that that necessarily is the way to fight this Korean War in the limited sense with which we are at present engaged.

Senator CAIN. Well, against my own assumption, General Vandenberg, it is not, is it, possible to employ with any effectiveness jet aircraft in a 50-mile radius north and south.

General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir. The effectiveness as to whether they are jet or not does not depend upon that 50-mile area as such.

If I might explain, the difficulty as we go north and as the distance between the Yalu River and our front lines decreases is due to the fact that night movements can be made in two successive stages, and that there is a very short time comparatively speaking that their supplies and their reinforcements are under attack because of the length of time, the short length of time in a motor convoy or otherwise that it takes them to run down from the border to the front lines.

With the increase in night operations in which we are becoming increasingly successful, and we are pressing that with everything we can, it would be more difficult today for them to successfully operate than it was 6 or 7, 5, 6, or 7 months ago, but still the greatest length of road and rail that you can get the enemy from his main source of supply, the more advantageous it is to the Air Force and, therefore, as you decrease it, it becomes less advantageous.

Senator CAIN. General Vandenberg, you have been very helpful to my study and I appreciate it deeply.

General VANDENBERG. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there are no further questions, I will, in behalf of the committee, thank you, General Vandenberg, for your testimony here.

I am quite sure it will be very helpful to us. You brought in some new and different ideas, at least on some of the issues that have already been presented.

A great many of the questions that have been asked you of course, did not deal directly with the matter that we had under consideration, but went to the development and the strength of our air power in this country.

That deals with a highly specialized arm of the service and, of course, one of the most important to the maintenance of our security, and the discharge of our responsibilities all over the globe; and I am sure all the members of the committee found that portion of your testimony interesting.

In my opinion, you enunciated some mighty good old American doctrines here in your discussion of our relations with the other nations in the world.

As I understood it, you believed in cooperative effort; that you thought it was worth while to make considerable sacrifices to have allies, but in the last analysis you did not wish us to depend altogether upon others but to maintain our own self-reliance and our own means of defending America in discharging our obligations throughout the world.

I thank you, sir, for your testimony, and the committee, I am sure, will find it most useful in arriving at our conclusions in this matter. Thank you, sir.

General VANDENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there are no other questions or other matters now, we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 6:30 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10:05 a. m., Wednesday, May 30, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services) presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), George, Smith (New Jersey), Green, Hickenlooper, Sparkman, Bridges, Byrd, Johnson (Texas), Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Hunt, Cain, and Long.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Carl M. Marcy, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, the committees will be in order.

The witness before the committees today is Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.

Since the formation of our Republic, naval power has played a crucial role in the defense of our Nation. It has served us well when we considered the oceans that lap our shores to be impregnable bastions. In the modern world when technology has annihilated distance it plays possibly an even more important role.

I have a kindly feeling toward the Navy because the only rank that I ever acquired in the service of my country was that of apprentice seaman in World War I.

Our Navy has fulfilled its mission in the Korean war with the courage and efficiency that accords with our finest traditions. It has protected the landings that were made on beaches, it has evacuated our hard-pressed Tenth Corps with the very minimum of losses, and it serviced our ground forces.

In addition to that, it has supported the foot soldiers with its planes and its guns and can claim much of the credit for the battles that have been won by our fighting men.

The Marine Corps, a branch of the Navy, has added to its imperishable laurels. I believe we are fortunate to have this great arm of our defense forces officered by such men as Admiral Sherman. He and his fellow officers and men are adding many pages to the Navy's record of service to our country.

Admiral Sherman, the committee has directed me to administer the oath to all witnesses, and you will therefore please rise and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will give to this committee on the inquiry now under way will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, before we get started with the witness, I mentioned yesterday that this procedural question of the December 23 memorandum——

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir, and we will take that up. I wonder if you would let us proceed with Admiral Sherman until a little after 12 o'clock. There are some other procedural matters to take up, and then we can excuse him until 2 or 2:30 and we can take them up at that time.

Senator KNOWLAND. That will be perfectly agreeable.

Chairman RUSSELL. If no member of the committee objects, I would be glad to have Admiral Sherman on the committee's time give us a brief statement of the last operations in Korea.

Admiral, we had General Collins here—I have forgotten just what day it was—and he explained the situation to us at that time. If you would give us a brief statement of the events of the last few days and the position of our forces, the apparent strength of the enemy, I think the committee would be interested in that.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FORREST P. SHERMAN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. IRA H. NUNN, UNITED STATES NAVY

PRESENT SITUATION AT THE FRONT IN KOREA

Admiral SHERMAN. The developments of the last few days have been a movement forward by the Eighth Army and a cleaning up of the situation on the eastern flank, that is before the Republic of Korea Corps and our Tenth Corps.

Our Tenth Corps has moved in a northerly direction, some of it driving northeast, and in that area a great many prisoners have been taken and the Communist forces on that part of the front have withdrawn a considerable distance.

The Korean division which is on the seacoast, the eastern end of the line, has been able to move forward until this morning it is about 26 miles north of the thirty-eighth parallel. That move forward up the narrow coastal highway and area along the coast has been assisted by the *New Jersey* and two or three other ships which have given them very effective support which has facilitated that movement north, as has been done before.

The resistance seems to be stiffening as of this morning and on the 7 o'clock telecon this morning the report indicates that the First Corps and the Ninth Corps, which are on the western end of our line, are now meeting very firm resistance. Yesterday there were some attacks even against units of the Tenth Corps, including the Marine division, which were beaten off.

I noticed with interest this morning that over the preceding 24-hour period there were no personnel missing, which indicates no falling back.

The weather, which had been bad day before yesterday at sea, was good in the Sea of Japan, was still foggy in the Yellow Sea. The air functioned extensively all across the front and in the rear areas, and yesterday the carriers flew 199 combat sorties, the Marines, 153, the United States Air Force, 471.

Carriers in the Yellow Sea were in a fog and couldn't operate.

The general situation is one of regrouping and preparing for further operations.

On the whole, I feel that we have accomplished a great deal in this period that has just been finished; we have taken several thousand prisoners, and the estimates of enemy casualties run very high, our own casualty reports running rather low.

BOMBARDMENT OF WONSAN

Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral, I noticed in the paper where the *New Jersey* and some of our other ships which have been at the rear and placing gunfire ashore were struck by shells from shore batteries. Is that something new in the Korean war? Have the Koreans brought in some new artillery there or have the Chinese brought in some new artillery?

Admiral SHERMAN. Since the very beginning we have received a good deal of gunfire from shore, particularly in the Wonsan area. This is the first time for a considerable period that there has been any direct hit on one of our ships.

This was a hit on the No. 1 turret of the *New Jersey* that killed one man, presumably a man who was in an exposed position.

That bombardment in Wonsan has been going on now for—it is in its fourth month. It was 96 days a few weeks ago. It is around a hundred consecutive days of bombardment off that port.

The reason for bombarding Wonsan so steadily and intensively is that there are on shore three main lines of supply into South Korea. There is the coastal railroad and highway which comes down from Siberia along the northeast coast until it gets to Wonsan.

There the coast trends southeast, and the railroad and highway continue on southwest in the direction of Seoul; so Wonsan is the port farthest south where the line of supply from the direction of Siberia can be interdicted, where there is continuously a profitable target, and there is a job to be done in cutting that line of supply.

There are two other lines, one where it comes down more or less from the west coast, sufficiently far inland, and in from a rather shallow area, so that it is not susceptible to gunfire.

Then, there is the central supply route, which also comes in from Manchuria.

What I feel we have accomplished there is that we have cut the two coastal water routes and a couple of the coastal land routes so that the effectiveness of naval gunfire in assisting a land campaign has been unusually great, because the campaign is in this narrow peninsula.

Chairman RUSSELL. Getting back to the *New Jersey*, I always thought that the turret was the most heavily armored part of a battleship; and I notice this shell hit the turret and killed a man, and I therefore had the impression it must have been a rather large caliber, powerful shell.

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. I think it was a small shell; and what probably happened—and this is simply a guess—is that a splinter hit a man some distance from the turret.

Chairman RUSSELL. You don't think the man was hurt in the turret?

Admiral SHERMAN. Oh, definitely not.

MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS

That is one of the hazards of bombardment. Our principal losses out there have been in mine sweepers. We have lost four United States mine sweepers, and two or three others of our allies have been damaged; but that has been our principal source of naval casualties, other than in the air, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are they continuing to lay mines off these shores?

Admiral SHERMAN. There is some attempt now to start laying mines again, but it is of a very minor character.

Of course, we had a very serious mine problem in the days last fall when we were moving north, and moving into this area that had been mined over a period of 2 or 3 months.

While that has been one of our most difficult problems, it is also an area in which we have learned some of the most valuable lessons.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. We have swept up quite a few of these Russian mines?

Admiral SHERMAN. We have swept several thousand of them.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have made some inroads in the supply they probably had there from Vladivostok and other Russian ports.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I would like to be that optimistic, but I am afraid they can probably be manufactured at a rate just as fast as our recovery of them.

Another interesting fact about what we have been doing out there is the fact that we moved all of the troops with no difficulty, we have made amphibious landings, large ones and small ones.

We had a landing day before yesterday up in the northeast coast of Korea to destroy some craft that looked as if they might be being prepared for use in laying mines—sampans with steel decks.

One of our ships landed a party and destroyed them and took the landing party back aboard.

We are unloading in Korea now about 700,000 tons of supplies every month.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any prepared statement?

Admiral SHERMAN. I have prepared some material, sir, on the subject of economic and naval blockade, which the preceding witnesses indicated to me that they were going to pass to me. I think it would save time if I read the prepared material and then I would be glad to answer any questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Very well.

Admiral SHERMAN. In view of the statutory duties of the Chief of Naval Operations, it has been natural that matters which relate to the employment of naval forces, including, of course, the problems of blockade, economic and naval, have been of more immediate concern to me than to the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It seems desirable that I discuss those problems.

CHANGING SITUATION IN KOREA IN FALL, 1950

The intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea in great strength in November 1950 made it necessary to formulate possible courses of action to be taken in the western Pacific in the event that it became impossible to prevent the Korean incident from developing into a state of war between the United States and Communist China.

Consideration of this problem by the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued concurrently with their interim direction of operations in the Far East in a rapidly changing situation. Meanwhile it was necessary that the Chief of Naval Operations give continuous consideration to readiness of the fleet to meet its responsibilities in possible eventualities.

During nearly all of December the weight of the Chinese Communist attack made the preservation of our forces in Korea a matter of primary concern.

During December it seemed quite possible that our troops would be forced out of Korea or forced into a restricted position in the southern part of the peninsula. It will be recalled that the President declared a national emergency on December 17, 1950, and that the withdrawal of our troops from Hungnam was completed on Christmas eve.

In the last days of December, General MacArthur submitted his views which were that Government recognize the state of war forced upon the United States by China, the United States could blockade the coast of China, destroy China's industrial capacity to wage war through naval gunfire and air bombardment, secure reinforcement from Formosa and release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison.

At that time it seemed less than realistic not to face the fact that the Chinese Communist Government had openly and in great strength attacked the forces of the United Nations in Korea, and that since the forces of the United States constituted the major combat strength of the United Nations command, a state of open hostilities between the forces of Communist China and the forces of the United States existed in Korea.

Our operations in the Korean conflict had been restricted initially because of our desire both not to incur Russian intervention and avoid general war with Russia, and to deter Chinese Communist intervention.

MEASURES CONSIDERED TO MEET CHANGED SITUATION

Since the Chinese Communists had intervened, it seemed that the time had come to reexamine our objectives and the restrictions previously accepted, with a view to discarding at an appropriate time restrictions which had to do only with deterring Chinese Communist intervention. This reexamination was actually made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December and early January.

It had in November become an urgent necessity to do all possible by means of an economic blockade to reduce the ability of Communist China to wage war, no matter how the ground fighting in Korea developed. I will later indicate briefly what was done along these lines.

IMPLICATIONS OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE

The initiation of a naval blockade of China in the situation then existing would have had numerous complications. Not the least of these was the fact that the naval forces which could quickly be assigned to such duty would have to be subtracted initially from the naval forces then giving all practicable support to the local situation in Korea, including cover and support of the Hungnam-evacuation operations, and which might have been called on for similar operations elsewhere.

It should be understood that the imposition of a naval blockade is a belligerent right and implies the existence of a state of war.

A blockade must be limited to the ports and coast belonging to or occupied by an enemy; must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. Furthermore, it must be applied equally to the ships of all nations.

A blockade to be binding must be effective. Communist China is vulnerable to an effective blockade. The present Communist Chinese economy is one weakened by internal strife. It is basically unstable, depending particularly for materials of war on the import of many commodities and upon export trade for foreign credit.

EFFECT OF NAVAL BLOCKADE ON CHINA'S WAR ECONOMY

The following commodities, which are essential to China's war economy, could be seriously interfered with by naval blockade: rubber, petroleum, petroleum products, industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machine tools, machinery, industrial and automotive spare parts, metals, and electrical and electronic equipment.

An idea of the magnitude of China's imports prior to January 1951, may be had from the following estimates:

(*a*) 78 million tons of shipping of other than Chinese origin entered Chinese ports annually. This estimate represents over 2,500 foreign-flag ships. It is estimated that over 80 percent of their cargo capacity was unloaded for Chinese destination.

(*b*) 11,700,000 barrels of petroleum and petroleum products were imported into China by sea annually. Less than 10 percent of China's petroleum requirements are produced locally.

(*c*) 100,000 metric tons of rubber, and 200,000 tires and tubes were imported in the calendar year 1950. These quantities were sufficient for stockpiling in addition to normal usage, which in 1948 was 25,000 metric tons.

(*d*) 76,000,000 (1950 United States dollars) worth of machinery and machine tools were planned imports during the period 1950–52. Substantially all Chinese heavy industry is of foreign origin.

Although the economy of China is mainly rural and operates at a bare subsistence level, the urban and military segments of the economy are largely dependent on overseas trade, and to a lesser extent on coastal trade, and are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to blockade.

As regards urban centers, cutting off the trade on which their subsistence depends would create unemployment and unrest, hinder industrial production and create serious financial difficulties.

Such difficulties would be augmented if at the same time the tenuous internal lines of communication (consisting in the main of waterways and a very few rail lines) were cut either by air or guerrilla action.

As regards heavy military equipment, transportation equipment, automotive spare parts, and so forth, China is almost entirely dependent upon imports and would be greatly handicapped if these were cut off.

All manufactured material for replacing or carrying or augmenting heavy industry in China must be brought in from abroad, since nothing of that nature is produced locally.

In short, China would be forced to turn to Russia if an effective blockade were imposed, with consequent increased drain on Russian production.

Furthermore, practically all material from Russia to China must be transported via the Trans-Siberian Railway, which is known to be already overtaxed, and this would have an added adverse effect on Soviet war-making potential in the Far East.

The value of China's war potential of some imports cannot be measured in terms of weight.

For example, an examination of the shipping invoices of three typical ships destined for China during December 1950 showed the planned import of drugs as follows: 235,000 vials of penicillin; 36,244 boxes of penicillin tables; 7,800 pounds of sulfathiazole; 20,000 vials of crysticillin; 27,600 vials of streptomycin; 259 vials of chloromycetin; 1,000 pounds of sulfadiazine powder; 21,250 pounds of aspirin; 24,600 pounds of phenacetin; 1,500 pounds of chloralhydrate; and 13,800 bottles of procainol.

Since the Chinese are very susceptible to plagues and contagious diseases, the stoppage of such products would curtail the mobility of Chinese armies.

RED CHINA'S POSSIBLE DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIA IN EVENT OF NAVAL BLOCKADE

A blockade, to be completely successful, should cut off all access to vital strategic materials or equipment. However, since a naval blockade of China alone assumes a neutral Russia, it would be impossible to stop the flow of materials overland from Russia.

Russia has a capacity of making available to China some materials of war and essentials of industry.

For Russia to supply China completely would involve considerable dislocation of Russia economy, and would be very costly.

The weak link in the supply route is the one rail line across Siberia, which is long, inadequate, and vulnerable. The final link of this line, the Mukden-Tientsin Railroad, carries the major portion of the material from Russia into China.

Traffic along that railroad is particularly subject to easy disruption through means of bombing, sabotage, or naval raiding parties, Since this line is the only rail link between Manchuria and North China, such action, if decision were made to take it, could be very effective.

OTHER POSSIBLE MEANS OF AVOIDING BLOCKADE

Another means of evading a blockade would be by water shipment to neutral countries in base areas, primarily through Port Arthur, Dairen, Hong Kong, Indochina, and Burma, and thence overland. As regards non-Soviet countries, it should be our objective to obtain their active participation in the blockade.

This might be obtained from the United Kingdom and Portugal. Traffic via the Burma Road would not be important, even though cooperation in closing the road proved impossible.

Russia would very probably demand unimpeded access to Port Arthur and Dairen, over which it exercises military rights and other privileges under the Sino-Soviet treaties.

However, since power is the final arbiter in international law, any blockade is fraught with problems if objected to by a neutral willing to use power.

Contraband of war could still legally be stopped en route to neutral ports if its ultimate destination is China. However, this would involve invoking another belligerent right and announcing lists of items considered to be contraband.

DANGERS OF A UNILATERAL BLOCKADE

The foregoing are the difficulties of a unilateral United States naval blockade.

If goods entering Hong Kong were allowed to enter Communist China, the problems of enforcement would be greatly increased through conflict with commercial interests of our most important ally.

From a political standpoint, unilateral action would set us apart from our allies, and promote the feeling that the war with China is simply a United States war.

The blockade could not be tight without allied cooperation. The fact is that our allies have been unwilling to join in a naval blockade of China, and have been slow to establish a tight economic blockade.

It should be noted that only by the resolution of February 1, 1951, did the United Nations agree even to brand Communist China as an aggressor.

If the United Nations should declare a naval blockade, the Russians would probably respect it, as they did the United Nations blockade of Korea.

If the United States should declare a blockade unilaterally, the Russians might not respect it, and it is conceivable that they might oppose it by force.

ADVANTAGES OF A UNITED NATIONS BLOCKADE

A naval blockade by the United Nations would substantially reduce the war potential of Communist China. It would be highly effective in impeding preparations by China to invade Formosa. China is not capable of taking countermeasures that could appreciably reduce the effectiveness of such a blockade.

A naval blockade by the United Nations would be advantageous from a psychological standpoint. It would demonstrate to the Chinese Communists, and to neighboring Asian peoples, the power of the forces against communism—it would demonstrate the effectiveness of sea power, a power that Chinese Communists can do little to thwart.

Even prior to the beginning of the Korean conflict, the Navy Department was giving particular attention to the subject of control of east-west trade and the use of United States-flag shipping to transport strategic goods into and from Communist-controlled ports. The responsibility of the Navy in war for the control of sea communications makes a continuing study of associated matters, such as seaborne trade, a necessary part of the readiness of the Navy to meet its responsibilities.

UNITED STATES MEASURES TAKEN TO CONTROL TRADE WITH CHINA AND KOREA

I recommended to the President on June 30, 1950, that a naval blockade of North Korea be established. On July 1, 1950, the President announced that he had ordered a blockade of the entire coast of Korea.

During August 1950, the Navy Department, in the light of knowledge of certain shipments of material such as copper bars, tin plate, and armor plate to Communist China, took part in obtaining more effective control of such matters and recommended measures to preclude shipment of strategic items to the Soviet bloc, including that part of China and North Korea under Communist control.

On December 3, 1950, all United States exports to Communist China were prohibited except by validated export licenses, which are not now being issued.

On December 16, orders were issued by the Department of Commerce prohibiting United States ships and aircraft from calling at Chinese ports or transporting cargo so destined.

On December 17, 1950, all Chinese Communist assets within the United States jurisdiction were blocked. These economic sanctions have prevented either direct or indirect shipment to the United States of commodities originating in China, thus preventing imports to the United States of a few critical items.

EFFORTS OF OTHER NATIONS AND NON-COMMUNIST TRADE WITH CHINA

Other nations imposed economic restrictions on Communist China to a smaller extent. Shipment of foreign or transshipped United States goods in foreign bottoms is still possible.

For example, over 450 American-built trucks arrived in China during the period January to April 1951, India being an important reshipment port. On March 28, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense that they viewed with alarm the growing military assistance to Communist China by non-Communist countries other than the United States.

They said that the trade with Communist China was on the increase and constituted a direct threat to the security interests of the United States. They requested the Secretary of Defense to urge the Secretary of State to press other Western Powers for immediate denial of all commodities and services to Communist China which in any way could be used to support military operations.

However, commodities of strategic importance continued to move through Hong Kong into Communist China. Smuggling from Hong Kong into China is increasing, which makes it difficult to appraise the extent and character of the movement of supplies.

Examples of trade with Communist China are reports in April that one Hong Kong firm was attempting to barter rubber in exchange for 150,000 tons of Manchurian soybeans. Two hundred and twenty-eight trucks were shipped from Hong Kong to China from January to April 1951.

Another example is an offer during April by a Hong Kong firm to supply to the Chinese Communists 100 surplus General Motors 5-ton trucks and 10,000 sets of tires. Analysis indicates that Chinese imports are primarily of a strategic or industrial nature while Chinese exports are animal and vegetable products or such items as cotton clothing and hand-made goods.

Certain items which were supplies in Europe, such as aluminum ingots and tin plate, have passed through Hong Kong destined for China. On important quantities examples of materials shipped from Hong Kong into Communist China since January 1 include penicillin, sulfa drugs, rubber, steel plates, angles, zinc sheet, lead ingots and scrap, aluminum, machinery, and vehicles.

During the 6-week period, February 22 to April 4, 1951, and also a similar period from March 1 to April 11, 1951, about 235 western merchant ships visited Chinese ports. Of these, 96 were British, 46 Panamanian, and 22 Norwegian. During the 6 weeks ending May 9, there were 204 visits, of which 76 were by British ships. During the 6 weeks ending May 16, there were 219 ships.

On the other hand, there has recently been a significant reduction in shipping departing from Hong Kong and Singapore for Communist China. The total number of sailings from Hong Kong for Communist China dropped from 66 in January to 44 in February and 33 in March. Similar sailings from Singapore dropped from 10 in January to 7 in February and none since the 1st of March. These reductions are obviously due to tightening of export controls.

The tonnage of non-Communist ships trading with Communist China increased somewhat between November 1950 and January 1951, from 328,000 to 434,000 gross tons, but declined thereafter to about 300,000 tons. Vessels of Panamanian registry increased threefold in this period, and in March 1951 accounted for about 50 percent of the tonnage in this traffic. British shipping, which had comprised about 35 percent of the total, increased slightly up to January 1951 and declined thereafter. Greek shipping, which in December 1950 exceeded 100,000 tons, has also declined sharply since that time.

RECENT PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

In recent weeks considerable headway has been made toward maintaining the economic blockade of Communist China. The British Government has prohibited all sales of rubber for the rest of the year, and the General Assembly of the United Nations has approved a resolution calling for an embargo on arms, ammunition, implements of war, petroleum, and other military items.

There is every evidence that the economic blockade will now be made more effective. Such success as we have had in reducing the movement into Communist China of materials needed to support offensive combat operations has decreased correspondingly the urgency of a blockade imposed by naval forces.

However, in my opinion, our allies can still do much more to make an economic blockade effective.

ADVOCACY OF A UN NAVAL BLOCKADE

For the foregoing reasons I still hope that we can prevail upon our allies to join in an effective United Nations commercial and naval blockade of the ports of the declared aggressor and as a sanction short of war, as contemplated by articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.

I do not believe that a unilateral United States naval blockade is advisable.

[Deleted.]

That is typical of the type of import that comes in, which illustrates the loopholes in an economic blockade, which could be stopped if we could get agreement to establish a United Nations naval blockade.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean if a United Nations naval blockade were established?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral, I am frank to say you have made the strongest case here of the importance of an effective blockade on China that has been made. It has been very impressive to me. I had no idea that a blockade would be so effective in paralyzing the economy of China and affecting the operations of its armed forces as your statement would indicate, if I followed you correctly.

If I understand your position now, you are strongly in favor of a naval blockade by the United Nations.

Admiral SHERMAN. By the United Nations.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does that include Soviet Russia? They are members of the United Nations.

In other words, when you make your statement that you favor a naval blockade by the United Nations, is that contingent upon the cooperation of Russia or would you be willing to impose this blockade if the free nations of the world, exclusive of Russia and her satellites, were willing to enter into a naval blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. I would be not only willing but would advocate a blockade by the United Nations of any nation that attacks the forces of the United Nations in the field, and the history of the matter is that we did establish a United Nations naval blockade over North Korea on the 1st of July, and the Russians have respected it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, now some of these days we are going to end these hearings and I assume we will write some kind of findings or report, perhaps two or three of them, and I think the record should be clear that you would favor the imposition of a naval blockade if voted by the United Nations, without regard to whether or not all United Nations participated in the naval blockade.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir, because the greater part of the shipping going in and out of Chinese ports would be automatically stopped by the vote which established or by the procedure which established a United Nations blockade.

The United Nations would then be dealing only with such other countries as did not support the blockade, which would be a simple matter, whereas I feel that the course that we have followed so far has been entirely correct, the object being to cut off supplies which support the Communist Chinese offensive.

We have operated by negotiation and by urging the other countries concerned to impose export controls and participate in the economic blockade. It's been slow but it is becoming effective now with increasing rapidity.

The eventual clean-up, if this situation drags on, would be to stop everything by having the United Nations with their naval forces police the operation.

Chairman Russell. Have you as Chief of Naval Operations pressed the State Department to urge upon the United Nations the importance of this naval blockade?

Admiral Sherman. I have stressed it regularly and I recognize that the economic blockade, the steps that have been taken, were the first steps, and I have made my beliefs clear to all concerned ever since the move when the forces of Communist China intervened in Korea.

Chairman Russell. Well, human nature being what it is, I assume that if a majority of the members of the United Nations accept the economic blockade, they would be increasingly irritated by seeing the noncompliers profit by the trade that they carry on and that they would then be willing to support a naval blockade.

EFFECT OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE ON NEUTRAL PORTS

Chairman Russell. Admiral, what effect, if any, would the naval blockade that you have in mind have upon the port of Dairen?

Admiral Sherman. If a naval blockade were conducted in accordance with established international law, it could not include Honk Kong or Dairen as a matter of blockade.

However, in maritime warfare the procedure is to announce lists of contraband of war. Once that is done, the stoppage of contraband can take place without relation to a particular port.

That applies to shipments intended to reach the forces of the enemy directly or indirectly, so that in effect it would be a stoppage of trade, but it would not come within the formula of blockade.

Chairman Russell. Well, under the terms of the naval blockade which you have in mind—as a layman I am not familiar with it—would the blockading ships stop a Polish ship, a ship under Polish registry bound for the port of Dairen if it contained these listed contraband articles?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. And would take those articles off?

Admiral Sherman. Take them off or send the ship into port, depending upon the proportion.

Chairman Russell. So a naval blockade, then, would be completetly effective if it was an effective blockade?

Admiral Sherman. It would be effective as far as martime shipments are concerned. Of course, it would leave open the land frontiers, but the relation between the ability to supply China overland and by sea is best illustrated by the fact that I think the proportion is roughly five to eight between the full-blast capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the sea-borne trade into China, so that it would be impossible to have supply by land adequate to replace what could be stopped by sea.

OWNERS OF SHIPS UNDER PANAMANIAN REGISTRY

Chairman RUSSELL. Admiral, I was somewhat disturbed by your statement of the great increase in the shipments to Communist China carried by ships under Panamanian and Greek registry. A great many of those ships are really owned by American capital, are they not?

Admiral SHERMAN. I had an analysis made of the 39 Panamanian-flag ships that are currently operating, and there was only one owner listed as an American, and that was the case of one 5,000-ton ship owned by a man in New York with a Greek name.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean that no Americans own these Panamanian ships?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, this man is a United States national, but ——

Chairman RUSSELL. I am talking about the majority of them. Where are they owned? I do not care to get down to the details of each ship, but where are they owned? I had always assumed they were basically American-owned ships, although operating under Panamanian registry.

Admiral SHERMAN. The figure was 37 rather than 39. Examination of 37 Panamanian registered ships trading with Communist China reveals that the nationalities of the owners are 24 British, 8 Chinese, 4 Greek, 1 questionable whether he is American or Greek.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have anything to indicate the source from which those ships originated? Were they built in Panama or this country, or where were they built?

Admiral SHERMAN. I couldn't say, sir, except that I would comment I would doubt their having been built in Panama.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is any information available as to the number of ships of wartime construction that we have disposed of that have been transferred to Panamanian registry or sold to other than American nationals?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do not have that information, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know anything about the types of these ships, whether any of them are Liberties or Victories or American built?

Admiral SHERMAN. From the tonnage listed, a small number are obviously Liberties. But the Panamanian merchant marine, as I have seen it around the world, is made up of nearly all types of ships, usually ones which have gotten a little old and have been sold out from their normal registry.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not like to waste my time on this kind of question, but why is it so desirable for all these people to register their ships under the Panamanian flag? The Panamanians have never been a great seagoing people, sailors and navigators and things of that kind.

Admiral SHERMAN. My understanding, sir, is that that is a question of advantageous business arrangements. It has to do with taxes, labor requirements, various other legal requirements which involve expenditures, which make it profitable to operate older ships under the Panamanian flag.

RECENT DECREASE OF TRADE WITH CHINA

Chairman Russell. Now, you stated, and it may have been off the record but I think it should probably be on, there had been a decrease in recent days, not only weeks, but days, of the shipments to Communist China.

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. And that is through the voluntary action of the nations who are members of the United Nations?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir. I have seen one report that the British used one of their destroyers to intercept one of their own ships that was in the vicinity of Singapore going to China and turned it back.

GERMAN-CHINESE TRADE

Chairman Russell. Reports have come to me from other sources, in fact, I think I read it in the press, that a great many shipments were being made from Germany to China now. Have we reached a state of affairs in Germany now where we have no control over the exports from that country?

Admiral Sherman. As far as I know, sir, we have perfectly adequate control over the United States Zone but not over the other zones.

Chairman Russell. Well, either we or our principal allies have control over exports from——

Admiral Sherman. From West Germany.

Chairman Russell. Yes. So either we or the British or the French could, if we so desired, control exports from West Germany to China?

Admiral Sherman. We could, indeed, sir.

Chairman Russell. Do you know what bottoms carried these 450 trucks from India, or under what flag the ships sailed?

Admiral Sherman. I haven't that information available, Senator.

PRESSURE FOR UN BLOCKADE

Chairman Russell. What do you think of the possibilities, Admiral, of the United Nations, from the information you have—you have stated you have been concerned with it for months—what are the possibilities of the United Nations voting a naval blockade of Communist China?

Admiral Sherman. I would say that immediately it is not likely. If present, if this present condition drags on long enough, it will become likely.

Chairman Russell. Are you satisfied with the vigor with which we are pressing the United Nations for this declaration of a naval blockade against Communist China?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir, I am, because we have succeeded in obtaining what I regard as the first step in the program, which is the economic blockade, imposition of export controls, and having each country handle its own problem.

The United Nations naval blockade will be the subsequent step.

EFFECT OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE ON CHINA'S ECONOMY

Chairman Russell. Do you have any idea as to the effect that the measures taken to date are having upon the economy of China or its ability to wage war?

Admiral Sherman. I don't think that the steps taken have had a chance to become effective in China. The effects of the stoppage of shipments of material are slow and I think that the cutting down by other countries has been so recent that it has not had any marked effect yet on China.

To what extent it may contribute to the unrest and consequent reported executions and other difficulties reported I can't estimate.

Chairman Russell. Do you know whether or not there is a fairly effective economic blockade as to the petroleum?

Admiral Sherman. We know that that is included in the list of articles to be stopped, under the United Nations resolution; but that resolution has only been effective something on the order of 10 days, so we have had no chance to appraise its effect.

Chairman Russell. It will have some effect, you think?

Admiral Sherman. Yes.

Chairman Russell. As to rubber, too?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir .

Chairman Russell. One final question: Has a naval blockade ever been considered an act of war?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir; always.

Chairman Russell. Always been considered an act of war?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. Of course, in this case, the party who would be the object of the blockade is not a member of the United Nations.

Admiral Sherman. That is true, sir; and the Charter of the United Nations specifically included blockade as one of the means, short of war, for imposing its will.

Chairman Russell. Enforcing its sanctions?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir .

Chairman Russell. My time has expired.

Chairman Connally?

Chairman Connally. Admiral Sherman, I am glad to have the opportunity of being associated with you.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND NAVAL BLOCKADE

Will you, for my information, give the distinction between the economic blockade and a naval blockade?

As I understand it, the economic blockade is stoppage of certain materials and things of that kind, whereas the naval blockade would be the absolute cutting-off of all shipments that would go into these ports, is that correct?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir .

The economic blockade is imposed by agreement, by governmental action, and the governments which support it; whereas a naval blockade amounts merely to using naval forces to enforce a blockade by military action.

And, of course, the reason why I feel that the United States has been well advised not to attempt, unilaterally, by force, to establish this blockade——

Chairman CONNALLY. Naval blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Naval blockade, in that the object is to stop the shipment of material into China, and for us to send the United States Navy out to cut off shipments under the flags of our allies would, in my opinion, defeat our wider purposes.

NAVAL BLOCKADE WITHOUT THE UN

Chairman CONNALLY. In other words, unless the other members of the United Nations join with us, you would advise against a naval blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir .

Chairman CONNALLY. Is that right?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and continue to work the way we have, and to achieve the same results otherwise.

Chairman CONNALLY. Now, in your blockade of Formosa, under the President's order to neutralize Formosa, have you had any difficulty in that regard?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. No shooting by any vessel, or no force to be used?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. You said you can't do it, and they didn't do it.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir; with the additional comment that the forces which were in the part of China neighboring on Formosa, a good many of them moved north, and the apparent readiness of Communist China to attempt to attack Formosa has decreased greatly.

How much that is due to the announcement of the President and how much is due to their decision to use them in Korea is hard to determine.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, you have already explained that if the allies, our allies, the United Nations, declined to join us in the blockade, the result would be to continue what we are doing now, is that right?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; unless we are willing to use force to impose our will on our allies.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, that would be a very difficult undertaking, would it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Not only would it be difficult——

Chairman CONNALLY. We would lose them.

Admiral SHERMAN (continuing.) But in my opinion it would be ill-advised.

Chairman CONNALLY. We would lose our allies, would we not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Some of them, at least, in whom we are interested. So, you would not advise a unilateral blockade.

EFFECT OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE SO FAR

Now you were interrogated a while ago by Senator Russell about the shipments from Germany, and particularly Western Germany.

Of course, Western Germany is allied with us, and we can control that.

[Deleted.]

Admiral SHERMAN. I think it is only fair to say, sir, that the recent decision of the United Nations in connection with contributing to the economic blockade by an embargo has hardly had a chance to become effective, because it is only 10 days old.

Chairman CONNALLY. That was the one that picked out a great number of commodities that they said they could not ship to Communist China, is that correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And you think that has not had an opportunity to be demonstrated yet?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Is that right?

EFFECT OF MAINTAINING A NAVAL BLOCKADE ON UNITED STATES NAVAL POWER

If we should put on a naval blockade of the China coast, as recommended by a distinguished gentleman, how many ships would it take—how much force, how much naval power, numbers of ships would be necessary to enforce such a blockade?

[Deleted.]

Chairman CONNALLY. Would the diversion from our present situation of naval power, and other commitments—would the diversion of that many ships be of injury to us or embarrass us in any way?

Admiral SHERMAN. It would be a minor embarrassment if it were done with timing such that we could move the additional ships from the United States to the Far East. It would be very embarrassing to have to divert that number of ships from those currently engaged in the Far East. If we were using that number—if we were ordered to use that number of ships, I would have to ask to activate the same number from the reserve fleet to replace those diverted for this purpose.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is the answer to my question.

Admiral SHERMAN. The embarrassment would be directly related to the timing and speed with which it was done.

LOSS OF IMPORTS FROM CHINA

Chairman CONNALLY. How greatly does China—I mean Red China—rely on overseas supplies for her food and raw materials and equipment, and so forth?

Admiral SHERMAN. The relationship, as I understand it, is that China is dependent on the outside world for mechanical equipment and for petroleum; and that in exchange China exports food products to a minor degree and hand-made goods.

Chairman CONNALLY. Would the cutting off of those supplies affect us in our power to make war, in our capacity to make war?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. We cut off our commerce with Red China in December, and I don't think it has been noticeable in this country except in very minor ways.

Chairman CONNALLY. When we cut it off, did any of our allies, did any of the other United Nations join us in that action?

Admiral SHERMAN. Not immediately, sir. It is only recently that they have taken the same action.

Chairman CONNALLY. At the moment, 10 days ago, I believe you said, the action has been quite affirmative, hasn't it?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; the action has been quite affirmative, but it will take a good many weeks before we have a chance to appraise how effective it will be.

UNITED STATES NAVAL SUPREMACY IN FAR EAST

Chairman CONNALLY. It has been said here by a very distinguished witness that the Soviet Union could not wrest control of the seas around Japan from us. Do you care to comment on that?

Admiral SHERMAN. I agree with that, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. That they could not?

Admiral SHERMAN. That they could not wrest control of the sea around Japan from us. They could contest it, but we have sufficient naval power to prevent any other country from controlling the sea around Japan.

Chairman CONNALLY. How much of a fleet, if any, have the Red Chinese?

Admiral SHERMAN. They have a number of ships, nothing very large. They have one old cruiser, which was formerly a Japanese cruiser; they have certain ships that we supplied to the Republic of China, and which passed into the hands of the Communists, but they are destroyer escorts, landing craft, small vessels. It is not a very substantial force.

Chairman CONNALLY. That one ship you mentioned, given to the Republic of China, that was Chiang Kai-shek's Government?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. At the time that Chinese Nationalists were forced out of China, certain of the ships that we had given to the Nationalist Government passed into the hands of the Communists through capture, in other cases through defections. The whole force is not a formidable one in terms of everything.

Chairman CONNALLY. I was going to ask could this fleet of Red China do any serious damage to us if we undertake to put on a blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

NAVAL BLOCKADE AND NEUTRAL RUSSIAN PORTS

Chairman CONNALLY. It could not. Now I believe you touched on the installation at Port Arthur and Dairen.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. If we put on a naval blockade, what would be the effect?

Admiral SHERMAN. The effect of a naval blockade of the China coast would be to undoubtedly force traffic into Port Arthur and Dairen, because they could not be blockaded except as a part of an action directed at Russia.

On the other hand, shipments of, well, let's say a shipment of trucks for the Chinese Communist Army, if it could be proved that they were for that army, could be intercepted at sea even though the ship did say that she was on her way to Port Arthur.

Chairman CONNALLY. But a general naval blockade of Dairen or Port Arthur would in international law be an act of war against Russia, would it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And we would immediately be in world war III, I suppose.

Well, this naval blockade would cover neutral ports?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. A blockade by the United States would be an act of war against the country that owned any port blockaded. A blockade by the United Nations could be made effective against all members of the United Nations. There could be no doubt as to that jurisdiction.

Chairman CONNALLY. Russia is a member of the United Nations.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And that could be effective as to these two ports then, could it?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, no, sir; because there would be no grounds for blockading the ports of Russia.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, if they were carrying on traffic with Red Korea right through those ports?

Admiral SHERMAN. I don't think there would be any adequate grounds for blockading any Russian port unless the blockade were directed against Russia.

NATIONALIST STRENGTH IN FORMOSA

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, what do you know about the forces of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa? Are they militarily or otherwise suitable to put with our forces in Korea or elsewhere?

Admiral SHERMAN. My knowledge of the condition of those forces comes from two sources. One is the report of the group under General Fox which went there to look into their interests for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also such additional reports as I have in connection with the Chinese Nationalist Navy.

The first group of reports are generally to the effect that at that time they were not ready for offensive combat due to the lack of equipment.

As far as the naval forces are concerned, there are a number of ships in the Chinese Nationalist Navy which are inoperable because of lack of spares and lack of repairs. The things that they need are mostly ammunition, spart parts. We have a program for accomplishing that, and those naval forces should be in a much better condition within a few months after we have had a chance to make our program effective.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Connally.

Chairman CONNALLY. All right. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. Admiral Sherman, did you request the dismissal of General MacArthur?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I did not request it.

Senator BRIDGES. Did you vote for it? I mean have a formal vote and did you vote?

JCS MEETINGS ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Admiral SHERMAN. I think I can answer that question better, sir, if I may recount what connection I had with the detachment.

Senator BRIDGES. All right.

Admiral **Sherman**. On April 5 I was called to a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which the question of his removal was discussed, and at that time several procedures were suggested and discussed by the Chiefs of Staff.

One proposal was that—I believe I made this proposal—that an officer, as I said——

Senator **Smith**. Would you mind speaking a little louder, Admiral? This is very interesting testimony. Thank you.

Admiral **Sherman**. At that meeting I suggested that an officer equal in grade to his should go out and discuss with him the various factors which had caused his replacement to be considered, and attempt either to straighten the matter out or at that time to inform him that he would have to be replaced. I mean a direct approach of that sort.

Also there was suggested the possibility of accomplishing the same type of result by letter.

This meeting was inconclusive, no decisions were reached. It was really informative only, that the situation had gotten to the point where action of that character was being considered. That I believe was on a Friday afternoon.

The following Sunday I attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in General Bradley's office, called by General Bradley. Upon arrival we were told that our opinion on the removal of General MacArthur had been asked for and that we had an appointment with General Marshall at 4 o'clock.

At 4 o'clock we went to General Marshall's office. There was some discussion of the problem. Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked for his opinion. They were all the same, which was that, from a military point of view, he should be replaced in his command.

Senator **Bridges**. Now, who called the first meeting you went to, Admiral Sherman?

Admiral **Sherman**. General Bradley.

Senator **Bridges**. Do you remember who General Bradley—did General Bradley report to the Joint Chiefs attending there who asked him to call that meeting?

Admiral **Sherman**. Not that I recall, sir.

Senator **Bridges**. Did he say that he got an anonymous telephone call, that he could not remember who it was from and that is the reason he called you?

Admiral **Sherman**. No, sir.

PERSONS PRESENT AT JCS MEETING OF APRIL 5, 1951

Senator **Bridges**. Who attended that meeting?

Admiral **Sherman**. General Bradley, General Vandenberg, General Haislip; I was there.

Senator **Bridges**. Then it is a fact that testimony which has been given here in these hearings under oath that General Collins was present, is not true?

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, I read the testimony, and I would prefer to say that it was mistaken.

Senator **Bridges**. All right. But it is not true.

Who else was at this first meeting? Were your assistants, operating assistants, present, and were they released or were they just you people present?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it, the staff were present. Our deputies were also present.

Senator BRIDGES. Before you started talking you released them or did they stay during the conversation?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that they were there. We frequently do let them go. I think this time that they were there.

Senator BRIDGES. That is a new sidelight, because the testimony has been contrary to that, the other way, as I listened to the testimony. At one place the testimony is that there was nobody else there, and the next testimony is that they were there, but they were released. I respect you for giving us your factual memory, but it has been very confused and contradictory, and it is either a very vital mistake which has been made or the truth has not been told.

SUBSEQUENT JCS MEETING ON MAC ARTHUR

Now then, what did you hear about it after that? Did you follow through in any other way?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; that was Friday afternoon late; we had a meeting of a very brief half hour or something of that sort.

I was out of town on Saturday, and then Sunday morning, I believe it was—it may have been Saturday night—I was informed of a 2 o'clock meeting without knowing until I got there what it was about.

Senator BRIDGES. Why was your suggestion, or proposal to send a five-star general, equal in rank to General MacArthur, over to discuss this matter turned down?

Admiral SHERMAN. It wasn't turned down that I know of, sir.

This was a very brief meeting, in which there was a general discussion of different things that might have to be done. It was completely inconclusive, and when I left that meeting I had no reason to believe that the matter would come to a head as quickly as it did.

Senator BRIDGES. But as far as you can remember, and you have searched your memory, General Bradley when he called the conference did not state or say who had asked him to call it, or who had suggested it—just that he happened to call it?

Admiral SHERMAN. He called it; and I know that he informed us that this matter was under consideration; but if he stated where he got the information, I don't recall it.

WILL PRESENT STRATEGY WIN THE WAR

Senator BRIDGES. Do you think that the present strategy will win the war in Korea?

Admiral SHERMAN. At the present time, sir—and I would be less than frank if I didn't say that my estimate of the future has varied from time to time, as the tide of battle has surged backward and forward—at the present time I think there is good prospect of defeating the Chinese Army in Korea, and thereby achieving a situation in which the war in Korea can be ended under conditions which will, in the long run, be advantageous to us.

Senator BRIDGES. If that doesn't happen, would you favor a different strategy?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, definitely, if we were not successful in defeating the Chinese Army, destroying its power or alternatively causing it to withdraw, cease its attack on the United Nations forces, then of course some other course of action will have to be taken.

Senator Bridges. For the time being, you believe that continuing the fight within the area of Korea, with at least one hand tied behind our back, not bombing the lines of supply or the supply bases, even excluding areas within North Korea which we don't bomb, and fighting a sort of continuing action of attrition on the Chinese Communists—that is your belief?

Admiral Sherman. I would rather answer that by an affirmative statement, sir.

I believe that we are now doing the correct thing in attempting to prevent the Chinese Communists from having their way in Korea, attempting to destroy their army—or to use the more frequent expression, to inflict casualties on its personnel and material. I prefer to speak of the army as a whole, because I think there are qualities which go to make up an army other than the count of its personnel and material.

I believe that is the plan which offers the best chance of achieving a local success and permitting us to terminate that particular fight, war, or whatever it is.

UN OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

Senator Bridges. Admiral Sherman, what objective do you think we are fighting for now? We had the United Nations objective, which was to clear the Reds out of Korea. Is that what you are fighting for now or don't you know what you are fighting for? Haven't you been told?

Admiral Sherman. I think that I understand what we are fighting for, sir. We went into Korea to assist the South Koreans in resisting aggression.

Then there was a period when we had defeated the North Korean aggressor and it was hoped that we could unify all of Korea and set up a democratic form of government and achieve a very desirable political objective.

Then with the entrance of the Chinese Communists, a new situation was created, and to my mind our purposes had to be reexamined, and to me it is quite clear that what we are trying to do is, in an advantageous position in Korea, to destroy the Chinese Communist Army, which has entered Korea to attack the forces of the United Nations.

Senator Bridges. But you don't know today, you couldn't tell us today whether the objective was to clear out all of Korea of the Chinese Communists, and Communists, whether it stopped at the thirty-eighth parallel, or whether to go a hundred miles north of the thirty-eighth parallel, or where. Your interpretation is a general objective of killing Chinese Communists, is it not, defeating the Chinese Communist armies within Korea?

Admiral Sherman. Defeating the Chinese Communist Army within Korea and north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

Senator Bridges. All right.

Chairman Russell. Senator Wiley.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, as I understand it, the economic blockade has but recently been made effective; that is to say, it has but recently been tightened?

Admiral SHERMAN. It has been recently agreed to, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Recently agreed to?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. And went into effect in the last 10 days, I think, about 10 days ago?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

INTERCEPTING CONTRABAND HEADED FOR NEUTRAL PORTS

Senator GEORGE. As I also understand you, Admiral, in the case of a naval blockade the right only to embargo contraband entering a neutral port would exist?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is right.

Senator GEORGE. That would be the only thing we could do?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is all.

Senator GEORGE. That is all. In other words, we would not have to blockade Dairen or Vladivostok or Port Arthur, we simply would have the right of embargo on contraband?

Admiral SHERMAN. We would have the right of intercepting whatever we chose to——

Senator GEORGE. Designate.

Admiral SHERMAN. Designate as contraband.

Senator GEORGE. Designate as contraband; exactly.

Admiral, I want to thank you, sir, for your very comprehensive and at once an understandable statement. I think it is the best that has been made before this committee.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

PRESENT POLICY IN KOREA

Senator JOHNSON. Admiral Sherman, do I correctly understand you to say that in your judgment the course that we are presently following in Korea, a course that is being pursued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the course which, in your opinion, is best calculated to give us victory for our objectives with the least loss of life and material and the least danger?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, I do. I have participated in the formulation of the directives for what we are doing, and I support them.

I might say it is very tempting to consider courses of action which are more in accordance with the traditions of a country fighting alone, but each time that I have gone through the process of considering one of the more vigorous courses of action, which extends the war outside of Korea, I become convinced that it would jeopardize our long-term national security on a global basis.

Senator JOHNSON. Admiral, you recommended General MacArthur be relieved?

Admiral SHERMAN. I did not recommend it, sir; I was asked for my military opinion and I gave it.

Senator JOHNSON. And it was to the effect that he should be replaced?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. If you had to make that same decision again today, would it be the same decision?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; it would.

COMMENTS ON MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator JOHNSON. General MacArthur spoke to the Congress on April 19, and if you will I should like for you to turn to this committee document, page 198, and if you will indulge me a moment, I would like to read some recommendations he made to the Congress at that time. I am reading from about 10 lines from the bottom of the page:

> Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize sanctuary, protection given to the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary:
>
> First, the intensification of our economic blockade against China.

I gather from your testimony that has been done.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Our economic blockade of China has been intensified since that recommendation was made?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON (reading):

> Second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.

A naval blockade, do you interpret that to mean the unilateral blockade or the United Nations blockade or what kind of blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I couldn't undertake to interpret which General MacArthur meant. If he meant a United States, a unilateral United States action, then I would not agree.

I feel the way we have gone about it is better in the long run. If he by his language is advocating the blockade by the United Nations, then I would agree with him, but recognize that obtaining the necessary concurrences would be a slow and difficult process.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you form any opinion as the result of the reports that he made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about what kind of blockade he is talking about? Would you give the committee the benefit of any views you might have as to what kind of a blockade he is talking about.

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe that he was talking about a United States blockade, and——

Senator JOHNSON. Assuming that he was talking about a United States blockade, did you share his views on April 19?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I did not.

Senator JOHNSON. Did you receive any recommendation from either Admiral Joy or Admiral Radford prior to that time that such a blockade be established?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Are they your top men in that general area?

Admiral SHERMAN. Admiral Joy is the senior naval commander in the Far East, and he is a subordinate of Admiral Radford, who is

Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, so that I deal with Admiral Joy through Admiral Radford.

Senator JOHNSON. And neither of them recommended to you the establishment of a unilateral naval blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. They did not.

Senator JOHNSON. Now, third, General MacArthur says:

> Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Do you have any comment to make on what has been done in that respect? Are you achieving the same results through other means?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is a question of timing, sir, and it is interrelated with the preparation or improvement of the combat effectiveness of the forces on Formosa.

The action which was originally taken of preventing an attack on Formosa was taken in the belief that Formosa was vulnerable to such an attack; and it is my own personal view—and this is something I have not recommended because I do not think the time has come—but it is my personal view that when Formosa is surely able to defend itself, the mission of the Seventh Fleet with regard to Formosa should be terminated.

Senator JOHNSON. The fourth recommendation is—

> removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operation against the Chinese mainland.

Then he goes on to say:

JCS POSITION ON MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

> For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign—

I would assume that would include Admiral Joy and Admiral Radford——

Admiral SHERMAN. That does.

Senator JOHNSON (continuing)—

> including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, Admiral, I should like for you to comment on that statement, and give us your opinion as to whether that was a mistake or whether as a result of this tentative program of January 12, General MacArthur's views were shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

BACKGROUND OF JCS STUDY OF JANUARY 12

Admiral SHERMAN. At the end of November, as I recall it, it was about the 28th of November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the staff to make a study of the whole problem of courses of action.

At that time, the situation in Korea was not good.

There was a good deal of discussion back and fourth during——

Senator SMITH. Admiral, I am sorry, I can't hear you over on this side of the table.

Admiral SHERMAN. There was a good deal of discussion, back and forth, between the staffs; and in late December a paper was laid before us, with some disagreements on the lower echelons, as to courses of action, and as to terminology.

Meanwhile, things were not going well in Korea.

During December, we were dreadfully worried for fear that we might have to evacuate our forces.

There were three points at which we were considering evacuation. One was Hungnam, one was Inchon, and the other was Pusan. Two of those evacuations were accomplished.

Our forces were being pushed south, and the question in everyone's mind was—could we hold in a perimeter which would be adequate to permit us to stay there, or would they be forced out.

On the 1st of January, I took this paper and rewrote it, myself; and on the 3d of January, I submitted my rewrite to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Exactly the language with respect to these four courses of action was in the final paper.

I felt it important at that time to inject the matter of timing, and you will recall that in that document, it was produced here, there was a definite indication of timing, some things to be done now, meaning whenever the situation envisaged occurred, and then in connection with the blockade, there was a question.

General Collins then took my paper and made some very useful improvements to it, and on the 12th of January, the paper was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and, in retrospect, I can say that I think it was unfortunate that a good deal of the introductory language was dropped out, in a desire to be brief. We knew what it meant, but other people did not; so that was part of the business transacted on the 12th of January, which was a very busy day.

OTHER DIRECTIVES APPROVED AT SAME TIME

And, on that same date, while this paper was approved as a planning document, a firm military directive was approved by the Security Council and the President and sent to General MacArthur.

We were terribly concerned about a report which we had from him about the morale of the troops; and for that reason we decided that someone had to go out. I wanted to go, but General Vandenberg's reasons for going were better than mine, so General Collins and General Vandenberg went.

Then the next day a political message was sent from the President to General MacArthur, giving him political reasons why it was hoped that he could hold in Korea.

CONDITIONAL NATURE OF JANUARY 12 STUDY

But I want to make it quite clear that the language in those four courses of action I wrote myself and I felt those were things that we should consider doing. There was a list of 16, as a matter of fact, and of the 16, 13 had been done. The other three we have just discussed.

Senator JOHNSON. And it is fair to say that one could very properly assume that on January 12, based on certain eventualities and certain conditions, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt these courses of action should be taken.

Admiral SHERMAN. If things went against us.

Senator JOHNSON. But it is not fair to say that you on April 19 entertained the view that these courses of action should be taken.

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; but I feel that in fairness to General MacArthur, I should point out that he said, I believe, that they had been shared in the past.

Senator JOHNSON. Yes; I made that clear. I am not talking about General MacArthur's statement now. I want to make clear to the committee and to the country that while you felt on January 12 that, based on certain contingencies, you should act in one way, that on April 19, or on May 30, with the changed conditions, that you certainly make no such recommendations today.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is true, sir, and I have gone to considerable length to explain in connection with the economic blockade and the naval blockade, the detailed development of those two propositions.

Senator JOHNSON. Could you give me very briefly your estimate of the increased additional forces, if any, that would be needed for the Navy to carry out the logistical support to make an effective operation as he recommended in the naval blockade?

[Deleted.]

Admiral SHERMAN. It is something that we could do with no great strain, if we had sufficient time to bring the forces from the United States, and then as I said, I would immediately activate replacements.

Senator JOHNSON. And the logistical support to contribute to effective operation, do you include that?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

OUR NAVAL STRENGTH

Senator SMITH. Admiral, I join with the others in expressing my gratification that you are here with us to give us your judgment. I want to ask you one or two questions about our Navy situation in light of some discussions made to us by General Vandenberg yesterday.

He referred to our Air Force as a shoestring force, and he was opposed to what he called, and I quote his language, "pecking at the periphery." He thought if we went into an air operation, that we did not have the force to do it adequately if we had to see it through.

I can understand it very well, and I won't press that point except to ask you whether you feel that today on a global basis we have an adequate Navy for our global responsibilities?

Armiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, of course these matters are all relative, and I am rather reluctant to be the first military man to say that he has enough force to do everything he might be called up to do.

Senator SMITH. That is an unfair question from that angle.

Admiral SHERMAN. But I would say this: That I think the Navy is in good shap. We are stronger that we have ever been before at any time in our history except during World War II, and I believe that the combat readiness, ship for ship and airplane for airplane, is better than it has ever been except during the height of World War II.

I think that the Navy in what has been accomplished off Korea has demonstrated that it is ready to fight; and I believe it is very important to make it clear to all those who read the reports of these hearings that whatever differences we may have on courses of military strategy or political strategy, what we are trying to do is to maintain peace and avoid war, because we don't want war, but no one should be deluded into thinking that we wouldn't intend to win if we got into war; and I think it is important that, whatever comes out of these hearings, it be made clear that if we become involved in this general war that we don't want, we have every intention of winning it, we have every intention of inflicting the very promptest retaliation on any hostile government that starts it. I think that is all very important.

Senator SMITH. And you have a belief that we can?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and as far as the Navy is concerned, I think its combat readiness and morale are excellent.

Senator SMITH. As a representative of the State of New Jersey, Admiral, I naturally feel a great deal of pride in what appears to be a wonderful performance by the good ship *New Jersey* you referred to today.

CHARTER PROVISIONS ON NAVAL BLOCKADE

Now, Admiral, I understand your position to be that you would favor a naval blockade in a full naval blockade sense, though it involves war with the enemy, the enemy in this case being Communist China, providing it was a joint action by the United Nations?

Admiral SHERMAN. Providing it was done by the United Nations. But I would like to point out, sir, that under the Charter of the United Nations a blockade by that organization is not considered an act of war.

Senator SMITH. Well, I am glad you pointed that out because I have not got the Charter before me, but as you were speaking I thought that was the case. That would put a naval blockade in the same classification as an economic blockade, as one of the measures short of war that might be applied by United Nations action?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is my understanding, sir.

Senator SMITH. And that would probably mean it would not require Security Council action but could be passed on by the Assembly.

Admiral SHERMAN. I am afraid, sir, that it is listed as one of the prerogatives of the Security Council. But nearly everything else which is being done now is a prerogative of the Security Council.

Senator SMITH. I have just had brought to my attention article 42 of the charter—"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in article 41 would be inadequate * * *" and so forth—"it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations."

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Then it might be subject to veto by Russia as Russia is a member of the Security Council at the present time?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And therefore it would look as though it would be pretty difficult for us to get UN action.

Admiral SHERMAN. If I may be permitted to branch outside of my own sphere of normal responsibility here, I would like to make this comment: that it seems to me that a good deal of difficulty that we have gotten into is that we initiated an operation under the auspices of the Security Council when the Russian member was absent; and then when the Russian member resumed his seat, the Security Council became a less effective agency. Instead of being able to operate within 24 hours, as it did on the 24th or 25th of June, it became ineffective, and now the affairs of the United Nations with respect to this operation are being carried on through the General Assembly by resolutions instead of by directives of the Security Council.

Senator SMITH. Yes. I am glad you mentioned that. I was about to suggest, as I recall it, that the Assembly had taken some measures to, in a sense, bypass the Security Council in case they got stymied on this Korean operation. That is true.

Admiral SHERMAN. The original swift action in the beginning was taken by the Security Council at a time when the Russian member was not functioning.

MAC ARTHUR POSITION ON UN BLOCKADE

Senator SMITH. Now, Senator Johnson just raised the question as to whether or not General MacArthur was speaking in terms of a United States unilateral blockade or United Nations blockade. If I recall the testimony correctly, General MacArthur said that he was speaking in the first instance in terms of the things the United Nations ought to do. But then in answer to some questions, he did say if the United Nations Command were unable to do it or were blocked by the veto of the Security Council, he would favor our doing it. Why? Because he wanted to take the pressure off our boys in Korea and take such measures that would draw the Chinese Communists back and help relieve the pressure there. That is just my recollection of the testimony. Of course, that can be checked.

I just wanted to add that to Senator Johnson's comment because that was my understanding, at least, of the general's position.

NAVAL AND MARINE CASUALTIES

Now, Admiral, I would like to ask you, in terms of losses of men, our losses of men have not been very heavy in our naval operations, have they?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. I have the figures here on that. As of the 28th of May, the Navy had had 96 killed in action, 538 wounded in action, 82 missing in action, totaling 716.

Marines, 1,665 killed, 8,043 wounded in action, 160 missing in action, for a total of 9,868 casualties for the Marine Corps.

Senator SMITH. Well, I assume the Marine Corps figures are for their land operations?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. What do the casualties come from in the other naval operations? Is it air attack? You mentioned there were no submarines there. You had no losses from submarines.

Admiral SHERMAN. We have had some losses from minesweeping forces; we have had some from air attack, and then some of our naval casualties are among personnel serving on shore with the marines.

We have, as a matter of interest, lost 120 pilots, of which 53 were Navy, 30 marines—I am reading these totals incorrectly. The grand total is 120 naval and marine aviators, who are casualties.

Senator SMITH. Those are from an operation off flat tops, I suppose?

Admiral SHERMAN. Both Marine air wing on shore, and from the carriers, and as far as I know all of them are losses to antiaircraft fire or operational causes.

Senator SMITH. When you use the word "casualty," Admiral, do you mean killed, wounded, and missing?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, they are all practically either killed or missing.

RED CHINA'S ADMISSION TO UN

Senator SMITH. Very few who are wounded on that list. Now, Admiral, your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff have answered one question I put to them in one way, and I assume you would, too,

Would you be willing to consider the admission of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations as a basis of settling the Korean controversy?

Admiral SHERMAN. I wouldn't consider it as a basis for settling the Korean conflict. I don't believe we should consider it in any event.

Senator SMITH. I think that is right in accord with your colleagues' statement.

In other words, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are agreed clearly in their minds that we can't admit the Chinese Communists to the United Nations in light of their defiance of the United Nations in this Korean conflict, as far as we can see at the present time.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir. If I may add, I feel it is important to the future of the United Nations that there be an understanding as to what happens when any country, any power, attacks the forces of the United Nations in the field.

Senator SMITH. I am very glad you added that, because it seems to me it is terribly important. Here we have a flagrant aggression by another power in an area where the United Nations had a responsibility and had assumed that responsibility.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And how we can do less than insist that they withdraw from that aggression and defiance is difficult for me to understand. I realize there are some military considerations, but it seems to me, as far as principle, we must be clearcut if the United Nations is going to survive.

CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND RUSSIAN CONTROL OF DAIREN AND PORT ARTHUR

Now, Admiral, do you happen to know how Russia got control of the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur? We have been discussing those ports as though they were neutral ports today in the hands of Russia. How did Russia get hold of them?

Admiral SHERMAN. I really can't say, sir. I have known that, but, as I understand it, it is by a process which was satisfactory to the Russians and the Chinese and there is some question as to the standing of it with the other great powers.

Senator SMITH. Might I suggest that it grew out of the Yalta Conference where Russia was given certain concessions in case she came into the war.

That is the understanding I have, at least. I don't want to commit you if you are not familiar with the facts.

One more question, Admiral. How is my time, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about——

Mr. WILCOX. A minute and a half.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have a minute and a half.

REASONS FOR CONCURRING IN MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator SMITH. Could you tell us briefly, then, Admiral, the reasons why you felt that the removal of General MacArthur was desirable at this time and was requested by the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral SHERMAN. If I may say, sir, I would like to read a memorandum that I made that same day.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like very much to have the admiral do that if that is proper.

Chairman RUSSELL. He may do it, Senator. Any time that is consumed by a witness in answering the question within the 15 minutes goes on the committee's time. Your time is out, but the admiral has all the time he desires.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Admiral SHERMAN. At 4 o'clock met with General Marshall. He asked each of us for our views concerning the relief of General MacArthur.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What date was this?

Admiral SHERMAN. Sunday, the 8th, if the dates check.

I based my reply on the future and said that if we were to be successful in the attempt to limit the conflict to Korea and avoid world war III, we must have a commander in whom we can confide and on whom we can rely, that General MacArthur has not been sufficiently responsive to the directives and policy given, that from a military point of view he should be replaced and that the political aspects were above my level.

I would like to add that preceding that statement I told General Marshall that I was very fond of General MacArthur, that I had been associated with him for many years, and what I had to say I said with the utmost regret.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

MAC ARTHUR POSITION ON BLOCKADING PORT ARTHUR

Senator MORSE. Admiral Sherman, on May 5, when General MacArthur was on the stand, the following questions and answers in a colloquy between General MacArthur and myself took place. I read from page 644 of the transcript:

> Senator MORSE. General, in blockading the China coast what measures do you propose to employ in the case of the naval bases of the Soviet at Port Arthur?
>
> General MACARTHUR. I'd maintain a blockade.
>
> Senator MORSE. Of Port Arthur?
>
> General MACARTHUR. Yes, sir, I'd maintain the blockade entirely along the Chinese coast.

> Senator MORSE. Would a blockade of Port Arthur in your opinion increase the danger of open hostilities with Russia?
> General MACARTHUR. It would certainly cut off the supply lines from Russia into China. I do not believe the small incident involved would materially affect in any way the great decisions that would be involved in bringing the Soviet into a global war.
> I said that I doubted that anything that took place in the Korean war or in Asia would be of such influence as to alter the basic decision that Russia may make as to whether she is going to attack or whether she is not going to attack.

Am I correct, Admiral, in my understanding of your testimony this morning that it is your opinion that maintaining a blockade of Port Arthur would be an act of war?

Admiral SHERMAN. In my opinion it would be, sir.

POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTION BY RUSSIA

Senator MORSE. Am I correct in my understanding that the maintaining of a blockade of Port Arthur and of Dairen would increase the probability of Russia taking retaliatory action that would tend to enlarge this war beyond the sphere that it has been the policy of our Government to keep it to date?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do indeed, sir. I have no way of estimating the character of the Russian navy, but if the situation was reversed, I would expect our naval forces involved to go out and fight.

Senator MORSE. From the standpoint of your knowledge of Russian history, do you agree with me that on one point the Russian people have always rallied, namely when they become convinced that some foreign policy was making an attack that jeopardized their own territory, they did not hesitate to go to war?

Admiral SHERMAN. As far as I know that is correct, sir, and I think that it is characteristic of the Russian military outlook as I know it, and that it is colored very completely by the concept of defense of territory.

Senator MORSE. Was one of the reasons why the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not go along with MacArthur in his proposals for a blockade and for bombardment in Manchuria the fact that it was the military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that up until the present time at least our United States defenses, our military forces, had not reached such a point of strength as to justify our running a risk of a full enlargement of this war into a third world war, if we could possibly avoid it.

Admiral SHERMAN. I would say, sir, that our judgments in these tremendously important matters have been influenced by two concepts. One is that we should if possible avoid a general war, and second that because a general war in the present state of the world is always a possibility, that we must at all costs avoid getting so much of our military potential absorbed in the Far East that we would then lose our ability to hold Western Europe, which we think in the long run is more important to us, in fact almost essential to us.

Senator MORSE. That is true because of the great industrial war-making power of Europe, and its availability to Russia would threaten the future security of our country, would it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. It would, indeed.

STRESSING THE MUTUALITY OF UN ALLIANCE

Senator MORSE. Now, Admiral, I want to say to you that I think your testimony here this morning, in regard to the economic aid that has been furnished, in shocking quantities, from your testimony, to the Red Chinese, in times gone by, by foreign nations that should cooperate with us as allies, has been a great service to, I think, not only American public thinking on this controversy, but I hope, world-wide opinion.

In the course of your testimony you said that as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you feared that the application, or imposition of a unilateral naval blockade by the United States, which is your interpretation of what General MacArthur proposed, and which is also my interpretation, would cause us to lose our allies, or at least weaken our relationships with our allies, and that we should be careful to follow a course of action that would avoid that, if possible.

That is my interpretation of the meaning of your testimony, and I think that is right.

But, do you not think, Admiral, that our allies need to give some thought and attention to what would happen to them, through the Communist threat, if they followed a course of action which, in effect, caused them to lose us as allies?

This matter of losing allies works both ways, does it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. No alliance is good unless it does work both ways.

Senator MORSE. And do you agree with me that it is a duty on the part of the leaders of our country, including not only you men in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the men in the high echelons of the executive branch of the Government, but also of those of us in the Congress, to make very clear, in a perfectly friendly way to our allies, that they have no moral right, if they are to keep faith with the tenets of the United Nations Charter, to permit their nationals, commercial nationals, economic forces within their country, to follow an economic course of action that results in our paying a heavy sacrifice of American blood in Korea, along with their own soldiers who are dying because of trade with Red China?

Do you think I am correct in the thesis that I lay down in that observation?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I do.

I feel very strongly that in the conduct of war, whether it be a war of this character, or a more general war, that the control of trade, the control of the movements of supplies, is a much more important factor than many of us realize, and that it is unthinkable to send men out to fiight, in uniform, and then, from the same country, let shipments go out for the purpose of monetary profit.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO CHINA AND THE WAR IN KOREA

Senator MORSE. Admiral, for many months past, the senior Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, has played a very active role of leadership on the floor of the Senate in repeated protests against Allied economic assistance to our enemies in Asia, and a good number of us have tried to support his hand in this fight; and I mention that as a basis for the question that I now put to you.

Do you think it is a fair interpretation for me to put on your testimony this morning that the evidence you have presented to us as to the amount of that trade bears out the thesis of the Senator from California, and those of us who have supported him, that this economic assistance by our allies to our enemies in Asia has constituted a blow against the security of our forces in Asia?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, it certainly has impaired their security; and, in discussing this subject, I would like to say again that the lapse of time between the intervention of the Chinese Communists effectively and in strength at the end of November, and the action within our own Government with respect to our own trade, to me was gratifyingly short. I think the action taken was effective, complete, and rapid.

POSITION OF HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE UNDER BLOCKADE

Senator MORSE. Am I correrct in my understanding of one bit of your testimony that if the allies within the United Nations join with us in a naval blockade, that Singapore and Hong Kong would still remain neutral ports?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. They would remain neutral ports and, therefore, the question would still remain as to whether or not Great Britain would permit her nationals or the ships under the British flag to ply that port.

Admiral SHERMAN. I am not an expert on the economy of Hong Kong and Singapore, but I believe that they would withstand the damage done by cutting off transshipment of war material into Communist China.

Senator MORSE. The cold reality is that so long as Hong Kong becomes a port of import for goods going to the Red Chinese, it becomes a threat to the security of our forces in Asia.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, to that extent. But I believe that Hong Kong can survive economically without that type of traffic.

Senator MORSE. But if Hong Kong is really a source of great aid to our enemy, we are going to have to face the fact, if we are all in this together—England with us—that whether it can survive economically or not, it ought to be prevented from becoming the funnel through which matériel of war is being fed forces that are killing both English and American boys. Is that not true?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is true, sir.

Senator MORSE. One other question, Admiral, in regard to this conference on April 5 with General Bradley.

ATTENDANCE AT APRIL 5 JCS MEETING

You testified as to who was there, and I think you testified that General Haislip was there apparently substituting for General Collins. You frequently meet with General Bradley, do you not, as Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; we have three scheduled meetings a week, and then additional ones as required.

Senator MORSE. Do you agree with me that the fact that on this particular occasion he apparently was mistaken in his remembrance as to whether General Collins or General Haislip was there is not only an understandable and natural thing but certainly does not indicate any intent on the part of General Bradley to falsify to this committee but is one of those slips of recollection that the human mind is frequently capable of?

Admiral SHERMAN. About any other individual I would say it was a very natural lapse of memory in view of the large number of meetings at different times and places, and in the case of General Bradley I think that his character is unimpeachable in that regard.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Morse.

Senator Green?

Senator GREEN. Admiral, most of the questions I had to ask were asked by Senator Connally, but I would like to follow them up a little bit. That is in regard to a naval blockade.

I understand your position is that you might favor such a blockade provided it were authorized by the United Nations?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNILATERAL BLOCKADE

Senator GREEN. My question goes beyond that. If it were refused by the United Nations and if our allies individually declined to have part in it, that is whether your position would be the same in case we had to go it alone?

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe so, sir. It would depend, the answer to that question would depend very importantly of course on how effective the agreed economic sanctions had been, and also upon the over-all strategic situation, but we would still face the same hazard that to impose a unilateral naval blockade would amount to a declaration of war on China and everything that might come in the train of that action, and it is questionable whether even from the local tactical point of view it is not better to refrain in view of the many immunities that our forces have, because control of the sea and control of the air in the vicinity of our troops has been conceded to us.

Senator GREEN. Are you also taking into consideration the mutual defense treaty between Russia and China?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; that is a factor.

NAVAL FORCES NEEDED TO MAINTAIN BLOCKADE AND BOMBARD COAST

Senator GREEN. Well, then, to go further—if we did establish a naval blockade, how large a proportion of our Air Force would be necessary?

Admiral SHERMAN. We would not call on the Air Force at all, sir. Our naval patrol planes, which are designed for reconnaissance over the sea and antisubmarine warfare, would be the best types, and we would be able to deploy a sufficient number.

Senator GREEN. And it would only call for a moderate increase in the naval force?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. You see we are maintaining routine reconnaissance of the Formosa Strait and the approaches north and south of it now with naval patrol planes. We merely would have to augment that force.

Senator Green. The proposal which was originally made was that the naval blockade be accompanied by bombardment of the coastal cities and stations of China. That would be combined naval-air force?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Senator Green. How large a proportion of the Air Force would that take and of the naval force?

Admiral Sherman. Well, that operation could absorb very large forces, depending upon how far we wanted to carry it. To do a forthright job, I would think would take a very considerable part of the United States Air Force and considerable naval forces.

On the other hand, we can supply enough naval forces to carry on operations in a more moderate degree. It is just a question of how much of a sweep you would want to make.

Senator Green. General Vandenberg testified that it would take all of our total Air Force and leave this country, to use his expression, "naked." That would also be true of the Navy, would it not?

Admiral Sherman. Well, sir, I don't believe that that would be the best way to do it. I would rather initiate an operation of that type with the proportions of the forces that we felt that we could devote to it without undue detriment to our readiness elsewhere.

As I said before, if we allocated forces to that type of operation, I would feel it necessary to replace them at home. If we sent four carriers to operate against the China coast in addition to those now in the Far East, I would want to break out four more of them.

Senator Green. To keep the total present force?

Admiral Sherman. Yes.

VALUE OF ALLIES

Senator Green. Now there seemed to be some uncertainty in our testimony or the questioning as to whether the proposal of General MacArthur was to do it with the allies or to do it alone. I remember asking him myself that very question and he said he would try to get it with the allies, but, if not, go it alone. And I said, "Alone?" and he said, "Yes, alone."

You do not agree with that statement?

Admiral Sherman. No, sir. That is where I start to differ.

Senator Green. Do you know any other military authorities that do agree with it?

Admiral Sherman. No, sir. All of the military authorities with whom I deal believe that it is very important to retain our allies and not get involved in a unilateral war between the United States and China alone.

Senator Green. Thank you.

Chairman Russell. Gentlemen, we have a couple of procedural matters that we must determine now. I hope you will all stay here and pay attention to it.

Admiral Sherman, we will excuse you until 2:30 this afternoon unless you desire to stay here and hear these matters discussed.

Admiral Sherman. No, sir.

(Whereupon, the witness was temporarily excused.)

ORDER OF WITNESSES

Chairman Russell. The first one—the time is coming when we will have to decide something on the order of witnesses before the committee. I am not asking for any conclusion on that now, but I am merely throwing that out to the committee. We have no definite agenda for witnesses after hearing Secretary of State Acheson.

I ask the members of the committee to bear that in mind so we may proceed to notify the next witness.

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, I did not understand. Did you indicate the time for Secretary Acheson?

Chairman Russell. If we can conclude with Admiral Sherman today, we will call him tomorrow morning, Senator George. If we cannot, we will call him for Friday morning.

Senator Smith. Has the committee got a list of the witnesses that have been suggested?

Chairman Russell. I have them in a file, Senator Smith, including your letter and your suggestions.

Senator Smith. I think we ought to.

Chairman Russell. Yes, sir. I am sure the committee would want to examine your list. You have got, as I recall, two or three professors of history.

Senator Smith. I am not pressing that, but some of the others I would like to see called.

Chairman Russell. We will have to consider that before we enter them. I did not intend to do that now. I want the members of the committee to be thinking about it.

I will say this: I think there has been more support perhaps for hearing General Wedemeyer than any other single witness other than those we have scheduled, and I had assumed the committee would hear him. I do not know the order in which you want to hear him, but he is some distance away, so if the committee does decide to hear him at the conclusion of Secretary Acheson's testimony, we would have to have some time to alert him and enable him to come here.

Senator Smith. Do you contemplate calling Mr. Harriman?

Chairman Russell. His name has been suggested, Senator Smith, and I thought that perhaps in view of the relationship that he had had to the matters under inquiry that the committee would want Mr. Harriman as a witness.

Senator Smith. It seems to me he would be desirable.

Chairman Russell. Now in what order—we might just settle this right now. Should we go ahead with Mr. Harriman after concluding with the Secretary of State or should we bring in General Wedemeyer? I think we will hear both of them, and it is immaterial to me the order in which they will be heard.

If the committee desires to take any action on that, we can do it right now and then know where we proceed after hearing the Secretary of State.

Senator Long. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, in view of the fact that there has been some criticism, not by any member of this committee but by some Senators not on this committee, that all the witnesses we are hearing are responsible Government officials who could be expected to take the point of view of the administration, that if the members of the minority party would like to present some witness who would take a different point of view, they might suggest who they would like to have that might differ with the point of view that we will hear expressed by the next two or three witnesses.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. May I suggest that I agree with the objective of the Senator from Louisiana, but I disagree with his implication that the members of the minority party, as such, have any preconceived notions as to who should be brought before the committee to sustain any particular point of view. I think we are acting in our individual capacities on this committee, and I know of no position taken by the minority party on this committee on the merits or demerits of any point of view.

Senator LONG. I was under the impression Senator Taft spoke out and said his feeling was that all the witnesses——

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I think on this occasion, as on all others, Mr. Taft will have to be attributed as speaking for himself and not for the minority party. And I think that we have done a remarkablly fine job on this committee in conducting the hearings without a majority party or minority party division among us.

I would, therefore, move, because I think you have got to get something before us for a vote up or down, subject to whatever modifications you want to make to the motion, that for the immediate future we proceed in the following order, with the following witnesses: Mr. Acheson, General Wedemeyer, and Mr. Harriman.

Senator SMITH. I second that motion.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, that will be done.

Senator Bridges?

ADDITIONAL WITNESSES

Senator BRIDGES. In here somewhere, I think it is very important to have the former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and the question is after we have heard all these military witnesses. One person that we have not heard, who has been in this picture in a military capacity is Louis Johnson, and I think it would be very logical that we have, perhaps before we get into Mr. Harriman, Louis Johnson and Wedemeyer, and those are the two people militarily whom we should have.

I agree with the Senator from Oregon on his general procedure, but I would like to inject the name of Louis Johnson.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you accept——

Senator MORSE. I accept it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I say this because the only purpose is to have someone available for the committee where we don't run into a hiatus.

Senator JOHNSON. You do not want Secretary Johnson before Secretary Acheson?

Senator BRIDGES. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The chairman said if there was no objection; I object. I am not going to make any fight in this matter. I will vote against it, but I object to determining this matter at this time. I was unaware that the agenda was going to be fixed at this meeting.

I would say that we attempt to fix the agenda tomorrow, which would give us a chance to think about it a little bit rather than to arbitrarily fix it at this meeting. That is my objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think it is of too great importance, but it is of assistance in conducting an orderly procedure here, particularly when you run out of witnesses that are sitting down here at the Pentagon on call, and you have to have some time to notify them, and for that reason——

Senator Morse, did you accept Senator Bridges' suggestion?

Senator MORSE. I accepted his suggestion.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question is then on the motion that the Secretary of Defense and the chairman be instructed to undertake to secure the presence of General Wedemeyer, to follow the Secretary of State, to be followed by former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and Mr. Johnson to be followed by Mr. Averell Harriman. Of course, that is subject to change at any time the majority of the members of the committee wish to alter it.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, Secretary of War Pace has been out to the Far East on at least one occasion and his name has been brought into this matter.

Chairman RUSSELL. He is one of the witnesses that has been requested, Senator Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. I wonder if he could be put on the agenda somewhere.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am perfectly willing to do it. Of course, he is in town where he is available. So is Mr. Harriman for that matter, but the other three witnesses are not here and we have to take steps to secure their attendance.

If you want to offer that amendment, of course you have that right, but I don't think there is any question but what we will hear Secretary Pace before we conclude.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WITNESSES SUGGESTED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator is offering something, I did not want to interfere, but I merely want to suggest a substitute; that the chairman appoint a suitable subcommittee, the numbers to be left to him, to canvass this situation this afternoon and this evening and make recommendations as to the itinerary of witnesses on tomorrow.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you need to go over the whole matter of all the witnesses?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For the next four or five witnesses in their discretion.

Chairman RUSSELL. It was my purpose when we had concluded with what appeared to be the main participants in these hearings to appoint a subcommittee to go through the list of witnesses as suggested and make recommendations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely suggest the question of whether it is desirable, if we have Mr. Acheson, whether it is desirable to have Mr. Harriman follow him, because Mr. Harriman is in the diplomatic field, Mr. Acheson is in the diplomatic field.

I have no firm convictions on it one way or the other, but I think before we make any final action that we could take it overnight anyway.

Chairman RUSSELL. This committee is the master of its own course of action. Senator Hickenlooper moves that the Chair appoint a subcommittee of four members——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't care how many it is.

Senator GREEN. There is a motion before the House.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand, but this is in the nature of a motion to postpone consideration, and I think the ordinary parliamentary practice would take precedence.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We could request they report tomorrow.

Senator MORSE. Speaking in support of my motion in opposition to Senator Hickenlooper's motion, I wish to say that I completely agree with the Senator from Iowa that a subcommittee should be appointed to make recommendations to the full committee as to our agenda for witnesses for the total length of the hearings, but we have an immediate problem before us as to who are to be the next few witnesses, and I think that we can all take notice of the fact that we will want to hear Acheson, Wedemeyer, Johnson, and Harriman.

I do not think there is any doubt about the fact that an overwhelming majority of this committee will vote to hear them at least sometime, and I think that now is an appropriate time to hear them and that will give a subcommittee ample time then to prepare its recommendations for the rest of the hearings.

I think we ought to put the chairman in the position so he can notify these people as to what the immediate future program of the committee is going to be, and therefore although I am for a subcommittee, I shall vote against the Senator's motion as a substitute for mine.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, the question is on the substitute proposed by the Senator from Iowa. Those in favor of the substitute will say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of ayes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed will say "No."

(There was a chorus of noes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the substitute is lost.

Now, did you wish to offer that as an amendment?

LIMITING LIST OF WITNESSES FOR PRESENT

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes; I would like to put Secretary Pace on the list following Mr. Louis Johnson.

Chairman RUSSELL. You mean before Mr. Harriman?

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have heard the amendment, gentlemen, which will transform the order to——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think we are making a mistake. I think we are binding ourselves to an itinerary here long in the future that may be undesirable.

I see no reason to start adding names to this list at this time; so of course I am generally opposed to this procedure at this moment without some little thought overnight.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. May I say at this point I think the Senator from Iowa has a good point. We have taken care of Acheson, Wedemeyer, Johnson, and Harriman. We have met the chairman's obligation of having a schedule for the immediate future clearly outlined.

Then I think other people such as Secretary Pace are names that should be considered by a subcommittee.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question is on the amendment.

Senator LONG. I would like to state that I will not vote for this amendment at this time, but after we have heard the witnesses that have been suggested by the Senator from Oregon, if the Senator from Tennessee will bring up his suggestion at that time, I would be glad to go along with him in arranging that we set a time to hear Secretary Pace.

Chairman RUSSELL. I presume the committee would hear briefly at least from all the civilian Secretaries.

Senator MORSE. I am in favor of hearing them.

Senator KEFAUVER. The only thing I thought while we were on the military matters, before we got into the other, while we have one coming after the other, Pace ought to be in this group. That is the only reason I suggested his name.

Chairman RUSSELL. The question is on the amendment proposed by the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Kefauver.

All those who favor that amendment will say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of ayes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed will say "No."

(There was a chorus of noes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and now the question recurs to the original motion of the Senator from Oregon.

All of you are familiar, I take it, with the question.

Senator SMITH. Do I understand the order to be Acheson, Wedemeyer, Johnson, and Harriman?

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator is correct.

Those who favor that motion will say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of ayes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed, "No."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes appear to have it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say "No" on the basis that I am against fixing the itinerary at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes have it. The motion is agreed to. Now, Senator Knowland has a procedural matter here that was discussed yesterday afternoon, late, and which I will attempt to outline briefly.

CLASSIFICATION OF DECEMBER 23, 1949, STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS ON FORMOSA

It relates to a document requested by the Chairman, at the instance of Senator Knowland, from the State Department, which, in substance, was instructions to the American diplomatic and consular representatives abroad, as to an attitude to take with respect to Formosa.

Is that a fair statement?

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. It was issued in December 1949.

Senator KNOWLAND. December 23, 1949.

Chairman RUSSELL. December 23, 1949.

Now, the Department of State has undertaken to retain the classification of this document.

The subcommittee which was appointed to deal with these classified matters, and to secure the declassification of those that are classified, Senator Knowland and Senator McMahon, went into the matter.

The matter was taken up on request, in accordance with procedure, with the State Department, that they declassify the document, and they declined to do so.

Senator Knowland. I will say, what the Chairman says is correct.

I took the matter up with Senator McMahon. Senator McMahon discussed it with the State Department, with just whom I am not certain, but he indicated he discussed it with the State Department.

He came back with a suggestion that the matter be held in abeyance until Secretary Acheson, himself, should appear.

The State Department, when they furnished us the document, said it was being furnished, but they did not want it to be made a part of the public record.

I merely want to say, because it is pertinent, I think, that the document had a rather low classification, as classifications go. The Wake Island notes, for example, were "Top Secret." We have had other documents that were "Secret." This classification is "Confidential."

So far as I know, the issue does not involve any cryptographic situation, because it was sent out by mimeographed form. If it is, why, it could be paraphrased, and I would think that certainly there would be no problem involved, as far as that is concerned.

Now, the additional pertinent information is that on the 3d of January 1950, the United Press carried a rather extensive article in which it outlines a good deal of the material in here; namely, that it had been prepared by the State Department's Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff, and that among the other things which it said was that the island of Formosa had no strategic value.

Since it does not involve the security of our troops in Korea; since I do not believe it impairs in any sense a cryptographic situation; since it is more than a year and a half old; and since it is pertinent to this inquiry, as all the members of the Defense Establishment have testified that in their judgment Formosa is of strategic value, I think it becomes an essential part of this record in this case, and I think we will be very seriously impaired, in some of the questions I want to ask Admiral Sherman this afternoon, and other witnesses, if this is kept in its classified position.

Now, the Administration declassified the Wake Island documents from Top Secret to no classification at all, over night. In fact it was released to the public press before it was even declassified; and I have agreed with the censor on all matters which he has brought up in the past, with one or two minor exceptions, which were met to the entire agreement of both the censor and the committee; but I do feel that there is not the justification for keeping this classified, as it has been.

STATE DEPARTMENT VIEWS ON CLASSIFICATION

I want to say, as a matter of fairness, and I want the record to be very clear: Each time I brought this matter to the attention of the committee, I have said that I, of course, expected the State Department would have a representative here so he could present his point of view as to why they feel that the classification should still be kept, and that I would not ask for a vote until he was in here; but I understand someone was going to be over here and available to us.

Chairman Russell. We have one available.

I appreciate your making that statement, and I want to make a statement of, not my views on this matter; so far as I can see, unless I am convinced to the contrary, I see no reason why it should not be declassified.

However, Senator McMahon was required to leave town yesterday, and did talk to me for a few minutes yesterday afternoon, and was very insistent that the matter should not be taken up for a decision on the declassification until the Secretary of State was present as a witness.

I don't think he went any further in his statement to me. If he expressed any opinion of his own as to whether it should be declassified or not, I do not recall it.

He did say that he thought that the proper procedure would be to wait until the Secretary of State was here before the committee, and then let him discuss the views of the State Department, as to whether or not it should be declassified.

As I understand it, that is the only real difference between the members of the subcommittee on the handling of the matter.

They all understand the procedure: That is, that the Department will present its views as to whether they think it should be declassified, and the committee can take such action as they see fit.

But, there was a difference in that Senator McMahon had, I might say, been rather insistent to me that the committee not take action on declassification until the Secretary of State appeared here as a witness, and that is a matter that I want the committee to pass on.

Senator Johnson. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Senator Johnson. In view of what Senator McMahon says, Senator Knowland, why do you feel that it is essential, if we are going to have Secretary Acheson tomorrow, and that would meet with the other member of the subcommittee's views, why is it essential that we take a vote prior to tomorrow?

Senator Knowland. Well, with all due respect to the point of view of Senator McMahon, I think it is entirely proper that his views should be expressed, but a good deal of my questioning this afternoon, of Admiral Sherman, is going to rest on this document.

DECLASSIFICATION OF STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENT

Of necessity, unless the document is declassified, the censor will then be required to cut out a great deal of the material from the record.

I think that I am as security-conscious as any member of the committee. I have served on the Joint Atomic Energy Commission, and served in the armed services.

I can say that I have read and reread this document, and I cannot see, for the life of me, why, a year and a half after it was put out, when a good part of it has already been published, why the document should not be made available so that the witnesses can be examined and cross-examined on it, because I think it is a very important document—as to how the State Department happened to declare, in a policy memorandum, that the island had no strategic value, when the evidence of all the witnesses from the Defense Establishment, who are charged with the responsibility of the strategic defense of this Nation, have testified that it does have strategic value, and when it is my personal opinion that the State Department, prior to December 23, 1949, had advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the island has strategic value.

So, I think I will be seriously impaired, from a point of view of the public record, in this case of an examination.

Now, if it is going to be necessary to keep this classified——

Senator JOHNSON. What you are saying, then, is that the making available to the public of the questions you will want to ask this afternoon, would necessarily be postponed.

Senator KNOWLAND. No. Admiral Sherman is only going to be here this afternoon——

Senator JOHNSON. There is nothing to keep you from questioning him about it, is there?

Senator KNOWLAND. It would not be made a part of the record.

Senator JOHNSON. In effect, it would be postponing the public release of the exchange this afternoon.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do I understand that a representative of the State Department is here this morning, at your request, in this matter?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes. I am trying to keep the committee furnished with everything necessary to keep it going, to the best of my ability.

It is running itself pretty well, I might say.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We might expedite the matter and save considerable talk and speculation if we call the representative in here and have him tell us what the State Department's reasons are.

Senator JOHNSON. I would like to hear Senator McMahon on that.

Senator CAIN. Might I say something, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Am I not right in saying that the document, in whole or in part, has already been stated and explored on the floor of the Senate many times?

Senator KNOWLAND. Only from the point of view of the press dispatches which had previously been released, but not from the point of view of the document itself.

Senator CAIN. The subject matter of the document is common knowledge.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have no objection whatever to the committee taking action on it.

DELAYING DECLASSIFICATION OF THE INSTRUCTIONS

I did feel that I should bring to the attention of the committee Senator McMahon's views, since he insisted that he saw no reason why it should be made public until the Secretary of State had an opportunity to give his views on it.

Senator KNOWLAND. I might say I communicated with the State Department January 3, 1950, and for a year and a half have been trying to get this document made available, and it has not been to date.

Now, the Wedemeyer report was kept suppressed for 4 years; the Wake Island document was declassified very quickly, and I have no objection on that situation, at the request of this committee, and as I say, it was printed in the public press while it was still a top secret document.

I do think that I am not asking too much that the State Department cooperate by making what I think is a very fundamental policy document available to the committee and to the country.

Chairman RUSSELL. As I see it, it is a question of timing altogether.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we have a simple question here analogously speaking of the admissibility of evidence. I can't imagine that anything that the Secretary of State could say on that issue as to whether or not this should be admitted into the public record that he can't say through his agent who apparently is available to testify before this committee on this particular point of evidence at this time.

It is all argumentative, and the Secretary of State certainly can speak through the voice of his agent. I presume he will, and I think we ought to hear the representative of the State Department and then pass judgment as to whether or not we ought to insist upon its being declassified at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, if somebody will make a motion, I will put it to a vote.

Senator BRIDGES. I agree, Mr. Chairman, with the position taken by Senator Knowland. I see no reason why it should not be declassified, but inasmuch as you have invited the representative of the State Department to here explain their position, I would agree with Senator Morse that we should certainly give him the courtesy of an explanation before we pass on it.

STATE DEPARTMENT VIEWS ON CLASSIFICATION

Senator KNOWLAND. And I hope my position was clear. I did not want you to vote until you had heard the State Department representative.

Chairman RUSSELL. Under our procedures we have to hear him, Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. I merely wanted the record to be clear. I was not urging it be done without hearing the State Department representative.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, another thing about it. Shouldn't Senator McMahon have an opportunity of presenting his viewpoint or did he want that opportunity?

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I stated here that he felt very strongly that the matter should not be, that action should not be taken on the release of this matter until the Secretary of State was on the stand. Now why I do not know. I did not go into any details with him.

He came by here and talked with me a few minutes yesterday afternoon. Those were his views and he told me that in expressing his regret that he had a speaking engagement, I think, at Hyde Park, N. Y.

Senator JOHNSON. Did he give any indication whether he would object to its release after the Secretary was heard before the full committee?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not think he did, Senator. I do not recall.

Senator JOHNSON. He did not take a position one way or the other?

Chairman RUSSELL. I do not recall.

Senator MORSE. I move you, Mr. Chairman, that we hear the representative of the State Department on this issue at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those of you who favor the motion of the Senator from Oregon that the representative of the State Department present the views of the Department as to the declassification of this document at this time will say "Aye."

(There was a chorus of ayes.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Those opposed will say, "No."

(There was no response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The ayes have it. Invite in—I think Mr. Fisher is the person.

I want to further advise the members of the committee that I have been advised that none of the restaurants are open in the Capitol today, so any expedition we can give these proceedings will assist us in getting a bite to eat before we get back here at 2:30 this afternoon.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I wonder, when the witness presents himself for the information of the comminttee, will you get some background of the witness, who he is and how long he has been in the Department.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Fisher, under the instructions of this committee, I administer the oath to all witnesses who appear here, even on procedural matters.

You will raise your right hand. The evidence which you are about to give this committee upon the matters which will be asked you will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FISHER. I so swear, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ADRIAN S. FISHER, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Fisher, you are familiar with the procedures of this committee with respect to classified documents?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir; I am.

Chairman RUSSELL. What is your position?

Mr. FISHER. I am the legal adviser to the Department of State, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Legal adviser of the Department of State?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. How long have you occupied that position?

Mr. FISHER. Since the end of June 1949. The precise date isn't clear in my mind.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were with the Department prior to that time?

Mr. FISHER. I had been, sir, for a year prior to the war. I had not been with them immediately prior to my assuming the position of legal adviser.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you familiar with the document which contains instructions to American representatives in the diplomatic service abroad, dated in the month of November 1949?

Senator KNOWLAND. December.

Chairman RUSSELL. December 1949?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman, I am.

Chairman RUSSELL. Dealing with the island of Formosa?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. What classification has been given by the State Department to that document?

Mr. FISHER. It is classified as confidential, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Confidential? What reasons does the State Department have for desiring to retain that classification on this specific document?

Mr. FISHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, could I elaborate on that to some degree?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir. From the State Department, as you are, you give as full an explanation as you wish.

Mr. FISHER. In other words, the purpose of this document is, to put it crudely, give the Voice of America people the line they should follow because of an anticipated development.

Now, it is probably known to the Soviets that we do give them—give the people the lines to follow on various possibilities. They undoubtedly suspect it.

The question is can they prove it, and if this document were to be released, what propaganda use would they make of it, not as a leak but as an official United States document in which we tell our broadcasters, "Play up this; play down that."

Now, I don't believe that that is an improper thing to do. Anyone who knows the problems of a propaganda war realizes there has to be some central direction, but for counterpropaganda use, the exposure of that type of central direction gives the Soviets something that I think they would very much like to have for the purpose of destroying the credibility of the Voice of America, which we have all been working so hard to build up. That is, I think, a brief statement of the reasons, Mr. Chairman.

DOCUMENT ANTICIPATING FALL OF FORMOSA

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you mean, in other words, that in anticipation of the fall of Formosa to the Communist Chinese this document was forwarded to our own propaganda outlets so that they might discount it in advance and thereby avoid impairment of American prestige in the various areas of the world?

Mr. FISHER. That is my understanding.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt on a procedural matter? I am informed that Mr. Fisher has not given the reporter his full name for the record.

Mr. FISHER. Adrian S. Fisher.

SECURITY INVOLVED IN DOCUMENT

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, may I say for the record that he comes from Memphis, Tenn., and his father was a very distinguished Member of the House of Representatives.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have a procedural matter which may clear up one point and perhaps we can get this question answered.

Is there any cryptographic security involved in this document?

Mr. FISHER. I have not been advised of any, Senator.

Senator KNOWLAND. I have a question or two I would like to ask when it gets around to my turn.

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't assume we would go all around. You were one of the parties at interest here, so you might say; so I will recognize you.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Fisher, apparently from the testimony here, there is no cryptographic security involved.

So far as I have been able to tell in reading the article, there is nothing that adversely affects the security of our forces on Korea at the present time. Would you agree to that?

Mr. FISHER. I am not entirely clear, sir, as to how much meaning you put into adversely affecting the security of our forces in Korea. If this impairs the utility of the Voice of America, it may have that effect. It will not give any specific military information of value to the enemy. We should be clear on that, and I am not making that contention.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Fisher, I happen to be in the Senate and on the Appropriations Committee that has supported the Voice of America. I think it is doing an important job.

But I also think it is important that when the executive branch of the Government of the United States sends out information to our representatives and agents overseas which is not in keeping with the facts of the situation, that if they need to be called to account on it, they should be called to account.

BRIEFING INFORMATION OFFICERS

I want to read you a couple of paragraphs here. I am reading from paragraph 2 of page 1:

> Pro-Nationalists, principally in the United States, who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government can survive and who tend to create an impression that the United States is delinquent if it fails to save Formosa.

Now, do you classify everyone who has considered Formosa as being strategically important to the United States as being a pro-Nationalist, and for that reason are you trying to tar with that label to all your representatives abroad everybody in this country who has advocated that Formosa was strategically important?

Mr. FISHER. Senator Knowland, I don't believe the purpose of this is to tar anybody with any label. I believe the purpose of item 2—"Background"—is to give to the people who are engaged in information activities a good idea of what they can expect from United States outlets of opinion and to identify purely for working journalism purposes, without any tar, color, or description one way or the other, what they can normally expect the sounds coming from these great United States would sound like.

I think that is the purpose of these statements entitled "Background," not in any way to characterize, to impugn, or for that matter, to praise—merely to make an accurate prediction of what might happen.

Senator KNOWLAND. That is not the interpretation I place on it, and it is even worse if you say this is a background to go to the press abroad, because, let me point out to you that the views some of us have had on the strategic importance of Formosa are precisely the views which Mr. Secretary Marshall has testified to before this committee—that Formosa is strategically of value, and it should not be allowed to fall into Communist hands.

It is the same testimony of General Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it is the same testimony of General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and it is the testimony of Admiral Sherman today.

So that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had precisely the same view that some of us have had for a period of more than 2 years; and yet in this memorandum that you have sent to your agents abroad you have said that the people expressing those views are pro-Nationalist.

Now, let me read you another paragraph.

Mr. FISHER. May I answer that, Senator?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. FISHER. I would like to make one point, sir, which I believe you said background of the press abroad. I meant for the background of the United States information people, so that they would know, in the way you would expect an information officer to know, what would be coming from the United States.

This is without color or criticism or, for that matter, without any evaluation. This is merely a prediction as to the type of public discussion that will probably be coming from the United States.

PRESERVING CREDIBILITY OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me read you paragraph B:

> Loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists add weight to the expectation. Its fall would therefore—

And you list a number of the things that would happen in its fall.

Now, the fact of the matter is, Mr. Fisher, that for a period of time, through certain representatives of the Department of State on the island of Formosa, they were sending back information to the State Department on the theory that Formosa could not hold out for 3 months' time.

That information was being sent back at that time. I did not believe it. It was contrary to what I personally saw on the island, and yet, by the statement which you were sending to all our diplomatic representatives abroad you were anticipating the fall of the island in the immediate future. Is that not correct?

Mr. FISHER. Senator Knowland, I believe that the general circumstances surrounding the issuance of this directive, why a particular item is in it, and why particular items are not in it, is a matter about which I think you would want to hear from the Secretary of State himself.

What I am trying to impress my own views on, the views which I hold, is that whether or not you agree with this directive, whether or not you think it was right—and those are properly matters for discussion before this committee, and I understand it will be dealt with—that it is still a type of guidance, the existence of which is generally assumed by our enemies in the cold war of ideas, but the exposure of which adds to their arsenal a valuable weapon to attempt to destroy the credibility of the Voice of America.

EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES PRESTIGE

Senator KNOWLAND. Let me read you this paragraph:

> All materials should be used—

Now listen to this—

> to the best to counter the false impression that:
> 1. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government.

Well, I submit to you that the fall of Formosa at that time would have destroyed the Government of the Republic of China because it was its last place.

I call your attention to item 3 under that subdivision. Mind you, the false impression:

> Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or the other countries opposing communism.

Yet every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have so testified before this committee without equivocation of any type or character whatever, and yet to your diplomatic representatives abroad and perhaps to the press you say that this is a false impression.

Mr. FISHER. Senator Knowland, at the time this was issued, the people that issued it were under the impression that Formosa was going to fall. Under those circumstances the best thing we could do was cut our losses as much as we could.

This is issued for that purpose. If this is made public, every statement made by the Voice of America in the future will be subject to the counterstatement, "I wonder what directive they issued that under," and the whole reputation which we have strived so hard to build up will be destroyed.

Now I think that the policy officers should indicate in considerably greater detail the policy considerations that led them to believe the fall was imminent at that time, but it is my understanding that they did so believe.

That being the case, we had to take steps so that the fall would, in the language of the directive itself,

> minimize the damage to United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Fisher, let me read you this statement:

> Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points,

and main point No. 2.

> Formosa has no special military significance.

Now my information is that prior to the 23d day of December of 1949 the State Department had information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they considered Formosa of strategic value at that time. They did not feel that it would be advantageous to be in unfriendly hands even prior to the time that this document was issued.

Yet in the face of it you issue a document to the American diplomatic representatives abroad saying Formosa has no special military significance.

Now I only say to you this, Mr. Fisher, with all the sincerity I possess as someone who has supported the Voice of America.

If you are today putting out guidance memos which are as far off base and as defeatist as this one was, I think that it is high time that the Congress and the American people know it, and if you have made a mistake, you had better publicly admit your mistakes and start out with a clean slate on the situation.

Mr. Fisher. Mr. Chairman, may I make one observation there?

Chairman Russell. Yes.

Mr. Fisher. Senator, in the same vein, what I would like to say, at the time this position was taken it was the view that Formosa was going to fall.

Senator Smith. May I ask a question there?

Chairman Russell. As soon as he completes his statement.

Senator Smith. It is just on that point. I wonder who had that view, because I came back from the Far East in the middle of October, and I sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State that the judgment out there of military men was that Formosa should not under any condition get in hostile hands.

I would like to ask Mr. Fisher who it was that said Formosa was going to fall.

REASONS FOR CLASSIFICATION

Mr. Fisher. Mr. Chairman, I would like, if I could, to defer the policy decisions which went into the issuance of this directive to the appropriate policy officer. But what I would like to say is to point out the reason for classification.

Now it seems to me that those who were responsible for the issuance of this document will, of course, answer why they felt that. I can testify here that this was issued on the assumption and on that information, and I should think a decision on it would await not the actions of a classification officer like myself, but after a full exploration with the appropriate policy officer—in this case I think the Secretary of State—the decisions surrounding its issuance, and then on the basis of the whole record the question of its classification could be discussed.

My own feeling is that any guidance, although we all know of their existence, and all assume that they exist, is dangerous if exposed. the very sentence that Senator Knowland read—

> Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points.

I can imagine our enemies having an awful lot of fun with that.

Now I am not apologizing for the fact we issue guidance. I think it is essential, because without it you wouldn't have the sort of coordinated program that best represents the interest of the United States. What I am trying to suggest for the consideration of the committee is the reasons why guidances are bad things to expose.

Senator Bridges. Do your guidances usually make false statements? And certainly it is a false statement that Formosa is not of strategic importance to the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have taken a very definite position on that, and you are making a positive statement the other way.

Senator George. You mean now?

Senator Bridges. What?

Senator George. As of now.

Senator Bridges. Or at any time.

Mr. **Fisher**. The problem of the extent of importance and how much value you put into the word "special" is a matter that I gather there have been varying views about at varying times, but that is not my direct concern.

What I am saying, sir, is that the extent you issue any guidance, to the extent that any official document says, "Without appearing to be unduly concerned, you might deal with the following points, and avoid various other points," you are indicating what someone else would call a line.

Now it is my judgment that you should have lines. It is also my judgment they should be the best lines we can work out in the interests of the United States, and we ought to consider in detail the problems raised by this one. That the Secretary is prepared to do. It is not my judgment—and I submit it in all humility for the consideration of the committee—that publication of it is a valuable thing for the over-all interests of the country.

Senator **Green**. Mr. Fisher, is there not a distinction which you might make between saying that is of importance to the United States and saying that its loss to our enemies would be of importance? I thought our position throughout was not that it was important in itself to us but it was very important that it should not fall in the hands of our enemies. Is that not a distinction?

Mr. **Fisher**. That is my understanding.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hickenlooper.

TRUTH OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I think there are two matters involved in this thing. Having gone to Europe to visit 21 or 22 countries with Senator Smith and some others on the Voice of America Subcommittee, and having had it dinned into our ears by the representatives of the Voice of America that we told the truth and that is the way we countered Russian propaganda, and having been constantly told that we confine the Voice of America to truth, and having felt that we bend over backward to not even approach the line of distortion, I am very shocked at this explanation.

Now I think the explanation could well fit the question of Korea. In December there was considerable highly schooled opinion in our technical circles that it looked like we might have to get out of Korea. We were being pushed back. We might have been able to hold a bridgehead; we might have had to evacuate Korea. It would have been just as shocking had the State Department then, on a frolic of its own, decided that we had better propagandize the whole world that Korea, after all, is not important at all, and if it falls to the Reds, why, the sacrifice of a good many thousand men and several billions of dollars is just an idyl of an afternoon. And that is what we were telling all our representatives over the world in this document.

Now that is one phase of the thing. I think the same situation would have been comparable had we propagandized our representatives over the world at the time in December when it looked like the situation in Korea was very bad, that, after all, we were just training over there, and Korea was not important or the principles involved were not important.

Now there is another ground that I merely suggest. I merely suggest that there is a strong feeling in many sections of this country that there has been a segment of belief and agitation within the State Department to actually accomplish the giving of Formosa to the Peoples Republic of China. I wonder whether or not this may or may not have been in furtherance of that known agitation among certain people—I am not saying the whole State Department—but certain people in furtherance of the agitation that we ought to give Formosa to the Peoples Republic of China.

POSITION ON CLASSIFICATION

Senator GEORGE. As I undertand you, Mr. Fisher, it is not a question whether these statements here are true or untrue, or whether the Secretary of State will come along and admit that they were facts or unrealistic it is that if this document is now made public, then the Russian propagandists will be able to trace it right back to your directive and say, "Here. This is the source of it," and everything they say is simply put out over there in this way. Is that your position?

Mr. FISHER. That is the position on the classification issue, Senator.

Senator GEORGE. I mean that.

Mr. FISHER. Just on that issue. I wouldn't wish to leave the impression it doesn't make any difference whether this is a good or bad directive.

Senator GEORGE. Oh, no, just on the question of classification.

Mr. FISHER. That is correct.

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Fisher, you are not naive enough to believe that the Russians are not saying exactly that now, that we are slanting, are you? As a matter of fact, I read in reports that they are in their propaganda.

Mr. FISHER. I would hate to help them out.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

EFFECTS OF PUBLICATION ON VOICE OF AMERICA

Senator KEFAUVER. As I understand, Mr. Fisher, you, I don't believe, were even counsel for the State Department when this was written, and you are not trying to pass on whether it is a good directive, whether it should have been put out, or anything else about that. You are just talking about the damage that the publication of it right now might do to the program of the Voice of America; is that correct?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct. I was with the State Department when it was written. I was up in Ottawa trying to settle the Colonial Airlines matter at the time and did not know of it myself. But the subsequent issue that you state is entirely correct.

Senator KEFAUVER. So you are not undertaking to pass on the question Senator Knowland raised as to whether it should have been put in these words or this sentence or what should have been said?

Mr. FISHER. That is right.

Senator KEFAUVER. You just do not want the Russians to have something tangible that they can condemn the whole Voice of America program?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I just read an additional paragraph here to throw some light on the situation?

I am reading from the last page, subdivision (*e*)—

> In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds in Formosa, avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited (usually individual) source, and make clear that the total of such demands evidences concern and frustration in some quarters but does not add up to a consensus on any particular position different from that officially taken.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit that the Voice of America is not the voice of the administration, that the Members of Congress are part of the Government of the United States, and to indicate, as this very clearly does, when some of us were raising this question a year and a half or 2 years ago, that our position would be jeopardized in the United States, was purely an individual view resulting from frustration, I think is something which the Congress of the United States should have a vital interest in if that is the advice going out to the diplomatic representatives of this Government abroad.

Senator GEORGE. Now—did you want to answer?

Mr. FISHER. I think my answer is the same as to Senator Kefauver. It is—what I am talking about—I think the directive as a policy document, whether wise or unwise, should be discussed by someone else. The point I am trying to make relates only to the wisdom or unwisdom of making it public.

Senator GEORGE. I was just going to suggest that if we were satisfied with asking Mr. Fisher these questions, we might just excuse him and let us make the decision and go to dinner.

Senator BRIDGES. I want to make one question.

Mr. Fisher, your whole argument is on the first two or three sentences there. Supposing we should agree to eliminate those two or three sentences and release the rest, would that remove your objection?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Senator BRIDGES. That is your argument.

Mr. FISHER. That would put the rest in entirely different context without those first sentences. If they were not made public, the remainder would appear as a statement of United States policy, not as a statement of background and general attitudes to be taken.

One of the things I would like to urge is that perhaps—I feel a sense of inadequacy in expressing my view because of the fact I was not directly involved in the directive itself—is that the problem of classification and the problem of the wisdom of directives, while they are separate problems, nevertheless do, as Senator Knowland's questions indicate, have some relation to each other. Perhaps you might wish to hear the views of the Secretary himself on the substantive questions which might issue in the procedural points because they do have some value.

Senator BRIDGES. Your argument has been entirely devoted to one thing.

Now, I ask you a simple question, if we eliminate that you say you are still opposed to that.

Mr. FISHER. Because I think that the rest is misleading, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I merely want to suggest for the thinking of this committee, because it is a committee of Congress charged with honorable action, that there is in law such a thing as compounding a felony. I wonder if this committee wants to be put in the position of compounding a felony, even though it may not be a legal felony? Compounding an immoral act of distortion and misrepresentation is an immoral or unmoral act. I merely suggest that to the committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. If there are no further questions now, we will excuse Mr. Fisher.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

MOTION TO MAKE DOCUMENT AVAILABLE

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to move—I wish to move—that the document dated December 23, 1949, Special Guidance Bulletin No. 28, I believe it is, Department of State, public affairs policy advisory staff, be made available in the public record of this committee.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I second the motion. It remains for the future to tell whether or not we will have the authority to enforce our motion but I think we ought to try and therefore, I second the motion.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement entirely off the record? May I just ask that these gentlemen here not do any pecking?

Chairman RUSSELL. If there is no objection, Senator George, you may make a statement off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

SEEKING ACHESON'S OPINION

Senator LONG. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that without the type explanation that has been given to us here, it is difficult for me to see how our enemies could use that in that fashion, particularly if you take off the number of the information bulletin which is not material anyway, and to simply state that a bulletin was sent to our people to prepare them for what their thinking should be in the event of the fall of Formosa.

It is difficult for me to see how the Russians are going to officially establish that that is a line put out by the Voice of America.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am going to make a brief statement. I may be overly security conscious. Mr. Fisher has not convinced me on this matter, but I would like to get the views of the Secretary of State so far as I am concerned as an individual member of the committee.

It seems to me that we should ask these questions and use this matter, if it were held up by Admiral Davis, that we can vote on this matter tomorrow or some other time, we just have to ask Secretary Acheson to come here and then determine whether or not we should release it.

Senator Morse thought it would be ineffective. Of course, if this committee votes to release any document, Senator, it goes out hence-forth right there. There is no power on earth that can stop it. We have the document and we release it.

Senator MORSE. I see that.

Chairman RUSSELL. For that matter I don't like to vote on Senator Knowland's motion now. I don't think the matter deserves any classification, but I do have enough doubts in my mind where I would like to hear from the Secretary of State on it. That is my own opinion.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for a vote on my motion. Of course we will have to abide by whatever the vote of the committee is. I shall raise the question again and again and again, because I think it is a very vital question.

It is one that Senator George says can't be kept from being brought into this hearing, and I think it clearly shows the viewpoint of the Department of State as of that date.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I am not discussing that question. I am not even saying it should not be released, but, or course, if this matter is deleted by Admiral Davis and then this committee votes to release it, it will then be released at a later date.

The questions you might ask Admiral Sherman this afternoon if they delete it and then we vote on it after hearing Acheson, to release all of it, then the evidence of Admiral Sherman will go out along with the release of it. It will all get out.

I was just stating my view that in the light of Senator McMahon's insistence that I would vote to release it, I would do so at the proper time.

DELAYING DECLASSIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I feel very much as the Chairman has expressed himself, and I can see no great damage that would be done by delaying this vote to declassify until Senator McMahon can be heard and until the Secretary of State can be heard, and therefore I offer a substitute that we take action in declassifying this document at the end of the first session after the Secretary of State appears.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask for a roll call on that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is after we discuss it.

Senator JOHNSON. Yes; and Senator McMahon will have a chance to be here and Senator Knowland can go on and ask his questions. They will be in the record, and then we can vote on declassifying it tomorrow at noon as soon as the Secretary is heard and Senator McMahon is heard, and the most you can do is postpone releasing it to the public for a matter of overnight, and I think that would be a proper courtesy that Senator McMahon is entitled to, and I would like to hear what the Secretary of State has to say about it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, are you ready to vote now? The first question is on the substitute.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to postpone action until tomorrow, until the next meeting.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is the effect of Senator Johnson's motion. Senator Johnson offered that as a substitute for Senator Knowland's motion.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that Senator Johnson is simply saying that the release will be held until tomorrow?

It doesn't say that Senator Knowland should not bring this up this afternoon in his cross-examination?

Chairman RUSSELL. Oh no. Of course he can bring it up. It just means that if the Johnson motion carries, that it will not be released until the committee votes on it after hearing Acheson and Senator McMahon being present.

Senator SPARKMAN. Unless Admiral Davis should clear it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are you ready to vote, gentlemen? Those who favor the motion?

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. George.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, this is on Senator Johnson's motion?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is on the substitute by the Senator from Texas that we vote on the declassification of this paper after tomorrow morning's session, after the first session at which the Secretary of State appears.

Senator KNOWLAND. Which may not be tomorrow if Admiral Sherman is still on the stand.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is right.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. George.

Senator GEORGE. I vote no.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Green.

Senator GREEN. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. McMahon.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Fulbright.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Gillette.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Wiley.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Smith.

Senator SMITH. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Lodge.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Tobey.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Brewster.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Chairman Connally.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Byrd.

(No response.)

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Kefauver.

Senator KEFAUVER. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Hunt.

Senator HUNT. Aye.

Mr. DARDEN. Mr. Stennis.

(No response.)

Mr. Darden. Mr. Long.

Senator Long. Aye.

Mr. Darden. Mr. Bridges.

Senator Bridges. No.

Mr. Darden. Mr. Saltonstall.

(No response.)

Mr. Darden. Mr. Morse.

Senator Morse. No.

Mr. Darden. Mr. Knowland.

Senator Knowland. No.

Mr. Darden. Mr. Cain.

Senator Cain. No.

Mr. Darden. Mr. Flanders.

(No response.)

Mr. Darden. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Aye.

The Clerk. Senators recorded voting in the affirmative are Messrs. Green, Sparkman, Johnson, Kefauver, Hunt, Long, and Mr. Chairman. Senators recorded voting in the negative are Messrs. George, Smith, Hickenlooper, Bridges, Morse, Knowland, and Cain.

Chairman Russell. On the motion of the Senator from Texas the "ayes" are seven, and the "nays" are seven, and the motion is therefore lost on the tie vote.

AUTHORITY OF COMMITTEE TO DECLASSIFY

The question recurs to the question of the Senator from California, Mr. Knowland, that this matter be released immediately to the public—to be declassified and released immediately.

Will you call the roll?

Senator Hunt. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman: Does this committee have the authority to do that?

Chairman Russell. Well, yes, sir, if we are willing to assume that we have it.

Senator Hunt. If what?

Chairman Russell. If we are willing to assume the full responsibility for our act, we have that authority.

Senator Kefauver. It looks like we are assuming an awful lot for 1 day's delay.

Senator Hunt. What is the legal authority that gives us the right to declassify some executive department release or order?

Chairman Russell. Well, that is a legal question, Senator; I do not know whether we, strictly speaking, have it or not, but if we are assuming it, I do not know of any power on earth that can prevent our doing it. In other words, if this committee votes to release this matter, it may be that we have no legal authority, but as a matter of fact, the document will be released to the public immediately.

Senator Hunt. But in the division of powers of the three components of the Federal Government, it seems to me as we often resent the executive department's assuming legislative authority, likewise we should respect executive authority for that reason.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I may suggest that Admiral Davis sits out here outside of this room for that very purpose, and we have decided that we will overrule Admiral Davis on any declassified information that he will delete. I mean we have passed on it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have stated that it is my ruling that if this committee wishes to assume the responsibility under these circumstances, they have the power to do so.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I might say, in fairness to Admiral Davis, and he will be able to cut this out if I am not stating the situation accurately, that he says that on the matter of security insofar as the question affects the Defense Establishment, he has been delegated by the Defense Establishment to make such deletions as in his judgment are essential to the national defense and security, and so forth.

That insofar as matters relate to the State Department documents, which they have declined to declassify, he does not feel that he himself has the authority to so release them under the authority he has from the Defense Establishment; so that Admiral Davis, I think, would not take the position that he himself could declassify the State Department documents.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I think that is correct, Senator, but, of course, in the last analysis when we went into these hearings, I tried to impress on everyone the importance of security, but I have undertaken to leave clearly within the hands of this committee as to what should be released, and if this committee feels that they desire to release matters that Admiral Davis has deleted from the record, I think we have the authority to do so.

Now, as to the policy involved, the wisdom of it, that is a matter that addresses itself to each individual of the committee.

Of course, it is going to have the effect, I think I might throw in in passing, of preventing our getting any more documents; but you may be able to proceed with these hearings with what we have got. I do not think that other committees of Congress will be able to get many documents.

Senator GREEN. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of policy or ethics, or whatever you wish to call it, do you think we should ask the Department to give us documents that are classified, and declassify them without the consent of the State Department?

Chairman RUSSELL. That is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion and the opinion and the judgment of each member of the committee, as I see it, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. That is not the question we are deciding, because the motion I made was merely to allow a member of the subcommittee to be present on a matter that he had investigated and to vote on the matter tomorrow at 12 o'clock.

Senator GREEN. I voted with you. This is another motion.

Senator JOHNSON. And nothing seems to be gained by rushing it out tonight in the absence of one of the members of the subcommittee, and in the absence of the appearance of the Secretary of State.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I say he not only is a member of this subcommittee, but he is Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on Information, including the Voice of America, and things of that kind, and I think by all means Senator McMahon ought to be heard.

Chairman RUSSELL. Gentlemen, if you are through, the clerk will call the roll.

Senator GEORGE. I ask again, does the Senator request to be heard? If he does, why, that is one issue.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, he did not know the matter was coming up today, did he?

Chairman RUSSELL. No, sir. I do not think that he did think it was coming up. He did tell me—he discussed it with me, and said that he was very firmly of the opinion that it should not be released until the Secretary of State had been heard, and that he wished he could be here today but he could not; that he had this engagement he had had for months, and had to leave town.

POSTPONING DECLASSIFICATION UNTIL ACHESON HEARING

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, might I make a statement at this point: Under the circumstances—Senator McMahon did not request, at least to me, that this matter be delayed, but in view of the statements that have been made on the situation, and because I feel that this is a matter in which as large a membership of the committee as possible should be present, as far as I am concerned, if the committee will agree to take it up at the—when the Secretary of State appears, as the first order of business, so that we can get it out of the way when the Secretary is before us, and not at the end of some questioning, I will be willing to consent, as far as I have any control over the situation, to postpone the matter until the Secretary appears, providing it is the first order of business.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that is a very reasonable position on the part of the Senator from California, and I hope no one will except to it.

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to say I would have been willing to make it before or after, and if he had raised that position——

Chairman RUSSELL. As I understand the Senator's position, he is willing to leave it deferred until the Secretary of State appears as a witness—the release—not the examination, but the release—to be deferred until the Secretary of State appears as a witness; whereupon, we will address ourselves first to the declassification of this document before proceeding to the general examination of the Secretary of State.

Senator MORSE. I want to say this is a very fair suggestion of the Senator from California, and, as he will say, it represents the point of view of some of us who voted with him on the last motion.

I think it is a fine way to settle this matter for the present time, although I want to say that I agree with the Senator from California that eventually this document should be released.

Senator HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I too want to compliment the Senator for the position he has just now taken, because I have some fear that we, as a Senate committee, were stepping entirely out of bounds of our prerogatives and our rights, which I, as one, did not want to do. I appreciate the position.

Chairman RUSSELL. Without objection, then, the unanimous-consent proposal of the Senator from California is agreed to as a modification of the Johnson substitute, and the matter will be determined upon the appearance of the Secretary of State as the first order of business.

The committee stands in recess until 2:30 p. m.

(Whereupon, at 1:50 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Russell, Connally, Green, Sparkman, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Johnson (Texas), Kefauver, Stennis, Hunt, Long, Bridges, Morse, Knowland, and Cain.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right gentlemen.

Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral Sherman, I had, prior to this time, intended to discuss, or to raise some questions relative to a State Department document which was issued on the 23d of December 1949, but the committee has finally determined that the matter would be taken up as to whether it can be made a part of the public record or not, when the Secretary of State appears, either tomorrow or the following day.

So, I have decided not to question you on that document, which has not yet been made available.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, if you will pardon me, on the committee's time, of course you understand that you can proceed now with those questions, and that at the conclusion of the determination on the motion, it would be——

Senator KNOWLAND. I had determined that I would prefer not to proceed, under the circumstances.

Chairman RUSSELL. I didn't want to infringe on your prerogatives in any way.

Senator KNOWLAND. First of all, Admiral, I would like to make a brief statement, before raising some questions.

INCREASE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL STRENGTH IN FAR EAST

In November of 1949 I was very much concerned by the fact that at that time, as I understood it, we had, I think, one cruiser and either two or four destroyers between the Philippines and Japan.

I certainly want to commend you as Chief of Naval Operations and the Navy Department for, even before the outbreak of Korean hostilities, having taken steps to augment our position as a naval power in the Far East.

I think it has done a great deal to help stabilize the situation that today might be far worse than it is with merely Korea had that not been done, or we could show the flag in that area of the world.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF UNITED STATES POWER

Now, as I understood his testimony yesterday—I do not know whether you have had a chance to examine the record—General Vandenberg had indicated that the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression in his judgment was our possession of a superiority in the atomic weapon plus the air power to deliver it.

While I have been a supporter of adequate air power, as I have of naval and land power, I am not sure that I agree that that is the only deterrent to Soviet aggression. I would like you, if you would, to give briefly your views as to the deterrent effect of the United States Navy as far as possible potential aggressors are concerned.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, Senator, the Soviet problem in the event of hostilities as I see it is a very complex one and a very large one. It involves operations of one sort or another all around the periphery of Russia. There is a great problem of communications.

The Russian economy is hampered by lack of adequate internal communications. The Russian railway system is somewhat inadequate, and strained to capacity, and is greatly dependent on inland waterways, and to a certain extent dependent on shipping, and to that extent they are vulnerable.

The Soviet military force is predominantly an army, with naval forces which traditionally have been tied to the army, but are being built up for other operations.

I regard the Russians as being vulnerable to air attack in which both the United States Air Force and the United States Navy as now constituted each could play an important part.

They are vulnerable to military operations in selected theaters, and they are, of course, vulnerable to the air attack, atomic attack, deep into the heart of Russia.

If we conceive of a war with Russia as one in which the inevitable purpose is to overrun all of Russia—the unconditional surrender type of thinking—the problem is much more difficult.

If we conceive of a war with Russia as being one in which the objective is more limited, doesn't involve the complete overrunning and the enormous destruction in the interior, the problem is more simple.

I happen to believe that the deterrent to war with us is the realization that with our technical and industrial potential, the forces that we have, our ability to expand them, that there is a realization on the other side that if a general war comes, they will be defeated.

I find difficulty in isolating the roles that would be played by any one element of our Armed Forces in accomplishing that end.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am glad, Admiral, you have made the statement you have and the earlier statement today that while, of course, we all hope and pray that world war III will not be visited upon the world, if some potential aggressor determines that there will be war, that we are intending to win it if we become involved in it.

It was not very long ago that a President of the United States mentioned that we had nothing to fear but fear itself. I have been a little concerned about the statements that appear sometimes on the part of newspaper columnists, sometimes on the part of public officials, that, with the Soviets' rapidly developing situation in atomic power, stating that perhaps there isn't much for us to do but—you almost gain the impression—to surrender in advance.

I don't conceive that we are in any such desperate situation now, nor do I conceive there is any need for us, if we use the same courage and common sense that motivated the men who founded this Nation, ever to get into such a position.

RELATIVE NEED FOR ALLIES AND BASES

Now, we have heard testimony from time to time as to the importance of our allies in furnishing bases, and I think we all agree as to the importance of bases.

I do not believe that our allies are going to desert us. I would hate, as a member of the Senate of the United States, to believe that that suggestion that is made from time to time is true; but I think Senator

Morse very ably brought out this morning that this alliance business is a two-way street and while we have much to gain from our allies, I still cannot help but believe that our allies have much to gain from us.

So, I am not willing to assume that they would voluntarily desert us. It is possible, I suppose, in the fortunes of war if the world should become involved in a war that part of some of the countries might be overrun and certain areas that we are counting on as bases would not be available to us.

I would like to ask your military judgment on this matter. In the event that we should lose some of our bases in various areas of the world, would we be then foreclosed from strikes upon the Soviet Union if it were the aggressor or would we, with naval aviation, with the larger carriers that we have available to us, having the capabilities of handling various weapons, be foreclosed from making strikes upon certain of their vital areas or do you believe that we would still have access, at least to some punishment of the Soviet Union or any other aggressor?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, of course, the situation that you depict is one which could be interpreted differently in different areas. There are many different explanations.

I believe that because of the diversification of our base program and the availability of floating bases, that even though we would feel the loss of any particular base complex, that there are enough others so that we would not be foreclosed in carrying on the war.

Senator KNOWLAND. If I might interrupt you just at that point—you would not consider, as a military man, that it would be sound strategically to have all our eggs in one basket if we can avoid it?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, indeed, for many reasons. Because, being realistic, I think we have to face the fact that while all of our allies might be steadfastly with us, when we get into trouble some of them may move more slowly. That is the history of such matters.

I am greatly encouraged at the way our allies have behaved, particularly the small ones. Greece and Turkey in proportion to their manpower have done a great deal, after having, in the case of Greece, a conflict in which they received a good deal of internal damage. And there are numerous indications that our program of solidifying the western world is making headway. The elections in Italy the other day are a sample of the improvement that is going on.

PROGRESS OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Senator KNOWLAND. In his testimony before the committee on May 28, on page 3630—I am frank to say I was a little shocked at General Vandenberg's testimony to the following effect:

> But the fact is that the United States is operating a shoestring Air Force in view of its global responsibilities.

I would like to ask if my interpretation of your testimony this morning, that you do not believe that we are presently operating a shoestring Navy, is correct.

Admiral SHERMAN. We are definitely not, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do I understand your testimony correctly, that while, of course, there is always either a desirability or a necessity for some increases, that in the event we should be forced into a war against our will, that the United States Navy is prepared to carry out its mission at the present time?

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe that we are as well prepared as is reasonably consistent with where we were a year and a half ago. The force levels to which we are building up now in the Army, Navy, and the Air Force were agreed upon prior to the beginning of fighting in Korea. We have made rapid headway in reaching them.

The Army has reached its level first. We are coming along a little more slowly for administrative reasons. Then, of course, the Air Force has the most difficult problem of all of us because of their problems of aircraft production and new facilities and things of that sort, which are reflected in the Naval Establishment only in the case of naval aviation.

I think our interim levels are sound, and it may well be that after they are reached the world situation will call for additional increases; perhaps not.

Fortunately, that is not a decision we have to make today. We may have to make it within 6 months, but as of today, our rate of expansion is about as rapid as we can advantageously handle; a little bit later, we will come to a period where we do have more of a range for decision.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would just like to ask one final question——

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I am afraid, through inadvertence, I have let you run over your time.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

NAVAL STRENGTH NEEDED FOR NOW AND NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many ships, squadrons or fleets, do we have in Asia right now, in the vicinity of Korea, Japan, and Formosa, Admiral?

The Seventh Fleet is there, isn't it?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. That is the only numbered fleet that we have out there.

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we have a force in being out there; is our naval force in being out there at the present time comparable to the strength which will be necessary for such a blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, the force that we have out there now——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I am trying to get at is—Could the force we have out there now handle the blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Not without detriment to what it is doing. It would be much better to send out additional ships from the United States, even though that got us involved in more call-up of reserves, slower rotation, and that sort of thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No question but what we have ample ships in reserve, is there?

Admiral SHERMAN. We have ample ships in reserve, and activating that many would give us administrative trouble; but that could be solved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They come under the heading of "routine troubles"?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir.

They may be big troubles, but still they are troubles you have to face in any kind of an operation of that sort.

REASONS FOR CONCURRING IN DISMISSAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am interested in this matter of the relief of General MacArthur and the incidents occurring around the 5th of April. I do not know whether you answered the question or whether it was asked you—I do not recall—as to whether or not prior to the 5th of April you had ever recommended that General MacArthur be relieved, that is from your position as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I had never made any such recommendation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will ask you this question which I asked General Bradley. Including the 5th of April thereafter until the relief of General MacArthur did he commit or do any acts which in your judgment warranted his relief?

In other words, from the time of the 5th of April on until he was relieved, was he guilty of any actions or activities which you believe warranted his relief?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. My opinions were based not on any particular act, but more on a situation which was the accumulation of a number of things over a period of time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am making or attempting to make or find out about, Admiral, is that whatever reasons which led to your conclusions or concurrence in relief, whatever the reasons, they already existed at the time you made your conclusions prior to April 5.

Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it, sir, there is only one minor incident that occurred subsequent to the 5th, and that was relatively minor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, what was that, Admiral?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I remember it after the 5th there was the incident of his statement concerning arming the South Koreans, vis-à-vis arming the Japanese police force.

As I say that was only minor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that in the report here, so we can get the date?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is in the compilation.

Admiral SHERMAN. It came to my attention actually after the meeting on the 5th.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that page 186, message from General MacArthur to Henry Hazlitt of the Freeman magazine?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. But I say that is relatively minor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The thought I have in mind is this, and I have asked other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It seems clear from their statements here that their conclusions and their concurrence with the idea of the relief of General MacArthur existed on what they say were cumulative reasons prior to April 5. Yet when those reasons existed, insofar as I know, no member of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested his recall. Yet the reasons upon which their later concurrence was based all existed prior to the 5th of April.

Now I am wondering whether this entered into your thinking as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your concurrence: That it was entirely within the province of the President as Commander in Chief to recall, replace or reassign the officers in the whole military establishment if he wanted to, and that from a military standpoint that was perfectly all right.

You could raise no particular objection from a military standpoint to his exercising his constitutional rights, could you?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, to use a hypothetical case to illustrate a point, if it had been—if the case had come up where a commander in chief who was a naval officer was being relieved, and I felt that he should not be relieved, I recognize the right of the President to do it, but I would certainly feel that it was my duty as his statutory naval adviser on the conduct of war to give him my recommendation, whether I agreed with him or not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; but wouldn't you feel it also your duty as Chief of Naval Operations, to affirmatively recommend—or take steps to relieve that commander or do whatever you should when the conditions upon which that relief should be based became in being? I hope I am making clear what I am getting at. The reasons upon which these so-called concurrences were based all existed prior to the 5th of April, and yet no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were designated as the agency that dealt with the general, no member individually, nor the Joint Chiefs collectively, ever formally recommended his recall prior to the time that it was indicated that the President was thinking about that. It runs in my thinking that probably it is an obligation of the responsible senior officer, if conditions exist warranting the recall or reassignment or some disposition of an officer, to go forward with the recommendation if he believes that it has come to the point, and recommend that some action be taken, instead of coming in afterward and concurring.

I am just a little mystified as to why the Joint Chiefs now all join and did join on the 7th or 8th of April in the concurrence. I am wondering why they did not go forward in March before that and say, "Here, let us say, in effect, that this commander is not doing things we think he should do, and we think he ought to be reassigned, recalled, or something done with him."

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I see your point, sir. To my mind, the situation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their commander in chief in the Far East, particularly the great many exchanges of messages, great many public statements—the whole general atmosphere was not the ideal one as between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of the officers who exercises unified command under them.

At no time had that situation gotten so acute that I, as Chief of Naval Operations, would have felt any responsibility to initiate anything of that sort.

However, I was increasingly aware of the magnitude of the problem, and when I was asked for my opinion, as I said this morning, with considerable reluctance and regret, I had to give my military opinion when it was asked for.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral, isn't it a normal objective of military action to terminate it as quickly as reasonably possible under all the circumstances and save loss and destruction of life and property?

Isn't that the normal objective and program?

Admiral SHERMAN. Normally that is advisable.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And aren't the Joint Chiefs of Staff now requesting a study and guidance on what our policy is in Korea? Hasn't that request been put through by the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Isn't that in the process now?

I say that because I believe General Bradley testified that he had, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested a study to outline and determine our policy and objectives in Korea.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, those studies have been going on continuously and there is in process now a redraft, a summarization of all existing directives to General Ridgway in his capacity as commander in chief for the United Nations in Korea and also his normal United States capacity as commander in chief, Far East Command.

In connection with that we, of course, are continuing to work with and consult with the State Department in connection with the matter of the political objectives, which always control military action; but I feel that we have been, as far as I know, as continuously informed of the political objectives as was feasible in the circumstances.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you consider that we are operating today in Korea under clear-cut, understandable, delineated objectives for this situation, or are we acting in a sort of partial vacuum?

I have asked questions of all these people about what do we consider the termination of this. What is our goal outside of broadest generalities? We all want peace. There is no question about that, and we all advocate peace. We all want victory and we all advocate victory. But what are the details that will come when we can put them down one by one and say, "These have been accomplished. This is the victory that we want"?

Do we have such a clear-cut policy? I have been unable to get such a policy from anyone, at least to my own understanding.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I can only recount to you the objectives and the policies as I understand them.

As I see it, it is our objective, as I said this morning, to defeat the Chinese Communists in Korea, as we have previously defeated the North Korean Army; having done that, then to achieve a settlement which will leave Korea as a political entity, in which certainly the South Koreans and as much of North Korea as possible have a chance to work out their salvation themselves with such assistance as they can get.

In other words, I go back in my thinking to the operation in Greece, with which I was quite familiar.

There we had an invasion, more or less covertly, but often physically quite openly, across the border. Eventually the invaders were destroyed and driven out and the country is now improving its position rapidly.

In Korea the situation is much worse but to me the principle is the same.

Chairman **Russell**. Your time is up.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. I just say that I want to pursue those two things in your thinking in questions as to what you mean by the defeat of the Chinese; secondly, what you mean by a proper settlement in Korea politically.

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell**. Senator Cain?

Senator **Cain**. Admiral Sherman, it is very good to be in your company again, sir, and to have this opportunity to ask you some questions which are of great concern to me.

For the moment, however, I wish to establish in very brief form a foundation to which I shall return at a later date, because of the determination on the part of this committee member to see that the reputation and prestige of a very great American, General MacArthur, is not tarnished or held in doubt in any respect without complete justification.

CORRECTION OF TESTIMONY UNDER OATH

Admiral Sherman, as a witness you have taken an oath to speak the truth as you understand it. Is that not so, sir?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Cain**. If, after you have concluded your testimony, I have reason to believe that you have on occasion unintentionally but under oath related one or more items which appear not to be the truth, would you not welcome an invitation to clear up or explain away the apparent misstatement before this committee?

Admiral **Sherman**. I certainly would.

Senator **Cain**. As you would welcome that invitation, sir, I would insist that you be provided with such an invitation.

ATTENDANCE AT JCS MEETING OF APRIL 5, 1951

On a recent day when General Bradley testified under oath that he called the JCS together for about 30 minutes on the afternoon of April 5 to discuss the question involved in General MacArthur, when the fact appears to be that the Army Chief of Staff, a member of the JCS, was out of the city on April 5, General Bradley refreshes his memory about the meeting from notes.

General Bradley is quoted on page 1935 as follows: "If you don't mind, I will refer to notes."

Admiral Sherman, as I wish to provide you with every courtesy and protection as a witness, I have the same object in mind for General Bradley and every other witness, including General MacArthur. Particularly I seek to judge the facts surrounding the relief of General MacArthur on the basis of facts and not on the basis of faulty or confused memory, as we appear to be confronted with in given and understandable instances.

My first question runs to the colloquy that passed between you and Senator Bridges this morning, in which you described, in part anyway, the first meeting you attended on the afternoon of Thursday April 5, with reference to the possible removal of General MacArthur.

I wish that you might permit me to burden you by asking you to relate again, in as much detail as you can remember, that meeting.

What I want first to know, Admiral Sherman, is the form of the question which General Bradley, the Chairman of the JCS, who called you into conference as members of the JCS—what did you sit down to consider, sir?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I remember that meeting, we were called to the meeting at 5 o'clock, which we did.

The other members were present; they were the only ones except that General Haislip was there in place of General Collins.

Senator CAIN. May I interrupt occasionally, in an effort to get the record as straight as we can, together?

Admiral SHERMAN. Surely.

Senator CAIN. Was it said in your presence that General Haislip, one of General Collins' deputies, was there to represent General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, and that General Haislip would assume the responsibility for briefing General Collins on what transpired?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; it was not.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. On the other hand, I feel it necessary to state that whenever one of the members is not there, it is the customary procedure for the next senior officer, usually the Vice Chief, to attend in his stead; and it is assumed that such necessary internal communications as are necessary will take place.

Senator CAIN. General Bradley, when he testified that he called the JCS together, might well have assumed that we would have taken for granted that if the Army Chief of Staff was out of town, that his deputy would properly sit in his place.

The record does not indicate that.

General Bradley will clear that up in his own time.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; that is the custom.

DETAILS OF JCS MEETING OF APRIL 5

Then when we arrived, General Bradley told us that consideration was being given to the relief of General MacArthur, and that we should be thinking about it, that we might be asked for views or recommendations.

Senator CAIN. Did he say, sir, by whom this question was then being considered?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I remember it, he intimated that the consideration was being given in the White House, and that again is an impression. In justice to whom and by whom, at that time I had been given no knowledge.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. Then there ensued a general discussion of the problem, the problem as we saw it from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and there were various comments, suggestions as to how the general problem might be handled.

I remember suggesting that one possible procedure would be for a five-star general to go out there and talk to him. I remember that distinctly because General Bradley apparently thought I was talking about him, and I said no, I thought it would be better to get one senior to General MacArthur.

Senator CAIN. May I stop you there, sir, for a minute. You actually suggested at that first meeting that there was in your mind a possible way of reconciling the differences that prevailed between General MacArthur and the supreme commander in the Far East and those in higher authority in Washington, and that if a five-star general was sent out to discuss the problem frankly and honestly with all the cards laid on the table, that there was in your opinion an opportunity to satisfy or liquidate these differences and maintain Gen. Douglas MacArthur in his supreme command in the Far East; is that not so, sir?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is true. That was one of the alternatives. The alternatives were either to be able to resolve the matter that way or at least to have determined that it was not possible to resolve it that way.

Senator CAIN. Permit me to press just 1 minute, because to my way of thinking this is exceedingly germane and important to our whole consideration.

What was the reaction of the other members of the JCS, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Deputy Army Chief of Staff, who was acting that afternoon for General Collins?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do not recall the reactions of all of them, except that I remember that a comment was made that possibly a letter would handle the problem, and there was some general discussion; but I do not remember the rest of it well enough to attempt to recount it.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Sherman, when General Bradley responded to your suggestion by indicating that he thought you had him in mind, and you responded by saying, "No, I think it ought to be a five-star general, who outranks General MacArthur," that could only have been the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. What response was given to that statement of yours in that meeting by anybody, sir?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, there was no opposition to it, and no general concurrence. We were, frankly, in a position of having been given a problem to think about, and of more or less speculating on it without reaching any conclusions, and no conclusion was reached. But the two possible procedures that were left in my mind were those two.

Now, my suggesting sending an officer, a senior officer was because I happened to have seen that method employed once in the Navy, and it was so successful that I doubt if anyone knows who I am talking about; I hope they don't.

Senator CAIN. No, sir.

Admiral Sherman, you, as a member of the JCS, are official military advisers to the President of the United States.

It seems to me that your recommendation to your fellow officers in the JCS that this matter could be resolved harmoniously without needing to remove the supreme commander in the Far East, was made against your desire to give your best advice in that official capacity, as one of the chief military advisers in this country; is this not so, sir?

Admiral SHERMAN. That was my spontaneous reaction to the problem as it was presented to us at that meeting. That is really about all that I can recount of that meeting.

DETAILS OF APRIL 8 JCS MEETING

Senator CAIN. All right, sir. In terms of logic, may we go from Thursday afternoon at about 5:30, on April 5, to Sunday afternoon, at 2 o'clock in the office of the Secretary of Defense, where after those who had gathered on Thursday had had a chance to think, they were going to get together with General Bradley and decide what they were going to do with reference to their 4 o'clock meeting on the same afternoon with the Secretary of Defense.

What happened if anything to your recommendation of Thursday in that first meeting on Sunday?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, first, between Friday and Sunday, I had given a great deal of consecutive thought to the whole problem, which to me is a tremendously important thing——

Senator CAIN. And a very large problem, sir, as we can all understand.

Admiral SHERMAN. And the long range, very important effect on the security of our country, which was involved in the future course of events in the Far East.

After reflecting on everything involved, I came to the opinion that I gave when asked for it on Sunday and at that Sunday meeting the question of procedure was not discussed; and as I testified this morning, I added at the end of my opinion that the political aspects were above my level.

Senator CAIN. Admiral Sherman, I think——

Admiral SHERMAN. May I pursue this one step further?

Senator CAIN. Please, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. The next information that I had—there was no further discussion of it between me and anyone—the next information that I had was when I heard on the radio the morning after the general had been relieved that the action had been taken.

Senator CAIN. That would have been Wednesday morning, April 11.

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe so.

Senator CAIN. I believe that is so. But, Admiral Sherman, I think you have told me this: that with reference to the two meetings on Sunday, one with the Chairman of the JCS and the other with the Secretary of Defense, no consideration of any kind was given to the method of relieving General MacArthur. All of the consideration was to the reasons that would support relieving him if higher authority wished to relieve him.

Admiral SHERMAN. No. There was one other matter in connection with this particular problem that was discussed on Sunday and that was the personality of his relief—who could take his place. At least, to me, that was no problem. There was only one logical man.

Senator CAIN. One last question. I think I have the time in this period.

It seems to be a fact that in the three meetings involved, you, the Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the JCS, happen to be the only individual that suggested that the matter could be resolved in Tokyo and Korea short of relieving Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and I did not press that after the first occasion.

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator McMahon.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman.

FACTORS CONSIDERED BY WITNESS IN DECISION TO CONCUR

Senator SPARKMAN. Admiral Sherman, following up the question that Senator Cain just asked you, do I understand correctly that this proposal of yours was made at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; that was my offhand reaction to the situation when I was first told of it on Friday.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is when you were exploring the situation, exploring all possibilities.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Admiral, I am not going to ask you many questions, because I think you have gone over the ground very thoroughly and given us a very fine presentation.

You made this decision of approval or concurrence and approval of the removal of General MacArthur of your own accord, completely independent of anyone else?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I did not consult or confer with anyone, because I felt that I had been associated with General MacArthur longer than anyone that I had access to; I had been with him a good deal during the war. It was my duty as Admiral Nimitz' representative, to go to his headquarters, arrange to coordinate the operations of the two commanders.

I had spent a good deal of time with him in his various headquarters in Brisbane, New Guinea, the southern Philippines, Manila, and I felt this was something I had to wrestle with by myself.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, all of the normal tendencies would have been in the other direction except for your official duty as you saw it.

Did you feel, and do you feel now as one of the top military advisers of this country, that the replacement of General MacArthur was in the interest of our national security?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do. That is the reason that I gave my military opinion that it should be done.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you still believe that?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir

Senator SPARKMAN. Admiral Sherman, under the law the three Chiefs of Staff with the Chairman constitute the top military advisers of this country; isn't that true?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. By law we are the military advisers to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it is your responsibility in that capacity to devise methods of providing adequate defense for ourselves and to work out plans of strategy in the event we get into trouble?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. General MacArthur during the time he was serving as our commander in the Far East was under the supervision or jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral SHERMAN. He was under the strategic direction, in the language of the law, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged by law with the establishment of unified commands and their strategic direction.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it was in recognition of that function that this action was taken on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, and in our capacity as military advisers. As I have testified before, each of us was asked his military opinion, and they were given separately in order of seniority.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Admiral Sherman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis, we welcome you back, and hope you had a pleasant trip.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I regret very much being absent from attending the sessions here, and I will want to read the record.

I am sorry that I did not get to hear Admiral Sherman this morning. I am going to read his testimony, and I am going to waive all except a question or two now, because I do not want to repeat.

Admiral, you said awhile ago that you feel that we have more than a shoestring Navy.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

OUR NAVAL PREPAREDNESS

Senator STENNIS. Have you gone into such factors as you might see fit to go into about the readiness of our Navy? Is there anything you have not brought out on that?

I think now would be a good time for that.

You feel like we are pretty well steamed up; do you?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think we have improved our naval readiness greatly in the last year and when we finish the program we are now engaged on we will be in even better shape; and, while there are many of my advisers who tell me that we ought to go further and faster, there are others who are equally ready to point out some of the administrative reasons why we should proceed about as we are going, and maintain quality and readiness, while expanding.

Senator STENNIS. I understand that this morning you said that you recommended a naval blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; a United Nations——

Senator STENNIS. A United Nations blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. I had not caught that point.

That was—you recommended a United Nations blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, whenever our allies in the United Nations are prepared to join in.

RUSSIAN DIRECTION OF NORTH KOREAN AND CHINESE AGGRESSION

Senator STENNIS. Well, I want to ask your opinion on this, as a military man and a citizen too: You have no doubt that the Russians at least partly inspired that war in Korea; is that your idea about it?

Admiral SHERMAN. All of the intelligence that I have is to the effect that the Russians prepared for and instigated the North Korean aggression.

However, my intelligence in connection with the Chinese Communist aggression is less convincing.

I have a feeling the North Koreans did exactly what they were told, when they were told, and as they were told to.

The other affairs was a little more out of control, and still may be, and therefore the independence of it from direct Russian control may eventually be an asset.

That may be wishful thinking, but that is it.

Senator STENNIS. So, if I understand you correctly, you think now that the Chinese Reds' activities, the Red Chinese activities, are not under the direct control of Russia?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, they think it is under their influence.

Senator STENNIS. Influence; but not close control.

Admiral SHERMAN. But I don't believe that the Chinese Communists, as a whole, and particularly those apart from their leader, are as prepared to always do exactly what the Russians want, as would be the North Koreans; and, as I say, that may be wishful thinking, but there seems to be a little difference there in the two relationships.

Senator STENNIS. You are inclined to then separate them in your thinking as to their coordination and hand-in-glove methods?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have at the present time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

VISITS TO KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. The Chairman? I have one or two questions. Have you been to the Far East since the commencement of hostilities in Korea?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you there?

Admiral SHERMAN. I was there in August, last year.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was before the real sunlight—so far as the North Koreans were concerned, well before the darkness of the Chinese Red intervention?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I was out there at the time that we were making the arrangements for the Inchon landing.

DISCREPANCIES IN RECORD

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, we have been examining here with great detail, Admiral, as to the various sessions of the Joint Chiefs to discuss the relief of General MacArthur, the question of who was present. There are discrepancies, little discrepancies, in the testimony as to that.

I had understood all of the witnesses who attended those meetings, up to the time you appeared here, to testify that the first meeting was on Thursday, the 5th, but you have said Friday throughout your testimony.

Since we are pinning the record down, I would like to know whether it was Thursday or Friday.

Admiral SHERMAN. It was the 5th of April.

Chairman RUSSELL. Sunday was the 8th; it would be Thursday instead of Friday.

Admiral SHERMAN. I am sorry; I got the wrong day of the week.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am giving you an opportunity to correct your testimony now.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right.

MEMORANDUM ON REASON FOR CONCURRING IN DISMISSAL

Now, Admiral, are you familiar with the reasons given this committee by General Bradley, the memorandum of the three or four reasons approved by the Joint Chiefs, for the relief of General MacArthur from his several commands?

Admiral SHERMAN. If I am thinking of the same document, I am sir. After the investigation it was announced that he was preparing his testimony. He showed us a draft of what he intended to say as his memory of the summation of the reasons, and he finally furnished me a copy of that, dated some date in April, and that was as accurate an account as I could remember. I have no basis for differing with it.

Chairman RUSSELL. It at least was the general agreement of the Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. As a meeting of the minds at the conference held on Sunday the 8th?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I might comment as to what actually occurred. Each man gave his opinion, gave his own reasons separately, so that in effect General Bradley's memorandum is a summation of views expressed separately, which naturally did not overlap.

As I testified this morning, I spoke last and addressed myself only to the future, because past events had been discussed by previous speakers.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that the method of the relief of General MacArthur has perhaps been more startling, we might say, to the American people than the fact that he was relieved, Admiral Sherman. That is only one individual's opinion.

WITNESS' RECOMMENDATION TO SEND MARSHALL TO CONSULT MAC ARTHUR

You say that you stated at the first meeting held on Thursday, the 5th, that your spontaneous suggestion was that some man who outranked General MacArthur—I believe there is only one alive who does—should go to Tokyo and consult with him and see if there was any way to arrive at accommodation between the differences between the Joint Chiefs and General MacArthur.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, what I had in mind was not an accommodation but a bringing of him to the established position.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, to send Secretary Marshall to Tokyo to bring him to agree completely with the policies enunciated by the Joint Chiefs and the President of the United States.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you renew that suggestion at the meeting on Sunday?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I did not.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe you state that you did not participate in any meetings after the Sunday conference?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I did not.

Chairman RUSSELL. You at no other time renewed that suggestion to the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was any suggestion made as to requesting General MacArthur's presence here in Washington to discuss these various matters?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; not that I know of—certainly not in my presence.

Chairman RUSSELL. You did not hear any such suggestion?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

CLARITY OF NATURE OF JCS STUDY OF JANUARY 12

Chairman RUSSELL. Now this document of January 12, the so-called study, Admiral, has been the subject of literally hundreds of questions. I have read the evidence of General MacArthur here. He made it perfectly clear that he did not consider that a directive in any sense of the word. His evidence is shown on pages 32, 33, and 34. He read from these four items that he used in his remarks here before the Congress, and he was asked a question, I asked him:

> Was that message, that document from which you have read, transmitted to you as a part of your instructions?
>
> General MACARTHUR. No, sir; this was a recommendation, a study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense. Copy of it was furnished me.
>
> Chairman RUSSELL. But it was furnished to you as a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, and you of course awaited the decision from that source before proceeding along?

He interrupted there to say:

> General MACARTHUR. A decision putting this into effect never arrived.

Another question:

> They were submitted to you as a recommendation of the Joint Chief dependent upon the approval of the Secretary of Defense or the Commander in Chief; is that a fair statement?

And he replied:

> A copy was furnished me of this military study which the Joint Chiefs of Staff made to the Secretary. Copy was sent to me for my information only.

So, while we are making statements here, I will state: So far as I have been able to discover from the record, there has been no issue as to whether that was ever a directive. It was merely a study, and the contingencies involved were not in doubt.

EFFECT OF UN NAVAL BLOCKADE ON EXTENSION OF CONFLICT

Now, in your testimony this morning, you stressed the fact that you would favor a rigid naval blockade if voted by the United Nations or approved by the United Nations as part of sanctions against an aggressor, but you were opposed to our undertaking a blockade on our own responsibility as an individual nation.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is right.

Chairman RUSSELL. You think that would be very unwise?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do, sir. I think it would not be the best way to interdict the trade of our allies with China.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, I believe you testified that one of the reasons for that was because Russia had respected the blockade imposed by the United Nations on North Korea.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. And, that blockade being an act of war, you apprehended it might involve us in a world struggle if we embarked on a blockade as an individual undertaking.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. In other words, the risk of all-out war, world war, would be measurably lessened if not eliminated if it was a United Nations action instead of a unilateral action?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. The history of extensive blockades is that they antagonize neutrals; they antagonize the bystander. That had something to do with our War of 1812. It certainly helped strain relations in England between 1861 and 1865, and it certainly strained relations between us and Germany when the Germans undertook to stop shipping in the vicinity of England between 1914 and 1917.

It is inevitable that when one nation uses force to blockade a second nation, that the third nation, whose movement of its ships is restricted, becomes annoyed.

Chairman RUSSELL. Not to speak of our difficulties with France in the early days of our Republic when we had an undeclared naval war with them.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

UNITED STATES NAVAL BLOCKADE RECOMMENDED ONLY IF DRIVEN FROM KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. This study, Admiral, the naval blockade feature, did that blockade contemplate a unilateral undertaking on our part or was that reference to a naval blockade there, did that refer to a United Nations blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. In the study of the 12th?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; January 12.

Admiral SHERMAN. The language of the draft of those papers is such that we were discussing what we would do by ourselves in the event that we were forced out of Korea. That was the primary assumption.

In connection with the blockade it is said "or stabilize." That had reference to the possibility that we might wind up in a very small perimeter in the southern part of Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you ever at any time advocated a naval blockade of Communist China that was not dependent upon our being forced or driven out of Korea?

Admiral SHERMAN. I have never advocated a United States naval blockade.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I am speaking of.

Admiral SHERMAN. That was not dependent on our being forced out of Korea as it looked as if we might be in early January.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have the Joint Chiefs ever recommended that?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Connally.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT NEEDED BY NATIONALISTS TO OPERATE AGAINST MAINLAND

Chairman CONNALLY. I will be as brief as I can. Admiral, there has been a recommendation here that the wraps be taken off the Formosan troops, the Nationalist Chinese troops in Formosa, and that they be given the logistical support and allowed to go where their commander dictated or directed, wherever Chiang wanted to send them.

What kind of logistical support would it be necessary for us to give them to put them in that shape?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I believe that a moderate program of assistance such as the one now under way might well put the Chinese Nationalists in the position where they could undertake minor operations.

To conduct a large-scale invasion of the mainland of China from Formosa as a base with the Chinese Communist forces in strength such as they have now would probably involve a rather large effort. It would mean if it was confined to logistic support that we would have to turn ships over to them.

If it were military support we would become involved in it, and frankly I don't know how to conduct an amphibious operation in which the troops fight and ships don't, so we would be abandoning our policy of long standing against becoming involved as active participants in fighting between the Government of the Republic of China and the Communist government on the mainland.

Chairman CONNALLY. Could the Nationalist Chinese Navy undertake to transport the Nationalist Army to China without our help?

Admiral SHERMAN. Not in its present condition, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I am talking about.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is right. No, sir; it could not.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, if we diverted much of our Seventh Fleet to the Nationalist troops, we would need to replenish it somewhere else; would we not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; well, we could not exactly do that. As you know, sir, we, since the war, have transferred a large number of ships to the Republic of China. We had one program which was, I believe, 271 ships or something of that sort, large and small, and we now have a program of somewhat over $5,000,000 to put in better shape the ships that they still have. But they are not in a position to conduct a major invasion at the present time.

On the other hand, if they were turned loose, undoubtedly there would be an advantage to the degree that they attracted forces which might now be in Korea, to get down to the provinces across from Formosa.

Chairman CONNALLY. Of course, they were on the mainland of China originally.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. And they got off in a hurry?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Is that right?

Admiral SHERMAN. They did indeed, sir.

ADEQUACY OF NAVAL POWER IN CASE OF WAR NOW

Chairman CONNALLY. If Russia should enter the war, could we, Admiral—have we got the present capacity to knock out her installations, shipbuilding facilities, and fleet?

Admiral SHERMAN. We have enough power to do that in the Far East, but in the course of that operation we might lose forces that were much more important in Europe and the Middle East. I do not believe that the Western World is ready for a general war at the present time.

Chairman CONNALLY. No; I hope not. Well then, in a full-scale war in the Pacific, of course, it would impair our security in the Atlantic and elsewhere; would it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; it would. It would divert forces. I can't visualize a full-scale war with Russia in the Pacific without being at war with Russia in Europe and the Middle East——

Senator CONNALLY. Everywhere.

Admiral SHERMAN. Around the world.

Senator CONNALLY. If we were at war with her in the Pacific, we would be at war with her wherever we could find her; wouldn't we?

[Deleted.]

DEFENSE OF ALASKA

Chairman CONNALLY. Is Alaska in your opinion adequately protected from a possible Russian invasion across the Bering Sea?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I believe it would be advisable to have more forces in Alaska, but I think that, in proportion to our resources and the world-wide demands for deployment of forces, the deployment in Alaska is a sound one.

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE AND FAR EAST

Chairman CONNALLY. You don't have any doubt as to which, from the standpoint of sea power, which area is more important, the Far Pacific or Europe, do you?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

To me it is very easy to decide; because I believe that if we lose Western Europe, we will have great difficulty in preventing a subsequent build-up of Soviet power; with the shipyards and airplane factories, all of the productive capacity of Western Europe lost, we would have an increasingly difficult time in holding our own; whereas, if we lose all of the Asiatic mainland, we could still survive and build up and possibly get it back again.

Of the two, there is no doubt in my mind as to which is the more vital.

Furthermore, our defense across the Pacific, even including the approach through Alaska, is more adequate than any defense we could devise for Western Europe.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, here is one question I intended to ask you, but I am not going to ask you because it is so highly important, I don't want to put it on the record at all.

That is about the number and location of our bases in foreign countries.

I don't think I want to ask that question. I suppose that somebody has got a record of where they are, and knows how to find them when we need them.

IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL BASES OVERSEAS

Could our Navy continue to operate effectively without the facilities that our European allies afford us?

Admiral SHERMAN. As far as the Navy is concerned, sir, we could operate effectively if we had the use of the necessary anchorages in the part of the world that we operate in. We are not completely dependent on shore facilities overseas. But at the same time, if we did not have any shore facilities we would be severely handicapped.

But I think under any condition where we fight to support our allies, we can certainly expect that they will give us the use of bases.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges.

THE EVANS CASE

Senator BRIDGES. Admiral Sherman, are you familiar, I assume you are, with a case which the Navy has just had under consideration involving a letter written by Lt. (jg) W. A. Evans, and who was discharged from the Navy, I believe, as of yesterday?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. I am not going to question the propriety of what the Navy did or the action. The point in raising it is, Does the sentiment which Lieutenant Evans' letter revealed, do you think that is generally shared all or in part by our Armed Forces in the Pacific?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I do not. A very thorough board of investigation revealed that it was not shared by his shipmates, which was the place that we investigated.

Senator BRIDGES. And the board of investigation did interview his shipmates, and he was rather alone in his views that he expressed and they were not generally shared?

Admiral SHERMAN. I directed the commander in chief, Pacific fleet, to convene a board of investigation and to determine what the state of affairs was on that ship. His recommendation to me was to discharge the officer and, except for his presence, the discipline of the ship was unimpaired.

I have not read the report; it has not reached me yet.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that secret?

Senator BRIDGES. This is a copy of the letter. I didn't want to spread it in the record.

Senator CONNALLY. Do you say you're going to put it in the record?

Chairman RUSSELL. He said he was not.

Chairman CONNALLY. I hope not.

CHIEF DETERRENT TO WAR

Senator BRIDGES. What do you consider, Admiral Sherman, the chief deterrent to war, all-out war, with Russia?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I think that the chief deterrent with Russia as far as the Russians are concerned is the fact that they have seen us win World War I and World War II. I think an attempt to break it down into any one element, to say that it does it all alone, is mistaken. The residual power of the United States is the deterrent.

RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

Senator BRIDGES. Do you think that some act of ours, like the bombing of bases in Manchuria, or the attacking of the supply lines, is likely to bring on all-out war, or do you believe, if it comes, it will come when the Kremlin very coldly determines that it is coming regardless of any incidental incidents?

I assume this will be classified and off the record.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I think that the truth lies between those two or possibly, more accurately, in a combination of those two. I believe that if the Kremlin decides it is time to have a general war, that they will do so.

On the other hand, a good many of the fundamental causes of war exist now, and therefore any one of the actions under discussion might very well turn out to be the proximate cause. After all, we saw World War I start because one man got assassinated down in what is now Yugoslavia.

NAVAL AVIATION IN POSSIBLE BOMBING OF RED CHINA

Senator BRIDGES. How far from inland or from the shore would Navy planes be able to carry an attack? What is their range, in other words?

Admiral SHERMAN. In normal circumstances, six or seven hundred miles.

Senator BRIDGES. Would they be, therefore, an asset if it were decided to bomb bases in Communist China or supply lines? Is the range of the Navy plane sufficient so that they would be part of that force?

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe they would, sir, and the ability to move carriers into closer proximity to the objectives than our airfields can be moved would mean that the fighters, dive bombers, short-range aircraft, would be very effective in getting down and destroying the enemy aircraft, which is what I take would be our first objective.

Again, I believe the proper way to conduct that operation, if it were decided on, would be a combination of both the Air Force and the Navy in order to get the most efficient over-all operation.

EFFECT OF REARMING WESTERN EUROPE

Senator BRIDGES. You have pointed out here, in answer to questions from some of our colleagues on this joint committee, the terrific strategic importance of Europe to the free world and to the security of our own country. Would not, by reason of your own testimony, therefore, Europe and what we are doing in Europe, which is building up the defense of Western Europe, building up the productive capacity of Western Europe, be a more provocative act in bringing Russian-American conflict to a head than any minor incident that might occur in Asia?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I can only comment, of course, that the building up of Western Europe is an exceedingly worth-while objective on the road to peace.

One of the great difficulties since 1944, really, has been that in place of a more or less balance-of-power system, we had a great military vacuum where Germany plus France used to be, and it is my belief that, in the long run, peace in the world is going to be achieved by restoring the condition where there is some balance rather than just two great centers of power facing each other, because two great centers of power lead probably, eventually, to only one being left.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF OUR PACIFIC ISLAND CHAIN

Senator BRIDGES. Do you believe that the so-called concept of General MacArthur of holding a chain of island bases from Alaska to Japan, Okinawa, Guam, Formosa, the Philippines, and so on, is proper?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I do, because holding that chain of offshore positions enables us to control the Pacific, maintain our forces as far to the west in it as possible, and without the involvement of major ground elements.

It permits us to exploit the sea and air power, which are our national forte, rather than to attempt to fight Asiatics on the Asiatic mainland, which I have been brought up to believe to be an error, and I would like to take this opportunity to say that with respect to General MacArthur, one of the outstanding attributes that he possessed as a commander in the Pacific was his exceedingly thorough understanding grasp of the use of sea power, and to me it was always a pleasure to listen to this concepts of the use of sea and air power.

[Deleted.]

RUSSIA'S WAR-MAKING POTENTIAL IN FAR EAST

Senator BRIDGES. You talked this morning of an economic blockade and a naval blockade by the United Nations. Assuming that in an all-out conflict with Russia the Trans-Siberian Railroad was destroyed, all or in part, do you believe that Russia could maintain over any lengthy period a major war in the Far East?

Admiral SHERMAN. Certainly not a major war. They would be in great difficulties, because their sea communications would be cut, they would lose roughly 17,000 tons a day, I think it is, that they move across the Trans-Siberian and they would be dependent on the facilities in the Far East.

However, the Far East has been made self-supporting to a considerable degree.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

NO DIFFERENCES WITH MAC ARTHUR ON VISITS IN 1950

Senator SMITH. Admiral, could you tell me when you became Chief of Staff for the Navy?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; the 2d of November 1949.

Senator SMITH. Have you visited MacArthur in the Far East more than once?

Admiral SHERMAN. I visited him twice since assuming my present duty. I went out in February of 1950; and then I went out last year just before the Inchon landing.

Senator SMITH. Were you aware, at the time of those visits, of any differences of opinion with regard to general strategy in the Far East, between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur?

Admiral SHERMAN. At the time of the first visit, none.

Senator SMITH. That was prior to Korea, of course?

Admiral SHERMAN. That was prior to Korea.

At the time of the second visit, there had developed no difference in concepts. At that time we were fighting only the North Koreans, and we were getting ready to take the offensive and move north from what was really our all-time low, in the old Pusan perimeter.

Senator SMITH. You personally had not had an opportunity to discuss with him some of the possible differences in strategy or differences of view on limiting the war to Korea, and anything else—you personally never discussed it with him?

DIFFERENCE ON DEGREE OF FORMOSA'S IMPORTANCE

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. Only one of his strategic concepts, the only one that I didn't wholly subscribe to, until after the Korean fighting started, was the significance of Formosa. I felt that Formosa was vitally important, but I did not go quite as far as he did.

Senator SMITH. I am interested in what that difference might be. You said you didn't go quite as far as he did.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I think that in his presentation before this committee, and in his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and in a coded dispatch last spring, or a year ago this spring, he felt that we would be in much worse shape if we lost Formosa than I did; but that was just a matter of degree.

I have always conceived that Formosa's primary importance was in connection with the purpose for which we made plans for its capture at the end of the war, which was to cut off the places north of it from the places south of it.

We, before we went into the Philippines, made plans to capture Formosa, to cut Japan off from southeast Asia; and I have always felt that Formosa is much more important in connection with what we may call north-south problems than it is with east-west problems; but there again it was a matter of degree.

Senator SMITH. Did you agree with him that it would be unfortunate, and probably a threat to us, if Formosa was in hostile hands, for example, Russian hands?

Admiral SHERMAN. I, along with the other Joint Chiefs of Staff, have gone on record repeatedly and consistently that Formosa should not be allowed to fall into unfriendly hands.

I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff have used almost the same language every time that we have given forth any opinion on Formosa; although we have also felt that, in the state of the Military Establishment, that we couldn't afford to deploy forces in there to attempt to hold it.

When we were capturing Okinawa, Formosa in enemy hands required us to tell off a carrier task force to keep Formosa and Sakishima pounded down.

Certainly, in unfriendly hands, it is in a position which is exceedingly important and particularly in connection with communications between points north of it and points south of it.

Senator SMITH. Well, generally speaking, from the standpoint of its being unwise to have it in enemy hands, you all agreed to that phase, at least, of the Formosa issue?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you would not think the difference in degree of thought as to the importance of Formosa was grounds for the removal of General MacArthur?

Admiral SHERMAN. Nothing like that.

Senator SMITH. I am interested in that, because I want to try and find out a little more of the reasons for removing the general.

CLEARANCE OF STATEMENTS OF MAC ARTHUR

I won't read the three reasons which appear on pages 2275 and 2276 of the record as given to us by General Bradley as a summing up of your reasons. I just want to ask you about the second one, and I will read the second one:

> The second reason advanced by the Chiefs was that General MacArthur had failed to comply with the Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public. He had also taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice and had made that statement public despite the fact that he knew the President had such a proposal under consideration on a Government level.

Then the third reason had to do with the civilian authority. It is this second one that I am troubled by and I am trying to get into my mind from the different Joint Chiefs what the particular statements he made were which they felt were so badly out of line you might say as to justify their feeling that he ought to be removed. Was it the VFW one, the Veterans of Foreign Wars statement?

IMPLICATIONS OF MAC ARTHUR'S FORMOSA STATEMENT TO VFW

Admiral SHERMAN. That certainly did not come under the heading of violating a Presidential directive because that directive had not been given at that time.

As I recall it, that was an exceedingly embarrassing situation because General MacArthur was issuing one statement at the same time that Senator Austin was delivering another one on more or less the same subject.

Senator Austin in the United Nations was depicting our views with respect to Formosa as being very amicable, and I believe General

MacArthur's statement as I recall it implied that we are going to use that as a base from which we could be able to attack objectives in Asia and so on.

Senator SMITH. I have read that speech three times. I have heard that statement made so much. I have read it three times and I can't find a single word in it where he advocated our using it as a base.

He did point out the danger to us in case it was in the enemy's hands to be used as a base against us. I won't labor that point, but I would appreciate very much if those who are saying that would really check that. I would like to have it pointed out to me.

As a matter of fact, the general did, I believe, after he was asked—did not actually deliever the address but it had gotten into the press and it received the publicity. We have it here in this compilation of the important documents.

I felt from reading that that it was so in line with the other conception of General Bradley and the other Joint Chiefs that I was rather astonished to find that they felt that there was something wrong with that particular statement.

It was brought to our attention by the recent statement of the President to the press that at the time of it he began to think that MacArthur ought to be removed. I was wondering if that could possibly be the basis for his removal, because in that he pays a great tribute to the President of the United States for the wonderful lift it gave to everybody in the Far East when he took his strong stand on Korea.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I recall that.

EFFECT OF MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT

Senator SMITH. Another statement was the Martin letter which the President said was just a part of an accumulation. He did not lay much stress on that, and the other one was the well-known statement of March 24 with regard to dealing with the enemy, and I think in the testimony here we brought out that whatever negotiations might be on foot, certainly General MacArthur did not know anything about it.

Iwould just like to ask you whether you were under the impression in criticizing MacArthur for this March 24 armistice message, that he knew of the negotiations that were pending?

Admiral SHERMAN. At that time, sir, I knew definitely that he had not been furnished a draft of the announcement planned by the President through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There were one or two points of similarity in the two which made me wonder if any part of it had been circulated.

The very fact that a planned statement had been circulated to 13 other countries made it possible that it might have gotten out there. I have read since that it did not.

Senator SMITH. He made the distinct statement in his testimony that he never received it, and also he sent that telegram to Newsweek magazine.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes. That was just conjecture on my part.

Senator SMITH. I noticed in the compilation, I suppose you are familiar with it, on page 101, paragraph 43, referring to this proposed statement it says:

> The proposed statement by the President pointed out that the aggressors in Korea had been driven back—

and so forth.

In the message that you sent to General MacArthur, which is No. 40 on page 100, all that was said there was:

> State—

which meant State Department—

> is planning a Presidential announcement shortly that with the clearing of the bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations is now preparing to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea.

I did not know whether the President was negotiating or considering negotiations, or whether the United Nations as such, or who was.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I don't know to what extent the President may or may not have known about this plan. It was brought to a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by representatives of the State Department. We went over it, improved the text—a least, we tried to improve the text—and while that was being done the message was sent to General MacArthur in order to let him know the type of action that was in the wind.

MESSAGE INFORMING MAC ARTHUR ABOUT PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator SMITH. This item 40 on page 100 says that on March 20, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the following message, which was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, to General MacArthur.

It doesn't state whom the message came from. It says the Joint Chiefs approved it and they dispatched it, but was that a State Department message?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. It heads off: "State is planning a Presidential announcement." I thought it came from the State Department probably.

Admiral SHERMAN. That message either went from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or from the Chief of Staff of the Army as their executive agent, one or the other. It was written in a meeting when the planned announcement had been under discussion.

Senator SMITH. But according to your recollection the details were not sent to General MacArthur. That seems to corroborate the testimony we have had.

Admiral SHERMAN. I have no knowledge of his ever yet having seen the draft.

OTHER MAC ARTHUR STATEMENTS

Senator SMITH. Could you tell me, then, further with regard to this second reason advanced by the Chiefs, what particular documents we should study, having to do with his failure to comply with the President's directive to clear statements on policy?

All I can find is that Martin letter, which has been the subject of some discussion as to whether Mr. Martin should even have published it, as a personal letter to him, and the other was the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech; and beyond that I don't seem to find anything that General MacArthur put out that hadn't been cleared.

Admiral SHERMAN. The examples which come most readily to mind as being in violation of the directive, which is the directive of December 5 or December 6, are the statement of March 24, I think it was——

Senator SMITH. That is the one—the armistice statement——

Admiral SHERMAN. The armistice one; and the reference to policy in that Freeman magazine affair; I can't cite any others.

CIRCUMSTANCES ON QUESTION OF ARMING SOUTH KOREANS

Senator SMITH. Well, that one, I think it was brought out in the testimony before, that the first time he referred to the arming of Korean troops was in January at the time you were contemplating evacuation. The evidence, as I understood it, was that at that time the plan was for evacuation, and it was not unnatural for General MacArthur to have suggested that, rather than arm more Korean troops, we give our arms to the constabulary in Japan, because Japan then would be in jeopardy. The later message, the Hazlitt message, came in April, and we had already decided not to evacuate. Then the question came up again whether or not we could rearm the Koreans. I think the criticism of General MacArthur was that he said it was a political question, and it looked as though he was passing the buck, so to speak, to the people in Washington. Yet it might very well be considered that, as Syngman Rhee had asked for that arming that it was a political question.

I am just desirous of clearing the record on that because we have had that practically with all the Joint Chiefs, and it seems to me that is a reasonable explanation of divergence between the January suggestion and the later one.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Smith, but, of course, the admiral is at liberty to comment on your question.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I have no particular comment to make on that, sir. To me, as I believe I testified, the more important reason was the fact that, as this whole compilation, this whole record, shows, there was a situation where the commander in the field and the authorities in Washington were more or less continuously at cross purposes.

It is the general picture to me which is more important than any part of it.

I was not as directly involved in this exchange as was the Department of the Army, but I felt that there was a very, very complicated situation which was undesirable.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Admiral; my time has expired.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Saltonstall?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Johnson?

PROGRESS IN NAVAL REARMAMENT

Senator JOHNSON. Admiral, just a question or two: Are you satisfied with our naval expansion goal?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that our goal for the period of time in which it is to be accomplished is a very sound one. There are, of course, advantages in speeding up and expanding more rapidly in order to get more forces more quickly, but the minute we do that, we become more deeply involved in questions of inducting reserve officers who do not want to join up at this present time, and slowing down our release of the people that we have had to bring in, slowing down rotation of personnel in the forward areas, and things of that sort and, therefore, I believe that the program that we have now cut out for ourselves for the next 12 months is a sound one which will permit us to maintain quality, combat readiness of individual units, while reaching that level.

If, as the months pass, the international situation looks worse, why, of course, we may have to lift our sights.

Senator JOHNSON. And in your opinion it is a sound goal under the circumstances?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator JOHNSON. Are you satisfied with the progress we are making toward reaching the goals we have set?

Admiral SHERMAN. I am satisfied with the progress we are making in all respects except the heavy procurement area. Although I am not as closely associated with that as I am with the operating, I feel that they are running into difficulties due to a variety of things, all of which I believe are public knowledge—shrinkage in the purchasing power of the dollar, getting the materials, getting the contracts out, and eventually getting the deliveries.

With respect to aircraft construction and the components that go into aircraft, that is a difficult area, but I have nothing to complain of. I think the difficulties we are experiencing are just about what we might expect.

We are doing our best to get our program ahead as fast as we can. But it is in that area that I believe we are having more difficulty than in the other.

EFFECT OF MANPOWER ACT PROVISION ON NAVAL PERSONNEL

Senator JOHNSON. What effect will the requirements of the manpower bill that you discharge all enlisted and also reserve who have served 17 months since Korea and as much as 12 months in the last war have upon the operating of the Navy?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do not believe it will interfere with operations at all. To the degree we let officers out before the 21 months we will call others in more rapidly, and will have a little more turn-over.

On the other hand, considering the over-all problem, again I feel that the resolution that was achieved, frankly, is better than I expected by at least a month.

Senator JOHNSON. And is it true that there would be very few officers that will be required to be replaced as a result of that provision?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is true, sir. Early indications we have are that, in the group of officers that we thought were the ones who had been inducted compulsorily, there is a very satisfactory percentage that want to stay on instead of going out as required at the end of 21 months.

Senator JOHNSON. You have a substantial number who have not served in World War II, do you not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. That definition of what constituted the 12 months was very helpful.

Senator JOHNSON. But what difficulty you will have will be with officers and not enlisted men?

Admiral SHERMAN. As far as I can estimate it, sir, the difficulties we have will be with officers and with one or two limited groups of enlisted men—the electronic technicians and people in specialties, technical specialties of that sort.

Senator JOHNSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral, when I last discussed this with you we were talking about the objectives, and I believe you said broadly that you considered our objectives to be the defeat of the Chinese and the reestablishment of peace and law and order and orderly free government, or something like that, in Korea.

WHAT CONSTITUTES DEFEAT OF CHINESE COMMUNISTS

I would like to take those one at a time. What would you consider defeat of the Chinese? I agree with those objectives thoroughly, but what constitutes those objectives?

Admiral SHERMAN. I would say we have defeated the Chinese if we have destroyed their will to fight.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, how are you going to test that will to fight?

Let me pose this supposition: Suppose we are successful and drive the Chinese back, and they decide to retire over the Yalu. We know we have not destroyed all their equipment, we have not killed them all off. They go back over the Yalu, and we know they are sitting over their with their forces being regrouped. They have not told us they are coming back across the Yalu, but they are regrouping their forces, replenishing them with new supplies and continuing their activities in Manchuria. What do we do then? They have actually gone out of Korea, but there is every reason to think that they probably are just resting up and will come back over for another slap at us as quickly as they feel they are ready. Now is that a defeat of the Chinese?

Chairman CONNALLY. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, now, wait a minute.

Admiral SHERMAN. I think it is a defeat of the Chinese if we cause them to withdraw. But it seems to me inevitable that if the Chinese are defeated in the field in Korea—as I said, I will define that by saying destroy their will to fight—and if they then indicate that they would like to settle this dispute in a manner which will permit the establishment of the Republic of Korea with, I hope, a boundary that could be defended rather than a parallel of latitude, or a frontier the length of the one between North Korea and Communist China, I would hope that it would be possible to achieve some sort of a settlement.

OTHER MEANS OF DESTROYING WILL TO FIGHT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, again I suggest, Admiral, that we all agree, I think, that such a speculative result would be desirable, but what are our objectives?

Now, among those objectives to destroy the will of the Red Chinese to fight, we might go back to Mukden and Harbin and blow up their arsenals with bombing and break up their transportation system right up there in Manchuria back of the border a way, where they have a lot of things. That might be one objective.

That would undoubtedly destroy a part of their ability to fight for a substantial period of time. Whether it destroyed their will to fight or not is another thing, but their ability to fight.

Now, we have nothing except that we are not to cross the Yalu. Now, that is a policy—not to cross the Yalu. But let me ask you this: Suppose the United Nations today would say to us, "We agree that you should immediately put into effect a program of bombing in Manchuria within reasonable limits." They might say within three or four hundred miles of the border—the installations, railroad system, and bridges, and marshaling areas there, airfields, and so forth.

Suppose the United Nations would say that to us today. Would you think we should go ahead and do it? I am assuming they formally approved and formally directed that it be done and we consented.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, it is difficult to conceive of that because, of course, they haven't done it; but assuming that the other members of the United Nations trust us to do that, I think then we should make inquiry as to the contribution that they would make to the endeavor.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HOT PURSUIT AND DESTROYING PLANES ON THE GROUND

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You supported the hot pursuit theory, didn't you, across the Yalu?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As I asked General Vandenberg yesterday, what is the difference between shooting hostile Chinese planes in the air across the Yalu and shooting them on the ground across the Yalu? What is the moral or other difference?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, of course, hot pursuit is a term which came from practice of naval blockade. When a blockade runner runs a blockade, you can chase him as long as you are engaged in hot pursuit.

In other words, it is a continuing operation against a ship, or in the case of the airplane, against an airplane that is coming into North Korea and has attacked you; you engage in a fight with him, and you continue the fight and you keep on fighting as you pass over the border.

That, to me, is different from deliberately planning to go and hit Mukden on a particular day. I think it is recognized as the traits of human nature that once we are in a fight, it is difficult to peel off at the border.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aren't we in a fight in Korea?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Chinese are shooting our people.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

NATURE OF SANCTUARIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, Admiral, as far as blockade is concerned—I don't know what the rules of war are now or whether we have any or not—but, anyway, it is usually the custom under the law of war that an enemy ship can find sanctuary in certain ports for a very limited period of time.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Senator **Hickenlooper**. But he has to get out of that port or lose his ship. They put him out of action if he doesn't take to sea within a certain very limited time—a day or something like that.

But here we have a sanctuary in Manchuria where these people can retire for an unlimited period of time until they get good and ready to come back over, and we can't control their action.

Sanctuary in other places is controllable by the nation where a ship finds sanctuary in a harbor. It is controlled and limited to a very short period of time, and then the ship has to leave.

But here we have no control over it. Now, isn't it reasonable for a theater commander, if he is making plans in the field in which he is charged with responsibility for a certain accomplishment—shouldn't he know what his objectives are?

MEANS OF ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES WITH GREATEST FORCE

Now, I will try and make that a little clearer. Here is a theater commander in Korea fighting aggression by the Chinese. If he is held responsible only for whipping Chinese in a specific battle and pushing them to an undetermined place, just fighting them when they want to fight, that is one thing. If that is the end, that is all there is to it.

But if suddenly he is called upon to knock out their will to resist, shouldn't he have some kind of a policy laid out so that he could be prepared at least to go over there and break up their concentrations back of the Yalu?

I mean isn't it a reasonable thing when a theater commander says, "What are we to do here? What are the objectives of our accomplishment other than just" I think General MacArthur used the words "accordion war"?

Well, it has been that up until now. It has been back and forth. I have said that it reminds me a lot of a football game where a team can advance to the 50- or 60-yard line, but they don't dare carry the ball up toward the goal and make a touchdown. They have to stop up there some place. The rules are funny that way.

It still seems to me we have not laid down a policy, that we are operating with ideals in mind. Certainly peace, destroy their will to fight, set up a sound government in Korea. I agree with those, and I agree those are worthy objectives. I agree that we ought to teach aggressors a lesson.

I think we have been very dilatory in the United Nations in not meeting aggression with tremendous force and with a showing in this very first test of the United Nations that we stand for no monkey business.

Instead of that it seems to me we have stood for a lot of monkey business and been pushed around a lot. I do not believe that the United Nations have given us the vigorous and quick and instatnteous support that they should have. There is a great difference, in my opinion—this is what I am searching for in my questioning—a great difference between objectives, that is broad objectives such as peace, success of the United Nations, destroy the enemy's will to fight, and how you are going to do it, and what are the limitations and what your physical implementations of that are. That is what bothers me. I can only express what is in my mind as to what I am searching for, and in these hearings I have not been able to receive any policy other than the broad humanitarian objectives.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, it seems to me, sir, without referring to any particular document, going through this whole record, it has been made quite clear that the policy or political objective if you choose to call it that, and military objective included has been to defeat the enemy army in Korea and to avoid becoming involved in war with Russia or in a general war unilaterally with Communist China.

I think that has been made quite clear by this whole mass of dispatches back and forth.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course I think we are at war with Communist China. I mean if it isn't Comunist China that is fighting us, I don't know who it is.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, they are engaged in attacking an organization of which we are members and to which we are making the greatest contribution of forces.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When I say we, I mean all the countries that are involved there.

Admiral SHERMAN. And I agree that if the United Nations are going to be an effective instrument for the future, that there must be a code by which when the forces of the United Nations in the field are attacked, that something happens quickly.

Like a gangster shooting a policeman, action is a little more rapid, a little more effective than for——

OBJECTIVES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right, but when a gangster shoots a policeman and they start after him, their object is to catch him and immobilize him, put him clear out of action, if they can, put him in jail or hang him.

Let's take the North Atlantic Pact. I would say we have announced broad objectives there and I would say that we have announced a policy. We have announced the objective of resisting the aggressor, banding together to put down aggression, but we have gone ahead with a definite policy which at least I think I can understand up to certain very long and powerful limits.

We have said we will furnish soldiers to various nations, we will furnish supplies, we will furnish navy. We have implemented it. We know what our objectives are there, so I think that in addition to the broad policies, we have announced implementing objectives and limitations. I do not believe we have done it in Korea. That is the thing that bothers me. That is my attitude.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Morse.

EVIDENCES OF MAC ARTHUR'S LACK OF SYMPATHY WITH UNITED STATES POLICY

Senator MORSE. Admiral Sherman, you have testified today, as I understand it, that you concurred in the recall of General MacArthur.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. You testified that you are still of the opinion that he should have been recalled.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Seantor **Morse**. I hold in my hand——

Admiral **Sherman**. I would like to correct that, sir, what I testified and which was the fact. I gave my military opinion that he should be replaced.

Senator **Morse**. He should be replaced for military reasons?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Morse**. I hold in my hand, Admiral, what I referred to in my examination of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a secret exhibit in this hearing entitled, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations," which purports to set forth a paraphrase of the communications that were sent to General MacArthur and that he sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

You are familiar with the contents of this document?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Morse**. Admiral, do you think it is a fair conclusion on my part to say that the contents of this document, taken as a whole, contain ample evidence that General MacArthur was not in sympathy with the military and foreign policies of the United States in the Korean War?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir; I think that that document, and particularly with the associated material, by which I mean the full text of many of the dispatches that are paraphrased, gives a general picture of nonconcurrence with the military and foreign policy of the Government with respect to the Far East.

Senator **Morse**. Therefore, is it fair to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed the impression through their relationships with General MacArthur, that his attitude made it necessary for them to deal with a commander in the field who was not giving them the teamwork cooperation that they felt they would receive from a commander in the field who demonstrated that he was in complete sympathy with the military and foreign policy of the United States in Asia?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir; and I prefer really to express it with respect to the future. That if the foreign and military policy of the Government were to continue as they are, in order to implement those policies it was necessary to have a field commander, theater commander, who was more in sympathy and more responsive to those policies.

Senator **Morse**. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that the exchanges set forth in this exhibit between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur support the conclusion that you had reached a point in your dealings with MacArthur where they could be described as dealing at arm's length? You had to be meticulously careful to constantly forewarn him not to do this and that or to clear with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before he did this or that; and, as a result of that relationship, which had been set up, in your opinion, it was important that you get a commander in the field in greater sympathy with the foreign and military policy of the United States in Asia.

Admiral **Sherman**. The situation had become exceedingly difficult.

EXEMPLIFICATION IN MESSAGES OF JANUARY 9, 10, 12

Senator **Morse**. I refer, Admiral, to page 83 of this document, which refers to the message of January 9 that was sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCFE which, I think, is a rather important message in this whole record, in which you again make clear to him that the retaliatory measures suggested by CINCFE were being given continued consideration, but you go on to point out that there would be a great many negotiations that would have to take place before any final conclusion could be reached in regard to any such change of policy as MacArthur was suggesting; and on page 84 you point out in your message to MacArthur that in the light of all these foregoing considerations, of the negotiations that would have to take place, he was directed—

> (*a*) To defend in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to the primary consideration of the safety of his troops and the defense of Japan.
>
> (*b*) That should it become evident in the judgment of CINCFE that evacuation was essential to avoid severe losses of men and material, CINCFE was at that time to withdraw from Korea to Japan.

Doesn't this message, just before your message of January 12, indicate again pretty clearly to MacArthur that he was to follow a course of action that would avoid an extension of this war beyond Korea and into China?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, when that message was sent, it was my hope, and I believe that was also the hope of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that that would be more or less an adequate reply to the different recommendations and proposals that had come in; and it was with a feeling of some disappointment, certainly to me, that we received the reply the next day requesting clarification and the character of that reply on the 10th of January was such as to precipitate an immediate meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with representatives of the State Department on the 11th; a further meeting on the 12th; the preparation of a new military directive, which was taken to the Security Council, and which was eventually dispatched; and then the Department of State, in a desire to make it prefectly clear what the purely political considerations were, arranged to send their message, which was released by the President on the 13th. That period of January 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 was a very difficult one.

Senator MORSE. It has been referred to several times in this hearing that MacArthur meticulously carried out the military directives and that at no time did he fail to carry out a military directive, which I do not dispute.

But is it not true that before he meticulously carried out each military directive frequently you had just the kind of a controversial situation with him as is exemplified here by the message of January 9, January 10, and finally the study of January 12, followed by a sending of Collins and Vandenberg out to Korea to have personal conversations with him, which all added up to a feeling of lack of confidence and trust in MacArthur to cooperate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the officials of this Government in carrying out our Asiatic and foreign policy without a lot of controversy about it?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I would prefer to refer to it, not as a lack of confidence, but as a feeling of misunderstanding and difficulty in reaching a meeting of the minds.

Senator MORSE. Is it fair to say that whatever the reason, it had become anything but a coperative teamwork relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur?

Admiral SHERMAN. At this period, possibly better than any other indication, the normal relationships which are desirable between one echelon of command and another had been seriously impaired.

CONCERN WITH SITUATION BEFORE JCS MEETING OF APRIL 5

Senator MORSE. Now, you testified earlier today, Admiral, that it was not until April 5 that you had reached the point of taking any crystallized position in regard to whether or not MacArthur should be recalled.

Would it be fair to say, however, that as far as you were concerned, as one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the MacArthur problem had been incubating in your mind for quite some time, as you went through the experiences that this exhibit shows you all went through, in connection with your exchanges with General MacArthur?

Admiral SHERMAN. I had been worried about it for a long while, and possibly my previous associations and my private personal admiration for the general, and my participation with him in another war, had made me worry about it more.

A good many of the problems involved had more to do with the Army than with the Navy; but I had been worried about this whole situation for a long while, and each time that General Collins went out there, I had hoped that we would achieve a better understanding between this headquarters and the organization there; and even on the 5th, it was still my instinct to hope that a repetition of going out and trying to get a better understanding would be the technique.

However, the whole period, this whole exchange, had created a very difficult problem in this extremely unusual condition where, instead of the ordinary military situation where you give a field commander a mission, to go do something, and if anything gets in the way, get it done anyway—but here we had a situation which was also controlled by the overriding considerations of avoiding precipiating a general war.

It made it an extremely difficult problem for everybody connected with it.

ATTENDANCE AT JCS MEETING OF APRIL 5

Senator MORSE. Admiral, when General Bradley calls a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sends a deputy, does he function for that particular Joint Chief of Staff on a par with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. He functions just as his principal would, with one exception: That is, if there is a subject under discussion which he feels should be held over until his principal is present, that privilege is usually accorded him, if time permits.

Senator MORSE. And it is your recollection that on April 5 General Haislip represented General Collins?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; in Washington, he was acting as Chief of Staff.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I will take the remaining minute or minute and a half of my time to refer to the record, and report to the committee of the telephone conversation I had with General Bradley this afternoon, at my own initiative.

At page 1935 of the record, in answer to a question of the chairman, General Bradley said:

> My first information that there was some concern being shown by the President over this was late the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th of April, when I received the information—I don't remember where from—but I think I received it from a telephone from someone; at which time I called the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for about 30 minutes, from 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon.

Later on in an exchange with Senator Wiley, on page 1988 of the record, General Bradley said:

> I called the three Chiefs and asked them if they could come by my office at 5 o'clock.
>
> Senator WILEY. Name them, please.
>
> General BRADLEY. General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman.

I called General Bradley this afternoon and asked him for his explanation of it, and he told me that he sent the message to their office to have a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he thought that is what he testified to.

He testified——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, with all sincerity, I do not like to object to the Senator's statement, but I think that General Bradley is the best——

Senator MORSE. If the Senator will hear me through, I have a motion of procedure to make.

Chairman RUSSELL. The Senator has about three-quarters of a minute.

Senator MORSE. He testified that if he said that General Collins was there that that was his recollection at the time; if he made a mistake in his recollection, he certainly wanted to have it corrected, and if the committee would give him an opportunity to reappear before the committee he would be very glad to answer questions on this point because he gave them his best recollection.

I therefore move, Mr. Chairman, that at an appropriate time General Bradley be recalled to the stand to be examined on this point, because I think it is nothing but a slip of the recollection, and he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be there and General Haislip came in General Collins' place, and he had forgotten it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, I do not think we ought to undertake action on that right now. Do you insist on your motion at this time?

Senator MORSE. Well, I will file it, but I think an injustice will be done General Bradley if we do not give him a chance to clear this up.

Senator CAIN. A parliamentary inquiry?

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain, I think, suggested that yesterday.

Senator CAIN. Mr. Chairman, on yesterday the Senator from Washington suggested to the committee that General Bradley be recalled to clear up the discrepancy. If there is need for a motion, I do not see it.

Chairman RUSSELL. The motion can be filed, but I do not think we ought to undertake to press it.

Senator McMahon.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Tobey.

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Sparkman.

NAVAL SUPPORT OF ALLIES IN KOREA

Senator Sparkman. Admiral Sherman, I want to ask you just one question that I do not believe has been dealt with, and that relates to the contribution that has been made by other members of the United Nations toward naval support in the Korean situation.

You have not previously discussed that; have you?

Admiral Sherman. No, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Has that been small, moderate, or substantial?

Admiral Sherman. It has been quite substantial and, I may say, extremely helpful, particularly at the very beginning. When this operation started we had only one aircraft carrier in the Far East. The early arrival of the British carrier, eevn though it was a smaller one, multiplied the total effectiveness out of all proportion, as is always the case between one aircraft carrier and two.

[Deleted.]

If I may, I would like to take time to state that one of the most valuable contributions to naval operations that has been made has been made by the Republic of Korea, which is a number of small ships, and with a personnel who know their own coast, know their own people, have made it possible for us to conduct operations that would otherwise have been much more difficult. They have really turned in an outstanding performance.

Senator Sparkman. Have all of these contributors participated all the way through in the various naval undertakings?

Admiral Sherman. They have participated in all naval undertakings other than the patrol of the Formosa Strait. That has been carried on unilaterally by the United States because it is not a United Nations undertaking.

Senator Sparkman. Was the landing at Inchon and the taking of the men off last fall, were those the two largest naval operations?

Admiral Sherman. I think that they were the two largest operations during the time, but of course each of them lasted a relatively short period, whereas these other activities have been over a very long period of time.

Senator Sparkman. I really meant an individual undertaking or engagement. Of course I realize that patrolling is a constant thing.

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Did our allies participate in both of those undertakings?

Admiral Sherman. They participated very extensively in the Inchon landing and to a lesser extent in the Hungnam evacuation.

[Deleted.]

Senator Sparkman. I take it from what you say then that you are pretty well pleased with the naval participation by our allies?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir; I am, and at one point the First Sea Lord asked me if I thought he should redeploy more ships from the Mediterranean and home waters to the Far East, and I told him that in my opinion the way we were doing it was the more efficient because if his naval deployment in other places was decreased, ours might have to be increased. Therefore our existing arrangement was a better one.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral Sherman, you were just discussing the contributions of the other allies, other UN members who were participating in the Korean naval operations.

[Deleted.]

Senator KNOWLAND. Then that actually makes the percentage if you include the Marines, makes the percentage of allied naval forces less than the 10 percent of their total forces which they have contributed in the Far East.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

EFFECT OF OPERATING UNDER THE UN ON FIGHTING IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. I would like to ask this: You mentioned some of the problems that have been faced, in answer to one of the questions here this afternoon, and pointing out quite correctly that probably for the first time in our history since we are not engaged in either an American war against somebody as such or even an operation such as we had in World War II where you had definite objectives and a single commander in a theater operating under directions from above, that one of the great problems was trying to fight this war in a limited area and avoiding world war III, the spreading of it.

In addition to that problem, would you not say that another difficulty was carrying out our operations and not causing political discomfort to the other UN members? Isn't that a practical problem that both the Joint Chiefs here, our Government, and General MacArthur were all confronted with?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; that has been one of our difficulties, and then also—and as I said this morning, here I get a little out of the naval field—I feel that starting a war under the Security Council and then having to prosecute it under the General Assembly has increased the difficulties on the political level.

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral, from time to time suggestions have been made in various quarters of the press, and I think some public officials, that while they quite agree that Formosa should be kept out of Communist hands, that perhaps what might be done is to set up a trusteeship of some kind under the United Nations.

SITUATION IN FORMOSA AND SUPPORT FOR CHIANG EXCEPT IN CIVIL WAR

As a military man and facing the problem in a realistic way, do you not believe there would be a considerable problem against the will of the Republic of China for the UN to disarm 500,000 non-Communist troops on the island of Formosa and the navy, though it is small, and the air force, though it is small, and do you know just what United Nations mouse might bell the cat when they have only furnished 30,000 troops to resist aggression in Korea?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, that is a problem which poses some practical difficulties as well as some in ethics.

It is my feeling that there is a point to which you should support your allies even if they fall into adversity, and Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of the Republic of China, was our ally in World War II, and so far as I know there has been no point at which we have decided that he was no longer our ally.

Senator KNOWLAND. The record is also very clear before this committee, I think the testimony of General Marshall made it clear and also the testimony which was put in of General Wedemeyer, that the Republic of China during World War II kept a million and a quarter or more Japanese troops occupied on the mainland of China despite numerous efforts on the part of the Imperial Buddha of Japan to work out a deal with him which, had he been willing to deal, would have freed those million and a quarter Japanese troops to be used against us elsewhere.

Admiral SHERMAN. Throughout the period beginning with the directive given to General Wedemeyer as the commanding General of the China theater, following on to the directives given to Admiral Cooke when he was a naval commander in the western Pacific, those given to Admiral Badger when he was the naval commander in the western Pacific, and up until the date of withdrawal of our forces from China, there is one directive which is always included which, if I may find it, I would like to read.

Practically every directive in this long period issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, General Marshall, and General Arnold, down to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which included, I believe, Admiral Denfeld, General Vandenberg, and General Bradley, this language was always common:

> Conduct no activities which prejudice the basic United States principle that the United States will not support the Central Government in fratricidal warfare.

There was always this injunction against fratricidal warfare.

Now, if I may take the liberty, I would like to read you a communication I received from Admiral Nimitz the other day. I am sure he would be willing to be quoted.

> In accordance with the Yalta agreement, Formosa was promptly turned over to the Government of China, after the shooting ended in 1945. The proposal to turn Formosa over to the Red Government of China would mean an intervention in the China civil war.

And then he goes on to point out the practical problem that there is on Formosa a large number of troops, some Navy and some Air Force.

So that to agree to turn Formosa over to Red China would involve a problem not only of ethics, but one of who does it?

NAVAL EQUIPMENT TO PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA, AND INDOCHINA

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, another question I would like to ask, which I have asked of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and you can either put it in the record now or furnish it for the record; what naval equipment has been turned over since June 30, 1949, to the Republic of the Philippines, to Indochina, and to the Republic of China on Formosa?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I would like to supply that for the record.

(See Admiral Sherman's testimony on May 31, p. 1611.)

POSSIBLE LOSS OF BASES AND EFFECT ON NAVAL AVIATION

Senator KNOWLAND. I think your testimony is clear, but I just want to be certain of it in this record. In the event we would lose certain land bases through either some of our allies pulling out or through loss by enemy action, it is your belief that at least in certain areas an effective air job could be done from naval carriers in interdicting supply lines, of course, within the reach of naval carrier aviation; am I correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes; within their capacity, I think they can do an effective job.

ACCESS OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO PRESIDENT

Senator KNOWLAND. Do the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have access to the President of the United States or do they operate through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in getting to the President?

Admiral SHERMAN. Normally, we function, we discharge our statutory duties as military advisers by formulating papers which are then presented to the Secretary of Defense, and transmitted by the Secretary of Defense either to the President or to the Security Council, of which he is the presiding officer.

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral, are the members——

Admiral SHERMAN. The President, however, has on two occasions made it clear to all of the members of the Chiefs of Staff that they have direct access to him any time they desire it on application to the appropriate aide.

In other words, in accordance with the President's directive, any time that I want to see him, I need only tell his naval aide.

Now, obviously that can only be done in connection with a matter of either extremely great importance or minor importance. Normal business naturally must go through the Secretary.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION IN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator KNOWLAND. Are the members of the Joint Chiefs—that is, the three members of the Joint Chiefs, plus their Chairman, who is a nonvoting member as I understand it—are the members, are they members of the National Security Council?

If the answer is that they are not——

Admiral SHERMAN. They are not, sir. I have not been in a meeting of the National Security Council since January 12.

Senator KNOWLAND. I was going to ask the next question—so far as you know, do the individual members of the Joint Chiefs attend meetings as guests or participating guests in the National Security Council?

Admiral SHERMAN. Almost always—in fact, I know of no exception—but there may be one—almost always the Secretary of Defense, who is a statutory member, takes with him either General Bradley or a substitute.

Senator KNOWLAND. In answer to a question by Senator Connally that if war broke out any place, it would be world-wide, which I think we will all agree to; the vice versa situation is true, that in the event of war breaking out in Europe, undoubtedly we would be under some pressures in the Pacific and in Alaska, would we not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. I want to devote the balance of my time, if I have any, and if not, I think I can finish it up in a relatively few minutes——

Chairman RUSSELL. You have about 2 minutes.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24 STATEMENT AND THE PROPOSED PLAN FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. To this question of the March 20 statement of General MacArthur—I believe that is the date—where he again, as he had last October, suggested to the enemy commander that he capitulate and cease fire and behave himself.

As I understand it, the two previous orders had the knowledge and approval of the Joint Chiefs, or did one of them have the knowledge and approval of the Joint Chiefs?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it, one of them was a directive, the other was an authorization, and I think for the authorization he came back and said he agreed with our suggestion and did it.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, specifically to this situation of the proposed agreement, which was supposed to have been kicked over by his premature statement of his own on the cease fire, I would like to specifically know if you have the answer to it, whether such a document had been put into final form even in the Government of the United States, and whether, to your own knowledge, a copy of such a document, even in its tentative form, had been circulated to any of the UN members.

Admiral SHERMAN. I have a copy of the draft as it was corrected in the meeting on the 19th, I believe, and in that same meeting General Collins, sitting next to me, wrote the message which went to General MacArthur. I know definitely that the draft was not sent to General MacArthur through any communication controlled by the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator KNOWLAND. Could you give that draft to the committee at this time?

Admiral SHERMAN. I can, sir. Whether it should be left in the record or not, I have doubts.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, could it be placed into our executive record?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that would be entirely proper.

Senator KNOWLAND. Not in the public record?

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Knowland.

You may proceed, Admiral Sherman.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understood that you could proceed in answer to the question.

Admiral SHERMAN. If I can find that; I know I have it here.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you do not have it here, Admiral, you may furnish it for the record, with a notation as to your appraisal of its classification.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. Perhaps, if we might continue, maybe the captain can locate it. It is a thin piece of paper, which I am sure we have.

Senator **Knowland.** I have no objection if you proceed with the next questioner; but, if they can find it, I would like to have it inserted in the record.

Chairman **Russell.** I have lost my standing with the reporters now on account of the lateness of the hour. [Laughter.]

Senator Gillette?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Brewster?

(No response.)

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Hunt?

Senator **Hunt.** No questions, Mr. Chairman, due to the lateness of the hour.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Cain?

Senator **Knowland.** I think the admiral has located this now, and perhaps it might be——

Senator **Cain.** When we talk about war and peace, we are not concerned with the hour, be it day or night.

Admiral **Sherman.** Shall I proceed?

Chairman **Russell.** Yes.

[Deleted.]

Chairman **Connally.** May I ask, Mr. Chairman, who wrote that; who sent that?

Admiral **Sherman.** That, as I understand it, Senator, was never sent.

Chairman **Connally.** That is a communication they were going to submit to the United Nations, but the MacArthur action stopped it; is that right?

Admiral **Sherman.** Yes, sir. This is the planned Presidential message. It was retyped in the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the State Department on the 19th, at the same time that the mesasge was sent to General MacArthur telling him that such a step was planned.

Chairman **Connally.** All right.

Chairman **Russell.** Senator Cain.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Senator **Knowland.** I understood that would go into the secret record; and, for the benefit of Admiral Davis and all concerned, it would certainly have a bearing on any future action, which I certainly do not contemplate. I think that this should be in the secret record, but not in the public record.

Chairman **Russell.** That is exactly what I thought.

I think it will be all right, Admiral, to give it to the reporter, because it will not go any further than Admiral Davis and the secret record of this committee.

Senator **Knowland.** I would suggest, procedurally, Mr. Chairman, that General Mudge now tell Admiral Davis about this; that it is the judgment of the committee, as well as the Admiral, that this part dealing with the message will not be made a part of the public record, so that it will just be a double-check, so that there will not be any slip-up on it.

Chairman **Russell.** That will be quite all right.

But, I have a great deal of faith and confidence in Admiral Davis.

Senator **Knowland.** I have, too; but, under the conditions under which it was offered to the committee, I want to be doubly sure it would be thoroughly understood.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

PROCEDURE WITH WITNESS

Senator SMITH. Might I ask a question of procedure?

Are you planning to have Admiral Sherman here tomorrow?

Chairman RUSSELL. We will settle that right now.

Senator SMITH. I have to meet a train.

Chairman RUSSELL. I had hoped to conclude with Admiral Sherman today, but I want to permit every member of the committee to ask every question of Admiral Sherman they desire to propound; and, if the Senators would indicate now about the length of time it will take them to conclude their questioning, we can decide right now and determine whether Admiral Sherman will return tomorrow morning.

Is there any Senator who would be willing in the interests of arriving at an early conclusion to state about the time he thinks it would take him to ask any questions he might desire to ask?

Senator CAIN. Speaking for one member, I would assume that I would have about 30 minutes of questioning.

Chairman RUSSELL. About 30 minutes?

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. In view of the fact that we cannot have a meeting of the two committees on tomorrow afternoon due to our intention to present the military manpower bill conference report on the floor of the Senate tomorrow afternoon, I see no reason why we should not recess at this juncture until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Admiral Sherman, you will be good enough to be back with us then?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope we may conclude your testimony then, and Friday morning we will start with Secretary Acheson. If there is nothing further, the committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 5:34 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:05 a. m., Thursday, May 31, 1951.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1951

Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Richard B. Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), presiding.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman, Committee on Armed Services), Connally (chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations), Smith, Green, Hickenlooper, McMahon, Lodge, Fulbright, Tobey, Sparkman, Gillette, Brewster, Byrd, Saltonstall, Johnson, Morse, Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Bridges, and Stennis.

Also present: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Carl M. Marcy, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Chairman Russell. The committee will come to order.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of procedure, might I respectfully say that the Labor-Federal Security bill is going to be marked up in the Appropriations Committee this morning, and I will have to leave at about 25 minutes of 11.

Chairman Russell. We regret to lose the Senator, but I understand the necessity for your attendance at that meeting.

On yesterday, Senator Knowland requested certain figures of the naval aid furnished for French Indochina, the Phillipines, and Formosa since January 1, 1949. That has been handed me, and due to the fact that there are some hieroglyphics involved in describing the ships, I will ask Admiral Sherman to read it.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL FORREST P. SHERMAN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. IRA H. NUNN, USN—Resumed

NAVAL AID SHIPPED TO FAR EAST

Admiral Sherman. Mr. Chairman, the question asked was the naval aid furnished since the 1st of January 1949, to French Indochina, to the Philippines, and to the Government of the Republic of China on Formosa.

The French Indochina program, $63,500,000 have been approved, allocated to the Navy.

[Deleted.]

That program is approximately three-quarters completed as far as deliveries are concerned.

The Republic of the Philippines, 4.2 million dollars has been approved and allocated which are mostly miscellaneous materials and spare parts. That program is 40 percent completed.

To Formosa this year there has been allocated a total of 5.2 million dollars covering ammunition, ordnance, spare parts for ships.

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, at that point might I interrupt? I was not, on this question of yesterday, so much interested in the allocations. I was interested in the actual shipments there since January 1, 1949.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I have covered that in that the Indochina program is three-quarters delivered, the Philippines 40 percent delivered, and the funds for Formosa were not received until the 7th of May, and there have been no deliveries under that program.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain.

MAC ARTHUR AS A STRATEGIST

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Admiral Sherman.

On yesterday, sir, you expressed your admiration for General MacArthur as other military witnesses have freely done, and your amazement over General MacArthur's concept as to how sea and air power might and ought to be employed.

I have a question against what you said. Do you happen to have known an officer of any nation, Admiral Sherman, who had, in your opinion, a better grasp of how to use sea, air, and land forces than General MacArthur through the years?

I merely wish to know if, in your military judgment, General MacArthur stands forth as a strategist of great stature.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, if I may, I would rather avoid the comparison. I would say that he was in the forefront among the strategists with respect to the coordinated use of land, sea, and air power.

Senator CAIN. Well, I did not wish you to make reference to any other individual. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Sherman, I have two brief questions about the two meetings which were held on Sunday, April 8.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

JCS MEETINGS RELATIVE TO MAC ARTHUR RELIEF

Senator CAIN. The first: From your testimony and from the record it appears to me to be so that the Army Chief of Staff, a member of the JCS, who was not present at the Thursday, April 5, meeting, was not advised at either of the two Sunday meetings that a suggestion had been made on Thursday that an officer with comparable rank to that of General MacArthur be sent to Tokyo in an effort to reach an understanding and full agreement with General MacArthur. Is that your understanding, sir?

General Collins testified that he had not heard of the Sunday meeting until he was advised of it by General Bradley sometime Sunday morning, at which time General Bradley merely requested that General Collins come to his office and the subject of the meeting was not discussed.

Admiral SHERMAN. To the best of my recollection, sir, there was no discussion at either Sunday meeting as to methods and procedures. The discussion in those meetings had to do with the basic problem and the question of replacement.

Senator CAIN. Will you please recall as best you can the form of the question which the Chairman of the JCS posed to the JCS at the 2 p. m. meeting on Sunday, April 8.

May I say this, Admiral: That you have testified that General Bradley on Thursday merely said to the other gentlemen in attendance that the question of replacing General MacArthur might be raised by those in higher authority and the JCS ought to give some thought to the question.

Now, I wish to know if you can recall the form of the question which actually got the meeting under way on Sunday at 2 o'clock.

Admiral SHERMAN. I really don't remember that, sir.

Senator CAIN. I was wondering whether the Chairman might have said, "Gentlemen, I have been officially requested for your views, your military views, in support of a decision which is likely to soon be reached to relieve General MacArthur of his Far Eastern Command."

You just don't remember?

Admiral SHERMAN. I don't recall the form. The substance of it was we were to be asked for our opinions at 4 o'clock.

TOTAL NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Admiral Sherman, in my opinion your testimony of yesterday was worth at least a score of ships, in what I personally hope will soon become a total naval blockade of Red China.

I was, as an American, deeply encouraged by the firmness and frankness of your testimony; but I was likewise made a bit heartsick by the disclosures covering what had taken place in Red China because an effective economic and naval blockade has not been in force during recent months.

Our several administration witnesses, in endeavoring to define what we are doing in Korea, have said that we were buying time so that we might have a more adequate defense or better military posture several years from now.

BUYING TIME IN KOREA

Do you agree, sir, that, among other things, we seek to buy time in Korea?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I don't quarrel with that concept, sir, although I sometimes question whether at any particular time we can feel that we are sure that in this instance we are profiting.

Our objectives are always the same, and I feel that definitely, in the short term, time is on our side, that our military position is improving very rapidly because of the expansion programs that are under way.

I would like, if I may, to go back to the question of economic blockade, and again, for clarity and emphasis, point out that I feel that in this country things moved rapidly and kept up with the situation.

Certain things were done in other countries in connection with economic blockade, but there is still much to be done and after that process has been exhausted, that is the time when the sweep-up process of a complete naval blockade will become timely.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral Sherman, if the concept of buying time is reasonable and valid, does it not mean that every allied nation ought to use the time available to it in the most productive and effective way?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; because I believe that the nations allied with us, none of them are in quite as secure a position as we are.

Senator CAIN. Sir, if, at our present rate of endeavoring, it will take us, as some witnesses have testified, from now until about 1953 or sometime in 1954 to attain the military posture we seek, why don't we begin, in this country and among our allies too, to work harder and longer and get the instruments of war more rapidly, that we need in order to bring this war in Korea to the most rapid possible, and successful conclusion?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir; that is a rather fundamental question, and it is not an easy one to answer.

Senator CAIN. I know it isn't, but I ask it validly, against our great and natural distress that the greatest people in the world are providing us with that time, and I am not certain that we are utilizing it fully.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, in principle I certainly agree we should make the best use of the time that we have.

SUPPLYING RED CHINA WHILE UN TROOPS ARE KILLED

Senator CAIN. Admiral Sherman, you said something yesterday with which I want to associate myself, if I understood you correctly. You said that in your view it was unthinkable that any allied nation—and that would include the United States—should send military personnel out to fight in Korea while the nation which sent them continues to provide the enemy, Red China, with the provisions of war.

All of us know that all of the free nations outside of the United States and South Korea have committed but a handful of foot soldiers to the Korean conflict, and that some of the Allied Nations have made no commitment of ground strength of any kind.

From the figures you offered to us yesterday—and I spent a lot of time last night in just reading them again, sir, and thinking about them—the only hard-headed and realistic conclusion I can reach is that some of the free nations, aside from the United States and South Korea, have by dealing with Red China maintained up to this time far more enemy troops in the field than those free nations have offered collectively to the Korean War.

Could I in terms of logic draw any other conclusion, Admiral Sherman.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, that is a very forceful expression of the situation. I can't say whether it is more or less and it is difficult for me to translate trucks into troops and vice versa.

Senator CAIN. And penicillin and blood plasma and all the rest of them.

Admiral SHERMAN. These are all intangibles.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. But the effect is certainly in that direction.

Senator CAIN. Well, that being so, can we think of any single reason to justify the loss of any single American in Korea if any single allied nation including the United States continues to supply Red China with any of the many provisions and sinews of war to be used against our men and women in Korea, sir?

MOVING TOWARD ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I think that now, in fairness to the nations concerned, that they have all been moving toward the establishment of an economic blockade; and I know that many of them felt that when they agreed to the position recently taken in the General Assembly that they were merely taking a cooperative position, which was an etxension of what they had been doing already.

It is important, I think, not to translate this situation which we have been discussing into too direct an indictment in general terms because a good many of these countries have taken steps, but it is my belief that those steps should be made as completely effective as possible.

Senator CAIN. Well, my present and real concern, Admiral, lies not with the past, but with our hopes for the future, and such questions as I have offered to you were designed only as an encouragement to others to do a much better job than they have had a chance to do so far.

UN APPROVAL OF BLOCKADE

Here is a more or less legal question about the naval blockade. I have no idea concering its answer. If the United Nations approve and develop a naval blockade to stop the supply of materials of war to an aggressor nation, Red China, would not all members of the United Nations, while they are members of that organization, be bound by that action?

(*a*) If not, why not?

(*b*) If so, how could Russia, while remaining a member of the United Nations, consider such a blockade by the United Nations to be an act of war?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, the only precedent that we have to go to is that a United Nations naval blockade of North Korea was established, and as far as I know, it has been respected by all the members of the United Nations.

Senator CAIN. And Russia has not in that instance said that that blockade was an act of war?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. Russian ships have been, as far as I know, meticulous in avoiding the combat area. For instance, they have avoided going through the straits between Korea and Japan.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, Admiral.

General Vandenberg, and I think each of our other witnesses, has testified that he never heard of any recommendation by General MacArthur to employ American troops in any force on the mainland of China. You have known General MacArthur longer than most of the other witnesses or have been more closely associated with him in recent years. Have you ever heard General MacArthur to make any such recommendation, Admiral Sherman? I am asking now about the employment of American ground troops on the mainland of China.

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I did not. I know of no such proposal.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Cain.

Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Long?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. The chairman. The chairman passes.

Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

SEPARATING MAC ARTHUR'S COMMANDS

Senator SMITH. I just have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Sherman, I refer again to your recommendation of April 5 that someone of high rank should go to confer with General MacArthur and see if the differences couldn't be worked out or possibly a change of command be made without the necessity of the abrupt dismissal. Perhaps you are aware that when General MacArthur was before us he was asked that very question; namely, whether, if he had been waited on or asked to come here, he would have been very glad to turn over the command without involving the Japanese picture and everything else.

My question is: In your judgment, if that had been done, would it have been necessary to remove him from his very important work in Japan as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, in view of the fact that the peace treaty was pending at that time and Mr. Dulles had been there and he and Mr. Dulles had been the top people in those negotiations?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir—and before I answer, may I correct the impression about the incident on the 5th? I don't believe it is fair to my colleagues to say that that was a recommendation. It was more in the form of a suggestion, and there was, of course, someone else's suggestion of doing it by letter. Those were just ideas that were advanced at the meeting which was not intended to be conclusive.

To go to the other question, I read General MacArthur's testimony when it was given, and I have no reason to question it.

With regard to the problem of separating commands, that was discussed, I believe—I would rather not try to say whether that was discussed on the 5th or on the 8th—and I had no views on it. Those who were more familar with the interlocking of those responsibilities felt that it was not feasible.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall whether the advice of Mr. Dulles was asked with regard to the whole situation and what the effect might be on the peace negotiations?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do not know but, if it was done, I never heard of it.

FIRST SUGGESTION OF KOREAN EVACUATION

Senator SMITH. Now I would like to ask you another question. The point has been raised that General MacArthur was the first one to suggest the possibility of evacuation in Korea. I am wondering if you recall just how that suggestion did originate. I have been trying to study these documents here in this compilation, and it seems to me that impression is hardly justified by the memoranda here.

Do you recall whether the suggestion first came as a question from the Joint Chiefs or whether MacArthur himself said he thought we would have to evacuate?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it—and it may be possible to verify it from a reexamination of this compilation—the first report, the first communication that I had, which raised the possibility, came from our naval commander, who, of course, was concerned with questions of shipping and readiness.

For example at the end of November, probably I would say the 29th or 30th, a day along in there, I remember I sent him one very short message which was that I assumed that he would hold any shipping that he might have need for, hoping that he would stop any return of empty ships to the United States because of the obvious possible requirements.

Through the month of December there was a great deal of discussion of the probability or possibility of evacuation becoming necessary and, as I recall it, General MacArthur sent us one message which indicated to me certainly that there must be consideration given to the probability of evacuation.

There was a dispatch on the 3d of December in which he discussed the situation and made reference to—this statement appears:

> Steady attrition leading to final destruction could reasonably be contemplated.

That had the effect on me of feeling that if it was a case of a military situation involving final destruction of the forces, that obviously consideration must be given to getting them out and, as far as I know, sir, the correct answer to your question is that General MacArthur did not specifically in exact language raise the question of evacuation until later in December.

On the other hand, we have this eventual destruction message on the third. On the fourth there was a message from General Collins who was then in Tokyo.

Senator SMITH. Are you speaking of December now or January?

Admiral SHERMAN. December, sir. On the 4th of December there was a message from General Collins to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collins then being in Tokyo, which said that General MacArthur feels best solution would be to arrange armistice on best terms available as soon as possible, there again under certain surrounding conditions, so that through that month there was a general discussion of the possibility that, if we were forced on south, that we would have to follow the Hungnam evacuation and the Inchon evacuation by a final evacuation from the whole peninsula, and then again, speaking from memory, I believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff then sent a message which used languge along the lines of, "We are forced to conclude that evacuation is a possibility," or something of that character. We can probably find that message, if you wish.

Senator SMITH. I find on page 80 of this compilation in paragraph 37 the following:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on December 29, 1950, pointed out to CINCFE that effective resistance at some position in Korea and the deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interests if this could be accomplished without incurring serious losses.

And then later in that paragraph is the important point, and I quote from it:

> Comments by CINCFE were requested as to conditions which might determine a decision to evacuate Korea.

That seems to me to be the point at which he was called upon to state those conditions, and his message of January 10 in which he was criticized for being the apostle of gloom, and so forth, and was urging evacuation, seemed to follow from this in the message of January 10; and it seems to me that he was pointing out that either we must evacuate or change our policy along certain lines.

I just wanted to make clear that the record was not left with the feeling that General MacArthur was the first one to urge evacuation, because, in other parts of these documents, he seems to be opposed to it, but he thinks that to prevent it we had to adopt certain different procedures.

I just wanted to get that clear for the record; I do not want to belabor it.

GLOOMY MILITARY SITUATION, DECEMBER 1950

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I think that a fair expression would be that during the month of December the military situation was such that both in Tokyo and in Washington it was apparent to all that the situation was gloomy, and that consideration had to be given to the possibility of evacuation.

If I may, I would like to find this message of December 29. You might look for it, Captain.

Senator SMITH. I did not want to press that further. My thought was I did not want to leave the record to show that MacArthur was the one who was urging evacuation, but rather that my impression from reading the entire document is that he was just asked what steps should be taken in case we had to evacuate, and the desirability of it and, as you say, it was an exchange between Washington and General MacArthur on that point.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. It was a general exchange of thought during that whole month of December. The information and the basic thinking, of course, had to come from there; and, as I recall it, after receiving a number of those messages, which were factual but which did give us a pretty gloomy picture, a message finally went out from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which, I think, for the first time really raised the question of conditions and circumstances, and at that time and at that period we were all very concerned not to send anything out which would be depressing to the morale of the recipients.

Senator SMITH. I have one more question, Admiral, if I have time, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; you have about—nearly 2 minutes.

ALLIES' POSITION RELATIVE TO NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator SMITH. I was interested yesterday in your statement that you were in favor of a naval blockade, provided it was a blockade by the United Nations. I think you were sound on that.

We, of course, want our allies in with us on that, and I would like to ask you this question. I do not know whether you were engaged in the negotiations with the United Nations on that point or not or whether you knew anything about it. but the impression that I have had was that our good friends the British were the ones who, because they were concerned about Hong Kong, and the trade with Communist China, and they felt that the blockade might make trouble that they did not want to face, that outside of the British no one else had enough concern to really oppose it.

It was really a difference of opinion between the United States and Britain as to a naval blockade, and their position was in order to protect the Hong Kong situation, and so on.

Now that suggests to me at least, and I would like to ask your view, whether in connection with this issue of the naval blockade we should not continue further in urging the British to join us in that conception as a way to put the pressure on the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea because of the fear of being cut off from all intercourse with the outside world.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I think, as I said yesterday, the first steps were to stop the important items, follow by abetting a general concurrence on an economic blockade, and then, with that condition established, we are then in a position to go forward and say, "Now we have gone this far, why don't we stop everything by a naval blockade?"

With reference to the attitude of the British about Hong Kong, I have had no direct association with that problem. I have merely followed the question of shipments from the best information that came to me through my own Intelligence Corps.

Senator SMITH. Were you aware if there were any other of the United Nations group who were opposing the blockade, or was it primarily the British?

Admiral SHERMAN. Not that I know of, sir. And, Senator, it is only more recently since we have been able to get the economic blockade, the control of exports in a satisfactory condition, that it becomes more timely now to go ahead with the next step.

Senator SMITH. Which would be a naval blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Byrd?

(No response.)

Chairman Russell. Senator Saltonstall?

FORMOSA SHOULD NOT BE IN UNFRIENDLY HANDS

Senator Saltonstall. Admiral Sherman, I have just two or three questions I would like to ask you, and if you have answered them yesterday, when I was not able to be here, please say so, because I do not want to clutter up the record.

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. You agreed with the other members of the JCS who have testified that the first suggestion for the relief of General MacArthur did not come from the JCS, but came down to them, in order that they might make suggestions. Is that correct?

Admiral Sherman. That is correct, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. Now, is Formosa, in Communist hands, hurtful to our security?

Admiral Sherman. Definitely yes. That is exactly our position: that Formosa should not be allowed to pass into unfriendly hands.

Senator Saltonstall. Now, the suggestion has been made that the Chiang Chinese Nationalist troops be permitted to carry out their own ideas as to warfare on the mainland, on China or otherwise.

In your opinion, could the Chiang Nationalist troops get across the Strait of Formosa and be supplied without the active aid of the United States Navy?

Admiral Sherman. Not on a large scale, sir; minor operations, yes; and, to the degree that conditions become unsettled on the mainland, the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists to conduct minor operations would increase.

However, I think it is important to go back to the situation as we understood it last June, which was that at that time Formosa was exposed to attack, and we were concerned that it might pass into unfriendly hands at a most unfortunate time.

Therefore, the decision was made to prevent an attack on Formosa, and with it the concurrent decision to state that we would not permit Formosa to be used as a base for attack on the Chinese mainland because, obviously, if we did one without the other, then we would be taking part in civil war in China.

Senator Saltonstall. When you say "a major operation on the mainland," in a broad general way what do you mean by that—100,000 men, 200,000 men, or what?

Admiral Sherman. A force of two or three divisions as contrasted with a raid of regemental size or even a large one for a brief period.

STATUS OF NATIONALIST TROOPS TODAY

Senator Saltonstall. Do Chiang's Nationalist forces have some of our LST's and some naval equipment today?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir; they do have. They have a considerable portion of that original aid-to-China program which ran to 271 ships and was never fully completed.

The best report that I had, I believe, ond the state of affairs out there prior to the beginning of the fighting in Korea was a rather long communication from Admiral Cooke, who was out there in an unofficial capacity.

He indicated to me then that he felt that Formosa would be, could be attacked after a build-up of Chinese air took place, and that the Chinese Nationalist Navy was deteriorating for lack of spare parts, ammunition, and so on.

Many of the better units had fallen into Communist hands as the movement over to Formosa went on, and there were defections within the navy as there were within the other forces.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So, quite a lot of our equipment that was turned over—naval equipment—has fallen into the other hands?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is right.

IMPORTANCE OF MEDITERRANEAN BASES

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, if it was not brought out yesterday, I would like to ask you this: There are bases in the Mediterranean and in Europe, but particularly in the Mediterranean, that are very important from our point of view in the Navy. Is that not true?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; they are.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And that is particularly true of many in the Mediterranean as opposed to the North Atlantic?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, it is. Our base problems in that part of the world, as far as the Navy is concerned, are primarily in the Mediterranean; and, of course, the Air Force bases in the same part of the world are correspondingly important because we visualize coordinated operations.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And are we dependent for those coordinated operations with the Air Force and for the bases of importance in the Mediterranean, and do we rely greatly on the cooperation of our allies in Europe?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. England and France, particularly.

Admiral SHERMAN. England, France, Italy—those are the principal ones.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Isn't it very important—if you care to give an answer to this—that the command of our forces in the Mediterranean be kept in American hands?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir; I think it is quite important, because the forces in that area would be predominantly American.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Outside of the selfish interests of our security, we have no selfish territorial interests or anything else in that territory.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is true, and then there is another very important feature in connection with command.

The logical way to approach resolution of command problems is on a basis of responsibility. Where we take a responsibility, a major responsibility, there should be authority commensurate with it. When we take the command authority, we thereby assume certain responsibilities.

I feel that one can not be discussed without the other.

JCS RELATIONSHIP TO HIGHER COUNCIL

Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask you just one more question. I believe it has not been discussed, and if it has, please say so.

There was a newspaper article Monday, May 28, which quoted you particularly, in the New York Times, and it was headlined "Joint Chiefs vexed over way advices get to the President."

Reading it, there would be two points, it seems to me, that the article brought out particularly in connection with your name. The first was that the Joint Chiefs and even the Secretaries of the three services are somewhat rankled at their remoteness from the highest Government councils; and the second was that the Joint Chiefs were harried by the enormous weight of the responsibilities created by the JCS and being heads of the services at the same time.

Would you care to comment on that, particularly in view of the fact that you helped so much in drafting the Unification Act?

Admiral SHERMAN. Gladly. In the first place, I think the article is exaggerated. I made the point in testifying before the Senate committee in connection with the Marine Corps bill that I felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were sufficiently large that the fact that there were four members made it natural that many times only one man would be sent for and would tend to act as an intermediary between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the agencies to whom we are by law the advisers.

It is not a question of being rankled or annoyed. I was trying to make a logical analysis of the facts of the situation and the situation as it would exist if we started enlarging the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I say, that statement was in my remarks before the Senate committee; and, as I recall it, you made some comment on it then.

JCS FUNCTIONING UNDER SECURITY ACT

Senator SALTONSTALL. Do you feel remote from the President? Do you feel remote from the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I do not. As I stated yesterday, the President made it quite clear that the Chiefs of the services are free to come to see him at any time.

I have the same feeling with the Secretary of Defense, that I can go and talk with him at any time.

The same statement was included in my remarks before the House committee. For convenience and to save labor, I used a great deal of the same material without change; and against the background of this hearing apparently it created much more curiosity, and I believe that that article is the result.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Do you feel overburdened?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I do not. I feel there is a tendency, which we have to resist, to inject the Joint Chiefs of Staff into administrative matters, which are not ours, but that resistance doesn't take up very much time.

I welcome the opportunity to make it clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff function very harmoniously and with a degree of cooperation and understanding which to me is very gratifying when I consider some of the growing pains that we went through in obtaining the passage of the Security Act of 1947.

In making an objective analysis of our procedures, there are certain tendencies I feel we have to guard against, but life is that way.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Then, in other words, you feel as a member of the JCS that you are not remote from your higher officials and that the JCS is functioning reasonably as the act intended it to?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In a difficult time.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green.

(No response.)

RELIEVING SUBORDINATES

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral Sherman, have you ever relieved a subordinate commander who is in an important position under you for matters of policy disagreement without discussing the matter with him or having it discussed with him and the reasons for that relief given to him in advance of the actual final action?

I take it from your testimony on yesterday and from the attitude you have expressed that it is good military custom and practice to follow that procedure in general when relieving persons in important command as subordinates.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. That is sound policy, I think.

FORESIGHT IN PREPARING FOR ALL EVENTUALITIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, we have heard a lot of questions and answers on the question of who suggested the possibility of evacuation in Korea. I am taking no exceptions to the questions or the answers, except I would like to ask you this: In a situation on a narrow peninsula, where freedom of maneuver is greatly restricted, where the enemy is known to far outnumber us, where on occasions overwhelming odds have been met in certain actions, where certain reverses have occurred, and where reinforcements for our forces are not forthcoming in great quantities, would you say that the commander in that theater should not at all times consider the alternative or the possibility of having to evacuate and make plans tentatively if things went badly? Would you not say that he should make those plans?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I am very proud of the fact that my naval commander out there made a plan, started gathering his ships, without very much consultation with the people ashore, not wanting to worry them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean, is there anything improper about a commander in the field saying, "Look. We have taken some beatings up here with odds over which we have no control. We may have to evacuate this place. Now I would like to know what our policy should be."

Is there anything wrong about that?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. I think that that is just being foresighted. When there is a possibility of having to evacuate, I believe that a commander would be negligent if he didn't have someone, some part of his planning staff, considering how he would go about it if he were forced into it. My only experience—when I was in the

Mediterranean I exercised my Marine battalion as much in withdrawal as in landing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it is fully as much a part of military planning to figure how you are going to get out of there, if things go wrong, as it is, on some occasions, how you are going to win it? That is, is there a commensurate value in the two propositions?

Admiral SHERMAN. Of course an evacuation is one of the most difficult propositions in war——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Undoubtedly.

Admiral SHERMAN. For the simple reason that in a landing you get progressively stronger, whereas, in an evacuation, you get progressively weaker, and the situation gets progressively more critical for those left.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One of the two chief charges given to General MacArthur, by way of directives, was the security of his troops, and the eventual security of Japan.

Those two things were really prime targets, were they not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; those were foremost in his instructions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And wouldn't you say that one of the essentials of the security of his troops would be to plan against the eventual possibility, which might become very real in the near future, as to how he was going to get them out of there?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And, there is nothing wrong with that?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And in your view, there was nothing to be criticized if General MacArthur suggested that "We may have to evacuate this place, and I am making plans for it, if we have to?"

Is there anything wrong with that, militarily?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

I feel that there is no particular credit or discredit involved in the question of who talks about evacuation first, because certainly I believe that every thinking military man who was following the course of that campaign must have given some thought to it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If a military man went into a situation, and found himself up against insurmountable odds, and had given no thought as to how he might extricate himself, he might be subject to severe criticism, might he not, under normal military operations?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

I can only speak on that from my own experience.

From the end of 1943 until the end of World War II, I was responsible for the planning in the Pacific Ocean areas, and I can assure you that consideration was always given to how we were going to get out of situations we got into, if they proved too rough.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with that thoroughly, but I wanted to make it clear that at least in my view, that it is most important that you plan how you are going to get out of a situation, if you are not certain that you can win it, and certainties are not always available.

POSSIBLE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Now, Admiral Sherman, you held considerable responsibility for the Mediterranean subsequent to World War II; were you the commander in that area?

Admiral Sherman. I was in command of our fleet in the Mediterranean for 2 years.

Senator Hickenlooper. I asked this question of General Vandenberg as an airman either yesterday or the day before: Suppose Russia moved down through the Middle East, and came in and took over the northern Mediterranean, and the eastern Mediterranean, with force. I am assuming that they bring their air and land armies. Suppose they come down with what we know to be a very substantial amount of air they have, long-range and short-range air; wouldn't the Mediterranean then be almost a cul de sac for a hostile navy operating in there?

Admiral Sherman. Well, if they have already accomplished this objective of taking over the eastern half, it would be a pretty tight spot; but, on the other hand, I believe that our fleet would be one of the most effective instruments in combating that advance, and I do not believe it is sound to contemplate the developments of a world war without looking at the periphery of Russia, and seeing what all the requirements are from Kamchatka all the way around through the Middle East, and up the North Cape, and I think you will find that the Russian military leaders are in the same position as we usually are, of trying to provide sufficient forces to wage a decent fight in each of these various areas.

Senator Hickenlooper. Under no circumstances do I want to be understood to say or even indicate that we should abandon the Mediterranean; that is not the point.

The point I am getting at is it would be a pretty hot spot, would it not?

Admiral Sherman. If they concentrated against the Mediterranean it would be a very hot spot.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

Now then, what I am leading up to is this: The British have always considered themselves to be a great world naval power, but I notice that they very kindly turned over the responsibility for the Mediterranean to the United States Fleet now, and I am wondering just what in this North Atlantic mutual defense contribution system we can expect.

ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY AND COMMAND

I think the sense of your statement a moment ago was that when we take responsibility, command should go along with it. I suppose that to turn that around the other way would be to say that when we take command we assume responsibility.

Now we have assumed command and responsibility in Asia, that is, in the Korean situation. We have the supreme commander on the land in Europe. We have assumed command with a big majority of the ships in the Mediterranean.

Aren't we moving according to that theory pretty much to assuming the sole responsibility on land, sea, and air for this North Atlantic situation and for the possible defense of the whole world?

I am merely probing to see where these other people are assuming their responsibility. They may make some contributions but the responsibility, the assumption of responsibility may be a most important thing.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, the naval combat responsibility, on which I can talk best, has been assumed by the British in the northeastern Atlantic. I am speaking now of combat command in the forward areas.

Under our planning, the British have the naval combat command on the northern flank of Europe, and we feel that we should concentrate and take the naval combat responsibilities on the southern flank of Europe, and to that there is not the wholehearted agreement that we would like to have.

However, that is the division and it is a logical one, because otherwise we would be in the position of sending ships to the British Isles and having the British send ships from the British Isles to the Mediterranean.

It is only logical that they keep their ships in the vicinity of their home country and we send ours to the Mediterranean. It makes the logistic problem simpler and the tactical command organization better.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARD MEDITERRANEAN

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Except for the significant fact that for generations the British have looked upon the Mediterranean as a British lake. They have established bases in there. Their fleet has had the full run of the Mediterranean. The Suez Canal has been vital to their lifeline.

Now we see the British willing to let us assume the responsibility in the Mediterranean. Maybe we are anxious for it, I do not know, but here the British are getting out of their traditional one great naval area where they have let no one dispute their actual control and operational facilities.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, their capabilities, their naval capabilities are not now sufficiently great to provide what is needed in the vicinity of the United Kingdom in the event of war and in northern Europe, and at the same time send any substantial force to the Mediterranean.

Their naval capabilities are not what they used to be.

BROAD RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNITED STATES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, these particular questions are in line with questions that I raised some time ago in connection with the North Atlantic Pact and the ground implementation in Europe.

I raised the question of whether or not we were not moving with great speed toward assuming the complete responsibility, not the entire contribution but the complete responsibility so that other nations could look to us and say, "Well, you have taken this and you have taken that. Now the responsibility is yours. We will sit back and let you run the show without too much contribution. You have assumed the responsibility. You have got to do the things that are necessary now to meet that responsibility which you have assumed."

I personally have been fearful for a long time that in spite of the fact that under the North Atlantic and mutual defense agreements where everybody was to contribute substantial amounts and we were only to do certain things, that we nevertheless have been pushed month by month into assumptions of broader responsibilities in more theaters until finally the entire basic burden of that responsibility will rest on the United States. I frankly doubt that we can stand that responsibility. That is the thinking behind my questions.

Now, one more question. Do I have a half a minute, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman RUSSELL. Just about a half a minute.

SHERMAN'S OFFICE RECORD

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral Sherman—I do not mean a telephone dictograph record or anything like that—but do you keep some kind of a record, notes, memoranda, or anything like that, in your office, or is it kept for you of all telephone calls and communications on official matters?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. The record kept in my office is not that complete. They have a book in which they record who comes to see me and where I go, as closely as they can keep up with it. Actually I have only looked in that once since the 1st of January, and that was in connection with a business call. But they do try to keep track of me and find out who calls and record it for me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do they keep track of all incoming calls to you and who they are from?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up.

Senator Johnson?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Morse?

RESTRICTIONS CONTINGENT UPON A LIMITED WAR

Senator MORSE. Admiral, I want to return for a few questions on what I consider to be the basic documents in this hearing—the secret exhibit previously referred to by me, entitled "Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Operations."

I quite agree with you that it is not a matter of great significance as to who first discussed, and when they first discussed, the possibility of evacuating Korea. I think both MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have been derelict in their duty if they had not been discussing it for quite some time, and if they did not have blueprints for evacuating in view of the developments in Korea. However, I think this document makes perfectly clear that it was long before December 29 that General MacArthur was discussing in his communications with Joint Chiefs of Staff the possibility of evacuation.

Is it not true, Admiral, as we study this document, that it shows a rather consistent and persistent position on the part of General MacArthur that he would have the Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the restrictions that were being placed upon him as far as extension of the limitation of the war was concerned, in his opinion, increased the possibility of evacuation?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that is part of the broad picture one gets from a reexamination of all of the dispatches, that in the headquarters of General MacArthur—I use that term advisedly because the contacts with an organization of the size of his are with a headquarters as well as with only the commander—in his headquarters I believe there was a feeling that as the situation got more critical, that the way to relieve the pressures was to branch out across the Manchurian border and do these other things. And we here felt that the broader results of that type of action would be unacceptable.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, Admiral, that this exhibit shows there was such a consistent resistance on the part of MacArthur and his headquarters to the limitations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to impose upon him because of the policy of our Government to keep the war a limited war, if it was at all possible to do so, explains in part at least, and in considerable part, the fact that there did develop between MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other high Government officials charged with the responsibility of prosecuting the Korea war, a lack of rapport necessary under such circumstances which could be properly described as full-hearted team work?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I think that is a fair way of expressing the situation as it developed.

REVIEWING JCS-MAC ARTHUR COMMUNICATIONS

Senator MORSE. Now, Admiral, I ask you to turn to page 70 of this exhibit to the message of December 4, at the bottom of the page, which says:

> In Tokyo, CINCUNC on December 4, 1950, had informed the Chief of Staff of the Army as to his views on the Korean situation. These views were later given orally by the Chief of Staff of the Army to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCUNC's basic position was that the United Nations should not fail to accept the new challenge of Communist Chinese aggression and that the full power of the United Nations should be mounted at once. If reinforcements could arrive in time the most advantageous action would be a withdrawal in successive positions, if necessary, to the Pusan area; otherwise the command should be evacuated.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. That leaves no doubt, does it, that at least as early as December 4 MacArthur advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and I think from the record that it appears he would have been derelict in his duty if he did not—unless he got the necessary reinforcements it was going to be necessary to withdraw to successive positions and finally evacuate? Is that not true?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. That dispatch, of course, is a dispatch from General Collins, who was then present in General MacArthur's headquarters.

Senator MORSE. But reporting General MacArthur's point of view which had been given to General Collins by General MacArthur directly in person?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Then let's look at the next document on page 71.

MAC ARTHUR SUGGESTS ALTERNATIVE CONDITIONS IN KOREAN CAMPAIGN

> After his return from Tokyo, the Chief of Staff of the Army reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the thinking along the following lines, which was expressed by CINCUNC at the final conference in Tokyo on December 7, 1950.

Now, when we refer to CINCUNC in these messages, who are we referring to personally?

Admiral SHERMAN. General MacArthur, Commander in Chief of United Nations Command.

Senator MORSE. I used that in my previous question and that was my understanding of the meaning of the abbreviation.

Here are the conditions that he suggested:

> Condition 1:

apparently which Collins had obviously talked to him about—

> Continued all-out attack by Chinese Communists coupled with the following restrictions on UN forces.

Those restrictions were, no air action against China; no naval blockade of China; no reinforcement of forces in Korea from Nationalist China.

[Deleted.]

> CINCFE—

who was MacArthur—

> felt strongly that if all or a major part of the above limitations were placed on his command, while it remained under strong Chinese Communist attack, this, in itself, would represent essentially a surrender. Under these conditions the question of an armistice would be a political matter, helpful but not essential from a military standpoint. Our forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea but we should not be precipitate in seeking an armistice, since CINCFE agreed with his field commanders that the Eighth Army and the X Corps could be safely withdrawn, with or without an armistice from Pusan and Hungnam.

In other words, CINCFE, MacArthur at this time, December 7, felt that if these restrictions of no extension of the war by air attack into China, no naval blockade, no help from the Nationalist forces, would be imposed upon him it would amount, in fact, to essentially a surrender, and it would, of course, make it necessary to withdraw from Korea, isn't that true? Isn't that the position he took as to that condition?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Now, as to condition No. 2, if we followed that alternative, all-out Chinese Communist attack but with increased United Nations support of United Nations forces in Korea as follows:

> (1) Effective naval blockade of China.
> (2) Air reconnaissance and bombardment of Chinese mainland.
> (3) Maximum employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces—

under these conditions—this is December 7—one of these conditions was the condition of bombardment in China—

> Under these conditions CINCFE felt that we should continue to hold the best possible positions in Korea. Tentatively he would plan to move the X Corps by water to Pusan and thence overland to join up with the Eighth Army. The combined forces, under Eighth Army Command, would hold a position across the peninsula as far to the north as possible.

And so on.

But it is fair to say that this document shows that as of December 7, it was MacArthur's position and, therefore, his recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that if these restrictions were lifted, as set forth in condition No. 1, previously cited on the page, he would then be in the best position to carry on the war gainst the Communits Chinese.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. This text is, as far as I can see without checking one against the other, an exact copy of a memorandum General Collins prepared either at Tokyo or in the plane on the way back, and read to use when he returned from that meeting.

Senator MORSE. As a report of CINCFE's position?

Admiral SHERMAN. That was CINCFE's position as the Chief of Staff of the Army had determined it in his visit.

SERIOUS SITUATION, DECEMBER 6, 1950

Senator MORSE. Now, as a result of the report that General Collins brought back, including the recommendations of MacArthur, we note, do we not, starting on the bottom of page 72 of this exhibit, the following:

> On December 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed all unified commanders, including CINCFE, that they considered the situation in Korea had greatly increased the possibility of general war. Accordingly, they directed the addresses to take action to increase their readiness without creating an atmosphere of alarm.

In other words, on December 6, this situation had become so serious that our Government was very much concerned about the possibility of it developing into a general war?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. And CINCFE, MacArthur, was notified so.

Is it not a fair statement, Admiral, to say that under those highly critical conditions, that everyone of the Military Establishment was then under great obligation to exercise the utmost caution in respect to any military policy, and make certain that any proposal or public statement or announcement that they made had the clearance of their Government?

As a result of that directive, for example, the Mediterranean Fleet got under way and went to sea.

Senator MORSE. And is it not true that it was about that time, as set forth on page 74 of this exhibit, that the President of the United States issued his directive that—

> * * * all commanders reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy; and that no public releases on such matters be made without clearance from the Departments of State or Defense, as appropriate.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Thus, is it not true that if time permitted, Admiral, we could go through this document and find reference after reference showing two things?

(1) This difference in point of view between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur as to the strategy that should be followed in the conduct of the Korean War; and

(2) The time and time again manifestation on the part of MacArthur that although he meticulously carried out military orders, he had a way of always making it clear to his superiors that he was carrying them out, but not in sympathy with them?

Admiral SHERMAN. I would rather reply to that particular question in an affirmative manner by saying that throughout this period the conduct of affairs was made difficult by a lack of responsiveness to the obvious intentions of the directives which were transmitted out there and a tendency to debate and in certain cases to criticize.

Senator MORSE. In my dictionary your answer means the same as my observation.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired. Senator McMahon.

Senator McMAHON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Lodge.

REEXAMINING DEFENSE PREPARATION PROGRAM

Senator LODGE. Admiral, do you believe that the Kremlin could call off this war in Korea if it wanted to?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator LODGE. Do you believe, therefore, that if we were in a position to put sufficiently firm diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin; we could induce them to call it off?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, it would seem so, sir.

Senator LODGE. But we are not sufficiently strong at the present time to put such pressure on the Kremlin, are we?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I don't think we are sufficiently strong to make it effective now.

Senator LODGE. Do you think we are building strength fast enough in order to get ourselves in a position to put diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin?

Admiral SHERMAN. At the moment I think that our rate of buildup is about as rapid as can be accomplished with efficiency, certainly with respect to air.

I believe we could make more rapid progress in the calling up and preparation of ground elements. I don't think that has been true in the past, and I believe in the next few months we are going to have to reexamine again, when the decisions are made as the present programs start to be implemented, whether we should add to them.

Senator LODGE. Do you believe that the program for building up the air has got to be examined? Do I understand you correctly to say that?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I think all the programs must be reexamined within a few months. Now the question as to whether we can make greater sacrifices and make greater inroads on the civilian economy and have more controls, more production, and so on, I feel that I am not the best witness on it, but I do feel that we have gone quite a long way and that from here on further progress will be more difficult than the program we have now launched upon.

MORALE OF KOREAN TROOPS

Senator LODGE. If our men in Korea are buying time for us, as the saying goes, don't you think as a matter of good faith to them we ought to build strength as fast as we can?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator LODGE. Isn't it rather a unique situation for a small group of Americans to be sacrificing practically everything in Korea and for the rest of us here at home to be living more or less the usual kind of life?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, very embarrassing.

Senator LODGE. Very embarrassing and very bad from a morale standpoint both here and there, don't you think so?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I believe that is one of the basic difficulties in the period in which we are living.

Senator LODGE. Because certainly in a democracy you do much better if there is a common sacrifice by all, don't you think so?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, our minor personnel problems would be handled more easily if there weren't this gap, this difference between the man who has been out in—well, I had a letter this morning. A sailor has been on board an LSD off Korea for nearly a year now, lots of others going ashore in the United States.

The difference creates some of our large national problems and it also creates small ones which are easier to remedy.

Senator LODGE. Yes. I remember last year I heard a great deal of talk to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be called upon to pass on every little administrative detail that came up, and that they were so constantly interrupted by these administrative details that they did not have time to think about large questions of policy. Is that condition true at the present time?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I do not believe that it is. I for one have managed to arrange my office so that I am free from minor details.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are using their deputies to clear away minor problems to a much greater degree than they did before. The normal procedure in the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting is for our deputies to arrive first and do all the things they can. The more difficult ones are the ones that the Chiefs have greater responsibility for themselves. It has been a highly effective procedure.

Senator LODGE. You agree, do you not, that the Joint Chiefs should be free to think about the big problems?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

STRATEGIC AREA OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

Senator LODGE. Is it not true that the Mediterranean countries ranging from east to west, from Turkey through Greece, Italy, southern France, Spain are a strategic entity insofar as the defense of the West against Communist aggression is concerned?

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe that they are a strategic entity and a very important one because on the ground there is a great deal of strength in Turkey, in Greece, certainly increasing strength and a great deal of residual strength in Spain and Portugal.

While those countries are efficient in the development of air forces and their naval forces are not very large, yet they are in terms of good solid combat ground elements. Turkey and Greece are quite well off in proportion to their size and resources.

Senator LODGE. Hasn't Spain got quite a potential for a ground army also?

Admiral SHERMAN. Spain has a considerable potential for a ground army. The state of its equipment is much lower than the others, of course.

[Deleted.]

Senator LODGE. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Kefauver.

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

JCS DISCUSS FUTURE ACTIONS IN KOREA

Senator KNOWLAND. Admiral Sherman, going back to the testimony of yesterday afternoon and the March 19 proposal which appears in the yellow record, the secret record of the committee, I do not care to question you on the document itself. I have read and reread that, but with that background I now refer you to the booklet that we have from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the report for the Senate committees.

Referring particularly to page 100, that states in paragraph 39:

> On March 19, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held another informal discussion with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State on the subject of "Future Courses of Action in Korea." The draft of a proposed Presidential declaration on the Korean situation, which had been prepared by the Department of State, was discussed. It was agreed that a message would be sent to General MacArthur to the effect that the Department of State was working on a Presidential announcement and CINCFE was to be queried as to the authority he would need for the next 2 weeks or so.

And it goes on with some additional language.

Now, that is the March 19 draft which you placed into the record; is it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, apparently subsequent to that time it is indicated that there were suggested changes made in that draft; is that correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. The draft which I read yesterday was the corrected draft.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, corrected as to how late? You mentioned that was the draft as corrected on the 19th of March.

Admiral SHERMAN. I can't be sure as to just when the corrected draft was typed, but corrections were certainly those discussed in that meeting on the 19th, which I identify primarily because this mimeographed record shows that the 19th of March was the meeting where the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State were present and it was in that meeting that the original draft was discussed and certain changes were made.

Senator KNOWLAND. Now, apparently as late as the 27th of March—because I call your attention to page 103, paragraph 47—

> on the 27th of March the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Secretary of Defense of the conditions and arrangements that should be made before an armistice should be concluded with the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. These armistice arrangements may be briefly summarized as follows:

And then it summarizes them.

Doesn't that indicate that between the 19th of March and the 27th that there must have been additional discussions? Because certainly in the time the proposed Presidential statement was going to be issued they knew the general basis upon which they would negotiate; did they not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. As I recall it—and it is with some difficulty, because there have been so many of these meetings—after the 19th meeting, in which the general frame-work of the announcement was agreed upon, one of our staff committees was told off to bring up a document which would be available in the nature of rather complete arrangements. And here I am supposing rather than remembering. I suppose that the date of March 27 on this completed document was the result of work in the intervening period by a committee which led to their having a paper which the Chiefs of Staff approved on the 27th.

MAC ARTHUR'S MARCH 24TH ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator **Knowland**. The only thing I am trying to find out, Admiral, for this record, and so the committee will be correctly advised, is—the impression which was publicly given was that the announcement of General MacArthur, on the 24th of March, asking the Communist commander in chief to lay down his arms and cease fire, had kicked over a pretty well developed cease-fire announcement and plan which had been worked out; and I merely—that may or may not be a fact—and I am merely trying to find out whether there had been substantial agreement in the Government of the United States regarding such a proposal, and whether or not there had been any agreement at all with any other nations, at the time the proposal was supposed to have been kicked over, and the record, I do not think, is very clear in that regard.

I call your attention to page 106, which relates to a message as late as the 5th of April, which appears on page 106 as message 54, and that ends up with paragraph D, saying:

> Action should be taken—

that is in the future, and I say that parenthetically—

> Action should be taken as a matter of urgency to ascertain the policies and objectives of our allies toward Korea specifically, and the Far East in general; and also to discover the degree and nature of support which we could expect from them under certain contingencies.

Now, that time, as late as the 5th of April, at that time there must not have been a great deal of circulating going on, or otherwise wouldn't we know what their views were in these regards?

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, sir; as to the attitude of other governments, I am not the best witness.

Senator **Knowland**. No; but are you not kept advised by the State Department?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

From the Joint Chiefs of Staff's point of view, we were brought a propoistion on the 19th, to which we contributed some ideas in connection with the revision and improvement of the document.

Then, as I say, we turned it over to a committee to get out what would be our armistice terms anyway. That job they completed, regardless of what might be going on in other circles.

VIEWS OF ALLIES REGARDING KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS

Then, as I remember it, this 5th of April document resulted from the feeling of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that our handling and discussion of these important matters would be improved, if we could find out what the views and objectives and policies of our allies were, before we tried to resolve the action, instead of being in the position of trying to get up proposals which they might or might not accept—that it would be quite helpful.

Senator **Knowland**. I quite agree with that, but this is still 9 months after the war had broken out in Korea, and some 6 months after the Chinese Communists had come over in force, and the only thing is that there is a great coincidence, strange coincidence, and maybe it is only a coincidence, that on the 5th day of April, when this memo appears, happens to be the day in which apparently somebody, unknown at the moment, notified General Bradley that they were going to get rid of General MacArthur.

Now, the question arises in my mind, had they been informed in these discussions with other nations that the only acceptable terms would be such that the belief was, with the past relationships we have had with General MacArthur out there, that he would have issued some kind of a statement pointing out that in his judgment it would lead to appeasement in Asia.

Now, that is, very frankly, what I am trying to find out here. They say that these things had been distributed to other countries.

Was the British Government insisting, for instance, as they did in January, when the January 11 measure was voted on at Lake Success, that Formosa be negotiated to be turned over to the Chinese Communists?

Were they still insisting that Red China be admitted into the United Nations? Is that what concerned the Joint Chiefs that they should know definitely what the views of our allies are so that we could get some kind of a firm proposal that would warrant the support of the Government of the United States?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, this document of the 5th of April, as I remember it, and I had something to do with drafting it, was an attempt at that time, in the light of the fact that this planned announcement and what might have come from that, seemed to be more or less in the discard for the moment, that it was necessary that we, as we had done many times, make the best possible round-up of where we stood and reexamine our objectives, and that it would be extremely helpful in doing a sound military job if we could get in advance the best possible expression of the thoughts of our allies and have that while we were undertaking this effort.

Senator KNOWLAND. Well, I just have one more question, Admiral.

Of course, this booklet which we have been furnished ends on the 5th day of April, because the last notation, paragraph 26, is:

> Between Thursday, April 5, 1951, and Tuesday, April 10, 1951, inclusive, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended several meetings at the Executive Office of the President, where the question of the relief of General MacArthur was discussed. Separately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met informally on two occasions to discuss this question. The President finally directed that a message be sent relieving General MacArthur of his commands in the Far East—

period; end of the booklet which has been furnished.

I think, as you have correctly pointed out, you do not handle the diplomatic phases of it, but when the Secretary of State gets here it does become a pertinent question as to why here, as late as the 5th of April, when our booklet ends, we apparently still do not know what the views of our allies were, when presumably we had been circulating a document since the 20th of March or thereabouts in order to get their views so that the President could issue an announcement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Fulbright?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

NORTH KOREAN BLOCKADE

Senator SPARKMAN. Admiral Sherman, I want to follow up briefly a question that Senator Cain asked you earlier, and that was whether or not the blockade of North Korea had been considered by Russia as an act of war.

Now there has not been any act, has there, in the blockade of North Korea that in any way affected any Russian port?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. They have only been Korean ports; have they not?

Admiral SHERMAN. We have blockaded only the coast of North Korea, and we have been meticulous in avoiding the boundary between the territorial waters of Korea and Soviet Russia.

INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATIVE TO CHINESE BLOCKADE

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, as I recall yesterday, in discussing the blockade of China, you said that in order for it to be effective it would be necessary to blockade Port Arthur; did you not? Or, whether you did or not, may I ask you if you could have an effective blockade of China without blockading Port Arthur?

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe that a blockade of China could be reasonably effective without blockading Port Arthur; and then with respect to Port Arthur, which could not be blockaded without it being an act against Russia, the only way of intercepting shipping would be on a basis of the principle of contraband of war, which applies not to all manner of things but to specific items of military importance.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, now, do you mean that you could effectively stop even Russian ships carrying contraband of war without Russia regarding that as an act of war on our part?

Admiral SHERMAN. Under international law as it has been understood, and still issued to ships of the Navy for guidance, if the forces of Communist China are fighting in Korea and the ship is on its way with a tank which is destined for that army, whether it is going into a Chinese port or into a Russian port, or into one of our own, that can be intercepted because it is military equipment on the way to the enemy.

Now, of course, as to the willingness of the Russians to accept the principles of international law in that regard, we are only guessing. It is my judgment that it is well worth trying.

BLOCKADE ONLY AS A JOINT UNDERTAKING

Senator SPARKMAN. You did advocate that you would try the blockade only as a joint undertaking with the United Nations, did you not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Only as a joint undertaking and only following exhaustion of the possibilities of economic blockade.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, as are many other proposals, is this also subject to the proper timing?

Admiral SHERMAN. Definitely; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is true with all of your plans, is it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. And I want to make it clear that I have not advocated establishing a blockade and been overruled. I have discussed the problem here in relation to the recommendations of General MacArthur to go ahead with it, to show what the problems are, what the possibilities are, and to try to make an objective analysis of it.

In my opinion the time has not arrived for such an undertaking, because I still believe that the best way to stop this traffic is by mutual agreement between the United Nations. I think, beginning with the action of some of our own oil companies fairly early in the game, following the things that are now being done through the United Nations and through cooperation, we can make a great deal of headway. It may be that we can make enough. But, if we ever resort to a blockade by force, it must be a United Nations operation unless we are going to get involved in a unilateral war between the United States and China, which in my own opinion is extremely undesirable.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, if we did have the blockade, you testified that it would be necessary for us to take additional American naval units of our own?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would you expect our allies likewise to furnish additional naval units?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I think they should.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would that include the United Kingdom?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH FLEET

Senator SPARKMAN. Did I understand you, in answer to a question propounded by Senator Knowland a while ago, to say that the British fleet was deployed just about as thinly as it could be?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I believe that I have testified that at one time last summer I was queried by the First Sea Lord, who is my opposite number in the British Navy, as to whether I felt he should send more ships out there. At that time our reactivation of ships from our own reserve fleet had not progressed, and I felt that the Mediterranean was as thin as it should be, and therefore I replied that I felt he should not weaken his deployment in the Mediterranean any further.

If we were to undertake a United Nations blockade, I believe it would be extremely important to have representation from the navies of all the countries whose merchant shipping might be involved so that to a maximum degree we could police our own nationals.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes; I remember the statement that you made that you have just repeated. That was in reply to a question that I had put to you yesterday. But just a few minutes ago Senator Hickenlooper, I believe, propounded the question why it was that we had taken over the responsibility of the Mediterranean, and I understood you then to say that the United Kingdom fleet was pretty well taken up around the British Isles.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; that was in reply to Senator Hickenlooper. I indicated that under the NATO command, arrangements which we have discussed recently, that our thinking was the British would do as much as possible in the vicinity of their own country, and that we should take the responsibilities elsewhere.

Senator SPARKMAN. The whole point is this, as I understand it; I will see if I am correct: even though it may become necessary to establish a blockade by force, and it may become desirable at sometime in the future, it is not such a simple thing as just ordering it into effect at some day when you may want it. It is really a complicated matter, is it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. It is a complicated matter which, to be done efficiently, requires advance arrangements. If possible those arrangements should include representation from all countries whose merchant ships would be involved. It would make the job of the blockading squadron commander much easier.

NO ADVOCACY OF OUR EVACUATION OF NORTH KOREA

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, Admiral Sherman, Senator Hickenlooper asked you several questions with reference to who brought up the idea of getting out of Korea, and who suggested it first. Let me ask you this: Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever suggest or put forward the idea that you desired our force to evacuate North Korea for political purposes?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. As far as I know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never advocated either staying in Korea or getting out of Korea for political reasons.

The reverse is true. You may recall the incident of the dispatch directive of January 12 and a political message on the 13th of January.

SEPARATING MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff went to considerable length to persuade all concerned to keep the two subjects separate so that we would be dealing with military matters in military language and that the political considerations could be presented separately and identified as such.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now those messages followed a message from General MacArthur on January 10, did they not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. In which he suggested the advisability, or perhaps I should say the inevitability, of his getting out of Korea.

Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it, sir, the message of the 9th, which was sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, was a military massage and gave him a military directive.

On January 10 in his reply, the latter part of it, he raised the question of the primary political interest of the United States and his asking that questions about the political interest of the United States, in his statement that the military course was implicit in political policy, and so forth, was what created the necessity really for the military reply of January 12 and the desirability of the political message of the 13th.

WHITNEY'S COMMENTS ON JANUARY 13 MESSAGE

Senator SPARKMAN. Now I want to call your attention to an article that appeared in the Washington Post, Friday, May 11, 1951, under a New York, May 10, United Press, date line:

> General MacArthur's spokesman said today that until January 13 this year MacArthur believed Washington officials wanted our forces evacuated from

Korea and made a scapegoat for some political advantage. Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's aide, said a January 13 message from President Truman was the Government's first clear statement to MacArthur to hold in Korea.

Do you know of anything to justify such a statement as that?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I don't believe that the record warrants a statement of that sort.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not going to read the whole statement; it has been placed in the record on 1775 of the transcript, but there are a couple of other things I want to hurriedly call to your attention.

I quote:

> Before receiving the message, said Whitney, MacArthur and his command had been led to believe the administration wanted to evacuate the Eighth Army from Korea, pretending the enemy forced an evacuation which would be used as an international political weapon.
>
> MacArthur "wasn't going to use the Eighth Army as a scapegoat," Whitney said.

Do you know of anything to justify any such statements as those?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. I think that is an unwarranted accusation against the responsible authorities in the Government of the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. The Joint Chiefs of Staff never did advocate an evacuation on the pretense that the enemy had pushed us out, did they?

Admiral SHERMAN. So far as I know, every action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the more important ones taken that I did not participate in, have been made on the basis of what we believed was for the good of our country.

Senator SPARKMAN. And certainly the Joint Chiefs of Staff never did want to make the Eighth Army a scapegoat, did they?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, indeed.

Senator SPARKMAN. I go on, quoting General MacArthur's spokesman, Major General Whitney:

> "You must understand that prior to the receipt of this message it appeared to be the prevailing view in Washington that our forces should be evacuated from Korea as soon as diplomatic discussions then underway in the United Nations had been concluded," Whitney said.
>
> "It seemed to be the prevailing view of the authorities in Washington that if the evacuation was conducted as the result of enemy pressure some political advantage would be served."

Then, he further says that this letter from the President on the 13th was a reversal of the views he, MacArthur, had previously received from Washington.

Is that a true statement, warranted by the facts?

Admiral SHERMAN. As far as I know, that is unjustified.

Senator SPARKMAN. You know of nothing to justify any of these statements?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I do not.

RUSSIAN-RED CHINESE RELATIONSHIP

Senator SPARKMAN. Now Admiral, just one very short question. Yesterday you indicated that you believed that there was a difference in the relationship between Russia and the people of China and that perhaps the people of China did not react to this Russian domination as they did in some of the satellite countries. But what do you think about the relationship between Moscow and Mao-Tze-tung and other Communist Chinese leaders?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think Mao-Tse-tung, as far as I know, he is under practically direct Russian control, but how widely that extends, how firm it is, and how long it can be maintained with respect to the rest of the Chinese I think is somewhat debatable.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, you think there is some hope as to the people, but you believe that the ruling powers are Russian puppets. Is that correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe that there is hope as to the people, particularly those in the south.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hunt?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cain?

RACIN, SUPPLY DEPOT

Senator CAIN. I think Senator Stennis, sir, is here.

Chairman RUSSELL. You happen to precede, just as Senator Wiley precedes Senator George.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Sherman, do you happen to know how far inland Racin is, and Racin, so we have been told by several witnesses, is the large enemy supply source and depot in northeast Korea.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, it is a seaport, sir, and is about 17 or 18 miles from the Russian border connected by railroad with Siberia, but not to the south.

Senator CAIN. Racin is therefore within range of your naval gunfire?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. Racin, therefore, could be destroyed as a supply depot which now maintains enemy troops in the field if the decision was made by high authority to destroy it?

Admiral SHERMAN. It could be seriously damaged certainly.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. Well, it has seemed strange to some of us that Racin is permitted, for one reason or another, to be, in itself, so to speak, a sanctuary in the area occupied by our enemy.

FRICTION BETWEEN MAC ARTHUR AND HIGHER AUTHORITIES

Senator CAIN. Admiral Sherman, on page 3583 of the record, I posed this question to General Collins, and I ask your view about the matter, please, sir:

> Is it a reasonable assumption that, prior to the time that Red China entered the Korean War, there was a minimum amount of friction between General MacArthur, the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the President, and all others in authority?

And, General Collins responded:

> Yes, sir. I believe that is a fair statement.

Admiral SHERMAN. I agree with General Collins.

Senator CAIN. Would you, in just a minute, then, Admiral, relate, as best you can recall, the report which probably Generals Collins and Vandenberg made to the other two members of the JCS when they returned from Tokyo in January, after having had some conversations with General MacArthur?

The point involved, sir, is: Did those two generals, when they returned, report any cause, as of the month of January, for continuing friction between our Supreme Commander in the Far East and those in higher authority in this country?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it, sir, most of their report, on their return, had to do with the military situation.

I remember distinctly their very specific comment on the morale of the troops, which they found to be better than we had feared that it might be; and they related their discussions of the situation.

I do not recall anything further than that about their report.

Of course, between the time of their departure and the time of their return, things were looking up in Korea, and, as I remember it, their general report was an optimistic one.

Senator CAIN. And you do not recall that they stated to the other members of the JCS that there was reason to believe that large disagreements continued to prevail, between the JCS, for example, and the commander in Tokyo and Korea?

Admiral SHERMAN. I don't remember any comment on that subject whatever.

COMPARING UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN JET ENGINES

Senator CAIN. Admiral Sherman, I have often heard the Navy jet aircraft engines highly complimented.

May I ask if, in your professional view, you consider those jet engines possessed by the Navy to be comparable in effectiveness to the jet engines now being used by the Russians?

Admiral SHERMAN. I have not, of my own knowledge, any first-hand technical information about the Russian jet engines, other than it was reported to me that certain of the metals used showed considerable technological advances that paralleled an analysis that we had made of metals used in mine cases.

I do know that the fighter that they have in production, and in service, the MIG–15, has a better performance, insofar as speed and rate of climb is concerned, than the jets that we have in service in our aircraft carriers.

On the other hand, we will greatly surpass those two qualities in the new types that will be going into service at the end of this year; and ours, as of now, are better gun platforms, have greater range, and greater combat effectiveness, as shown by the fact that our carrier jets are credited with destroying three MIG–15's and not having received any damage from MIG–15's.

EVACUATION ASSOCIATED WITH RESTRICTIONS

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

On a recent day I posed this question to General Vandenberg:

> Have you ever heard anything said, or have you ever seen any message that said that General MacArthur proposed to evacuate Korea except under conditions which might prevent him from using his maximum power to repel the enemy?

And General Vandenberg's answer was that he had not heard of any request by General MacArthur to evacuate Korea.

Is that your view, sir?

Admiral SHERMAN. Without running through the dispatches to check, it is my impression that all of his comments concerning the evacuation of Korea were always associated with the limiting conditions——

Senator CAIN. The restrictions?

Admiral SHERMAN. The restrictions which he advocated lifting.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

It is my understanding, and I stand to be corrected, obviously, if I am wrong, that on December 29 the JCS sent General MacArthur a message in which the JCS gave their view about the possible need for evacuating Korea, as the question was understood here in this country, and asked General MacArthur's views.

My further understanding is that the message from General MacArthur to the JCS of January 10 was in response to that military message of December 29.

In order to save your time, I would appreciate it, if there is such a message, and I understand it is in code, that you would, at your convenience, paraphrase it out fully for the record so that I might have an opportunity to study it.

Admiral SHERMAN. You are referring now, sir, to any message intervening between 29 and 9——

Senator CAIN. I am referring particularly, sir, to what I understood was a message dated December 29.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I will be glad to look that up.

As I recall, and of course I will check this, that message included in there the statement that from his reports we concluded, or words to that effect.

Senator CAIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. And then I might say that I had previous reports of conferences that the fleet commander out there was called to, as of about the 12th of December, on the Chief of Staff level. It was a very thoroughgoing discussion of the military situation, and I believe General MacArthur's Chief of Staff felt very strongly about it, that they would have to face up to it, that the Chinese Communists could drive them out; and I believe that General Whitney, in that meeting, asked for, or advocated the lifting of restrictions, and was against sending any message which would cause a reaction back here.

NAVY EXPANSION PROGRAM

Senator CAIN. Admiral Sherman, I have understood you to say that the American Navy is today, short of war, battle ready and qualified to carry out its many responsibilities and obligations.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I don't want to be in the position of saying that we are completely ready, that we can't improve, but I do feel that we have made a very great improvement in the past year and that progress we are making is quite satisfactory.

I will feel happier about our situation at sea when we begin to get deliveries on our new jets the latter part of the year and when the expansion program is completed.

Senator Cain. That is to say that you feel that the Navy is presently keeping pace——

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Senator Cain. With the growing complexity of this day.

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Senator Cain. Admiral Sherman, I have understood you to state that, in your opinion, the only real deterrent against aggression is a proper employment of all three of our armed services.

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir. That coupled with the residual capacity of the country.

Senator Cain. Certainly, sir.

BLAIR HOUSE MEETINGS, JUNE 25 AND 26

Admiral Sherman, General Vandenberg testified on page 3943 with reference to the discussions at the Blair House last June. He said this:

> As I recall, the decision was made that somewhere along this line that the satellites were pushing the free world back on their heels every time; somebody had to make a stand somewhere, and the decision was that that was the place to do it.

Was this decision discussed at the Blair House meetings or by the JCS as being a calculated risk?

Admiral Sherman. The discussion to which he probably refers is really two meetings which took place at Blair House—one on the 25th of June, one on the 26th of June—in which various steps were discussed, some decisions made the first evening, others reserved for the second evening; but they all had to do with naval and air action, except for such limited ground elements as were involved in the distribution of supplies.

Senator Cain. And evacuation of our nationals, perhaps.

Admiral Sherman. The directive of the first evening was predicated entirely on naval and air cover south of the thirty-eighth parallel, for the cover of evacuation.

UNITED STATES STATE OF PREPARATION

Senator Cain. If I may put that question in a slightly different way, what difference do you see, Admiral Sherman, between the situation that confronted us in June of 1950, when we apparently had a shoestring Air Force, and a very limited ground strength, and the situation that faces us today when we possess a powerful Navy, a powerful Air Force, and a much larger and more effective Army?

Admiral Sherman. Well, sir, I believe our military position vis-à-vis our possible enemies is greatly improved as compared with a year ago.

It is true that certain of our forces are engaged in the fighting in Korea, but our over-all situation, outside of those forces, is very much better.

Senator Cain. I asked that question, sir, because so much of the testimony points out that we must be extraordinarily cautious in our dealings with our enemy because we are not prepared to take the war to our enemy.

The fact is that last June we were much less prepared than we are today, and I continue to be curious concerning what we were thinking about in terms of calculated risks and hazards last June when we had so little, very little, to work for us, Admiral.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time is up, Senator. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral SHERMAN. I was going to say, of course, the initial commitment of June 25 and 26 had to do only with naval and air forces, and there was no commitment of a large ground force.

Senator CAIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis? Senator Stennis passed on his last time.

Senator Flanders?

(No response.)

Senator Long?

(No response.)

Senator Gillette?

RED CHINESE ENTRANCE IN KOREAN WAR

Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman and Admiral Sherman, unfortunately for me I was unable to be here yesterday, and I am reluctant to ask questions which in all probability have been covered, but there are two or three questions that I should like to ask that I think will be helpful to me.

[Deleted.]

Senator GILLETTE. On another subject, Admiral Sherman, when General MacArthur addressed the joint session of Congress, he stated, referring to the period last November when we had advanced the farthest north, that:

> Our victory was complete. We had hurled back the invaders and dissipated his forces. Our objectives were within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and a situation not contemplated.

Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I agree with all of it except the "not contemplated," because that becomes a question of the meaning of the word "contemplate."

I will say this. I had worried about it for a long while, ever since I first heard that the army opposite Formosa was moving into Manchuria, and in October we captured Chinese prisoners and we had in early November, there was a time when General MacArthur was asking to bomb the Yalu bridges because thousands of Chinese were pouring down through Antung and Sinuiju. Our morning reports had trucks bumper to bumper, so I had worried about it.

Senator GILLETTE. Well, I am glad indeed that you made that answer because I had been seriously disturbed over a statement of that kind in view of known facts. For instance, you will recall that early last year when Mao went to Moscow for those conferences, there was announced one treaty and undoubtedly there are other secret arrangements. In that treaty the purpose was stated to be an attempt to unify their efforts to prevent a revival of Japanese aggression, and in addition it was announced that as a provision of the treaty the Soviet Union was allowed to use Chinese bases for 3 years.

Certainly it would be a reasonable implication to deduce from that that there was some changed condition to be contemplated at the end of 3 years with reference to Japan to deprive her of her power of aggression, possibly that she become Communist through internal revolution or through some military effort. Other implications could be drawn in view of the fact you just stated that it was known the troops were being sent north for a build-up across the border, and that the troops were coming into North Korea. In view of all of those things it seemed to me little short of fatuous to assume—and I was hoping that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not assume—that they could contemplate some military action of that sort. Do you care to comment on that?

Admiral SHERMAN. You will recall here was an exchange of dispatches in November, along in the middle of November about how far north United States troops should be sent. There was a hope that we would stop on some advantageous position short of the border because it was evident that this build-up was taking place in Manchuria, that there had been considerable movement into the border areas inside North Korea, and we felt that we had to proceed very cautiously.

Senator GILLETTE. That is reassuring because it indicated to me as a layman when that statement was made, that there was either deplorable lack of intelligence or an inexcusable failure to evaluate intelligence. It is reassuring to have you make that statement.

I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

MAKING COMMITTEE ARRANGEMENTS

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster. Pardon me, Senator, before you start with your examination.

Gentlemen, it would be very helpful to the Chair if the Senators would indicate about the length of time that they think they will require, so that I might make arrangements for an afternoon session of the committee.

I cannot be here this afternoon, and I will have to notify Senator Connally in order that he might be here to preside if we cannot conclude by around 1 o'clock. Do you have any idea about the length of time your examination will take?

Senator SPARKMAN. I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GILLETTE. I am through.

Senator SMITH. I have no more.

Senator STENNIS. I will waive altogether if that is necessary to get through at 1 o'clock.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am not pressing you, Senator.

Senator STENNIS. I know.

Chairman RUSSELL. I am trying to make arrangements for Senator Connally to be here this afternoon.

Senator STENNIS. I won't take over 2 minutes if you get to me.

Senator CAIN. I wish only to have the admiral enlarge upon one question I asked him, and I would assume that will take but several minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think you can conclude in fifteen minutes?

Senator CAIN. Oh, in several minutes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster, have you any indication as to the time?

PRECEDENTS FOR A NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator Brewster. Well, I am limited to 15 minutes, and I have not occupied any time, so I am sure that I will not encroach.

Chairman Russell. All right, sir, proceed then.

Senator Brewster. I want also to say the fact that I have not been able to be here these two preceding days will, I hope, not involve me in repetition. I have gone over the record as well as I could both through the press and through what I have examined here. There are certain aspects of matters which have not been gone into as extensively as I would like to.

Chairman Russell. I am not trying to in anywise curtail you. I was merely seeking information so I would know what plans to make for the afternoon.

Senator Brewster. I am so enthusiastic for an adequate presentation of the significance of naval blockade that I would almost be ready to settle on that basis.

It was very refreshing to have the historic significance of sea power so adequately presented. I think it must have had a profund impact on the committee as well as on the country.

Is it not true, Admiral, that historically we have learned much of the profound significance of sea power in blockade upon military operations through the military traditions of the British?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir; but also prior to the recent build-up of our Navy just before World War II the only preceding time that we had the largest Navy in the world was when he had operated for 4 years in blockade of one of the largest coastlines in the world, and in that we had a great deal of experience and built up a considerable background of precedent, law, and understanding of the matter.

RECOMMENDING UN NAVAL BLOCKADE

I may say that on last summer, around the 30th of June after I had recommended establishing a United Nations naval blockade of Korea, I sent for the proclamations issued between 1861 and 1865 and I was amazed at the great mass of records that we had in the Navy Department in connection with the blockade.

Senator Brewster. And did you continue to recommend and urge the institution of the naval blockade by the United Nations as the most effective means of curtailing the military potential of the Chinese Communist forces?

Admiral Sherman. I have been giving long consideration to it, and since we achieved the step of the economic blockade. the agreement in the United Nations about 10 days ago, I have been again raising the question and urging a United Nations naval blockade as the next logical step.

Senator Brewster. I note that on page 4003 you said, according to the record:

> The fact is that our allies have been unwilling to join in a naval blockade of China and have been slow to establish a tight economic blockade.

That is the end of the quotation. The clear implication of that is that we have been urging such action.

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir. There was discussion of that with our principal naval ally in mid-January.

Senator **Brewster**. And do you have any question that the more quickly that could be accomplished, the more quickly we should curtail very greatly the Chinese military potential?

Admiral **Sherman**. It is the most effective way that I can see of putting pressure on them without engaging in hostilities and attacking the Chinese people with weapons.

Senator **Brewster**. It is also saving a great many American lives to the extent that it is effective in crippling their military supplies.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

SHIPPING THROUGH ARCTIC CIRCLE

Senator **Brewster**. I was interested also, Admiral, in your comments about the trans-Siberian railway about which I had earlier inquired of General Bradley. He spoke in that connection of the transit from Russia by the Arctic Circle at certain periods. Now, how extended a time can they run ships along that Arctic Circle?

Admiral **Sherman**. Very few months of the year, sir.

Senator **Brewster**. Not over 2 or 3 months?

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, I would have guessed probably about 2 months.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

Admiral **Sherman**. And the extent of it is exceedingly limited.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

You have made it clear, I believe, that you have no question as to our power to control the seas around Japan and Korea under any conditions you can anticipate?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir. I believe we can control the sea in that vicinity.

[Deleted]

CAPACITY OF TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

Senator **Brewster**. What is the capacity of the Siberian railway? I think General Bradley said 17,000 tons a month—I should say a day.

Admiral **Sherman**. The figure that I was given was 17,000 tons a day; and I have an idea that that is probably a little on the high side as far as an average goes. I should think in the wintertime they might find a little difficulty with that.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes; and that also anticipates no interference of any character with their operations by an outside force——

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Brewster** (continuing). To which they are very vulnerable.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Brewster**. So that General MacArthur's statement to us was that in the event of any major conflict developing in the Orient, the Russian military potential would decline steadily from the first day as a result of the transport difficulties. Is that correct?

Admiral **Sherman**. I should expect it to, Senator.

PETROLEUM AS KEY TO MODERN WAR

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

It is the fact, is it not, that petroleum supplies are almost the key to modern war, both on land and on the sea, is it not?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator **Brewster**. I heard a statement that 60 percent of our transit across the Atlantic during the Second World War were petroleum products. Do you have some such figure in mind?

Admiral **Sherman**. That sounds about right to me, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator **Brewster**. They have no adequate resources of petroleum in the Far East nor of refining facilities to handle them, do they?

Admiral **Sherman**. Not sufficient, sir.

[Deleted.]

SOVEREIGNTY OF DAIREN AND PORT ARTHUR

Senator **Brewster**. Yes. Now on the sovereignty of Dairen and Port Arthur, I have been looking at the secret agreement at Yalta and the Sino-Soviet agreement regarding it, to which you refer. Do you consider that under the provisions of those two agreements Dairen and Port Arthur are not under Chinese sovereignty?

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, sir, my people who have studied the matter advise me that there is a good case that they are under Chinese sovereignty; but, on the other hand, the facts of life are that the Russians are in occupation and control of them.

Senator **Brewster**. I think that is very interesting. As I read it, it seemed to me that they clearly and repeatedly reiterated that they did not challenge the sovereignty of the Chinese Government over these ports.

It is very interesting and important if the Russian assertion is not in accordance with international law, which would affect this question of blockade, would it not?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir. Along about 1946, you will recall we had difficulty maintaining our consulate representatives or State Department representatives in Dairen.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes. I know when I flew over there in 1946 they advised us to keep a few miles away from Dairen and Port Arthur or we would get shot down as we were going to Korea, although there was no warrant of any character in international law for any such attitude or action with American military planes.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes.

Senator **Brewster**. That was clearly in violation of all existing rights in their assertion. Is that correct?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes. Well, I think that they are in de facto occupation.

Senator **Brewster**. Yes.

Admiral **Sherman**. That would be an item in the blockade.

UNITED STATES CONTROL OF THE SEAS

Senator **Brewster**. Is it not the case that perhaps the most significant development in international relations in the last decade has been the recognition by the British that the control of the seas must in large measure be passed on to the United States?

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, I believe that is one of the significant developments in the world situation, that we are now the greatest sea power, and that many of the responsibilities in the world that used to be taken by the British Navy now, of necessity, fall to the United States Navy.

Senator BREWSTER. Is it not true that the development of the British Empire in the last century and the maintenance of the Pax Britannica, which kept peace in the world was due in almost entire measure to the prudent and possible exercise of British sea power?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; British sea power constituted the element which permitted the British to display force and use force with a great deal of mobility. Of course, in the modern world, the similar military function involving the use of mobile forces includes aircraft, both naval aircraft and Air Force aircraft.

Senator BREWSTER. That has been the change that has come but the fact remains that transport must still primarily depend upon the sea.

COMPARISON BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD TONNAGE

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and if I may take time, I would like to read a fragment which I picked up the other day which I think is very interesting.

In 1949 the United States railroads, serving an area only about one-third the size of Russia, moved 680 billion ton-miles of freight and could have handled more. The Soviet system was operating virtually at full capacity, moving 330 billion tons.

Senator STENNIS. That is railroads?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. Now, at sea the free nations are connected by 3,500 United States ships with a gross tonnage of 26 million, 7,500 West European ships with a gross tonnage of 42 million; the Communist world has less than 1,000 ships totaling less than 3 million gross tons.

In other words, we have 23 times as much tonnage in the free world as there is in the Communist world at sea. The situation on shore, as far as transportation goes, indicates the importance of sea communications, their use and their control.

Senator BREWSTER. The British have come frankly to recognize that their current resources and responsibilities would not permit them to continue the maintenance of a navy adequate for the exercise of the powers they formerly employed.

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that is correct, sir. I don't believe that the British economy would support a military establishment which would include a navy the size of ours.

NAVAL AIRCRAFT, 1938

Senator BREWSTER. I was interested in your comments on the advent of the Air as it was in 1938, I think, the General Board of the Navy recommended the limitation on naval aircraft to 3,000.

Do you recall that episode? I believe you did not concur.

Admiral SHERMAN. I nonconcurred. I became a naval aviator in 1922, and I have been for the expansion of naval aviation.

Senator BREWSTER. That is one episode that always intrigued me, as I was responsible for striking that amendment out of the supply bill at that time, so that naval aircraft would be unlimited. It has been very gratifying to see the recognition of the joint part which the Navy and the Air can play.

Admiral SHERMAN. We are very grateful for your help, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think that is a good place to advise you your time on this round has expired, Senator Brewster.

There is no need of my calling all these names. Senator Green, did you have any questions?

Senator GREEN. I would like to ask one question.

NAVAL AND AIR COMMITMENTS REGARDING KOREA

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon me. I will switch to this table under my system. Senator Cain.

Senator CAIN. A few minutes ago we were discussing the Blair House meetings——

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes.

Senator CAIN. In late June. You indicated that at those meetings only the commitments of air and naval units were discussed.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator CAIN. I merely wish the record to support your feeling of the matter with these several sentences from the President. On June 27, 1950, the President said:

> In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

In the same message he related:

> Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.

AUTHORIZING GROUND FORCES IN KOREA

Then on June 30 in a statement the President said this, or it was said:

> The President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in northern Korea wherever militarily necessary and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground forces.

All of this indicates that there wasn't a seeming likelihood in late June that the United States and her allies would soon be heavily engaged on the ground in Korea. Is that a fair reconstruction of the situation of that day, Admiral Sherman?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; that is true, and that situation continued until the night June 29 to 30, and then, as indicated in this record on page 11, General MacArthur made a reconnaissance of the battle area where the South Korean Army was fighting; and he sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that the only assurance of holding the Han River line and to regain lost ground would be through the commitment of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area.

In that message he stated his intention, if authorized, to move a United States regimental combat team to the combat area in Korea as the nucleus of a possible build-up of two divisions for early offensive action.

Then, as I recall it, General Collins telephoned to me at 5:30 in the morning to tell me that that message had come in, that there had been a teletype conference between him and General MacArthur, as a result of which and as indicated in this document furnished the committee, authority to move the regimental combat team to the combat zone was secured from the President by the Chief of Staff of the Army through the Secretary of the Army and General MacArthur was informed of this authority and told he would be advised about the build-up later.

Senator CAIN. The JCS must have been meeting rather constantly at that period.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

CONSIDERATIONS OF JUNE 30, 1950

Senator CAIN. Were the JCS giving consideration to the likelihood that what had begun as a very small undertaking was likely to become enlarged into a general war within Korea?

One reason I ask the question, Admiral, is that I should think that all of your education and your training would disincline you to any commitment of ground forces against Asiatics in Asia; and I wanted to ask what sort of advice you might have given as of that day and what the other members of the JCS were thinking about in terms of the future or were things happening so rapidly that there just wasn't time to consider these long-range possibilities?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, things were certainly happening rapidly on the 30th of June.

Senator CAIN. They were indeed, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. The decision had been taken on the recommendation of General MacArthur, who was on the spot. I had some apprehensions about it, and in the following days I felt that the decision was a sound one, it was unavoidable, but I was fully aware of the hazards involved in fighting Asiatics on the Asiatic mainland, which is something that, as a naval officer, I have grown up to believe should be avoided if possible.

I remember talking about this thing with the Secretary of Defense, then Louis Johnson, in August, expressing my view that if we possibly could, sooner or later we should get out of the business of fighting on the Asiatic mainland, because even then we could see as of August 15 we were pretty far south——

Senator CAIN. You were indeed, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. And it was perfectly obvious that if we were not going to drain off a good many resources in the Far East, we would have to find ways and means of terminating that type of operation, which, if intervention took place from either Russia or China, could get to be a long process, absorbing a great deal of our military potential.

RISKS OF INVOLVEMENT ON SIBERIAN FRONTIER

Senator CAIN. I thank you, sir.

Would you help me just once more. Would you state in very brief fashion the military reasons, if there are those reasons, why Rashin, as an enemy supply source should not be destroyed.

Admiral SHERMAN. The military reason was that we felt that the risks of involvement on the Siberian frontier were unduly large with relation to the return that would be gotten from destroying an installation which is really part of what you might almost call the Vladivostok complex.

The Russians had an agreement to use Rashin; did use it at times, since the war, and at the time that the restriction was imposed, it was imposed against the background that we had had violations of Soviet territory and Chinese territory by our aircraft who were sent off to work along the border in these difficult areas.

We had the embarrassing instance of one of my naval aircrafts, which had gotten across the border, and that made us reluctant to undertake an operation of that sort in that location if it was not necessary.

[Deleted.]

Senator CAIN. Admiral Sherman, you have taught me much, sir, during these last several days, and again I bespeak my appreciation.

Admiral SHERMAN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Green, you said you had a question?

Senator GREEN. Yes.

SHERMAN OPPOSES "GOING IT ALONE"

Admiral Sherman, yesterday; when I had the privilege of questioning you, I drew attention to the proposal of General MacArthur to bomb the coastal cities of China, and establish a naval blockade, and the fact that when I had questioned him on that subject, I asked him whether he would, if he could not get the consent of his allies, go it alone. He said, Yes, alone.

I asked you whether you agreed with that statement, and you said, "no"; and I asked you if you knew of any of the military authorities with whom you deal, who agreed with it, and you said, "no."

But notwithstanding those statements, both the newspapers this morning and some radio commentators stated in headlines, that you agreed with General MacArthur, and so it occurred to me that I had better ask you why neither you nor any of the other military authorities with whom you had dealings, disagree.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I would be glad to have the occasion for again repeating that I am opposed on military grounds to getting involved in a war alone with Communist China.

I think it is extremely important that we not get—let ourselves become involved in such a war for two reasons: First, the military aspects and, secondly, after all we have gone through since last June to support a policy of operating under the United Nations, the last thing I would think we would want to do now is to do something which is not sound from a military point of view, and which would immediately throw this United Nations arrangement overboard at that time.

I am definitely opposed to going it alone in operating against China.

Senator GREEN. Well, let us hope that this statement today won't be misrepresented as the ones of yesterday were. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis, you said you had a couple of questions.

ECONOMIC BLOCKADE RELATIVE TO NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator STENNIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Sherman, I have heard it said here that if an economic blockade is imposed on China, that that makes a naval blockade question almost academic.

Now, that was the substance of the thought here to some answers given. I have not had the benefit of all of your testimony, but I strongly conclude from your ideas that that is incorrect, in your opinion.

We could still have an effective—rather effective—United Nations economic blockade now—and now take it up there and give us the reasons for the necessity of a naval blockade, too.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, the economic blockade, as it is now arranged, involves having certain countries of their own volition stop sending certain things.

Now, after that is done, and we see where we stand, the question will arise as to how important is the traffic which continues. We have had one or two countries which have announced that they would not be bound by it anyway, that they would trade with whom they wished; and the language of what is to be stopped is very flexible, and if we find that that procedure is not effective, then the only recourse we have left is to call on our allies to join with us in cutting off trade by sea with Communist China which, I believe, would be quite effective.

Senator STENNIS. Of course, that would still leave the connection there with Russia on the mainland, and all?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. But you do think that the plans ought to be carried right on to try to perfect this naval blockade through the United Nations?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. If that should continue on unabated?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, that is the next step.

Senator STENNIS. Yes, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. I think the time has come to get started on it.

CONTEMPLATED USE OF NATIONALIST TROOPS

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

With reference to the use of these Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa, I never have understood exactly just what is meant by the contemplated use of those troops.

I understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought they were not strong enough as offensive troops in Korea or as offensive troops into China, without our material support, is that correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir; and the people who have gone out there, including General MacArthur, up to a certain date, advised us to that effect.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Admiral SHERMAN. More recently, with the increased need for troops in Korea, there has obviously been a change of mind in the headquarters of the Far East, and at the same time, the program for improving the condition of the forces on Formosa has not had an opportunity to become effective, so there is a question of judgment there, and being a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the least direct experience with ground forces, I am really the worst possible judge of it.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. But on this proposition of logistical support now, to put them over there on the mainland of China, you were just touching on that when I came in yesterday, and I did not get the benefit of all of it.

CONFINES OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, I believe what I was coming to and commenting on was generally to the effect that logistic support in terms of furnishing them supplies would be one thing.

Now, if anyone, in talking about logistic support, means that we would move them with our ships from Formosa to the mainland, then they are contemplating an amphibious operation that I don't know how to conduct where the troops fight and the ships don't, and if the ships fight——

Senator **Stennis**. That is my point. How could we do that without involving our soldiers as well as the naval forces on the mainland of China? That is the point I have not understood.

Admiral **Sherman**. I don't think we could, sir. I think that logistic support must be confined to delivering to Formosa supplies that are needed, including putting their forces in such shape that they do the rest; they carry on all the obligations.

Senator **Stennis**. That they navigate themselves across the water.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Stennis**. I wanted your opinion on it.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Chairman **Russell**. Do you have any other questions, Senator Brewster?

MAKING ECONOMIC BLOCKADE EFFECTIVE

Senator **Brewster**. Yes, I do.

If the Chinese Government has sovereignty over all of Manchuria, as provided in the Sino-Soviet agreements, would that not permit the institution of a naval blockade against such a port so far as international law is concerned?

Admiral **Sherman**. Technically, I should think yes, sir; but practically, I think that the point would be difficult to sustain.

Senator **Brewster**. Well, I am speaking purely from a legal standpoint. I realize the actions which the Russians have taken there, of course, are a wholesale violation of all their agreements, both with us and the Chinese; but in international law we would still have a fairly firm ground on which to stand.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Brewster**. You emphasized on page 4,011:

> However, in my opinion, our allies can still do much more to make an economic blockade effective.

That is, the economic sanctions we have talked of; and you went on:

> For the foregoing reasons I still hope that we can prevail upon our allies to join in an effective United Nations commercial and naval blockade of the ports of the declared aggressor and as a sanction short of war as contemplated by articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter.

Is there concurrence among your associates, both in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department and the White House as to the very great desirability of moving on to this next step of a naval blockade?

Admiral **Sherman**. I would say that, as of this time, there is full concurrence on getting on with the economic blockade——

Senator **Brewster**. Economic sanctions.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir; economic sanctions.

Senator BREWSTER. Which is a more proper term, isn't it, than blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and making them as effective as possible.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral SHERMAN. But, it would be my feeling that they should be followed by the more complete action.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you feel that there will still be sufficient holes left in the situation, doing the best we can hope for under economic sanctions, which would make the imposition of a naval blockade by the concurrence of our allies very desirable?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is my judgment, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And you haven't, have you, been able to sell that completely to your associates in our Government?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I have not made any very vigorous attempt, because this other operation has only been completed just recently; and I have informed my colleagues in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and associates in the State Department, that I felt that this was the next thing.

ALLIES AGREE TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Senator BREWSTER. Now why, in your opinion, did our allies finally, after 6 months, agree to the economic sanctions?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I think there are a number of factors.

One of them is the initiation of this hearing, and the public discussion of the problems in the Far East.

Senator BREWSTER. I hope the chairman will take note of that comment.

Admiral SHERMAN. Another is the growing realization of the situation, the continued activity of our State Department, and the general realization of the people in some of these other countries as to the matters involved.

Senator BREWSTER. The temper of the American people is being profoundly affected, is it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and, of course, as I recall it, there were some very convincing speeches made in London.

Senator BREWSTER. In other words, our allies have come to recognize that the American public is increasingly concerned over measures which are involved in the sacrifice of our sons?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And I assume that there are a variety of forms of persuasion that can and are used in international intercourse to persuade our allies to cooperate.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

YALTA AGREEMENT REGARDING CHIANG'S CONCURRENCE

Senator BREWSTER. I call attention to the provision of the Yalta Agreemen which is recited on page 1818 of volume 10 of our record and to this clause in that agreement, which says:

> It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

Do you know whether or not that provision regarding the undertaking of President Roosevelt to secure the concurrence has been called to the attention of President Truman, as to whether or not he might emulate his distinguished predecessor in persuading our allies to be somewhat more cooperative both in what we are doing in Korea and in the measures that seem desirable to save the sacrifice of life?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I have no knowledge of that situation.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you are familiar with the provision?

Admiral SHERMAN. I am familiar with the provisions of the Yalta Agreement.

Senator BREWSTER. You do not know just what the measures were that then President Roosevelt thought he might take in order to see—as it says there "in order to obtain this concurrence"?

Admiral SHERMAN. No.

Senator BREWSTER. Obviously we were giving aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at that time, and for that reason possessed some power of persuasion.

Admiral SHERMAN. That might be what was in his mind, but I really have no knowledge of what was intended.

Senator BREWSTER. And we are now proposing $8½ billion in military aid to Europe to these same allies. To what extent would it be prudent or proper to take into account considerations of this character in persuading them to be somewhat more cooperative?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir; that is a matter which is outside my responsibilities. But I believe that there is a greater willingness to cooperate among our allies than sometimes seems on the surface to be the case. Like the many other of our endeavors, it takes a good deal of doing.

Senator BREWSTER. It is easier to be philosophical here about it than it is over in Korea, I assume.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That is something I think that probably impressed itself greatly on General MacArthur when the boys are there.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SPAIN

One other question I have about the part of Spain. Have you at any time expressed any opinion as to the strategic significance of Spain in our operations in the Mediterranean?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. In discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in my general conversations, I have always pointed out the strategic importance of Spain in connection with the Mediterranean.

Senator BREWSTER. Is there any government in Europe with which you are familiar that is less penetrated or affected by Communist influences than the Government of Spain?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, my visits to Spain have been extremely limited, but such as they were, I was impressed with the fact that the Government seems to be in pretty tight control. On the other hand, they have had recently some labor disturbances, and to what degree that may be indicative of lack of control of the elements that were supposed to have been placed under control, I don't know. I think there is a good deal of internal tension in Spain.

Senator BREWSTER. Perhaps my question was not sufficiently clear. It was with regard to the Government itself. The episode to which you speak indicates some unrest, but as far as the Government itself is concerned, is there any government in Europe which would be nearer the top of the list for Soviet elimination if they had the power?

Admiral SHERMAN. No; I think not. It is the only government which has established itself by defeating a Communist government.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. And the very survival of that regime is dependent upon there not being Soviet domination of Europe. Is that not a fair assumption?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think that is true, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. If there were any government in Europe which would wish to cooperate in curtailing the expansion of Soviet power, it would be that Govenrment; would it not?

Admiral SHERMAN. I am not so sure about the degree of cooperation or the manner of cooperation.

Here, again, I have looked at Spain through the eyes of a sailor charged with responsibility in the Mediterranean. As to the political situation in Spain, I am not as well-informed as I would like to be.

I do feel that Spain, the Spanish Government, is definitely and strongly committed against communism.

Senator BREWSTER. And the mutual defense pact between the United States and Spain might be one method of bringing their potential contribution into the general problem with which we are faced?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; it would.

Senator BREWSTER. If the territory of Spain were under the control of Communist influence or sympathizers, would operations in the Mediterranean be very practicable?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, they would be made much more difficult.

Senator BREWSTER. Could you go by the Straits of Gibraltar with any security if there were Communist control in Spain?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, it would depend upon the strength of their air force, the military establishment.

Senator BREWSTER. One other question. The assumption I think is general that because Russia is so largely a land power, that naval power would not be as significant in any development. Is it not true that under the complex mechanism of modern war, the intricacies of all the requirements, that even so great a land power as Russia is still dependent upon many strategic materials not readily available to it?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, Russia has need of many things from outside her periphery, and very importantly for materials such as petroleum products which come from places not very far inside the periphery.

DO THE RUSSIANS WANT A GENERAL WAR?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now a certain naval person has stated—and his opinion is entitled to high respect—that the reason the Russions do not move now is because of the lack of adequate atomic power. Do you concur in that opinion?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. I think that the reason why the Russians have not initiated a general war is more fundamental than that. In the first place, I am not convinced that they want a general war.

I am not convinced that they do not see a way to achieve domination without general war, and as I stated yesterday, I believe that the great deterrent against a greater war is the respect that the Russians have for the residual powers of this country.

Senator BREWSTER. That is our industrial potential.

Admiral SHERMAN. Industrial, military potential, the over-all power of this country which is the greatest in the world.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator Brewster. Senator Kefauver?

UN NAVAL COMMAND, KOREA

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, I find that most of the questions that I had in mind asking have already been asked, but I do want to say, Admiral Sherman, that I think you have made a very valuable contribution to the committee, and I pay you a very high compliment for the forthrightness in which you have given us information and for the excellent statements that you have made.

I believe that one matter that has not been covered, Admiral Sherman, is the method of command between the American Navy and the other United Nations countries that are making a contribution to the naval part of the conflict in Korea.

How is that arranged? What is the method of United Nations command?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, under the commander in chief, United Nations forces in Korea, originally General MacArthur, now General Ridgway, there is a United Nations naval commander, Vice Admiral Joy, who within the United States Navy is our comamnder, naval forces Far East, is the commander of the United Nations naval forces operating and assisting in Korea.

He has under his control the British, French, Dutch, Siamese and others and also under him and receiving a great deal of support from him are the naval forces of the Republic of Korea.

As far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, he is responsible to General Ridgway, General Ridgway is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

His naval responsibilities as an American naval commander, are to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Radford; and Admiral Radford is, in turn, responsible to me.

That arrangement permits Admiral Radford to make available to Admiral Joy, what he needs, from all over the Pacific, decentralizes our naval administration, and also permits Admiral Radford to go out and see what is needed, and inform me, if necessary, so that my communication with Admiral Joy has been limited to the extent that I could get out there; but I have had Admiral Radford as an intervening echelon of command, and it has proved a very sound arrangement.

Senator KEFAUVER. From the scant information I have about the subject, I think that the American Navy, under you, and the other UN contributions, have been handled awfully well, and the command has been very good, for a joint purpose.

I do take it that you would feel that over a long pull, and contemplating the possibility of some larger operations, that there should be a lot of consideration given to a better political backing and direction, in which all of the nations can have a fuller participation for the direction, not only of the Navy, but the other elements of our armed services, is that correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

ALLIED NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN KOREA

Senator KEFAUVER. And there has been so much said, by way of criticism of our allies, about the contributions that they are making.

It was very gratifying to hear, and read, in your colloquy with Senator Sparkman, that you felt, considering everything, and the requests that had been made upon our allies for naval assistance, that you were well satisfied with what they were doing, is that correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and in amplification of that, I would like to say that as far as I know, we have anticipated all of the needs of the Far East Command for naval forces.

I think the only thing that General MacArthur ever asked for that he was not provided immediately, was when he asked for a full Marine division, and we had to wait until we could assemble one.

As far as I know, Admiral Joy has every ship that he wants. That is one of the reasons why we have not felt it necessary, from a military point of view, to ask other countries to assemble a larger naval force.

Politically, it is considered desirable to have as many different countries make contributions as can. For example, we have one Siamese frigate, and one Colombian frigate, and the small navies have been quite willing to participate in that manner.

Senator KEFAUVER. Didn't you say, in answer to a question of Senator Sparkman, that the First Lord of the Admiralty, I forget his name, offered some additional ships, or fleets, and you didn't want it?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Lord Fraser, through his representative here, sent word to me, and he also talked to me about it, that they stood ready to increase their naval contribution, but that if they did so, it would have to be subtracted from the deployments elsewhere; and under those circumstances I felt it better not to weaken their other deployments.

Senator KEFAUVER. It seemed to me, Admiral Sherman, that rather than play up all the time what we feel is the lack of contribution by our allies, we should take into consideration that, as to troops, they have commitments that we do not have, like Indochina and other countries where they do have some commitments; and also that we should let the American people know more about the good part of the contributions that they are making, so as to try to lessen this tension that seems to be growing all the time, on both sides of the Atlantic.

Don't you agree with that?

Admiral SHERMAN. I do, sir.

I saw, the other day, a mathematical analysis of the contribution of forces under arms, potential reserves, and so on, of our allies which, to me, was surprising because it indicated that in that relationship, what they were doing was much greater than it would appear at first glance.

Senator KEFAUVER. In any event, you are satisfied with the naval contribution——

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator **Kefauver**. That is being made?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF UN MILITARY COMMAND ORGANIZATION

Senator **Kefauver**. Admiral Sherman, have you made any progress or has any effort been made to have an over-all UN military command, or army command, or a navy command, in the United Nations so that as to General Eisenhower in Europe, and as to our operation in the Pacific and General Ridgway's operation in Korea, that there can be some more satisfactory method for United Nations direction of these operations?

I do not mean more satisfactory; I mean with a broader political base.

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, sir, there has not been much done on that. Of course, General Eisenhower's responsibilities come back to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In other words, he——

Senator **Kefauver**. Reports to the Council of Twelve?

Admiral **Sherman**. Well, he reports to the standing group, the group which is the military group here in Washington representing the three largest powers.

The membership of the standing group is British, French, and American.

The difficulty about a United Nations military command organization is that the military committee of the United Nations is representative of the members of the Security Council, and the Security Council includes at least one country which is, to put it mildly, uncooperative.

Senator **Kefauver**. So as it is presently set up, it is very difficult to get a military command out of the United Nations which would be altogether on the side which we are concerned about.

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

RECOMMENDING MAC ARTHUR'S REMOVAL

Senator **Kefauver**. Admiral Sherman, there is one other question—I think it has been made clear, but I did want to ask it again.

As I understand your testimony, you had been considerably concerned not about General MacArthur's technical efficiency—because we all recognize that he is technically a great general and one of the world's greatest military leaders and geniuses—but that prior to April 5 you had been concerned about his not going along or believing in the policies of the Chiefs of Staff in the conduct of operations in Korea and had felt that something, one way or another, would have to be done about that; is that correct?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes.

Senator **Kefauver**. That was prior to April 5?

Admiral **Sherman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Kefauver**. And in your discussion with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did you find that was also their view?

Admiral **Sherman**. Well——

Senator **Kefauver**. They have spoken here for themselves, of course.

Admiral **Sherman**. I don't think we ever faced up to the problem by saying something had to be done about it, but certainly we were all conscious of the problem we were dealing with. Different things would happen. Sometimes it would be disconcerting, sometimes mildly annoying, and then other times it would be merely a dispatch which would call for again trying to issue a directive that would set matters straight.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then you were notified that on April 5, by telephone call from General Bradley, I believe, that the matter was going to be brought to a climax; is that correct?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. We were informed that there would be a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and we met and at that meeting General Bradley indicated to us that the question of General MacArthur's removal was under consideration; and we were probably going to be asked our views and that we should be thinking about it.

Senator KEFAUVER. At that meeting—I want to get this clear—you did not get the impression that a decision had already been made, but you were told that the matter was up for consideration and your views would be desired?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. And on that basis you jointly recommended that he be relieved of his command?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. We discussed the matter, various comments were made, and then at a later time we were asked individually by General Marshall for our military opinion as to whether or not he should be replaced in his command. We gave those opinions individually, we did not initiate a recommendation.

Senator KEFAUVER. You gave your individual opinions?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then subsequently, following that, he was relieved of his command.

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. Those individual opinions—were they opinions that were in the nature of recommendations that you felt that militarily he should be relieved?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir, just about that form.

Senator KEFAUVER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL.

[Deleted.]

MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

Is that being handled on Navy ships or is that in ships that belong to the shipping companies?

Admiral SHERMAN. It is both, sir. The military sea transportation service doesn't have the capacity to carry on an active operation like this and some of the requirements are met—of course, our own ships are used to capacity—some are met by charter, and some by loading of ordinary steamers.

Chairman RUSSELL. I don't suppose you can give us an approximation of what is carried in strictly Navy bottoms.

Admiral SHERMAN. The greater part of that tonnage is being handled in commercial shipping. We obtain that through the Maritime Commission when we charter, and when we just contract loads and so on, that is done, I believe, with a straight-out contract with the Navy Department and the contractor.

Chairman Brewster. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. I would like to call the attention of the Admiral to the fact that we find in the paper we have twice protested Russian actions in Dairen as in conflict with their agreements, so that we have refused to recognize their assertion of power over that port.

Admiral Sherman. I was sure that was our technical position.

Chairman Russell. Admiral, I wish to add my compliments to those expressed on your testimony here, and I am sure it has been of great assistance to the committee.

We are all proud of the days of wooden ships and iron men, as being a very proud part of American tradition, but in these days the Navy utilizes technological developments of this modern age to the fullest extent. I, for one, am very proud of the fact that we today have the most powerful Navy afloat.

We are in a position now to utilize seapower to the maximum extent. I suppose Admiral Mahan—wasn't he the man who wrote the famous book on the application of seapower?

Admiral Sherman. Yes, sir.

Chairman Russell. That in the Valhalla of warriors of the past he must be rejoicing as he looks down and sees you carrying on with a Navy of the proportions that we enjoy today.

Your appearance here, sir, has been reassuring to me, as has that of the other Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the great ability and devoted patriotism and high integrity of the men who are in charge of our armed services in this very critical part of our history.

I thank you, sir, for your appearance.

Senator Brewster. I want to add it is gratifying to have emphasis on the fact that we do not need to be entirely afraid. I have felt as though that note had been recurring a little too often.

To hear the Admiral express confidence that America does still possess power and can exercise it, I think, is reassuring to the American people.

Chairman Russell. I agree with you. The committee stands in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:29 p. m. the committees recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m. Friday June 1, 1951.)

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